

ASEAN Regionalism in the 21st Century: A Review of the Community-Building Process (2003-2015)¹

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Abstract

This study aims to analyze the main motivations that led the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to adopt a community-building goal in the political-security and economic fields, the content of the community goal, and the general situation in practice. The dynamics that led ASEAN to adopt the community goal were the fact that ASEAN remained weak in the face of regional problems in the 1990s and the will of the member states for a more comprehensive ASEAN cooperation. With the goals of the political-security and economic community, ASEAN aimed to ensure regional security, combat non-traditional security threats, eliminate the gap in economic development between member countries, and achieve economic liberalization. With the goal of community, ASEAN demonstrated a strong will to develop a common stance against regional problems and diversify cooperation areas. In practice, however, in the political-security field, ASEAN remained ineffective in the South China Sea and Preah Vihear disputes and failed to tackle non-traditional security threats comprehensively. On the other hand, in terms of economy, ASEAN achieved positive economic growth, decreased tariffs, and reduced the economic development gap between ASEAN-6 and Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar (VLCM). From this point of view, although there were problems in both areas of cooperation, this study concludes that in the community-building process, the economic field in the ASEAN regionalism was relatively more successful than in the political area.

Key Words: ASEAN, ASEAN political-security community, ASEAN economic community, ASEAN member states, ASEAN-6 and VLCM

21. Yüzyılda ASEAN Bölgeselleřmesi: Topluluk İnřa Sürecinin Bir İncelemesi (2003-2015)

Öz

Bu alıřmanın amacı, Güneydoęu Asya Uluslar Birlięi'nin (ASEAN) siyasi-güvenlik ve ekonomi alanlarında topluluk oluřturma hedefi benimsemesine yol aan temel motivasyonları, topluluk hedefinin ierięini ve pratikteki genel durumu analiz etmektir. ASEAN'ın topluluk hedefini benimsemesine neden olan dinamikler, 1990'larda ASEAN'ın bölgesel sorunlar karřısında zayıf kalması ve üye devletlerin ASEAN iř birlięinin daha kapsamlı olması yönündeki iradeleri olmuřtur. Politik-güvenlik ve ekonomik topluluk hedefleriyle ASEAN; bölgesel güvenlięin saęlanması, geleneksel olmayan güvenlię tehditleriyle mücadele, üye ülkeler arasındaki ekonomik geliřmiřlik açığına giderilmesini ve ekonomik liberalleşmenin saęlanması hedeflemiřtir. Topluluk hedefiyle ASEAN, bölgesel sorunlar karřısında ortak bir duruř geliştirme ve iř birlięi alanlarını çeřitlendirme konusunda önemli bir irade ortaya koymuřtur. Ancak uygulamada, siyasi-güvenlik alanında ASEAN, Güney Çin Denizi ve Preah Vihear řeklindeki anlaşmazlıklarda etkisiz kalmıř ve geleneksel olmayan güvenlię tehditleriyle mücadelede kapsamlı bir ilerleme saęlayamamıřtır. Dięer yandan ekonomi bařlıęında ASEAN; ekonomik büyüme, tarifelerin düşürülmesi ve ASEAN-6 ile Vietnam, Laos, Kamboya ve Myanmar (VLKM) arasındaki ekonomik geliřmiřlik farkının azalması konusunda olumlu çıktıları elde etmiřtir. Bu noktadan hareketle alıřma, her iki iř birlięi alanında da sorunlar olmakla birlikte, topluluk inřa sürecinde, ASEAN bölgeselleřmesinde ekonomik iř birlięinin siyasi alana kıyasla görece daha bařarılı hale geldięi sonucuna ulařmıřtır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: ASEAN, ASEAN politik-güvenlik topluluęu, ASEAN ekonomik topluluęu, ASEAN üye devletleri, ASEAN-6 ve VLKM

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Introduction

It can be said that there were various dynamics that pushed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (in short, ASEAN), which is an example of regionalism in Southeast Asia, to want to build a community in the early 2000s. The most important of these dynamics was the inability of ASEAN to take practical and concrete steps to deal with the problems in Southeast Asia in the 1990s. In the face of regional issues such as East Timor³ in the 1990s and the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis⁴, ASEAN states could not show a remarkable example of solidarity. Non-regional actors such as the International Monetary Fund in the economic crisis and Australia in the East Timor issue were influential in Southeast Asian politics. Another dynamic that caused ASEAN to adopt the community goal was Indonesia and the Philippines, the founding and significant actors of ASEAN, thought that cooperation in the ASEAN regionalism should gain a multidimensional feature both as a subject and an actor. With the influence of the democratization process in Indonesia, the Jakarta administration advocated that ASEAN cooperation should also include democratic values. From the Philippines' perspective, ASEAN collaboration would be more effective if it addressed the problems or expectations of Southeast Asian people. Furthermore, in the early 2000s, the ASEAN member states aimed to strengthen economic cooperation within the ASEAN regionalism and thus effectively reduce the economic development gap between Southeast Asian countries.

With ASEAN Concord II adopted in 2003, ASEAN declared it intended to create a community in the political-security, economic and socio-cultural fields. With the goal of the political-security community, ASEAN aimed to strengthen cooperation to combat not only classical security challenges but also non-traditional security threats such as natural disasters. The economic community goal wanted to bring two essential features to ASEAN economic cooperation: (i) to ensure that ASEAN economic cooperation gains dynamism by making it a more competitive character; (ii) to integrate ASEAN into the global economy. In the context of the economic community goal, ASEAN desired to make a single market and production base by eliminating the economic development gap between ASEAN-6⁵ and later members Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar (in short, VLCM).⁶ Within the framework of the community-building objective, ASEAN positioned non-state actors as an actor that can contribute to the process in the implementation of many of the goals outlined in the ASEAN blueprints. Based on the points outlined in the ASEAN community goal, this article demonstrates that ASEAN developed a comprehensive vision of collaboration that sees people as social actors and aims to combat non-traditional security threats such as environmental issues.

On the other hand, in the community-building process, ASEAN faced several problems in practice. Even though ASEAN adopted an ambitious target such as building a community, implementing some cooperation areas specified in the community goal was either impossible or postponed due to the member states' unwillingness to take steps on some issues. In addition, although ASEAN official documents stated that non-state actors would participate in the community-building process, in practice, ASEAN states did not show a strong will to cooperate with non-state actors.

This article aims to analyze the dynamics that led ASEAN to adopt the goal of community building in the political-security and economic fields, the content of the political-security and economic community goals, and the problems encountered in practice. In this context, first, the developments that led to ASEAN's adoption of the community goal and the member states' perspectives will be presented. Then, based on ASEAN blueprints, this article will examine the main features of the ASEAN political-security and economic community goals. In the next section, the problems faced in practice by ASEAN in the

³ The East Timor dispute arose when the separatist movement in East Timor did not recognize the authority of the Indonesian government, and Indonesia claimed that East Timor was geographically an integral part of itself. Indonesia's resort to hard power in East Timor and ASEAN's lack of reaction led the United Nations (UN) to send a peacekeeping force (INTERFET) to East Timor and establish a temporary administration (UNTAET) in the region. Australia's military contribution and role in the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) had been more than some of the ASEAN members (Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) contributed.

