Socio-Economic and Regional Determinants of EU Ignorance in Turkiye

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ABSTRACT

The European Union is mostly criticized for its so-called democracy deficit. To tackle this, citizens are expected to have information about European integration so that they can make conscious choices. Nevertheless, it has been well documented in research conducted over the years that EU citizens are generally ignorant of the EU. This study aims to investigate the factors underpinning the lack of EU knowledge. Although socio-economic and demographic factors affecting EU ignorance in European countries have been investigated in previous studies, the factors affecting the EU knowledge level of Turkish people has only been examined in one study in the literature, which failed to include the regions (cities) variable. To close this gap, this research examines the effects of regions (cities) in Turkey on the EU ignorance by controlling for other variables frequently mentioned in previous research. In order to run the analysis, data from Eurobarometer 93.1 and 94.3 surveys were used and binary logistic regression was employed as a method of analysis because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. The results of the two regression models show that citizens living in cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Antalya, and Gaziantep are less likely to be ignorant of the EU than those living in other cities. Moreover, in both models, the regions (cities) variable is a stronger factor than factors such as age, education, occupation, gender, and political opinion.

Keywords: EU Ignorance, democratic deficit, regions, binary logistic regression

Introduction

Turkey has been neglecting the EU membership process for a long time. Although there was serious momentum on EU membership in the first years of its rule, the AKP government has neglected the EU membership process since 2011. Coming to power for the third time after the 2011 general elections, the AKP government began to reject some of the criticisms in the EU progress reports with increasingly harsh language. A quick look at the EU progress reports from 2012 onwards will show this divergence. First only visible as a passive reluctance, this neglect turned into clear opposition to the EU, especially after the second half of the 2010s. Nevertheless, considering Turkey's geopolitical conditions, EU membership is not an issue that can be neglected for a long time. In the near future, either with a change of government or a possible change in the party leadership of the current government, Turkey may go through a sudden change of understanding. As a result, the EU membership process may become salient again in Turkey. In that case, public attitudes towards the EU will inevitably return as a subject of discussion in Turkey. However, as a factor that affects the public's attitudes towards the EU, the scope of the research was limited to the level of EU knowledge. Therefore, the EU attitudes and policies of governments, as well as the relevant literature, are not the focus of this research.

While matters of the EU were a foreign policy issue shaped by the political elites in the first years of the integration process, this situation has gradually changed since the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1993. Nowadays, EU policies cannot be carried out in a manner that ignore public opinion (Hobolt, 2007). After the French and Dutch vetoed the Maastricht Treaty in their national referendums, the interest in the determinants of the public attitudes towards the EU surged among both the political elites and academic circles that conduct research related to public opinion. The most important studies shaping the literature on this subject emerged after this period (Hooghe & Marks, 2005).

Research on the factors affecting attitudes towards EU membership have generally been classified under three headings. These are studies that highlight economic calculations (Gabel, 1998), studies that examine identity factors (McLaren, 2002; Carey, 2002; Luedtke, 2005), and those that focus on factors related to cues by parties and the media (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Hellstrom, 2008; Maier & Rittberger, 2008; Vliegenthart, et. al., 2008). According to this literature, opinion of the EU is affected by: citizens' individual economic backgrounds and economic expectations, the extent to which people feel connected to their nation-states, the parties and the media they prefer to follow, together with their age, gender, education level, occupation, and political ideology. In addition to all these factors, cognitive mobility and knowledge levels of individuals have been shown as factors affecting EU attitudes in various studies (Inglehart, 1970; Hakhverdian, et. al., 2010). For a comprehensive overview of this literature, see Boomgaarden et al (2011), Hobolt & De Vries (2016), and Hooghe & Marks (2004).

The impact of all these factors varies from research to research and from country to country. Among these factors, the effect of EU knowledge level on EU attitudes is also controversial. Although it is seen in some studies that being ignorant about the EU reduces the possibility of approving EU membership, in other studies a relationship between these two variables could not be determined (Hobolt, 2007). In his seminal work, Inglehart (1970) argued that having higher education levels increases the cognitive mobility of individuals and this leads to a better understanding of European integration, which eventually leads to approval of its policies. Similarly, Hayo (1999) found that higher level of knowledge about the EU increases the possibility of approval for its policies. However, these assertions have not gone uncontested. Janssen (1991) found no statistically significant correlation between education and EU support. Similar conclusions can be found in Hobolt (2012) and Clark (2014).

