Makalenin Türü : Teorik Makale Geliş Tarihi : 25.11.2022 Kabul Tarihi : 01.12.2022



Hegel's Self-Emptying Subject

Hegel'in Kendisini Boşaltan Öznesi

Erdem BAYKAL*

Abstract: In this article our aim is to understand Hegel's philosophy from the point of view of the Philosophy of Religion. For this, we strive to explain the exteriorization, one of the most important Hegelian concept, in its relation with kenosis, a religious concept. To do this, we will use Hegel's The Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of Logic and Lessons on the Philosophy of Religion. Especially, The Phenomenology of Spirit and Lessons on the Philospohy of Religion will be our main sources in this research. But our primary goal will be to connect the concept of exteriorization to that of kenosis. In this way it will be possible to understand the relationship between exteriorization, that's to say kenosis, and the Spirit. In general, the Kenosis has a lot of meanings; exteriorization, self-sacrifice and self-surrender... By keeping in our mind all this meanings cited, we will try to illimunate the place of kenosis in the constitution of Spirit. In fact, Hegelian Spirit must be understood in its process of becoming subject, through exteriorization. In this process we have also a selfsacrifice and self surrender. But before that, we are going to see the unhappy consciousness; a type of consciousness which is the last form of the first section of Self-Consciousness. With Unhappy Consciousness, we will be dealing with the consciousness that experiences the gap between itself and Divine truth. We will see that this consciousness turns away from the world by performing a false act of sacrifice in order to unify itself with Divine truth. On the contrary, the Spirit is itself an act of self sacrifice because it is a reciprocal self sacrifice and this reciprocal act performed by self consciousness and substance at the same time. The Spirit opens itself, exteriorizes itself to allow particulars self-consciousnesses to realise their goals, but it depends on recognition. It means that, a Hegelian metaphysics could be based on recognition, on a true self-emptying process.

Key Words: Philosophy of Religion, Hegel, Kenosis, Spirit, Unhappy Consciousness, Recognition

Öz: Bu makalede amacımız Hegel Felsefesini, Din Felsefesi üzerinden anlamaya çalışmak olacaktır. Bunun için Hegel felsefesinin önemli kavramlarından olan Dışlaşma kavramının Hristiyan dini düşüncesindeki Kenosis ile bağlantısı ele alınacaktır. Bu noktada başvuracağımız metinler Hegel'in *Tinin Görüngübilimi*, *Mantık Bilimi* ile *Din Felsefesi Üzerine Dersler* olacaktır. Özellikle *Din Felsefesi Üzerine Dersler* ile *Tinin Görüngübilimi* bu noktada en çok başvurulan kaynaklar olacak. Ama öncelikle amacımız Hegel'in Din

Dr. Öğretim Üyesi, Bitlis Eren Üniversitesi, İslami İlimler Fakültesi, Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri, Bitlis / Türkiye ORCID: 0000-0001-6105-5791 proklus26@gmail.com

felsefesinde de kullandığı kavram olan *Dışlaşma* kavramını *Tinin Görüngübilimi* ile ilişkisinde ele almak olacak. Bu şekilde *Dışlaşma* kavramının, böylelikle de *Kenosis* kavramının Tin ile ilişkisi ortaya konmuş olacaktır. *Kenosisin* temelde dışlaşma ve boşaltma anlamı dışında kendini feda etme, kurban etme yanı da vurgulanacak ve bunun Tinin yapısı içindeki yeri belirlenecektir. Temelde Tin kendisini dışlaştıran, boşaltan bir özneleşme süreci olarak ele alınacaktır. Bunun öncesinde bir başka *Dışlaşma* veya *Kendini Boşaltma süreci* olarak *Mutsuz Bilinç* de ele alınacaktır: *Mutsuz Bilinç* dendiğinde kendisi ile İlahi hakikat arasında uçurumu deneyimleyen bilinci ele almış olacağız. Ama bu bilinç yanlış bir fedakârlık eylemi gerçekleştirerek dünyadan yüz çevirir ve Köle bilincinin bir sonucu olarak gözükür. Oysa Tin temel olarak karşılıklı bir dışlaşma ve fedakârlık süreci olarak ortaya çıkar. Kendini boşaltma kendi tikel özelliğinden ve sabitliğinden vaz geçmedir ve bu da Tin ve kendilik bilincinin karşılıklı eylemi olunca başarılı olur. Tin en temelde tikel kendilik bilinçlerinin kendilerini gerçekleştirecekleri bir alanın oluşumudur ve bu da tanınma ile olanaklıdır. Bunun anlamı, Hegelci düşüncenin tanınmaya, bu nedenle kendini boşaltmaya dayandığıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Din Felsefesi, Hegel, Kenosis, Tin, Mutsuz Bilinç, Tanınma

Introduction: Logical and Historical Backround

When it comes to Hegel, it must be said that everything becomes logical, be it religion or metaphysics. From this point of view, Christianity, as an *absolute religion*, also undergoes a great transformation in the hands of Hegel. That's why, it is possible to see Hegel's philosophy of religion as heretic; making from religion something totally logical and almost melting it into logical thinking is the main source of this accusation. In short, in Hegel's eyes, because of his thought that everything before us has its being thanks to logical concept or to its movement, religion as it is experienced becomes something more than a pictural necessity. On the other hand, For Hegel, religion per se is nothing more than a pictural thinking. Therefore, we need to illuminate the relationship between religion. For this reason it is important to summarize certain aspects of Hegel's philosophy of religion vis-à-vis institutional religion.