⁴ The Asian economic crisis began in 1998 with the excessive depreciation of the Thai baht. The financial crisis resulted in decreased production and consumption and increased inflation and unemployment in ASEAN countries.

⁵ The term ASEAN-6 refers to the five states that established ASEAN on 8 August 1967, namely Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, and later Brunei, which became a member of ASEAN in 1984. Throughout the study, the term ASEAN-6 used in the literature will be preferred to express these countries.

⁶ In the literature, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, which later became ASEAN members, are briefly referred to as VLCM.

community-building process will be discussed separately for the political-security and economic communities. This article will focus on the topics of political-security and economic community, and the issue of the socio-cultural community will be included in the content of the article as long as it is related to the political-security and economic community.

Factors

In the 1990s, ASEAN could not show an influential presence in the face of issues such as the 1998-1999 Asian Economic Crisis, East Timor, the Regional Haze⁷, and the South China Sea⁸. ASEAN was ineffective in the 1990s because ASEAN cooperation did not have a vision for how to tackle issues that concern people and societies, such as the regional haze and economic crisis. Throughout the 1990s, Southeast Asian states mostly prioritized bilateral or tripartite cooperation initiatives over the approaches developed within the framework of ASEAN in the face of regional problems. The ineffectiveness of ASEAN in the face of regional problems revealed the expectation that ASEAN would adopt a new approach in the early 2000s (Quayle, 2013, p. 58). In an environment with an expectation of change, the member states decided to form a community in the political-security, economic and socio-cultural fields. The member states wanted to realize the following issues by adopting the community goal: First, the member states aimed to bring dynamism to ASEAN cooperation within the framework of the community goal. Second, the member states intended for ASEAN to respond more powerfully and effectively to traditional and non-traditional security threats within the framework of its community vision.

Indonesia, one of the founding and important members of ASEAN, argued that the vision of protecting member states' sovereignty and territorial integrity, one of the main features of ASEAN cooperation in the 20th century, should continue in the 21st century. The reason for the request of the Jakarta government was Indonesia faced various separatist groups. According to the Jakarta government, these secessionist movements could have increased their power by procuring weapons from other regional states (Narine, 2018, p. 49). Therefore, from Indonesia's point of view, the idea of an ASEAN security community would play a functional role in identifying separatist elements as a security threat by Southeast Asian states.

In the early 2000s, the Philippines aimed to involve people and non-state actors in ASEAN cooperation as important and collaborative actors. Although the problems, such as regional haze, in the 1990s, affected the people of the region, non-state actors such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) could not influence the behavior of the member states. For example, in Malaysia, the government sometimes prohibited academics and journalists from commenting on the regional haze (*Straits Times*, 13.11.1997 and 21.04.1998). Aware that the state-centered structure is an important feature in ASEAN cooperation, the Philippines argued that ASEAN should establish a cooperation framework that concerns not only interstate issues but also societies (Severino, 2006: p. 368-370). According to the Philippines, when people were involved as an actor in ASEAN cooperation, some of the member states' actions would be directed towards issues that concern people and societies, such as the environment. Furthermore, by involving the peoples of the region as an actor in the ASEAN cooperation, ASEAN intended to achieve two outcomes in the Southeast Asian regional system: (i) strengthening the legitimacy of ASEAN; (ii) making ASEAN a more important actor for the peoples of the region (*Straits Times*, 05.12.2005).

ASEAN faced non-traditional security threats, such as forest fires in the 1990s, and was ineffective in combating these threats. In the 21st century, developments such as climate change and forest fires under the title of non-traditional security threats have become an important part of the agenda of ASEAN member states (*Straits Times*, 21.07.2003; *Jakarta Post*, 08.08.2003). In particular, the Philippines stated events such as forest fires and the regional haze, which adversely affected human life, social life, and cooperation between states, could occur again in the 2000s. For this reason, according to the Philippines, tackling non-traditional security threats should be an important topic in ASEAN cooperation.

During the 1998-1999 Asian Economic Crisis, the ASEAN member states could not collaborate to combat the crisis. During the crisis, while some member countries preferred bilateral cooperation, others prioritized relations with non-regional actors. Because the ASEAN member states developed different

⁷ The problem of regional haze arose due to fires in agricultural lands managed by international investors and large companies in Indonesia. This problem affected the member states, non-state actors, such as citizens experiencing financial losses and health problems, and small and medium-sized companies.

⁸ The South China Sea issue is a dispute that has arisen because China and some ASEAN member states claim sovereignty in the South China Sea region, which is of great strategic importance in terms of natural resources, fishing, and trade routes.

strategies during the economic crisis, ASEAN could not establish strong solidarity and cooperation in dealing with the crisis (Ravenhill, 2008, p. 471). For this reason, the ASEAN member states wanted to create a sense of solidarity among themselves by creating a community in the economic field and thus strengthening economic cooperation (Aggarwal & Chow, 2010, p. 262-290).

In the 1990s, there were two distinct groups within ASEAN, the relatively economically developed ASEAN-6 and the less developed VLCM, which later became members. This economic division within ASEAN led to the determination of different target dates for ASEAN-6 and VLCM during the implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area⁹ (AFTA) initiative and the emergence of different economic indicators in ASEAN economic cooperation. Therefore, eliminating economic development differences between ASEAN-6 and VLCM was a critical dynamic that made ASEAN want to establish a community in the economic field (McGillivray, Feeny, Iamsiraroj, 2015, p. 95). With its vision of the economic community, ASEAN wanted to achieve two goals: (i) to reduce the gap between member countries in terms of economic growth; (ii) to create a positive and solid basis for strong economic interaction between member states.

ASEAN Political-Security Community

According to the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint (shortly, APSC Blueprint), the goals that ASEAN member states wanted to achieve in the politics and security areas in regional cooperation were as follows (APSC Blueprint, 2009, p. 2):

A rules-based community of shared values and norms

The political-security community blueprint strongly supported the process of establishing the regional code of conduct on how to behave in the South China Sea (APSC Blueprint, 2009, p. 7). In other words, this point envisaged that ASEAN states should fully implement the statement of conduct on the South China Sea issue, develop close consultations, and identify joint measures. Based on these points, two matters can be said: (i) Within the framework of the political-security community, ASEAN sought to establish rules on how to conduct relations with other actors on the South China Sea issue. (ii) In practice, ASEAN aimed to ensure that all parties comply with the set rules.

A cohesive, peaceful, stable, and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security

The political-security community blueprint identified separatist movements against ASEAN member states as a threat (APSC Blueprint, 2009, p. 9). The blueprint paid special attention to the protection of the territorial integrity of ASEAN member states. According to the blueprint, in addition to classical security problems such as separatism, the member states can cooperate in combating non-traditional security threats such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, money laundering, arms smuggling, maritime piracy, and cybercrime. ASEAN envisaged forming working groups, making legal arrangements and exchanging information mutually to implement cooperation in the fight against non-traditional security threats (APSC Blueprint, 2009, p. 12-13). Within the framework of the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the diversification of cooperation in the security field based on the topic emerged as a notable feature of the ASEAN cooperation.

The political-security community blueprint emphasized the development of capacity and response mechanisms to combat non-traditional security threats such as natural disasters. In this framework, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), adopted in 2005 and entered into force in 2009, included:

- establishing a disaster relief fund,
- accelerating customs procedures,
- coordinating military personnel and civilian institutions.