Although there appears to be no consensus on the causal direction between political knowledge and EU support, it has been widely accepted that there is a massive knowledge deficit among European peoples about the EU (Anderson, 1998; McCormick, 2014). This is mostly because of the complex institutional nature of the EU. Understandably, citizens perceive the EU as a faraway entity whose working mechanisms are complex and policy outputs are not very much visible. That distance from the daily lives of citizens leads to a disinterest, which in turn endangers European democracy. Lack of EU knowledge leaves European people vulnerable to manipulation by extremist political groups. On the other hand, Anderson (1998) argues that the lack of EU knowledge is not necessarily harmful as citizens use cues from their preferred role models when they need to make a choice on subjects they know little about. He uses the term proxies to describe how voters choose to vote on subjects they know nothing about, by using clues from their parties or the media they follow. In addition, there is the issue of terminological differences between EU awareness and EU knowledge. Although Fanoulis (2018) differentiates between EU awareness and EU political knowledge and argues that the lack of both restrains the normative potential of civic involvement, in this study, I find no use for such terminological differences.

Although there are many studies looking for answers to the question of whether the level of EU knowledge affects

attitudes towards EU membership, it appears that there have been minimal studies on the factors that affect the level of EU knowledge (Kentmen, 2010). The factors that come to the fore frequently in these studies include: age, education level, gender, occupation, media, and political interest (Kentment, 2010; Rapeli, 2014; Clark, 2014; Carl, et al., 2019). In his study, Clark (2014) reveals that variables such as education, income, and occupation (professionals, managers, and supervisors) are strong predictors of EU knowledge. In addition to those variables, people who work in the industry, agriculture, and finance sectors, which are subject to EU regulations, are less likely to be EU ignorant (Clark, 2014). However, in Rapeli's (2014) study, only the education and gender variables were shown to be statistically significant. The other variables, such as type of community, marital status, and age, did not produce statistically significant results. Finally, according to Carl, et al. (2019), the previous literature has found that age, gender, education, and political interest are positively correlated with knowledge about the EU (Carl, et al., 2019).

As for Turkey, the first study investigating the factors affecting EU knowledge was carried out by Kentmen (2010), which found that exposure to television and newspapers has a strong influence on individuals' EU knowledge levels, with no evidence for such an effect by exposure to radio. Kentmen (2010) argued in her study that the media is an important factor that determines the level of EU knowledge. However, she also stated that the low R square values of her models meant that there must be some other factors that affect the level of knowledge of the EU by Turkish citizens. She also found no statistical evidence for a relationship between education and interpersonal communication with EU knowledge (Kentmen, 2010). Moreover, the internet use variable was not included in her study. Another factor that Kentmen's (2010) and other previous studies did not include in the analysis is the city of residence variable. This research aims to examine the effect of cities variable on the EU knowledge level.

It is undeniable that the cities where we live affect our cognitive development. Cities affect the individual's perception of the world with the diversity and heterogeneous structure of the people that make up the population. With their different social and cultural activities and with the governmental and non-governmental institutions they host, cities help us form a kind of world perspective. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that if a person lives in a cosmopolitan city that hosts global institutions, industries, and sectors which deal with international trade, they are more likely to have information about global institutions such as the EU. In this research, I will test whether cities with the above-mentioned characteristics in Turkey host citizens who are more knowledgeable about the EU compared to other cities. I expect that people who live in cities that are more homogenous, less integrated into business with EU countries, and lack foreign institutions (like embassies) will be more ignorant of the EU. Accordingly, the hypothesis of this research is as follows:

H1 = The cities in which individuals live in Turkey affect their level of EU knowledge.

In the following sections of this paper, I will first describe the models and method of analysis by giving a detailed description of the variables included in both models. Then in the results section, I will present the findings of both models and their statistical validity. In the discussion section, I will evaluate the findings of both models in light of the previous literature and explain the limitations of this study and its implications for future studies.

Method

For this research, data sets of Eurobarometer surveys 93.1 (2021) and 94.3 (2021) were used. The reason behind this choice is the fact that those two data sets were the only surveys that include a sampling for Turkey among the most recent surveys.

