



MERSİN ÜNİVERSİTESİ KILIKIA ARKEOLOJİSİNİ ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
YAYINLARI
MERSIN UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH CENTER OF
CILICIAN ARCHAEOLOGY



OLBA XXXI



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OLBA XXXI

KAAM YAYINLARI

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KILIKIA ARKEOLOJİSİNİ ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
BİLİMSEL SÜRELİ YAYINI ‘OLBA’

YAYIN İLKELERİ

Amaç

Olba süreli yayını; Anadolu, Akdeniz dünyası ve ilişkili bölgelere dair orijinal sonuçlar içeren Arkeolojik çalışmalara yer verir; ‘Eski Çağ Bilimleri’ni birbirinden ayırmadan ve bir bütün olarak benimseyerek bilim dünyasına değerli çalışmalar sunmayı amaçlar.

Kapsam

Olba süreli yayını Mayıs ayında olmak üzere yılda bir kez basılır.

Yayınlanması istenilen makalelerin her yıl 31 Ağustos - 31 Ekim tarihleri arasında gönderilmiş olması gerekmektedir.

Yayın için değerlendirmeye alınacak makalelerde aşağıdaki kriterler gözetilir:

- Prehistorya, Protohistorya, Klasik Arkeoloji, Klasik Filoloji (ile Eskiçağ Dilleri ve Kültürleri), Eskiçağ Tarihi, Nüvizmatik ve Erken Hıristiyanlık Arkeolojisi (İS 7. yüzyıla kadar) alanlarında yazılmış makaleler, yayın için değerlendirmeye alınır.
- Makaleler tanıtım veya katalog niteliklerinin ötesinde, araştırma sorusuna/ problemine dayanmalı, somut kanıtlar ve tartışmalarla desteklenen, verilerin tartışıldığı ve bağlantıların kurulduğu içeriklere sahip olmalıdır. Tartışma içermeyen ve kontekstlerinden kopuk şekilde ele alınan arkeolojik malzemeler, kataloglar, buluntu raporları, derleme yazılar değerlendirmeye alınmaz.
- Olba Dergisi, Arkeoloji bilim dalını temsil eden bilimsel bir süreli yayındır. Bu sebeple, verileri farklı bilim dallarının (Harita Mühendisliği, Mimarlık, Arkeometri, Jeofizik ve Antropoloji vb.) işbirliği ile oluşturulan çalışmaların makalelerinde, arkeolojik değerlendirmenin ön planda tutulması beklenir.

Yazım Kuralları

1. a- Makaleler, Word ortamında yazılmış olmalıdır.
b- Metin 10 punto; özet, dipnot, katalog ve bibliografya 9 punto olmak üzere, Times New Roman (PC ve Macintosh) harf karakteri kullanılmalıdır.
c- Dipnotlar her sayfanın altına verilmeli ve makalenin başından sonuna kadar sayısal süreklilik izlemelidir.

d- Metin içinde bulunan ara başlıklarda, küçük harf kullanılmalı ve koyu (bold) yazılmalıdır. Bunun dışındaki seçenekler (tümünün büyük harf yazılması, alt çizgi ya da italik) kullanılmamalıdır.

2. Noktalama (tireler) işaretlerinde dikkat edilecek hususlar:

a) Metin içinde her cümlelerin ortasındaki virgülden ve sonundaki noktadan sonra bir tab boşluk bırakılmalıdır.

b) Cümle içinde veya cümle sonunda yer alan dipnot numaralarının herbirisi noktalama (nokta veya virgül) işaretlerinden önce yer almalıdır.

c) Metin içinde yer alan “fig.” ibareleri, parantez içinde verilmeli; fig. ibaresinin noktasından sonra bir tab boşluk bırakılmalı (fig. 3); ikiden fazla ardışık figür belirtiliyorsa iki rakam arasına boşluksuz kısa tire konulmalı (fig. 2-4). Ardışık değilse, sayılar arasına nokta ve bir tab boşluk bırakılmalıdır (fig. 2. 5).

d) Ayrıca bibliyografya ve kısaltmalar kısmında bir yazar, iki soyadı taşıyorsa soyadları arasında boşluk bırakmaksızın kısa tire kullanılmalıdır (Dentzer-Feydy); bir makale birden fazla yazarlı ise her yazardan sonra bir boşluk, ardından uzun tire ve yine boşluktan sonra diğer yazarın soyadı gelmelidir (Hagel – Tomaschitz).

3. “Bibliyografya ve Kısaltmalar” bölümü makalenin sonunda yer almalı, dipnotlarda kullanılan kısaltmalar, burada açıklanmalıdır. Dipnotlarda kullanılan kaynaklar kısaltma olarak verilmeli, kısaltmalarda yazar soyadı, yayın tarihi, sayfa (ve varsa levha ya da resim) sıralamasına sadık kalınmalıdır. Sadece bir kez kullanılan yayınlar için bile aynı kurala uyulmalıdır.

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Bibliyografya (makaleler için):

Corsten 1995 Corsten, Th., “Inschriften aus dem Museum von Denizli”, Ege Üniversitesi Arkeoloji Dergisi III, 215-224, lev. LIV-LVII.

Dipnot (kitaplar ve makaleler için)

Richter 1977, 162, res. 217.

Diğer Kısaltmalar:

age.	adı geçen eser
ay.	aynı yazar
vd.	ve devamı
yak.	yaklaşık
v.d.	ve diğerleri
y.dn.	yukarı dipnot
dn.	dipnot
a.dn.	aşağı dipnot
bk.	Bakınız

4. Tüm resim, çizim, tablo ve haritalar için sadece “fig.” kısaltması kullanılmalı ve figürlerin numaralandırılmasında süreklilik olmalıdır. (Levha, Resim, Çizim, Tablo, Şekil, Harita ya da bir başka ifade veya kısaltma kullanılmamalıdır).
5. Bir başka kaynaktan alıntı yapılan figürlerin sorumluluğu yazara aittir, bu sebeple kaynak belirtilmelidir.
6. Makale metninin sonunda figürler listesi yer almalıdır.
7. Metin yukarıda belirtilen formatlara uygun olmak kaydıyla 20 sayfayı geçmemelidir. Figürlerin toplamı 10 adet civarında olmalıdır.
8. Makaleler Türkçe, İngilizce veya Almanca yazılabilir. Türkçe yazılan makalelerde yaklaşık 300 kelimelik Türkçe ve İngilizce yada Almanca özet kesinlikle bulunmalıdır. İngilizce veya Almanca yazılan makalelerde ise en az 300 kelimelik Türkçe ve İngilizce veya Almanca özet bulunmalıdır. Makalenin her iki dilde de başlığı gönderilmelidir.
9. Özeti altında, Türkçe ve İngilizce veya Almanca olmak üzere altı anahtar kelime verilmelidir.
10. Metin, figürler ve figürlerin dizilimi (layout); ayrıca makale içinde kullanılan özel fontlar ‘zip’lenerek, We Transfer türünde bir program ile bilgisayar ortamında gönderilmelidir; çıktı olarak gönderilmesine gerek yoktur.
11. Figürlerde çözünürlük en az 300 dpi; format ise tif veya jpeg olmalıdır; bunlar Microsoft Word türünde başka bir programa gömülü olmamalıdır.
12. Dizilim (layout): Figürler ayrıca mail ekinde bir defada gelecek şekilde yani düşük çözünürlükte pdf olarak kaydedilerek dizilimi (layout) yapılmış şekilde yollanmalıdır.

MERSIN UNIVERSITY
'RESEARCH CENTER OF CILICIAN ARCHAEOLOGY'
JOURNAL 'OLBA'

PUBLISHING PRINCIPLES

Scope

The Journal 'Olba', being published since 1998 by the 'Research Center of Cilician Archeology' of the Mersin University (Turkey), includes original studies on Prehistory, Protohistory, Classical Archaeology, Classical Philology (and ancient languages and cultures), Ancient History, Numismatics and Early Christian Archeology (up till the 7th century AD) of Asia Minor, the Mediterranean and related regions.

Articles should present new ideas and not only have catalogues or excavation reports as their contents. The articles of archaeological studies undertaken together with other disciplines such as geophysics, archaeometry, anthropology etc should give more emphasis to the archaeological part of the work as the Journal Olba is an archaeological journal.

Olba is printed once a year in May. Articles can be sent from 31 August - 31 October each year.

Submission Criteria

1. a. Articles should be written in Word programs.
b. The text should be written in 'Times New Roman' in 10 puntos; the abstract, footnotes, catalogue and bibliography in 9 puntos (for PC and for Macintosh).
c. Footnotes should take place at the bottom of the page in continuous numbering.
d. Titles within the article should be written in small letters and be marked as bold. Other choises (big letters, underline or italic) should not be used.
2. Punctuation (hyphen) Marks:
 - a) One space should be given after the comma in the sentence and after the dot at the end of the sentence.
 - b) The footnote numbering within the sentence in the text, should take place before the comma in the sentence or before the dot at the end of the sentence.
 - c) The indication fig.:

* It should be set in brackets and one space should be given after the dot (fig. 3);

* If many figures in sequence are to be indicated, a short hyphen without space between the beginning and last numbers should be placed (fig. 2-4); if these are not in sequence, a dot and space should be given between the numbers (fig. 2. 5).

d) In the bibliography and abbreviations, if the author has two family names, a short hyphen without leaving space should be used (Dentzer-Feydy); if the article is written by two or more authors, after each author a space, a long hyphen and again a space should be left before the family name of the next author (Hagel – Tomaschitz).

3. The ‘Bibliography’ and ‘Abbreviations’ should take part at the end of the article. The ‘Abbreviations’ used in the footnotes should be explained in the ‘Bibliography’. The bibliography used in the footnotes should take place as abbreviations: Name of writer, year of publishment, page (and if used, number of the illustration). This rule should be applied even if a publishment is used only once.

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Richter 1977 Richter, G., Greek Art, New York.

Bibliography (for articles):

Corsten 1995 Corsten, Th., “Inschriften aus dem Museum von Denizli”, Ege Üniversitesi Arkeoloji Dergisi III, 215-224, pl. LIV-LVII.

Footnotes (for books and articles)

Richter 1977, 162, fig. 217.

Miscellaneous Abbreviations:

op. cit. : in the work already cited

idem : an author that has just been mentioned

ff : following pages

et al. : and others

n. : footnote

see : see

infra : see below

supra : see above

4. For all photographs, drawings and maps only the abbreviation ‘fig.’ should be used in continous numbering (remarks such as Plate, Picture, Drawing, Map or any other word or abbreviation should not be used).
5. Photographs, drawings or maps taken from other publications are in the responsibility of the writers; so the sources have to be mentioned.
6. A list of figures should take part at the end of the article.

7. The text should be within the remarked formats not more than 20 pages, the drawing and photographs 10 in number.
8. Papers may be written in Turkish, English or German. Papers written in Turkish must include an abstract of 300 words in Turkish and English or German. It will be appreciated if papers written in English or German would include a summary of 300 words in Turkish and in English or German. The title of the article should be given in two languages.
9. Six keywords should be remarked, following the abstract in Turkish and English or German.
10. Figures should be at least 300 dpi; tif or jpeg format are required; these should not be embedded in another program such as Microsoft Word.
11. The article, figures and their layout as well as special fonts should be sent by e-mail (We Transfer).
12. Layout: The figures of the layout, having lesser dpi, should be sent in pdf format.

THE ROLES OF ARTABAZUS II AND HIS FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE PERSIAN-MACEDONIAN WARS

Sevgi SARIKAYA*

ÖZ

II. Artabazos ve Aile Fertlerinin Pers-Makedon Savaşlarındaki Rollerini

Bu makalede Pharnakes hanedanlığından Artabazos ve aile bireylerinin Pers-Makedon savaşları sırasında üstlendikleri askeri ve politik rolleri incelenmektedir. Bir ailenin Pers imparatorluğundan Makedonia krallığına kadar uzanan kariyerlerindeki iniş-çıkışları ve başarıları analiz edilmiştir. Aristokrat ailelerin gerek Pers gerekse Makedon yönetim sisteminde önemli misyonları vardı ve onların sadakati sistemin devamlılığı açısından gereklidir. Bu bağlamda Artabazos ailesi özelinde aristokrat ailelerin imparatorluk sistemi içindeki işlevi ve önemi ortaya konulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Bu perspektifte dönemin önemli tarihsel olayları yeniden incelenmektedir. Bununla birlikte Rhodoslu yerel bir ailenin Pers satrabyıyla kurulan evlilik bağı sayesinde imparatorluk sistemi içerisine girişine ve politik kariyer basamaklarını nasıl tırmandığına değinilmektedir. Pers satraplıklarının idaresi için oluşturulmuş yaygın bir bürokratik sistem olmakla birlikte, satrapların emri altında memur ile kendi hane halkından oluşan bir kadro bulunmaktaydı. Bu sayede Mentor ve Memnon Troas Bölgesi'ndeki bazı kentlerin idaresi, Hellenli ücretli askerlerin komutanlığı gibi çeşitli kamusal ve askeri görevler üstlendiler. Ancak köklü bir aristokrat aileye mensup olmak bir ailenin politik başarısını garanti etmiyordu ve yapılan yanlış davranışlar ailenin bütün itibarını gözden düşürebiliyordu. Artabazos ve ailesinin kamusal kariyerlerinde üç kritik dönüm noktası bulunmaktadır. İlki, Artabazos'un Daskyleion satraplık görevi esnasında Pers kralı III. Artakserkses'e karşı başlattığı başarısız isyanın Pella'da sürgün hayatıyla sonuçlanmasıdır. Bu esnada Mentor ise Mısır'a sığınmayı tercih etmiştir. İkincisi kralın tarafına geçen Mentor'un Mısır ayaklanmasındaki başarıları sayesinde MÖ yak. 342 yılında Artabazos'un sürgün hayatının sona erdirilmesi ve tekrar Pers sitemi içerisine aile fertlerinin dahil edilmesidir. III. Dareios'un tahta geçmesiyle aile, eski itibarını kazandı ve İskender'in Perslere karşı açtığı savaşta büyük bir nüfuz elde etti. Özellikle Küçük Asya'da Memnon ve Pharnabazos, İskender'e karşı yürüttükleri deniz savaşında önemli başarılar elde ettiler. Merkez Asya'da ise Artabazos, oğulları (Arsames, Ariobarzanes, Copen) ve Thymondas üstlendikleri önemli askeri görevlerle III. Dareios'la birlikte İskender'e karşı savaşmışlardır. Üçüncü kritik durum ise III. Dareios'un ölmesiyle İskender'in tarafına geçmeleridir. Pers imparatorluğu yıkılmasına rağmen, bu defa da Makedonia krallığı içerisinde kısa süreliğine de olsa yer edinmeyi başardılar. Sadakatlarını sundukları İskender'le birlikte Baktria, Sogdiana bölgelerinde isyan eden ve direnen yerel halklarla aktif bir şekilde savaşmışlardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: II. Artabazos, Mentor, Memnon, III. Pharnabazos, Kophen, III. Dareios, Büyük İskender.

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ABSTRACT

This article deals with the military and political roles undertaken by Artabazus from the Pharnacid dynasty and by his family members during the Persian-Macedonian wars. The ups and downs and accomplishments in a family's career all the way from the Persian Empire to the Macedonian Kingdom are analyzed. Aristocratic families held important missions both in the Persian and Macedonian court hierarchy. Their loyalty was a prerequisite for the continuation of the system. Here, in the context of Artabazus' family, the function and importance of aristocratic families within the imperial system are explored. From this perspective, the notable historical events of the period are reexamined. Furthermore, the inclusion of a local Rhodian family into the imperial system through kinship to the Persian satrap by marriage and this family's climbing the steps of the political career is also mentioned. Apart from a comprehensive bureaucratic system established for the governance of the Persian satrapies, satraps also had officials and staff consisting of their relatives under their command. By this means, Mentor and Memnon assumed such public and military duties as ruling some cities in the Troad region and commanding the Greek mercenaries. But belonging to a deep-rooted aristocratic family did not guarantee political success. The wrong steps taken might mean the loss of respectability of the whole family. There are three critical turning points in the public careers of Artabazus and his family. The first is his failed revolt as the satrap of Dascylium against Persian king Artaxerxes III resulted in life in exile at Pella. Meanwhile, Mentor preferred to take refuge in Egypt. The second is Mentor's alliance with the king and his accomplishments during the Egyptian revolt, which put an end to Artabazus' exile in c. 342 BC and resulted in the rehabilitation of the family members in the Persian system. When Darius III came to the throne, the family gained its prior dignity and was highly influential in the war Alexander waged against the Persians. Particularly in Asia Minor, Memnon and Pharnabazus successfully conducted the naval battle against Alexander. In Central Asia, Artabazus, his sons (Arsames, Ariobarzanes, and Copen) and Thymondas held important positions and fought alongside Darius III against Alexander. The third critical event is their siding with Alexander after the death of Darius III. Behind them was the Persian Empire fallen apart, and this time-albeit not long-lasting- they managed to acquire a place within the Macedonian Kingdom. Alongside Alexander the Great, to whom they proclaimed their loyalty, they actively fought against the revolting and resisting local peoples in Bactria, and Sogdiana.

