

Grasping the Migration Discourse: Case of Turkey¹

Göç Söylemini Algılamak: Türkiye Örneği

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Abstract

To exclude a group politically, socially and economically also means marginalizing that group and pushing it to create a real reason for security. The perception of us and others created by migration is fueled by populism, and refugees are securitized. The other created is unfortunately refugees, one of the most vulnerable segments of society. This study analyzes the discourses on refugees in Turkey through the election manifestos of political parties, which are the strongest political actors of representative democracies. Election manifestos are essential data sources as they are official documents showing the positions of the parties and the manifestos of political parties in Turkey's general elections on the mass migration movement from Syria to Turkey are among the most important data sources of migration discourses and attitudes towards refugees. For this reason, Turkey's general election manifestos before and after the Refugee Crisis were included in the analysis (2007- 2011- 2015 June- 2015 November- 2018). The concept set used in discourse analysis finds its place in the migration literature through populism, securitization and 'the other'. For this reason using the mixed method, it is claimed that in this research, the categories in which migration takes place in political discourse are populism, securitization, and Euroscepticism. In this research, migration discourses of election manifestos are associated with political attitudes. The main argument of this study is that only with the refugee crisis, the words refugee, immigrant, asylum seeker are given the meaning of other and they take place together with securitization in populist rhetoric in political discourse and are supported by xenophobic and Eurosceptic arguments.

Keywords: International Migration, Refugee, Securitization, Populism, International Politics

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Özet

Siyasal, sosyal ve ekonomik olarak bir grubu dışlamak o grubu marjinalize ederek onu gerçek bir güvenlik sebebi yaratmaya itmek anlamına da gelmektedir. Göç ile yaratılan biz ve ötekiler algısı popülizmle körüklenmekte ve mülteciler güvenikleştirilmektedir. Yaratılan öteki ise maalesef toplumun en kırılgan kesimlerinden biri olan mültecilerdir. Bu çalışma, temsili demokrasilerin en güçlü siyasi aktörü siyasi partilerin seçim manifestoları üzerinden Türkiye'deki mültecilere yönelik söylemleri analiz etmektedir. Seçim manifestoları, partilerin duruşlarını gösteren resmi belgeler olması dolayısıyla önemli veri kaynaklarıdır ve Suriye'den Türkiye'ye kitlesel göç hareketine dair Türkiye genel seçimlerinde siyasi partilerin manifestoları göç söylemlerinin ve mültecilere yönelik tutumlarının en önemli veri kaynaklarıdır. Bu nedenle mülteci Krizi öncesi ve sonrası Türkiye genel seçimleri manifestoları analize dahil edilmiştir (2007- 2011- 2015 Haziran- 2015 Kasım-2018). Söylem analizinde kullandığı kavram seti göç literatürde popülizm, güvenikleştirme, ötekileştirme üzerinden kendisine yer bulmaktadır. Bu sebeple bu çalışmada, karma yöntem kullanılarak göçün siyasal söylemde yer aldığı kategorilerin popülizm, güvenikleştirme ve Avrupa şüpheliliği ile olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu

¹ This article is prepared from the author's unpublished doctoral thesis titled "The 'Refugee Crisis' in Political Discourse: Italy, Hungary, Turkey"(Siyasal Söylemde 'Mülteci Krizi': İtalya, Macaristan, Türkiye) completed in 2021 at Istanbul University Faculty of Political Sciences. For this study, the literature was created by highlighting the Turkey section of the doctoral dissertation; the original version of the thesis is on the comparison of Italy, Hungary and Turkey as countries on migration.

arařtırmada seçim manifestolarının göç söylemleri politik tutumlarla ilişkilendirilmektedir. Bu çalışmanın temel argümanı ancak mülteci krizi ile beraber mülteci, göçmen, sığınmacı kelimelerine öteki anlamının yüklendiđi ve siyasal söylemde popülist retoriklerde güvenlikleştirme ile beraber yer alıp yabancı düşmanlığı ve Avrupa şüpheli argümanlarla desteklendiđi yönündedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Göç, Mülteci, Güvenlikleştirme, Popülizm, Uluslararası Siyaset

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1. Introduction

The refugee² crisis has created economic, social and political reactions in countries that are in the primary and secondary level of expansion. The study of these reactions can gain meaning by examining them with a causality that can be established between social-political phenomena. Turkey (Türkiye) is the country hosting the highest number of refugees in the world (UNHCR, 2022). This situation has started to raise unwanted criticism in the eyes of the public. Refugees have started to be shown as the other. Discourses that have been suppressed/softened for a long time have affected the language used in the election campaigns, although not specifically in the manifestos. While the developments before/after the 2018 elections, the terrorist threat faced by Turkey, the rising far right with the 'refugee problem' externalized by Europe, Islamophobia, xenophobia and border issues were on the agenda, discourses targeting displaced people in Turkey were sharpening.