In these two datasets, there are three standard true-false questions that measure the level of EU knowledge. The first of these questions is a statement about the number of states in the Euro area, with the answers given to this question coded as follows: Euro Area 19 States; 1= "True (Correct)," 2 = "False," 3 = "Don't Know."

The second question is a statement indicating that the members of the European Parliament are elected. The answers for this question are coded as: EP Members Election; 1 = "True (Correct)," 2 = "False," 3 = "Don't Know."

Lastly, the third question states that Switzerland is a member of the EU, with the answers to this question coded as: Switzerland is Member; 1 = "True", 2 = "False (Correct)", 3 = "Don't Know".

To give some descriptive statistics of both data, the percentage of those who answered the first question correctly is 40.8%, those who gave wrong answers is 29.9 and those who answered as "I don't know" is 29.4% for the data set 93.1 (2020). These rates are 42.5%, 29.5%, and 28%, respectively, for the same question in the 94.3 (2021) data set. As for the second question, the percentage of those who answered the question correctly is 38.4%, those who gave wrong answers is 31.9%, and those who answered as "I don't know" is 29.7%. These rates are 44.6%, 27.5%, and 27.9%, respectively, for the same question in the data set numbered 94.3. Finally, the percentage of those who answered the third question correctly is 31.7%, those who gave wrong answers is 41.5%, and the percentage of those who answered

as "I don't know" is 26.8%. These rates are 33.9%, 38.9%, and 27.2%, respectively, for the same question in the data set 94.3.

The answers given to these three questions in the Eurobarometer data sets are grouped under dummy variables as those who answered all three questions correctly, those who answered only two questions correctly, those who answered only one question correctly, and those who gave zero correct answers.

It is controversial to assume that a score of three correct answers would necessarily be a good indicator of a high level of EU knowledge. Moreover, since the number of those who gave correct answers to all three questions in both data sets in the Turkish sample were few in number, it would be statistically problematic to operationalize a logistic regression analysis with many cases not included in the models. For this reason, it was deemed more appropriate to measure EU ignorance rather than EU knowledge in this study. In line with this, the variable that groups all those who gave wrong answers to all three questions about the EU was considered as a good indicator of EU ignorance.

Therefore, the "0 Correct Answer" variable was chosen as the **dependent variable**. This variable is tagged as "EU Knowledge - 0 Correct Answer" with a dichotomous coding as 0= "(Not the Case)," 1= "0 correct answer." According to this classification, 67.2% of the 1,015 participants in data set 93.1 answered at least one question correctly, while 32.8% could not answer any question correctly. For the 94.3 data set, these rates are as follows: 71.5% answered at least one question correctly, while 28.5% could not answer any question correctly.

The **independent variables** that are expected to have an effect on this dependent variable were coded in two data sets as follows: "Age Exact" variable is a scale data coded as ages between 15-99. The highest percentage in the age group is between the ages of 20-45.

The "Left-Right Placement" variable asks the political opinions of individuals. It is coded as a scale ranging from 1 to 10 as 1 = "Left" and 10 = "Right." While 24.2% of the participants marked the number 5 in this scale, 10.6% marked the number 6, 12.4% marked the number 7, and 10.4% marked the number 8. The remaining numbers decreased as single digits towards the Left and Right ends. This shows that Turkish participants are more inclined to political Right than political Left. These ratios are also similar in the 94.3 data set where the biggest accumulation is seen around number 5 with 26.7%.

Answers to the "Education Country-Specific" variable are coded as follows: 0= "Not received any official education," 1= "Primary school (5years)," 2 = "Primary education (8 years)," 3 = "Junior high school or vocational school at the same level," 4 = "High school or vocational school at the same level," 5 = "University (Associate Degree) / Higher Education Schools (2 years)," 6 = "University graduate (4 years and above)," 7 = "Master/Postgraduate." Of the participants, 57.9% had a high school diploma, while 13.9% are university graduates, and 16.0% are 5-year primary school graduates. The rest of the participants are in the minority on a single percentile. For the same variable in data set 94.3, these rates are 54.7%, 13.4%, and 17.9%, respectively.

The "Gender" variable is coded as 1 = "Man" and 2 = "Woman." The rate of men was found to be 49.1%, while that of women is 50.9%. These rates are 51.7% and 48.3%, respectively, in data set 94.3.

