ATATÜRK’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDERSTANDING AND APPLICATION

Şaban ÇALIŞ*
Hüseyin BAĞCI**

Abstract

After 1923, domestic and international affairs of Modern Turkey were essentially formed by Mustafa Kemal, intended to integrate with the Western World and complete Turkey’s modernization project. In this context, Turkish state changed its identification radically and accepted secular character instead of religious components in her identity in order to run western oriented foreign policy and create a modern nation. The Kemalist reformation was in reality Turkey’s total break with its Islamic, Ottoman and to some extent with its Turkist past on one hand, and total embrace of Europe through an acceptance of its values and institutions. In this article, the application of Kemalist foreign policy understanding in the 1920s and 1930s by Atatürk himself analyzed in terms of establishment of the Turkish state and the defining Turkish national identity.

Keywords: International relations, foreign policy, state, nation, identity

Özet


Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası ilişkiler, dış politika, devlet, ulus, kimlik

* Doç. Dr., Selçuk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi
** Prof. Dr., Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi
1. Introduction

Modern Turkey and its foreign policy cannot be evaluated properly without understanding Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a leader and practitioner in political life including domestic and international affairs. As much as is in the case of creating the Turkish Republic as a modern state, the very foundations of Turkish foreign policy were put by Mustafa Kemal and have since remained essentially unchanged. As simply put it, Mustafa Kemal first of all wanted to create a modern and western country and then he used foreign policy as well in order to realise this basic aspiration. Just as he introduced many reforms in order to westernise Turkish state and society, so did he establish a foreign policy intended to accord with the standards of Western civilisation. For it was his sincere desire to see Turkey among the Western countries, Turkey completely turned its face from East to West, internally and externally in his lifetime. What Turkish decision makers have done since his death has not been different from what had been done already: Turkey was actually being integrated with the Western world. It is therefore a must to have a look at Mustafa Kemal’s own foreign policy understanding and application if we want to understand modern Turkish foreign policy. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, foreign policy had also been regarded by the Kemalist establishment as a part of Turkey’s modernisation and westernisation/Europeanization process as much as domestic policies. In terms of creating modern Turkey, there is not a major difference, in the final analysis, between Atatürk’s reforms such as the abolition of the Caliphate or the fez reform and foreign policy. Since 1923, Turkey has accordingly developed a powerful internal structure, which does not allow external changes such as the collapse of the Cold War to alter drastically the traditional course of foreign policy.

According to Mustafa Kemal himself, there was, and should be, close correlation between the internal structure and foreign policy of a country. In *Nutuk* (Speech), he explained this as follows:

What particularly interests foreign policy and upon which it is founded is the internal organisation of the State. Thus it is necessary that the foreign policy should agreed with the internal organisation. In a state which extends from the East to the West and which [unites] in its embrace contrary elements with opposite characters, goals and culture, it is natural that the internal organisation should be defective and weak in its foundations. In these circumstances, its foreign policy, having no solid
foundation, cannot be strenuously carried on. In the same proportion as the internal organisation such a State suffers specially from the defect of not being national, so also its foreign policy must lack this character. To unite different nations under one common name, to give these different elements equal rights, subject them to the same conditions and thus to found a mighty state is a brilliant and attractive political ideal; but it is a misleading one. It is an unrealisable aim to attempt to unite in one tribe the various races existing on the earth, thereby abolishing all boundaries. Herein lies a truth which the centuries that have gone by and the man who lived during these centuries have clearly shown in dark and sanguinary events.

There is nothing in history to show how the policy of pan-Islamism could have succeeded or how could have found a basis for its realisation on this earth. As regards the results of the ambition to organise a State which should be governed by the idea of world-supremacy and include the whole humanity without distinction of race, history does not afford examples of this. For us, there can be no question of the lust of conquest. On the other hand, the theory which aims at founding a 'humanitarian' State which shall embrace all mankind in perfect equality and brotherhood and at bringing it to the point of forgetting separatist sentiments and inclinations of every kind, is subject to conditions which are peculiar to itself.

The political system which we regard as clear and fully realisable is national policy. In view of the general conditions obtaining in the world at present and the truths which in the course of centuries have rooted themselves in the minds of and have formed the characters of mankind, no greater mistake could be made than that of being a utopian. This is borne out in history and is the expression of science, reason and common sense. In order that our nation should be able to live a happy, strenuous and permanent life, its necessary that the State should pursue an exclusively national policy and that this policy should be in perfect agreement with our internal organisation and be based on it. When I speak of national policy, I meant it in this sense: To work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and the welfare of the nation and the country by, above all, relying on our own strength in order to retain our existence. But not to lead the people to follow fictitious aims, of whatever nature, which could only bring them misfortune, and expect from the civilised world civilised human treatment. Friendship based on mutuality (Ghazi, 1929: 377-379; Atatürk, 1989: 584-587).

In this quit lengthy quotation, he certainly meant that the principles of Turkish revolution which established a modern state aimed to create a western nation/society were at the same time the principles of modern
Turkish foreign policy. Indeed, when one looks at Kemalist principles and modern Turkish foreign policy in application together, one can see that there is a perfect agreement between them. Above all, the more westernising reforms had been materialised the more Turkey turned its face from the East to the West.

In the following pages, the application of Kemalist foreign policy understanding by Atatürk himself will be analysed under some subheadings covering the period of 1923-1938. These parts will include: i- Atatürk's perception about establishing a relationship with the West in general; ii- Turkey's relations with Islamic countries and Arabs; iii-the emergence of the Italian threat and the establishment of regional pacts; iii-relations with the Soviet Union; v-Turkey's rapprochement with Britain.

At this point of the article, it should be noted that Atatürk's main concern in the 1920s in particular was to establish the Turkish state and to define Turkish national identity. As far as foreign policy is concerned, the basic issue was the consolidation of Turkish national independence and sovereignty. After obtaining international recognition, the best foreign policy option during the period was to ensure Turkey's security by avoiding foreign entanglements and by achieving workable agreements with neighbours in matters of local and regional concerns. Nevertheless, as we will see in the following pages, Turkey's modernisation efforts also provided a considerable input for foreign policy and the Turkish state's identification with the ideals and ideas of the western world considerably affected Turkey's foreign relations even during the period.

2. Anti-westernism and Anti-imperialism Dichotomy

A conventional understanding argues that Atatürk himself adopted an anti-imperialist, anti-western, and at least neutral and pragmatic policy in international relations. However, this approach is misleading, if not an attempt to distort historical facts.