According to the agreement, including non-state actors, like NGOs, in the process is essential and beneficial in terms of three points: disaster risk management, disaster preparedness, and early response

⁹ ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) aimed to liberalize trade between member states by eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers between ASEAN members. In the 15-year period from 1993 to 2008, the AFTA tried to create a free trade zone by reducing tariffs by 0 to 5 percent. The mechanism envisaged by AFTA for implementation was the Common Effect Preferential Tariff (CEPT). Within the framework of AFTA, different dates were foreseen for the ASEAN member states to achieve the determined targets. The target date was 2002 for ASEAN-6, 2006 for Vietnam, 2008 for Laos and Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia.

(ASEAN-AADMER Work Programme, 2010; Allison & Taylor, 2017, p. 37). Moreover, ASEAN positioned NGOs as actors to provide inputs to the policy-making process in tackling non-traditional security threats, as seen in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Action Plan (ASCC Plan of Action, 2012). With an emphasis on NGOs in combating non-traditional security threats, the member states demonstrated they tried to cooperate with non-state actors such as NGOs in ASEAN regional cooperation (*Jakarta Post*, 08.08.2012).

The political-security community blueprint envisaged the development of methods in the form of good offices, conciliation, and mediation for resolving disputes between member states (APSC Blueprint, 2009, p. 10). In addition, the blueprint identified various roles for ASEAN in the post-conflict period, such as providing humanitarian aid and promoting peace (APSC Blueprint, 2009, p. 11-12). These issues mentioned in the blueprint aimed to make ASEAN one of the leading players in conflict resolution and give ASEAN a more functional role in the post-conflict period.

ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community blueprint stated that the ASEAN member states should actively tackle environmental problems such as climate change (ASCC Blueprint, 2009, p. 14). The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community blueprint promoted the sustainable use of marine areas, natural resources, biodiversity, water, and forests (ASCC Blueprint, 2009, p. 17-19). Based on these points, the following two considerations can be said: (i) in combating non-traditional security threats, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community blueprint complemented and supported the political-security community blueprint; (ii) collaboration statements and initiatives helped ASEAN dispel criticism that it lacks the vision to deal with non-traditional security threats (Martel, 2017, p. 552-553).

A dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world

The political-security community blueprint envisaged that ASEAN would maintain constructive relations with actors interested in the region to ensure regional stability in Southeast Asia (APSC Blueprint, 2009, p. 14-15). With these constructive relations, ASEAN aimed to develop strong relations with non-regional actors on issues related to regional cooperation and achieve positive results from these relations. In this context, the East Asia Summit¹⁰ is the platform that enables ASEAN to develop strong relations with non-regional actors. The East Asia Summit has been a diplomatic platform where ASEAN discusses issues regarding traditional and non-traditional security threats with non-regional actors (Emmers, 2018, p. 362-363). Through the East Asia Summit, ASEAN sought to encourage great powers to act in accordance with ASEAN norms (such as mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and the prevention of the use of force) on issues related to regional issues such as the South China Sea (Caballero-Anthony, 2014, p. 571). In addition, the ASEAN member states wanted to express their priorities in the face of other actors within the framework of the East Asia Summit.

ASEAN Economic Community

The final goal that the Southeast Asian states wanted to achieve in the field of the economy was the ASEAN economic community (Narine, 2015, p. 174). The targets envisaged within the framework of the ASEAN economic community can be examined as follows:

A single market and production base: This point emphasized creating an integrated economic cooperation environment by eliminating national economic borders (AEC Blueprint, 2008). Thus, it aimed to meet the economic needs of producers and consumers without encountering any obstacles. The economic community blueprint recommended harmonizing customs procedures within the framework of the ASEAN Single Window to ensure the free movement of goods and the elimination of non-tariff barriers (AEC Blueprint, 2008, p. 6). Additionally, the blueprint included the removal of barriers to trade in services (AEC Blueprint, 2008). Based on these points, it can be said that the blueprint intended to strengthen economic liberalism in the ASEAN region. However, according to the blueprint, the member states' national economic capacities should be considered when implementing the economic liberalization process in regional economic cooperation within the framework of ASEAN (AEC Blueprint, 2008, p. 12).

¹⁰ The East Asia Summit is a dialogue mechanism that brings together ASEAN members and important actors of the Asia-Pacific region, such as Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the USA. On December 14, 2005, the first East Asia Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur. The EAS meetings are held after the annual ASEAN leaders' meetings. ASEAN takes the central role and leadership in the East Asia Summit, and traditional and non-traditional security issues such as food security, trade, economy, maritime security, and cooperation are discussed at these summits.

This point displayed that the AEC blueprint offered a state-centered perspective concerning economic liberalization.

A highly competitive economic region: This point aimed to strengthen ASEAN cooperation not only in the classical elements of the economy, such as goods and services, but also in other areas of the economy that have recently gained importance, such as financial services and intellectual property (AEC Blueprint, 2008). Thus, the blueprint desired that the ASEAN economic cooperation acquire a quality that supports economic innovation (AEC Blueprint, 2008, p. 19-23).

Equitable economic development: This point aimed to close the economic development gap between ASEAN-6 and VLCM, which was one of the most critical problems of ASEAN economic cooperation in the second half of the 1990s. The blueprint encouraged two points through the ASEAN Integration Initiative, which started in November 2000, to improve the economic development of VLCM countries: (i) to increase investments toward VLCM countries; (ii) to ensure the growth of private sector enterprises in VLCM countries (AEC Blueprint, 2008, p. 24-25). By focusing on the private sector and investments, the blueprint brought economic liberalization to the forefront of the economic development process of the VLCM countries (Murray, 2020, p. 48).

A region fully integrated into the global economy: This point predicted that integrating Southeast Asian countries into the global economy within the framework of ASEAN would bring more economic benefits. In this framework, the blueprint aimed that Southeast Asian states would act within the framework of ASEAN centralism while maintaining international economic relations (*Jakarta Post*, 07.04.2010). The ASEAN countries' decision-makers, who brought the blueprint to the agenda, wanted to achieve two important goals with a strong and common attitude within the framework of ASEAN: (i) to provide more output relative to bilateral economic relations; (ii) to be more effective in economic relations (Caouette & Côté, 2011, p. 32). Moreover, according to the blueprint, an integrated and outward-looking ASEAN with the global economy would be stronger in the economic sphere (AEC Blueprint, 2008).

The effects of the ASEAN economic community target on ASEAN economic cooperation can be analyzed in terms of economic growth, purchasing power parity, and intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN foreign direct investment (Roberts, 2012, p. 133-134; Yean & Das, 2015, p. 194; *Straits Times*, 02.01.2016; Azis, 2018, p. 4; Natalegawa, 2018, p. 165-168; Chen & Lombaerde, 2019, p. 737; Idris & Kamaruddin, 2019, p. 244).

