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Populism, Culturalism and Political Representation in the Context of an Authoritarian Politics: Lessons Drawn From the History

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The omnipresence of the state in society and politics, its determining economic role, its principal command of resources and political organizations and its 'pronounced autonomy' vis-a-vis the society put the state itself (or those who claim to represent the state) at the centre of all national political questions in Turkey. This paper argues that the structural and ideological impediments of authoritarian politics to political representation and differentiation needs to be analysed in the context of a development model within a corporatist form of society based upon the forms and features of the "developmental state". For an explanation of the degree of political participation and the nature of populist politics, an analysis of the features of the state and its relationships to social classes in the development process and the changing nature of social relations become crucial. This is to say that when the intensification of the exploitative relations inherent in the national bourgeois developmental approach accelerates the growth of economic inequalities, which is accompanied by the use of political repression, the mobilization of "state-oriented" populist rhetoric as an effective way of enforcing solidarity limits the ways for political differentiation and representation. This approach highlights the shortcomings of such explanations tending to present political differentiation in terms of a clash between the "modernising centre and reactionary (traditional) periphery[1]" or a clash over "cultural cleavages".

In this paper, the state apparatus is conceptualized as a politico-ideological form, a historically accumulated network of institutions, norms and values whose reproductive functions permeate all the constituent dimensions of the social formation. The reproductive role performed by the state is explained in terms of its own reproductive imperatives as a historical form of political domination, based on a specific set of material and ideological foundations which privilege certain policies, strategies and actors above others. In this context, an analysis of the

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ideologically enforced role of the military bureaucracy, which has become an important component of state capitalism, in politics needs to be examined in terms of its primary political functions in accordance with its stake in the economy. Such an analysis provides a comparative framework for identifying similar tendencies, beliefs and attitudes among competing actors in politics.

The general framework of the developmental state utilised in explaining the nature of politics includes the following: (a) a revolutionary seizure of state power from above and the establishment of the new state basing its legitimacy upon nationalism and a wish to "catch up" with the developed world; (b) the dominance of the political system by the state, which was necessary for promoting and concentrating sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the state. This would help to shape and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives by establishing and promoting the condition of economic growth through, for example, short and long term planning, which is advisory for the private sector, and the establishment of state dominance in economy by state owned enterprises. Corporatism is at the centre of this mode of politics; (c) the limitation of power and participation in national decisions to almost the highest level of bureaucracy, civil and/or military, but this includes also intimate relations with a privileged part of the private sector; (d) the elimination and subordination of political groups and socio-economic classes. The autonomy of the highly centralised bureaucracy is embedded in a web of ties with non-state actors, such as intellectuals and the dominant urban and rural socio-economic groups, for whom such an integration of interests is beneficial, since they need the backing and power of the bureaucracy; (e) shifting coalitions of interests with reference to developments in the political system and therefore the intensification of intra-elite and policy conflicts, becoming obvious in the establishment of various political parties after a period of intensive development process and (f) the existence of repression and suppression of civil rights to various degrees (Leftwich 1994)

Progressiveness, the Progressive State and the Political Oneness

A large portion of the scholarly work on the Turkish politics and state bears the mark of the culturalist perspective and is often confined to the description of institutional arrangements and analysis of the manifestation of certain cultural peculiarities which may occur in such institutions. Many studies have illustrated how cultural attitudes and/or religious beliefs of society have influenced both popular and elite perceptions of the role of the state; the arrangement of power within it; and the outcomes of this arrangement in the "top-down" modernisation process (Berkes 1964; Tuncay 1981; Turan 1991) or focussed on various political and institutional manifestations of the country's culture within the framework of its state (Karpat 1959; Heper 1977 and 1985; Dodd 1979; Tachau 1984; Akarlı 1985).

In most of the analyses, the state machinery or the state elite is seen to operate in the interests of the nation, i.e. "general will", and so it is seen as neutral. Culturally determined elite-pluralism, along with its association with the modernization endeavour bears the influence of functionalism for political analysis. The state is perceived as an agent that maintains order, particularly in the face of increased differentiation, and economic and political crises. This image is particularly apparent in the interpretations of military intervention in politics. The common approach is to classify the (modernising) state and/or society within the framework of a sharp division into two polar sets, i.e. traditional versus modern, suggesting that the movement between the two poles of traditionality and modernity must be directional and unilinear and therefore bearing the influence of e.g., Weber's sacred-secular polity. In Lifchez's words, Turkish studies needs to be freed from the *"schizophrenic quality of modern Turkish cultural life... with its sharp cleavage between an 'enlightened' elite of reformers and an 'ignorant' mass of traditionalist or reactionaries"* (1992: 315).

The subsequent emphasis has been on the "progressive" role of the state which commands this transition and is adhered to Kemalism (Durgun, 2002: 198). Since the main stream of Turkish literature *a priori* accepts and emphasises that Kemalism as a revolutionary ideology is progressive and modernising, and has the potential to move towards democracy[2], the state is therefore associated with modernity and democracy. At this point it should be emphasized that, as Evin highlights (1988: 210-1), the concept of being progressive in the Turkish context is ambiguous and needs to be carefully applied. The term was firstly used in the nineteenth century to indicate those group of intellectuals who pressed for the adoption of representative forms of government (but not for a process of democratization) and for equal protection under secular law. It is important to bear in mind that the modernisation of political institutions did not bring political rights and liberties for the general public until the second half of the 1940s. Later, the concept of being "progressive" underwent a transition in its meaning with the transition to multi-party politics and was associated then more with participatory democracy, and created confusion through identifying progressive reformism with a progressive attitude towards the operations of participatory democracy. Reformism, however, principally aimed at modernising the state rather than liberalizing political competition. Political development is mainly understood in terms of political stability based on the capacity for purposeful and orderly change. To an extent, this excludes democracy as incompatible with planned development. Stability is, therefore, an arbitrary support of the status quo and leads to the control of social forces in order to maintain it. For both the right and the left, politics is to a larger extent about the justification of elitist and authoritarian tendencies. In this context, mass participation in politics is the means of claiming justification for such political actions.