As it is pointed out by Peter Kalkavage, some of the problems with Hegel's idea of Christianity could be summarized like this; 1) "God is not person and consequently does not love man". 2) "God becomes only God by becoming man". 3) In order to be a knowing self-consicousness, God must be, like us, evil as well as good". 4) "The Bible is picture-thinking that must not to be taken as "literally": it is not "reveletion". 5) "Jesus (...) is pictural-thought that must be transcended, and a logical moment of God as spirit". 6) Ultimatly God is embodied, not in Christ but in Christian community. 7) "Man is united with God (...) through the community's works of mutual forgivness". 8) "Absolute religion is not a religion, it is religion itself". 9) "The incarnation and resurrection are not past events but (...) logical aspects of the divine essence". 10) "There is no immortality of the soul". 11) "There is no beyond or Kingdom of Heaven". 12) "The truth of Christianty can be grasped only by philosophy" (Kalkavage 2007, 398-399).

Peter Kalkavage's list shows us the profound disagreement between religion as such and religion understood by philosophy. However, all these points of view cited above do not have the same value for our purpose. Some of them are clearly heretical when it comes to religion. There is no suspicion about this. But, we want to link certain of them to the kenosis problem; Entäußerung or alienation. Hegelian God is self-emptying and alienated from his being. The divine essence in this sense, is alienation itself. This type of bifurcation of essence is far from graspable for ordinary beliver. The division of oneself, separating oneself from one's distinct being in order to grasp oneself in one's other, this is what Hegel wants to define as the ultimate truth. That is to say, the Christian God can be understood only within the limit of dialectical logic and such an objective is summed up as such; "God becomes only God by becoming man", "Jesus (...) is pictural-thought that must be transcended, and a logical moment of God as spirit", "Ultimatly God is embodied, not in Christ but in Christian community" and "The incarnation and resurrection are not past events but (...) logical aspects of the divine essence".

All of these remarks give us the kenotic aspect of God. God is the movement of self division and self othering. But why does God have to make himself something sensorial and finite? The answer is: By becoming something finite in the sensorial world, God knows himself. The concept of God as God, like Universality in Logic must particularise himself. So, the Being of God consists of self-othering. For exemple, the universal which is beyond all its particularisations could not be a real universal which conforms to its truth. Therefore, already in the beginning, the true universal is self-division. A universal which remains in its simple purity is only an abstarction made by external reflection. Universality that lies in its particularities and that realize its essence through them is the true universality. In short, universal is creative and immenant to its particulars. Secondly, the Hegelian dialectic constitutes an immenance against transcendence, because a transcendent divinity would be a divinity without self-consciousness.

We can express all this as follows: Logic, as the science of pure thought is not something external to beings, but a contrario is the very being of beings, their internal movement exposed in pure thought. And God is not something graspable by pictural thinking but through the movement of logical Concept itself because a living thing is by nature a conceptual being. This is the main point of Hegel's philosophy. Moreover, like God, life and Spirit are also concepts in movement and their particularisations are its productions. Immenance is the most important aspect of universality and thanks to immanenance, universal remains in its productions. That is to say, the Universal becomes *for itself*. But an abstarct Universal "keeps singularity, individuality, and the personality principle away from their products, and thus cannot reach beyond Universalities without life and spirit, without color and without content" (Hegel 2014, 275). In this case, it is possible to say that a true divinity is close to its productions; God with his community! This is the very truth of God. But what's the truth in itself? What is this truth that provides a movement as such?

The truth is to see reality from a point of view. Therefore, a question like this could be answered only by determining the form of this truth;

Further, the living Substance is being which is in truth Subject, or what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself. This Substance is, as Subject, pure, simple negativity, and is for this very reason the bifurcation of the simple. Only this self-restoring Sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself-not an original or immediate unity as such-is the True (Hegel 1977, 10).

This passage above presents us the Hegelian spirit in its speculatif form. What is important here is the life as a living substance which is simple negativity, a becoming of itself in the other. In this case, the self-negation and also the negation of this negation is the general procedure of the concept. Here we already see the transition to other by way of negation. The essential point is the circular shape of this structure. The circular form of this movement gives us the end of this movement; a unity differentiated and enriched by movement. Such a return is the end of this procedure. "Only this self-restoring Sameness" is the truth because the truth is self-knowing self-consciousness and its movement. "This reflection in otherness within itself" is the name of this type of self-restoring. Restoration means internalizing the other without reducing it to nothingness. On the contrary, in this movement we see an act of self surrender.

To summarize; the religious dimension of Hegel's philosophy introduces us with an immenant divinity, responding to the logical requirements. But there is also another dimension. An immenant divinity is a divinity in the World, with his community. Now, it is possible to compare the Christian embodied God with the Greek deities who were also sensorial. They were inside the walls of Greek cities, without recognizing the citizens (Lebrun 1972, 24). Although there was a sensorial dimension of the gods, there was not a community around these gods. The Greek Gods were foreigners! The kenotic aspect of Christian God destroys this unfamiliarity; God makes himself something finite and suffers like a man and dies like a man in pain! Kenosis is the sacrifice, a sacrifice that performed for the community of belivers.