The "Occupation of Respondent" variable is coded as: 1 = "Responsible for ordinary shopping, etc.," 2 = "Student," 3 = "Unemployed, temporarily not working," 4 = "Retired, unable to work," 5 = "Farmer," 6 = "Fisherman," 7 = "Professional (lawyer, etc.)," 8 = "Owner of a shop, craftsmen, etc.," 9 = "Business proprietors, etc.," 10 = "Employed Professional (employed doctor, etc.)," 11 = "General management, etc.," 12 = "Middle management, etc.," 13 = "Employed position, at desk,", 14 = " Employed position, travelling, " 15 = "Employed position, service job " 16 = "Supervisor," 17 = "Skilled manual worker," 18 = " Unskilled manual worker, etc." The skilled manual worker category is the most populous of all occupations, with 27.6% of participants choosing this option. The rates of other categories are as follows: 18.1% Responsible for ordinary shopping, 10.2% Student, and 8.3% Owner of a shop, craftsman. For data set 94.3, these rates are: 25,7%, 17,4%, 12,5%, 11,0%, respectively.

The "Type of Community" variable is coded as 1 = "Rural area or village," 2 = "Small/middle town," and 3 = "Large town." According to the data, 20.9% of participants live in rural areas, 11.7% live in small towns, and 67.3% live in large towns. For the same variable in data set 94.3, these rates are 21.1%, 12.2%, and 66.7%, respectively.

The "Internet Use (Index)" variable is coded as: 1 = "Everyday/Almost everyday," 2 = "Two or three times a week," 3 = "About once a week," 4 = "Two or three times a month," 5 = "Less often," 6 = "Never/No Access," 7 = "No Internet access at all." Most of the participants have internet access, as 89.1% chose the "Everyday" option. The rest of the participants chose the other options gradually decreasing to 0.4% at option 6. These rates are 86.6% to 0.5% from the first option to the sixth option in dataset 94.3.

The "Social Class - Self-Assessment (5 Cat)" variable is coded as: 1 = "The working class of society," 2 = "The lower middle class of society," 3 = "The middle class of society," 4 = "The upper middleclass of society," 5 = "The higher class of society." Descriptive statistics show us that 46.9% of the participants identify themselves as middle

class, while 23.9% identify as working class and 23.0% say they are lower middle class. For the same variable in the 94.3 data set, these rates are 24.1%, 25.2%, and 47.2%, respectively.

The "Turkish Region" variable is coded as: TR1 – Istanbul, TR2 – Tekirdağ, TR3 – Balikesir, TR4 – Izmir, TR5 – Aydin, TR6 – Manisa, TR7 – Bursa, TR8 – Kocaeli,TR9 – Ankara, TR10 – Konya, TR11 – Antalya, TR12 – Adana, TR14 – Kirikkale, TR15 – Kayseri, TR16 – Zonguldak, TR17 – Kastamonu, TR18 – Samsun, TR19 – Trabzon, TR20 – Erzurum, TR22 – Malatya, TR23 – Van, and TR24 – Gaziantep.

The "Media Trust Index" variable was only available in the data set 94.3 and it is coded as: 1 = "High trust in the media," 2 = "Medium trust in the media," 3 = "Low or no trust in the media." Of the participants,18.3% chose high trust, 29.6% medium trust, and 52.1% low trust.

The "Media Use Index" variable was not asked to Turkish participants so it could not be included in any of the models.

It should be easy to see that the dependent variable in both data sets is a dichotomous item. Therefore, binary logistic regression analysis is the most appropriate method of analysis for this study. In order to run both analyses, the Turkey sample was first separated from the general sample, and then the "0 correct answer" item was placed in the dependent variable section. After that, the above-mentioned variables were put in the independent variables section. The first option was chosen as the reference value for categorical data. Both models were operationalized with the Enter method. The results of both of the binary logistic regression analyses are described in the results section.

Results

Binary logistic regression analyses were performed in two models to measure the effects of the independent variables of age, gender, education level, occupation, internet usage index, left/right political ideology, social class, community type, media trust index, and region (cities), on the dependent variable "0 correct answer." Both models were statistically significant with the following values of omnibus tests of model coefficients respectively: χ^2 = 375,736. p < .001 and χ^2 = 409.131. p < .001. Model 1 explained 43.0% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in EU ignorance and classified 79.5% of cases correctly. Model 2 predicted 82.1% of cases correctly with a Nagelkerke R2 of 48.0%. Both models' high R-square values are indicative of their high explanatory power. Moreover, both regression models were shown to fit, as the Hosmer and Lemeshow test was statistically non-significant (p> .050).