Table 1. *Economic Growth Rate, 2004-2015¹¹*

Countries	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Brunei	0.5	0.4	4.4	0.6	-2.4	-1.8	2.6	3.4	0.9	-2.1	-2.3	-0.6
Cambodia	10.0	13.6	10.8	10.2	6.7	0.1	6.0	7.1	7.3	7.4	7.0	7.1
Indonesia	5.0	5.7	5.5	6.3	6.0	4.6	6.2	6.5	6.3	5.6	5.0	4.8
Laos	6.9	7.3	8.3	6.0	7.8	7.5	8.1	8.0	7.9	8.0	7.6	7.6
Malaysia	7.2	5.3	5.6	6.3	4.8	-1.5	7.4	5.3	5.5	4.7	6.0	5.0
Myanmar	13.8	13.6	13.1	12.0	10.3	10.5	9.6	5.6	7.3	8.4	8.7	7.1
Philippines	6.7	4.8	5.2	6.6	4.2	1.1	7.6	3.7	6.7	7.1	6.1	5.8
Singapore	9.5	7.4	8.9	9.1	1.9	-0.7	15.3	6.2	3.7	4.6	3.3	2.0
Thailand	6.3	4.2	5.0	5.4	1.7	-0.7	7.5	0.8	7.2	2.7	0.8	2.8
Vietnam	7.8	7.5	7.0	7.1	5.7	5.4	6.4	6.2	5.2	5.4	6.0	6.7
ASEAN	6.5	6.8	6.0	6.6	4.7	2.5	7.5	5.0	6.1	5.2	4.7	4.7
ASEAN-6	6.1	5.3	5.6	6.4	4.4	1.9	7.5	4.9	6.2	5.0	4.3	4.3
VLCM	9.5	9.6	9.0	8.7	7.2	6.7	7.4	6.2	6.1	6.5	6.9	6.9

(Source: ASEAN, 2016a; the ASEAN Secretariat, 2016b, p. 43).

¹¹ "ASEAN GDP growth is calculated as a weighted average using the PPP-GDP share used in the April 2016 IMF-WEO Database" (ASEAN, 2016a; the ASEAN Secretariat, 2016b, p. 43).

As can be seen in Table 1, the ASEAN countries made significant progress in economic growth between 2003-2015, except for the 2008 economic crisis and the following two years. Notably, VLCM countries achieved a positive economic growth rate. This case indicates that the ASEAN economic community goal was successful to some extent in reducing the difference in economic development between ASEAN-6 and VLCM.

The share of consumer goods in regional trade increased from around 20 percent in 2003 to almost 40 percent in 2015. Most of the consumer goods in the regional market were subject to zero or very low tariffs, and consumers' welfare increased as access to low-cost and diverse foreign products became easier. This situation shows that individual consumers also gained positive benefits from the process. Figure 1 reveals a steady decline in the proportion of the ASEAN population living on less than \$1.25 a day. The population living under \$1.25 a day fell from 47 percent in 1990 to just under 14 percent in 2015.




Figure 1. PPP-1 Population living under \$1.25 per day (%), ASEAN Totals, 1990-2015 (Source: ASEAN, 2017a; the ASEAN Secretariat, 2017b, p. 21)

Figure 2 represents that intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN foreign direct investment increased significantly. In 2015, the date set for the community target, intra-ASEAN foreign direct investment was US\$22.232 billion, extra-ASEAN foreign direct investment was US\$ 98.586 billion, and the total was US\$120.818 billion. Figure 2 indicates that intra-ASEAN foreign direct investment remained low compared to extra-ASEAN foreign direct investment.




Figure 2. Intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN Foreign Direct Investment (billion USD), 2000-2017 (Source: ASEAN, 2018a; the ASEAN Secretariat, 2018b, p. 43)

Tariffs for more than 99 percent of products on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (shortly, CEPT list) were reduced to the range of 0 to 5 percent. VLCM made significant progress in the implementation of the CEPT. Furthermore, these positive economic points regarding the reduction of tariffs indicate that there was significant progress in achieving common economic gains (such as implementing financial liberalization).

ASEAN was successful at various levels in dealing with the economic development gap. While Cambodia and Vietnam reached remarkable achievements in economic growth, Laos and Myanmar achieved positive economic growth momentum, although not as much as Cambodia and Vietnam. Hence, the gap between ASEAN-6 and VLCM in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) narrowed. While the GDP gap between ASEAN-6 and VLCM was more than five times in 1999, this gap was only 2.7 in 2016.

The decline regarding the difference in development, GDP, and income inequality between the ASEAN-6 and the VLCM demonstrates that ASEAN economic cooperation has yielded beneficial results.

Six percent of foreign direct investment flows in the global economy in 2015 occurred in the ASEAN region. The EU and the USA, which contributed 15-20 percent of foreign investments every year, were ASEAN's two most important sources of foreign investment. ASEAN achieved remarkable growth and by 2015 was the fourth largest actor in global trade after the United States, China, and Germany. Within the framework of integration into the global economy, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) became multilateral and included a \$120 million swap agreement. The multilateralism of the CMI indicated ASEAN had developed functional cooperation in terms of obtaining economic benefits from great powers. As ASEAN integrated into the global economy, multinational foreign direct investment in the region increased, and local enterprises gained more experience. The most apparent indicator of ASEAN's integration into the global economy was the signing of free trade agreements between ASEAN and great powers in the global economy, such as China, India, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia.

Challenges in the Practice

ASEAN encountered some problems that prevented the full implementation of the idea of the political-security and economic community. This section analyzes these issues separately for the political-security community and the economic community.

Challenges for ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC)

According to some scholars (see Hassan, 2015, p. 313), the ASEAN political-security community goal was successful, and ASEAN had turned into a security community, as it had eliminated the possibility of war between member states in the Southeast Asian region. However, it can be said that ASEAN's political and security cooperation did not fully evolve into a community, or community awareness did not develop until 2015. The reasons for this can be listed as follows:

Even though political-security and socio-cultural community blueprints tried to establish cooperation between states and non-state actors such as NGOs in combating non-traditional security threats, ASEAN states failed to cooperate with non-state actors such as NGOs in practice. The reason why cooperation could not be established is that, in practice, the member states positioned the ASEAN cooperation as a purely state-centered formation. In practice, non-state actors were seen as players who could be involved in the community-building process as long as member states and technical conditions allowed (Murray, 2020, p. 54). For instance, ASEAN failed to take full advantage of the NGOs in tackling non-traditional security threats such as environmental issues (Allison & Taylor, 2017, p. 34). The NGOs could have played a supportive role in preventing environmental pollution by informing the region's people about the disadvantages of global warming. The reasons why non-state actors could not be influential in ASEAN cooperation can be listed as follows:

First, there was uncertainty about how to strengthen communication between member states and non-state actors in ASEAN cooperation (Lim, 2015, p. 278). This uncertainty caused the inability of non-state actors, such as NGOs with expertise in specific issues, to be effective actors that will provide input to the decision-making process in ASEAN cooperation. Second, in practice, ASEAN countries tended to view non-state actors as actors who would make ASEAN better known among the regions' people (Collins, 2008, p. 327-328). This attitude of the member states resulted in non-state actors being in a secondary position rather than being political actors who often provide inputs to the ASEAN cooperation. Third, in Southeast Asia, which is frequently exposed to natural disasters, there was a lack of coordination between ASEAN member states and non-state actors, such as NGOs, regarding disaster management. This lack of coordination was because NGOs could not fully cooperate with member states at the beginning of the natural disaster process, but after a while they learned the behaviors developed by member states (Allison & Taylor, 2017, p. 36).

