



## *Crisis Management Policies Concerning the Russo-Ukrainian War in the European Union's Security and Defence Approach: Soft Power and EUAM*

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### Abstract

The European Union (EU) has long been formulating security and defense policies, and strategy documents, incorporating modern developments, based on joint assessment of threats and challenges against the security of Europe. European Union, while striving to optimize existing sources and boosting the overall efficiency of crisis management policies to address foreign crises, falls short of substantial progress in overcoming the challenges. This article aims to discuss the EU's crisis management policies regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War, covering the years 2014-2022, from a historical perspective on the Union's approach to security and defense. In this context, this article focuses on the use of soft power and European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) adopted by the European Union for Ukraine as part of its crisis management policy, and evaluates the security and defense approach it has displayed in resolving the crisis combined with the objectives pursued and the goals to be achieved.

**Keywords:** European Union, Ukraine, Russia, EUAM, soft power, crisis management policies

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# *Avrupa Birliđi'nin Güvenlik ve Savunma Yaklaşımında Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı'na Yönelik Kriz Yönetim Politikaları: Yumuşak Güç ve EUAM*

## **Özet**

Avrupa Birliđi, uzun yıllardır güvenlik ve savunmaya ilişkin çeşitli politikalar belirlemekte ve Avrupa'nın güvenliđi için karşılaşılan tehditlerin ve zorlukların ortak deđerlendirmesini temel alan ve modern dünyanın gelişmelerini içeren strateji belgeleri üretmektedir. Avrupa Birliđi, dış krizlere yanıt vermek üzere mevcut kaynakları optimize etmek ve kriz yönetim politikalarının genel etkinliđini artırmak noktasında çaba sergilemekte, fakat sorunlarla başa çıkma konusunda çok az ilerleme kaydetmektedir. Bu makale, Avrupa Birliđi'nin Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı'na yönelik 2014-2022 yıllarını kapsayan kriz yönetim politikalarını, Birliđin güvenlik ve savunma anlayışına ilişkin tarihsel yaklaşımla ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda bu makale, Avrupa Birliđi'nin kriz yönetim politikasında Ukrayna için benimsediđi yumuşak güç kullanımına ve EUAM'a odaklanmakta ve krizin çözülmesinde sergilediđi güvenlik ve savunma yaklaşımını gözetilen amaçlar ve ulaşılmaması beklenen hedeflerle deđerlendirmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Avrupa Birliđi, Ukrayna, Rusya, EUAM, yumuşak güç, kriz yönetim politikaları



## 1. INTRODUCTION

Europe has been worn out over long periods of war and policies and hasn't been able to wield its full potential. The dedication to rebuild everything in both Eastern and Western Europe has been a driving force for Europe and a desire for social and economic recovery has been demonstrated. The collapse of old structures over time prepared the grounds for innovation and a defense umbrella emerged in Europe within the framework of Marshall Plan aid (Kennedy, 1991, p.496). The United States' adoption of liberal internationalism after 1945, in essence the Marshall Plan, involved American aid to Europe. The Marshall Plan focused on state building and integrating some parts of the working class in Europe. The Marshall Plan played a significant role in addressing economic needs against the communist threat, and as a turning point in world history, it provided consensus on the recognition of the Soviet threat and providing economic support to Europe. Many causes have become social issues with the Marshall Plan (McCourt and Mudge, 2022, p.2-5).

In the meanwhile, democracy was supported against Russian expansionism according to foreign policy trends and Russia's integration into the international system was considered a key role in the emerging international order. For this reason, it was vital to influence Russia's behavior and calculations and preventing Soviet hegemony in Europe became crucial in the act (Kissinger, 2012, p.794-795).

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, most of the countries in the Eastern Bloc turned to the European Union (EU) and the Eastern European countries were presented with a EU membership perspective. Enlargement policy has always been a strong suit of the EU (Güner, 2020, p.165) and Eastern European countries have turned to Europe for both political and economic reasons. Therefore, Eastern European countries desired Union protection against the possible revival of communism and the security concerns of Eastern European countries made it impossible to neglect these regions (Düzgit, 2013, p.46).