Table 1 shows the Exp(b) values that indicate the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable in both models together with the standard errors SE. The numbers in parentheses contain the Wald statistics showing the weight of the variables in the model.

Since it is more convenient to interpret the odds ratio Exp*(b)* values in a logistic regression analysis, I will refer to the Exp*(b)* values instead of the B values while presenting and commenting on the effects of the independent variables in both models. When we look at **Table 1**, the results of the two models show that the Age, Social class, the Media Trust index and Left- Right scale variables are all statistically non-significant in both models.

The Gender variable is statistically significant only in the first model with an odds ratio (OR) of 1,676 (95% CI 1,141 – 2,462), which can be interpreted as women are 67% more likely to be included in the *0 Correct answer group* than men.

The Type of community variable is statistically significant in both models. However, there is an apparent contradiction between the results of the two models. In the first model, OR for Type of community is 0.700 (95% CI .553 – 0.887), while in the second model it is, 1.418 (95% CI 1.057– 1.904). The result of the first model indicates that there is a negative relation between a unit increase in the dependent variable and the independent variable. Accordingly, a unit increase from 1 (rural area, village) to 2 (town) decreases the likelihood of belonging to the 0 correct answer group by a factor of 3%. That is to say, living in larger social environments helps one to be more informed about the EU. On the other hand, the result of the second model shows a contradictory figure, which means an increase in the independent variable results in a positive increase in the dependent variable. According to this contradictory result, living in a large town increases the likelihood of being in the 0 correct answer group by a factor of 41%. These opposing values between the two models need to be explained, which I will attempt to do in the discussion section of this paper.

The Internet use index variable is statistically significant in both models, with the results being in compliance with each other. The odds ratios for internet use frequency are 1,184 (95% CI 1,015– 1,381) and 1,175 (95% CI 1,006– 1,372), respectively. This means a unit decrease in internet usage frequency leads to an 18% (for one model) or 17% (for the other) increase in the likelihood of belonging to the 0 correct answer group.

As for the Education variable, have a Junior high school, Associate degree, and University degree are statistically significant variables in the second model, with the odds ratios being: 0.279 (95% CI 0.078– 0.997), 0.153 (95% CI

Table 1. Binary Logistic Regression Model Results

Predictors	Model 1[a]			Model 2		
	b	SE	Exp(*b*)[b]	*b*	SE	Exp(*b*)
Age exact	,005	,010	1,005(,305)	-,002	,009	,998(,049)
Left- Right	,001	,004	1,001 (,045)	-,024	,019	,976(1,665)
Gender (ref: man)	,516	,196	1,676 (6,919)*	-,111	,216	,895(,266)
Type of community	-,357	,121	,700 (8,751)*	,350	,150	1,418(5,412)*
Internet use (index)	,169	,079	1,184(4,605)*	,161	,079	1,175 (4,139)*
Social class	-,082	,113	,921 (,526)	-,113	,112	,893(,867)
Media Trust index				,146	,154	1,157(,897)
Education (Ref: None)			(5,963)			(13,621)
Primary school (5 years)	-2,069	1,447	,126(2,045)	-,878	,621	,416(2000)
Primary education (8 years)	-2,719	1,504	,066(3,268)	-,901	,743	,406(1,473)
Junior high school	-2,437	1,462	,096 (2,777)	-1,275	,649	,279(3,862)*
High school or vocational school	-2,345	1,464	,096 (2,566)	-1,526	,636	,217(5,755)
Associate degree	-2,560	1,508	,077(2,882)	-1,879	,696	,153(7,286)*
University graduate	-2,204	1,489	,110(2,190)	-1,854	,708	,157(6,861)*
Master / Postgraduate	-1,449	1,934	,235(562)	-21,767	40192,97	,000(,000)
Occupation (ref: sales rep)			(21,784)			(22,431)
Student	,259	,391	1,296(,439)	-,205	,428	,815(,230)
Unemployed	1,033	,402	2,811(6,606)*	-,220	,425	,803(,267)
Retired	,317	,471	1,373(,453)	-1,323	,453	,266(8,544)**
Farmer	1,450	,539	4,263(7,328)*	1,397	,654	,247(4,559)**
Fisherman	1,728	1,588	5,628(1,183)	21,424	40192,97	201454 (,000)
Professional (Lawyer etc.)	-,016	,949	,984(,000)	-1,272	1,178	,280(1,165)
Owner of a shop	,613	,377	1,846(2,642)	-1,211	,394	,298(9,458)**
Business proprietors,	-20,799	16335,111	000(,000)	-20,177	21842,662	,000(,000)
Employed Professional (Doctors etc)	,631	,737	1,880(,735)	-,915	,919	,401(,991)