The ASEAN norms, such as respect for sovereignty and non-interference, sometimes emerged as an obstacle to implementing the goals in the ASEAN community-building process. Even though the political-security community blueprint specified the fight against non-traditional security threats as one of the areas of cooperation, there were significant problems at the point of implementing this collaboration. First of all, the implementation dimension of most of the mentioned areas of cooperation in combating non-traditional security threats fell within the sphere of national sovereignty of the ASEAN member states (Narine, 2018, p. 75). Due to the sensitivity of the member states regarding sovereignty, progress

was slow on issues such as harmonizing environmental policies outlined in the draft and data sharing. For example, the lack of legal measures on environmental issues made it difficult to implement the goal of combating non-traditional security threats such as environmental problems (Idris & Kamaruddin, 2019, p. 242-244). Therefore, a mismatch emerged between the desire of member states to preserve their sovereignty and the motivation to achieve the political-security community goal in ASEAN cooperation (Narine, 2018, p. 79; Yukawa, 2018, p. 310).

Combating non-traditional security threats like natural disasters requires strong material resources and technology. However, most ASEAN countries did not allocate strong financial resources to combating non-traditional security threats and had limited capacities in terms of technical expertise. More importantly, the member states could not develop a strong political will to deal with non-traditional security threats, although it was stated in the blueprint (Varkkey, 2014, p. 65-81). Even though Singapore informed Indonesia about the location of the fires in accordance with the agreement on transboundary haze pollution, the Indonesian government did not take any significant steps to combat fires in practice. As a result, the practical validity of the cooperation developed in the fight against non-traditional security threats and other areas depended on the concrete actions of the member states (Sukma, 2015, p. 416). Indonesia's behavior indicated that the national perceptions and actions of the member states could harm the progress of ASEAN cooperation (Quayle, 2013, p. 58-59).

Although the political-security community blueprint envisaged the development of methods such as conciliation and mediation for resolving disputes between member states, ASEAN was ineffective in some conflicts. One of the most prominent examples was the Preah Vihear¹² dispute between Thailand and Cambodia. In an environment where ASEAN strengthened the political-security cooperation in the theoretical framework in line with its vision of the political-security community, it was expected to be more effective in resolving the Preah Vihear conflict in practice (Seah, 2009, p. 212). Even though Hassan (2015, p. 316) stated ASEAN is a dialogue mechanism for the continuation of amity between member states in a conflict such as this, ASEAN failed to meet the expectation that it would be more active within the framework of the political-security community ideal. The following developments can be listed as indicators of ASEAN's ineffectiveness:

Cambodia's attempt to solve the dispute in the context of international order mechanisms, such as the United Nations Security Council, rather than regional diplomacy, displayed that ASEAN was ineffective in addressing the concerns of a member state (Narine, 2018, p. 70). Despite Cambodia's request for assistance within the framework of the ASEAN way, ASEAN's demand to resolve Cambodia's dispute with Thailand through bilateral negotiations rendered ASEAN ineffective (So, 2015, p. 170). Indonesia, the term president of ASEAN, attempted to resolve the dispute by taking an active stance, but Thailand's unwillingness to respond to Indonesia's initiatives invalidated diplomacy, and ASEAN could not establish an environment for dialogue or negotiation (Quayle, 2013, p. 64-65). At the ASEAN Summit in May 2011, Singapore argued ASEAN should maintain the principle of non-interference. According to Singapore, Indonesia's active initiative could put ASEAN in a difficult situation, such as the risk of failure and conflict (Narine, 2018, p. 70-71).

These points demonstrated that the role of ASEAN in the conflict resolution process was limited due to the principle of non-interference and the member states' attitudes. Moreover, methods such as goodwill, reconciliation, and mediation expressed in previous documents and the political-security community blueprint could not be implemented during the conflict. As a matter of fact, the change of administration in Thailand, rather than the ASEAN cooperation, was influential in losing the place of the Preah Vihear conflict on the agenda and reducing the tension between Thailand and Cambodia.

The South China Sea was another dispute concerning the political-security dimension of ASEAN cooperation. Natalegawa stated this dispute was one of the most important problems that could lead to instability in Southeast Asia (Storey, 2015, p. 317). Even though this dispute had the potential to cause chaos and instability, within the framework of the political-security community, the ASEAN states could

¹² The Preah Vihear dispute arose due to Thailand's claim of sovereignty over an ancient temple within the borders of Cambodia. The International Court of Justice stated in 1962 that the temple was under Cambodian sovereignty. The Thai government made the issue political when the temple began participating in the World Heritage List in 2008. The occupation of a pagoda (the name given to the religious buildings of Buddhists) in the conflict zone by Thai soldiers increased the tension between the parties. For both Thailand and Cambodia, this tension resulted in the death of some soldiers and the displacement of civilians, and the temple was slightly damaged (Narine, 2018, p. 67-68).

not develop a common stance on the establishment of a code of conduct against China, which is a party to the conflict. The reason for the lack of solidarity in cooperation in practice was the different attitudes of the member states. Indeed, the security perceptions of the member countries regarding the South China Sea issue differed. The South China Sea dispute was a serious national security issue for Vietnam and the Philippines, while it was a secondary agenda item for Malaysia and Brunei. Thus, different points of view on the South China Sea issue in ASEAN cooperation created a pluralistic situation. More importantly, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia emphasized economic and political ties with China (Storey, 2015, p. 319-320). For example, in 2011, Cambodia received \$1.19 billion in foreign direct investment from China. Beijing-based foreign direct investment caused the Phnom Penh government to attach importance to relations with China instead of prioritizing ASEAN political-security cooperation (Sato, 2013, p. 104-105). In this period, Cambodia's call for the dispute to be handled bilaterally and for ASEAN to remain neutral caused ASEAN not to develop a common attitude towards China (Emmers, 2018, p. 365).

Based on the points analyzed above, it can be said that the cooperation that ASEAN states tried to develop in the South China Sea conflict was limited due to the problems and divisions among themselves (Quayle, 2013, p. 74). The divisions among the ASEAN states resulted in ASEAN's inability to issue a joint statement at the 45th ASEAN Summit held under the presidency of Cambodia on 9-13 July 2012. Due to the different approaches of the member states on the South China Sea, ASEAN has not been able to issue a joint statement after an ASEAN Summit for the first time in its history. Another reason why ASEAN could not publish a joint statement was that Cambodia, which wants to gain economic interests from China, supported China's strategy of keeping the South China Sea issue away from multilateral platforms. This situation displayed that if any of the ASEAN member states did not share the same or similar opinion as other member states, ASEAN cooperation would remain in uncertainty.

After ASEAN failed to develop a common will on the South China Sea issue, ASEAN countries agreed on a six-point memorandum with the initiatives of Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa (*Jakarta Post*, 07.02.2013). According to Mahbubani and Sng (2017, p. 180), the six-point regulation emerged due to the desire of political decision-makers to strengthen ASEAN cooperation. Nevertheless, this regulation did not put forward any significant actions for implementation; it only repeated standard ideas, such as the non-use of force and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Thus, it can be said that this document was a regulation aimed at protecting the prestige of ASEAN, whose reputation was damaged due to its inability to publish a joint statement. If the member states had a real will to strengthen ASEAN political-security cooperation, after the ASEAN summit, other member states should have supported some initiatives, notably the Philippines' call for an action plan within the ASEAN framework. Nonetheless, some member states did not support the Philippines' call for an action plan within the framework of ASEAN.