Keywords: Artabazus II, Mentor, Memnon, Pharnabazus III, Copen, Darius III, Alexander the Great.

Artabazus II was the son of Pharnabazus II from the Pharnacid dynasty, which inherited the satrapy of Dascylium for nearly 138 years, from c. 478 to 340? BC. Artabazus was one of the most distinguished members of the Persian aristocracy and a grandson of Artaxerxes II. In 387 BC, Pharnabazus II was recalled to the court in order to marry the king's daughter and prepare for the Egyptian campaign.¹ King thought that he could benefit from his military experience. Pharnabazus' stay at Susa increased his social and political status. He married Apama, the daughter of Artaxerxes II, and Artabazus II was born in 387/6 BC.² Pharnabazus' older son Ariobarzanes was temporarily appointed as the satrap of Dascylium.³ In 366 BC, Ariobarzanes secretly allying with Datames, the rebellious satrap of Cappadocia and Cilicia, revolted against the Persian king. After being betrayed by his eldest son Mithradates, he was captured.⁴ In 363/2 BC, Ariobarzanes was brought to Susa, and the Persian king ordered him to be executed (Harpok. *lex.* 56). Artaxerxes II appointed his own grandson Artabazus in his place. He probably assigned the task of capturing Datames to Artabazus⁵. In probably 362 BC, shortly after becoming the satrap of the Dascylium, Artabazus married the sister of Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes, who were the commanders of the Greek mercenaries.⁶ By his wife, whose name is unknown, he had eleven sons and ten daughters, including Barsine. Except for his daughters Barsine, Artacama, whom Alexander married to Ptolemy, and

1 For the Egyptian campaign, see Isoc. Paneg. IV. 140; Diod. XV. 29. 1-4; Corn. Nep. Dat. XIV. 3. 4-5; Plut. Artax. XXIV. 1. On Pharnabazus' marriage to the daughter of the Persian king Artaxerxes II see Xen. Hell. V. 1. 28; Ages. III. 3; Corn. Nep. Con. IX. 2. 1-2; Plut. Artax. XXVII. 7; Alex. XXI. 4; see also Berve 1926, no 152 (Artabazus); Weiskopf 1989, 28 n. 37; Ballesteros-Pastor 2012, 368 n. 12; Sealey 1993, 43.

2 Berve 1926, no 152; Weiskopf 1989, 55; Hornblower 1982, 173; Bosworth 1995, 118.

3 Xen. Hell. V. 1. 28; see also Weiskopf 1989, 28 f.; Beloch 1923, 146-151; Debord 1999, 96 n. 110; Klein 2015, 149-155. In ancient sources, there are no definite expressions concerning whether Ariobarzanes was the son or brother of Pharnabazus. Some modern scholars think that Ariobarzanes, who was appointed satrap after Pharnabazus was summoned to Susa in order to crush the Egyptian revolt in 387 BC, might be Pharnabazus' brother (Hornblower 1982, 173 et al.; Ruzicka 1992, 60; Buckler 2003, 352). But the possibility of such a claim to be real is low because the point which has escaped the attention of modern scholars is the existence of the appointment of the dynasty in Dascylium. This appointment became a continuous practice from 478 BC onward and was left under the authority of the Pharnacid family. Of course, the Persian king could annul the appointment of a dynasty whenever he wanted, but he did this when the satraps failed to perform their duties, did not obey the orders and rebelled against the king. But his having done such a thing, especially at a time when Pharnabazus together with Conon launched campaigns, destroyed the Spartan hegemony and reestablished the Persian authority in Asia Minor and because of his outstanding achievements he was highly appreciated and commissioned in the Egyptian campaign is contradictory (Sarıkaya 2018, 291 n. 1212).

4 Xen. Cyr. VIII. 8. 4; Aristot. Pol. 5. 1312a; Val. Max. 9. 11 ext. 2; see also Weiskopf 1989, 50.

5 In 362/1 BC, although Artabazus drew Datames' father-in-law Mithrobarzanes to his side during the Cappadocia campaign, he was heavily defeated (Diod. XV. 91. 1-7; Polyae. strat. VII. 21. 7). However, Datames shared the same fate with Ariobarzanes. In c. 361 BC, he was stabbed to death by Mithradates, whom he had considered a close friend (Corn. Nep. Dat. XIV. 10-11; Polyae. strat. VII. 29. 1).

6 Diod. XVI. 52. 4: ἦσαν γὰρ Ἀρταβάζω γεγονότες ἐκ τῆς Μέντορος καὶ Μέμνονος ἀδελφῆς υἱοὶ μὲν ἔνδεκα, θυγατέρες δὲ δέκα. Dem. Androt. XXIII. 154-157: ὁ Μέμνων καὶ ὁ Μέντωρ, οἱ κηδεσταὶ τοῦ Ἀρταβάζου, ἀνθρώποι νέοι καὶ κεχηρημένοι ἀπροσδοκῆτω εὐτυχίᾳ τῆ τοῦ Ἀρταβάζου κηδείᾳ/ "Memnon and Mentor, the sons-in-law of Artabazus, were young men enjoying unexpected good fortune by their relationship to Artabazus". See also Weiskopf 1989, 54-56.

Artonis, whom Alexander married to Eumenes of Cardia in the wedding ceremony at Susa in 324 BC⁷, and his sons Cophen, Arsames II, Ariobarzanes II, Pharnabazus III and Hystanes/Ilioneus, neither the names nor the actions of the rest of his children are known.⁸

Artabazus' family ties constitute a striking example since they illustrate the ever-increasing and improving links between the prominent Persians and the local elites. As the famous Athenian statesman and orator Demosthenes emphasized (*Androt.* XXIII. 154-157), Artabazus' marriage to the sister of Mentor and Memnon, afterward, the brothers' endogamic marriages to their niece Barsine brought Mentor and Memnon unexpected and significant privileges and positions in the imperial system. The first privileges came with their being the brothers-in-law of Artabazus, who was the Persian king's grandson and satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia: they were assigned to rule Troad, one of the sub-satrapy regions of Dascylium and some important places including, as far as is known, Lampsacus, Abydos, Scepsis, Ilion, and Cebren.⁹ From c. 360 to 340 BC, the brothers played active roles in the region. Likewise, the wives of Artabazus and Mentor profoundly influenced the elite women of Troad by their lifestyles.¹⁰

In c. 360 BC Artabazus, when he was in the second or third year of his satrap, fell out with Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia. The satrap of Dascylium was arrested for a short time by the Lydian satrap.¹¹ This is an indicator of Artabazus' having fallen from the Great King's grace because it is incompatible with the fact that in the royal administration system, a satrap who was under the authority of the Persian king and acted as his representative in the provinces could not hold another satrap captive without the king's consent. The insufficiency of the available evidence and inconsistency between the data and the flow of events render definite statements concerning this

7 Arr. VII. 4. 4-6; Phot. Bib. 91; Plut. Eum. I. 3.

8 Diod. XVI. 52. 3; Curt. V. 9. 1; VI. 5. 2; Plut. Alex. XXI. 4; Justin XV. 2. 3. for Cophen, Arsames II and Ariobarzanes II see Arr. III. 23. 7; II. 15. 1 'Cophen'; or Pharnabazus III see Arr. II. 1. 3-4; 2. 1-2; for Hystanes/Ilioneus see Curt. III. 13. 13. On the subject, see also Heckel 1987, 116; Shayegan 2007, 101.

9 Memnon's land (τῶν τοῦ Μέμνονος χωρίων), or Memnon's country (τὴν χώραν τὴν Μέμνονος) in Troad see Polyaen. strat. IV. 3. 15; Arr. I. 17. 8; see also Briant 2002, 698. We know that Artabazus II granted the rule of Scepsis, Ilion, and Cebren to the Rhodian brothers (Dem. *Androt.* XXIII. 154; see also Kahrstedt 1965², col. 964). On Memnon's authority in Lampsacus, see Ps. Aristot. *Oecon.* II. 1351b1-11. On the subject see also Ashton 2002, 14; Sarıkaya 2018, 74-76; Kholod 2018, 179; 183; Ellis-Evans 2018, 33-69.

10 When Athenaeus (*Deip.* VI. 256 c-e) mentions flattering people, among the examples he has given are also the women who were called "flatterers" (κολακίδες) in Troad from the city of Gergina/Gergithar. According to the author, some of them who were left crossed the sea and were sent to the wives of Artabazus and Mentor. Their names changed to "female ladders" (κλιμακίδες). These Troian women in order to please the wives of Mentor and Artabazus, stooped and made a ladder of themselves so that the wives could mount or dismount the cart by stepping on their backs. This was not an abjectness coming with luxury. On the contrary, it was the device of these stupid Troian women. The trend also reached Macedonia. This event must have occurred when Artabazus was at the peak of his career as the satrap of Dascylium. Therefore, when Athenaeus said 'Mentor's wife', he probably meant Mentor's first wife before Barsine.

11 Dem. *Androt.* XXIII. 154; see also Weiskopf 1989, 62; Heskell 1997, 118 f.; Briant 2002, 657; Ellis-Evans 2018, 38.

period impossible. In 359/8 BC, in the last years of Artaxerxes II Mnemon's reign, the bloody fights for the throne started among his sons. Artaxerxes III Ochus eliminated his rivals and came to the throne¹². Egypt, Phoenicia, and Cyprus taking advantage of the inner struggles within the dynasty revolted again against the Persian authority (Diod. XVI. 40. 3-5). In c. 356 BC, probably shortly after Artaxerxes III Ochus succeeded to the throne, Artabazus, not obeying the king's order concerning the disbandment of the mercenaries (Schol. Dem. IV. 19), explicitly defied him. Since his Rhodian wife's two brothers, Memnon and Mentor, were commanding the Greek mercenaries for the Persians, this was something that interested Artabazus' family members¹³. Artabazus' brothers, Oxythres and Dibictus, and the Rhodian brothers actively took sides with him giving their support until the end. Although the satrap of Dascylium, was encouraged by the Rhodian brothers and sporadically received military aid from Chares of Athens and Pammenes of Thebes, he was deplorably unsuccessful during the revolt, which lasted two or three years.¹⁴ In c. 354/3 BC while Artabazus, with his entire family, and Memnon of Rhodes, chose exile at the court of Philip II of Macedon, Mentor found refuge with the Egyptian pharaoh Nectanebo II. Philip entertained Artabazus and his family at his court in Pella, the capital of the Macedonian kingdom.¹⁵ After the revolts of Pharnabazus' sons -first Ariobarzanes, then Artabazus- the Persian king Artaxerxes III ended the appointment of the hereditary dynasty in Dascylium, which had been inherited in the Pharnacid dynasty since 478 BC. In c. 340 BC, he appointed Arsites satrap of the province of Dascylium.¹⁶

From 354/3 to 342 BC, Artabazus lived in exile at the court of Philip II in Pella for more than eleven years. He and, naturally, his children were functionally bilingual. He spoke his native tongue and Greek. The Macedonian experience enabled him to improve his Greek language and his knowledge of Greek culture. Furthermore, Artabazus and Memnon, who accompanied him in exile, obtained important military information concerning the Macedonian court. It is highly likely that they also shared some crucial information about the Persian administration with Philip. In c. 342 BC, Artabazus and his family's exile ended thanks to Mentor of Rhodes. Mentor had betrayed Nectanebo, the king of Egypt, and thus paved the way for Artaxerxes III to reconquer Sidon in

12 Plut. Artax. XXX. 1-5; Curt. X. 5. 23; Justin X. 3. 1; Val. Max. IV. 2. 7; Sarıkaya 2021, 297-302.

13 Schol. Dem. IV. 19: βασιλέως τοῦ Περσῶν ἐπιστεῖλαντος τοῖς ἐπὶ θαλάσσης σατραπείαις διαλύσαι τὰ μισθοφορικὰ στρατεύματα διὰ τὸ πολλὰ χρήματα καταναλώσασθαι¹³ "The king of the Persians sent an order to the coastal satraps to disband their mercenary armies, on the grounds of the enormous expenses they were incurring". See Briant 2002, 791-792; see also Ruzicka 2012, 155 ff.; Klein 2015, 175-177.

14 For detailed information, see Sarıkaya 2018, 307-315.

15 Diod. XVI. 52. 3; Curt. V. 9. 1; VI. 5. 2; Ath. Deip. VI. 256c-e; see also Berve 1926, 82 no 152; McCoy 1989, 422; Buckler 1989a, 53 n. 33; 1989b, 161 n. 30; Hammond – Griffith 1979, 309; Hammond 1994, 130; Briant 2002, 688; Olbrycht 2010, 346; Biagetti 2015, 27-41; Kholod 2018, 180. According to Briant (2002, 687), Artabazus chose Macedon as a place to settle partly for its proximity to a region near the border of his satrapy and to find a structure and way of life among the local aristocracy in Macedon rather like that to which he was accustomed.

16 Paus. I. 29. 10; Arr. I. 12. 8: Ἀρσίτης ὁ τῆς πρὸς Ἑλλησπόντῳ Φρυγίας ὑπαρχος; see also Sarıkaya 2018, 314 f. Arsites was a satrap of Daskyleion between 340 and 334 BC. It is difficult to know whether he immediately replaced Artabazus or someone else provided the interim during this decade.

Phoenicia and then Babylon.¹⁷ Nectanebo employed nearly 20,000 Greek mercenaries, but he had lost the collaboration of Mentor, one of the best mercenary commanders. Mentor not only joined the Persian side at the time of the suppression of the Sidonian revolt (345 BC) but also played an important role in the Egyptian campaign. He held a high command position with Bagoas during Artaxerxes' invasion of Egypt. Artaxerxes III received reinforcing armies for this campaign -3000 men from Argos, 1000 from Thebes, 6000 from Asia Minor- and weakened Nectanebo's military force.¹⁸ In 343/2 BC, he had (re)conquered Egypt, put it under Persian control again, and appointed a new satrap (Diod. XVI. 46. 4-7; 51). The king saw that Mentor the general had performed great services for him in the war against the Phoenicians and Egyptians.¹⁹ He honoured Mentor's heroic actions by giving him 100 silver talents and the best of expensive jewelry (Diod. XVI. 52. 1-2). Besides, he appointed Mentor the supreme command -a kind of *karanos*- of the Asia Minor coasts to deal with the rebels in the area.²⁰ The insurgent satraps and especially the Egyptian revolt, to which the king had been directing all his attention and military power rendered the Persian control in the coastal cities of Asia Minor ineffective. Consequently, as in the example of Hermias, tyrant of Atarneus, the city tyrants expanded their own rule in defiance of the Persian authority and some cities sought to solve the various crisis created by the revolt among themselves.²¹ On the other hand, as it is understood by the examples of Artabazus, the former satrap of Dascylium, Hermias of Atarneus and Pixodarus of Caria, Philip II attempted to gain the friendship

17 Chronicle of Artaxerxes III 9 lines. 1-8 (Grayson 1975, 114-115 and, transl.): The fourteenth [year] (= 343 BC) of Umasu, who is called Artaxerxes (III): In the month Tishri (= September/October) the prisoners which the king took [from] Sidon [were brought] to Babylon and Susa. On the thirteenth day of the same month a few of these troops entered Babylon. On the sixteenth day the ... women, prisoners from Sidon, who the king sent to Babylon -on that day they entered the palace of the king. See also Brosius 2021, 174-175.

18 Diod. XVI. 44. 1-3; 46. 4; Isoc. Paneg. IV. 161; Dem. Phil. X. 34; XII. 6; Didy. Dem. col. 8. 9-11; see also Hammond 1994, 166; Olbrycht 2010, 349 n. 35; Ruzicka 2012, 177-183. While the Athenians and Spartans reconfirmed their friendship with the Great King, they refused to send troops to Egypt.