Predictors	Model 1[a]			Model 2		
	b	SE	Exp(*b*)[b]	*b*	SE	Exp(*b*)
General management, etc	-19,772	40192,970	,000(,000)	21,125	27376,7	14946776(000)
Middle management	-,776	1,361	,460(,325)	,104	,630	1,109(,027)
Employed position, at desk	,152	,448	1,164(,115)	,024	,778	1,024(,001)
Employed position, travelling	-,796	1,149	,451(,480)	-,762	,951	,467(,643)
Employed position, service job	,055	,462	1,057(,014)	-,467	,491	,627(,903)
Supervizor	-18,891	15232,470	,000(,000)	-2,195	1,154	,111(3,618)*
Skilled manual worker	,378	,288	1,459(1,724)	-,573	,346	,564(2,748)
Unskilled manual worker	1,264	,436	3,544(8,419)**	-,968	,590	,380(2,687)
Region (ref: Istanbul)			(176,235)***			(126,994)***
Tekirdağ	,937	,511	2,552(3,358)	1,992	,544	7,329(13,400)***
Balıkesir	2,510	,618	12,308(16,504)***,	170	,548	1,186(,097)
İzmir	2,583	,401	13,230(41,408)***	1,591	,363	4,911(19,221)***
Aydın	1,332	,420	3,790(10,067)**	1,106	,457	3,022(5,854)*
Manisa	1,065	,415	2,900(6,575)*	,538	,452	1,713(1,420)
Bursa	1,872	,390	3,029(23,090)***	,103	,444	1,109(,054)
Kocaeli	-,033	,439	,968(,006)	2,386	,452	10,866(27,878)***
Ankara	-2,967	1,037	,051(8,188)**	-3,128	1,055	,044(8,794)**
Konya	2,462	,491	11,614(24,987)***	1,554	,509	4,732(9,316)**
Antalya	-3,398	1,119	,033(9,228)**	-2,465	1,058	,085(5,426)**
Adana	-1,236	,438	,291(7,965)**	-18,761	4006,187	,000(,000)
Kırıkkale	-2,603	1,222	,074(4,540)*	-19,585	9540,048	,000(,000)
Kayseri	-,637	,600	,529(1,126)	-,498	,561	,608(,786)
Zonguldak	-20,173	10529,179	,000(,000)	1,145	,647	3,141(3,130)
Kastamonu	-,243	,817	,784(,089)	2,461	,779	11,711(9,983)**
Samsun	,073	,468	1,076(,025)	-,036	,508	,964(,005)
Trabzon	1,023	,443	2,781(5,322)*	1,910	,455	6,753(17,594)***
Erzurum	,041	,516	1,042(,006)	,393	,568	1,482(,480)
Malatya	1,131	,532	3,099(4,521)*	-1,917	1,081	,147(3,145)
Van	2,149	,601	8,573(12,795)***	1,711	,558	5,535(9,395)***
Gaziantep	-,958	,409	,384(5,487)*	-1,668	,600	,189(7,712)**
Constant	1,224	1,614	3,402(,575)	-,194	1,008	,823(,037)
Models summary						
Hosmer and Lemeshow (Chi-Square χ^2)		,502 (7,321)				,892(3,595)
Nagelkerke R^2		,431				,480
-2 Loglikelihood		908,072				790,620
N		1015				1004

*p< .05, **p< .005, ***p< .001
a. Dependent variable; "0 Correct Answer" is the case (= 1).
b. Values in the brakets are Wald statistics.

0.039– 0.598), 0.157 (95% CI 0.039–0.627). These results indicate that junior high school students are 72% less likely to answer all the questions incorrectly than the reference category group who have no formal education. In addition, those who hold Associate and University degrees are 84% less likely to give 0 answers to all three questions.