As far as is understood from available sources, the truth is that his foreign policy was western oriented as much as his reforms. But it is a fact that the Turkish war of national liberation was at the same time waged against those western countries which agitated and supported the Greek invasion plans of Anatolia and decided to divide Turkey into small zones of occupation as revealed in the Sevres Agreement. When the Ottomans were defeated in the
war, what Europe particularly wanted to see was the end of the existence of the Turks in the continent. As also indicated elsewhere, Atatürk was very well aware of the fact. But he "acted with the belief that giving a Western image to Turkey was a prerequisite [condition] for its security. Europe would agree to co-exist with Turkey, only if the latter were similar to itself." (Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, 1985:36) Therefore, he never had anti-western thoughts including foreign policy, even though Mustafa Kemal was an anti-imperialist leader.

If we look at his own application of foreign policy, we can see that as the war was approaching the end, Mustafa Kemal began to follow a more friendly policy towards the West, whilst reducing the intensity of relations with the Eastern countries. Even during the War, Kemalists sought some ways, although keeping it secret, to establish amicable relations with the United States and Britain. Despite the Hatay question, Turkey did not hesitate to sign a treaty of friendship with France in 1921 (Soysal, 1984:959-1044; TCKB, 1992: 45-49, 579-590). Perhaps in the 1920s, including the period of the National Liberation War, Mustafa Kemal's Turkey paid special attention to the friendship with the Soviets who offered Kemalists support in the War, but as we will see in the following pages, this gradually turned uptown while Turkey's relationship with the West in the 1930s was developing.

As Atatürk was indeed sending encouraging messages to the West, he did not forget to stress the limited purposes of the Turkish war of liberation: Turkey would be a national, independent, moderate and westernised state. For Turks, neither pan-Islamism nor pan-Turkism or Easternism was a solution in order to live in a world which was under the control of western domination. As he rejected pan-Islamist and pan-Turkist policies, he had a clear vision of foreign policy direction. As early as December 1921, when he made a speech in the National Assembly, he clarified his position as follows:

Gentlemen! Every one of our compatriots and coreligionists may nourish a high ideal in his mind; he is free to do so... But the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey has a firm, positive, material policy, and that, gentlemen, is directed to the preservation of life and independence... within defined national frontiers. The Grand National Assembly and government of Turkey, in the name of the nation they represent, are very modest, very far from fantasies, and completely realistic.... Gentlemen, we are not men who run after great fantasies and present a
fraudulent appearance of doing things which in fact we cannot do. Gentlemen, by
looking as though we were doing great and fantastic things, without actually doing
them, we have brought the hatred, rancour, and malice of the whole world on this
country and this people. We did not serve pan-Islamism. We said that we had and
we would, but we didn't, and our enemies said: "Let us kill them at once before they
do!" We did not serve pan-Turanianism. We said that we could and we would, and
again they said: "Let us kill them!" There you have the whole problem.... Rather
than run after ideas, which we did not and could, not realise and thus increase
number of our enemies and the pressure upon us, let us return to our natural,
legitimate limits. And let us know our limits. Gentlemen, we are a nation desiring

With the Mudanya Agreement of 1922 between the Kemalist forces and
the Allies, the first sign of Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy in future began to
appear. After the Mudanya, he acted very quickly in order to settle Turkey's
problems with the Western countries as far as possible.

In this respect, one of the turning points in Turkish foreign policy was the
Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed with the Allied powers in July 1923. If we look at it as a whole, it is possible to understand what Mustafa Kemal
wanted in foreign affairs (Timur, 1993: 50-52). First of all, Turkey accepted
that the Ottoman Empire was dead. As the international community was
recognizing its independence, Turkey in return gave up those imperial
aspirations, which sometimes surfaced in the name of pan-Turkism and
sometimes pan-Islamism. With the abolition of capitulations and other
privileges for foreign countries in economic, judicial and military matters,
Turkey's rights of sovereignty as a nation state, except for the Straits and the
Mosul problems, were restored. In addition, the integrity of Turkey in most
part was recognised, and thanks in part to the provisions of exchange of
populations Kemalist Turkey was provided with the opportunity of creating
a culturally homogenous state (Soysal, 1989: 67-84).

Just as the reforms of Mustafa Kemal erected a new state according to the
standards of western civilisation, so Mustafa Kemal changed the focus of
Turkish foreign policy with the Treaty of Lausanne. This Treaty transformed
the multi-national/religious Ottoman Empire into a small republic. But by
growing smaller, Mustafa Kemal poured new blood into the vessels of the
Turkish nation. Now Turkey began to be accepted as an equal state by the
western countries with which Turks had fought for centuries. It is quite
obvious that as we have shown in the previous pages, Mustafa Kemal did not adopt a dangerous and ambitious course of aggrandizement and unrealistic irredentism. Even more, in order to reach an agreement with the western countries, he had to accept a smaller map than the National Pact had envisaged (Lenczowiski, 1987:122).

After the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey began to develop friendly relations with Western countries (Kürkçüoğlu, 1981: 164-165). In this sense, there were great similarities between the aspirations of Mustafa Kemal and those of the nineteenth century’s westernists. Like the westernists, he wanted to finish centuries old hatreds, wars and antagonisms between Turkey and the Western countries. Of course, Turkey's aspiration of becoming a western country certainly affected foreign policy as well. As clearly pointed out by several Turkish scholars, modernisation/westernisation was a basic foreign policy goal of Atatürk's Turkey.

Turkey's external relations also became westernised in accordance with the westernisation of the internal structure, during the time of Atatürk. After the Lausanne Treaty in particular, his anti-imperialist stance was shelved and Turkey became essentially a status quo power. The dictum of Atatürk, "peace at home and peace in the World", was the best summary of this understanding (AKDTYK, 1989: Vol. I, 374). As pointed out by Kinross, Mustafa Kemal always said, 'let us recognise our own limits'. "By keeping Turkey small he would make her great. The Turkish Republic desired only its territorial integrity and freedom. As long as the West would respect this, Turkey in return offered the West a zone of peace in an explosive corner of the East. The new sovereign Republic, geographically poised between East and West, was to be a stabilising element." (Kinross, 1990: 458) It was certain that such a policy was obviously suited to the western countries' interests, but it was at the same time what Turkey needed particularly in order to make and sustain its own westernising reforms.