19 In the inscription dated to 327/6 BC and called the honorary decree of Memnon of Rhodes, the Athenians mention the favours Pharnabazus, his son Artabazus and Mentor did to their city. They honoured Mentor because he had protected the Greeks in the Egyptian campaign. Pharnabazus showed Athens his benevolence by giving money and support to Conon for the fortification of the walls of Piraeus (IG II² 356 str. 24-37= Rhodes-Osborne 2007, 506-508 no 98): [πρ]ότερον οἱ π[ρ]όγονοι [Φα]||[ρν]||ά[β]αζος καὶ Ἀρ[τά]βαζος[ς] | [δι]ετέλουν τὸν δῆμον [τὸν] | [Ἀθ]ηναίων εὐεργετοῦν[τε]||ς καὶ χρήσιμοι ὄντες ἐν [τ]||οἷς πολέμοις τῶι δῆμωι· [κ]||[αι] ὁ πατὴρ Θυμῶνδου Μέ[ντ]||[ω]ρ τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτωι στρ[α]||[τ]ευομένους τῶν Ἑλλήνων | [ἔ]σωισεν, ὅτε ἦλω [Α]||[γ]υπτ[ο]||[ς] ὑπὸ Περσῶν ἐπανέσσει [μ]||[ε]ν αὐτὸν καὶ στεφανῶσαι [χ]||[ρ]υσῶι στε[φ]άν[ωι] ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα "previously his forebears Pharnabazus and Artabazus continued to act well to the people of Athens and were useful to the people in the wars; and Mentor, the father of Thymondas saved those of the Greeks who were campaigning in Egypt, when Egypt was taken by the Persians: Praise him and crown him with a golden crown for his goodness". For detailed information on the Egyptian revolt see Briant 2002, 682-688; see also Debord 1999, 419; Harding 2006, 147-150; Ruzicka 2012, 165-176; 179-198; Sarıkaya 2018, 315-316.

20 Diod. XVI. 50. 7: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Μέντωρ ἐν τοῖς παραθαλαττίοις μέρεσι τῆς Ἀσίας ἡγεμὼν μέγιστος ἀποδειχθεὶς; XVI. 52. 2-3: ἀπέδειξε δὲ σατράπην τῆς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν παραλίας καὶ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς ἀφερσηκότας πόλεμον ἐπέτρεπεν, αὐτοκράτορα στρατηγὸν ἀποδείξας. See also McCoy 1989, 422 vd.; Kholod 2018, 181 f.

21 I.Erythrai no 9; Rhodes-Osborne 2007, 344-345 no 68.

and alliance of Asia Minor's Persian governors.²² Sometimes he supported them against the Great King, sometimes he instigated them to rebel, and sometimes he tried to establish a marriage connection - as the marriage attempt between Pixodarus' daughter and his son Arrhidaeus.²³ Mentor, trusting his credibility in the eye of the king, requested Artaxerxes III to dismiss the charges against his brother Memnon and his brother-in-law Artabazus, who were then at Philip's court, and to permit them to return with their families. His request was accepted (Diod. XVI. 52. 1-4). This was quite a serious concession but was not something against the Persian royal traditions. The Persians were inclined to show mercy, honour, and benevolence to their enemies. From the beginning, Cyrus the Great, the founder of the kingdom, had based his conquest strategy not on exterminating his rivals but on suppressing and subduing them. To respect the enemy king and his sons were among the royal customs of the Persians. In some cases, they even left the administration of the territory which was included in their sovereignty to its prior king. However, when these people attempted to revolt, they were killed and their sons were appointed (Hdt. III. 15).²⁴ The same rule applied to the high officials who misused their authority in the Persian empire.

In c. 342 BC when Mentor came to Asia Minor, he married Barsine, Artabazus' daughter and his niece. It was not a love match but a political union, which was founded to restore the respectability of the Pharnacid dynasty and to protect his own personal relations. We encounter the same type of marriage this time in 336 BC. Philip II married his daughter Cleopatra by Olympias to her uncle by her mother's side, Alexander, the king of Epirus.²⁵ After Mentor married Barsine, he promoted the sons of his brother-in-law and also father-in-law Artabazus, giving them positions of the most significant distinction within the armed forces.²⁶ As it is understood from his further tasks, Pharnabazus was definitely among these nephews, whose names are not mentioned. It is also clear that this was Mentor's second marriage.²⁷ In the

22 Hornblower 1982, 218-222; see also Olbrycht 2010, 347; Sarıkaya 2018, 317-318.

23 According to the narration of Plutarch (Alex. X. 1-4), Pixodarus, the satrap of Caria, wanted to give his eldest daughter in marriage to Arrhidaeus, the son of Philip. But Alexander intervened. Outside his father's knowledge, he secretly asked for her hand and thus prevented his brother's marriage. Philip was furious and sent Alexander and his friends, including Harpalus, Ptolemy, Erigyus and Nearchus to exile.

24 Cyrus spared Astyages' life and granted him a princely style of life (Hdt. I. 130). According to Justin (I. 6. 16), Cyrus acted towards him the part rather of a grandson than of a conqueror, making him ruler of the powerful nation of the Hyracanians, for he was unwilling to return to the Medes. He took Croesus to Persis and employed him as one of his counselors (Hdt. I. 153; 155; 207-208). He allocated the city of Barene near Ecbatana to him (FGrHist III C 1 688 F 9 (5) 'Ktesias'= Phot. Bib. 72. 36b; Justin I. 7. 3-10). Cambyses sent Psammenitus III, who was taken captive in the Egyptian campaign, to Susa with 6000 people of his own choosing and treated him honourably (Hdt. III. 10-15; see also FGrHist III C 1 609 F 2 (50) 'Manetho'; 688 F 13 (9-11) 'Ktesias'= Phot. Bib. 72. 37a; see also Sarıkaya 2021, 173 f.).

25 Thus Philip II intended to eliminate any possible conflicts between the two states (Justin IX. 6. 1; 7. 7; XIII. 6. 4; Diod. XVI. 91. 4-93. 2). Cleopatra gave birth to a daughter, Cadmeia and a son, Neoptolemus.

26 Diod. XVI. 52. 4: ψυχαγωγούμενος δ' ἐπὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν τέκνων ὁ Μέντωρ προήγε τοὺς παῖδας, παραδιδούς αὐτοῖς τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας ἐν τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς ἡγεμονίαις. On the subject see also Berve 1926, II no 152; McCoy 1989, 422-423; Briant 2002, 353; 782.

27 K. J. Beloch (1923, 123) remarked that Mentor's first wife might have died, or he might have separated from her.

epigraphic record and the ancient sources, Mentor's son Thymondas is documented.²⁸ Thymondas' age proves that he cannot be Barsine's son.²⁹ When Barsine returns from Macedonia, she is probably 14 or 15 years old and has just reached the age of marriage. When we take Barsine's stay in Macedonia, her being very young and during this time Mentor played an active role in the Egyptian revolt into consideration, it is impossible for them to meet before c. 342 BC. To suppose that Thymondas was born after this marriage is to accept that in 333 BC the command of the Greek mercenary forces in Issus was given to just a nine-year-old child and that is unreasonable. According to modern authors, Thymondas was born in c. 355 or 353 BC.³⁰ However, Barsine's marriage to Mentor lasted nearly four years, and she gave birth to three daughters (Curt. III. 13. 14); one of them became the wife of Nearchus of Crete (Arr. VII. 4. 2-7).

Not much is known about what Artabazus and Memnon did after returning. Artaxerxes III did not commission Artabazus as satrap, Arsites continued his task as the satrap of Dascylium. While Memnon stayed in Troad, Artabazus might have returned to Persia. However, Artabazus and Memnon had brought beneficial, first-hand information to the king regarding Macedonian king Philip's plans and power. During this flow of information, they might have notified the king of the secret alliance between Philip and Hermias³¹. Mentor of Rhodes together with his nephews, whom he had granted important positions, made his first military assault in Asia Minor on Hermias, tyrant of Atarneus (Dikili), who had revolted from the king and seized many cities -in particular Assus- and fortresses. Hermias trusted his close friendship and alliance with Philip II and believed that one day Philip would capture Asia. Therefore, rather than being subjected to the Persian king, he behaved as if he was independent of him.³² In c. 341 BC, Hermias was accused of treason. The allegations were that he knew all the plans of Philip against the king and was secretly aiding and abetting him.³³ Famous philosopher Aristotle had written letters to Mentor to persuade him to take sides with Philip II.³⁴ However, Mentor promised Hermias that he would persuade the Persian king to drop the charges against him. He deceived the tyrant, arrested Hermias, and then sent him to the king. In the same year, Hermias was tortured and executed.³⁵ According to Strabo (XIII. 1. 57 c. 610), it was Memnon who arrested

28 IG II² 356 lines 24-37; Arr. II. 2. 2; 13. 2; Curt. III. 3. 1. On Memnon decree, see also Rung 2016, 51-58.

29 See also Beloch 1923, 123.

30 Considering Demosthenes' information (XXIII. 157) about Mentor and Memnon's ages "ἄνθρωποι νέοι" and Curtius' (III. 3. 1) portrayal of Thymondas in 334/3 BC "impiger iuvenis: an energetic young man" his year of birth might be 355 BC (Berve 1926, II 182 no 380; see also Atkinson 1980, 114-115; Heckel 2006, 267; Bosworth 1988, 183). K. J. Beloch (1923, 123) says he was born in 353 BC at the latest.

31 On the subject, see also Hammond-Griffith 1979, 521.

32 Hammond-Griffith 1979, 519 f.

33 Dem. Phil. X. 32 'He calls Hermias 'Philip's confidant and agent who was privy to all his schemes against the king of Persia'; Schol. Dem. X. 32 (202); Didym. Dem. col. 6. 16-45; 55-60; see also Hammond-Griffith 1979, 519 n. 3.

34 Diog. Laert. V. 27 [144]: 'Ἐπιστολαὶ πρὸς Μέντορα α': Letters. To Mentor, one. On the subject see also Zoepffel 2006, 622-623; Olbrycht 2010, 347-348; Takmer 2016, 453; 482-483.

35 Dem. Phil. X. 32; Didym. Dem. col. 6. 50-65; Diod. XVI. 52. 4-8; Diog. Laert. V. 6; Polyæn. strat. VI. 48. 1; FGrHist II B 115 F 291 'Theopompos' = Didym. Dem. IX col. 4. 48-5. 63; see also (Ps.) Aristot. Oecon. II. 28 [1351a]; PHerc. 1018 col. II. 5. Strabon (XIII. 1. 57 c. 610) here mentions not Mentor but Memnon. Pub. Ovidius Naso (315-320).

Hermias by inviting him, pretending to be a friend and showing false hospitality. We can infer from this statement that Memnon collaborated with his brother Mentor during these military operations.³⁶ Mentor continued his military activities at full speed in Asia Minor. He subdued all the leaders (*hegemones*) who were at odds with the Persians, sometimes by force or stratagem.³⁷ Furthermore, in 340 BC he must have been instrumental in Philip's ending his siege of Perinthus (Marmara Ereğlisi). Because Artaxerxes III had ordered all the Asia Minor satraps –especially Dascylium and Sardis satraps- and commanders to assist Perinthus and Byzantium as much as possible.³⁸ Since c. 342 BC, Mentor had been the supreme commander (Diod. XVI. 52. 2-3: αὐτοκράτορα στρατηγὸν) in Asia Minor and he was responsible for obeying the king's order. Recruiting mercenaries from Greece and sending them to Artaxerxes III were among his principal duties. In the course of his activities administering all his duties courageously and loyally, he did great service to the king (Diod. XVI. 50. 7). However, not much is known about Mentor's later activities and his end. In 338 BC, Artaxerxes III was killed by eunuch Bagoas by poison with the help of a physician.³⁹ It seems that the skillful commander Mentor also died in the same year⁴⁰ because he is not mentioned in the ancient sources concerning Philip II's Asia Minor expedition commanded by Attalus, Parmenion, and Amyntas in the spring of 336 BC.⁴¹

In accordance with the tradition of the endogamic marriage, whose purpose was to secure the sovereignty of the Pharnacid dynasty, while the widow Barsine was still in mourning for her husband, she married her other uncle.⁴² Artabazus had nine more daughters, but the Persian royal custom was in question here. As it is known from Herodotus' narration (III. 88), Cyrus the Great's daughter Atossa first married Cambyses, after his death she married his brother Smerdis or, more accurately, following the tradition she had to marry him. However, it is also known that this was Memnon's second marriage, as was Mentor's. Because in 334 BC, Memnon had participated in the battle of Granicus with his sons (Arr. I. 15. 2: Μέμνωνος παῖδες καὶ αὐτὸς Μέμνων). When Memnon found refuge at Philip's court in Pella, he probably

36 Chandler 1995, 55.

37 Diod. XVI. 52. 4-8. On the subject, see also Hammond-Griffith 1979, 522 n. 6; Briant 2002, 688-690; Debord 1999, 419; Harding 2006, 124; Olbrycht 2010, 348; Sarikaya 2018, 318-320.

38 Diod. XVI. 75. 1-2; Paus. XXIX. 10; see also Hammond 1991, 506; Briant 2002, 689 f.; Bosworth 2005, 33.

For detailed information about the siege of Perinthus and Byzantium, see Hammond-Griffith 1979, 566-581; Hammond 1994, 133-135; Cawkwell 1996, 99; Worthington 2008, 132-135; Arslan 2010, 180-200; Sarikaya 2018, 321-324.

39 Babylonian solar eclipse tablet (Kuhrt 2007 II, 423 no. 1): *Month Ululu* [26 August to 25 September 338] *Umakush* [Akkadian Umakush= Greek Ochus] (went to his) *fate; Arshu, his son, sat on the throne*. For another fragmentary Babylonian tablet, see Kuhrt 2007 II, 424 no 2: On this tablet, there is the expression Artaxerxes III, "*Umasu called as Artakshatsu*". As Diodorus (XV. 93. 1) relates, when Ochus came to the throne he changed his name as Artaxerxes. Diod. XVII. 5. 3-6; Ael. *Var.* VI. 8; Arr. II. 14. 5; *Oxyrh. Pap.* XII *col.* 2 lines. 11-17= *FGrHist* II B 255 (4).

40 For the supposition that Mentor died before 336 BC, see also Badian 2000, 254. For the claim that Mentor died in c. 340 BC, see Kahrstedt 1965² b, 965; Kholod 2018, 183 n. 16.

41 Diod. XVI. 91. 2; 92. 3-4; XVII. 2. 4; 7. 7; Justin IX. 5. 8-9; also Polyae. *strat.* V. 44; Paus. VIII. 7. 6; see also Hammond 1994, 168.

42 Arr. VII. 4. 6; Plut. *Alex.* XXI. 8.

brought his first wife and children with him. Barsine bore Memnon a son. In 333 BC, when the son was captured at Damascus with her mother, he was just a child (Curt. III. 13. 14). After Mentor's death, the whole rule of Troad was handed over to Memnon of Rhodes with the permission of the king.⁴³ Consequently, Barsine must have continued living in the house allocated to her by her ex-husband. When Artabazus and his family members, the Rhodian brothers, revolted against Artaxerxes III, they fell out of favour with the king and shook his confidence. Although Mentor regained the Great King's trust through his actions in Egypt, the same does not seem to have applied to Artabazus and Memnon. Artaxerxes III remained cautious and kept his distance. Since there is not enough evidence, we do not know whether this situation changed or not during the reign of Artaxerxes IV (338-336 BC). However, when Darius III came to the throne, Artabazus proved his loyalty and obedience. If Curtius' citation is accurate (V. 9. 1), thanks to his oldest friendship and companionship with Darius III (*Artabazus vetustissimus amicorum*), he might have contacted with the king and restored his damaged credibility. It is certain that their friendship started before Artabazus was appointed satrap of Dascylium when he was in Persis. While Pharnabazus stayed with Memnon, Artabazus, his other sons, and Thymondas might have gone to the king's side in Persis. Artabazus and the adult men of the family performed important tasks under the service of Darius III.⁴⁴ Although Mentor was not at first charged with the task of supreme commanding, a vacancy due to Mentor's death, because of his military experience and familiarity with the region, he became the commander of an army consisting of nearly 5000 soldiers.⁴⁵ Memnon used the information he had acquired during his exile in Pella about the Macedonians in Asia Minor against the Macedonian expeditionary force of 10,000 soldiers commanded by Attalus and Parmenion. But this situation also caused the Persians to be in doubt and not trust him. In the summer of 336 BC, Macedonians were successfully proceeding. In 335 BC, Memnon, with a small army of mercenaries the king had given under his command, brought this marching to a halt. He took Lampsacus (Lapseki)⁴⁶ and defeated the Macedonians near Magnesia. He caught the Macedonian army unprepared, inflicted a heavy defeat on them, and took many captives.⁴⁷ Next year, crossing Mount Ida (Kaz Dağı) and moving northwards, he organized an unexpected attack on Cyzicus. To take the city was a matter of time. He had his soldiers wear Macedonian caps. When the people of Cyzicus observing from the city walls saw them, they supposed that Chalcus the Macedonian, their friend and ally, was coming with his men. When they were about to open the city gates, they realized that it was a trick. Memnon could not take the city but he plundered its territory and collected much booty.⁴⁸ While Memnon was thus occupied, Parmenion took the city of Gryneium (Temaşalık) by storm and sold its inhabitants as slaves.

