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Respect for Reason as a Reason of Law and Morality in the World Some Anotation to Kant's Conception of Worldcitizenship

Abstract

The background of the study is set on the analysis of Kant's idea of worldcitizenship in empire of human rationality, which he sees as world of academic liberty, authority of reason and equality of actors. Author of this study tries to focus an attention on basic idea of Kantian morality – on Respect to moral law giver. He shows that in Kant's conception is the law giver only the critical reason. This moment allows Kant to create authonomous morality in which is law giver, actor and judge the same. Reason in each from these persons is the same like in each rational being. So Kant discovered proof of equality as a condition of universal morality.

The second moment of Kantian morality is duty of logical consistency (respect of rationality to reason in everybody). Because the rationality is universal, we must respect Reason in each man and it gives the dignity to each. Equality and the duty of respect to another is a main idea of Kant's conception of of worldcitizenship.

At the end of study author shows phyziocratic source of worldcitizenship from Kant's point of view. He analyses typical idea of Freedom as a condition of morality in the polemic with Kant's idea of "providence" and rationality of Nature. Author believes that Kant's argumentation can be inspirative in conterporary world, too.

Key Words

Kant, Reason, Law Giver, Respect, Equality, Worldcitizenship.

Dünyada Ahlaklılığın ve Yasanın Nedeni Olarak Akla Saygı: Kant'ın Dünya Vatandaşlığı Kavrayışına İlişkin Bazı Açıklayıcı Notlar

Özet

Bu incelemenin arka planı, Kant'ın akademik özgürlük, aklın otoritesi ve failerin eşitliği dünyası olarak değerlendirdiği insan akılsallığının egemenliği içinde onun

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dünya vatandaşlığı fikrinin analizi üzerine kurulmuştur. Bu çalışmanın yazarı, Kantçı ahlakın temel bir fikri (ahlak yasasını ortaya koyan kişiye duyulan saygı) üzerine yoğunlaşmaya çalışmaktadır. Yazar, Kant'çı kavrayışta yasa koyucunun sadece eleştirel akıl olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu moment, Kant'a, yasa koyucunun, failin ve yargılayanın aynı olduğu otonom bir ahlak yaratmasına izin verir. Bu kişilerin her birinde akıl, her akılsal varlıktaki gibi aynıdır. Böylece Kant, evrensel ahlaka ilişkin bir koşul olarak eşitlik kanıtını keşfetmiştir.

Kant'çı ahlakın ikinci momenti mantıksal tutarlılığa ilişkin ödevdir (herkeste bulunan akıl sebebiyle akılsallığa saygı). Akılsallık evrensel olduğundan, biz her insanda bulunan akla saygı duymalıyız ve bu durum her bir insana itibarını teslim etmektir. Eşitlik ve başkasına duyulan saygının ödevi Kant'ın dünya vatandaşlığı kavrayışının önemli bir fikridir.

Çalışmanın sonunda yazar, Kant'ın bakış açısından dünya vatandaşlığının fizyokratik kaynağını göstermektedir. Yazar, Kant'ın doğanın akılsallığı ve tanrısallığı fikriyle bir polemik içine girerek özgürlüğün tipik bir fikrini ahlaklılığın bir koşulu olarak analiz etmektedir.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Kant, Akıl, Yasa Koyucu, Saygı, Eşitlik, Dünya vatandaşlığı.

Philosophical work of Immanuel Kant is one of the greatest monuments of philosophical thinking of the Western culture. Undoubtedly there are many reasons why it is so. One of them is to unite and overcome modern rationalism and empirism by learning about the conditions of possibility of knowledge as such. The other reasons are his deontological ethics and Critique of Judgment. Kant is a philosopher who managed to combine knowledge, morality and feeling, and also to create a new concept, by which he closed the Enlightenment and opened a new chapter of philosophical thinking.