Ukraine was among the countries experiencing security concerns, and since December 2, 1991, which is accepted as the beginning of the European Union-Ukraine relations, the political culture of Ukraine has developed. Particularly after 2014, reforms in Ukraine intensified significantly and most Ukrainians supported European integration. At this stage, Russian pressure on Ukraine was relentless and Moscow tried to halt the political development. Indeed, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 substantially affected both the EU and the rest of the world, and it was once again loudly proclaimed that Russia is a threat to Eastern European countries. Located between Europe and Russia, Ukraine has presented a crisis given the political expectations of both sides within the framework of these issues.

Based on the security and defense approaches of the EU, covering the years 2014-2022, this article presents a theoretical framework on soft power and the European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) in the Union's crisis management policies regarding the



Russia-Ukraine War. The article starts by building on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the 2003 European Security Strategy, the 2016 European Union Global Strategy and the 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. Then, in light of these documents, the EU's approach to crises in security and defense policies and its evaluations on Ukraine are analyzed. Finally, the article discusses how the EU employs its soft power in the crisis management policies towards the Russia-Ukraine War and how it utilizes EUAM.

## **2. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESPD)**

The concept of common security in Europe was first instigated by the parameters of the Cold War and the European Security and Defence Policy came to the fore with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which formed the EU. The European Security and Defence Policy, primarily designed to reduce the dependency of the EU on the US in terms of security, aimed to combine the defense expenditures of the member states in one place for higher efficiency (Tuğtan, 2013, p.251). For this purpose, the pursuit of subtle and effective policies of resistance against American competition and the production of arms in Europe were seen as a feasible way (Vestel, 1998, p.202).

Over time, the crises in the Balkans prompted the US to put pressure on Europe and it became important to share the burden on Europe. The United States' defense expenditure, demand for an increase in Europe's share of NATO contributions by the United States, lead of the United States in the European conflicts, and Europe's military reliance on the power of the United States have projected its own military and political weakness (Tangör, 2012, p.589). As the EU's security and defence policies evolve and achieving a full consensus in sensitive policy areas have become more difficult considering the diversity of the member states, the EU's role and contribution to the resolution of global crises has become a new topic for discussion. (Britz and Eriksson, 2005).

Europeans realized that they would be in a predicament due to the differences of opinion between the US and Europeans on how to manage crises or conflicts, and the need for rapid and effective decision-making in crisis management in Europe (Tangör, 2012, p.589). There were shortcomings in the European Security and Defence Policy in terms of both the quantity and the quality of the resources available for responding to crises (Grevi and Keohane, 2009, p.69). In turn, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy were designed and structured to be responsible for crisis management. This was characterized in theory as the capacity to deal with a situation from start to finish. Subsequently, in 1999, the Council of Europe in Helsinki mandated the establishment of a military management mechanism at the disposal of the Union and its Member States to coordinate and make more potent the various civilian vehicles and resources as well as the military vehicles. This concept was based on the experiences, resources and capacities of the Member States (Hunter, 2002, p.85). Therefore, the ability to formulate, adopt and implement decisions gained importance in political decision-making capacity. As for the European Security and Defence



Policy, these capacities entailed a number of key functions, including agreeing on the common political and strategic priorities, developing the conceptual framework for the EU crisis management, gathering information, formulating a common analysis, reining and extending military and civilian forces, and managing crisis management operations (Grevi, 2009, p.18-19). The necessity to build on a combined assessment of threats and challenges in the operational steps of the EU, to formulate and develop cooperation to respond to crises, and to optimize the existing resources became vital to develop tailored solutions in the common security and defence policy. In line with this necessity, the Security and Defence Policy came to be an integral component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, including of cooperation and coordination among the member states, and gained importance for the protection of peace and security in Europe in terms of Union's military and civilian missions and reinforcing responses to military and political crises. As a matter of fact, financial delays in civil operations grew into controversies in the European Security and Defence Policy. Furthermore, the Commission and the Council Secretariat's differing definitions of relevant competencies in the field of non-military crisis management disrupted inter-agency cooperation and fast financing (Grevi and Keohane, 2009, p.95). Another issue surfaced in the development of a genuine European security and defence identity. In order to achieve the vision of a common future and to cultivate a common identity outside the institutional mechanisms, European citizens' aspirations for European integration as well as efficiency and transparency gained significance (Tank, 1998, p.21).