For the occupation variable, only three categories (unemployed, farmer, and unskilled worker) are statistically significant in the first model. The odds ratios for the unemployed are 2.811 (95% CI 1.278– 6.181), 4.263 (95% CI 1.492– 12.179) for farmers, and 3.544 (95% CI 1.507– 8.318) for unskilled workers. This means compared to the reference group sales reps, the unemployed are 181%, farmers are 326%, and unskilled workers are 254% more likely to belong to the group of 0 correct answer. As for the second model, the following occupations are statistically significant: retired, farmer, owner of a shop, and supervisors. They have the following odd ratios respectively: 0.266 (95% CI 0.110– 0.647), 0.247 (95% CI 0.069– 0.892), 0.298 (95% CI 0.138– 0.645), 0.111 (95% CI 0.012– 1.069). These results indicate that compared to shop assistants, the retired are 73%, self-employed (owner of a shop) are 70%, and supervisors are 88% less likely to belong to the 0 correct answer group. However, in the second model, farmers were found to be 75% less likely to be in the group who answer all the three questions incorrectly as compared to sales reps. There appears to be a curious contradiction between the odds ratio results for the farmer category in the two models, which I will discuss in the discussion section below.

For the region (cities) category, the Tekirdağ province is statistically not significant in the first model but statistically significant in the second model, with and odds ratio of 7,329 (95% CI 2,523– 21,293) which means people in Tekirdağ are 632% more likely to answer all questions incorrectly than people in Istanbul. Balikesir is only statistically significant in the first model and its odds ratio is 12,308 (95% CI 3.666– 41,321), which means that people living in Balikesir are 11.30 times more likely to be in the zero correct answer group. Similarly, the following cities are statistically significant in at least one of the two models with odds ratios increasing the probability of being in the zero correct answer group: İzmir 13,230 (95% CI 6.025– 29.052) and 4.911 (95% CI 2.411– 10.02), Aydın 3.790 (95% CI 1.664– 8.633) and 3.022 (95% CI 1.234– 7.400), Manisa 2,900 (95% CI 1.285– 6.544), Bursa 3.029 (95% CI 3.029– 13.948), Kocaeli 10.866 (95% CI 4.482– 26,344), Konya 11.614 (95% CI 4.440– 30.377) and 4.732 (95% CI 1.744– 12.837), Kastamonu 11.711 (95% CI 2,545– 53,890), Trabzon 2,781 (95% CI 1,166– 6,630) and 6,753 (95% CI 2,766– 16,486), Malatya 3,099 (95% CI 1,093– 8,793), and Van 8,573 (95% CI 2,641– 27,825) and 5,535 (95% CI 1,853– 16,532). These results indicate that people living in the above mentioned cities are more likely to answer all the questions incorrectly than the people living in Istanbul.

However, the following cities are statistically significant in at least one model with odds ratios decreasing the probability of being in the 0 correct answer group: Ankara 0.051 (95% CI 0.007– 0.393) and 0.044 (95% CI 0.006– 0.346), Antalya 0.033 (95% CI 0.004– 0.299) and 0.085 (95% CI 0.011– 0.677), Adana 0.291 (95% CI 0.123– 0.686), Kırıkkale 0.074 (95% CI 0.007– 0.812), and Gaziantep 0.384 (95% CI 0.172– 0.855) and 0.189(95% CI 0.058–0.612). These results show that people living in Ankara are 94-95%, Antalya 96-91%, Adana 70%, Kırıkkale 92%, and Gaziantep 61-81% less likely to be in the zero correct answer group.

In the discussion section, which is the next and last section, the contribution and limitations of the current findings to the literature will be discussed.

Discussion

In this research, the factors affecting the EU ignorance of individuals living in Turkey are analyzed by binary logistic regression method. According to the results of the research, the factors affecting EU ignorance are Gender, Type of Community, Internet Use Index, Education, Occupation and Region (cities).

Confirming the previous literature, the Gender variable turned out to be effective (Carl, et al., 2019; Rapeli, 2014; Kentmen; 2010). Accordingly, women are more likely than men to be ignorant of the EU. However, since this effect is not seen in both models, it would be more convenient to interpret this cautiously.

As for Type of Community variable, it appears to affect having knowledge about the EU as well. However, the nature of this effect gives contradictory results in the two models. In the first model, it appears that those living in big cities are less likely to be EU ignorant, which is consistent with the previous literature. In the second model however, this relationship shows the opposite direction, which means that living in a big city increases EU ignorance. This inconsistency in the results for type of community variable shows that it is vulnerable to contingencies. For this reason, it should be repeatedly included in the analyzes in future studies and tested until it can be proven to have a consistent effect on the EU knowledge level. Rapeli (2014) also found no relevance for this variable.