EU migration policies are shaped around the security framework: Fortress of Europe is in formation, the second generation information system, Euroda, visa information system, Eurosur, Frontex are in place for the management of the EU's external borders; borders have been places where they manage migration for the EU, and they have naturally become instrumental in this context (Trojanowska-Strzeboszewska, 2018, pp. 176-177). Decisions taken in the Migration Agenda are the implementation of *ad hoc* emergency practices in the first stage, and the long-term management policies based on development in the second stage. (Trojanowska-Strzeboszewska, 2018, p. 181). The resettlement proposal, the Treaty of Lisbon, the provision on temporary measures on migration management becoming operational for the first time (Saatçiođlu, 2017, p. 221), constitutes a temporary and exceptional relocation mechanism for two years from peripheral member states, Italy and Greece, to other member states (Council of the European Union, 2015). The realization of the Turkey-EU Refugee Reconciliation and the Joint Action Plan in 2016 was an important move to stop the irregular refugee influx on the Aegean-Greece-Eastern Balkans road, but the EU side has not yet realized the short-term visa liberalization clause in Turkey, which has not met the expectations of the Turkish side. (Yaprak, Akgüngör, & Kuştepli, 2017, p. 26). The sudden decrease in the number of refugees crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands (Deutsche Welle, 2016) has been an important indicator for the EU (Kaya

² In international law, the terms immigrant, asylum seeker, refugee are used terminologically. In this thesis, the term refugee and/or immigrant will be preferred unless the legal situation is mentioned or special or legal status is referred to, the refugee/immigrant/asylum-seeker is sociologically referenced.

& Kaiser, 2018, p. 424). The EU realized that it could no longer remain indifferent to the situation and that the impact of this crisis on the EU would be much greater. The necessity of coordination and common migration and asylum policies among EU countries was felt (Özer, 2017, p. 43). Institutions such as Frontex and the European Asylum Support Agency have not been successful enough in managing the crisis (Özer, 2017, p. 43). It can be said that one reason for this is the tendency of countries to prefer a national policy instead of a common policy. For example, Slovakia and Hungary filed a lawsuit at the European Court of Justice (2015) for the annulment of the quota system decision for refugees, on the grounds that freedom of thought and opinion was restricted and that they had the right to weave barbed wire (Saatçioğlu, 2017, pp. 223-224). As discussed in the securitization theory, which includes the situation of leaving the political process, it is revealed that the process takes place at a narrower point (Williams, 2003, p. 513).

Turkey is the country that gives the biggest support to Syrian refugees in the world (UNHCR, 2022). The issue securitized in Turkey is not the refugees in general terms but the process of marginalizing the country's own internal elements along with its own domestic terrorism problems; the emptiness and insecurity created by the crises have been the elements that create a dynamo effect in the process of creating 'the other'. Turkey has not put it into a security perspective as it has been put in Europe. The main problem in Turkey has been that these people have been subjected to a perception with the guest/going discourse for years, and they have had problems with their definition and status in Turkey. The scope of security is mostly determined through internal ethnic, belonging to the country and identity issues. In this sense, the other is the 'others within us'; not others from outside. The word 'us' does not refer to the whole of Turkey in general. Dividedness, separation within itself, and different nationalisms produce different definitions in general; elements such as founding value, history and partnership that can be gathered under the title of 'us' within the borders of the country which are in conflict. This 'us' and 'other' issue creates populism and securitization within discourses.

When it comes to the refugee concept, several types of political discourse have emerged: populism, securitization, Euroscepticism, and xenophobia. Securitization of migration is the process of creating a perception that immigrants/refugees are a security threat by creating an atmosphere of fear. When all migrants/refugees are targeted, discourses are made in this direction, and 'the other' is pointed out. When immigrants/refugees are targeted, populism refers to the other as well. Refugee/immigrant is labelled as a security issue and a dangerous element in domestic and foreign politics; They are targeted as a security issue that has a different culture, religion, and identity; therefore cannot adapt and they cannot change their difference. Immigrants as a group have become the definition of danger. Refugee rhetoric is used in political discourse as a rhetoric of securitization and populism.

The questions of whether the refugee perception, which has changed over the years, started with the refugee crisis or whether this discourse on migration/immigrant/refugee is the result of a long-term process are also important for the study. The article focuses on the migration of Syrians, referred to as the refugee crisis. Also, Political populism finds ground where media populism succeeds (Mazzoleni, 2008, p. 54), election times are the times to observe the media supporting political populism as well. In this research, party manifestos in the general elections in Turkey between 2007-2018 will be analyzed with a mixed method in the context of this agenda. In the second part, the manifestation of populism and securitization in the discourses on migration will be examined theoretically, and in the third part, the

method of the study will be explained. In the fourth section, the results and evaluation of the study will be given. In the fifth section, the results and general evaluation will be analysed.