### 3. EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY 2003

As a unique actor in international politics and law, the EU engages in a partially independent security policy from Member States and seeks to shape its political steps in line with that policy. Although the EU pursues a normative agenda and design, it generally adopts security-oriented steps and geopolitical concerns and priorities rank high in its foreign policy (Özgöker and Batı, 2017, p.272). Regarding the concerns and priorities, a more aggressive Bush administration in the United States, the global war on terrorism, the Iraq War and the EU member states' disagreement over the Iraq War, concerns over international law (Smith, 2017, p.507), the Cold War, the Gulf War and the September 11 attacks had an impact on the formulation of Europe's security approach and the EU established a security framework to acknowledge the importance of strategy. As a nod to such importance, the European Security Strategy, the first of its kind in the history of the European Union, was introduced in 2003 (Portela and Kienzle, 2015, p.48-49).

The exercise of the European Security Strategy 2003 was a step towards Europe's distinction between foreign and security, and security in multilateral and bilateral relations and towards escalating a qualitative growth in foreign and security policy tools (Bendiek, 2006). Therefore, security concerns triggered by the problems of a developing world, the threat of terrorism, overspread weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, economy intertwined with political issues, organized crimes, and the particularly troublesome energy dependency prompted the EU



to address the threats in assuring the Union's security. The European Security Strategy was regarded as the prime reference to prepare for facing possible crises.

The European Security Strategy stated that the European countries were committed to solve disputes peacefully and to cooperate through joint institutions and affirmed that the vision of a united and peaceful continent had become a reality. The document noted that European integration played a critical role in security and emphasized that Europe continued to face security threats and challenges. The conflicts in the Balkans were pointed out to showcase that war was yet to be eliminated on the European continent ([European Security Strategy, 2013](#)). The lessons regarding crisis management learned by the EU from the experiences in the Balkans were reflected in the security strategy. Those experiences prompted the Union to develop a set of civilian and military crisis management capabilities, institutions and tools within the European Commission and the Council General Secretariat. Moreover, crisis management tools were implemented to support stability and association process in the Western Balkans, and the Union's security and stability oriented wide scope strategy in the Western Balkans was designed to include the countries in the region into the Union ([Ionnides, 2007, p.82](#)). In this respect, the European Security Strategy acknowledged that security and development go hand in hand in hand with the establishment of peace and stability and stipulated focus on policy areas at the intersection of security and development to achieve crisis management and stability ([Vasconcelos, 2009, p.29](#)).

Over the years, a unique European approach to security has emerged, characterized by a broad, multidimensional or comprehensive concept of security that builds on all dimensions of security, and political, socio-economic, ecological, cultural and military interdependence. The commitment to set targets and implement instruments in all fields, and the approach of focusing on security and multilateralism based on dialogue, cooperation, and partnership have been incorporated in the strategic indicators of the European Union ([Biscop, 2005, p.9-10](#)). The European Security Strategy was created within the framework of these indicators to establish cooperative relations, develop an international order based on prominent multilateralism, progress in effective crisis management, strengthen capacity during and after crisis situations, and ultimately enable the EU to become a global player. The soft power of the EU is the underlying component of the aspiration to become a global player on the international arena. The EU, falling short of achieving targeted military intervention capacity, attempted to switch to policies and soft power given their influence on security, and yet, as the challenges became more complex and interconnected, the search for solutions in crisis management put the Union in a difficult position.