Kemalism was formulated in the 1930s when the West, the centre of Kemalist reformism, witnessed the German and Italian experiences in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Corporatism was the primary mode of politics. Accordingly, Kemalist corporatism, although it emerged in special circumstances, condemned both the Marxist and the liberal conflict models of politics. It conceived of conflict as pathological and hence structured organizations and representations around the major functional groups in society according to the initiative of the state. Corporatism provided the "legitimate" means for the state (Parla 1989). The party and the state were considered to be two complementary entities in Kemalism. In the early 1930s, this conception resulted in the end of the independent existence of the one party from the state. The concept of the state meant that "the nation is united in the personality of its leader" (or leaders). It is important to emphasise that as a result of the idea of eventual unification of the party and the state into a single authoritarian apparatus, the rulers of the party became the rulers of the state. In such political environment, the one-party rule invoked the concept of populism to describe itself as the synthesis of the people and the sole authoritative interpreter of the national interest. However, the concept of populism has been revised over time. Implying support for popular sovereignty and being equated with nationalism and anti-imperialism, populism later became the sociological basis of the new nation-state and society, united in terms of race, religion and culture, filled with feelings of mutual respect and sacrifice and shared a common fate and interest. In the absences of prior social mobilization or a mass movement, of the threat and potential damage of foreign capital and of an anti-oligarchic movement, the aims of political regime were reduced to control and repression from above. This is, the regime lacked the kind of social base characteristics of fascist or populist examples. There was no breakdown of an exclusionary bourgeois system of restrictive parliamentarism that was followed by *etatism*, as was the case with fascism. Rather, it sought to extend bureaucratic rule and conceived a modality of coalition with a newly emerging bourgeoisie. Thus, it was a regime where bargaining and political posturing remained within the realm of the ruling elite. In addition, Kemalism was not born out of a crisis of redistribution of wealth, but rather out of a crisis of accumulation of necessary capital in a society that was just emerging into capitalism (Bilgin, 1991: 79).

The concept of solidarity provided the bureaucrats with tools to corporate society as one indivisible unit. Nationalism as a modern ideology was put forward to make nationhood the primary collective identity in a society where religious communities had been the primary collective identity for hundreds of years. The imposition of Turkish nationhood as a collective identity meant the exclusion of plural identities from the public sphere. Nationalism was utilised as a substitute for religious belief, and provided the necessary concepts for meaningful action, good and evil and

salvation. Society was not defined in terms of classes with separate interests, but classes were seen to be interdependent upon each other for their existence. Hence, it was claimed that there could no longer be any contradiction between society and political authority, because the nation was a self-governing body. As solidarity was conceptualised as being based on the functional interdependence of different social and economic groups, populism, in this context, became increasingly distinct from popular sovereignty. Rather, it was identified with the effort to encourage economic development and preserve social peace, and was linked to the state's application of distributive justice to all social groups. This understanding of populism is evident in Gökalp's emphasis on the subordination of occupational associations to the state, and the maintenance of an economy that is under the state's leadership. This provided the justification for the Kemalist experiment with state corporatism as an authoritarian response to the problems of economic underdevelopment. Since the existence of social classes was denied, it was then argued that they could be both represented and regulated by a unified party-state apparatus, led by elite that could form a kind of universal class. The context of populism needed once more to be revised in the era of multi-party politics. Despite still avoiding the word "class", this understanding of populism recognises that society consists of various social groups, and describes the task of state as harmonising their conflicting interests. It continues to undermine the notion of class-based political parties. This is to say, political parties commonly portray themselves as national parties or mass parties which represent the interests of all social groups and seek to reconcile them with each other. This view is based to a great extent on the persistent fear on the part of political or state elites that unless partitive interests are repressed, regulated or harmonised, divisions along lines such as class, ethnicity, religion or region will threaten both the unity of the nation and the authority of the state. It has also justified the effective control and penetration of the state into every aspect of life (Bianchi, 1984: 100-4).

In other words, official view while adopting the market economy has not accepted conflicts of interest but instead emphasised the integrative aspects of the division of labour. Notions of public interest are located in the "national will" or the "collective conscience" which nonetheless transcended particular groups and individuals (Sunar, 1974: 63-4). It is important to mention that this approach makes the concept of particular interests within authority disappear (Durgun, 2000: 119). Hence, the demands of people in the political system lose their importance, while rulers claim to act on behalf of the idealised moral entity of the nation, but not that of people. The result is the denial of plural politics since the interests of the people are harmonious. As a result, everyone needs the encouragement and the protection of the only representative of the national interest, the state, whose role as the sole proprietor of political power is to generate impetuses for the accumulation of capital,

to oversee the general development process, to intervene when necessary in accordance with the interests of private capital and guide foreign capital.

From the point of view of Turkish modernisation the official discourse is formulated around a theme of tension between "pre-modernity and modernity". Since Turkey has seen as undergoing a process of transition from a traditional/transitional society towards a modern one in which religion is supposed to lose its importance and become a matter of personal conscience, according to the premises of the modernisation theory, the literature has mostly concentrated upon explaining the causes of religious continuation in political as well as societal life. The favoured question has been whether culture poses a political threat to the survival of the modern state (Lewis 1952; Karpat 1959; Landau 1976; Dodd 1979; Heper 1981; Toprak 1981; Rustow 1987). From this point of view, efforts were directed towards locating the faults of society with reference to its culture or political regime in order to offer an explanation for political movements, although much of this discussion has been abstract and speculative. The problem has often been described as a struggle between the modernising state and a traditional (irrational) society.

The style of modernisation shows that authoritarianism and elitism have been the prominent features of Turkish history. The reflections of such elitism can be viewed in the whole tradition of Turkish reformism. The elitist mode of politics is accompanied by a cult of leadership, that of 'enlightened elite'. One of the critical consequences of the cult of leadership for Turkish politics has been the deepening of the tension between the leaders and the people. According to the leaders, *"the leader*[s] *would not fail, but the people would"* (Parla, 1989: 7). The ruling elite's mission of "elevating the people to the level of contemporary civilization" has played a legitimising role for elitist politics since it is assumed that the people by themselves are neither willing nor capable of achieving this basic goal. This means that the people should not have sovereignty until their collective conscience has reached a certain level, the criteria of that, though, is ambiguous and arbitrary. Until then the "national will" is to be shaped by a leadership group, which could lead the (uneducated) people through the necessary stages of progress towards a more civilized (preferred) pattern of life and thereby enlighten them. Moreover, public policy has been not supposed to be the outcome of a detached aggregation of interest, but the consequences of a search for "truth" and "the one best way" (Heper, 1985: 51). In other words, only a portion of sovereignty should be exercised by the people through the nationally elected representatives. In fact, the state elite who perceived themselves as the only ones capable of serving the nation are supposed to exercise sovereignty in order to promote the "general interest", the definition of which is neglected. It should be stressed that the ambition of official ideology of the state has been embedding sovereignty not in the people but in the nation. For both

the right and the left, politics is to a larger extent about the justification of elitist and authoritarian tendencies. In this context, mass participation in politics is the means of claiming justification for such political actions.

In achieving an "unconditional transformation", the concept and limits of that are drawn by the 'enlightened elite' representing the nation rather than differentiated specific interests defined, and "destroying all forces of reaction", a definite doctrine of (polity-dominant) secularism has been rigidly implemented as state policy. This means that the centralisation of every single aspect of social life is one of the state's priorities (Başbuğ, 1998: 40). The secularism policy as part of the social engineering process rather than an outcome of the process of modernisation and societal development has been highly instrumental in creating and keeping together the identity of 'modernising elite' (Göle,1997: 49). Control over education is crucial in this context since the main aim seems to be to transform society into an "ideal" by controlling the state. The notion of "transforming society into an "ideal" is the key argument by which the 'modernising elite' justifies and reproduces their privileged position.