One of the strong messages of the Kant's philosophy is the belief in equality of all rational beings and idea of the worldcitizenship in theoretical and practical terms. This idea has its roots in the Enlightenment and was strongly applied in the very motto of the French Revolution: "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity!" Kant deals with the issue of freedom, equality and fraternity in philosophically fundamental way and precisely this solution offers opportunity of its applicability in the current period, although in a somewhat reverse order: Equality, Fraternity, Liberty!

The Universality of Thinking As a Basis of Equality

I believe that the cornerstone of Kant's argument is the idea of reason as a universal legislator, both in the field of knowledge, morality, as well as the social structure.

Kant operates with the idea of equality and worldcitizenship for the first time in his epistemological considerations. It seems to me that there we can also find their very roots. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant considers the knowledge that would not be

affected by experience. We know from Hume that inductive knowledge-based experience may claim only probable and not universally valid and inevitable experience. And it is the necessity and universality Kant in his first Critique speaks about.

If, together with the Kant, we will ask about the fundamental problem of epistemology, will we examine whether there is something which is necessarily valid, and what we all can accept? It seems that if something as such exists, it will be only because the very concepts do not enable us to think differently (analytical judgments). However, Kant is not interested in the question of analytical judgements; he is rather looking for the existence and reasons of validity of the analytical judgments, which are valid a priori. And they were those, if existing, which will ensure uniformity and hence the necessity and universality of our knowledge.

A significant feature of Kant's theory of knowledge thus lies in the question, whether we can find some universal forms and contents in the knowledge. The diversity of experience is so great that it forces us to eliminate specific contents of thinking and thus Kant is looking for what cannot be removed from the knowledge under any circumstances. These are for him forms of appearances, pure reason concepts and ideas - in other words, mere rationality. The underlying assumption of the existence of universally valid knowledge in Kant is therefore not the world or our ability to know things as they are themselves (*Ding an sich*) (amount and accuracy of empiricism), but rather the existence of universal forms of thought, which lies in the universal form of rationality as such. This necessity and consistency of rationality lies in the impossibility to think of certain contents in another way¹. And that leads Kant to postulation of the realm of knowledge, which is equally accessible to all subjects.

Kant in his file *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics* indicates that due to the identity of rationality or rationality of the same kind it is possible to come to inevitable and uniform (scientific) knowledge. He says that philosophers "For it, at some time, by the will of God, they wake up, i. e., open they eyes to such and view as does not exclude conformity with others people's common sense, then none of them will see anything that does not appeal evident and certain in the light of the proofs to other also, and the philosophers will then inhabit a common world, of the kind which mathematicians have already occupied for a long time. And this event cannot be delayed much longer, if certain signs and predictions, which for some time have appeared over the horizon of science, can be trusted." (Kant, 1990, p. 74-75) Our knowledge can thus be determined by cultural, linguistic, historical but also experiential differences; however the very nature of human rationality nevertheless allows us to come to the same conclusions, which is documented by geometry, arithmetic, logic or physics. Kant, therefore, believes in one universal truth, which (if being consistent) we can all agree upon, because our rationality forces us to do so. The latter creates a realm of knowledge, in which all the cognitive entities are equal because they are basically the same reason.

¹ „H. Vaihinger in *Commentar to Kant's Critique of pure reason* says on impossibility to be different (*Nicht-anders-sein-können*) and he distinguishes its two mutually connected forms: qualitative (which is unavoidable) and quantitative (which is austere universality“ Cited according to: Marcelli, M.: *Transzendentalismus a jeho východiská*. In: *Filozofia*, č. 3 49/1994, p. 142.

Kant's concept of cognitive subject is that of a subject without geographical, historical and cultural contexts. That is what makes us individuals of the same world of intelligible reason. And precisely this is the foundation of his political perceiving of the world in the worldcitizenship sense.