The European Security Strategy, put into effect by the European Council in December 2003, was a motivating approach to develop countermeasures against recent and older threats, yet the threats could not be entirely eliminated. The terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 saw improvements in the EU's efforts to rectify institutional shortcomings and strengthen coordination, and building security gained prime priority in relations with third



countries in the European integration efforts. Factors enabling the integration of trade, development, etc. in bilateral relations with the strategically important countries as specified in the European Security Strategy were based on a multilateral order and strong commitment (Bendiek, 2006, p.11-12). Despite these developments and approaches, the European Security Strategy fell short of determining clear priorities, associating specific resources with specific targets, and reviewing practices on a regular basis (Smith, 2017, p.508).

#### **4. EUROPEAN UNION GLOBAL STRATEGY 2016**

During the period following the European Security Strategy 2003, the implications of security of climate change, energy security, cyber security, the Eurozone crisis, the Arab Spring, and events breaking out on a wide region from Ukraine to Türkiye, Syria, Egypt and Sahel as well as the continuously intensifying foreign policy agenda clearly indicated that the EU was surrounded by a chain of crisis (Smith, 2017, p.508-509). By 2016, Ukraine had taken up a substantial place in the crisis chain. In November 2013, the Ukrainian internal crisis blew up upon President Viktor Yanukovich's rejection of the agreement for further integration with the European Union, the violent suppression of the mass protests in the country, and Russia's support of Yanukovich. The Ukrainian crisis triggered a continent-wide crisis in Europe. With Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, in an attempt to recover its dissipated influence in Ukraine, and with the pro-Russian separatist rebels starting to seize lands in Eastern Ukraine, peace and stability in Europe were disrupted. Another important factor showing that the EU is in a crisis chain is the terrorist attacks of ISIS and the uncontrolled flow of immigrants and refugees to Europe. These developments prompted a new strategy regarding the foreign and security policy of the Union.

The EU Global Strategy underlines that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, the inviolability of borders and the peaceful resolution of disputes are the main elements in the European security order, and affirms that these elements are valid for all states both within and outside the borders of the European Union (European Union Global Strategy, 2016). The EU Global Strategy acknowledges that there is no peace and stability in Europe and emphasizes that Russia violated international law and destabilized Ukraine, and that long-term conflicts in the Black Sea region affect security order in Europe. Along the same vein, the European Union Global Strategy stipulates that the European Union will be an organization of international law, democracy, human rights and cooperation in which each country will be free to choose for itself (European Union Global Strategy, 2016).

The EU Global Strategy acknowledges that managing relations with Russia is an important strategic challenge, and that a coherent approach should remain the cornerstone of the European Union's policy towards Russia. The Strategy also provides that regarding the relations particularly between the European Union and Russia, an approach based on international law and the principles that form the basis of the European security order, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, will be followed, and underlines that Russia's illegal annexation



of Crimea and destabilization of Eastern Ukraine will not be accepted ([European Union Global Strategy, 2016](#)). Based on the developments in Ukraine and Russia, the European Union Global Strategy adopts an approach that will strengthen the European Union, strengthen the resilience of its eastern neighbors and support their right to freely define their approach to the European Union. It is acknowledged that, in case of a conflict of interests regarding the Russian conflicts, cooperation will be initiated ([European Union Global Strategy, 2016](#)). As in the case of Ukraine, a paragraph is dedicated to the Middle East, and the resolution of conflicts, promotion of development and human rights, overcoming the threat of terrorism and the problems concerning demography, migration and climate change, and achieving a shared prosperity are described as goals. The strategy emphasizes that practical cooperation will be supported; dialogue and negotiations will be favored in regional conflicts as such in Syria and Libya; and that close dialogues will be established with key stakeholders in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and also included the issue of refugees ([European Union Global Strategy, 2016, p.34-35](#)).

The European Union Global Strategy stipulates that the EU will take measures at all stages of conflict cycles, respond to crises responsibly and decisively, invest in stability, and take early measures in case of a new crisis. The strategy notes that conflicts cannot be resolved alone, and it highlights that sustainable peace can be achieved through comprehensive agreements based on well-rounded, deep and lasting regional and international partnerships ([European Union Global Strategy, 2016, p.9-10](#)). Accordingly, the strategy affirms that the vision of peace policy will be quickly translated into action and a smooth transition towards long-term peacebuilding will be ensured. Furthermore, the document mentions the correlation between crisis intervention and the long-term efforts towards peace, human rights and resilience through Common Security and Defence Policy, humanitarian aid and sanctions, and diplomacy ([European Union Global Strategy, 2016, p.50-51](#)).