State Capitalism and Political Representation

The transition to multiparty politics in the late forties is a turning point in terms of political representation, since political power significantly changed hands through free elections after three decades of single party rule. It was not a simple transfer of power from one party to another (Karpat 1972: Sunar 1974; Ahmad 1977). The new Democrat Party was, at the first real opportunity, overwhelmingly supported by popular consent. An adequate answer for this transition can be given with reference to the political economy of the period between 1923 and 1950. The problem is one of identifying the location of core capital within the class structure of society and understanding its relationship to the state and dominant classes. At the founding of the Republic in 1923, Turkey was a predominantly agricultural country with an economy devastated by the war, especially with regard to the labour force. The overwhelming mass of the population lived in the countryside as peasants, engaged in the production of foodstuffs and the raising of livestock. Radical shifts in the political balance of power coincided with turning points in the world's economic and political order, when a new set of constraints came into play and a local accommodation of these external developments was on the agenda. The relationship between the world economy and the national one while integrating into the world capitalist system[3] was very direct. It was as a result of the 1930s depression that economic reconstruction allowed bureaucratic control to achieve centrality. The bureaucracy could opt for a politically directed national economy in the inter-war period because of the dismantling of the world order. However, the distinctive features of industrialization policies in the post 1929 period in each developing

country depended on how the roles of the state and the industrial bourgeoisie were reconciled. In countries that had an important industrial sector before 1929, further industrialization was based on the expansion of private enterprise. But even in those economies, the state created new areas of investment concentrated around heavy industry and infrastructural works. In others, like Turkey, the state apparatus was used to form an industrial class, which would eventually share an entrepreneurial function with the state[4].

The lack of capacity and incentive on the part of private capital in investing in the development of industry was partly due to the fact that the import and export trade provided easier and quicker profits. The negative effects of the world economic crisis in 1929 led to an import-substitution economic policy, coupled with a strong corporatist state. It was the state, in the name of etatism, that assumed a major economic role in promoting economic development. The absence of a landed oligarchy in the agrarian structure and the prior expulsion of a majority of the Christian bourgeoisie during and after World War I meant that the bureaucracy derived its power solely from its position in the state structure and its unchallenged authority. Whatever remained of the bourgeoisie was too weak to constitute a class with an autonomous stance against bureaucracy. It was either the bureaucracy or groups within the bourgeoisie who, through their conflict, defined the parameters of state policies, administrative forms and the political regime. Nationalism helped to integrate the interests of these various groups as a result of the low degree of social differentiation. The peasants and the considerably small numbers of workers entered into this picture only indirectly, and their position was determined by the outcome of the struggle for supremacy rather than by their own political activity (Keyder, 1987: 2-4). Under the circumstances, the bureaucracy became very influential in centralising the distribution and reallocation of resources. Since it was concentrated in the large metropolitan centres, relatively better organised than other groups in society with developed lines of communication, the bureaucratic stratum functioned as a class with its own political-economic project. The ideologically and politically well-established state gave full support to the development of the industrial bourgeoisie despite opposition from agricultural and commercial capital, which saw itself as the backbone of the economy and liberalism as its ideological guide.

The essential principle was to provide the necessary conditions for the accelerated accumulation of primary capital, and to ensure its transfer to industrial production through the instrumentality of the party-state. Available capital resources were reallocated by the interventionist state. Forming new industrial enterprises and passing them on to private capital was to be the means of creating and maintaining the conditions of existence for the development of an industrial bourgeoisie. In so doing, the liberal foreign trade regime and fiscal and monetary structures, which were intact before the 1929 depression, were revised in order to protect Turkish

interests. The state initiated central planning for economic development and acted as the primary instrument in the accumulation of private capital by establishing industry and creating intermediary positions for the commercial classes. Under the policy of state capitalism, a series of state-holding enterprises were established to finance public investments in textiles, mining and other industrial areas. The aim was to create an industrial class that would be capable of being the backbone of the country's development. *Etatism* did not include agriculture, but rather restricted itself to the sphere of industry. Commercial groups were the beneficiaries of state investment since they were not only protected and encouraged, but were also given concessionary positions for providing raw material and distributing state refined goods. The bureaucrats used their power to establish economic interests of their own within society. A large number of them joined the commercial bourgeoisie and used their commercial and concessionary earnings to become landowners as well[5]. *Etatism* meant the policy of industrialization as conceived within the parameters of society but without the political institutions proper to such a society. Under the guise of a novel social system, a political elite and an emerging bourgeoisie joined forces to isolate a national economic space for themselves in which heavy oppression of the working class and exploitation of the agricultural sector would allow for rapid accumulation. All this was achieved under an ideology of national solidarity that, as mentioned earlier, denied the existence of conflicting class interests in favour of a corporatist model of society. The growing bourgeoisie allied itself with the bureaucracy, which was the tool of the single party, the Republican People Party (RPP). The state would apply increasingly aggressive measures to repress the growing opposition. The industrialization process created population movement towards the cities. Opportunities for the economy to incorporate the masses through industrialization and the state's ability to incorporate them politically had, however, been structurally and ideologically limited (Ramazanoğlu, 1985: 62-64). The developmental model gave the state the role of maximizing the interest of the national bourgeoisie. In this context, the state performed a double function: anti-imperialist gesturing and disciplining of the labour force. As a result of the relatively weak position of the labour force, the trade unions, which had no right to strike, were absorbed into the state apparatus. The intensification of the exploitative relations inherent in the national bourgeois developmental approach accelerated the growth of economic inequality and social polarization.

The economic practice of state capitalism led to an increase in industrial production, and therefore the interests of the two groups seemed to coincide in a period when the growth of a domestic productive sector increased political control over the economy, a result which the bureaucracy naturally desired. Yet there was a tension in the alliance born out of the competing claims of state capitalism and the market economy. During World War II, the alliance within the power block started

to diminish, in part because the RPP, which was lacking any popular base and was a party of the bureaucratic and professional strata, attempted to alter the balance of power between the urban and rural classes by undermining the position of agricultural capital and therefore creating potential of threat to the existing order. Throughout the war, people on fixed incomes became poorer while those engaged in trade and industry grew richer. The peasant masses had been economically deprived and found themselves unable to maintain their earlier levels of consumption. The severe disparity between the wealthy and the poor peasantry induced the government to attempt to gain the favour of the latter by placing a land reform proposal before the Parliament (Sarıbay, 1991: 120). However, there was no pressure from below for land reform, and the problems in the agricultural sector were not linked to shortage of land. Rather, it was the shortage of the labour force and the necessary tools for production in agriculture. The policies aimed at incorporating agricultural production into the process of generalised commodity production resulted in turning substantial sections of the landed interests away from the RPP. In the war period, the state faced a decline in its revenue in terms of taxes and duties due to a sharp decrease in the importing of capital goods (Sunar, 1974: 68-73). The war economy as managed by the RPP was characterized by black market dealings in essential items, shortages and rising prices. Merchants, industrialists and those fractions of agricultural capital keeping up with the rapidly changing situation benefited largely from the uneven implementation of etatist policies during the war period and its aftermaths. The etatist policies of the RPP had been successful in the creation of a capitalist class and the monopolistic control of state power. However, this newly accumulated wealth led the commercial bourgeoisie, with the support of capitalist farmers, to demand more direct participation in the use of state power, the re-implementation of liberal economic measures and the opening of the Turkish economy to world markets. This meant generating an alliance between domestic private capital and foreign capital, and breaking up the alliance with the bureaucracy. (Ramazanoğlu, 1985: 68-7). However, the revenue of the state remained static and inadequate during the war period. This resulted in rapid increases in taxes and a further expansion of state control in economy. The implementation of wealth tax and the proposed land reform brought the urban commercial groups and large landowners together. The bureaucracy, which was involved in private transactions itself, had the power to canalize the concentration of wealth in selected hands and to create monopolies. All possible oppressive apparatuses were used to maintain order. The Democrat Party (DP) was formed by dissidents from the RPP in 1946 under these above-mentioned circumstances.