On the other hand, in recent years, the Beijing administration has announced China is ready to start negotiations on the code of conduct in the South China Sea. The reason for this change in China's approach is that it wants to avoid disrupting relations with ASEAN and create the impression that it is a compromise actor on the issue of the South China Sea. Hence, the decisive factor on the way to the formation of the code of conduct has been the will of China rather than the attitude of ASEAN (Storey, 2015, p. 320).

Challenges for ASEAN Economic Community

According to Cuyvers, Chen, and Lombaerde (2019, p. 612), the ASEAN member states realized that the target year 2015 was a very close date for achieving the AEC target and began to see 2015 as a stage in the progress of cooperation rather than a final date. Indeed, as with the implementation aspect of the APSC, some problems prevented the full implementation of the AEC goal. These problems were related to the sensitivities of the member states regarding sovereignty and national borders and the state-centered definition of the process.

In practice, the member states did not take the necessary steps on specific issues, such as implementing the flow of goods, services, and capital specified in the AEC blueprint. For example, due to the shortage of economic resources, Vietnam could not establish strong collaboration with other ASEAN countries in implementing the issues set out in the AEC blueprint (Yean & Das, 2015, p. 197). Therefore, ASEAN states ignored that regional economic cooperation would be mutually beneficial (Thuzar, 2015, p. 198). The lack of consensus on the circulation of goods and services among some member states was a

significant obstacle to establishing a single market and production base outlined in the economic community blueprint (Murray, 2020, p. 48). So, in practice, the lack of common will on some issues related to the AEC became a significant problem (Caballero-Anthony, 2014, p. 579-580). Based on these points, Denis Hew (2015, p. 225) wrote the leaders of ASEAN did not have a real will to create a single market like the EU.

The ASEAN countries were reluctant to create institutions independent of member states in the community-building process (Soesastro, 2015, p. 217-220) because the member states thought that an independent institution would mean them giving up their national sovereignty/authority. Therefore, an independent institution could not be established to reduce the development gap and implement other economic cooperation activities in the ASEAN cooperation. In the process, the ASEAN way, which is based on flexible cooperation, became dominant (Cuyvers, 2019, p. 698). The effectiveness of the ASEAN way, which emphasizes a non-legally binding form of cooperation, also continued in the community-building process (Hew, 2015, p. 224). For example, due to the flexibility of the ASEAN way, ASEAN's dispute resolution mechanism did not become a powerful instrument (Narine, 2018, p. 63-64). The member states' preference for the World Trade Organization (WTO) instead of resolving disputes within the framework of ASEAN damaged the spirit of regional cooperation in the context of the AEC. In terms of institutional characteristics, the weak structure of ASEAN negatively affected the implementation dimension of the community-building process in Southeast Asia.

As analyzed earlier, ASEAN wanted to create an economic relationship model that supports innovation. However, other member states, except Singapore, did not allocate remarkable resources to technology, science, or innovation (Pitsuwan & Yoon, 2016, p. 55). This case caused the economic relations between ASEAN countries to rely on classical elements of the economy, such as trade in goods and labor-intensive products, rather than innovation and technology (Chen & Lombaerde, 2019, p. 747). The trade-based nature of economic relations failed to provide significant economic growth and created a middle-income trap risk for ASEAN countries (Pitsuwan & Yoon, 2016, p. 55). Moreover, despite substantial improvements in tariff reduction, non-tariff barriers have increased significantly in ASEAN regional cooperation since 2000 (Yates, 2019, p. 237). Nevertheless, the ASEAN countries made little progress in combating non-tariff barriers (Yean & Das, 2015, p. 194). These problems posed a significant obstacle to the diversification and strengthening of ASEAN economic cooperation.

As previously analyzed, with the admission of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar in the 1990s, two groups (relatively wealthy ASEAN-6 members and underdeveloped VLCM) emerged within ASEAN in terms of economic indicators. Within the framework of the AEC blueprint, even though the gap between ASEAN-6 and VLCM in terms of GDP and poverty indicators decreased, there were differences between ASEAN-6 and VLCM in terms of income, education, health expenditures, and economic development rate (McGillivray, Feeny, Iamsiraroj, 2015, p. 96). The economic differences damaged the efforts of the member states to build the ASEAN economic community (Idris & Kamaruddin, 2019, p. 239) because although the ASEAN countries tried to implement the points outlined in the blueprint, it took time for them to develop a common attitude within the blueprint. The economic differences between member states made it difficult to establish stronger practical cooperation in constructing the AEC (Quayle, 2013, p. 66; Soesastro, 2015, p. 220).

Following the 2008 economic crisis, governments in Indonesia, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia prioritized local products, and protectionist trends emerged. Due to the recession in the aftermath of the crisis, the Philippines indicated it would move slowly to reduce tariffs on economic products such as rice and sugar (Nair, 2011, p. 258). Given the protectionist trends in other countries during the same period, this was not something unique only to the ASEAN countries. However, it is noteworthy that such developments negatively affected the capacity of the member states to adapt to the process within the framework of the AEC.

ASEAN signed free trade agreements with the great powers to mitigate the negative effects of the 2008 economic crisis. However, in practice, it was difficult and time-consuming to implement some of the ASEAN free trade agreements in all ASEAN countries simultaneously (Nair, 2011, p. 257). Some free trade agreements, such as the agreement between ASEAN and India, had a complex nature and different rules of origin. This circumstance led to the fact that the positive impact of these regulations on the construction of the ASEAN economic community was not immediately visible (Yean & Das, 2015, p. 195).

The AEC blueprint also concerned the private sector and non-state actors. Therefore, at the point of effective implementation of the blueprint, there had to be an exchange of information between ASEAN and non-state actors. However, businesspeople in the ASEAN member states did not have much awareness of the AEC process (Narine, 2018, p. 60). Furthermore, the ASEAN member states sometimes did not pay the required attention to transparency, such as stopping the publication of scorecards, which was one of the crucial documents regarding economic cooperation, after 2012 (Pelkmans, 2019, p. 623-624). The limitation of information sharing with the public restricted the access of non-state actors, such as businesses, to knowledge in the economic community-building process to a certain extent (Yean & Das, 2015, p. 193-194). More importantly, due to this disconnect between businesses and the ASEAN economic community-building process, the contribution of businesses to the AEC process was minimal.

Some of the ASEAN members did not ratify some of the agreements signed to put the AEC goals into practice (Narine, 2018, p. 59-61). In other words, due to the flexible cooperation style of the ASEAN way, the member states did not take the necessary steps in practice. In addition, the current regulations on the liberalization of trade in services within the framework of ASEAN remained insufficient, and efforts were made to achieve the liberalization of trade in services through unilateral initiatives (*Straits Times*, 08.05.2014). As mentioned before, the blueprint stated that progress in the free movement of economic products would depend on the national capacity of the member states. This situation caused significant differences in the free movement of economic products between the member countries and led to the fact that the liberalization of intra-service trade was not at the desired level in regional economic cooperation (*Straits Times*, 02.01.2016).