3. The Islamic World between Religion and Secularism

Parallel with the pace of Kemalist reforms, Ankara's relations with Islamic countries and Arabs deteriorated considerably during the period (Gökalp and Georgeon, 1990: 31-45; Kruger, 1932: 160-197). Several reasons to explain this deterioration can be listed here on the condition that we should keep in mind the general effect of Turkey's identity change.
First of all, there had been a perception problem between the Turks and Arabs towards each other which was exacerbated by the anti-Turkish campaign of some Arabs during the World War I. But this misperception was also related with the twin process of state formation and nation building in Turkey and Arab countries towards the end of the Ottoman Empire. As also stated elsewhere, Turkish and Arabic secular circles "sought to remove what was seen as the dead weight of Islam and the Ottoman Empire by exaggerating the differences between Arab and Turk and vilifying one another". (Yavuz and Khan, 1992: 71)\(^\text{11}\)

In addition to the factor, Kemalist reforms were disapproved by conservative Arabs and interpreted as Turkey's breakaway from Islam (Aykan, 1993:91).\(^\text{12}\) This Arab estrangement from Kemalist Turkey further increased when the province of Hatay, which was taken from Syria in 1938, joined Turkey a year later (Kürkçüoğlu, 1987: 13).

The abolition of the Caliphate was one of the most important turning points in Turkey's relations with the Muslim world. Indeed, the consequences of the abolition were manifold. To begin with, as also indicated elsewhere, "Turkey ceased to be the centre of Islamic authority" (Toynbee and Kirkwood, 1926: 179). No longer was Turkey the leader of Muslims.

On the one hand, Turkey closed its doors to the Islamic world. On the other, the Islamic world would gradually become estranged from Turkey, (Oran, 1990: 177) because, in the heyday of imperialism, when most Muslims living under the western occupation looked for help from the Caliph, the abolition finished their expectations, with a great frustration (Toynbee, 1927: 62-63). Secondly, it was a signal to the Western world to modernize the country's foreign policy as much as internal political system (Başkaya, 1991: 43-44), a signal that Turkey would cut down its ties with its Islamic and Ottoman past in international affairs as well.\(^\text{13}\)

It is not an exaggeration, we think, to say that since the establishment of the Turkish republic, its foreign policy towards the Islamic world has essentially been conditioned by the state's identity change which has determined policy making patterns. As also pointed out by Vali, "Kemalist Turkey, obliged to eliminate the Islamic and theocratic foundations of the Ottoman state and to modernise its political and social structure, turned its back on the Middle East and especially on the Arab world."(Vali,
A similar observation was made by others. Whereas Lewis related such a policy with Kemal's wishes "to cut [Turkey] off from its oriental and Islamic past", (Lewis, 1971: 133) Robinson pointed out that "for Turkey, a secular state, religion was not a valid basis for a political relationship" in international relations as well (Robinson, 1965: 171). Turkey had refused to form any relationship, which was based on Islamic rules. As Robinson makes clear, such a policy was "an extension of domestic law which [held] that the use of religion for political purposes is subversive to a secular state, and hence, illegal. To use religion in international politics would therefore be at odds with a clearly defined domestic policy" (Robinson, 1965: 171-172).

As a result, Turkey first declined to join the Cairo Conference held by Muslim countries and organisations in May 1926 (Toynbee, 1927: 81-90). Since its subject was the problem of caliphate, the Turkish authorities thought that this Conference contradicted the secular principle of the Turkish state. "Such a problem [as caliphate] did not exist for Turkey", said the Turkish Ambassador in Cairo (Toynbee, 1927: 84-85). On the other hand, in June of the same year, Turkey participated in the Islamic Congress of Mecca organised by the King Ibn Sa'ud to promote the well-being of sacred places and the security of pilgrims (Sindi, 1978: 107-113; Toynbee, 1927: 308-319). This may be seen as a contradiction. But it was not, since the aim of the Mecca Conference did not violate the principles of the Turkish state. In this respect, it is very significant that the Turkish delegation in Mecca behaved cautiously (Al-Ahsan, 1992: 59), and objected discussing any political issue and taking decisions on any matter other than the well-being of pilgrims (Toynbee, 1927: 214-215).

But Turkey would change even such a careful policy and adopt a cooler approach towards Islamic organisations as displayed in the case of the Third Islamic Congress of Jerusalem, in December 1931. Although it had in fact similar objectives with those of Mecca, the Congress caused a visible "nervousness" in Ankara, because Turkey perceived it as a religious congregation "conflicting with the aims of any modern state". According to the Turkish foreign minister, Turkey would have nothing to do with such a congress, since it was of no value to any Muslim country and would instead distract the Islamic nations from pursuing the true path of political and economic progress. He made it very plain that any external and internal policy that used Islam would be vigorously opposed by the Turkish Republic
There are also more dramatic examples of Turkey's new policy towards the Islamic world. On one occasion, for example, Turkey's relations with Saudi Arabia were strained, because the Turkish authorities did not allow Muslim pilgrims to wear their traditional turbans, which were banned in Turkey, while visiting Turkish shrines (Vali, 1971:276).

Similarly, wearing the fez caused tension between Cairo and Ankara in 1934. When the Egyptian ambassador came with a fez to an official reception for foreign diplomats, he was told by the Turkish president to remove his headgear. As related by Kinross, "the Gazi sent a waiter with a salver for the fez, remarking, 'tell your King I don't like his uniform'...When the news of the episode was reached Cairo, King Fuad was furious, and a break in relations with Turkey was only avoided by tactful diplomacy on both sides." (Kinross, 1990: 462).16

In another occasion which was concerned a security problem in Turkey's frontier with Iran in 1930, Atatürk could not hesitate showing a firm action toward a neighbouring Muslim country. He advised Turkish Ambassador in Teheran to be hard against the Iranians, even to return to Ankara immediately if they did not accept Turkey's proposal as it was (Arar, 1981:18).

In a time when Mustafa Kemal was approaching western countries with sympathy and even establishing very friendly relations with the arch-enemy, Greece, there was indeed a considerable lack of enthusiasm towards Muslim countries. It can be said that at the root of such behaviour there was a kind of reaction to the past. Arabs always reminded Turkey of Islam and the Ottomans. As a Turkish minister explained this psychological factor, Turkey was "only thinking of breaking this Muslim yoke that is upon it". He said "as we are breaking this foreign Arab yoke, we are finding ourselves as Turks. (Jones, 1926: 257)"

4. Security, the Italian Effect and Regional Pacts

For Turkey, the most immediate threat in the 1930s was Italy. As an external factor, Italy then played a role in the making of Turkish foreign policy during the period under study which can be compared with that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In three respects, these similarities are of special importance. The first one is the fact that this external threat
compelled Ankara to follow an active policy in the region. Secondly, this threat (Italy before the Second World War and Russia after it) helped Turkey to have closer relationship with the Western world. Thirdly, closely related with the first two, Turkey in return accepted a role in the region protecting the interests of the western countries. As also pointed out by Brock Millman, it was this Italian factor that compelled Turkey to have a more active foreign policy in the region, to conclude its alliance with Greece, to play a prominent part in the League of Nations, to change the status of the Straits by the Montreux Agreement and to take a leading role in the formation of the Balkan and Saadabat pacts (Millman, 1995: 485-488).