The leaders of the DP represented either the interests of commercial capital or those of agricultural capital. The DP demanded the opening up of the Turkish

economy to world markets and believed that the role of the state should be confined to the provision of infrastructural services. The DP attempted to win the support of the masses, most of whom were engaged in agriculture, by offering economic incentives such as credits, subsidies and road building programmes. The leader of the DP appeared to reflect the chief interests and fears of the leading social groups in small towns and among big farmers. These groups, in comparison to the urban bureaucratic stratum, which had undergone an ideological and cultural transformation, had maintained their cultural and religious roots and felt a strong sense of continuity with their past (Karpat, 1988: 138-9). Elite opposition to the *etatist* policies of the bureaucracy therefore converged with popular discontent. The DP policies were geared to increasing the power and influence of emerging new entrepreneurial groups and of the special class of countryside merchant landowners. On the one hand, under the rule of the DP throughout the 1950s, the economy was experiencing a rapid change in its character from an agrarian economy to one in which commerce and industry were becoming dominant. The DP policies gave incentives for the improvement of the means of agricultural production. The countryside was opened up with roads, buses, tractors and credits. A liberal model was put into effect and a national economy was created for foreign goods. But the agricultural expansion, aided by the favourable price conjuncture of the Korean War, was undermined by fluctuations in agricultural output due to weather conditions and a decline in foreign demand by 1954. It became clear that exclusive dependence on agricultural exports would be an insufficient base on which to finance an increasing demand for imported goods. There was a decrease in the usable component of foreign grant, credits and aid, since a large percentage of these were used for debt servicing. This led the DP to opt for inflationary finance of agriculture via credits, price support programmes and growing public investment, in order to extend the economic boom. The liberal trade regime was abandoned due to difficulties in balancing external payments, and some of the statist measures of control were readopted in 1954. The political authority, through complicated systems of tariffs and quotas controlled the nature and quality of imports and therefore decided on the extension of market privileges to chosen manufacturers. In the short term, under the import restrictions and protections the industrial sector began to grow faster than agriculture. Yet in the long term, the industrial capital was not happy with the petty bourgeois market ideology of the DP. In the post-war years, a new model of accumulation was needed by the nationally based manufacturing bourgeoisie and its international links. Though the DP government had always denounced any statist policy, it agreed to implement a stabilisation programme, set by the World Bank and the OECD. This meant a policy of import substitution by planning, in exchange for continuing aid. In fact, an overt policy of industrialisation accompanied by the import-substitution model began to be implemented by its central planning organisation after the military coup in 1960. Therefore, military intervention

promised a planned allocation of scarce resources in the service of rapid development, and responded to foreign pressures as well as to discontent among various strata of urban public opinion, all of which served to promote the project of industrial capital (Keyder, 1987: 132-5). The rise and fall of the DP marked a new stage in the transformation of state capitalism. By the 1950s politics was opened up for an overt class struggle among the different factions of the capitalist class, industrial, financial, commercial and agricultural. Given the rapid accumulation of industrial and financial capital, these factions had been able to establish their economic dominance, although they had to share state power with the agricultural and commercial factions at the political level.

On the other hand, the policies of DP led to a rapid growth in the size of the new economic middle class, and to inflation that not only reduced purchasing power, but also diminished the prestige and influence of the military-civilian bureaucracy. It is important to emphasise that the DP's actions vis-a-vis the military were not sufficient in themselves to provoke a military takeover, although there was an open display of hostility toward the military's informal linkage with the RPP. The DP did not try to downgrade the role of the military and bureaucracy. Yet one important issue is that much of the political history of the 1950s is marked by a steady decline in the bureaucratic stratum and a rise in the representation of the professional and economic contingent in the parliament. Frey shows that when the DP first challenged the RPP in 1946, there were very significant differences in the social background of deputies between the two parties. Whereas only 6 percent of the DP's deputies were bureaucrats, the figure for the RPP was 39 percent. In 1923, approximately 55 percent of the RPP deputies were bureaucrats, with this figure declining to 45 percent by 1943. (1975: 56-60).

The removal of the DP's government from the power has certain parallels with later incidents in 1971, 1980 and 1997 in terms of the rhetoric applied. For example, the RPP accused the DP of destroying the legacy of Kemalism. The argument against the DP was that it was unfit to govern, despite the preferences of voters for the party, because it was "anti-democratic, reactionary, conservative and anti-secularist". The RPP challenged the DP through political demonstrations, in which the students of the military academy also took part. The DP's attempts to silence such opposition and its threats to close down the RPP led to a covert call in 1960 by the RPP for the military to intervene in politics to "save democracy". Within a few months of the intervention, the government was once again in the hands of the RPP. The military rule of 1960 was from the beginning a great example of wide cooperation and intercourse with civilians who overwhelmingly belonged to the cadres of the RPP. The old ruling coalition was restored to power and expected to gain legitimacy in the election of 1961. However, the Justice Party (JP), the successor to the DP, won the majority but was not allowed to form a government

until 1965. Instead, the RPP formed a series of weak governments. The JP's elected governments in 1965 and 1969 were effectively prevented from exercising their mandate by a series of measures by the RPP's statist-elitist intelligentsia. The JP was designated unfit to govern, as it framed the concept of "modernity" and "progress" in empirical and economic terms while its opponents had an ideological-cultural concept of "modernity" associated with Westernisation (Karpat, 1981: 14). In the meantime, the military stood by as the faithful supporter of the RPP, which was still regarded as the only party that could implement the new Constitution in 1961 and maintain the principles of Kemalism. Since the 1960s, military interventions have been justified as necessary to re-establish order and stability as well as to safeguard democracy and the state from self-serving and corrupt politicians. Therefore, the crucial question to be answered is "under what circumstances and in whose interest does the army break the democratic rules to which it claims to be committed, and act on its own initiative?"