The 2003 European Security Strategy A Secure Europe in a Better World (ESS 2003), as well as the 2015 US National Security Strategy (NSS 2015), played an important role in the development of the 2016 European Union Global Strategy, and in the changing global environment, both served as reference points in the European Union's characteristics ([Selchow, 2016](#)). Indeed, the 2016 European Union Global Strategy was revealed as a strategy document that the 2003 European Security Strategy attempted to live up to. The European Security Strategy was a draft of the European Union's aspirations and the European Union Global Strategy appeared as the strategy itself ([Žutić and Vukadinović, 2017, p.104](#)). While the European Security Strategy adopted multilateralism as the advocated word, the European Union Global Strategy embraced resilience/flexibility. While multilateralism is indeed indicative of the EU's preferred implementation of foreign and security policies, another desired aspect demand/flexibility in the other party. There is also a pragmatic objective that depends on existing European Union instruments. Both the 2003 and 2016 Documents focused on the European Union's engagement in the international security environment, and the EU Global Strategy set a final goal ([Žutić and Vukadinović, 2017, p.108](#)). Ultimately, the EU Global



Strategy 2016 formed an aspect of the social reestablishment of European security and was designed as an advisory and inclusive strategy (Selchow, 2016).

## 5. EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY UNION STRATEGY 2020

The European Union Security Strategy notes that the security environment is affected by numerous elements including changing threats, climate change, demographic trends and political instability that transcends borders. The new strategy document focuses on the importance of working together to improve the overall crisis system and contribute to global stability. It has been emphasized that efforts should exceed the borders of the European Union, that the protection of the Union and its citizens goes beyond ensuring security within the borders of the Union, and that the external aspects of security must also be addressed (EU Security Union Strategy, 2020, p.1-2). In this context, the new document states that the European Union's approach to external security within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy will continue to be a fundamental component to increase security within the European Union. On the other hand, the new document sets out that cooperation with third countries and on a global level to address common problems, stability in the Union's region and security are critical for the Union (EU Security Union Strategy, 2020, p.2).

The new document emphasizes the need to develop capacities for early detection, prevention and quick response of security crises, the need for reliable strategic intelligence for security policies, and the importance of a broader crisis management system (EU Security Union Strategy, 2020, p.5). The European Union has also underlined that its position is unique in responding to new global threats and challenges and has outlined the below four key strategic priorities (EU Security Union Strategy, 2020, p.6):

- A future-oriented security environment
- Tackling emerging threats
- Protecting Europeans from terrorism and organized crime
- Building a strong European security ecosystem.

While the 2016 European Union Global Strategy included articles on Russia and Ukraine, the new document does not contain any statements nor solutions regarding the relations with Russia or the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Although the new document attempts to build the security ecosystem of the European Union and emphasizes complex cross-border threats and issues such as the fight against Covid-19, a Security Union has not been clearly defined. The document focuses more on ambitions rather than on concrete structures, and prioritizes the security of the individual over the security of the European Union. Also asserting strengthening border security through close cooperation with third countries and international organizations, the strategy document mentions that the security policy should be based on the shared values of the European Union including democracy, the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights.



## 6. THE USE OF SOFT POWER

The European Union, a symbol of European unity, bears considerable soft power. The view that war is now out of the question between countries that have fought fiercely for centuries and that Europe has become an island of peace and prosperity inflicts a positive image in many parts of the world. The economic growth and the development of equality, democracy and personal freedoms in Europe set a model and Eastern European countries had a positive outlook towards Europe (Nye, 2005, p.80-81). With the end of the Cold War, the aim of becoming a member of the European Union led the countries in Eastern Europe to Brussels, and captivated by the Union, these countries envisioned their long-term future in the European Union (Nye, 2005, p.81).