But there are also historical reasons behind the Hegel's philosophy of religion. Bubbio declares;

The Enlightenment pursues the emancipation of the self that Christianity had initiated: this is the merit of the Enlightenment. Accomplishing intellectual liberation from the abstract God of traditional metaphysics and theology (which is the death of the Cartesian divine guarantor), the Enlightenment represents the peak of the crisis in normativity. Here one can think of Kant's repeated claim that one must listen to moral commands as if they were spoken by the voice of God—an attempted solution to safeguard normativity that shows all its intrinsic weakness soon enough and results in the "reflective philosophy of subjectivity". Like Christ's disciples after the crucifixion, human beings now experience grief in a godless and meaningless World (Bubbio 130-31, 2017).¹

After Kant, God becomes something unknowable and world becomes something meaningless. The being of God is reduced to moral voice by resisting to being visible and knowable. Such a world isoleted from the truth is only World of finitude. So with the appearance of critical philosophy a rupture between God and man has taken place. Against this, Hegelian philosophy introduces a new form of infinitude; an infinity that becomes finite in order to make itself visible. By this way the truth could be in this World with us. In short, kenosis as self-sacrifice, emptying oneself was a solution to this modern crisis, however a solution within the limits of modernism; a finit subject must also empty itself to make room for others. The modern area and its ethical structure depends on a such self surrender (Bubbio 2015, 702). In fact, the absolute is this making room for others, leaving men in his pleasure, by this way the Spirit as absolute also makes himself the real substance of all things.

¹ Bubbio redefines Hegel's metaphysics by using Redding's expression "strong transcendental idealism". For Bubbio, with this expression it becomes possible to see Hegelian philosophy as a succesor of Kantian critical philosophy. In this lecture, the problem of recognition plays a central role; by redefining Hegelian metaphysics as normative structuration of reality, Bubbio makes it dependant to recognition. But recognition has a kenotic structure. An excellent recognition depends on a reciprocal self-sacrifice and this type of sacrifice is par essence a kenotic one. We have a metaphysics which is based on recognition outside of the limits of christian kenosis. Hegel's philosophy of religion compels religion to become more logical and immenant.

5

From the point of view of Hegel, Kant's critical philosophy leads us towards a world where subjective truth becomes insignificant by no longer being true (Hegel 1996, 60). According to this philosophy, the infinite is the other of the finite, beyond its horizon. However, for Hegel the Kantian infinitude, under the rubric of the idea, reappears, but this time as an unconditional which can never be the object of intuition (Hegel 2021, 387). For Hegel, the philosophical duty would be to actualize the infinite by saving it from its indeterminate state and this could be realized through kenosis that could re-unite the finite with the infinite and *vice versa*.

2. The Kenosis of Spirit

2.1. The Unhappy Consciousness and the Entäußerung

With the unhappy consciousness, the consciousness experiences its finitude as an impasse; as a self-consciousness, the unhappy consciousness tries to make itself equal to itself. But its truth is in a beyond and it is impossible for consciousness to connect itself with this beyond. All the strategies of the unhappy consciousness becomes a search to find a bridge that could connect its finitude to infinitude, because as a self consicousness, the unhappy consciousness is an assumption that suppose a reconciliation with which it sees as something essential and incheangable. Therefore, for us this self-consciousness lives in a deep contradiction; it is itself at the same time the finit consciousness and the infinite and uncheangable truth which is seen as the essential part. But this truth is not transperant to it, beacause it is a consciousness which separates its object from itself as something alien. But in reality and for us it has two aspect; one of them is its finite and chaengable part and the other is its essential and unchangeable part;

The Unhappy Consciousness itself is the gazing of one self-consciousness into another, and itself is both, and the unity of both is also its essential nature. But it is not as yet explicitly aware that this is its essential nature, or that it is the unity of both (Hegel 1977, 126).

The origine of unhappy consciousness relates to slave consicosness who gives shape to nature and lives with fear. If so, the slave had been thrown to its interiority by the repression of the Lord. He is the being of inwardness. And this inwardness is the origine of the incomprehension inherent to unhappy consciousness too: the latter can not see the effective truth that the beyond posited by it, is in fact is its own creation. But, to better understand this structure belonging to unhappy consciousness we must look to the genesis of self-consciousness itself. The first thing to discern about this concept is that it is selfcontained truth. In sum, the essence of the unhappy consciousness is the consciousness of the slave. But the consciousness of the slave relates to self-consciousness in general.

Behind the self consciousness we find a logic of comeback; self-consciousness is a consicousness which falls back to itself. It falls back because all the moments before self-consciousness becomes only its moments; "this in-itself (the object's) turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for an other" (Hegel 1977, 104). That's to say, the object is nothing more than a construction of consciousness. This revelation transforms the consciousness and "These are no longer essences, but are moments of self-consciousness, as self-consciousness, henceforth has a double object: one is the immediate object, (...) and the

second, viz. itself, which is the true essence, and is present in the first instance only as opposed to the first object" (Hegel 1977, 105). In this manner, self-consciousness is the name for a movement which tries to make its identity explicit against the division. The world is the other and the self is this power for which the world has no more importance, but the self will experince the independance of its object; "Self-consciousness which is simply for itself and directly characterizes its object as a negative element, or is primarly desire, will therefore, on the contrary, learn through experience that the object is independent" (Hegel 1977, 106). This structure is the main organization of the section "Self-Consciousness".