In the 1960s, the developmental state pursued the implementation of import-substitution policies (ISI) within the statist mode of expansion. The mode of development was heavily dependent upon the initiative of the state and coercive power of the state. The general thrust of development policy, which previously was concerned with increasing "social justice" through immediate improvements in living standards, was on immediate "sacrifice" in order to achieve higher rates of savings and investments, and therefore was on the "trickle down" approach (Bianchi 1984:142). The introduction of comprehensive five-year development plans, and the establishment of the State Planning Organisation (SPO), in the framework of a mixed economy put the main emphasis upon industrialisation and initiated a major attempt at extending import-substitution through protectionist policies into the intermediate and capital goods categories. The ISI policy was instrumental in the creation of an expanding industrial sector and effecting a transition from a mercantile to an industrial economy, which aimed at the generation of a gradual structural change against agriculture. The ISI policy relied on the administrative allocation of scarce economic resources, such as credits, foreign exchange, import quotas and subsidies. Therefore, the role of the government was crucial in this process. Through the ISI policy, for example the formulation of various importation lists, the bureaucracy, which had a long tradition of state intervention, was brought into closer contact with private sector representatives. The SPO was the central body for the allocation of resources. The state emerged as the main arbiter between the various competing factions of the bourgeoisie, especially industrialists and merchants. It sought to encourage cooperative interest group leaders in the major economic sectors to share the responsibility for implementing development programs. The state attempted to foster collaborative class relationships and coordinate nationwide collective bargaining through vertically structured, quasi-

monopolistic associations in the key economic sectors. A collection of weak associations was eager for official recognition and privilege in order to improve their political and economic positions. Therefore, the political activities of voluntary associations were restricted to a considerable degree in order to hinder the emergence of strong bodies that were outside state control. Accordingly, labour policy constantly sought to delay or control the development of collective action among workers and to isolate the labour movement from all other associations. The use of suppression was one of the means working against the labour movement. Trade unions were incorporated into the state structure as semi-official hierarchical occupational associations, since they were created by legislation. They were supposed to subordinate their own economic and institutional interests to national goals. Official recognition of an association as the authoritative spokesperson for a given factor was granted from above (Bianchi 1984:143-5). As the state was becoming a major distributor of benefits that invariably accrued to specific private interests, the determination of the main beneficiaries became a major public issue. The daily functioning of the ISI mechanism was transformed into a spoils system. In this context, the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchange (TOBB) was the scene for the initial struggles within the private sector, since it possessed the right to allocate foreign exchange and quota lists, and determine the selling price of imported items. The TOBB, which established close links with the JP, regarded import controls as fairly crucial for industrialists, although the merchants within this organisation continued to advocate the liberalisation of the import regime and the prioritisation of agriculture in the economic development strategy. Entrepreneurs who had import permits were able to obtain scarce foreign exchange at the official rate, which was much lower than the market price. They were able to import intermediate goods at prices lower than their market values, with the state subsiding the difference. They enjoyed monopolistic privileges in a protected market. Consequently, large scale production began to develop due to the heavy concentration of resources on the small base of the manufacturing sectors. This was to change the character of industry, which had been dominated by numerous small units scattered across the country, and to deprive the agricultural sector. The conflict between merchants and industrialists in their competition to benefit from the spoils was exposed in terms of opposition between Istanbul and Anatolian capital, which saw itself as the locus of real development (the production of capital goods with indigenous sources of finance), since it relied on national capital and resources, condemned the development policy as favouring an assembly-type industrialisation. Nevertheless, large monopolies and holding companies dominated the economy in a very short time, and economic power was soon concentrated in the hands of the industrial and financial bourgeoisie. The large manufacturing sector became well-established in the economy with healthy returns on investment. Although the programme of the JP included transforming artisans and craftsmen with limited

opportunities into medium and big industrialists through a favourable credit system, its governmental performance did not meet the emerging demands of its collective electoral base. Rather, the result was that many small local firms in Anatolia became sub-contractors to larger firms or completely went out of business. Workshop production, however, remained an important sector (Keyder 1979).

Conflicts among the various factions of the bourgeoisie led to the establishment of splinter parties that were to compete for the traditional electoral base of the JP. Emerging political demands which had not been aggregated and integrated by the policies of the JP in the process of a rapid socio-economic development were reflected in secular trends in the fragmentation of the Turkish party system. However, it is important to emphasize that the political aspect of social behaviour was and is not completely institutionalised, organised and instrumental (class-based). Therefore, it is possible to observe sudden changes in party alignments in some provinces from one election to another.

The import-substitution strategy reached its saturation point by the early 1970s, when the expansion of the domestic market had developed as far as possible. Further growth was possible by opening up to the world markets. Therefore, the implementation of an export-oriented strategy in accordance with the restructuring of the international division of labour was the next step. The dissatisfaction of Istanbul-based industrialists with the performance of the TOBB led to the emergence of the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen' Association (TÜSİAD), a voluntary organisation, in 1971 in order for them to be able intervene in larger political processes. The TÜSİAD aimed to promote the rapid accumulation of finance capital under industrialists' control at the expense of merchant, banking and agricultural interests, which distinguished their position from that of the multi-functional TOBB. Agricultural and commercial interests and the growing working class were perceived to be obstructing the opening up of the economy. The TÜSİAD campaigned for integration with the world market, although this process of transformation would have further negative effects on the domestically based nascent industry and on the material well-being of the traditional middle class base of the JP, such as artisans, craftsmen and merchants (Ramazanoğlu, 1985: 84-7). The TÜSİAD's views reflected the interests of the largest and most prosperous firms, which are less labour intensive and have greater access to foreign capital and technology. For the dominant capitalist class, "the opening-up of the economy" meant increased state assistance for exports, the easing up of exchange control regulations and the encouragement of foreign investment rather than any systematic reduction in the degree of protection it enjoyed in the domestic market. The new strategies were aimed to attract a steady flow of foreign capital for investment, and restructure the Turkish economy through foreign competition. The insistence of the JP on acquiring associate membership of the European Economic Community

(EEC) then was a part of this orientation. Yet the JP faced a dilemma in translating the coherent economic power of its electoral base into political practices, which aimed to gain monopolistic use of state power by the dominant faction of the bourgeoisie. This was because the middle class base of the JP had already started slipping away as a result of the primary allocation of public resources to industry in preference to landed interests and small business, where capitalist production was much less developed.