43 According to Polyaeus (strat. IV. 3. 15), when Alexander reached Asia and learned that the Persians suspected Memnon, he sent some part of the army to the region where Memnon's estate was located. He ordered his soldiers to burn and destroy everything without damaging Memnon's belongings and properties (τῶν τοῦ Μένωνος χωρίων). See also Strab. XIII. 1. 11; Arr. I. 17. 8.

44 Curt. III. 13. 13; V. 9. 1; VI. 5. 2; Arr. III. 23. 6; see also Briant 2002, 782.

45 Diod. XVII. 7. 2-3; Polyaeus (strat. V. 44. 4) refers to Memnon's 4000 troops.

46 Ps. Aristot. Oecon. II. 29a [1351b]; Bosworth 1980b, 108; McCoy 1989, 424; Ashton 2002, 14-15.

47 Polyaeus. strat. V. 44. 4; see also Bosworth 2005, 51-52.

48 Diod. XVII. 7. 8; Polyaeus. strat. V. 44. 5.

When he besieged Pitane (Çandarlı), Memnon came with his army and forced the Macedonians to lift the siege. Later, he made the Macedonian force commanded by Calas, which he fought against at Troad, withdraw to Rhoeteum.⁴⁹ With the support of Memnon, Ephesus had taken out of Macedonian control, and pro-Persian tyrants were re-established in the city, supported by Memnon.⁵⁰ At the beginning of 334 BC, as it seems, only Abydos was in Macedonian hands.⁵¹

In 334 BC Memnon, the son-in-law of Artabazus, continued to play a key role in the defence of Darius III's rule against the assaults of Alexander in Western Anatolia. He commanded the army he had mustered in his own land, Troad. Memnon participated in the battle of Granicus with his own cavalry forces -among them were his sons- lining up the left wing.⁵² In the war council at Zeleia (Sarıköy), the Persian satraps' rejection of Memnon's proposal is thought to have been one of the reasons of their defeat at the battle of Granicus. Memnon suggested the systematic destruction of all supplies in the way of the Macedonian army instead of an immediate fight. As the ancient authors pointed out, this method could have been highly effective. However, Arsites, the satrap of Dascylium, preferred fighting immediately rather than damaging the harvest.⁵³ The Persians thought that because of the honour he had received from the king, Memnon deliberately wanted to prolong the war, therefore, they distrusted him.⁵⁴ The Persians suffered a definite and heavy defeat and the commanders who had remained alive dispersed.⁵⁵ After the surrender of Sardis, Memnon and his sons and other Persian survivors of the Granicus battle fled first to Miletus (Diod. XVII. 22. 1). The lives of Barsine and her children were in danger. Following the battle of Granicus, Alexander the Great stayed for a short time in Sardis. While he was moving towards Ephesus with his main force, he sent Calas, whom he appointed satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. I. 17. 1), and Alexander, son of Aeropus, with some part of the army consisting of Peloponnesian and allied soldiers northward in order to seize Memnon's untouched country in Troad.⁵⁶ These regions suddenly and with incredible velocity had gone out of Persian rule. Memnon

49 Diod. XVII. 7. 10; see also Anson 1989, 46-49; Bosworth 2005, 52; Ashley 1998, 160-162; Panovski – Sarakinski 2011, 7-9; Sarıkaya 2018, 328-330; Rop 2019, 184.

50 Arr. I. 17. 10-11; see also Bosworth 2005, 52 n. 31; Briant 2002, 817.

51 Arr. I. 11. 6; see also Briant 2002, 817.

52 Arr. I. 15. 2; 12. 8-10; Diod. XVII. 19. 4-5.

53 Diod. XVII. 18. 2; Arr. I. 12. 9. Referring to Xenophon's narration (Cyr. VIII. 6. 5-7), among the instructions Cyrus the Great gave to the satraps he appointed is: the territory of the regions they govern shall not be damaged. Cyrus ordered them to behave the inhabitants as they behaved, to train cavalrymen and charioteers, and to protect the lands of the people under their rule against any kind of harm. These principles still prevail in the Persian country.

54 Arr. I. 12. 9-10: *καὶ τοὺς Πέρσας Ἀρσίτη προσθέσθαι, ὅτι καὶ ὑποπτόν τι αὐτοῖς ἦν ἐς τὸν Μέμνονα τριβᾶς ἐμποιεῖν ἐκόντα τῷ πολέμῳ τῆς ἐκ βασιλείως τιμῆς οὐνεκα*. Concerning to the subject see also Rop 2019, 186, n. 43.

55 For the battle of Granicus, see also Badian 1977, 271-293; Devine 1988, 3-20; Ashley 1998, 187-202; Bosworth 1980b, 111-127; 2005, 53-62.

56 Referring to Arrian' (I. 17. 8) narrative, Alexander, who came to Sardis after the battle of Granicus, appointed Asandrus, son of Philotas, satrap here. He sent Calas, who was installed as satrap of Hellespontus Phrygia (I. 17. 1) and Alexander, son of Aeropus, with a considerable part of the Peloponnesian and allied forces to Memnon's country.

decided that the royal capital would be the safest place for his family. According to Diodorus' narration (XVII. 23. 5), after Alexander seized Miletus⁵⁷, Memnon sent his wife Barsine and his children to the Persian king Darius. Probably Pharnabazus' wife and children went with them as well. By leaving his family in the king's care, Memnon was planning to ensure their safety and by giving the king his family as hostages, he was trying to win the king's confidence and take over the post of supreme command. His father-in-law, Artabazus, who was in Susa, must have supported him with his advice to the king. Memnon's military experience and Artabazus' advice and support were important factors in Memnon's appointment as supreme commander. Another reason was that many Persian commanders had lost their lives at the battle of Granicus and there were few people trustable for the task.⁵⁸ Darius III, sending a letter, left all the Aegean coast and the fleet under the supreme command of him. Memnon received the news of promotion when he was in Halicarnassus.⁵⁹ After the capture of Miletus, the greater part of the Persians and mercenaries had gathered in Halicarnassus (Diod. XVII. 23. 4). Memnon made all the necessary preparations against a possible siege, fortified the walls and blocked the entrance to the harbours with triremes (Arr. I. 20. 2-3). Alexander intensified the siege at first around the city of Myndus, and when he failed, he started to besiege Halicarnassus again (Arr. I. 20. 5-7). Since he encountered a strong defence and resistance, he came on the verge of losing the battle. But although the Persian units commanded by Athenian mercenary commanders, Ephialtes and Thrasybulus, inflicted heavy losses on the siege towers before the bastion, they could not succeed. Seeing that the number of casualties was increasing, Memnon consulted with Orontobates, the satrap of Caria, and decided to abandon the defence. At night after setting fire to the arsenals of munitions and to the great tower on the walls, he retreated with his men to the citadels of Salmacis and Zephyrium. A considerable part of the fleet and some part of the provisions were transferred to the island of Cos (İstanköy) (Diod. XVII. 27. 1-6). Alexander did not dare to siege the citadels, he left a small garrison there.⁶⁰ Memnon kept Halicarnassus, and it remained as the military base of the Persian forces until early 332 BC.

57 When Hegesistratus, the garrison commander of Miletus, whom Darius trusted most, learned that the Persian fleet was a couple of days distance, he decided to resist the Macedonians (Arr. I. 18. 4; Diod. XVII. 22. 1). But Alexander's fleet came earlier, and occupying the offshore island of Lade prevented the Persians from entering Miletus. The Persian fleet, which had to anchor under the foothills of Mycale, could not assist the Milesians during the siege, and the city surrendered to Alexander (Arr. I. 18. 3-9; 19. 1-11; Diod. XVII. 22. 1-5; Plut. Alex. XVII. 1).

58 Persian commanders there fell: Niphates, Petenes, Spithridates, the satrap of Lydia, Mithridates, the Cappadocian hyparch, Mithridates, son-in-law of Darius, Arbupales, son of Darius who was a son of Artaxerxes II, Pharnaces, brother of Darius' wife, and Omares, commander of the mercenaries. Arsites fled from the battle into Hellenistic Phrygia, but there he died by his own hand (Arr. I. 16. 3).

59 Diod. XVII. 23. 6 'οὗτος παραλαβὼν τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμονίαν'; Arr. I. 20. 3 'ἤδη ἀποδεδειγμένος πρὸς Δαρείου τῆς τε κάτω Ἀσίας καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ παντὸς ἡγεμών'; see also Ruzicka 1988, 131-132; Bosworth 2005, 63-65.

60 Diod. XVII. 23-27; Arr. I. 20-23; Curt. V. 2. 5; see also Bosworth 1980b, 143-151; 2005, 66-68; Atkinson 1980, 94; Rop 2019, 196-200; Heckel 2020, 64-69.

When Alexander reached Celaenae, Memnon had gathered a big part of his dispersed army. He was planning to distract Alexander by turning the direction of the war from Asia to Macedonia and Greece.⁶¹ Many Greek cities were pleased with Memnon's successes, they were hopeful and ready to revolt against Alexander. The rumours -he would cross Euboea and from Greece he would attack Macedonia- accelerated the expectations. The Cyclades' islands sent envoys to Memnon and the Spartans openly expressed their support (Diod. XVII. 29. 3; 31. 3). Darius III appointed Memnon the commander-in-chief of the whole navy and all the coast.⁶² He provided a considerable amount of money for war expenditures. Memnon raised a large army consisting of mercenaries and set sail with his fleet of 300 ships. Attacking less protected coastal cities, like Lampsacus and islands he captured them. Since Alexander had disbanded the naval force in 334 BC after the fall of Miletus,⁶³ the Macedonians did not have enough ships to protect these places. The dissensions in the cities also helped Memnon. The people who had attained wealth and power under the Persian sovereignty preferred the Persian authority to the so-called liberation Alexander had brought to the cities. Therefore, Athenagoras and Apollonides opened the Chios' gates to Memnon. The city was taken and a garrison was established.⁶⁴ Memnon sailing from Chios towards Lesbos occupied Antissa and Metymna and Pyrrha and Eresus without a blow.⁶⁵ He appointed Aristonicus tyrant of Methymna (Curt. IV. 5. 19).⁶⁶ He commissioned Eurysilaus and Agonippus, two old tyrants, as the administrators of Eresus.⁶⁷ He occupied the whole

61 Diod. XVII. 30. 1; 31. 3; Arr. II. 1. 1. See Cawkwell 2005, 206-207.

62 Diod. XVII. 29. 1-2: τῷ Μέμμωνι καὶ τοῦ πολέμου παντὸς ἀπέδειξε στρατηγόν; Arr. II. 1. 1: Μέμμων τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ παντὸς ἡγεμὼν ἐκ βασιλείῳ Δαρείου καθεστηκὸς καὶ τῆς παραλίῳ ξυμπάσης.

63 Alexander observed that his fleet was ineffective in the open sea and could not compete with the Persian naval force. Therefore, instead of building new ships, he dispersed the whole fleet leaving only a small fleet of vessels used for carrying a load (Arr. I. 20. 1; Diod. XVII. 22. 5-23. 3; Bosworth 1980a, 141-143; 2005, 66).

64 Arr. II. 1. 1-2; Diod. XVII. 29. 2; 31. 3.

65 Diod. XVII. 29. 2; 31. 3; Arr. II. 1; see also Bosworth 1980b, 178-180; Ruzicka 1988, 133; Briant 2002, 826-827.

66 Memnon had friendly relations with the prominent people of Methymna, which had been started by his father. When Chares besieged Aristonymus in the city, Memnon sent an embassy to him, asking him to desist from any further hostilities against Aristonymus, who was his father's friend and ally (Polyaen. strat. V. 44. 3).

67 IG XII. 2. 526; OGIS 8; Heisserer 1980, 27-78; Rhodes - Osborne 2003, 406 no 83; see also Bosworth 1980b, 178-180; Lott 1996, 26-40; Wallace 2016, 239-258. These two tyrants were condemned to death by Alexander and the city. Eurysilaus was accused of seizing the citizens' arms, their daughters and wives on the acropolis, plundering and burning its temples, and the dead, and exacting 2.300 staters, etc. (IG XII. 2. 526 b.1 lines 1-14: [παρ]ήλετο τὰ ὄπλα καὶ | [ἐξ]εκλάισε ἐκ τῆς [πόλι]ος πανδάμι, ται[ς] | [δὲ] γύναικας καὶ ται[ς] | [θ]υγάτερας συλλάβ[ων] | [ἦ]ρξε εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπ[ολι]ν καὶ εἰσέπραξε | δισχίλιους καὶ τρι[α]κοσίους στάτηρα<ς>, τὰν | δὲ πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἱερά [δι]α[ρ]πάσαις μετὰ τῶν | [λ]αίستان ἐπέκλεισε | [κ]αὶ συνατέκασε | σώματα τῶν πολί[ταν]). Agonippus was accused of destroying altars erected to Zeus Philippios, making war on Alexander and the Greeks, and slandering the citizens of Eresus to Alexander, seizing their arms and shutting them all out of the city, and arresting their women and daughters and confining them in the acropolis, and exacting 3.200 staters, etc. (IG XII. 2. 526 a lines 4-11: [τοι]ς Ἑλλανασι εἰλαίε[το] καὶ τοῖσι βώμοισι ἀνέ[σ]καψε τῷ Δίῳ τῷ [Φι]λιππί[ω], καὶ πόλεμον ἐξε[ν]ήκαμενος πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τοῖσι Ἑλλανασι | τοῖσι μὲν πολιταῖσι παρελόμενος τὰ ὄπλα ἐξεκλάισε ἐκ τῆς πόλιος [πα]νδάμι, ται[ς] δὲ γύνα[υ]κας καὶ ται[ς] θυγάτερας συλλάβων καὶ ἔρασε | ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει τρισχίλιους καὶ διακοσίο[ις] στάτηρας εἰσέπραξε etc.).

island except Mytilene (Midilli); only this city resisted. Encircling Mytilene by double walls and sending ships to Sigrium, the promontory of Lesbos he took the area under control in order to prevent the approaching ships from assisting the city. He settled down to an intensive blockade by land and sea. In July or August of 333 BC and during the siege of Mytilene, Memnon suddenly fell gravely ill and died -probably he was poisoned.⁶⁸ This unexpected situation dragged the Persians into despair. Artabazus' son Pharnabazus together with Autophradates was among the commanders of the Persian naval force led by Memnon (Arr. II. 1. 3). When Memnon was near death, he had handed over his command -until Darius III legally appointed someone- to his nephew Pharnabazus, the son of Artabazus.⁶⁹ Pharnabazus shared command of the Persian fleet with Autophradates. He carried on the siege of Mytilene and pressed the city to capitulate (Arr. II. 1. 3). The Mytileneans could not endure the siege for a long time and had to open the city gates. Pharnabazus reminded the Mytilenians of the second provision of the 'Common Peace' (*koine eirene* [κοινή εἰρήνη]), 'The King's Peace'⁷⁰ or with its other name 'the Peace of Antalcidas', which was made with Artaxerxes II in 386 BC, and ordered them to observe the peace.⁷¹ The provision contained the recognition of the freedom and independence of all -small and great- Greek cities and islands and also the elimination of the garrisons founded by external forces.⁷² In accordance with the King's Peace, mercenaries stationed by Alexander were sent away. Since the treaty of the alliance they had made with Alexander was no longer valid, the pillars on which the treaty was recorded alliance with Alexander were destroyed. In the meantime, the peace evidently recognized Asia as the king's dominion and prescribed autonomy for all the Greeks, threatening war against transgressors.⁷³ The people of Mytilene agreed to be the allies of the Persian king and cooperate in the recovery of his rights.⁷⁴ Pharnabazus called back the citizens who had been exiled due to their loyalty to Darius III (Arr. II. 1. 4). He made Diogenes, one of the exiles, the tyrant; he put in a garrison in the city under the command of Lycomedes of Rhodes and exacted money from them.⁷⁵ Probably after Mytilene, Autophradates launched a sudden raid on Samothrace with his fleet and took the island under his control.⁷⁶ Though the exact

68 Diod. XVII. 29. 2-4; Arr. II. 1. 1-3; Curt. III. 2. 1. According to Plutarch (*Alex.* XVIII. 3), Alexander heard the news of Memnon's death after he received the submission of Paphlagonia and Cappadocia. According to Diodorus (XVII. 28. 1-29. 4), this event occurred after the king had captured the Marmarians in Lycia during Nicochares' *archonship* in Athens in 333/2 BC. Diodorus (XVII. 31. 2-4) says that the king received the news of Memnon's death after Darius III marched with his army from Babylon to Cilicia but before Alexander fell ill in Tarsus. See also Atkinson 1980, 457-458.