The EU's practice of soft power generally consists of a top-down approach, bridging gaps in the public sector in the respective country, concluding trade and political agreements, and supporting new policies where necessary (Christian, 2020, p.12). In this context, the European Union believes that the European Union is a positive force in solving the problems of the world as a measure of its soft power. After the Iraq War, Eastern Europeans and the Turkish gave high marks to the European Union from reducing poverty to protecting the environment and fighting terrorism. However, as evidenced in the case of Iraq, there is a disagreement of perspective in Europe which faced the Union with numerous issues. It made it particularly challenging to address the crises as in case of disputes, the foreign policy and defence policies reside in the authority of national governments and (Nye, 2005, p.82) the states' hard power falls in the hands of countries advantageous in terms of budget and arms.

Soft power has also been used as a tool on Ukraine in the European Union's security and defense policies. Having officially declared independence on August 24, 1991, Ukraine faced political, social and economic problems and had high hopes of improving the economy and building democracy, a value that constitutes a soft power of Europe (Galeotti, 2019, p.4-5). In early April 2014, Russian-backed uprisings broke out in Ukraine's heavily Russian-speaking, heavy-industrial region Donbass, and a war began that risked bringing Ukraine to its knees (Colborne, 2022, p.32). With Russia's annexation of Crimea and its support of the Donbass rebels, the Western narrative of democracy once again surfaced (Cohen, 2019) and the soft power values in the security and defense policies of the EU were wielded towards the full acquisition of Ukraine. The political provisions of the Association Agreement were signed between the EU and Ukraine on March 21, 2014, immediately after Russia's annexation of Crimea, which started in February 2014 and lasted over twenty days, and underlined the continuation of the signing and conclusion of the remaining parts of the Agreement.

As mentioned in the 2003 European Security Strategy, following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine's integration into the European Union was regarded as a way of crisis management and the policies regarding the crisis proved insufficient. The European Union endeavored to use its soft power and will to counter these developments, and the Association



Agreement with Ukraine turned into an area of defense and security where soft power can be equipped.

In the meanwhile, the EU emphasized the importance of human rights, and pursued an approach that kept communication channels open, had restrictive measures, and ensured the support of Ukrainian reforms. With the aim of resolving the political crisis in a peaceful and conciliatory manner, the EU combined pressure with diplomatic efforts and sustained dialogue (Rees, 2016, p.32). The European Union's calls to protect the soft power values to defend human rights and democracy in Ukraine during and after the crisis and to continuously highlight Russia's violation of international law did not solve the problems related to security and defense, and rather gained further importance to plans of creating a European identity. The division in Eastern Europe, cultural differences, traditional rivalries in Europe and the ethnic nationalism of Russia caused a conflict between the patriots in the crisis policies of the European Union and in the process of creating a European identity. Europe proved contradictions in the crisis management policies regarding the use of soft power in crisis particularly when it welcomed Ukrainians despite having closed its doors to Syrians in the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis.

The European Union's soft power approach works well in the case of a friendly government that desires change. As in the case of Ukraine, the model demonstrated by the government helped shape people's expectations of a European future and set the stage for a vicious rupture in society between the pro-European and pro-Russian groups. While supporting state structures and adhering to economic and political agreements play an important role in terms of soft power, complying to it as an actor limited in only one region (Christian, 2020, p.12) did not solve the problems either.

Following the annexation of the Crimea in 2014, a large-scale military build-up was launched by Russia in 2021 near the eastern Ukraine border, and a new crisis commenced with Russia's military offensive against Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Military aggression against Ukraine was condemned by the European Union. As of February 2022, the Council of Europe and the Council of the European Union met regularly to discuss the situation and it was stated that tensions and conflicts would be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy. European Union leaders demanded that Russia cease military actions and that Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence be fully respected, and emphasized Ukraine's right to choose for itself. The European Union also called for solidarity and support between countries hosting refugees fleeing the war in Ukraine and coordinated with NATO, OSCE, UN and G7.