Turkey's membership to the League of Nations was also significant with respect to Turkey's approach to international organisations. As a country which believed in the importance of international cooperation and of keeping the status quo in the World, its participation in this organisation was in fact not a surprise development. In June 1932, on Atatürk's instructions, Ankara declared that it was ready to join the League if invited (Kinross, 1990:527). Subsequently, it was invited in July 1932 and Turkey was formally accepted by the League, (Akşin, 1966: 50-57; Tamkoç, 1976: 138-151; Krueger, 1932: 214-218) thanks particularly to Britain (Akşin, 1966: 50-57). Certainly, the League's failure to stop revisionist states' aggressive policies such as the Italian invasion of Ethiopia would disappoint the Turks, but as the then Turkish foreign minister, T. Rüştü Aras, told British Ambassador, Sir Percy Loraine, the maintenance of peace by the League of Nations was the foundation of Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy (PRO FO 371/19039 E6710/1213/44). The foreign minister himself always insisted on two principles: "absolute fidelity to the League and unquestioning discharge of the obligations imposed on her [Turkey]"; and that outside these obligations Turkey had no quarrel with any nation" (PRO FO 1011/61).

Turkey's ever increasing fear of fascist Italy was considerably heightened in 1934 when Italy began to fortify the Dodecanese Islands, Rhodes and Leros in the Aegean Sea which were located only a few miles away from the coasts of Turkey (Zhivkova, 1976:9). The irresponsible proclamations of Mussolini concerning the so-called historical objectives of Italy in Africa and Asia further alarmed the Turkish authorities to follow a more active policy in the region (Kılıç, 1959: 50-54).
As a result, Ankara together with Greece played a leading role in the establishment of the Balkan Entente in February 1934, consisting of Turkey, Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia (Vali, 1971: 25-26). The aim of the pact was the prevention of a war in the region by establishing a common policy against aggressors. Should a non-Balkan country attack any of the signatories and be assisted by a Balkan country, the other signatories would also be obliged to go to war against the aggressor (Kiç, 1959: 52-54). As the involvement of Greece in this agreement made it very clear, the effect of Britain cannot be denied in its realisation. Altemur Kiç also notes that in addition to the Italian effect, the main aim of the Balkan unity was to create a bulwark against the Soviet Russia (Kiç, 1959: 52). If it was the case, it means that Turkey's foreign policy in the 1950s which was to be performed by the Democrat Party was indeed not more than a confirmation of Kemalist foreign policy understanding. At this point of the article, in order to exemplify this continuity, we can mention here the Democrats' efforts to create another Balkan pact in the 1950s.

This continuity in conducting Turkish foreign policy reflects itself in other fields as well. Despite the ideological parting of ways between Turks and Arabs which we have analysed in the previous parts, Kemalist Turkey did not totally remain isolated from the Middle East for security reasons in particular and attempted to establish a closer relationship with Iraq and Iran in the latter part of the 1930s (Gönlübol, 1989: 111-113). As a result of this attempt, Turkey and Iraq signed the Saadabad Pact in July 1937 with the participation of Iran and Afghanistan (Kürkçüoğlu, 1987: 13).

In the conclusion of the agreement two important reasons, inter alia, which are closely connected with each other had played their parts. The immediate reason for this pact was to demonstrate the determination of these signatory countries to stand against the change of status quo in the region by force, a fact that was exacerbated by Italian aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean area, Africa and Asia in those years (Aşin, 1966: 79-80). The other reason was Turkey's security problems in its eastern and southern borders. In the 1920s and the 1930s, Turkey had to face great Kurdish revolts which could not be totally kept under control, mainly due to the lack of security measures in the region (Soysal, 1989: 582-583). By the pact, Turkey intended to seal its borders against the logistic support of Kurdish nationalists (Ghassemloou, 1965: 61-62).
The timing of the agreement was significant because in the second half of the 1930s the revisionist states began to play with fire. Certainly, this drove Turkey to increase its national security arrangements including the establishment of the Saadabad Pact.22

This pact in fact resembled nothing but "a weak non-aggression treaty" as put elsewhere (Vali, 1971: 277). Turkish Foreign Ministry explained that its importance for Turkey's security stemmed from its role as a morale booster confirming the feeling of friendship among its signatories. It was an agreement that was designated to preserve the existing status quo in the region, by confirming the principles of non-interference in domestic affairs, non-violability of borders and mutual consultation in the event of an international crisis (Aykan, 1988: 43-44).

Nevertheless, it is of a significant importance to understand the basis of modern Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. According to Ludmila Zhivkova, the Saadabad pact was designated against the struggle of the Arab countries for their national liberation from the British imperialism in the region and against the Soviet Union (Zhivkova, 1976: 55). If we take into account the role of Britain in the realisation of the pact, it is then possible to say that this pact helped to strengthen the British position in the region. Indeed, it was certain that without British approval the signing of the pact would have been impossible, because, as also pointed out by A. Şükri Esmer, Iraq, a country under the British mandate, could be included in this agreement only with London's consent.23

In terms of these objectives, it is impossible not to see similarities between the Saadabad Pact of Atatürk and the Baghdad Pact of the Democrat Party, as pointed out by George S. Harris (Harris, 1982: 131). Perhaps some would not agree with such an interpretation but this would not change historical realities. As in the case of the Democrats' conviction regarding the national interests of Turkey and those of the western powers in the 1950s, when the Saadabad Pact was signed in the 1930s the Turkish foreign ministry also had the idea that "there existed a complete identity of interests between the two countries [Turkey and Britain] (Kılıç, 1959: 61).

As it is clear, Turkey’s search for security and the place of the Italian threat cannot be denied, but a combination of several factors affected Ankara's active foreign policy in the 1930s. These factors also included Mustafa Kemal's general foreign policy understanding which was summed
up in his motto "Peace at home, peace in the world." Obviously, this aphorism was, however, far too general to order any specific line of action, as pointed out by George Harris (Harris, 1972: 11). In practice, the guiding principle of Atatürk's foreign policy demonstrated itself in different forms. One of them was to enter international organisations and to conclude regional defensive alliances closer to home with Balkan and Near Eastern states.