69 Arr. II. 1. 3; Curt. IV. 1. 37.

70 Xenophon (*Hell.* V. 1. 36), at the beginning of his passage, uses the statements of "ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης: "as a result of the so-called Peace of Antalcidas"; and after "τῆς ὑπὸ βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης: "the treaty proposed by the King".

71 Diod. XV. 5. 1 'κοινῆς εἰρήνης τῆς ἐπὶ Ἀνταλκίδου'; *FGrHist* III B 328 F 149a-b 'Philokhoros'; Didym. *Dem.* X. col. 7. 18-28.

72 Xen. *Hell.* V. 1. 31; VI. 3. 9; 12; 5. 2-3; Diod. XV. 5. 1; Arr. II. 1. 4-5; see also IG II² 34= Syll³ 142 lines 6-16; IG II² 43= Syll³ 147 lines 7-14.

73 Xen. *Hell.* V. 1. 31; Diod. XIV. 110. 2-3; XV. 5. 1; *FGrHist* III C 1 690 F 28 'Dinon'= Plut. *Artax.* XXI. 5; *mor.* III. 213 b; Apophtheg. Lacon. 60.

74 Bosworth 1980b, 182.

75 Arr. II. 1. 4-5; III. 2. 4-6; Curt. IV. 1. 37.

76 Plut. *mor.* IV. 339e; De Alex. 2; Alex. 48.4-5; see also Briant 2002, 830.

date is uncertain, Autophradates also made a successful expedition on Ephesus in the same year (Polyaen. *strat.* VII. 27. 2). Miletus came under Persian authority again by late 333 BC.⁷⁷

Pharnabazus with the foreign mercenaries set sail for Lycia and gave Autophradates the task of occupying the other islands (Arr. II. 2. 1). Darius III thought Memnon was a skillful commander and after he died, he had difficulty in finding someone who would fill his place (Diod. XVII. 30. 7). He did confirm Pharnabazus in his position. He commissioned Thymondas, the nephew of Memnon and the son of Mentor, to take over the mercenaries from Pharnabazus and lead them to him, and to instruct Pharnabazus to take over Memnon's command.⁷⁸ Pharnabazus handed over this army to Thymondas in Lycia and sailed to join Autophradates. It is clear that he also received the order from the king to put Memnon's plan into action. After having united the armies, Pharnabazus sent ten ships under Datames the Persian to the Cyclades, whose people were ready to revolt to instigate the Greek cities. He himself sailed with 100 ships to Tenedos (Bozcaada), which was near the entrance of the Hellespont and where he could easily cut the Macedonians' line of supply. He came to the port called Boreios 'north harbour' and demanded that the city surrender. In accordance with the King's Peace, their agreement with Alexander was invalid. Therefore, he ordered them to destroy the pillars recording their treaty with Alexander (Arr. II. 2. 2-3). Even though the Tenedians supported Alexander, they were in an awful situation, so they had to accept the Persian terms. During the siege of Tenedos, since Hegelochus and Amphoterus had failed to assemble a sufficient number of ships, they had not been able to come to the city's rescue (Arr. II. 2. 3). Alexander realised that by disbanding the fleet, he had made a military mistake and ordered a new naval force to be re-established.⁷⁹ In the summer of 333 BC, after witnessing Memnon's successes, he appointed Amphoterus commander of the fleet at the shore of the Hellespont and Hegelochus commander of the land forces. He ordered them to assemble a new fleet to free the islands such as Lesbos, Chios and Cos from the Persian garrisons and gave 500 talents for war expenditures. Likewise, he sent 600 talents to Antipater for the protection of the Hellespont and demanded that ships be furnished from the cities taking part in the Corinthian League.⁸⁰ Antipater commissioned Proteas, the son of Andronicus, to collect ships from Euboea and Peloponnesus and to protect Greece and the islands against the Persian naval attacks (Arr. II. 2. 4). Hearing of Datames' ten ships set sail near Siphnos, he organized a sudden midnight attack and captured eight ships with their crews. Datames managed to escape with the remaining two

77 Curt. IV. 1. 37: *Milesiis deinde Pharnabazus praefectus Persicae classis pecunia exacta*. Some modern authors claim that in this passage Curtius confused Mytilene with Miletus. But in the following parts of his (IV. 5. 13-14) narration, he uses the expression of 'Miletus has been retaken under Macedonian rule', which shows that he did not make a mistake. On the contrary, there is no inconsistency in what he has related. Curt. IV. 5. 13-14: "Alexander not only subdued each and every city that refused to come under his yoke, but also his generals occupied many places: Calas invaded Pahplagonia, Antigonus captured Lycaonia and Balacrus, who defeated Darius's satrap Hydarnes, retook Miletus."

78 Arr. II. 2. 1; Curt. III. 3. 1; 13. 14.

79 Curt. III. 1. 19-20; Arr. II. 2. 3.

80 Curt. III. 1. 19-20; IV. 1. 36-37; see also Heisserer 1980, 87 f.

ships and joined the other fleet.⁸¹ This little failure could not bring the Persian fleet's activities on the Cyclades to a halt. But Aristomenes commissioned by Darius III to secure the Persian authority over the coast of the Hellespont was either captured by the Macedonian fleet or his ship was sunk (Curt. IV. 1. 36).

In 333 BC Darius III advanced toward Cilicia with the army he had mustered in Babylon. According to Persian customs (Hdt. IV. 84; VII. 38-39), all the family members who were old enough to be drafted had to take part in the war commanded by the king. Therefore, Artabazus participated in the battle with his sons, Cophen, Ariobarzanes, Arsames, and his ex-son-in-law Mentor's son Thymondas. Pharnabazus was at the head of the fleet and was conducting the war in Asia Minor on behalf of the king. It is known that Artabazus had eleven sons. In the ancient sources, only his four sons who were old enough to perform military service are mentioned. Thymondas, following the king's order, came to Syria with his mercenary unit⁸², which he took over from Pharnabazus in Lycia in order to fight against Alexander. He joined the army of Darius III at Sochoi in northern Syria. While Darius set forward towards Sochoi on the Amik plain, he had left the army baggage, his treasure, his harem, and most of the wives and children of the royal and aristocratic families behind in the military camp, which had been pitched by the river Pinaros at Issus. Giving an army under the command of Artabazus' son Cophen, Darius sent the royal treasure, the wives and children of prominent families -the Artabazus was among them- and envoys from Greece to Damascus (Şam).⁸³ Damascus, 300 km south of Sochoi, was a fortified fortress that was difficult to be seized. Cophen was to leave them under the protection of the satrap of Damascus and turn back to the king's side.⁸⁴ There is no information regarding which flank Artabazus and his sons were at the battle of Issus and what they did during the battle. However, Thymondas as the commander of the infantry division of 30,000 Greek mercenaries, was on the right flank, near Nabarzanes's army.⁸⁵ Before the war started, Thymondas and the Greek mercenaries under his command were among those who had advised Darius not to fight against Alexander with his crowded army on Cilicia's narrow plains.⁸⁶ After Darius had to take flight, this battle ended in a decisive victory for the Macedonians. The flight of the king had started the feeling of desperation and panic among the Persian soldiers. Consequently, Antiochus' son Amyntas, Mentor's son Thymondas, Aristomedes of

81 Arr. II. 2. 4-5; see also Bosworth 2005, 84.

82 It is understood from Arrian's (III. 13. 3) account that he brought the mercenaries by sea to Tripolis in Phoenicia, and they probably joined the royal army in Syria.

83 Arr. II. 11. 9-10; 15. 1-2, Curt. III. 8. 12; 13. 2-6; Diod. XVII. 32. 3; see also Atkinson 1980, 257; Ruzicka 1988, 132; Heckel 2016², 48 n. 26.

84 Curt. III. 13. 6: *Multa milia virorum feminarumque excedentem oppido sequebantur, omnibus miserabilis turba praeter eum cuius fidei commissa erat.* "As Parmenion was leaving the city of Damascus, many thousands of men and women followed him, a throng to excite the pity of all except the man (sc. the satrap of Damascus) to whose protection they had been entrusted".

85 Curt. III. 9. 1-2; see also III. 3. 1.

86 Curtius (III. 8. 1-3) Thymondas and his Greek soldiers suggested to the king that he should not fight on the Mesopotamian plains or depend on a single victory and he should divide his countless forces. Other ancient authors state that it was Amyntas the Macedonian who gave the Persian king similar advice (Arr. II. 6-7. 1; Plut. Alex. XX. 1-2). See also Rop 2019, 187 n. 45; 208, Table I. 1; 1.3.

Pherae, and Bianor the Acarnanian with an army of 8000 soldiers headed southwards to Tripolis and here they saw the ships which had conveyed them over from Lesbos anchored.⁸⁷ They held as many as they needed and burned the rest ships, lest the enemy captured them. At first, they set sail for Cyprus (Kıbrıs) and began recruiting soldiers. Then, they set forward towards Egypt under the command of Amyntas and tried to occupy it here. Amyntas seized Pelusium and made his way to Memphis, claiming that he was the successor of satrap Sauaces/Tasiaces⁸⁸, who was killed at Issus.⁸⁹ Since his units were undisciplined, he was killed by a sortie from the Memphis troops. It is quite probable that Thymondas, instead of having gone to Egypt with Amyntas, might have gone to his cousin's side -Pharnabazus- since he was himself Rhodian, a trustworthy friend and relative. In any case, he continued fighting for the king.⁹⁰ The Persian king withdrew to Thapsacus with some surviving soldiers, including 4000 mercenaries⁹¹; Artabazus and his three sons, Arsames, Ariobarzanes, and Cophen accompanied the king. Later, the king marched from here to Babylon with his army.

Hard –to compensate- part of the Issus battle was that the Achaemenid royal women, female members, and children of noble Persian families had fallen into the hands of the enemy. In the military camp of Darius III, pitched by the river Pinaros, among those who were captured were his mother Sisygambis, his sister, his wife Stateira and his daughters Stateira, who bore the same name as her mother, Drypetis and his very young son. The satrap of Damascus betrayed the Persian king; he handed over the treasure and the members of the royal and aristocratic families to Parmenion by trickery.⁹² In the group Parmenion captured were the previous king Artaxerxes Ochus III's wife and his three single daughters, including Parysatis. Also, the daughter of Darius' brother Oxyathres, Artabazus' wife and his young son Hystanes/Ilioneus, his daughters Artacama, Artonis?, Barsine and her three daughters by Mentor, her little son by Memnon, Pharnabazus' wife and son were taken prisoner.⁹³ They were

87 Arrian (II. 13. 2-3) gives a detailed list of the fugitive soldiers and commanders who crossed from Tripolis to Cyprus. He cites that the total number was 8000. Diodorus (XVII. 48. 2-6) without mentioning other commanders, states that 8000 mercenaries who stayed alive after the Battle of Issus went under the command of Agis in Europe and there were 4000 mercenaries commanded by Amyntas. Curtius (IV. 1. 27) writes that Amyntas fled to Cyprus with his 4000 soldiers, and after mustering soldiers there, he sailed to Egypt.

88 Sauaces (Arr. II. 11. 8) and Tasiaces (Diod. XVII. 34. 5).

89 Diod. XVII. 48. 2-6; Curt. IV. 1. 27-33; Arr. II. 13. 2-3; FGrHist 72 F 17 'Anaximenes'. Concerning the subject, see also Bosworth 2005, 84 n. 119; Heckel 2006, 267; Rhodes-Osborne 2007, 509; Ruzicka 1988, 132 f.; Briant 2002, 829; Lendering 2018, 117 f.

90 S. Ruzicka (1988, 146-147 n. 44) suggests that Thymondas might have come to Halicarnassus with the mercenaries he led and joined Autophradates. For Thymondas, see also Berve 1926, II 182 no. 380; Heckel 2006, 257; Hofstetter 1978, 182 no. 319.

91 Arr. II. 13. 1; Curt. IV. 1. 1-3.

92 Curt. III. 13. 2-17; Polyæn. *strat.* IV. 5.

93 Arr. II. 11. 9-10; Diod. XVII. 32. 3; 36. 2-5; Curt. III. 11. 24-26; 13. 10-15; Plut. *Alex.* XXI. 4-5; Justin XI. 9. 12; 10. 2. According to Athenaeus' narration (*Deip.* XIII. 607f-608a), Parmenion, after taking Damascus and all the equipment of Darius III, sends a letter to Alexander. He itemises everything he has captured. He writes that the king has 329 concubines who are capable musicians, 46 men who are masters at weaving wreaths; 277 cake makers; 29 pot tenders, 13 milk cooks, 17 preparers of drink, 70 wine clarifiers and 40 perfume makers. Alexander received this letter probably when he was at Marathus.

captives in the hands of Alexander. It was anticipated that this development would pose a serious drawback and prevent the Persian resistance and fight, but as it is seen in the example of Artabazus and his sons, the Persians remained loyal to their king. While Artabazus and his sons were fighting against Alexander until the very end, his daughter Barsina had to serve Alexander as a concubine.⁹⁴ Barsine, who spoke two languages and was brought up in two different cultures had not been chosen as a courtesan coincidentally. According to Aristobulus' account, because of her being the daughter of Artabazus, a descendant of Artaxerxes II, her having had a good Greek education and her beauty, Parmenion encouraged Alexander to form an attachment with this woman.⁹⁵ Whereas, among the captives there were Artabazus' two more daughters who had the same qualities as Barsine's and they were single. The most important reason for this preference was Alexander's wish to retaliate Memnon, who had cast a shadow over his own successes in Asia Minor. Barsine's two previous marriages and being the mother of four children were also significant factors because the marital status of Barsine was a kind of guarantee in the eyes of the Macedonian commanders that Alexander could not marry her.⁹⁶ For Alexander, Barsine was an ideal woman counsellor who knew Macedonian and Persian cultures very well, with whom he could speak Greek and get first-hand information about the Persians.⁹⁷

In 333 BC while these events were occurring, Pharnabazus, commander of the Persian fleet, and Autophradates were having financial difficulties; therefore, they collected money by force in Miletus and put a garrison into the city of Chios. They set sail with 100 ships for Andros in order to help Datames and from there for Siphnos. They despatched some part of the fleet to Cos and Halicarnassus. Apart from punishing Andros and Siphnos, they installed garrisons there.⁹⁸ The Spartan king Agis needed money and ships to continue fighting against the Macedonians in Peloponnesus. So, he came on a trireme to meet with Pharnabazus, whose fleet was at anchor in Siphnos. He asked for money in order to raise a big army and fleet.⁹⁹ At that time came the news of the Issus defeat and the seizure of Damascus with all the women and children of the Artabazus family, including Pharnabazus' wife and son, having been taken prisoners (Curt. III. 13. 12-15). Pharnabazus was thinking that the news of defeat would start a revolt in Chios. He immediately set out for Chios with 12 triremes and 1,500 mercenaries. Because of its geographical location, Chios was an important harbour base for the Persian fleet to anchor during the naval expeditions that would be conducted along the shores of Western Anatolia. Autophradates gave Agis 30 silver talents and 10 triremes. Agis, remaining at Siphnos, sent these to his brother Agesilaus, who was at Taenarum under the command of Hippias. He

94 Plut. *Alex.* 21. 7-9; Justin XI. 10. 2-3; XII. 15. 9; see also Bosworth 1980b, 200-203; 2005, 85 f; Sina 2018, 164-167.

95 Plut. *Alex.* XXI. 9= *FGrHist* 139 F 11 'Aristobulus'. Justin (XI. 10. 2), says that Alexander fell in love with Barsine for her beauty and by whom he afterwards had a son that he called Heracles.