As a result not only of the fragmentation of the right-wing but also of the challenge from the left, the JP lost a significant portion of its urban votes from the lower-classes in the1970s, mainly because of its socio-economic policies and the increasing bottlenecks in the economy. There had already been a massive and rapid uprooting of labour from the land because of the processes of mechanisation, commercial development and the differentiation and reorganisation of production in agriculture in some parts of the country. This, in turn, led to the acceleration of the differentiation of the rural population, and widening rural inequalities. Dispossessed or impoverished peasants and petty commodity producers became wage labourers and started migrating from countryside to towns and cities. Although the growth of industry had led to an increasing demand for wage labour, the rate of urbanisation due to mass immigration from rural to industrial centres was far beyond that of industrialisation. The result was increasing unemployment and subsequently the fall of many immigrants settling in shanty-towns to below the poverty line. The accelerating economic crisis since the late 1960s, which was partly due to increasing foreign debt, rising inflation and entry onto the world market on unequal terms, further reduced the living standards of low-level income earners. Consequently, the JP lost a significant portion of its urban vote from lower-classes in the 1970s. Growing popular demands for social justice and economic redistribution gave chance to the Republican People's Party, which, in the late 1960s, was struggling to become a party of the urban and rural lower classes. This was vital for the RPP, as the voting results of the 1950-65 period showed that the RPP had not been able to return to power electorally since it was defeated in the 1950 election by the DP. This was despite doing well in the least developed regions of eastern Turkey, where the sources of support were still tied to tribal chieftains. After the 1965 election, the RPP declared itself a social democratic party, left of the centre. Contrary to Kemalist populism, the populism of the RPP in the 1970s acknowledged the existence of classes and their conflicting interests. However, its basic goal was still a harmonious society promoted by an egalitarian approach to social welfare and economic planning. The RPP sought to take political power by encouraging the mass participation in politics of urban lower class groups and rural voters. This was to be the basis for a specific socio-economic program which included the need for agrarian reform, social welfare and improvement in the living standards of lower

income groups. Several references were made after the 1969 election campaign to the issue that the RPP was no longer the party of the large-land owning class, but of the people. It was crucial for the left to turn to the peasantry as a potential force because they were a numerically important and rapidly changing group, although politically they had gone unrecognised. However, the peasantry was far from being a homogenous group, which included landed as well as landless peasants, share-coppers, and wage earners. This meant that there would be differential responses by these different parts of the peasantry to various types of political activity. This was very obvious in the election results. In any sense, the populist image of the RPP was instrumental in its attempt to distinguish itself from its authoritarian past and its identification with the 1960 military coup (Sunar, 1974: 177). Yet the RPP had to compete ideologically with the far left, the Marxist Turkish Labour Party (LP), which was able to send MPs to Parliament in 1965 due to its relative strength among industrial workers. But apart from being subject to sustained harassment by government, the LP could not pose a real threat to the RPP because of its continual fragmentation, the absence of effective leadership and its identification by voters as an intellectuals' club. Nevertheless, both the RPP and the LP managed to raise opposition from industrial workers to the JP's government, by emphasising the fact that the workers, despite being given the right to collective bargaining and striking by the 1961 Constitution, were unable to obtain wage increases in keeping with rising productivity. Increasing opposition to government policies and a big strike by industrial workers in June 1970, described by the government as a "dress rehearsal for a revolution", led to the enforcement of the constraints of political actions and the declaration of martial law in the industrial provinces. The government was unable to respond to the increasing demands of rising socio-economic groups, nor to provide political stability required by dominant capital in the transitional period, during which production was being restructured and money markets were being established. Finally, the alleged threat of communism to the Republic was used by the army to intervene for the second time, in 1971, with an ultimatum which demanded the dissolution of the JP's government. Freedoms granted by the constitution were suspended (Ahmad, 1985: 203). The 1971 intervention obtained the dissolution of the LP and the National Order Party, a splinter from the ranks of the JP. The aim for the successive military-civilian government from 1971 to 1973 was therefore to secure the conditions of existence for the dominance of industrial and financial capital.

The 1973 general election restored the civilian rule. The existence of various right-wing political parties gave the RPP opportunity to come to power in 1974. However, the populist rhetoric of the RPP aimed to gain the support of the expanding working class, the government, which represented conflicting interests, did not provide the necessary framework for an open economy in accordance with

what the dominant capital had desired. It may be argued that a rapid transformation of Turkish capitalism that was within the international division of labour and through democratic channels was not feasible. Turkey's position in the world capitalist system had to be restructured because of: the growing bottlenecks in the domestic economy; the steadily diminishing of international markets at a steady pace for Turkish products; the adverse effects of the 1973 rise in oil prices; the increasing unwillingness of centres of international capital to bail out Turkey; and the effects of the American embargo after the 1974 intervention in Cyprus. Political instability caused by the short-lived coalition governments, increased political polarization, the militant activities of both left and right and the widespread use of violence against each other became the salient features of political activities in the late 1970s. In 1979, when the JP was in power as a minority government, the IMF's assistance, in order to extend credit facilities needed to service foreign debts and to tackle the economic problems, was on the agenda. Finally, on 24 January 1980 the government accepted an austerity package. The measures suggested by the IMF aimed to transform the economic and political structures and bring them into line with the pre-requisites of the world capitalist system. It demanded the devaluation of the currency, the lowering of wages, increases in taxes which gave priority to the export sector, the opening of the economy to international competition, the encouragement of foreign capital, the introduction of policies that would cause the transformation of the agricultural sector, and privatisation of the state economic enterprises, which owned 47 percent of the industry. The state economic enterprises were the keystone of etatist policies and in time became the focus of political action, which was confined largely to competition over employment in the expanded state sector in exchange for votes. The last measure aimed to alter the powerful position of the (civil) bureaucracy. The government's lack of success in controlling inflation, removing shortages and countering terrorism gradually reduced its popular support. The austerity programme was welcomed by the TÜSİAD and the Istanbul Chamber of Industry, since international credits had always been vital for their members. As the government was unable to provide political stability and order, it could not therefore implement such an extensive package, which caused widespread social unrest. The political stability needed for the implementation of economic measures to open up the economy without resistance from the lower classes was provided by the third military intervention in 1980. Therefore, the contradictions between the requirements of capitalist expansion and a liberal form of parliamentary democracy appeared to have been resolved by the military intervention, in favour of the dominant capital (Ramazanoğlu, 1985; 92-4). It seems that the coup, which swept daily violence and terror away in a remarkably short time, was well planned in terms of timing by the military in association with their national and international supporters, in order to provide the maximum possible popular support. The transformation of the political structure, which placed the emphasis on "the rule of

law" rather than "the rule of parliament", was completed after this intervention (Heper 1987). By re-enforcing and enlarging presidential power and the legal status of the National Security Council (NSC) as well as that of the Constitutional Court, the bureaucracy's access to state power was expanded at the expense of that of the parliamentarian system. The military regime ensured a ban on strikes and established a tight level of control over the labour force. All trade union activities were banned and strikes were made illegal. All political parties and civil organisations were dissolved and austerity measures were reintroduced in a climate in which there was no right of demonstration. Politicians of the preceding decade were charged with treason. The exclusion of peasants and workers from the debates about development policies was ensured. There was an effective censorship of the mass media and opposition was silenced by the detention of dissidents. The elimination of minor parties on both the right and the left by the military was thought to be crucial in order to build a two-party system which would end the coalition governments and provide constant political stability. However, this aim was not realised as the fragmentation of the Turkish party system further deepened in the 1980s. This took place in the context of continuing rapid social development and the restructuring of the economy in favour of big capital, which further intensified the dissatisfaction with mainstream political parties on both the left and the right. While the fragmentation in the right-wing was exacerbated by the split of the "centre-right", the "centre-left" was also divided between two parties mainly due to intra-elite conflict. On the right wing, the Motherland Party (MP) and the True Path Party (TPP) were the successors of the Party of the JP. On the left wing, the Social Democrat Populist Party (SDPP) became the mass party. It merged with its splinter group, the (new) Republican People's Party (RPP), in 1994 and was named after it to claim traditional leadership of the left against the Democratic Left Party (DLP). From a national perspective, it can be said that the right with its all various parties has been able to keep its share of votes (about 60 to 70 percent since the 1950s). However, this does not mean that Turkish voters have remained totally conservative in their political views. It is important to emphasize that despite the conventional left and right division, there has been electoral movement between the two sides of the ideological spectrum