In fact, in its first characterization, the self-consciousness is only a need for selfidentity, but this supposed self-identity gradually becomes more and more impossible or temporary. Because the real object that could provide self-identity is an aother self consciousness. This necessity is the most important reason behind the search of un happy consciousness. Unhappy consciousness is a search for reconciliation. At the end, with the appearence of unhappy consciousness the two poles of the consicousness could be unified only *externally*. The unhappy self-consciousness assumes that its reconciliation with the unchangeable could be provided by the mediation of church. Contrary to this assumption, self-consciousness finds itself more and more estranged from the world in which it finds itself.

The whole movement of self-consciousness, therefore, is only an effort to realize itself. But, an effort to realize oneself is useless without recognition by another. Its being depends on another. The being of "I" needs a recognition. And a real and effective recognition would be a recognition by another who is the substance and the essence of all that is. That's to say, God. But God must be with its community, must walk in the earth. However, now we find ourselves faced with an insurmountable obstacle. The unhappy consciousness is defined by a polarity which causes a division of which the fusion would be impossible without an external intervention. "Since it is, to begin with, only the immediate unity of the two and so takes them to be, not the same, but opposites, one of them, viz. the simple Unchangeable, it takes to be the unessential Being; but the other, the protean Changeable, it takes to be the unessential" (Hegel, 1977, 126-127). Such an experience produces an unhappy life, because what is essential lies in a beyond and in this case the consciousness sees itself as an inessential being.

But what makes unhappy consciousness advanced over other forms of selfconsciousness is the sense of representing the unchangeable as an individual. It must be remembered that the unhappy consciousness has the memory of Christ, his being in the world as the son of God. The advantage of the unhappy consciousness then is its capability to bring togehter pure thinking with individuality. An unchangeable as an individual is a solid ground. But now the unhappy consciousness is only a intuition; "it is the unity of pure thinking and individuality; also it knows itself to be this thinking individuality or pure thinking, and knows the Unchangeable itself essentially as an individuality" (Hegel 1977, 130-131). This formation of consciousness, its bringing together individuality with thinking is *par essence* the achievement of christianity which is for now only a feeling not a reality. The real advance would be like this; "the Unchangeable, which it knows essentially in the form of individuality, is its own self" (Hegel, 1977, 131). Self-consciousness must see the world as a production of itself, a truth engendered by its work! The Christian religion is the reason behind this form of consciousness and the unhappy consciousness is a progress when it is compared to stoicism and skepticism, because it thinks of the unchangeable as an individuality.

But thers is an obstacle, as we said; "the Unchangeable, which it knows essentially in the form of individuality, is its own self" but unhappy consciousness has not such a knowledge and because of this, "it does not relate itself as a thinking consciousness to its object, but, though it is indeed in itself, or implicitly, a pure thinking individuality, and its object is just this pure thinking" (Hegel 1997, 131) it is only a *devotion*. Peter Kalkavage says that the purpose of unhappy consciousness is to unite with the other who is an unchangeable being. But this communion can be achieved only by freeing oneself from its unessential being (Kalkavage 2007, 142). Freeing oneself from oneself, it is an action of self-emptying, but one that has no effective solution to the split between two poles of the relationship. The foundation of the unhappy consciousness was its feeling of itself as a futile being before that of the essential. The real reason of this attempt of self-sacrifice is this feeling due to slavery. During slavery, consciousness experienced its being as a futile thing and that is why we see in the last part the effort to overcome this feeling by an action of selfemptying; "it truly and completely deprives itself of the consciousness of inner and outer freedom, of the actuality in which consciousness exists for itself" (Hegel 1977, 137).

To summarize; This consciousness is only a consicousness of its nothingness and worthlessness (Kalkavage 2007, 142). Devotion, working and depriving itself were the three form of this experience. At the and of the story, the unhappy consciousness makes himself a thing, a worthless being through self-emptying. The Entäußerung which is achieved in the last part of the *Self-Consciousness* section consists of a self- subordination. The church is an institution based on its action that denies its being as a free subjectivity. Morever, if we interpret everything that happens in the section of the unhappy conscience from the perspective of the history of religious thought, it is possible to say that, this type of subordination had taken place thanks to Paul and to his thought based on the religious thinking. The Religious thought imitates everything that takes place as external things, although the true locus of all that takes place is self-consciousness itself (Dubilet 2018, 109).²

At the end, the consciousness can not empties itself from itself, but it only turns back by sticking to itself. Consciousness, due to its stubborn character turns back to itself. According to Hegel this means only that "the universal which thereby comes to be for it, is not regarded as its own doing" (Hegel 1977, 138). Consciousness is this incapacity to see the inherence of universal to particular, that's to say it fails to notice its being as logical and conceptual. The unchangeable is in reality its own being, its own consciousness. Alex Dubilet explains that in this self-sacrifice what is missing is a thought of immenance that could help a well-accomplished Entäußerung (Dubilet 2018, 113). Consciousness in this

 $^{^{2}}$ According to Dubilet, the true realization of an act as self-emptying should be outside of the christology. This means, only a philosophical approach could understand what happens in reality; "Articulated within such a context, self- emptying never subverts the fundamental difference between self and other, but allows them to persist as themselves in their self- negation" (Dubilet 2018, 109-10). In short, a pictural thinking like religion can not see the interdependance and interpenetration of finitude and infinitude. In this form of thought coappertenance of the opposites sides could not be overcame.

state remains like a prisoner of transcendence and therfore it separates itself from the other. In short, self-surrender is not a true self-emptying!