The internet use index variable reveals that the probability of being EU ignorant increases as the frequency of internet use decreases in both models. In her research, Kentmen (2010) stated that she did not analyze the effect of the internet

on EU knowledge level. The present research has made a contribution to the literature by proving the positive impact of the internet.

In accordance with the literature (Carl, et al., 2019; Clark, 2014), the education variable confirms that educated people are less likely to be EU ignorant. Here, the low number of people with higher education (such as a doctorate degree) has caused these levels to be statistically non-significant. However, an inverse relationship was found between the increase in education level and EU ignorance at the high school and university levels with sufficient number of participants.

As for the occupation variable, it can be said that the results are generally compatible with the literature (Clark, 2014). In this sense, individuals with professions that are more international and more competitive and require more qualifications are not EU ignorant compared to individuals working in professions that do not have these characteristics. Farmers are the only occupational group that appear to have contradicting results in both models. The reason for this difference may be the difference in the number of respondents in both models and the region of residence of the farmers surveyed. Some agricultural products are subject to EU regulations, making the farmers who produce these products more knowledgeable than other farmers who do not produce these products.

The effect of the regions (cities) variable on EU ignorance has not been investigated in any previous study. This research shows that in Turkey, the cities people live have a strong influence on EU ignorance. As Turkey's most cosmopolitan city, Istanbul is an influential city with a high degree of EU level. The impact of other cities on EU knowledge was measured by taking Istanbul as a reference. Thus, compared to Istanbul, only the individuals living in the Ankara, Antalya, Adana, Kırıkkale, and Gaziantep provinces are less likely to be EU ignorant. On the other hand, compared to Istanbul, the probability of being EU ignorant is extremely high with individuals living in other provinces. It is necessary to explain the differences of the cities which have positive effects on EU knowledge level. First of all, since Ankara is the capital of Turkey, it hosts many international official institutions. Being the center of bureaucracy, it is expected that living in Ankara will make it easier to be exposed to some information about the EU. Although there are consulates and similar official institutions in Istanbul, it can be understood that they are more effective in Ankara when the impact of the population rate is taken into account. Antalya is the most touristic and famous holiday region of Turkey. This makes Antalya a frequent destination for foreigners from many countries, especially European countries. This cosmopolitan environment encourages local tradesmen and people living in Antalya to be more knowledgeable about the outside world. Adana and Kırıkkale are statistically significant in only one model, that is why these results maybe contingent for the two cities. Future analyzes will be needed to see a more precise effect for both cities. Before making a binding assessment for these two cities, it should be seen whether these two cities have an inverse relationship on EU ignorance in the coming years. Gaziantep, on the other hand, was effective in both models. Gaziantep is known in Turkey for its gastronomic richness and being an industrial hub. Since it is a city with a high level of foreign exports and hosts many EU projects with its cultural richness, it is possible that the residents of this city have learned some things about the EU.

Variables such as age, social class, the media trust index, and left–right scale have no effect on EU ignorance in the present study. Since these variables show different results from research to research (Carl, et al., 2019; Rapeli, 2014; Kentmen, 2010), the extent of their effect is controversial.

As a contribution to the previous literature, the present research has shown that internet usage and regions (city) in Turkey are important determinants of the EU knowledge. Nevertheless, some variables such as political parties and preferred media organs (newspaper, TV, or radio) were not included in the analysis due to lack of data.

Finally, as for the limitations of this study, although it is a well-established application in the EU studies literature to use three objective Eurobarometer questions to evaluate EU knowledge, it can be argued that such a few numbers of questions are not enough to have a firm say on individuals' EU knowledge. Correct answers to these three objective questions may not be enough to accept an individual as knowledgeable or ignorant about the EU. In addition, since categories such as some PhD graduates and various occupations are not sufficiently represented by the participants for some variables, their relationship with the EU knowledge level cannot be seen clearly. These concerns can be stated among the limitations of this research. In future research, a more comprehensive scale measuring the EU knowledge level can be prepared and variables such as political parties and media organs can be tested in a single model, in addition to the variables included in the models in this study.

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