A brief review of the social indicators of development, for example, demography, health, education, income and consumption, industry, labour, and communication suggests that although Turkey has changed greatly over recent decades, economic growth has tended to result in a very uneven pattern of development. The impact of change has been differentially felt due to sharp imbalances between regions, economic sectors and social classes. The Constitution of 1982 has excluded the subordinate classes from any effective participation in the political decision-making process. Any challenge to the *status quo* or attempt to

broaden power sharing has been faced with the use of force and repression, which in the long term has deepened political conflicts and social unrest. The governments of newly established parties since 1983 have had implemented economic policies based on restrictive monetary policies with successive devaluations, aimed at reducing domestic demand and increasing export under the supervision of the IMF. On the one hand, the aim of austerity programmes has been to consolidate economic power in the largest corporations or holdings, represented by the TÜSİAD, with just over four hundred members. Accordingly, credits, investment and export promotion incentives have led to a distributional shift in favour of the private sector, as the privatisation of public corporations was on the agenda. However, within the private sector the bias against relatively small enterprises in the provision of government services and other incentives has continued, particularly in the allocation of credits and foreign exchange. High interest rates almost brought small firms to the brink of bankruptcy since increased costs and higher prices meant losing their customers who had reduced spending power. The austerity programmes have negatively affected small enterprises which were essentially home-oriented and dependent upon state subsidies. The stabilisation measures ended state subsidies to the smaller sectors of industry. The competition among various sectors of the economy for the state patronage, signified different party preferences within the right-wing. While other sectors of the economy have been alienated by the economic policies of the centre right, the preoccupation of the TÜSİAD's elites, who own the largest corporations in Turkey, with stability that allows high profits rather than with reformist measures which would enlarge the internal market has been apparent in their party preferences and attitudes towards political issues. Given the linkage and dependence between the large industrial firms and foreign capital, and the high degree of concentration of economic power in the form of monopolies and oligopolies in industry, industrialists have become militarist, while (military) bureaucracy capitalist. The TÜSİAD has welcomed state intervention when it was used to support, subsidize or protect large enterprises within the industrial sector. In general, the smaller firms which have been denied access to state patronage have found it more difficult to gain a significant advance. The policies conducted under the stabilisation programmes have aggravated the erosion of real wages. The increasing trend toward capital intensity together with the rapid pace of urbanisation has exacerbated the problem of unemployment and underemployment, which reached almost 20 percent of the labour force in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Rising unemployment among the young and educated members of the labour force between the ages of 15 and 29 has become an intensifying social problem of the 1980s and 1990s. Massive migration has also contributed to widening disparities in regional population structures.

Bureaucracy as a Political Functionary

As mentioned above, the military has overtly intervened in politics three times since the establishment of the Republic either by direct takeovers as in 1960 and 1980 or by issuing ultimatums to the elected government and replacing it with the one of technocrats appointed by the military directly as in 1971. The 1997 intervention through the National Security Council may be called a covert military coup, since the military, without overtly seizing the reins of government, exercised a power of veto behind the scenes and pioneered the establishment of a new government by political parties which were trusted with the state ideology.

The military involvement in politics and the patterns it employs after seizing power are often explained or justified within the literature from a culturalist point of view, with reference to the history and tradition of military institutions and the legacy of Atatürk. For example, Tachau and Heper argue that

> *the Turks are heirs to Muslim culture which recognizes and accepts the legitimacy of the military as an arm of the community... the Quran declares that those who are martyred in defence of the community of the faithful are guaranteed automatic and immediate access to eternal paradise* (1983: 18).

The legacy of Atatürk, the formal separation of the army from politics, which also permits military action against elected authority on behalf of the "welfare of the people", is somewhat contradictory. It forbids serving army officers to play any part in the legislature, on the one hand, though, on the other hand, it encourages them to think of themselves as the ultimate guard of the Atatürk reformism (Hale, 1988: 160). In fact, the former does not seem to have validity. In fact, the channels for the military to reach the highest authority of the state were kept intact during the single-party era since the regime was assured of the military backing for its reform programme and the power of the military has been constitutionalised since the 1960 coup.

The military interventions in Turkey cannot be understood in terms of cultural peculiarities or the tradition of the military. Some of the highlighted issues which are supposed to have provoked any military takeover are: economic crisis; rapidly increasing foreign debt; intra-elite conflict; political polarization; and political violence. But it is important to emphasize that these can be contributory, but not sufficient conditions for any coup *d'etat*. The shortcoming within such explanations is that the use of state power by the military, as a political actor, is tied to its alleged pursuit of "collective goals", or modernisation. The mode of modernisation is set by Kemalism, and therefore it has legitimate authority, which is asserted by its tradition, culture and position in the modernisation process as the initial receiver and implementor of reform programmes. Such an approach dissociates the use of power by the military from conflicts of interests, and therefore conceives it as the most committed institution for the effective pursuit of the "general interest", which is

conceptualised upon an assumed consensus on the behalf of society. The linking of the primary use of state power by the military to authority and "collective goals" assumes that such power is a system property. This ignores the fact that the "collective goals" are the outcome of a negotiated order based upon conflicts between parties holding differential levels of power. They serve to reinforce the position of the military within the power structure by granting it a functional explanation. However, any analysis should take into account the mode of capitalist development and the role and the position of the military within the ruling-class structure.

The military has been committed to the preservation of the undisputed dominance of industrial and financial capital at the political level, despite the fact that this meant the suspension of the democratic regime in almost every decade since 1960. Since the early 1950s, the military itself has had growing commercial and industrial interests and has become a significant interest group. The OYAK (Army Mutual Aid Society) was initially set up after the 1960 intervention to create a pension programme that would protect officers from the economic insecurity they had suffered during the rapid inflation of the 1950s. This was soon transformed into the country's largest and most diversified industrial corporation, investing in automotive, cement, insurance, communication, banking etc. (Bianchi, 1984: 70-1). The integration of the top officers into the Turkish military-industrial complex was further strengthened with the establishment of an arms industry. By the time of the 1971 and 1980 interventions, the senior commanders were an integral part of the ruling structure (Ahmad 1987). Since then large resources have been allocated to the development of a defence industry. Its establishment has been costly to a great extent, since it has relied heavily on the importation of technology and essential components, and has had a limited export market, although it was justified on the grounds of its spill-over effects on other sectors of the economy in the long term[6]. Although a number of private firms have been allowed to enter the sector, the military has monopolised the industry. More than three quarters of the 23 leading companies in arms production are controlled by the various departments of the military bureaucracy For example, ASELSAN (Military Electronic Industry), which was established in 1975, is largely owned by the Armed Forces Foundation. This is, the defence industry, as one of the developing sectors in the economy, will be an essential part of the industrial sector and production in the future.