5. Atatürk's Turkey and Greece

As clearly indicated in the previous section, the Italian threat began creating a security crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean in particular. This brought Greece and Turkey together and they were able to establish the Balkan Pact. But the history of relations between Turkey and Greece is in reality the history of the creation of two separate nations from a multinational empire. Therefore, these relations are of special importance in order to understand the role of identity in foreign policy. But what is more interesting is the fact that Turkish foreign policy towards Greece is a laboratory for testing some arguments concerning the origins of Turkish foreign policy and the relative roles of national and state identities. As the identity of the Turkish state played a positive (centripetal) role in developing a close relationship with Greece, the Turkish national identity as a centrifugal factor created serious obstacles to such a relationship.

Greece was established as a national state in the 1800s after a long independence struggle against the Ottoman Empire (Bahcheli, 1990: 5-10). Because the Greeks lived for about four hundred years under the Turkish rule, the Turkish effect was one of the most important factors, if not the single one, in developing a distinct Greek national identity. For a Greek, the "other" which he/she uses in his/her identity definition has certainly been the Turks.24 The Modern Greek national identity and its implications for Greece's foreign policy cannot therefore be understood unless the Turkish effect is taken into account.25 On the other hand, the Greeks have in return played a similar role, perhaps "less significant",26 in the formation of modern Turkish nation-state identity (Gürel, 1993: 161-162). As already indicated, modern Turkey emerged as a nation-state in the 1920s following a national liberation war against the Greeks who attempted to occupy Anatolia at the end of the World War I. That is why both of the two nations have perceived each other as the arch-enemy.
As many students of Greek-Turkish relations would agree, at the root of existing differences and problems between Turkey and Greece including the Cyprus conflict, minorities and the Aegean dispute, there has in fact been such identification. This identification sometimes reflects itself in its extreme form in Greece as "Megali Idea" (Great Idea or pan-Hellenism) and in Turkey as pan-Turkism. It can be said that because of the historical roots of identification which have always been kept alive through education and socialisation process (Cramer, 1991: 58), the relationship of the two neighbours has been characterised by a mutual feeling of distrust, competition and rivalry more than by mutual trust and efforts for cooperation (Gürel, 1993: 163).

However, it should be noted here that this picture does not completely fit particularly with the general picture of Turkey's official approach towards Greece after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s. This is mainly due to the fact that parallel with the pace of reformation process and the implementation of Kemalist foreign policy understanding, Turkey's relations with Greece entered a period of reconciliation as soon as the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. Perhaps the Treaty left many bilateral problems unresolved such as that of minorities, but it was able to define at least a permanent physical frontier between the two countries (Bahcheli, 1990: 11-13). In addition, perhaps more significant than this, it provided a basis for mutual understanding, however officially, to develop relations between the two arch-enemies, which was to last until the second half of the 1950s (Bahcheli, 1990: 13-16).

In the 1930s, Atatürk and Venizelos were able to build up a good neighbourhood between the two nations. They first signed the Neutrality, Reconciliation and Arbitration Agreement in October 1930. This friendship was crowned with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1933 and then with the establishment of the Balkan Pact in 1934 (Bahcheli, 1990: 13-14; Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1994: 120-124; Vali, 1971: 224-226). During this period, both leaders even went so far as to discuss the possibility of some form of union between the two countries (Alexandris, 1982: 60). Needless to repeat, the most important cause of the rapprochement in the 1930s was the Italian threat and anti-revisionist policies of the two leaders. But this relationship was of symbolic meaning and ideological dimensions as well for modern Turkish foreign policy. First of all, this relationship was one of the symbols of Turkey's westernisation. Like the Greeks, the modern
Turks in various ways denied their Ottoman past including old patterns of foreign policy and cultural aspects of the old identity (Groom, 1986: 380). Yet, for example, whereas Arabic (language and alphabet) was outlawed in Turkey, Kemalists made the course of Greek language compulsory in secondary schools. Many Greek classical books were translated into Turkish. An educated Turk became much more familiar with Greek philosophy and mythology than Islamic ones. Particularly in the 1930s, this created a psychological background for the rapprochement of the two nations, which was symbolised with the conversion of Ayasofya mosque into a museum as a gesture of Atatürk to the Greeks (Bahcheli, 1990: 14).

At this point of discussion, it is necessary, to touch upon the foundations of Ankara's minorities' policy. When the Treaty of Lausanne was made, whereas a Christian minority and the Oecumenical Patriarchate were left in Turkey, a Muslim minority, of which an estimated 129,120 were Turks, was allowed to remain settled in the Western Thrace (Oran, 1991: 35). This population was exempt from the agreement of the emigration exchange, taking place between Greece and Turkey. But the Lausanne Treaty used the criterion of religion while referring to the ethnic communities. In the Treaty, it was referred only to Muslims in Greece and non-Muslims in Turkey as minorities, that is, the basis of group identity in the Lausanne Treaty was religious, not ethnic or national affiliations. In 1923, such was normal, because Turkey was still an Islamic state and the conception of minorities in the document was in harmony with this state identity. But this conception would leave Turkey to face an unspoken dilemma after the minority problems resumed in the 1950s: a Turkey, which rejected Islam and religious symbols, could not use such a concept as Muslims. As expected, modern Turkey preferred to refer to the minority of the Western Thrace as the Turkish people.

The real reason behind this can be debated, but it is certainly nothing more than a clear reflection of the Kemalist state identity to foreign policy making. The dilemma seemed to be solved by such a reference. However, Turkey's minority’s policy would not provide solutions but produce new problems after the 1950s. Particularly Ankara's reference to the Muslim population in Thrace as the Turkish minority would in fact create an artificial problem with Athens. It is true that in some bilateral agreements regulating the minority affairs the terms "Greek" and "Turkish" were used, but the Greeks would begin insisting the terms of Muslims instead of the
Turkish minority in Greece, because of the Lausanne Treaty (Bahcheli, 1990: 170).

The Treaty was an important document not only for this reason, but also for its provisions concerning some other aspects of the minorities. According to the Treaty, these minorities would be entitled to all the citizenship rights of the respective countries they lived in. They would also have the right to run their own religious, cultural and educational institutions. On the other hand, Turkey and Greece as the main parties had the right to monitor the implementation of these provisions. Initially, their implementations created substantial problems between the two countries. In the 1920s, they sometimes accused each other of violating the international and bilateral agreements. But this disappeared with the start of the cooperation period between Greece and Turkey in the 1930s.

Ankara's minority’s policy after the start of the Kemalist reforms is a subject which needs more space and attention. But as far as is understood from available sources, the Turks most affected by these reforms were those living in the Balkans (Gokalp and Georgeon, 1990: 36-37). Turkey's policy towards this subject was clear: "to see the Turks outside... [Turkey] develop their abilities by concentrating them upon the enlightened lines of advancement drawn up by our Great Ghazi [Atatürk]." It is, therefore, safe to note that during the same period Ankara's main problem was not the Greek government's policy towards the Turkish minority but the reaction of the minorities to the Kemalist reformation in Turkey.