96 Sarıkaya 2019, 274.

97 Lendering 2018, 148; Sarıkaya 2019, 257-282.

98 Arr. II. 13. 4; Curt. IV. 1. 37; see also Atkinson 1980, 289.

99 Arr. II. 13. 5; Diod. XVII. 48. 1; Curt. VI.

instructed Agesilaus to proceed to Crete with his army (Arr. II. 13. 5-6). Because the inhabitants of the island had divided into two between the Lacedaemonians and Macedonians (Curt. IV. 1. 38-40). Agis took 8000 Greek mercenaries, who had escaped from the battle of Issus and returned to their homes, under his command.¹⁰⁰ Alexander's Issus victory invalidated all the successes of Pharnabazus and Autophradates in Anatolia. Darius III had left the battlefield and he became a fugitive in his own empire. Alexander continued his progress through Phoenicia, the Persians' most important naval base. Seizing most of the cities, he dissolved Persian naval power. This victory put an end both to the Persian dominance over the Aegean and Mediterranean coastal cities, which had started with Memnon and continued under the command of Pharnabazus and to the expectations.¹⁰¹ Alexander was regarded as the conquerer and the meaninglessness of resistance began to prevail. Among those who took part in the fleet led by Autophradates were from Phoenicia Enylus, king of Byblus, Gerostratus, king of Aradus, Azemilcus, king of Tyre and the kings of Cyprus (Arr. II. 13. 7-8; 15. 7; 20. 1-3). In the spring of 332 BC, when the kings of Byblus and Aradus heard that apart from the Issus defeat, the Phoenician cities were also taken by Alexander, they left Autophradates and Pharnabazus and with their fleets returned in order to make terms with Alexander. Together with the triremes of Sidon when a fleet of 80 ships in total sailed back, only a small part of the main naval force was left in the hands of Pharnabazus and Autophradates (Arr. II. 20. 1-2). Furthermore, Azemilcus, king of Tyre also had to abandon Pharnabazus. While Alexander had besieged Tyre, he would not be a mere spectator. He sailed with his fleet in order to help his country¹⁰². As a result of all these reasons, Pharnabazus and Autophradates could not challenge the newly established Macedonian fleet effectively. They could not receive naval support from the coastal cities since most of them had immediately switched sides. The Rhodian, Lycian, and Cyprian envoys went to Sidon in order to compromise with Alexander (Arr. II. 20. 2-3). In 332 BC, the coastal cities fell one after another.¹⁰³ Amphoterus and Hegelochus sailed to Tenedos with a fleet of 400 ships. When the Tenedians, who had unwillingly obliged to collaborate with the Persians, revolted against them and took sides with the Macedonians, they easily occupied the city. Later, in Chios, conflicts broke out between the democrats, who supported the Macedonians and the pro-Persia oligarchists. The democratic party in Chios, despite the ruling junta installed by Autophradates and Pharnabazus, invited the Macedonians to the city. But Pharnabazus came from Siphnos on time and managed to intervene instantly. He caught those who wanted to hand over the administration to the Macedonians and with a small detachment of troops he delivered the city again to the pro-Persian men, Apollonides

100 Diod. XVII. 48. 1; Curt. IV. 1. 38-39; VI; see also Ruzicka 1988, 143-144.

101 According to Arrian (II. 17. 2-4), Alexander aimed at occupying Tyre to destroy the Persian dominance over the coastal cities. He was considering that after the seizure of Tyre, the Phoenicians, who constituted the most important and strongest element of the Persian naval force, would surrender to him and that the Phoenician example would be followed by Cyprus and other coastal cities.

102 When Alexander captured Tyre, king Azemilcus was among those he showed little mercy (Arr. II. 24. 5). After the siege, he might have appointed Azemilcus again as the king (Nawotka 2010, 192-193).

103 Bosworth 2005, 84 f.; Briant 2002, 830.

and Athenagoras.¹⁰⁴ Alexander's commanders were insistent on seizing Chios and they were relying on the supporters of Macedonia. A disagreement between Apollonides and the leaders of the troops provided them with the opportunity to enter the city. When the Macedonians broke the gates and came into the city, the democrats collaborated with them and killed those of the Persian garrison. Having taken Pharnabazus, Apollonides, and Athenagoras captive they surrendered them to the Macedonians. The spoils and the people captured included 12 triremes with their soldiers and rowers, 30 ships without crews, 50 piratical boats, and 3000 Greeks who served the Persians as mercenaries (Curt. IV. 5. 17-18). Aristonicus, the tyrant of Methymna, who was unaware that the island had been taken, had come to the island with some pirate sloops to meet Pharnabazus. The Macedonian guards at the control point of the harbour leaving him no time to become suspicious said that Pharnabazus was asleep while letting him enter with 5 or 10 pirate sloops. Then they caught and surrendered them to Amphoterus and Hegelochus. All the pirates who had come with Aristonicus were killed.¹⁰⁵ The Macedonians crossed from here to Mytilene. Chares the Athenian was holding the city with a garrison consisting of 2000 Persians, but since he could not endure the siege, he accepted to surrender the city on the condition that he should be allowed to leave in safety and then went to Imbros. The Macedonians also took possession of the other cities of Lesbos by agreement.¹⁰⁶ In response to the direct appeal from the island's inhabitants, Amphoterus sailed towards Cos with 60 ships taking the captive Pharnabazus with him. He occupied the island, but Pharnabazus managed to escape from his guards and disappeared (Arr. III. 2. 5-7). Witnessing these unfortunate events that occurred one after the other, Autophradates moved from Siphnos to Halicarnassus, where part of the fleet had lowered anchor. After a while, Agis joined Autophradates in Halicarnassus (Arr. II. 13. 5-6).

104 Curt. IV. 5. 13-17; Arr. III. 2. 3-5. Syll³ 283 lines 10-15; Heisserer 1973, 191-204; 1980, 79-95 'Alexander's letter to Chians': τῶν δὲ προδόντων | τοῖς βαρβάροις τὴν πόλιν ὅσοι μὲν ἂν προεξέλθωσιν φεόγειν | αὐτοὺς ἐξ ἀπασῶν τῶν πόλεων τῶν τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνοῦσῶν καὶ εἶναι ἀγωγίμους κατὰ τὸ δόγμα τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων· ὅσοι[τ] | δ' ἂν ἐγκαταλειφθῶσιν ἐπανάγεσθαι καὶ κρίνεσθαι ἐν τῷ τῶν Ἑλ[λ.]ήνων συνεδρίῳ. "Of those who betrayed the city to the barbarians, as many as have escaped, these are to be exiled from all the cities which share in the peace and are to be liable to arrest according to the decree of the Greeks; but as many as have been captured, these are to be brought back and judged in the synedrion of the Greeks". Alexander's second letter to Chians (SEG XXII 506 lines 6-11; Heisserer 1980, 96-117; Piejko 1985, 238-249): ἂν δ' ἀποδρά[ι] τις αὐτῶν, τὰ ἐπ[ι]τίμια ἀποτίνειν τ[ι]οὺς ἐγγυητάς· τῶν δ' ἄλλων Χίων μηδέ[ι]να εἰς δίκην ἄγειν ἐπὶ βαρβαρισμῶ[ι] πλὴν τῶν ἀχθέντων, μηδ' Ἀλκίμαχον | [ἔτι ὑπονοῆσαι]. In his second letter to Chios, Alexander declares that the rest of the people are not to be prosecuted on the charge of having taken sides with the Persians and similar accusations; likewise, Alcimachus is not to be under suspicion. It is quite probable that Alcimachus, who was one of the supporters of the Persian oligarchy while the city was under Persian rule, gradually became friends with Alexander and thanks to this friendship returned to the city by order of the king (Piejko 1985, 245). A. J. Heisserer (1980, 106; 109) claims that Alcimachus always remained loyal to Alexander, and he was one of Alexander's generals rather than a local Chian. See also Walbank 1962, 178-180; Atkinson 1980, 328-330; Bosworth 1980b, 178; Rhodes - Osborne 2003, 418-424 no 84.

105 Curt. IV. 5. 19-22; Arr. III. 2. 3-5.

106 Curt. IV. 5. 22; Arr. III. 2. 5-6. When Mytilene came under Alexander's rule, pro-Persians were exiled again. In c. 324 BC Alexander granted a general amnesty and enabled the exiles to return to the city (IG XII. 2. 6; OGIS 2; Heisserer 1980, 118-139; see also Atkinson 1980, 3330-332; Heisserer - Hodot 1986, 109-128; Worthington 1990, 194-214).

Pharnabazus, who had managed to escape from Cos, must also have gone to Autophradates' side. Although the ancient sources do not mention their names, Pharnabazus and Autophradates probably set sail for Crete, joined Agis and helped him during his occupation of Crete.¹⁰⁷ In 332/1 BC, Hegelochus came to Egypt in order to report to Alexander the events of Western Anatolia, bringing with him Aristonicus and the pro-Persians in Chios including Apollonides, Phesinus, Megareus, and many partisans. Alexander sent the tyrants back to their own cities to be punished by the *demoi*. Apollonides and the Chians with him were consigned under strict guard to the city of Elephantine in Egypt (Arr. III. 2. 7). There is not sufficient evidence for the subsequent actions of Pharnabazus and Autophradates. However, Pharnabazus, like his father Artabazus and his other brothers, must have performed in the service of Alexander. It is known that he lived until c. 320 BC and during the wars of the Diadochi he continued his military activities on the side of his sister's husband, Eumenes the Cardian, as the cavalry commander. At the battle in Hellespontine Phrygia,¹⁰⁸ which was fought against Craterus, Eumenes arrayed two foreign units consisting of 300 cavalry led by Pharnabazus and Phoenix of Tenedos opposite Craterus. Together with the Macedonian cavalry, he took the flank where Neoptolemus was. Pharnabazus and Phoenix inflicted heavy losses on the wing where Craterus was fighting, and Craterus lost his life during the battle.¹⁰⁹

In 331 BC the defeat of Gaugamela had much heavier consequences than that of Issus. Darius retreated to Ecbatana (Hamadan), the capital of Media. However, when he could not obtain the military assistance he needed from the peoples such as Scythians and Cadusians, he moved from Ecbatana towards the Caspian Gates in order to fight at the eastern satrapies.¹¹⁰ Following two heavy defeats, the king did not seem to have much chance left for victory against Alexander. The army was in a low mood and had lost hope of winning. Furthermore, the Persian aristocrats such as Bessus, satrap of Bactria-Sogdiana, Nabarzanes the chiliarch and Barsaentes, satrap of Drangiana and Arachosia, were rejecting Darius' discredited leadership. They had set their eyes on the king's throne. Bessus and Nabarzanes formed a conspiracy to take the king captive. They were planning to deliver the king to Alexander alive in case Alexander caught them and thus gaining his support. If they could escape from Alexander, they would kill Darius, assume the royal authority and continue the war (Curt. V. 9. 2; 10. 1-8). When Darius, who was unaware of the conspiracy, arrived at the Caspian Gates, he prepared to fight against Alexander instead of escaping. He assembled the war council (Curt. V. 8. 2-5). The power struggle concerning Darius' leadership became apparent at this meeting. After the king, Artabazus spoke. Paying his homage to Darius, he said that he would fight together with the king until the end (Curt. V. 9. 1-2). However, Nabarzanes offered, temporarily at least, Darius to abdicate and hand over his rights to Bessus. Bessus would return the throne to Darius again when the enemy withdrew

107 Bosworth 1975, 32-33 n. 29; Ruzicka 1988, 147.

108 Although the site of the battle is not known for certain, Corn. Nepos (Eum. V. 1) writes that it took place at or near the Hellespontus; Diodorus (XVIII. 37. 1) says that it happened around Cappadocia.

109 Plut. Eum. VII. 1; Berve 1926, no. 766; Bosworth 1980b, 267; Sarikaya 2016, 744-745.

110 Curt. V. 8. 1; Arr. III. 19. 1-3.

from Asia.¹¹¹ The offer infuriated Darius and he lunged at Nabarzanes. Bessus and his soldiers intervened and Nabarzanes had to leave the meeting. Bessus and his supporters drew the units they commanded out of the army and encamped them in a remote place (Curt. V. 9. 9-11). Artabazus was trying to soothe Darius, reminding him of their critical situation. Alexander was close to him and he was probably at Rhagae (Rey, southeast of Tehran) or Choarene (Khar), 90 km north of Rhagae.¹¹² Even when he confronted with a great army, he was a dangerous enemy. Nevertheless, the king had not yet been able to raise a strong army, and if he fell out with his followers, the situation might worsen. He advised Darius to tolerate the errors or stupidity of those whose peoples were subject to him (Curt. V. 9. 12). Darius, though unwillingly, agreed with Artabazus and went into his tent in despair. Bessus and Nabarzanes took action in order to realize their conspiracy, and they secretly tried to gain the soldiers with various promises (Curt. V. 9. 13-16; 10. 1-9). The internal dissension was necessarily slowing down the Persians' advance. They were getting more and more demoralized. In the meantime, while Artabazus was visiting the Persian tents to encourage the soldiers, he was also trying to persuade Darius to calm down and to focus on Alexander (Curt. V. 9. 17). Artabazus, in accordance with Darius's order, told Bessus and Nabarzanes that their apologies would be accepted if they asked for forgiveness. The following day, they came to the entrance of the king's tent. When Darius, having given the signal for marching, mounted his chariot, they prostrated themselves in front of Darius and apologized (Curt. V. 10. 10-15). The army started their march at the Caspian Gates and retreated north of the Elburz mountains. Patron, commander of the Greek mercenaries, tried to warn the king against the treachery of Bessus and Nabarzanes, but he could not succeed (Curt. V. 11. 1-12). The rumours regarding a conspiracy against the king began spreading in the encampment. Many soldiers ran away to join Alexander (Arr. III. 20. 2-4). When the treachery was revealed, Darius summoned Artabazus to his side to consult. Artabazus told the king that Patron's suggestion was the best course of action and that the king should go to the Greeks' camp. He thought that when the Persians realized their king was in danger, they would grab their arms and come to their king's rescue. But Darius was aware of the fact that 4000 mercenaries could not cope with Bessus' army of 30,000 soldiers. He hugged Artabazus and told him to leave his service and join the Greek mercenary army. He ordered those who were present to go away, telling them that by doing this they were not betraying him (Curt. V. 12. 1-9).¹¹³ Artabazus and his sons, Greek mercenaries, and the other Persians who remained loyal to Darius escaped from the military camp. The Persians who believed in Bessus' promises joined him two days later. After a short time, Darius was arrested by Bessus and his supporters.

Artabazus, who could not prevent the arrest of Darius III, withdrew with his sons Arsames, Ariobarzanes, Cophen and with the few remaining loyalists and the Greek mercenaries north into the Elburz mountains¹¹⁴. There they found refuge with

111 Curt. V. 9. 3-5; 8; see also 8. 6.

112 Bosworth 1980b, 339-340.

113 See also Atkinson 1994, 133-157; Briant 2015, 159-161.

114 Arr. III. 21. 3-5; 23. 1; see also Curt. V. 12. 8.

Autophradates, satrap of Tapuria. By order of Bessus and Nabarzanes, Darius III was killed by Satibarzanes, satrap of Areia, and Barsaentes, satrap of Drangiana and Arachosia.¹¹⁵ After that, the satraps and the people of the region started to surrender to Alexander. Artabazus and his sons, the representatives of the Greek mercenaries, and Autophradates, satrap of Tapuria, came to the Macedonian camp in Zadracarta, the largest city and capital of Hyrcania.¹¹⁶ When Artabazus II met with Alexander, he extended his right hand to the king. Because during his life in exile, he had been the guest of Philip II in Macedonia. But his loyalty to the Persian king surpassed the tie of guestship and he remained loyal to the king until the end (Curt. VI. 5. 2).¹¹⁷ There were many reasons behind Alexander's friendly treatment of Artabazus and his sons and granting them honourable tasks. One of them was his unwillingness to hurt someone who had once requested his father to right of political asylum. Alexander definitely knew Artabazus and his family, who had lived in Pella for more than eleven years. This bond of guestship probably caused Artabazus to feel grateful to the king and Alexander to trust this family. Alexander's relation with Artabazus' daughter, Barsine, must have been another factor in his friendly treatment of the Artabazus family. But the most important reason was Artabazus and his sons' being the noblest of the Persians, particularly their loyalty to Darius III until the end.¹¹⁸ The death of Darius III did not make things easier for Alexander because it would take time for the people of the regions under Persian rule to accept this change, and he would have to prove himself. Alexander needed local support and an army to be able to establish permanent sovereignty. He could only do this through the help of the present Persian army and the military support of the people in the region. To win supporters was as important as to win victories. Alexander was Macedonian. Even if he claimed that he was the Great King, he was not their legitimate king in the eyes of the Persians. The eastern peoples would continue guerilla warfare instead of coming under the rule of a foreign king. As in the example of Sparta, even the Greeks preferred the Persians they had been fighting for years rather than accepting Alexander's sovereignty. In Asia Minor the resistance had not been completely suppressed and the Macedonian authority had not been properly established everywhere. The Persians' nobles siding with Alexander would decrease local and regional resistance. When the local people saw the prominent Persians on Alexander's side, they would trust the new king, and, more importantly, thinking that there was no one to fight for they would give up resisting. Furthermore, the irresolute people would hesitate to support Bessus, who had himself proclaimed "King of Asia" under the regal name Artaxerxes V. Because of all these reasons, Alexander included

115 Arr.III. 21. 9-10; Diod. XVII. 73. 1-2; Curt. V. 13. 13-25; Plut. Alex. 42. 3-4; 43. 1-3; Ps. Call. II. 20-21; Justin XI. 15. 1-13. See also Swoboda 1901, col. 2205-2211; Bosworth 1980b, 340-345; Briant 2002, 864-866; 2015, 416.