2.2. The Sprit as a Kenotic Movement

The Hegelian Spirit is not something stands aside like an identitcal essence, but an immenant substance which provides a field for its members. "Spirit (...) is the unmoved solid ground and starting-point for the action of all" (Hegel 1977, 264) in such a way that its substantial being breaks into small pieces. In each of them the purpose is still the Spirit itself! Here it is very easy to discern two different modes of the Spirit; to be a substance and to be a substance dissolved to its members. In one case it is identity, in the other, being-for-itself. The dissolution of substance means opening a place for action and it also means "the selves" of all individuals. For Hegel, this moment assures a life to the spirit and that is why the spirit is alive and actual. So, the spirit is an opening up for the other and such an opening shows itself as a sacrifice and at the same time an exteriorization. To be more precise, an exteriorization of the self as self-emptying.

That's why, the birth of spirit is based on kenotic action and there is almost a *summum bonum* in the religious sense of the word because there is a godly charitiy and goodness; to give a space for action like a gift through a dissolution. For this reason, according to Beiser, the origin and the meaning of the spirit must be sought in the period of Frankfurt of Hegel. During this period, Hegel saw an identity between subject and object through religion and love. For Beiser, such an identity alludes to a recognition between subject and its other; both of them realizes their essences through its other (Beiser 2019, 157). If we look at this structure carefully, we see an immenance opened for action, for realizing itself through the other, provided by religion or by love. There is a co-appertenance by the mediation of self-exteriorization, a release of oneself from oneself towards World, an action of self-emptying which has no final destination. Malabou defines this in French "voir venir"; to see what will happen... There is an horizon without any final determinacy. Because there is an interpenetration inherent to Spirit. Spirit is itself this taking place of inter-penetration and there is no final moment which could unify this polarity in an unidimensional form.

What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is -this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: "I" that is "We" and "We" that is "I"." (Hegel 1997, 110).

Such inter-penetration, "we" as "I" and "I" as a "we", a passage from one to the other and vice versa is defined as the Spirit. The Spirit is the name for an "unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence". Then, Spirit is a "we", a form of "we" where freedom and independence find an opportunity to become an indefinite future (l'avenir).³ There is a self-exposition of the self, a realese without any predication. But how can we understand this "we"? I mean the modality of this "we". Its being lived by us, in the World. Here we find an absolute and absolving modality of "we". "Rather, all of these figures expose us, by their determinacy, to the unbinding or dislocation of all "Selves", of all self-certainties. It is we who are exposed, and thus it is to ourselves that we are exposed" (Nancy 1997, 116). *Ex-position* means a

³ Malabou, in his well-known book on Hegel, links kenosis to time. Through the incarnation God makes himself a predicat, an accident. The Lord posits himself out of himself and becomes fragile and plastic. "Voir venir", that's to say to see what happens to himself and to World, is the result of kenosis. (Malabou 1996, 166-167)

presence outside of the self but also to be prey to the outside. So here it's very easy to see the kenotic movement, the outward movement that opens itself into an opening. But this type of openness gives rise to indeterminacy and multiplicity which dissolves absolute to absolvant future. Therefore, it is not easy to see in Hegel an appropriation which reappropriate itself by the mediation of the other. Instead, there is a continous process which dis-appropriates its every members properties.

With these elucidations on the spirit we are close to a clear and summarizing perspective. Now we must clarify the kenotic aspect of the spirit, because in the previous section we have seen a failed exemple of kenosis. There, we have seen a third who had intervened as mediator between what is essential and what is changeant. But this type of renunciation had caused to an inwardness very strong, rather than a self-exteriorization in a field of immenance. As Alex Dubilet says; "Instead, it (spirit) names an unceasing reciprocal self-emptying, a reciprocal self-emptying and externalization that affirms its immanence as preceding and exceeding any structure of oppositional severance" (Dubilet 2018, 117). In this case, the Hegelian spirit consists of division of itself into a multiplicity of self-consciousnesses. But this division is at the same time an opening of a World which requires also the self-emptying of the self-consciousness. The reciprocity is the subsidary feature of kenosis.

The essence of Spirit, its division and differentiation to self-consciousnesses is also a repetition of logical concept; "the concept is the ground and the source of all finite determinateness and manifoldness" (Hegel 2010, 520). This definition accentuates the creative essence of the concept; a true concept is the foundation of singularities. It is a selfemptying process. Without a formation towards self-determination up to singularities, the concept will be only a means for the classification. But for Hegel the concept is the ground and the source in such a way that it would be incomplete without the self-manifestation and self-emptying process. This type of self-emptying process is also a turning point in metaphysics; for exemple, the Hegelian concept as a universal is not something that the particulars should partake for the sake of being good, brave, true etc. The Hegelian concept is no longer an idea in the Platonic sense;

On Hegel's conception of the universal, the universal must necessarily be in each particular as a whole, for "the elements distinguished are without more ado at the same time, declared to be identical with one another and with the whole, and the specific character of each is a free being of the whole Notion" (Moss 2021, 319).

The same is also true for the sprit as well. The spirit is concept *per se*, it is the ground as a self-differentiation such that all the members are equally the universel itself. However, a Platonic idea is a machine used to distinguish the true from the non-true. There is a discrimination in the search to find the true member of the idea. But Hegelian point of view is inclusive. Hegel, in *the Logic of the Encyclopedia*, declares that with the birth of the Christian religion, Universality becames a universality which includes all men (Hegel 1996, 110). But an idea in the Platonic sense is only an essence that remains invisible in its visibility. This is why a method is needed that tries to find the true against what is only a similar. Why? Because an essence as such resists visibility and transparency. There is no a movement like self-emptying... Without such action which consists of self-exteriorizaton as

release we have a discrimination like barbarians and greeks. There is always someone who is the real owner of the essence against which there are only similars.