Kant's conception of the intelligible world is a world inhabited by ghosts (in a rational sense) who are equal in their rights and in their competences. In this world, inhabitants are deprived of temporal and other identifications and they act as more or less equal and homogenous beings. In the file *What is Enlightenment?* Kant documents this vision of the world by the distinction between private and public use of reason. "By the public use of one's reason I understand the use which a person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public. Private use I call that which one may make of it in a particular civil post or office which is entrusted to him. Many affairs which are conducted in the interest of the community require a certain mechanism through which some members of the community must passively conduct themselves with an artificial unanimity, so that the government may direct them to public ends, or at least prevent them from destroying those ends ... But so far as a part of the mechanism regards himself at the same time as a member of the whole community or of a society of world citizens, and thus in the role of a scholar who addresses the public (in the proper sense of the word) through his writings, he certainly can argue without hurting the affairs for which he is in part responsible as a passive member... But as a scholar, whose writings speak to his public, the world, the clergyman in the public use of his reason enjoys an unlimited freedom to use his own reason to speak in his own person" (Kant, 1784).

Kant is thus very well aware of the distinction between political and therefore temporal world in which we are not individuals with the same rights and responsibilities and ideal world of knowledge in which every rational creature acts with the same competences in the matter of truth and knowledge. And it seems that Kant's desire was the desire to transform the political world into picture of the intelligible world.

Critique of Practical Reason as the Idea of Brotherhood

The idea of equivalence and equality in front of the truth is reflected also in the Kant's moral philosophy. Kant believes that morality, which could claim to have general application, must come from an autonomous source (Kant, 2008, p. 34). All moral standards, which are based on something heteronymous, are dependent on acceptance of authority, which is their author (education, Ten Commandments, culture,). Acceptation of such authority is given by the experience or the faith.

Kant's reflection from *Critique of Practical Reason* therefore tries to resolve whether there is some moral rule or command that is universally accepted. And it seems that such rule may be the desire for happiness as a permanent bliss. Unfortunately, the very concept of happiness is not sufficiently clear and it is a subject of many interpretations. Accordingly, Kant is looking for a formal definition of moral command (not its content-filling), and he finds it in acting in accordance with generally applicable legislation². Key term in Kant's postulation is precisely the postulation of that

² „Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation!“ (Kant, 2008, p. 31)

legislation. Kant is aware that for generally valid can only be accepted something that is prescribed by the very reason. The reason why it is so is the self-reference of the moral binding. According to him we can speak about the moral action only if the reason of our acting is our rationality. And this is the core of the problem.

Kant's project of morality assumes that only the reason can be universal legislator of the rational beings. This implies that the person prescribing the moral law (reason) is identical to those to whom it is prescribed (the will of rational being). Kant's morality is a morality only if the determining incentive of the will is our rationality.

Kant is aware that a man can act against common sense (e.g., instinctively), but also in accordance with reason, but without it (e.g. from emotions). However, such acting he does not consider to be moral. So what is the reason of morality? Kant says that it is the obligation (germ. Die Pflichte). What an obligation? The obligation of the reason to respect reason itself!

The same way as the basis of scientific knowledge is logical consistency, the basis of moral acting is rational consistency. If we are rational beings, we should honor the reason which commands us, in the form of categorical imperative, whether or not to act, and therefore act in accordance with its command. Morality therefore respects the sanity (Démuth 2006, 55). But what sanity?

From Kant's concept of theoretical reason we can assume that the mind is actually superindividual. And precisely such is also a practical reason. This implies that what I am committed to is not my willfulness, but the claim of universal rationality, which must be respected by every rational creature. Accordingly, if we are consistent, finally we all come to the same moral law.

Kant's belief in the universal practical rationality, however, hides a deeper message. It is the fact that if the rationality is universal and superindividual, it is not only mine, but can be found in any rational being. This is why Kant, in the third diction of categorical imperative, speaks about the dignity of human being, because the reason respecting itself, must also respects the reason in any rational being. And precisely the respect for the universal rationality is the essence of Kant's concept of brotherhood.

Reason in other man is of the same nature as the reason in me (creating my person). Therefore, if the reason wants to be consistent, it must appreciate the sanity of another being. This creates a respect for others, which is the basis of Kant's morality and politics.