Sufficient steps were not taken to strengthen the European Union or to contribute to the struggle of Ukraine regarding the resolution of the Ukraine issue, despite it being included in the 2016 EU Global Strategy. On the other hand, the emphasis in the strategy on taking early measures in case of such a crisis was turned into action. Although the European Union Global Strategy states that the values that constitute soft power, such as human rights, are linked to crisis intervention, the European Union responded with different answers to the crisis in Ukraine. The length of the decision-making mechanism combined with the inability to make joint or effective



decisions caused the crisis management to fail in achieving the expected results up until current period. The European Union has made efforts to use hard power as well as soft power, and many individuals and organizations have been included in the sanctions list, and Ukraine has been provided with humanitarian, financial, political and military support. The European Union has taken various measures to weaken Russia's economy and reduce its ability to fight by depriving Russia of technology. The European Union has also imposed sanctions such as the ban on transactions with the Central Bank of Russia and the SWIFT ban. In addition to economic sanctions, the European Union has also employed media restrictions and diplomatic measures in crisis management and closed its airspace to all Russian aircraft.

In compliance with its soft power approach, on June 23, 2022 the Council of Europe granted Ukraine candidate status for accession to the European Union. Ultimately, the 2020 European Security Union Strategy underlined the importance of crisis management and the correlation between security policy and values such as democracy and the rule of law, which include soft power values, while the crisis in Ukraine continued to be an important problem that needed to be urgently resolved for the European Union.

## 7. EUAM

The EU and its member states are implementing a range of tools to globally optimize their diplomatic, humanitarian and development contribution. Coordinated by the EU's External Action Service, these tools are employed in the efforts for global peace and security. EUAM, designed based on the values constituting the soft power of the EU and created after the Maidan Revolution, is important for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy ([EU Missions Worldwide, 2022](#)). Created in December 2014 after Russia's annexation of Crimea, EUAM operates in accordance with European Union standards and international good governance and human rights principles to accelerate sustainable reform in civil security. Leveraged for crisis response as a civilian mission in the European Union security and defense policies, EUAM functions in developing civil security strategies, cooperating and coordinating reform efforts with Ukrainian and international actors, and supporting reforms to deliver education and other projects ([EUAM Ukraine, 2022](#)). EUAM Ukraine, which is autonomous and its unitary and international nature respected by the host state as per the agreement ([Wouters et al, 2021, p.393](#)), was assigned new tasks by the European Union member states in March and April 2022. EUAM assists law enforcement to facilitate the flow of refugees from Ukraine into neighboring Member States and the humanitarian aid into Ukraine and works to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of international crimes ([EUAM Ukraine, 2022](#)).

Since 2015, 15,000 people have been trained with the contributions of EUAM, 27 key strategic documents have been approved after EUAM recommendation, and 59 bills have been passed with the help of EUAM. EUAM has been working on reforms for the development of the country from the establishment of a community policing strategy to countering domestic violence across Ukraine. With the contribution of EUAM, the National Security Law was



adopted in 2018 and the National Human Rights Strategy (NHRS) of Ukraine was signed in 2021 ([EUAM Progress in Reform, 2022](#)). With the escalation of the conflict with Russia that started in 2014 and the occupation of Ukraine in 2022, more than 7.4 million Ukrainians fled the country and a major refugee crisis was triggered. In the meanwhile, Ukraine has applied for EU membership. In response to Russian attacks, the Council of Europe decided to grant Ukraine candidacy status for the EU, and EUAM Ukraine acted together with its Ukrainian partners to stabilize the country, guarantee democracy, promote the rule of law and human rights ([EUAM Progress in Reform, 2022](#)).

As evidenced by the developments in Ukraine, states, international organizations, media and people try to grasp the emerging reality after a crisis, and the credibility and reliability of the actors' actions in many crises such as military conflicts, terrorist attacks or diplomatic crises affect crisis management ([Aydemir, 2022, p.132-133](#)). In this context, from the perspective of the European Union, EUAM is a credibility and reliability-oriented policy aimed at the resilience of Ukraine's civil security, and the combination of the rule of law with credibility ([Rabinovych, 2021, p.204](#)) in the Union's response to the crisis in Ukraine and its surroundings.