2. Populism in Migration Discourse

Although we do not have a definite theory of populism, it is observed that the power partners and those who try to be partner are articulated to every ideology in ambiguity and symptomatize being 'one' (Müller, 2017, pp. 14-19). Populism can be broadly defined as an ideology, a form of discourse, and one of the forms of political mobilization. Some thinkers classify populism as a rhetoric, some as a type of organization, some as an ideology, while others consider it as a communication style; Their common point is that they agree that the notion of the people/nation is the common point (Caiani, 2019, pp. 237-238). Populism as an ideology is a thin ideology that thinks it ultimately divides society into two homogeneous and opposing groups, the naive people and the corrupt elite, and argues that politics should be the expression of the general will of the people (Mudde, 2004, p. 543) (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). According to Mudde, thin ideologies are a very limited set of ideas about worldviews (Mudde, 2004). The advantage of understanding populism as a thin ideology is to identify what determines different populist movements, rather than whether they are left or right wing (Wirth W. v., 2016, p. 9). The hostile relationship between the people and the elite, the positive evaluation of the people and the discredit of the elite are frequent uses of the idea of popular sovereignty (Stanley, 2008, p. 102). Populism is a concept that can exist with its relational network, and popular sovereignty is placed around it with a relational relationship as the people, the elite, the populists, and the others (Wirth W. v., 2016, p. 8). In order to describe the atmosphere in which populism takes place, Brubaker refers to the economic crisis, the refugee problem, and an atmosphere called post-truth with the concept Brubaker calls the perfect storm (Brubaker, 2019, pp. 37-38). It has also been defined as an ideology that invokes virtuous and homogeneous people against elites and dangerous, others portrayed as depriving people of popular sovereignty, values, welfare, identity (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 3). Laclau defines populism as the boundary construction that divides society into two camps and the discourse between the powerful and the oppressed (Mouffe, Sol Popülizm, 2019, p. 23). The populist system of thought emphasizes that voters who do not support them cannot be a part of the people who are defined as a whole and with high moral value (Müller, 2017, p. 15).

Populist rise is especially seen in moments such as political system changes, foreign policy imbalances, international partnership problems (Wirth W. v., 2016, pp. 44-45). Taggart defines populism with being prone to war, faith and conspiracy theories (Taggart, 2019, pp. 82-85). In parallel, Wodak mentions that right-wing populism produces a policy of fear, thus persuading the public to have more security (Wodak, 2015, p. 1). Because politics always involves the creation of us and the other, which refers to the creation of a collective identity (Mouffe, 2005, p. 55). Because the migration crisis and the refugee issue are one of the priority issues in Turkey, most of the political parties have used the populist discourses when mentioning refugees, as mentioned below.

3. Securitization in Migration Discourse

An issue cannot become a threat simply by word-of-mouth and securitization is not complete, it needs more elements (Buzan, Weaver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 25). The target audience needs to accept the issue as a security issue and is also needed to be defined as a departure from the usual situation (Buzan, Weaver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 23). The securitized issue is now a threat and measures need to be taken, and legitimate grounds are provided for urgent and extraordinary measures (Buzan, Weaver,

& De Wilde, 1998, p. 24). In this case, the target, as the other in times of crisis is clear, the refugees. In periods of securitization of migration, immigrants are perceived as a cultural threat, as actors of criminal and terrorist threats, and as a threat to stability in times of economic recession and crisis (Phizacklea, 2011). The elites also make this topic a meta topic and blur the distinction between external and internal security, that is, the middle line (Faist, 2002). Associating the refugee or migrant with crime, danger, political troubles and unemployment as well as cultural corruption is a longstanding rhetoric, and these are perceived as national threats. The refugees/migrants are seen as the source of economic troubles, a threat to the job ability of the market and a burden on the social security system (Mandacı & Özerim, 2013, p. 116).

In periods of securitization of migration, immigrants are perceived as a cultural threat, as actors of criminal and terrorist threats, and as a threat to stability in times of economic recession and crisis (Phizacklea, 2011). In the elite's war on terror, terrorism is not only a link to immigration but also a process of threat to cultural identity (Toğral, 2011, p. 219). The criminal began to be described through 'the out group' (D'Appollonia, 2012). An issue such as immigration, which is not overtly and primarily a threat, becomes an issue of security through speech-act in the securitization process (Messina, 2014, p. 530). If the masses are large, it is really difficult to persuade and mobilize them to a common threat through 'us' (Buzan, Weaver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 36). For this reason, the unit where securitization is best applied is the nation level, which mobilizes the middle-level "us", the in group, more quickly. The EU's response to the refugee crisis was limited to a limited response based on border security, and remained inadequate and fragmented in both short and long-term movements (Trojanowska-Strzeboszewska, 2018, pp. 169-190). Turkey, on the other hand, has been inadequate in terms of policy and institutional, with its 'open door' policy followed by the refugee influx.

Regardless of which Euroscepticism typology is considered (Taggart & Szcerbiak, 2000) , (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002) Eurosceptics take positions according to the crises that Europe is facing, and Euroscepticism rises according to the size of the crises. By using common themes, Euroscepticists describe the events that affect or are likely to affect Europe, and describe these events, which are encountered or likely to be encountered, as difficult periods that must be overcome urgently, such as a 'crisis' (for example, the refugee crisis). Parallel to this, Buzan, Waever and Wilde summarize how immigration is securitized with the analogy of "X people are invaded by Y people or lose their characteristics because of that people. Community X will not exist as before because its population will be made up of people Y. X identity differentiates due to change in population structure" (Buzan, Weaver, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 121).

4. Methodology

The empirical part of this study is based on mixed content analysis of election manifestos collected within the scope of five national election campaigns between 2007-2018. Retrieved the 2007, 2011, 2015 June, 2015 November, 2018 manifestos.

The rationality underlying the reasons for choosing the parties as a sample is their continuity in entering the elections and their ability to enter the parliament (except for FP; originally FP was there to compare it with other countries similar parties). The parties analysed in this context are JDP (AK Parti- Justice and Development Party), NMP (MHP- Nationalist Movement Party), RPP (CHP- Republican Peoples' Party), DSP (DTP- Democratic Society Party), PDP* (BDP- Peace and Democracy Party), PDP (HDP- Peoples' Democratic Party), GP (İYİ Parti- Good Party) and FP (SP- Felicity Party).