Kant's Idea of Political Worldcitizenship

Ethical concept of dignity to another man is also the basis of Kant's political theory. Reason contained in another person compels us to respect the rights of the same reason in another being. Therefore, we must respect the other person as a very purpose. This led Kant to the postulation of the Republican concept of the state (because only there all the people are equal and a very purpose (first definitive article for perpetual peace), as well federalist concept of the relations between states (second definitive article for perpetual peace). And it is here that Kant expresses the main principles of the citizenship as respect for the principle of equality, fraternity and freedom: the principle

of hospitality, public ownership of the Earth, and also the need of communication needs; these are the basis for the world organization leading to eternal peace (Perpetual Peace) as wishful completion of society development and thus nature. Equality, fraternity and freedom are thus, according to Kant, the aim which we must follow.

Freedom as a Condition of Equality and Brotherhood?

Kant understands the freedom of thinking as a condition of philosophy as such and it is the same with his understanding of morality. If the man is not free, he cannot act morally and his action (good or bad) can not be considered from ethical point of view. Therefore freedom could be regarded as a primary and inevitable condition of equality and fraternity, thinking and morality. However, in *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* Kant suggests that achieving eternal peace in form of worldcitizenship organized society is a claim of the reason and nature, and thus not a matter of chance. Is a man free at all?

Kant considers freedom as something that can be perceived only in relation of the thinking to the will and action. In the field of thinking Kant suggests that if we want to be logically consistent, we are not really free and all we have to necessarily come to the only true knowledge (the truth is only one). Architectonics of our reason doesn't enable us to think logically consistently anything; on the contrary it is the reason why we are limited in our cognition. On the other hand, Kant is aware of the freedom of the reason to its passions and instincts as well as the possibility to refuse them. Man is not purely instinctive or rational being. If we were only instinctive, we would be subjected to the necessity of nature and, according to Kant, at all. If we were purely rational, we would be subjected to logical thinking and again we could not speak about the freedom either.

According to Kant, freedom raises in that we are somewhere on the border between animalism and rationality. This applies only to the freedom of an individual.

In the case of the kind it seems like Kant suggests that the development of our rationality is essential demand of nature (or providence), and "The history of mankind can be seen, in the large, as the realization of Nature's secret plan to bring forth a perfectly constituted state as the only condition in which the capacities of mankind can be fully developed, and also bring forth that external relation among states which is perfectly adequate to this end." (Kant, *The real motive of history is therefore providence and rationality of nature. "If I say of nature that she wills that this or that occur, I do not mean that she imposes a duty on us to do it, for this can be done only by free practical reason; rather I mean that she herself does it, whether we will or not (*fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt* ["Fates lead the willing, drive the unwilling" (Seneca *Epist. mor.* XVIII.)]" (Kant, 1795) Kant suggests that the idea of worldcitizenship concept of the state is essential demand of the reason. The real demand of nature is the rationality regardless of emotions, passions, and cultural and historical contexts. From the perspective of the history and development is therefore the freedom the second illusion. Free can the person be only towards the nature within himself. Species that should have certain purpose (according to Kant the purpose is the full rationality and worldcitizenship society) can not be free. In fact, Kant not only became*

the predecessor of the Schelling and Hegel thinking, but also a clear supporter of the French and English physiocrats (Francois Quesnay and Henry David Thoreau, or Adam Smith). And so we can summarize:

If we are rational beings, we can disregard from our individual, cultural and historical differences and, like scientists or purely moral beings, one day we come to such form of world organization, which will respect equality, fraternity and individual freedom. However, if Kant was wrong in his definition of the purpose of the nature, and nature is not intended to rational organization, and we just insert the rationality in it, the emotionality will not render to rationality, then conflicts, violence and inequality remain an inseparable part of society and nature. In this case, not only we will not reach Kant's desired ideal, but one day (considering the population growth and frequency of mutual conflict) we may succeed in complete deletion of the mankind from the world.

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