In this section, we have generally touched upon the centripetal factors that contributed to Turkey's relationship with Greece in the 1930s. However, it should be noted here that neither the above outlined official approach towards Greece and the minorities nor the Atatürk-Venizelos friendship eradicated the old antagonisms (centrifugal factors) living in the subconscious of both of the peoples. In the next chapter, we shall see the impacts of this psychological background on the Greco-Turkish relations which would clearly come out in the 1950s with the start of the Cyprus issue.

6. Unbalanced Relations with the Soviets

During the time of Atatürk Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union were based on very complex factors even from its very inception. It was not a
secret that since the establishment of the Russian Empire, the mightiest enemy of the Russians had been Turkic peoples surrounding the Muscovites (Vali, 1971: 165-166). With the expansion of the Muscovites to the South and South-West to be able to reach warm waters, to occupy the Straits and to conquer Constantinople where they wished to establish an Orthodox empire in the place of Muslims' capital, a Turko-Russian conflict became inevitable (Vali, 1971: 165; McGhee, 1954: 619). It is still difficult to establish exactly how many wars erupted between them, but, according to the most reliable sources, since 1677 the Turks have fought at least 13 wars with Russia (McGhee, 1954: 619; Vali, 1971: 166-177). All of these wars, as put it by G. McGhee, "have followed a similar pattern: in pursuit of her ambitions, Russia has resorted to overt aggression, alliances with Turkey's enemies alternating with offers of alliance with Turkey herself, construction of spheres of influence over buffer states, encouragement of independence movements and subversion of religious and other minorities" (McGhee, 1954: 619). From 1475 to 1774, the Black sea was almost a 'Turkish Lake' and the Straits totally under the Control of Istanbul. But the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca between Russia and the Ottomans ended the state of the Straits. It was the Turkish Straits, from this date to the end of Ottomans had obviously occupied the central point of Turkish-Russian relations (Vali, 1972: 18-20). All of these had created a permanent atmosphere of enmity and hatred (Vali, 1971: 166-177).

However, the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks attempted to establish closer relations with each other. The British sponsorship of the Greek invasion of the Western part of Turkey and Allied support of the counter-revolutionist forces in the Soviet Union drove them in each other's arms. But Turkey's so-called honeymoon or friendly relations with the USSR did not last long. This honeymoon was in fact a result of a reluctant marriage into which the two countries were pushed by western powers in the 1920s. This marriage was seemingly an anti-western move, because of Turkish disappointment over Mosul and the Soviets' suspicions on the treaty of Lacorno, after the First World War (Gönlübol, 1989: 80-81; Vali, 1971: 21 (footnote 44)). That move brought out the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality which consisted of only three articles and three protocols, and signed in December 1925 in Paris. In the Treaty, it was stated that Turkey and the Soviets would be neutral towards each other "in [the] case [of] a military action should be carried out by one or more powers against
one signatory party." (Hurewitz, 1956: 142) Under this treaty, each party also agreed to abstain from any direct aggression, and participation in any hostile coalitions or alliances against the other (Hurewitz, 1956: 142). The treaty that was originally valid for three years from the date of its approval, was broadened and extended for two years on 17 December 1929, for five more years on 30 October 1931, and for another ten years on 7 November 1935 (Erkin, 1968: 248-249).

However, as we have already noted, after 1930 while Turkey's relations with the West were developing, Russia's commitment to the agreement weakened and Moscow began to voice its historical demands particularly on the Straits in the latter part of the 1930s.

Turkey's path first separated from that of Russia in international relations when the former became a member of the League of Nations in 1932. On 28 June 1932, the foreign minister of Atatürk, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, declared that Turkey was ready to join League of Nations if invited. On 6 July, Ankara was invited by the members of the Organization to enter the League. On 18 July 1932 Turkey was formally accepted as a member. In this affair, British delegation helped Turkey (Akşin, 1966: 50-57; Tamkoç, 1976: 138-151; Krueger, 1932: 214-218). As far as Turkey's relations with the USSR are concerned, this was significant, because Turkey joined an organisation that the Soviets rejected and were always suspicious about.

Yet the real difference in foreign policy understanding between Ankara and Moscow actually surfaced at the Montreux Conference (Zhivkova, 1976: 42), which was held upon Turkish request. Having placed its relations with western powers on a sounder basis than ever before, Turkey at the beginning of the 1930s sought to revise the provisions of the Lausanne Convention concerning the regime of the Straits.

Despite the possibility of unilateral solutions, Turkey preferred to find a solution to the problems of the Straits in an international conference. Indeed, Ankara was not inclined to solve this problem with a fait accompli. Instead, it waited an appropriate time to raise the question through the proper channels of international law, which was expected to be recognized by all the Signatories of the Lausanne (Howard, 1974: 131-133 and 141-147; TC KB, 1992: Vol. 2, 280-286; Routh, 1937: 610-611). In April 1936 when Turkey requested from the Western powers to convey a meeting in Montreux for the revision of the statute of the Straits, they all, including
Russia but excluding Italy, responded favourably (Routh, 1937: 610-611).

However, during the Montreux Conference, it became apparent that
Russia's traditional position had not actually changed: To have, if not to rule
directly, a strong hand in the Straits and to keep them closed to the navies of
other powers.43

Nevertheless, thanks in part to the help of the Western powers, the
Conference successfully ended with a convention whose terms were in
fact more favourable to the USSR and Turkey, than to the other
participants. Historically, the Russians demand concerning the Straits had
not been satisfied by any international agreement that was practically
fulfilled. Therefore Russians were not happy with any agreement. The
Lausanne Convention was not an exception to this either. Although the
Russian delegate to Lausanne accepted to sign the Convention "under
strong protest", Moscow finally refused its ratification (T.E.M.M., 1946:
397). Under the Lausanne Convention that established an international
commission to oversee the execution of the Straits' regime, not only
Russia’s demands but those of Turkey as well had not been satisfied.
Ankara had not been given the right to have the Straits in its own
possession in terms of security and administration. Even, Turkish troops
had been denied the right to enter into the zone of the Straits, on the
ground that its security was guaranteed by the Four Powers which
consisted of France, Britain, Japan and Italy.44

However, as the Montreux Convention restored Turkey’s rights over
the Straits, the Soviets were also taken into account. By the Convention,
apart from other advantages, the traditional Russian demand of the entrance
of the non-Black Sea navies into the Black Sea should be forbidden was