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Table 1 Turkish Political Parties' Election Manifestos Included in This Study³

Political Party	JDP	NMP	RPP	DSP	PDP*	PDP	GP	FP
Elections								
2007	X	X	X	X				
2011	X	X	X		X			
2015 June	X	X	X			X		
2015 November	X	X	X			X		
2018	X	X	X			X	X	X

Source: Author's own research.

In the data analysis part of this study, the codes (conceptualized words) associated with the refugee/refugee crisis of countries were investigated. Sections were coded by in-depth research (see Appendix) (In the original of the doctoral thesis, Islamophobia was tried to be revealed with a mixed method, as measurements were made on the election manifestos of Italy and Hungary. Although it is a non-Islamophobia category for Turkey, it appears to be a category because it is used in the analysis for other countries). The most commonly used discourse on behalf of the category of immigration is culture, populism, security, Euroscepticism, and xenophobia. In order to make a comparative and scaled qualitative analysis in the research, all coded texts related to 'migration' were drawn for all manifestos. Every sentence in which the words "migration, immigrant, refugee, asylum seeker, asylum, temporary protection, human trafficking, human smuggling, international protection, Syrian" are included, has been selected from the manifestos and has been read comparatively. In addition, the same process is followed the discourse of Islam and discrimination; Europe discourses; discourses using security discourses and populist rhetoric were also repeated as in the migration category. There are different reasons for blaming 'the other', some of them being threatening basic needs. In the rhetoric of securitization, migration is constructed as a directable threat to the situation of countries in every aspect; for this, economy, political situation, social welfare and cultural values were used (Yiğit & Uyar, 2021, pp. 148-149). Disputes arise between refugees and policymakers of receiving countries and citizens of that country, objectively on issues such as employment, housing and welfare, and subjectively on cultural homogeneity, social values or national identity (Alexseev, 2005) (Bigo, 2001). Since the securitization of immigration is defined as the immigration of political, social and security elites threatening the basic values of the state and society, the security category in the study was created in parallel with this (Lazaridis, 2011, p. 2).

The study focuses on a comparative research question on how political discourse forms official approaches to refugees/immigrants and is a comparative case study that aims to investigate how political discourse works and in what context it contributes to party manifestos through the refugee crisis. In this study, the instrumentalization of refugees/immigrants and the refugee crisis in political discourse was studied, and case comparisons were made before and after the refugee crisis, specific to party

³ Most of the election manifestos are taken from the manifesto project database. Other exception manifestos are taken from the official websites of political parties. Election manifestos are publicly available, accessible from any platform. <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>

manifestos. It has been revealed how refugees and the refugee crisis are positioned in party manifestos with the claim of populism, securitization, Euroscepticism and xenophobia. In the party manifestos, content analysis based on the dictionary method was used and also the manifestos were analyzed qualitatively.

The reasons for choosing election manifestos of the unit of analysis can be listed as follows: First, an election manifesto can be viewed as an authoritative document that clearly reviews a party's ideas at a given time (Rooduijn, 2013, p. 83). Second, election manifestos are suitable documents for comparative content analysis because they are reasonably comparable across countries and over time; third, an election manifesto can be seen as the document that gives the clearest overview of what a party stands for at a given time; In most cases, politicians are committed to policy promises set out in an election manifesto. (Rooduijn, 2013, pp. 56-57). Fourthly, people's interest in both daily politics and politics in general increases during the election campaign period. It can also be caused by individuals and the abundance of information they are exposed to. According to Wodak, the common features of words and phrases that are described as populist are as follows: (Wodak, 2015, p. 49): Migration, immigrant, asylum seeker / Our cultural and familial values / Nation, homeland Glorious past / Security, terrorism / Mother tongue / Global threat, globalization / Islam in pejorative sense, the other / Comparison of West and East / Theft, crime / Citizenship, public, belonging / Security , law, order / EU and Euroscepticism / Market economy / Democracy and the people / Elitism. In this study, populist phrases mentioned by Wodak (2015) were examined in categories related to immigration. It was edited and compared (emergent) with the codes created after the text was read, not pre-created. As Wodak (2015) stated, it is argued in this study that the categories of security, culture, immigration, populism, economy, and Euroscepticism are interrelated. In order to prove this claim, dictionaries in different categories were created and coded. Although populism appears as an ideology, a style of discourse and a form of political strategy, the measurement in this article is based on this thin-centered ideology definition of populism (Mudde, 2004): anti-elitism, people-centrism. Dictionaries that were created and coded for populism were used. Frequencies can be found by word mining. In this study, the populism dictionary created by Rooduijn is used (Rooduijn, 2013, pp. 173-175). For this reason, only anti-elite coding (core) was used.

Context words have been added to the dictionary; these are the words 'will' and 'sovereignty'. According to the coding, if they emphasize people's virtues, if they emphasize people's achievements, if they show sympathy for people, if they suggest a monolithic people, they use human-centered rhetoric; anti-elitism includes strategies that condemn the elites, blame the elites, and exclude the elites from the public; These are the two indicators used to capture popular sovereignty, which demands popular sovereignty and rejects elite sovereignty (Bernhar & Kriesi, 2019, pp. 1196,1201-1203). All categories consist of populism, security, economy, Europe, Islam, immigration, culture (see appendix for phrases coded in categories). A dictionary is created by considering the associations and intersections with migration in other categories.