116 Atkinson 1994, 192-193; for the supposition that Artabazus and Greek soldiers met with Alexander near Mardes, to the west of Zadracarta, see Rapin 2017, 70-71.

117 Curtius (VI. 5. 4), in his passage where he mentions the same anecdote, writes that Artabazus II was 95 years old, and his nine young children, all born from the same woman, accompanied their father. But this age is definitely impossible. Basing on the information that he was born in 387/386 BC, Artabazus was 57/56 years old in 330 BC.

118 Arr. III. 23. 7; see also Iliakis 2021, 37-38.

the noble Persians, such as Oxyathres/Oxathres¹¹⁹, the younger brother of Darius III and Artabazus, the grandson of the old Persian king Artaxerxes II and a close friend and trustable man of Darius III, among his companions. The fact that they were under the service of Alexander hampered Bessus' efforts to gather supporters and also cast a shadow on the justification of his fight. In one way or another, it was a demonstration that he was no temporary conqueror but the true successor of the Persian monarchs, supported and served by the brother of his predecessor and other prominent Persians. Apart from that, the lands of the region were rough. A considerable part of the people consisted of warrior-individuals ready to resist, and all of the brave soldiers of the Persian army had scattered in the unoccupied areas. What Alexander needed most was guides and counsellors who knew the two languages and the two cultures well. Artabazus II and his sons were exactly meeting this need. It is certain that along with their native tongue, they spoke Greek fluently.

The representatives of the Greek mercenaries who came to the Macedonian headquarters with Artabazus demanded the guarantee of goodwill from Alexander. However, the king, reminding them of the prohibitions of the Corinthian League, wanted them to surrender unconditionally. The representatives accepted to surrender and requested an officer to accompany them to bring about 1,500 mercenaries waiting in the military camp to the king. Alexander put Artabazus and Agerrus' son Andronicus in charge of bringing the Greek mercenaries (Arr. III. 23. 8-9). This was Artabazus' first service to Alexander. It seems that Alexander was trying to create the impression that, except for the king, nothing had changed in the Persian imperial system. Therefore, in the first stage, he behaved as if he had come to the throne as the natural successor of Darius III, and he neither implemented any changes in the satrapies nor replaced the satraps. He reappointed Autophradates satrap of Tapuria. A short time later, when Satibarzanes and his followers surrendered to Alexander in Susia (Tus), the capital of Parthia, and they apologized, he forgave them and confirmed Satibarzanes in his satrapy.¹²⁰ After Darius III was killed, Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, Sogdiana and Saca and the leader of the anti-Macedonian resistance returned to Bactria. Here taking the name of Artaxerxes V and assuming the upright tiara of royalty, he proclaimed himself the 'King of Asia'.¹²¹ The Persians' battle against Alexander was more like a resistance than a revolt.¹²² The peoples of Bactria and Sogdiana remained loyal to their new king Bessus/Artaxerxes V, who was a relative of Darius III.¹²³ Bessus drew Satibarzanes, whom Alexander reinstated as satrap of Areia, to his side (Arr. III. 25. 1-2) and also appointed Brazanes as satrap of Parthia.¹²⁴ When Alexander set off to invade Bactria, Satibarzanes declared that he was on the side of Bessus

119 Diod. XVII. 77. 4-7; Curt. VI. 2. 9-11; VII. 5. 40-41; MetzEpit. 1-2; see also Bosworth 1980a, 5-8.

120 Arr. III. 25. 1; Curt. VI. 5. 32; 6. 14; Diod. XVII. 77. 3.

121 Diod. XVII. 74. 2; 83. 3; 7; Curt. VI. 6. 13; Metz Epit. 1. 3; Arr. III. 25. 3; the new Aramaic documents from Bactria, see Shaked 2003, 1517-1535; chronicle concerning Darius III and Alexander, see Spek 2003, text 3, 301-307; see also Olbrycht 2014, 41; Howe 2015, 160 f.

122 Howe 2015, 159.

123 Bessus was probably related by blood to the Achaemenids, see Arr. III. 21. 5; 30. 4. See also Charles 2016, 57-59.

124 Arr. IV. 7. 1; see also Briant 2002, 745-746.

and killed the little force of Anaxippus the Macedonian, who was left in Areia for collaboration. But when Alexander marched unexpectedly towards Areia with a great army, Satibarzanes fled eastwards.¹²⁵ In 329 BC, he returned with a large force of 2000 cavalry that Bessus had despatched. He took control of his satrapy and instigated the Areians against Alexander again.¹²⁶ When Alexander was proceeding towards Bactria against Bessus and was at the border of Arachosia, he heard the news of the second revolt. He sent Artabazus, who was a veteran man because of his military experience and as a native adviser, his childhood friend Erigyus, and Caranus with a force of 6000 Greek infantry and 600 cavalry to suppress the revolt. He ordered Phrataphernes, satrap of Parthia, to help them.¹²⁷ Since Phrataphernes was threatened by the invasion of Brazanes, whom Bessus had appointed satrap of Parthia, he could not assist them (Arr. IV. 71. 1). When the generals who were sent by Alexander back to Areia arrived, Satibarzanes pitched his camp near the Macedonian army with a large troop he had assembled. It took months to crush the revolt. There was constant skirmishing for a time and numerous small engagements. The hand-to-hand combat between Erigyus and Satibarzanes turned out to be a fierce battle. Erigyus killed Satibarzanes, striking him in the face with his spear. At last, the Macedonian army forced the enemy to surrender to Alexander.¹²⁸ After the Macedonian army led by Artabazus and Erigyus secured control of the region, they set forward to join Alexander without losing any time. According to Curtius (VII. 4. 32), the victory was reported to Alexander during his first stay in Bactria in the early summer of 329 BC. Alexander rewarded Artabazus by appointing him satrap of Bactria and Sogdiana.¹²⁹ This new task of Artabazus was one of the important turning points in his career. He had been placed in such a significant position as the satrap of Bactria, which was the first step to accession to the throne in the Persian empire. Although the region had lost this function with Alexander's rule, it was still a highly prestigious task. Artabazus had all the required qualifications for the office. Since he had once been the satrap of Dascylium, he was experienced. He was the grandson of the Persian king Artaxerxes II and a suitable person for the post which was given to the members of the royal dynasty. Besides, because of his previous task and his life in exile in Macedonia, he had no connection with the people of Bactria. He also had no ancestral ties with Bactria. His being Persian but having no relation with the inhabitants would provide him to constitute a balance of power between Alexander and these people. Furthermore, it was clear that Artabazus would never form an alliance with his enemy, Bessus, and would fight against him until the end. Artabazus

125 Diod. XVII. 78. 1-4; Curt. VI. 6. 22-23; Arr. III. 25. 5-7.

126 Arr. III. 28. 2; Diod. XVII. 81. 3; Curt. VII. 3. 2-3. See also Bosworth 1980b, 356-357; Howe 215, 167-170.

127 Arr. III. 28. 2; Curt. VII. 3. 2-3; see also Diod. XVII. 81. 3.

128 Curt. VII. 4. 33-40; Diod. XVII. 83. 4-6; Arr. III. 28. 3; see also Bosworth 1981, 20-24.

129 According to Curtius (VII. 11. 29) *Artabazus in petrae regionisque quae apposita esset ei tutelam relictus*: Artabazus was left to govern the Rock and the region adjacent to it. Since Curtius (VII. 5. 1) says *Bactrianorum regione Artabazo tradito*, this can only mean that Alexander added Sogdiana to his administrative responsibilities. Arrian (III. 29. 1) recorded that he appointed the Persian Artabazus as the only satrap of Bactria: τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις Βακτρίοις οὐ χαλεπῶς προσχωρήσασιν ἐπέταξε σατράπην Ἀρτάβαζον τὸν Πέρσην; see also Arr. IV 15. 5; 17. 3; Curt. VIII. 1. 19. Heckel 2020, 189 n. 70; see also Klein 2015, 81.

received the news that he had been appointed satrap of Bactria-Sogdiana when, on his way back, he encountered Alexander.¹³⁰ Alexander left Artabazus in Bactria with a garrison and army baggage. He himself entered the desert places of Sogdiana with a light-armed force leading his army by night (Curt. VII. 5. 1).

In the middle of the summer of 329 BC, Bessus was captured by Spitamenes and the other leaders of Sogdiana and handed over to Alexander.¹³¹ But a few weeks later, from Bactria to Cyropolis, uprisings led by Spitamenes broke out one after the other in the great satrapies.¹³² The communities near the Iaxartes (Syr-Darya) started the revolt by destroying the garrisons. After this, the people in the southern parts of Sogdiana and Bactria under the satrapy region of Artabazus revolted. Alexander was making preparations to suppress the rebel fiercely. The first region where the uprising had started was under control, but the news of uprisings from other places kept coming.¹³³ Alexander leaving Polyperchon, Attalus, Gorgias and Meleager in Bactria and ordering them to repress the remaining rebel strongholds, marched towards Sogdiana with some part of his army. He crossed into modern Tacikistan. In order to subdue the revolting inhabitants, he divided his military force into five parts. He gave the four brigades under the command of Hephaestion, Ptolemy, Perdikkas and Artabazus-and- Coenus. He himself took the fifth division and struck out with it into Sogdiana towards Maracanda (Samarkand).¹³⁴ Their tasks were to destroy the rebels who had taken refuge in the forts and the rocky valleys in Sogdiana (Arr. IV. 16. 3).¹³⁵ Artabazus' son Cophen was with Alexander as a negotiator since he knew both Persian and Greek well. In 328/7 BC, he besieged the fort which was built on the rocks in Sogdiana. Ariamazes the Sogdianian¹³⁶, was protecting the fort with 30,000 soldiers. The rock is 30 stadia high and 150 in the circuit, it is scarped on every side and approached by a very steep and narrow path. Also, it had provisions sufficient to support a great army for two years.¹³⁷ Before Alexander started the siege, he sent Artabazus' son Cophen¹³⁸ to Ariamazes to persuade him to surrender the rock (Curt. VII. 11. 5). Ariamazes, who trusted that the rock was impregnable, asked Cophen whether Alexander could even fly. Alexander commissioned 300 rock climbers by promising to give them a reward of 12 talents to climb the slope secretly and without

130 Bosworth 1981, 20; Lending 2018, 269; see also Iliakis 2021, 38.

131 Arr. III. 29-30. 5= FGrHist 138 F 14 'Ptolemy'; 139 F 24 'Aristobulus'; Curt. VII. 5. 36-42; Diod. XVII. 5. 36-42; 83. 9; MetzEpit. 5-6.

132 Arr. IV. 1. 4-5; Curt. VIII. 6. 13-15.

133 For detailed information, see Bosworth 1981, 22; Holt 1989, 59-60; Heckel 2020, 184-187; Rtveldadze 2007, 153-204; Vacante 2012, 87-130.

134 Arr. IV. 16. 1-3; compare Curt. VII. 10. 11-16; see also Bosworth 2005, 142-143; Holt 1989, 60-62; Rapin 2013, 55-56.

135 Arrian' (IV. 16. 1-3) passage is short, complicated, and in the nature of general revision. Also, he confused the sieges of Sogdian (IV. 18. 4-19. 4-5) and Sisimithres Rocks (Curt. VIII. 2. 19-33; Strab. XI. 11. 4) /Chorienes (Arr. IV. 21. 1-). When it is compared with Curtius' (VII. 11. 1-28) narrative about Ariamazes/Sogdian rock, there are controversies in the order of the events and narration (Bosworth 1981, 31-33; Heckel 1986, 223-226; 2020, 187; Vacante 2012, 87-130).

136 Ariamazus: Strab. XI. 11. 4; Ariamazes: Curt. VII. 11. 1-8; 21-29; Ariomazes: Polyae. strat. IV. 3. 29; Ariomazes: MetzEpit. 15-18; see also Heckel 2006, 44.

137 Curt. VII. 11. 1-2; Polyae. strat. IV. 3. 29.

138 Curtius (VII. 11. 5; 21-25) calls him sometimes Cophes, sometimes Cophen. Metz Epitome (17) calls him Dares. Arrian (IV. 19. 3) refers to him as a messenger/herald (πέμψας δῆκῆρυκα).

attracting the attention of the guards who defended the rock.¹³⁹ After a compelling climb, the mountaineers reached the top of the mountain, which looked down on the rock of Sogdiana.¹⁴⁰ Alexander sent Cophen to Ariamazes again. Cophen would observe the Sogdianians' reactions, and his task was to warn them to make a better choice. If they surrendered the rock, they would be allowed to retreat unhurt. But if they insisted on not surrendering, he would ask the Macedonians who had captured the summit to reveal themselves. When Cophen met with Ariamazes, he tried to persuade him to surrender the rock and said that if he did this, Alexander would forgive him (Curt. VII. 11. 22-23). Ariamazes spoke more arrogantly and braggartly than before and ordered Cophen to leave. Then Cophen took his hand and asked him to come out of the cave with him. He showed him the young men on the summit and, teasing his arrogance, told him that Alexander's soldiers had wings (Curt. VII. 11. 24). Later, sounds of the trumpets and clamors of the soldiers rose from the camp of the Macedonians. Since Ariamazes and his men were frightened, they could not estimate the number of the Macedonians. Alexander was also afraid that the Sogdianians might notice how few his soldiers were and would repulse them, but this did not happen. They called Cophen back and agreed to make terms (Curt. VII. 11. 25-26). Alexander was incensed by Ariamazes' arrogance, which is why he declared that he would only accept an unconditional surrender (Curt. VII. 11. 27). Ariamazes, believing that his situation was desperate, went down to the king's camp with his relatives and the nobles. Alexander ordered them to be scourged and crucified at the foot of the rock. Most of those who had surrendered were given, together with many spoils, to the settlers in the new cities.¹⁴¹

After Artabazus and each Macedonian commander completed their tasks, they joined Alexander in Maracanda again. Alexander sent Hephaestion out with a commission to settle people in cities in Sogdiana. When the news came in that Spitamenes had taken refuge in Scythia, Alexander dispatched Coenus and Artabazus there. He, taking with the rest of his forces, assaulted and destroyed the areas which were either under the control of the insurgents or could be probable hideouts in Sogdiana (Arr. IV. 16. 3). However, Arrian does not report any information concerning the military actions of Artabazus and Coenus against Spitamenes. In this expedition, not Artabazus and Coenus, but Craterus was in the foreground. While Spitamenes marched on with the Sogdianian fugitives in the territory of Scythia, he gathered a force of 600 Massagetae cavalry and arrived at one of the forts in Bactria. He seized the unprepared fort and killed its soldiers. After that, he proceeded towards Zariaspa. He besieged here, captured many booties, and heavily defeated a small Macedonian army in a defensive position (Arr. IV. 16. 4-7). When Craterus, who had heard of the Zariaspa defeat, came to help with his army, the Massagetae fled to the desert. Craterus caught up with the Massagetae, and a small-scale and victorious battle happened, but he could not pursue them in the desert for a long time.¹⁴²

139 Arr. IV. 18. 7; Curt. VII. 11. 7.

140 Arr. IV. 19. 1-2; Curt. VII. 11.14-20; MetzEpit. 16; Polyæn. *strat.* IV. 3. 29.

141 See also Strab. XI. 11. 4; Polyæn. *strat.* IV. 3. 29; *It. Alex.* 97; MetzEpit. 15-18; see also Vacante 2012, 87-95; Rapin 2013, 59-79.