Conclusion

This study concluded that even though there were problems in political-security and economic cooperation, the cooperation developed by ASEAN in the field of the economy was relatively more successful when compared to the political area. In other words, Southeast Asian countries achieved more concrete outputs in the economic field in the ASEAN community-building process. Within the framework of the community goal developed in the field of economics, the ASEAN member states achieved three following outputs: (i) The ASEAN member states achieved remarkable economic growth, and with the effect of this positive economic growth, the GDP gap between ASEAN-6 and VLCM decreased. (ii) The ASEAN member states reduced tariffs on CEPT-listed products and made significant progress in subjecting most consumer goods to zero or low tariffs. (iii) Foreign direct investment intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN increased, and ASEAN states signed free trade agreements with great powers within the framework of integrating into the global economy.

This study reached that ASEAN was ineffective in the political-security field because the member states did not show a strong will in the face of political and security-related issues. For example, ASEAN could not develop effective cooperation on the South China Sea issue. The reason for this ineffectiveness was that some member states, such as Malaysia and Brunei, did not perceive the South China Sea issue as an important security issue for themselves as much as other member states, such as Vietnam and the Philippines. This situation led to the fact that ASEAN failed to take strong action and develop harmonious cooperation on such a highly strategic issue as the South China Sea. Similarly, even though the development of methods such as conciliation and mediation were envisaged to resolve disputes, ASEAN was ineffective in the Preah Vihear dispute, which was an example of low-intensity conflict and was not related to non-regional forces, between Thailand and Cambodia. The reason for ASEAN's ineffectiveness was Singapore's view that ASEAN should not get involved in the dispute. Another example is that although Singapore informed Indonesia about the location of forest fires, a significant problem in non-traditional security threats, Indonesia did not take the necessary steps to implement.

This study revealed that the bilateral relations of some member states with non-regional powers played an important role in the ineffectiveness of ASEAN. The ASEAN member states, especially VLCM, which have a medium-sized economy and need foreign aid/investments, prioritized developing economic relations with China. Due to the negative attitude of Cambodia, which has strong economic relations with China, ASEAN could not issue a joint statement after the 2012 summit. For this reason, the fact that the VLCM prioritized economic relations with China eliminated the possibility of ASEAN taking a strong stance on issues such as the South China Sea issue, to which China is a party.

Another reason why ASEAN did not become an influential actor in the community-building process was the absence of independent institutional structures from member states and the fact that ASEAN

cooperation did not have a binding character on member states. In this context, ASEAN's inability to act in the face of the many problems faced in the community-building process was closely related to two main issues. First, ASEAN's dispute resolution mechanism did not function independently of the member states. Second, there were no legally binding agreements and mechanisms in ASEAN cooperation. In the community-building process, the reason for the institutional and methodological weakness of ASEAN was that the member states were sensitive about sovereignty and stuck to the principle of non-interference; therefore, they did not want to delegate some of their authority to ASEAN. The failure of member states to take the necessary steps on the flow of goods, services, and capital and the slow progress in harmonizing environmental policies and data sharing reflected the sensitivity regarding the transfer of sovereignty and authority.

Ethical Declaration

In the writing process of the study titled “*ASEAN Regionalism in the 21st Century: A Review of the Community-Building Process (2003-2015)*”, there were followed the scientific, ethical and the citation rules; was not made any falsification on the collected data and this study was not sent to any other academic media for evaluation. Since the document analysis is examined in this study, there is no requirement for an ethics committee decision.

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TÜRKÇE GENİŐ ÖZET

Bu alıŐma Güneydođu Asya’da bölgeselleŐmenin bir örneđi olan Güneydođu Asya Uluslar Birliđi’nin (kısaca, ASEAN) 21. yüzyılda siyasi-güvenlik, ekonomik ve sosyo-kültürel alanlarda topluluk kurma kararına yön veren temel motivasyonları, topluluk hedefinin içeriđini ve uygulamaya dönük yansımalarını analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

ASEAN, 1990’larda Güney Çin Denizi, Bölgesel Hava Kirliliđi, Dođu Timor ve 1998-1999 Asya Ekonomi Krizi Őeklinde sıralanabilecek güvenlik ve ekonomi alanındaki sorunlar karŐısında kayda deđer bir varlık ortaya koyamamıŐtır. ASEAN’ın bu etkisizliđinin nedeni, evre sorunları gibi geleneksel olmayan güvenlik tehditleriyle nasıl mücadele edileceđine dair bir vizyona sahip olmamasıdır. Bu noktadan hareketle, 2000’li yılların baŐında ASEAN üye devletleri siyasi-güvenlik, ekonomik ve sosyo-kültürel alanlarda topluluk kurma kararı olarak ASEAN bölgeselleŐmesini içerik yönünden genişletmeyi ve güçlendirmeyi hedeflemiŐtır.

Siyasi-güvenlik topluluđu hedefi erevesinde, ASEAN üye devletleri, Güney Çin Denizi sorununda yakın iŐiŐareler geliŐtirmeyi ve ortak önlemler belirlemeyi amaçlamıŐtır. Üye devletlere karŐı ayrılıkcılıđı bir tehdit olarak tanımlayan ASEAN; insan kaakçılıđı, uyuŐturucu kaakçılıđı, kara para aklama, silah kaakçılıđı, deniz korsanlıđı ve siber suçlar gibi geleneksel olmayan güvenlik tehditleriyle mücadelede iŐ birliđi yapılacađını belirtmiŐtır. Geleneksel olmayan güvenlik tehditleriyle mücadelede ASEAN, yöntem olarak alıŐma grupları oluŐturulmasını, yasal düzenlemelerin yapılmasını, karŐılıklı bilgi aliŐverisinde bulunulmasını ve müdahale mekanizmalarının geliŐtirilmesini öngörmüŐtür. Bir diđer husus, siyasi-güvenlik topluluđu vizyonunun üye devletler arasındaki anlaşmazlıkların barıŐçıl özümü için uzlaŐma ve arabuluculuk Őeklinde yöntemler geliŐtirileceđini belirtmesi ve ASEAN’a atıŐma sonrası süreç için insani yardım sađlama ve barıŐı teŐvik etme Őeklinde roller yüklemesidir. Bu noktalardan hareketle Őunlar söylenebilir: (i) Siyasi-güvenlik topluluđu erevesinde, güvenlik alanındaki iŐ birliđinin konu bazında eŐitlendirilmesi, 21. yüzyılda ASEAN bölgeselleŐmesinin önemli bir özelliđi olarak ortaya ıkmıŐtır; (ii) BarıŐı teŐvik etme ve insani yardım sađlama gibi rollerle ASEAN’ın atıŐma özümü sürecinde daha iŐlevsel bir aktör hâline gelmesi hedeflenmiŐtır.