In the next stage of the research, the main categories and subcategories were determined and the MAXQDA program, in which the mixed method could be operationalized, was used. In this program, after the manifest texts were read before, the program was run to evaluate the codes and sub-codes of the categories determined in terms of relationality. Network graphs are drawn showing associations and overlaps. In the network graphs, the networks are shown in the same colors. For example, if the

categories are symbolized in blue, they are indicated as being in the same network. Inter-network and intra-network lines and the closeness of categories and codes are represented by thick-thin lines. While frequency numbers are written next to the categories, overlapping relationships are written on the lines connecting networks and networks.

5. Results and Evaluation

It is a series of events that brought the 2007 election to the fore, starting with the inability of the president to be elected by the TGNA. It is an early election because the TGNA is deadlocked. The roots of the crisis lie in the tension between the secular and conservative wing in Turkey; early elections were called at the behest of the ruling JDP, pursuant to constitutional provisions requiring immediate elections in cases where the TGNA could not elect a president (OSCE/ODIHR, 2007, pp. 2-3). In addition, terrorism cases are seen in the East and Southeast. Below is the association graph with the migration category of the 2007 elections in Turkey. Accordingly, the percentages of categories associated with migration according to the election manifestos used as a sample in the 2007 elections in Turkey are stated. Migration has been most associated with security, culture, economy and populism categories in order.

Table 2 Network Maps of the 2007 General Election Manifestos of JDP, NMP, RPP, DSP




Source: Author's own research calculations. Network Maps consisting of the categories of (translation of the categories) cultur (kültür), economy (ekonomi), security (güvenlik), Europe (Avrupa), populism (popülizm), migraton (göç), İslam (İslam)

The "Kurdish Initiative" process, which started in 2009, had a place for itself even before these elections. It is aimed at improving relations with the Kurdish population through a series of confidence-building

measures. In addition, the ongoing investigation regarding the coup plans in the political discourse in Turkey were on the agenda, these were the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases' processes that would be revealed later. The 2011 elections were held under the debate of these issues. Constitutional reform has been on the political agenda in Turkey for a long time. During the election campaigns, the need for constitutional reform was emphasized by the majority of the political parties; this has been met with interest from all sides of the political spectrum (OSCE/ODIHR, 2011, p. 1). Below is the association graph with the migration category of the 2011 elections in Turkey. Accordingly, the percentages of categories associated with migration according to the election manifestos used as a sample in the 2011 elections in Turkey are stated. Migration has been most associated with culture, economy, security, Europe and populism categories.

Table 3 Network Maps of the 2011 General Election Manifestos of JDP, NMP, RPP, PDP




Source: Author's own research calculations. Network Maps consisting of the categories of (translation of the categories) cultur (kùltür), economy (ekonomi), security (güvenlik), Europe (Avrupa), populism (popülizm), migraton (gôç), İslam (İslam)

Year 2011 was a period when the crisis and civil war environment in Syria increased, and the number of refugees increased. The election in which the PDP participated as a party for the first time was the 2015 election. Previously, elections were held in which independent candidates participated and formed a group within the parliament. Socioeconomic issues, the Kurdish issue peace process and the ongoing situation in the Middle East were also discussed in more depth (OSCE/ODIHR, 2015, p. 13). While the president should be independent of parties, he supported his party, the JDP, throughout the campaign. Media freedom is also a concern around the elections (OSCE/ODIHR, 2015, p. 1). In the first period of the Syrian civil war, both in the Turkish media and in the discourse of politicians, the situation of refugees/asylum seekers was reflected on human values. In the following period, as a result of the intense refugee wave among the surrounding countries, especially Turkey, the rhetoric of return and

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repatriation and the context of economic costs came to the fore. Below is the association graph with the migration category of the Turkey 2015 June elections. Accordingly, the percentages of categories associated with migration, according to the election manifestos used as a sample in Turkey's 2015 June elections, are indicated. Migration was most associated with the categories of security, culture, economy and Europe categories respectively.

Table 4 Network Maps of the 2015 June General Election Manifestos of JDP, NMP, RPP, PDP




Source: Author's own research calculations. Network Maps consisting of the categories of (translation of the categories) cultur (kültür), economy (ekonomi), security (güvenlik), Europe (Avrupa), populism (popülizm), migraton (göç), İslam (İslam)

In 2015, the weight in the categories of security, populism and immigration has increased compared to the election a few months ago. Elections have been the clearest indicator of how discourse has changed in these times. The aggravated refugee discourse change, including the ruling party, has a different tone than the 2015 June elections. While the parties gave more place to refugees/immigrants in their manifestos, the tone of the discourse also changed. The discourses made in this atmosphere of fear were met by the public, the votes increased in the direction of radicalization and gave the power to guarantee another period. The conjuncture greatly influenced the discourses of political actors in the election discourses in November, reflecting that threats, anger and uncertainties paved the way to highlight the rhetoric of "unity" while blaming others/scapegoats; thus, while a homogeneous category of Turkish society could be defined as victims, other groups were seen as enemies of national

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
sovereignty (Erdoğan & Erçetin, 2018, p. 395). Two-year hiatus in clashes between Turkish security forces and KWP (Kurdish Workers' Party- PKK) ends in July (OSCE/ODIHR, 2016, p. 4). The main topics covered in the election included the resolution process, the deteriorating security environment, the campaign against terrorism, and socio-economic issues. Below is the association graph with the migration category of Turkey's November 2015 elections. Accordingly, the percentages of categories associated with migration, according to the election manifestos used as a sample in Turkey's 2015 November elections indicated that migration has been most associated with security, culture, Europe, the economy, and populism categories.