142 Arr. IV. 17. 1-2; see also Holt 1989, 64; Bosworth 1995, 113-114.

Alexander, who had got the Sogdian Rock divided the army this time into three parts.¹⁴³ He gave the lead of one part to Hephaestion, of the second to Artabazus and Coenus, and he himself commanded the third.¹⁴⁴ After he had subdued Sogdiana again, he returned to Maracanda (Curt. VIII. 1. 6). Here Alexander received a number of embassies from Saca tribes to the north and west of the Iaxartes¹⁴⁵. At the same time, Pharasmanes/Phrataphernes, king of Chorasmia, also came to make a treaty of friendship and alliance. Pharasmanes invited Alexander to assist him in a campaign against the neighbouring Colchians and Amazons¹⁴⁶. He told Pharasmanes that his first objective was India and that the conquest of the Black Sea was something he would consider later. He recommended Pharasmanes to Artabazus, whom he had left in charge of Bactria, and to all the other neighbouring satraps. He praised him and sent him back to his own area (Arr. IV. 15. 5-6). While Alexander was waiting for Hephaestion and Artabazus, he remained in the camp for a few days. After they arrived, they passed into Bazaira (Curt. VIII. 1. 10). In the summer of 328 BC, when Alexander returned to Maracanda, Artabazus requested that he be excused from his office, satrap of Bactria and Sogdiana, on the grounds of age.¹⁴⁷ Alexander accepted it and first appointed Cleitus the Black in his place (Curt. VIII. 1. 19-20). Artabazus, who was born in 387/6 BC, must have been about 60 years old at that time.¹⁴⁸ In that case, his old age is likely to have been a diplomatic excuse.¹⁴⁹ The regions of Bactria and Sogdiana had been offering fierce resistance against Alexander's sovereignty since 329 BC. Although the uprisings had been suppressed, this situation did not guarantee long-term control. Because there had to be various garrison bases in the satrapy, Artabazus would naturally have to work with one of the largest regional armies of the empire, and most of the army consisted of the Greeks.¹⁵⁰ The satrap, who would rule and command the army, would need to be able to establish his authority over them. As he was Persian, it seemed difficult for Artabazus to do this. Artabazus, in his previous offices of command given by Alexander, had experienced the difficulty. Alexander must have noticed the handicap from the very beginning. The reason for his

143 C. Rapin (2013, 56-57) claims that after the Sogdian Rock was captured, Alexander left Artabazus and his son Cophen here to keep control of the Sherabad Darya region. Therefore, Coenus continued the expedition against Spitamenes separately.

144 Curt. VIII. 1. 1: *Hephaestionem uni, Coenon alteri duces dederat, ipse ceteris praeerat*. Curt. VIII. 1. 10: *Utraque legatione benigne audita Hephaestionem et Artabazum opperians stativa habuit: quibus adiunctis in regionem, quae appellatur Bazaira, pervenit*. As it is understood from their previous offices, Artabazus and Coenus must have been together. Concerning the subject, see also Bosworth 1981, 33-34; Rapin 2013, 55-57; 2017, 99-100.

145 Curt. VIII. 1. 7-9. Arr. IV. 15. 1-5.

146 This narration of Arrian (IV. 15. 4-6) is in the passage before Alexander divided his army into five. Curtius (VIII. 1. 8-9) relates that it occurred after the Sogdian Rock while Alexander was waiting for Hephaestion and Artabazus in Maracanda. Arrian must probably have made a mistake in the succession of events.

147 Curt. VIII. 1. 19-20; Arr. IV. 17. 3.

148 Xen. *Hell.* V. 1. 28; Ages. III. 3; Corn. Nep. *Con.* IX. 2. 1-2; Plut. *Artax.* XXVII. 7; *Alex.* XXI. 4; Curtius (VI. 5. 4) claims that Artabazus was in his ninety-fifth year – a gross exaggeration. Concerning the subject, see also Berve 1926, no. 152; Atkinson 1994, 141; Weiskopf 1989, 55; Hornblower 1982, 173; Bosworth 1995, 118.

149 Bosworth 1995, 118.

150 Bosworth 1995, 118.

placing Artabazus in command, generally not alone but with Erigyus and Coenus was probably this. The realization of the necessity of a veteran Macedonian to be the satrap is not that surprising. But in order to maintain peace in the region, the sensitivities of local people needed to be taken into consideration. In any case, the people of Bactria and Sogdiana would prefer a Persian governor to a Macedonian satrap. Even if he could not constitute sufficient authority over the Macedonian soldiers, Artabazus, the descendant of Persian king Artaxerxes II, could easily do this over the local people. Furthermore, he could administer the urbanisation plan of the Macedonians much more effectively. As far as Alexander was concerned, a Persian by royal blood performing as the satrap of Bactria and Sogdiana would turn out to be more and more risky. However, the king had an important trump card against him: Artabazus' whole family was in his hands. It is probable that he did not wish to continue his task any longer, both because of the regions' most intractable nature and military problems and his awareness of Alexander's doubts and concerns. The potential difficulties which would be raised by the Macedonian soldiers might also be among the factors. Besides, he might have been highly disturbed by Alexander's brutal conduct against the local people and the rebels during the revolts in Sogdiana and Bactria.¹⁵¹ Artabazus preferred to leave his office because he was too old to bear such a heavy and delicate responsibility. It actually appears that Alexander desired to take the situation completely under his control by appointing Cleitus as Artabazus' successor. But after Alexander killed Cleitus in that famous banquet at Maracanda, he appointed Amyntas, son of Nicolaus, in his place.¹⁵² Later, he left two separate units under the command of Coenus and Amyntas. Giving the authority of supreme command to Coenus, he ordered them to spend the winter in Sogdiana to be prepared against the probable assaults of Spitamenes and ready to capture him (Arr. IV. 17. 3).

After 328 BC, there is not enough evidence about the male members of the Artabazus family. Alexander's relationship with Barsine lasted until the birth of Heracles in 327

151 In 479 BC, on the grounds that they had given Xerxes the temple at Didyma, he destroyed the city of Branchidae/Milesians inhabiting near Bactria and Sogdiana and killed the people (Curt. VII. 5. 28-35; Diod. XVII; Strab. XI. 11. 4; XIV. 1. 5; Plut. *mor.* VII. 557: *De Sera*; Suda β 514 s.v. Βραγχίδα= *Branchidae*). The men were killed, and the women and children were enslaved (Arr. IV. 2. 4); he razed the places around the Polytimetus (Zeravshan) river and killed those who defended the forts (Arr. IV. 6. 5). He had Ariamazes and his followers, who had surrendered, whipped and crucified (Curt. VII. 11. 28-29).

152 Curt. VIII. 1. 19 'Alexander, having accepted Artabazus' excuse of old age, made over his province to Cleitus'; VIII. 2. 14 'The province which he previously had intended for Cleitus he gave to Amyntas'. Arrian (IV. 17. 3) states that Alexander relieved Artabazus of the duty at his own request because of his age and appointed Amyntas, son of Nicolaus, as the satrap. Without mentioning the time when Cleitus replaced Artabazus, he directly refers to the transfer of authority to Amyntas. Arrian, before the narration of the Sogdian Rock, relates that Alexander removed Artabazus from his office. Curtius (VII. 11. 28-29) narrates that after the Sogdian/Ariamazes rock, Artabazus ceased to govern the rock and the adjoining region. In his other passages, he writes that Artabazus left his office before Cleitus was killed, and after Cleitus' death, Amyntas was appointed. Thanks to this piece of information, it is known that Artabazus left his post in c. 328 BC (Curt. VIII. 1. 19; VIII. 2. 14; see also Fox 1973, 318; 410; Bosworth 1981, 33-34; 1995, 118; see also 52; 112-113; Holt 1989, 65; Heckel 2020, 188-189).

BC¹⁵³. But when he married Roxane in the spring of 327 BC¹⁵⁴ everything changed. After that date, Alexander took a break in his relationship with Barsine or distanced himself from her.¹⁵⁵ Justin (XIII. 2. 7) records that when Alexander died, Barsine and Heracles were in Pergamum. It is thought that Barsine went to Pergamum after she gave birth to Heracles, probably after Alexander and Roxane's marriage.¹⁵⁶ Among these possibilities, another one could be added: she might have gone after Alexander's wedding at Susa in 324 BC. At the wedding ceremony at Susa, where the Macedonian aristocrats and the Persian noble girls matched, Alexander gave Barsine's daughter, who was by her first husband and whose name was not mentioned, to Nearchus of Crete (Arr. VII. 4. 2-7). He married Artabazus' daughter Artacama to Ptolemy and his other daughter Artonis to Eumenes.¹⁵⁷ It is not known whether Barsine took her other children by Mentor and Memnon with her while she was going to Pergamum or she had to leave them at Susa as captives. After the Susa marriage ceremony, Alexander drafted a select group of young nobles into the Companions' Cavalry and equipped them with Macedonian weapons (Arr. VII. 6. 4-5). Cophen, the son of Artabazus, was placed in the elite squadron. But these selected Persian aristocracies were not in positions of command, and they were also not vastly outnumbered. Alexander had probably chosen Cophen because he had successfully completed her mission in the Sogdian Rock.

Conclusion

The noble families naturally took place in the imperial administration. But the important point was to be able to exist within this system. The Persian dynasties maintained their prestige through strong family ties and support from family members. The family ties were strengthened by political and endogamic marriages. Artabazus married the sister of the Rhodian brothers, and he gave Memnon and Mentor important tasks within his provincial region. In 354/3 BC, the Artabazus family was removed from the royal system because they revolted against Artaxerxes III, and the satrapy of Dascylium, which had been granted to the Pharnacid dynasty, was taken away. In c. 342 BC, Mentor, who was appointed as the supreme command of the Asia Minor coasts, married his niece Barsine in order to increase the respectability of the family,

153 Heracles, who was Alexander's first and Barsine's fifth child, must have been born probably in c. 327 BC (Diod. XX. 20. 1-2) or later, in 324 BC at the latest (Iust XV. 2. 3) because Diodorus relates that Heracles was 17 in 309 BC and Justin writes that he was 14. Concerning the subject, see also Berve 1926, II 168 no. 353; Tarn 1921, 18-28; Carney 1996, 572 ff.; Heckel 2006, 138; Ogden 2009, 206 n. 17; Chugg 2012², 138 ff.

154 Arr. IV. 19. 5-6; 20. 4; Curt. VIII. 4. 21-30; 5. 7; Metz. Ept. 28-31; Plut. *Alex.* 47. 4-7; *mor.* 332c-e; 338d; see also Diod. XVIII. 1. 3. 3; *FGrHist* II B 260 F 3 (1-2) 'Porphyrios'= Euseb. *Arm.* p. 109. 8-113. 32; Justin XII. 15. 9; XIII. 2. 5-9; Strab. XI. 11. 4; see also Bosworth 1980a, 10-11; Carney 2000, 105-107; Müller 2012, 296-309.

155 Plut. *Alex.* XXI. 4: οὐτε τούτων ἔθιγεν οὔτε ἄλλην ἔγνω γυναῖκα πρὸ γάμου, πλὴν Βαρσίνης / "(to the wife and daughters of Darius III) neither touched nor had a relation with any woman before his marriage except Barsine". See also Carney 2000, 100.

156 Brosius 1996, 78. Concerning the subject, see also Brunt 1975, 22-34.

157 Concerning the subject also, see Plut. *Eum.* I. 3; XIX. 1; Arr. VII. 4. 4-8; Diod. XVII. 107. 6; Plut. *Alex.* LXX. 2-3; *mor.* *De Alex. Fort.* 329d-e; 338d; Justin XII. 10. 9-10; Curt. X. 3. 12; *FGrHist* 434 F 4. 4 'Memnon'; App. *Syr.* V.

which was left out of the royal administration and commissioned Artabazus' sons as commanders. But it was not easy for the family to erase the traces of the revolt against the king and to gain the trust of the Persian kings. After Mentor died, Memnon took his place. But for this to happen, he had to prove to the king his ability and loyalty. In 335-334 BC, he displayed his efficiency in the military expedition he conducted against Parmenion. In 334 BC after the defeat of Granicus, the key actors of the Persians chose to surrender to Alexander rather than resist him. This is one of the most important reasons of Alexander's success and his gaining such strength in Asia Minor. Mithrenes, phrouarch of Sardis, surrendered the treasury and citadel of Sardis (Arr. I. 17. 3). Thus, Alexander partly solved the financial crisis he had been in. The garrison commander Hegesistratus handed over Miletus to the king without resistance (Arr. I. 18. 4). Consequently, the Persian naval force lost a significant naval base. However, Memnon and his nephew Pharnabazus did not form an alliance with Alexander, whom they knew when they were in exile at Pella and with whom they had ties of guestship. On behalf of the Persian king, they continued to fight with all their might. Memnon guaranteed his loyalty to the king by sending both his and Pharnabazus' wife and children to Darius III as a sort of assurance. He displayed considerable resistance in the coastal cities against Alexander. Supported by Artabazus, who was in Persis near the king, he was appointed commander-in-chief of Asia Minor. At the same time, Artabazus paved the way in Persis for his sons and Mentor's son Thymondas to hold military posts in the army of the king. In 333 BC, before Memnon died, he had handed over his command to his nephew Pharnabazus, with whom he had fought against the enemy. Since Darius III had assembled most of his forces in Cilicia to fight Alexander, there were not efficient commanders available to send to Asia Minor, so he probably confirmed this appointment. Pharnabazus was a commander as skillful as Memnon. He took most of the coastal cities of Asia Minor under his control. But following the defeat of Issus and Alexander's Phoenicia conquest, with the departure of allied fleets, he lost his naval supremacy.

Artabazus did not regain his post at Dascylium, but he enjoyed an exalted position alongside king Darius III in the court hierarchy. Artabazus and his three sons (Arsames, Ariobarzanes, and Cophen) fought actively alongside the king in the battles of Issus and Gaugamela. After the defeat of Gaugamela, the Persian aristocrats and the peoples, such as the Scythians and Cadusians, realizing that Darius III had no chance left against Alexander, withdrew their support. A significant part of the Persians were thinking that Bessus was the only one who could defeat Alexander; therefore, they began to gather around him. However, Artabazus and his family exhibited unflinching loyalty to Darius III. While Darius was in a difficult situation, Artabazus became an influential adviser to him, trying to relieve the pressure of events, and remained loyal to him until the end. When Bessus and his followers arrested and killed Darius III, Artabazus and his three sons, instead of fighting alongside Bessus, chose to surrender to Alexander. Because he was related by blood to the Persian king Artaxerxes II, he managed to take part with his sons in the Macedonian royal system. Alexander gave granting them prominent positions in his administration. Such that, Alexander appointed him satrap of Bactria and

Sogdiana. His three sons became the negotiators, envoys, and translators of the king. Alexander, in accordance with his interests, continued to support the family and keep his friendship. As his network of alliances expanded, all his potential rivals on the Persian throne -such as Bessus and Spitamenes- were eliminated and his dominance over the regions- such as Bactria-Sogdiana- was consolidated, and this situation began to change. In the climate of success and expansion, there was less incentive to challenge the supremacy of Alexander. For that reason, the influence of the family gradually decreased and contracted. In 328 BC, Artabazus willingly left his post because of the possible problems he would have to face. But the Artabazus family remained within the administrative system. In 324 BC, Cophen was enrolled in the elite Macedonian cavalry squadron, in which small-scale members of carefully selected Persian/oriental families were placed. Alexander also secured their positions through political marriages. In the Persian and Macedonian kingdoms, only men could take part in political life; women were just figures in political marriages and gave continuity to the regime. Barsine, who was among the women of the Artabazus family, comes to the foreground. Through her endogamic marriage, she strengthened the political tie between the Pharnacid and the Rhodian family, and thanks to her illegitimate son, Heracles by Alexander, she retained her respectability in the eyes of the Macedonians. Alexander included Artabazus' daughters Artacama and Artonis and Barsine's daughter in his marriage alliance between the Macedonian and Persian nobles. Thanks to his sister Artonis, Pharnabazus commanded the mercenary cavalry under his brother-in-law, Eumenes of Cardia, during the Diadochi period.

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