If we pursue this path, it will become very clear that Christianity symbolizes a break with the Greek religion, which according to Hegel did not know God in his selfmanifestation. Greek God was a mystery behind his appearance, either as a statue or as a visible being. So, an appearance is not a manifestation. It is a movement of appearing while remaining in itself. In this way, we have also got the perspective of *Logic of Essence*; there is a deep difference between appearance and manifestation, between die Erscheinung and die Manifestation. Appearance hides something, although she gives herself in her appearance. On the contrary, the manifestation is always a self-manifestation, self-release;

To let this "for" stand as such is to liberate the self - which also means to liberate freedom itself. For it is to untie the self from any determination to which it would be attached: that of a substance or that of a subject in the sense of a given personal identity, that of an individual or that of a people, that of any essence or symbol, meaning, form or figure."(Nancy 1997, 53-54)

This point of view is also a critic of the essence as a dichotomy between inside and outside. But is there something totally inside a part from the outside? For Nancy "to be "forself" is to be "for" this absolute non-preexistence" (Nancy 1997, 53). There is always a forself prior to in-itself and the kenotic movement is the very condition of in-itself. Essence as a point of view is metaphysical, because it suppose an in-itself as mere presence which stands far from appearence. Aforementioned unhappy consciousness was this essentialist position. In short, the kenotic movement marks a turning point for metaphysics and also for religion. Through the kenotic movement we see a subversive reconciliation that demolishes all truths given as eternal free from the trace of time. At the same time, such a demolition gives us a new theory of subjectivity. What means a subject is to renounce its subjectivity as a sterile identity, to untie itself from its own property given as a heritage to protect. When it comes to Hegel, appropriation becomes dispossession; to be in one's other as oneself does not mean to submit the other to oneself. On the contrary, as the master-slave dialectic has shown us, subjugating another to one's power reduces the self to its isolation and loneliness. Such subjectivity will forever remain perfect incompleteness; dissatisfaction that has no recognition; "He (Lord) is, therefore, not certain of being-for-self as the truth of himself. On the contrary, his truth is in reality the unessential consciousness and its unessential action" (Hegel 1977, 117). The master as possessor of the property finds himself in an instant dispossessed. He is dependent. It is very easy to see that the history is the history of slave;

But just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it wants to be, so too servitude in its coosummation will really turn into the opposite of what it immediately is; as a consciousness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly independent consciousness" (Hegel 1997, 117).

It is necessary to understand the reason behind of this reversal; the destruction and the submission of the other is also the destruction of the object of the self-consicousness. At first glance, the lord gains an independance. In fact this independance is exceedingly dependant and turns out to be its opposite; "On the contrary, his (Lord's) truth is in reality the unessential consciousness and its unessential action" (Hegel 1977, 117). But all of these statements about this conclusion, which are nothing other than the reversal of the initial intenion, are insufficients. There is a reason behind this reversal; "but the lord, who has interposed the bondsman between it and himself, takes to himself only the dependent aspect

of the thing and has the pure enjoyment of it. The aspect of its independence he leaves to the bondsman, who works on it" (Hegel 1977, 116). So the servile part of this relationship is the truth of this relationship itself. By working, slave gains an independance, it is true but at the same time what is important is to remember that the slave had gone to his interiority by separating himself from the exterior. This was the reason behind the unhappy consciousness. In short, the unhappy consciousness is a result of the first exteriorization (the dialectic of master-slave) and the final outcome of the self-consciousness with unhappy consciousness was the total resignation of self-consciousness on behalf of a transcendance.

Consequently, the spirit is the movement which overcomes the defailment of the unhappy consciousness. According to Alex Dubilet, there are two aspects of Spirit, which prevent spirit to repeat the failure of unhappy consciosness. One of them is "that substance empties itself of its own self and becomes self-consciousness" and the other movement is the self's action that corresponds to the first action in which "self- consciousness empties itself of itself and makes itself into thinghood, that is, into the universal". (Dubilet 2018, 93) That's to say there is a reciprocity, which was missing in unhappy consciousness. The reciprocity is the main signature of immenance and also of speculative thinking. In this reciprocal movement the substance makes itself subject and the subject makes itself something universal. This reciprocal transitions are constituted on a specuative and immenant dimension; on Spirit. Because spirit is at the same a substance and a subject, an identity and a charity which opens up a field in which everyone has its place.

To summerize; the kenosis problem has a direct relationship with a lecture which is genereally accepted; Hegel's philosophy tries to appropriate all that is the other of subjectivity, so a Hegelian-like exteriorization wants nothing more than a forced reappropriation. To appropriate what is outside of subjectivity by way of externalization... But Hegel certainly undermines all traces and figurations of transcendence, but he does this not in order to affirm, but to undermine the operations of appropriation whose agent and ultimate result would be the (human) subject. But, according to classical or widespread reading of Hegelien philosophy, what matters is to make the other something to be left behind. In this account, the other is only a moment for the sake of a re-union with self or a reappropriation of the self by the self. In fact, according to A. Dubilet, such an interpretation is based on Aufhebung and the other, in a process of Aufhebung is there in front of us for our need, for our need for unification. The most apparent example of this reduction of the other, as we have seen, was the dialectic of "the Master-Slave" in which the slave had found himself obliged to return to his interiority. This return to the inwardness was the basic reason of the unhappiness and the the meaning of this return was to turn away from the World.