The military interventions have re-enforced the fact that politics is not only constrained, but is also under the control of the state. All military interventions since 1960 have displayed the similar aim of delineating an arena for the state (bureaucrats) as opposed to the realm of politics. For example, the Constitution of 1961 legitimized the political influence of the bureaucratic intelligentsia by prohibiting sole emphasis from being placed on the "national will". It pitted the

civil-military bureaucratic elite against the representatives in the parliament, which ended its theoretical supremacy. A juridical concept of state, placing greater faith in the rule of law, replaced that of one in the rule of parliament (Heper, 1988: 6-7). The 1982 Constitution, which was written under the military regime, has also asserted the supremacy of the state over the realm of politics, and placed constraints on the political system to prevent it from losing control of the state over to the governing institutions. The state has been unquestionably represented by the military elite, the so-called "principal interpreter of the general interest", and has been restructured in accordance with the restructuring of the economy in order to allow the dominant interest to monopolise state power and limit the access of the commercial and agricultural factions to power (Ramazanoğlu, 1985: 235). Accordingly, the execution of state power is located in the office of the President, by granting enormous direct power. The presidential post had almost traditionally been seen as the top echelon in the army career until the presidency of Özal in 1990, with the exception that of Celal Bayar, who was the leader of the DP in the 1950s. The judiciary was restructured to complement the reorganisation of the state apparatus, which meant the demolition of the means of controlling state power by citizens through legislative and judicial process. Ultimately, the political choice of citizens has been subordinated to "the needs and existence of the state".

Such dominance meant the further incorporation of the military with its economic interests into the political decision-making process after each military intervention, i.e. the institutionalisation of power. As Özbudun (1996) indicates, each military regime had prepared the ground for an "exit guarantee" under the new constitution after its departure from power. The National Security Council granted constitutional status by the Constitution of 1961 has reached the stage of continuing interference and influence in politics to an important extent and attained a constitutional office for its Secretariat (NSCS). The NSC was set up after the 1960 intervention to act as a consultative body to civil authority on matters concerning national security, internal and external. It was dominated by civil members. However, the 1971 intervention and the Constitution of 1982 improved the status of the NSC in terms of its status vis-a-vis the government. The new constitution balanced the numbers of civilian and military members. The NSC is therefore composed of five civilian, including the President, and five military members. The recruited members of the NSC have the same status as the elected members. It is an authority over the government since its recommendations to the cabinet are not "advisory" but "mandatory". The NSC provides an institutionalized channel for the military access to the top level of political authority. Besides the well-established guardian role of the army, the post-1980 pattern in particular appears to be one of, in theory, "shared" decision-making in "security matters", the framework of which is principally drawn up by the military. This, therefore, gives it a leadership position

in working out its response, with a near-remote possibility of being questioned about that role by civilian politicians. The existence and nature of the NSC and the NSCS indicate that the top military officers are not only bureaucrats in their own rights, but also constitutionally recognised political actors with a significant stake in the economy. Accordingly, the NSCS was granted autonomous status within the civil authority by the Constitution of 1982, and given enormous legal authority over the legislative and executive bodies. For example, the Secretary has the mandate to act independently from the prime minister and command public as well as private institutions in order to enforce policies drawn by the NSC, the content of which can override security matters. The concept of "national security" matters is defined in very abstract terms, and is therefore open to interpretation under existing circumstances. The military either directly or indirectly involves in the maintenance of the social and political order, which may include a dense traffic between the senior levels of military bureaucracy and high political offices. This is, concentrating on the competition over the allocation of public resources within a national developmental model, and identifying the strains and inequalities of the ongoing development process cannot be understand without a reference to the degree of bureaucratic involvement in the national economy. This draws attention to the fact that it is not identities which determines the course of political action, but vice versa.

Endnotes

[1] It has been a mainstream approach to explain the political, social, cultural or religious history of Turkey in terms of the two-tiered model, namely "centre and periphery" (Mardin 1973; Heper 1980),i.e. modern and traditional, or "high and popular realms" (Mardin 1969 and 1977). Yet the concepts fail to specify what concrete social groups fall within this purview. This approach continues to bear the mark of the modernisation paradigm and treats either side as a united, distinctive, homogenous entity in itself.

[2] See for a comparison, E. Kongar (1981) Atatürk Devrim ve Kuramları; and S. Savran (1985) "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye'de Burjuva Devrimi". While the former employs the modernisation paradigm, the latter applies historical-materialism to address the transformative feature of Kemalism, so that both approaches converge on the progressiveness of its nature. For example, M. Heper in The State Tradition in Turkey (1985) argues that Kemalism provided a "transient transcendental state" with normative foundations to prepare the people for democracy. See also N. Berkes (1964) The Development of Secularism in Turkey.

[3] The World System sees the development of Third World capitalism in terms of the main internal contradictions that characterize its mode of production as part of the development of world production. The processes of the capitalist system are such that boom and crisis periods are reproduced in national arenas, although the political and ideological accommodations of

these are naturally specific. The turning points of the world economy are crucial, because at such junctures particular local social groups and their political projects gain greater importance and help to determine the subsequent balance of forces (I. Wallerstein (1979) The Capitalist World Economy; A. G. Frank (1980) Crisis in the World Economy; and S. Amin (1976) Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formulation of Peripheral Capitalism.

[4] See F. H. Cardoso and E. Faletto (1979) Dependency and Development in Latin America, for more detail on state corporatism with reference to Latin America.

[5] The founding entrepreneurs in 74.2 percent of all firms established between 1931 and 1940 were bureaucrats. This high figure shows the bureaucracy's growing share in national income and the opportunities it had enjoyed in public contracts and land speculation in the growing capital city (Keyder, 1987: 106). The novel called Ankara, by Y. K. Karaosmaoğlu, narrates growing economic competitions and land speculations in Ankara among bureaucrats with reference to their understanding of modernity. Ankara portrays an enormous gap between the social life of bureaucrats and that of average residents, and their geographical segregation, as general public was forbidden to wander around the city centre with what was called then the "peasants' dresses", such as baggy trousers. Even a police patrol was provided around the city centre to prevent any violation of this rule.

[6] The growth rate of defence expenditure has averaged 6.2 percent annually, although the GNP in recent decade has been 5.2 percent. Turkey has allocated 5 percent of her GNP to the defence expenditure since the 1960s, although for health and education, the figures have been just about 2 percent. The figure for the defence expenditure is 21.7 percent of the central government budget. However, this does not include other sources outside the central government budget (Sezgin, 1997: 384).

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