Table 5 Network Maps of the 2015 November General Election Manifestos of JDP, NMP, RPP, PDP



Source: Author's own research calculations. Network Maps consisting of the categories of (translation of the categories) cultur (kùltür), economy (ekonomi), security (güvenlik), Europe (Avrupa), populism (popùlizm), migraton (göç), İslam (İslam)

Table 6 Network Maps of the 2018 General Election Manifestos of JDP, NMP, RPP, PDP, GP, FP



Source: Author's own research calculations. Network Maps consisting of the categories of (translation of the categories) cultur (kültür), economy (ekonomi), security (güvenlik), Europe (Avrupa), populism (popülizm), migraton (göç), İslam (İslam)


The 2018 Election took place for the first time following the constitutional referendum in April 2017; In the referendum, Turkey switched from a parliamentary system to a presidential system. The elections were held under the state of emergency; the reason for the state of emergency in Turkey is that a coup attempt was dared. On July 15, 2016, there was a coup attempt that would have severe social, political, economic and sociological consequences. With the constitutional amendments after the referendum held in 2017, the number of seats in the parliament was increased to 600 (formerly 550), and the duration

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of each term was extended from four to five years. The existence of a high threshold of 10 percent continues to exist. Selahattin Demirtaş from the PDP, one of the opposition candidates, was imprisoned during the elections. OSCE described this situation as follows: “Turkey is notable for transforming the political system into one with broad presidential powers, limited parliamentary oversight, and reduced independence of the judiciary” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2018, p. 1). Presidential candidate Erdoğan, after the cross-border operations in January 2018, said, “3.5 million Syrians we are hosting in my country at the moment ... We will send them back to their lands, to their homeland. I guess we are not in a position to settle permanently in tents or containers or wherever they find them” (Erdoğan R. T., 2018). Presidential candidate İnce (RPP) has often securitized the issue economically: “Instead of spending 40 billion dollars on Syrians, we will spend it on people from Çorlu, Lüleburgaz, Keşan, Tonya, Viranşehir” (AnadoluAjansı, 2018). İnce, again, stated that they would send refugees with drums and clarions in most of his speeches and contributed to the marginalization. GP also securitized the issue economically and at the same time used the rhetoric of repatriation in their election campaigns: “There are 4 million Syrians in our country. Wherever I go, complaints are made... We spent 150 billion Turkish liras... After that, we will send our Syrian brothers and sisters to their homeland; they will live happily” (Akşener, 2018). In general, more returns have come to the fore, and the cost in terms of economy has been mentioned. Above is the association graph with the migration category of Turkey 2018 elections. According to the election manifestos used as a sample in the Turkey 2018 elections (almost all of the sample manifestos entered the parliament, with the exception of the Felicity Party), the percentages of categories associated with migration are indicated. Migration has been most associated with security, economy, Europe, culture and Islam categories in order.

In the coding map below, the network graph of the sum of Turkey 2007, 2011, 2015 June, 2015 November, and 2018 general elections is given. According to this, when all the elections are evaluated, populism, culture, Europe, economy and security have created a network in Turkey. Besides, migration has created another network and Islam has created another network. The reflection of the category of migration in Turkey can be observed with other categories with which it establishes cluster relations. The migration is located as another cluster further away from the main cluster in the network, but still appears to be related. The reason for this is that migration suddenly has Turkey's immigration agenda, and it was slightly mentioned in the previous elections. The category of Islam, on the other hand, is a cultural issue in Turkey, as can be deduced from the number of intersections with culture; it has an intense intersection with culture.

Table 7 Network Map of Turkey Election Manifestos Network Map (2007-2018)




Source: Author's own research calculations. Network Maps consisting of the categories of (translation of the categories) cultur (kùltür), economy (ekonomi), security (güvenlik), Europe (Avrupa), populism (popülizm), migraton (göç), İslam (İslam)

Since the years in which the relationality of the migration category and other categories increased will show the determinants in the years of increase and decrease, which category increased in the election year with the highest correlation showed which context was used in extremist rhetoric. According to the years, both in-country and inter-country migration and increases and decreases in the level of its determinants have been observed and compared as categorised. Examples of qualitative/quantitative comparisons and explanations of migration determinants are evaluated under the headings of each election year. Explanation was made on the temporal graph. Cases were measured over the timeline. A total of 22 election manifestos in seven different categories were analysed for Turkey. In the graphs below, the average association rates of immigration and other categories based on the election years of Turkey, and the average association rates of İslam and other categories are given. Islamophobia has not been observed in Turkey.

As can be seen in the chart below, the leap year for Turkey, in which each category is highly associated with migration, was observed as the 2015 elections. The direct reason for this situation is the discourses made about the refugee influx. In addition, the migration-security relationship is one that has always existed on behalf of Turkey due to the terrorist threats it faces. In NMP, on the other hand, there is more association with crime. Terrorism is a completely different issue for Turkey and it is not related to refugees; The KWP and its terrorism, which Turkey has been dealing with for decades, show itself in all manifestos except the PDP. KWP, FETO, DAESH are Turkey's priority security issues. When the category of security and the category of immigration intersect in Turkey, the most common example here is the discourse of 'priority security of our own citizens'. The security discourse that prioritizes its own citizens has drawn attention.