2.3. Kenotic Movement in Philosophy of Religion

To better understand the final solution of kenosis, it is necessary to explain the position of God in Hegelian philosophy. As Beiser says, because God does not separate himself from the world, he makes himself nature and history although he is distinct from the world. So, the religous dimension in Hegel is central in order to understand. But we must first look at the source of the word kenosis and also its use in the religious field.

Bubbio tells us that "the term "kenotic" derives from the Greek word kenosis, meaning "emptiness" (Bubbio 2015, 7). But the use of term in the context of religion "dates

back to the Christian New Testament, in particular Philippians 2:7, where, to describe the incarnation of Christ, it is said that Christ "withdrew" or "emptied himself" (ekonosen)" (Bubbio 2015,7). In the same manner, Hegel use kenosis by translating it as "Entäußerung". There is a sacrifice in this movement, adjacant to exteriorization. This means that in Hegel's Phenomenology we read this; "or, since self-consciousness through its sacrifice brings forth substance as Subject, the substance remains self-consciousness's own Self" (Hegel 1977, 453-454). Or we read also this; "The externalization (or kenosis) of substance," means that "substance is in itself self-consciousness" (Hegel 1997, 457). Substance, by a miraculous action transforms itself to something other and is already in itself this other. Likewise, the blood is in itself a cup of wine. But we must read this representation in its true form, in the speculative shape; in its speculative meaning the otherness is not something beyond but is internal to it. Therfore, in its religous context sacrifice means the destruction of the natural (Bubbio 2015, 11). In fact, a natural thing is a thing circumscribed to a limit, and it is another of its other, thanks to a well-defined limit. But what is a real sacrifice? It is a transformation which beraks the limits. Through self-sacrifice we obtain the mystery of the reality; this mystery is the speculative. The substance is in itself self-consciousness... The point of view of speculation requires a relation based on the immenence of two points of view, their being intertwined to each other. For this, we must have an image which serves to show us this truth under its pictural thinking. The kenosis is this image which gives us the real structure of the speculative. In short, thanks to kenosis we gave an unity between man and God; "Spirit is known as self-consciousness and to this self-consciousness it is immediately revealed, for Spirit is this self-consciousness itself. The divine nature is the same as the human, and it is this unity that is beheld" (Hegel 1997, 460).

In its essence this image of incarnation as kenosis repeats the movement of the concept. The concept is its differentiation and it is this movement itself. To sum up; the self-emptying concept is the reason behind the religous imagination. Furthemore, the religion could be understood only by speculative thought; "God is attainable in pure speculative knowledge alone (...) for He is Spirit" (Hegel 1997, 461). God is Spirit, that's to say God is a supreme being who empties-itself from itself through incarnation. The essence of God is this transition. But at the same time this content is speculative, because it is only by thinking that this content opens itself totally to consciousness.

The best way to understand this structure is to turn to Hegel, for whom religion and philosophy have the same content:

Speculative knowledge knows God as Thought or pure Essence, and knows this Thought as simple Being and as Existence, and Existence as the negativity of itself, hence as Self, as the Self that is at the same time this individual, and also the universal, Self (Hegel 1997, 461).

Now, text quoted above presents us a schema. According to this schema God is itself pure thought. Secondly God is this thought as Existence (the moment of incarnation). Thirdly, it is negation of itself and therfore at the same time this indivudual and universal. But we have to be careful, because philosophical language is distinct from that of religion. In philsophical language there is no place for the trinity as such. As Malabou says, the Hegelian perspective is defined by difference. It is with the difference that God makes himself finite; "The dialectical "difference" is the key word for a chain conceptual which declines all the figures of the exit of God out of himself: *Entzweiung*, *Entfremdung*, and, of course, *Entäußerung*" (Malabou 1996, 137).

But there is also the death of Christ. This death is the ultimate point in the religion. For Bubbio, with the death of Christ the Christian community was forced to think this death through the concept. The death is more important than incarnation, because with that death, the human race was leaved to its own destiny. This idea of divine death, regards this death as something which annihilate all the externality. The disappearence of Christ's corporal existence, its dispersion in time and in space is the most perfect consummation of representation (Malabou 1996, 134). A real reconcilitation would be one that is extremly spiritual. Because the representation is only a pictural thinking and could not understand the real speculative content. The death of God means not the impossibility of reconciliation, contrary, it is the perfect occasion for a reconciliation. God himself is dead;

through this is expressed the consciousness that the human, the finite, the fragile, the weakness, the negative are themselves a divine moment, that this is in God himself, that finitude, the negative, the being-other are not outside of God and, as being-other, do not prevent unity with God" (Hegel 2004, 241).

Thanks to God's death the meaning of being in the World transforms itself. From now on, man is open to everything that will be contingent, but this contingency or the fragility of the world will no longer be an unhappy thing. There will be no more room for stoicism, or better all that refers to interiority and all that accentuates loneliness as a virtue will no longer be important. Man, this animal who is pushed outside of himself is always outside of his simplicity. Interiority is the most empty thing of the World. The truth is there, out of the simple interiority. To be outside of oneself is to live in the limit and what makes a living being a being of spirit is the intuition of limit. But the intiution of the limit also reveals the limitless, the infinitude. That's to say, the limit is the birth place of spirit, because thanks to limit the self-transcendance, the effort to go outside of oneself creates the World.