Depending on the type and severity of the crisis, minimizing damage in optimal response strategies, as well as focusing on what works best for everyone, including the national government and international public opinion in other countries, contributes to crisis management. EUAM intervenes ([Kim, 2015, p.124-125](#)) at a regional level depending on the nature and severity of the crisis and, in the context of EUAM's security and defense strategies, the objective to have Ukraine ([Mays, 2021, p.123](#)) reach a civil security sector that is efficient, accountable and trusted by the public is a strategy focusing on everyone's benefit. This strategy is also a message for Russia.

EUAM's presence in Ukraine, attempting to fulfill its duty in many respects after the comprehensive Russian occupation on February 24, 2022, has a symbolic meaning in terms of the use of soft power values of the EU in crisis management policies. Hence, considering the correlation between theory and practice, it is evident that it is challenging for EUAM, a component of the crisis management processes of the EU in the Russia-Ukraine War and the Union's presence in Ukraine since 2014, to respond effectively and rapidly to the crises.

EUAM, which was shaped by geopolitical concerns and priorities included in the 2003 European Security Strategy, serves as a positioning for Brussels in the security and defense policy towards Russia in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, EUAM emphasizes efficiency and transparency in Kiev's integration into the EU.

## **8. CONCLUSION**

The EU is both an intergovernmental and a supranational entity. The EU displays success in institutional terms and reveals a unique quality in terms of law. The EU has an intergovernmental organization model that limits supranational demands. Sometimes social



welfare and national security are the underlying reasons for joining the EU (Tzimitras, 2013, p.117). Policies and strategies regarding security are also put forward from time to time. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the 2003 European Security Strategy, the 2016 European Union Global Strategy and the 2020 EU Security Union Strategy failed to establish a working crisis management system in line with the EU's policies. Neither in the past nor today has the European Union been sufficiently successful in developing its defense capacity against Russia or strategically addressing the crisis management policies regarding the events in Ukraine, and has instead focused on the integration of Ukraine into the Union. In the security and defense approach of the EU, there have been difficulties in defining norms in crisis management policies, and especially in the crisis that has progressed gradually in Ukraine since 2014, the European Union has wielded soft power and EUAM to address concerns.

Although the European Union has adopted the soft power approach to crisis management, it has not been able to fully describe its general objectives and goals in the defense and security policies and overall objectives and goals have remained ineffective in resolving the crisis. The EU did not focus on specific objectives in resolving the crisis and failed to intervene quickly and firmly in crisis management. The EU's shortcomings were reflected in the Union's insufficient military power, lack of a proactive approach as evidenced in the differences between the strategic documents, failure in drawing clear lines towards Russia, incoherent political attitude towards the Syrian and Ukrainian crises, impact of conflicting policies on a set of subsequent policies, sanctions on Russia falling short of full impact, multilateral approach not fulfilling the expectations, and the lack of ability to estimate long-term developments as evidenced in the 2016 and 2020 documents.

To shape a democracy that takes Europe as an example is to create a real long-term solution for the security of both the country in question and Europe (Christian, 2020, p.12). The EU has pursued policies at the point of vital importance on sharpening soft power tools in order to secure the future of Ukraine and its surroundings, and has prioritized political coherence in strategies that contribute to regional security. EUAM, which took place in crisis management policies between 2014-2022, was also a reflection of soft power and prioritized EU standards and human rights. Therefore, the EU's desire to resolve crises peacefully and reconcilably on the axis of soft power, the difficulties of resisting geopolitical and geo-economic challenges, and the urgent need of establishing deterrence and defense against Russia have weakened the hand of the Union.

The influx of masses into Europe following the war in 2022 and Russia's exploiting of the EU's dependency on Russian energy, have indicated that it was vital for the EU to invest in hard power and energy. Furthermore, the Ukraine crisis has proven the need for urgent planning to resolve issues in dealing with complex strategic realities of the Union's security and defense approaches across borders, and for a new approach in crisis management policies.



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