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Table 8 Average Relationship of Turkey-Migration and Turkey-Islam Categories



Source: Author's own research calculations. Network Maps consisting of the categories of (translation of the categories) cultur (kültür), economy (ekonomi), security (güvenlik), Europe (Avrupa), populism (popülizm), migraton (göç), İslam (İslam)

Although the conceptualization of security in Turkey is not based on migration, the rights-based problem experienced with migration is related to status and definition. After the 2015 June elections, both the ruling party and the opposition side changed their tone against refugees/immigrants from rights-based discourses to 'aid-based' and 'return to their homes' rhetoric. In the elections held in November 2015, and in 2018 the marginalizing discourse increased the vote rates in which the anger and fears of the people were channelled. Looking at the 2015 elections, it can be observed that the security-migration relationship, the populism-migration relationship, and the culture-migration relationship gave the highest results. In this context, Turkey gave one of the highest reactions to migration in 2015. When analysed together with the qualitative method, the most marginalizing reaction in terms of quality among these findings was given in 2018; In this context, security-migration, Europe-migration, economy-migration relations are used. But the association with security is less than the previous selection. For this reason, association with Europe and the economy has been used in the name of the exclusionary discourse in Turkey. In other words, the rhetoric that made the exclusionary discourse in Turkey has passed through associating migration with Europe and the economy. Islam was associated with migration for the first time in 2018, and it was mostly done by the government, drawing attention to the rising Islamophobia, racism and discrimination in Europe. Security association is mostly done by NMP. The NMP is also an openly anti-globalization party, in line with the nationalist right parties in Europe. In this context, it also shows compatibility with the argument of the 'losers of globalization'. The association with Europe and the economy was made by almost all parliamentary parties, especially RPP and GP; described as 'responsibility and burden sharing'; 'economic cost' rhetoric was used. The 'economy' and 'cost' discourses pointing refugees were included in the manifestos of all parties in Turkey except the PDP. The fact that refugees create an economic burden, and the cost is heavy was even mentioned by the JDP and a call was made to Europe. It has been underlined that the solution of an international crisis must be international, and that the solution cannot be left to countries. PDP, on the other hand, stated that the issue should be based on 'rights' rather than 'aid' situation. In general, the issue is economic for Turkey, a call is made to Europe to share responsibility. Turkey is not a country of comparison in Islam category; because although Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country, the category of Islam is highly

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associated with culture. Religion is also a cultural issue for Turkey. Where the category of Islam is matched with security, it is mostly about Islamophobia, discrimination and human security calling out to Europe. Especially in JDP manifestos, a special section is devoted to this issue almost every time and this issue is condemned especially in Europe (West). The category of Islam for NMP is generally a Turkish-Islamic synthesis; hence it is mostly associated with culture and security.

However, 2018 is a prominent year in terms of associating Islam; Although the relationship between Islam and culture is very clear in the case of Turkey, a different picture emerged in 2018. One of the reasons for 2018 to come to the fore is the fact that the ruling party in Turkey and other parties frequently warned against the use of Islamophobic and discriminatory rhetoric and policy making in European and Western countries. This is the reason for the proportional rise in the relationship between the Islamic category and the European category in 2018. In the case of Turkey, religion discourse was brought to the agenda the most in 2018.

The RPP, a party that defines itself as a social democrat, has a far more extreme perspective than European social democrats and does not want refugees and uses 'repatriation' rhetoric. Social democratic and green parties in Europe display a pro-refugee perspective. The remarkable element here is that a social democratic party, which differs from Europe with this feature of the RPP, stands on this line. The GP, who defines itself as a more secular and secular nationalist, also sees refugees as an economic cost, similar to the RPP. NMP, allied with the ruling party, associates immigration with security and crime; but the NMP is in parallel with the nationalist right European parties and gives similar reactions. In general, they frequently used the rhetoric of repatriation. The second interesting point is that the JDP, which stands on Turkey's centre-right, continues this process by showing quite different reactions from the European centre-right parties. The open-door policy implemented since 2011, including the 2018 elections, has been a haven for refugees, displaced people and those fleeing the war. It has implemented a policy and discourse that is not excluding but resentful. However, JDP has recently approached the issue of migration in a more pragmatic manner. Refugees/immigrants have had a great influence on the formulation of policies or agreements with the EU. Although 2018 was a year in which the refugee discourse began to depart from the discourses of aid and inclusion in previous years, it was the choice in which the words of adaptation, adaptation began to be replaced by the rhetoric of 'repatriation, cost and burden'. It has been the year of transition to the discourse of "they", where asylum seekers were excluded from the inclusive discourse in which "us" and "our people" were included. Although the intrusive emphasis continues at times, all internationally displaced people were categorized as 'Syrians' in general, and they found a place in the elections more than ever before. In this period, economic, cultural and political discourse targeted refugees. The emphasis on the other has also started to be made by the ruling party, the JDP. Pointing and targeting asylum seekers/refugees has increasingly continued on behalf of all political parties, starting with the 2015 elections. In the November 2015 elections, the refugee tone also contributed to the reconsolidation of power. This increase has focused more and more on 'economic costs' and 'return' rhetoric in the 2018 elections. In addition, instead of using the terms refugee, asylum seeker and immigrant, institutional addressing of displaced people as 'Syrian' is generally used; This oratory style using national identity is an indication of in-group out-group rhetoric. While the refugees were mostly used by the opposition parties against the ruling JDP in domestic politics, the JDP instrumentalized this issue in foreign policy, especially against Europe. During this period, refugees became the subject of bargaining and were shifted from subject matter to objectivity. Populist discourse in Europe and Turkey in the most general sense, using