Nevertheless, Moscow was not happy with the outcome once again
and their so-called friendly policy towards Turkey began to change
radically (Sadak, 1949: 452).45 Even during the Conference, this became
so visible that the Turkish delegation itself was deeply worried about the
As such, the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote that "the
Russians' behaviour towards us was very much in negative tone. I could
say that it was only the Russians who gave us trouble and even stood up
against us in many points where we did not expect any objection."
After the Montreux Convention, the Soviets began insisting on a pact with Turkey for the defence of the Straits (Sadak, 1949: 135). Turkey refused this proposal, but only after some consultations with the British Government (Soysal, 1981: 137; Açıklan, 1947: 479). As can be expected, this sort of collaboration between Turkey and Britain was not welcomed by the Soviets; it even aggravated their negative attitude to the extent that a Soviet stated that: "Turkey could not talk with Russia without the consent of the British." (Açıklan, 1947: 479)

But such an accusation should not have bothered Turkish decision makers too much because historically in the eyes of Turks, whereas Britain was seen as indispensable part of the concept "Western Civilisation" and "Europe", Russia had always been put somewhere in the opposite. In fact, the Russians were the barbarians in the culture of the Turks. As a result of historical hatred, the 'Russian bear' and its communist ideology were never positive for most Turks.

Ideologically, as already indicated, Kemalist Turkey had excluded not only an Islamic world outlook, but it had also eliminated the Marxist-Leninist ideals of the Soviets. In 1932, Mustafa Kemal himself prophetically anticipated, seven years in advance, the likelihood of the World War II between 1940 and 1946 and warned all mankind about its possible consequences. He called the West to stand united for the future of civilisation against Russia, "the terrible power", by leaving aside their narrow interests to tackle with the enemy.

Today, the problem of Europe is no longer a problem that springs from conflicts between England, France, and Germany. But it goes well beyond all of these. The great danger of civilisation that Europeans and Americans alike do not know, lies in the east of Europe... The main winner of a war in Europe will be neither England and France nor Germany, but only Bolshevism. To be a nation fighting the most with Russia and a neighbour the nearest to it, we have closely followed the events taking place in this country, and openly seen its dangers for centuries... Bolsheviks are the most potential power that does not only threaten Europe, but also Asia (ADTYK, 1989: Vol.III, 134-135).

7. Rapprochement with Britain

All the above discussed dimensions of the Kemalist foreign policy in the
1930s in particular make it very clear that Turkey attempted to develop closer relations with the West in general and Britain in particular, while distancing itself from the Soviet Union. But for the Turks, Britain was of exceptional importance (Kılıç, 1959: 60-62; Millman, 1995: 490). It is interesting to note here that in all of the above mentioned Turkish initiatives in the 1930s Britain helped Turkey, which is again a help that is very similar to that of the United State's role in Turkey's participation in western organisations after the Second World War.

Indeed, despite the shadow of the Mosul question which was solved by the League of Nations in favour of the Great Britain, Ankara always enthusiastically sought to reach an agreement with London, in the 1930s particularly (Evans, 1982: 19-101; Kürkçüoğlu, 1984: 81-87). In May 1936, Sir Percy Loraine, British Ambassador in Ankara, wired a telegram to Foreign Office, saying that "relations with England rather than relations with Russia, have generally speaking become the key stone of the arch of Turkish foreign policy; while as regards European and league affairs Turkish eyes and ears now turned more hopefully to London" (PRO FO371/20092, 3969).

This became so obvious that one of Atatürk's close friends felt it to say that "I notice you are drawing a good deal closer to England". To this Atatürk's reply was more meaningful: "Drawing closer? I have thrown myself into the arms of England!"). In a conversation with Sir Loraine, Atatürk's Foreign Minister, Tevfik Rüştü, told that if there was to be another war, Turkey would fight on the side of England." (PRO FO371/20861, 1862)

However, this enthusiasm was not shared by Britain initially, despite the signature of the Friendship Agreement in 1930. But when Italy began to pursue a revisionist and irredentist policy in the Mediterranean which substantially jeopardised British interests in the region, London's policy towards Ankara warmed up considerably (Evans, 1982: 97-101). The emerging Italian menace also urged Turkey to come together with Britain much more than ever. Soon after, Mustafa Kemal explicitly suggested to London that they should establish a pact of non-aggression in order to protect peace and maintain the status quo, against revisionist powers in the region (Erkin, 1987: Vol.1, 83-84).

Although this pact was not realised in his life, London approached
Ankara with sympathy. Britain supported Turkey's entry to the League of Nations and its demands as to the status of the Turkish Straits, and encouraged Turkey's efforts to establish the Balkan and Saadabat pacts. As we have noted above, while Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated considerably at Montreux, the Conference positively contributed to the Turco-Anglo rapprochement. As such, when King Edward VIII visited Turkey in 1936, he received a cordial welcome from all of the Turkish people (TC KB, 1992: Vol.2, 63).49

Ankara had in the meantime increased not only its political, but also its economic relations (TC KB, 1992: Vol.2, 66) and even applied to London for financial assistance. All of this had been done under the control of Mustafa Kemal. When he died in 1938, as Turkey was leaving behind the burden of the past, its relations with the West, led by Britain, developed remarkably (Soysal, 1981; Soysal, 1982: 370-373). Before concluding, one more point concerning the Kemalist diplomacy and the attitude of Britain needs to be mentioned here. Analysing the period of 1934-1942, Brock Millman reaches to the conclusion that "it may seem strange, but it is true, that in the five years prior to the Joint Guarantee and through the negotiations leading to the Alliance and Military Convention of October 1939... the rebuffed suitor was constantly Turkey, and the woman wooed with much effort and heartache, Britain. There was a constancy in Turkish policy, but it was provided by Turkey's consistent attempt to achieve a real, fully articulated and reciprocal alliance with Britain" (Millman, 1995: 492).

9. Conclusions

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey adopted a new way of life which was essentially designed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Accordingly, Turkish state changed its identification radically and dropped religion from its identity definition. After 1923, as modern Turkey began to identify itself with the West, it also attempted to establish a national identity according to the standards of western civilisation. Since the basic aspiration of the Kemalist ideology and reformation was to create a modern/western nation, Turkey also abandoned its entire previous role in international relations. Accordingly, modern Turkey has been able to develop a foreign policy understanding that is completely compatible with the state's aspirations and westernising function.