Now we have the general meaning of the Spirit; the Spirit is to exceed its inner purity. As Gilles Marmasse says; "The alterity to which the spirit relates is a principle of concretization, but not a cause of alienation. While logic is disembodied and nature is, for its part, engulfed in the sensible, the spirit affirms its freedom within its limited content" (Marmasse 2008, 382). For Spirit, the otherness is its ocassion to be *for self*. The Spirit is openness *par excellence*. Spirit is the will to go outside of itself. In sum, there is no interiority before exteriorization, there is no proper that one has as a property. There is always dispropriation because the proper is always in the process of being de-possessed.

3. Conclusion

It is not surprising that the death of a corporal and sensorial being is at the same time the resurrection of its essence; "but a sensual certainty which at the same time passes into the spiritual consciousness and is likewise inverted into immediate sensual, in such a way that one also sees there the movement, the history of God, the life that God himself is" (Hegel 2004, 243). All this is of no use except that the eternal truth is with us. The truth is with us in such a way that the mediation itself, Christ, died to show us the truth as revealed. God is with his community! So, God is not something that is beyond our knowledge, but God is itself this movement of self-differenciation, being outside of himself, the movement of kenosis. Firstly, the constitution of Spirit depends on kenosis. Secondly, the true understanding of religous kenosis is philosophical kenosis. Thirdly and surprisingly, according Malabou, the representation is itself the consequence of concepts kenosis. Fourth acoording to Bubbio and Dubilet we must understand the hegelian kenosis as the essence of modern subjectivity.

To better understand all that we had told, we must also relate to Derrida; "So we have, for once, a kind of intuition of absence or, more precisely, the aiming of an absence through a full intuition" (Derrida 1997, 96). The interpretation of Derrida on Hegel's sign is based on a kenosis too. The sign is grave, we have no doubt about this, but the reason behind this grave which represents insufficiently the thought is the thought itself; thought is this exteriorization of itself in plain visibility. The sign is only a simple immediate unity of representation and sensibility, a being together of spontaneity and an immediate datum, a datum found being here below, a singular. And the grave of the soul is a production of this soul itself, because the very condition of this exteriorization is pure thought itself. Therfore the thought itself is its dis-appropriation!

The first result, according to which the constitution of Spirit depends o kenosis means that there is a space for exteriorization prior to any interiorization. There is no one property which is in essence owned by anyone, but there is always an incessant process of reappropriation and dis-appropriation. So, the real meaning of the transformation of substance to subject means also this incessant process.

The second point is about the form of the knowledge. Representation has an imaginary comprehension which finds its truth in philosophy but *apres-coup*. The truth, the reel form of knowledge waits for its time to come.

Thirdly, the representation is the result of a kenosis made by conceptual thinking. This point is connected to second point. Therefore, time and knowledge are intrinsically linked to each other.

Fourth, the essence of subjectivity, its being, is nothing other than its self surrender. The world and history are based on this necessary action. Being a subject is always being outside. The truth as subject means this transition, this passage. Hegel's Self-Emptying Subject

Bibliography

BEİSER Friedrich (2019). Hegel (çev. Seçim Beyazıt), İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları.

BUBBİO, Paolo Diego (2017). God and the Self in Hegel, New York: Suny Press.

BUBBIO, Paolo Diego (2015). Hegel: Death of God and Recognition of the Self, içinde *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 23:5, 689-706,

DERRİDA Jacques (1997). Marges de la Philosophie, Paris: Editions Du Minuit.

DUBİLET Alex (2018). *The Self-Emptying Subject, Kenosis and İmmanence, Medieval to Modern*, New York: Fordham University Press.

HEGEL Georg Wilhelm (1977). *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Çev. Miller ve Findlay), New York: Oxford University Press.

HEGEL Georg Wilhelm (1996). Anahatlarda Felsefi Bilimler Ansiklopedisi (Çev. Aziz Yardımlı), İstanbul: İdea yayınları

HEGEL Georg Wilhelm (2004). *Leçons sur la Philosophie de la Religion* (Çev. Jean-Luc Marion), Paris: Gallimard.

HEGEL Georg Wilhelm (2010). *The Science of Logic* (Çev. George di Giovanni), Cambridge: Cambrideg University Press.

HEGEL Georg Wilhelm (2014). Mantık Bilimi (Çev. Aziz Yardımlı), İstanbul: İdea Yayınları

HEGEL Georg Wilhelm (2021). Felsefe Tarihi Dersleri III (Çev. Doğan Barış Kılınç), İstanbul: Nota Bene.

KALKAVAGE Peter (2007). The Logic of Desire, Philadelpia: Paul Dry Books.

LEBRUN Gerard (1972). La Patience du Concept, Paris: Gallimard.

MALABOU Cathrine (1996). L'Avenir de Hegel, Paris: PUF.

MARMASSE Gilles (2008). Penser le Réel Hegel, la Nature et l'Esprit, Paris: Kimé

MOSS Gregory (2021). Hegel's Foundation Free Metaphysics, Londra: Routledge.

NANCY Jean-Luc (1997). Hegel L'inquietude du Négatif, Paris: Hachette.