the economic crisis environment, refugees, unemployment, salary problems, etc. have been declared guilty. Being a refugee should have been related to human rights; instead, it has become an issue related to numbers. For this reason, it is also important to use resentful rhetoric in society, to use discourses that calm society, and most importantly, to look at the issue as a human right.

6. Conclusion

During and after the refugee crises, in most of the countries that face the refugee influx, the refugees and asylum seekers and also immigrants were coded as having the motives that came to drift the country in an environment of fear and insecurity, associated with economic burden, unemployment, crime and the perception of its existence, became the cause of fear. Then refugee/immigrant is usually coded as a security issue and a dangerous element in domestic and foreign politics. Discourses usually included a security issue, culture, religion, identity, and adaptation problem. Immigrants as a group have become the definition of danger in most of the countries. The subject country of this article is Turkey. The focus on this article was put on the party manifestos of political parties, which are seen as the strongest political actors in the concept of representative democracy. Election manifestos are important data sources as they are official documents showing the positions of the parties. Turkey's general election manifestos before and after the Refugee Crisis were included in the analysis (2007- 2011- 2015 June- 2015 November- 2018). Using the mixed method, it has been claimed that the categories in which migration takes place in political discourse are populism, securitization, Euroscepticism and xenophobia. Migration discourses of election manifestos are associated with political attitudes. The populist rhetoric is kept on the agenda in accordance with the zeitgeist, combined with the categories of economy, immigration, security, culture and Europe in the case of Turkey. Association with Europe and economy variables were used for the exclusionary discourse in Turkey. However, in the most general sense, this perception created in Europe for refugees is not the same as the perception of the 'other' in Turkey. In other words, it is useful to underline that 'the other' is not exactly a refugee/immigrant in Turkey. In Turkey, the concept of the other is positioned as the sum of the rest of the segment that the power draws its boundaries as 'us/people/us', there is no specific other, and there is indeed a 'totality of others'.

As Wodak (2015) stated, it is argued in this study that the categories of security, culture, immigration, populism, economy, and Euroscepticism are interrelated (Wodak, 2015, p. 49). These issues are classified in the manifestos of the parties. With content analysis method, the selected words and phrases and their situations were evaluated and comparatively analysed in the context of collecting the election manifestos of the parties that were and/or trying to be power partners for Turkey before the elections in certain categories and their frequencies, categories, relations and evaluations related to the refugee/refugee crisis rhetoric. In this context, a positivist perspective has been tried to be added to post-positivist issues. The change in political discourse over the perception of migration has been examined. The rise of rising populism along with securitization, Euroscepticism and xenophobia, and the claim that the intersection of these three is the refugee crisis, are contextualized and examined. According to the findings of the study, the number of refugees, the location of the country, and the immigration policy of the countries are not important in terms of Euroscepticism, securitization, populism and xenophobia. What matters is time, that is, the crisis itself; when refugees are positioned as the other as a subject, the situation creates a legitimate basis for discrimination in the discourses and for not to be viewed as 'rights-based' issue.

Appendix-1: Categorized Word-Phrases

İslam (İslam)	Kültür (Cultur)	Göç (Migration)	Göç (Migration)	Güvenlik (Security)	Popülizm (Populism)	Popülizm (Populism)	Popülizm (Populism)	Avrupa (Europe)	Ekonomi (Economy)
Müslüman (Muslim)	Değerler (values)	Siğınmac (Asylum seeker)	Suriyeli (Syrian)	Terör (Terror)	Yolsuzlu (Corruption)	Referand (Referandum)	Aldat (deceit-)	AB (EU)	Ekonomik (Econom-)
İslam (İslam)	Kimli-k (identity)	Göç (Migration) (Immigration)	uluslararası korum (international protection)	Tehdi (threat)	Uzlaş (consensus)	Propaganda (propaganda)	Egemenli (sovereign-)	Avrupa (Europe)	Maliyet (Cost)
-İslam (-Islam)	Gelenek (tradition)	Göçmen (immigrant) (migrant)	geçici korum (temporary protection)	Güvenli (security)	Yalan (lie) (deception)	Kandır (deceive)	İrade (will)	Avrupa Birliği (European Union)	Dolar (dolar)
	Medeniyet (civilization)	insan kaçak (human trafficking)	Mülteci (refugee)		Utaç (shame)	Siyasiler (politician)	İhanet (betray)		Avro (euro)
	Kültür (cultur)	insan ticaret (--- trafficking)			Skandal (scandal)	Siyasetçi (politician)	Dürüst (honest)		TL (TL)
					Elit (elit)	Seçkin (elit)	anti- demokrat (anti- Democratic)		Lira (Lira)

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