Ekonomik topluluk vizyonu, ulusal ekonomik sınırların önündeki engelleri tamamen ortadan kaldırarak bütünleŐmiŐ bir ekonomik pazar oluŐturmayı hedeflemiŐtır. Ekonomik ürünlerin serbest dolaŐımının sađlanması ve tarife dıŐı engellerin kalkması için ASEAN Tek Penceresi kapsamında gümrük prosedürlerinin uyumlaŐtırılması öngörülmüŐtür. Plan, ulusal ekonomik sınırlar ortadan kaldırılırken, üye devletlerin ulusal ekonomik kapasitelerinin dikkate alınması gerektiđini vurgulamıŐtır. Ayrıca, ekonomik topluluk hedefi erevesinde, ASEAN, son dönemde önem kazanan finansal hizmetler ve fikri mülkiyet alanlarında iŐ birliđini güçlendirmeyi, ASEAN-6 ile Vietnam, Laos, Kamboya ve Myanmar (kısaca, VLKM) arasındaki ekonomik geliŐmiŐlik aıđını kapatmayı ve ASEAN’ın küresel ekonomi ile bütünleŐmesini hedeflemiŐtır. Bu noktalardan hareketle, ASEAN bölgeselleŐmesinin ekonomik boyutuna iliŐkin Őu tespitler yapılabilir: (i) Ekonomik liberalleŐme ön plana ıkarılmıŐ ancak ekonomik liberalleŐmeye devlet merkezli bir anlayıŐ erevesinde vurgu yapılmıŐtır; (ii) Finansal hizmetler ve fikri mülkiyet alanında iŐ birliđini güçlendirme iradesi, ASEAN iŐ birliđinin ekonomik yeniliđi destekleyen bir nitelik kazandıđını göstermektedir. (iii) Küresel ekonomi ile bütünleŐmiŐ bir ASEAN’ın ekonomik alanda daha fazla kazanç sađlayacađı varsayılmıŐtır.

Uygulamaya baktığımızda, ekonomi aısından, ASEAN ülkeleri, 2008 ekonomik krizi ve izleyen iki yıl hari, ekonomik büyüme aısından kayda deđer ilerlemeler kaydetmiŐ ve ASEAN-6 ile VLKM arasındaki GSYİH farkı azalmıŐtır (1999’da ASEAN-6 ve VLKM arasındaki fark beŐ kat daha fazlayken bu fark 2016’da sadece 2,7 olmuŐtur). Bölgesel pazardaki tüketim mallarının çođu sıfır veya ok düşük tarifelere tabi olmuŐ dolayısıyla tüketicilerin refahı artmıŐ ve günde 1,25 doların altında yaŐayan ASEAN nüfusunun oranı 1990’da yüzde 47 olurken, bu oran 2015’te yüzde 14’ün altına düŐmüŐtür. Ortak Etkili Tercihli Tarife listesindeki ürünlerin yüzde 99’undan fazlası için tarifeler yüzde 0-5 aralıđına inmiŐ, ASEAN ii ve ASEAN dıŐı doğrudan yabancı yatırım önemli ölçüde artmıŐ ve 2015 yılında küresel ekonomideki doğrudan yabancı yatırım akıŐının yüzde altısı ASEAN bölgesinde gerekleŐmiŐtir.

Diđer yandan siyasi-güvenlik topluluđu aısından incelendiđinde, bazı üye devletlerin müdahale etmeme ilkesine öncelik vermesi nedeniyle ASEAN, Tayland ve Kamboya arasındaki Preah Vihear anlaşmazlıđında etkisiz kalmıŐtır. ASEAN, Güney Çin Denizi meselesinde anlaşmazlıđa taraf olan Çin’e karŐı davranıŐ kurallarının oluŐturulması konusunda ortak bir tavır geliŐtirmemiŐ ve tarihinde ilk kez bir ASEAN Zirvesi (9-13 Temmuz 2012 tarihlerinde Kamboya’nın başkanlıđında yapılan 45. ASEAN

Zirvesi) sonrası ortak bildiri yayımlayamamıştır. Bunun nedeni, ASEAN üye devletlerinin Güney Çin Denizi konusundaki güvenlik algılarının/kaygılarının farklı olmasıdır. Bir diğer neden, Kamboçya'nın Güney Çin Denizi konusunda ASEAN iş birliğine destek vermemesidir. Kamboçya'nın ASEAN çerçevesinde iş birliğine destek vermemesinde Çin'den aldığı ekonomik yardımlar ve yatırımlar önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Ayrıca ASEAN ülkeleri, geleneksel olmayan güvenlik tehditleriyle mücadeleye güçlü bir finansal kaynak ayırmamış ve teknik uzmanlık açısından sınırlı kapasiteye sahip olmuştur. Geleneksel olmayan güvenlik tehditleriyle mücadele sürecinde taslak planda belirtilen çevre politikalarının uyumlaştırılması ve veri paylaşımı gibi konulardaki ilerleme üye devletlerin egemenlik konusundaki hassasiyetleri nedeniyle yavaş seyretmiştir. Dolayısıyla, üye devletlerin egemenliği koruma arzusu ile siyasi-güvenlik topluluğu kurma motivasyonu arasında bir uyumsuzluk ortaya çıkmıştır.

Ekonomik topluluk hedefinde birtakım ilerlemeler sağlansa da Vietnam gibi bazı üye devletler ekonomik kaynak sıkıntısı gerekçesiyle -ekonomik topluluk planında belirtilen hedeflerin uygulanması noktasında- diğer ASEAN ülkeleriyle güçlü iş birliği tesis etmemiştir. Uyuşmazlık çözüm mekanizmasının zayıflığı nedeniyle, üye devletler kendi aralarındaki ekonomik anlaşmazlıkları ASEAN bağlamında çözmek yerine Dünya Ticaret Örgütüne götürmeyi tercih etmiştir. Tarife indirimindeki önemli gelişmelere rağmen tarife dışı engeller önemli ölçüde artmış ve ASEAN ekonomik iş birliği yenilik ve teknolojiden ziyade mal ticareti ve emek yoğun ürünler gibi ekonominin klasik unsurlarına dayanmıştır. Ayrıca, devlet dışı aktörlerin ASEAN ekonomik iş birliği sürecine katılımı sınırlı olmuş ve hizmet ticaretine ilişkin mevcut düzenlemeler yetersiz kalmıştır.

Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, siyasi-güvenlik ve ekonomik iş birliği alanında sorunlar olmakla birlikte, ASEAN bölgeselleşmesinin ekonomik boyutunun siyasi alan ile karşılaştırıldığında görece daha başarılı olduğu sonucuna ulaşmıştır. ASEAN ekonomik iş birliği, üye devletlerin ekonomik büyüme açısından kayda değer ilerlemeler kaydetmesi, tarifelerin indirilmesi ve ASEAN içi ile ASEAN dışı yabancı yatırımın artması gibi somut çıktılar elde etmesi nedeniyle, siyasi-güvenlik alanındaki iş birliği ile kıyaslandığında daha başarılı olmuştur. Hem ekonomi alanındaki somut çıktılar hem de üye devletlerin ekonomik açıdan daha fazla kazanç elde etmek istemeleri, 21. yüzyılda ASEAN bölgeselleşmesinin ekonomik temelli bir nitelik kazanmasına yol açmıştır. Çalışma, ASEAN'ın siyasi-güvenlik alanında etkisiz kalmasının nedeninin üye devletlerin ulusal güvenlik algılarının farklı olması (bazı üye devletlerin Güney Çin Denizini kendileri için önemli bir güvenlik sorunu olarak görmemesi gibi) ve müdahale etmeme ilkesi nedeniyle ASEAN'ın ikili sorunlar karşısında güçlü bir dayanışma ortaya koyamaması olduğunu göstermiştir. Ayrıca çalışmaya göre, ASEAN'ın etkisiz kalmasında üye devletlerden bağımsız kurumsal yapıların olmaması etkili olmuş ve bağımsız kurumsal yapıların kurulamamasında üye devletlerin egemenlik ve yetki devri konusundaki hassasiyetleri belirleyici olmuştur.