In the development of a western oriented foreign policy, the identity of
the state has played a crucial role. This is because it was the state itself that wanted (1) to create a modern nation and (2) to integrate this nation with the Western world. In terms of westernisation, these two factors cannot in fact be separated from each other either. It would therefore be incomplete to evaluate Turkey's behaviour in foreign affairs unless the history and the process of westernisation and the ideology of Kemalism were examined. As it has been clearly demonstrated in the previous pages, the Kemalist reformation was in reality Turkey's total break with its Islamic, Ottoman, and to some extent with its Turkist past on one hand, and total embrace of Europe through an acceptance of its values and institutions. By this reformation, "instead of standing as the representative of the East, facing and challenging the West, the Turks deliberately turned over to the other side." (Jones, 1926: 253-261)

If the application of Turkish foreign policy in the 1920s and the 1930s by Mustafa Kemal himself is called the conventional understanding, this article has shown some of its essential features. These can be summarised as follows: (1), Turkey refused to enter into any international alliances or to attend any international conferences on the basis of common religion. Obviously, the secular identity of the Turkish state determined to a great extent Ankara's attitude towards the Islamic countries and conferences. (2) Kemalist Turkey repudiated all adventurist, imperial and irredentist policies. (3) Turkish decision makers put an end to historical enmity towards the West and tried to establish strong ties and friendship with the Western world. (4) Turkey preferred acting as an anti-revisionist country and favoured the preservation of status quo in international relations. Therefore, Ankara during the period of Atatürk supported all initiatives and efforts as much as possible, aiming to achieve regional and international cooperation.50

1 Modernisation can be defined as the process of substantial change whereby less developed countries accumulate characteristics common to more developed countries. Since European countries represented the concept of developed ones whose characteristics became the symbols of "modern" with the expansion of European world, the term modernisation was replaced with Europeanisation during the era of imperialism or colonialism. After the Second World War, with the emergence of the United States as global power and as global example of development, it has in general been begun to speak of westernisation. But the term westernisation (garblaşma) has been used in Turkey since the nineteenth century in order to convey the modernisation, before the US factor emerged. In this dissertation, all of them are used interchangeably. On these concepts see: (Meriç, 1983: 234-244; Tunaya, 1983: 238-239; Mardin, 1983: 245-250; Berkes, 1983:251-254; Günyol, 1983:255-260; Belge, 1983:260-264; Lerner, 1968:386-395; Coleman, 1968:395-402; Dore, 1968:402-409; Lerner,1958: 46-51; Inkeles and Smith,

2 See also: (Kürkçüoğlu, 1991:157)

3 For a different approach: (Başkaya, 1991:40-50 and 71-86)

4 According to George Harris, Mustafa Kemal was one of the men entertaining the idea of American mandate in Sivas. At least, Atatürk “did not wish to close the door completely on the idea of an American mandate if all else failed” (Harris, 1972:10-11). See also: (TCKB, 1992: 88-89, 235, 270-276) For this period see also: (Başkaya, 1991: 38-50)

5 For the texts of the agreement see also: (Soysal, 1989:48-60).


7 For example see (Tamkoç, 1976: 297-298; Günlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, 1985: 36)

8 See also: (Kürkçüoğlu, 1981:168-169)


12 See also: (Kürkçüoğlu, 1987: 11-12)

13 For the repercussions of the abolition of the Caliphate in the West see: The Times, 4 March 1924. See also: (Toynbee, 1927: 66-67).

14 On the conference see: The Times, 21-22-23 July 1926.

15 As reported by a newspaper, "Turkey's nervousness was somewhat allayed by British assurances that it was not backing the Congress and by the news that Albania, Persia, Afghanistan and Hedjaz would not take part." New York Times, 5 December 1931. On the Conference: (Nielsen, 1932: 340-354; Aykan, 1988: 55, fn.105). See also: (Sindi, 1978: 114-120).

16 For the fez problem see also: (Akşin, 1966: 90-91)

17 See also: (Günlübol, 1989: 98-103). For the background of events see: (Erkin, 1987: 30-33).

18 See also: (Günlübol, 1989: 115-120)

19 See also: (Günlübol, 1989: 103-111)

20 See also: (Soysal, 1989: 582-587)

21 See also: (Armaoğlu, 1993: 346-348)

22 See also: (Lewis, 1974: 132-133)

23 As cited in (Zivkov, 1976: 56).

24 For a recent EC survey including the opinions of the Greek people about "the other" in their identity definition see: (Commission of the European Communities, 1989: 39).

25 For the Turkish effect in modern Greek history and identity see: (Volkov and Itzkowitz, 1994: 35-46, 70-89).

26 See also: (Barkan, 1991: 19-23).


28 To this effect, a concomitant convention was signed in addition to the Laussanne Treaty. According to the convention, whereas more than a million Greeks emigrated from Turkey to Greece, over a half million Turks left Greece for Turkey in a very short time (Gürel, 1993: 162).
29 For example for the effect of the Turkish Alphabet Reform see: (Şimşir, 1988: 95-105)
30 As cited in (Şimşir, 1988: 97)
31 A more detailed analysis of this issue with special reference Turkey's minorities policy in the 1950s
will be made in the next chapter.
32 Vali noticed that he heard many Turks in the late 1940's saying, "my grandfather fought the Russians; my
father did; and so shall I, and my son." (Vali, 1971: 166-177)
33 See also: (G. McGhee, 1990: 10)
34 The question of the Straits during the Ottoman State can also be found in (Tuikin, 1947). For a brief
history of the Straits question and its outstanding importance in a changing world up to-day see: (Uçarol,
1992: 165-202)
35 Also: (McGhee, 1990: 10) For a brief history of the Straits up to-day see: (Uçarol, 1992: 165-202)
36 For a recent analysis of these relationship see: (Gökay, 1994: 41-58)
37 For a different interpretation see: (Başkaya, 1990: 82-86)
38 For the text of the treaty of 1925 see: (League of Nations, 1936: 353; Hureswitiz, 1956: 142-143). For its
original texts: (TCKB, 1992: 387-391)
39 For its original texts: (TCKB, 1992: 387 (French), 390(Turkish)).
40 The Article 2 of the Treaty. For its original texts: (TCKB, 1992: 387 (French), 390(Turkish)).
41 For the Convention see: (League of Nations, 1924: 115-137). Russians demands concerning the Straits
have not been satisfied by any international agreement. The Convention was not an exception to the
general rule either. Although their delegate to Lausanne accepted to sign it, Moscow finally refused its
42 According to British documents, Turkey first inquired the British Government's point of view on the
question in May 1935 (Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), 1977: 658).
43 For a detailed account of the Montreux Conference and its implications for Turkey's foreign policy
see: (Deluca, 1981: 14-135; Zhirkova, 1976: 35-51; Vere-Hodge, 1950: 103-105, 123-125; Routh, 1937:
1977: Vol VI, 624-625 and 658-659; Tschirgi, 1979: 116-117). For the Convention see: (League of
45 For similar observations see also: (Robinson, 1965: 172-177; Harris,1972: 11)

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