

**STAFF CUTBACK AS A STRATEGY OF THE POLICY
OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF GOVERNMENT: A
GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MOTHERLAND
PARTY GOVERNMENTS' STRATEGY OF STAFF
CUTBACK IN THE TURKISH CIVIL SERVICE
(1984-1990)***

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Abstract

In the face of fierce criticisms against the role, size and performance of government, searching strategies to limit the role and size and improve the performance of government has been one of the fundamental goals of many governments all over the world since the early 1980s. Staff cutback is also considered as one the basic strategies of the policy of the withdrawal of government since the staffing aspect of government is a significant element of the problem of government size and performance. With the effect of criticisms against the size and widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of the Turkish Civil Service, the Motherland Party (MP) Governments under the premiership of Mr. Turgut Özal aimed to have a smaller size and more efficient-effective bureaucracy. In this paper, the staff cutback strategy pursued by the MP Governments in the Turkish Civil Service in the period of 1984-1990 has been examined. Despite their New Rightist rhetoric, the MP Governments could not cutback the staff size of the Turkish Civil Service in both absolute and relative terms. The existence of civil service guarantees and the populist policies pursued in the face of increased political competition towards the end of period were the most significant obstacles to the success of the MP Governments. However, the overall effects of the MP

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governments on the growth of the Turkish Civil Service was quite restrictive. Therefore, this period can be considered as the restraint years since the rate of increase in the Turkish Civil Service staff was lowered significantly rather than as a period of cutback.

Keywords: The withdrawal of government, staff cutback strategy, public sector employment, the civil service, the Motherland (MP) Party, Turgut Özal.

Öz

Devletin Küçültülmesi Politikasının Bir Stratejisi Olarak Personel Azaltma: Anavatan Partisi Hükümetlerinin Türk Merkezi Kamu Yönetiminde Personel Azaltma Stratejisinin Genel Bir Değerlendirmesi

Devletin rolü, boyutu ve performansına ilişkin şiddetli eleştiriler karşısında, Devletin rolünü ve boyutunu sınırlamaya ve performansını iyileştirmeye yönelik stratejilerin araştırılması 1980'lerin başlarından itibaren dünya çapında pek çok hükümetin asli amaçlarından birisidir. Personel azaltma da, kamu istihdamı Devletin boyut ve performans sorununun önemli bir unsuru olduğu için Devletin küçültülmesi politikasına ilişkin temel stratejilerden biri olarak görülür. Türk Merkezi Kamu Yönetiminin boyutuna yönelik eleştirilerin ve onun performansına ilişkin yaygın tatminsizliğin etkisiyle, Turgut Özal'ın Başbakanlığını yaptığı Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) Hükümetleri daha küçük boyutlu ve daha etkin ve etkili bir bürokrasiye sahip olmayı amaçlamışlardır. Bu makalede, ANAP Hükümetleri tarafından Türk Merkezi Kamu Yönetiminde 1984-1990 döneminde takip edilen personel (devlet memuru) azaltma stratejisi incelenmiştir. Yeni Sağcı söylemine rağmen, ANAP Hükümetleri, Türk Merkezi Kamu Yönetimi personelini hem mutlak hem de nispi değerler açısından azaltamamışlardır. Memur güvencelerinin varlığı ve dönemin sonuna doğru artan siyasi rekabet karşısında izlenen popülist politikalar ANAP Hükümetleri'nin başarısı önündeki en büyük engelleri oluşturmuşlardır. Bununla birlikte, ANAP Hükümetleri'nin Türk Merkezi Kamu Yönetiminin büyümesi üzerindeki etkisi oldukça kısıtlayıcı olmuştur. Bu sebeple, bu dönem bir personel azaltma döneminden ziyade, Türk Merkezi Kamu Yönetimi personelindeki artış oranının önemli ölçüde azaltıldığı kısıtlama yılları olarak görülebilir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Devletin küçültülmesi, personel azaltma stratejisi, kamu sektörü istihdamı, merkezi kamu yönetimi-devlet memurluğu, Anavatan Partisi (ANAP), Turgut Özal.

INTRODUCTION

The public sector has become topical issue because of profound changes in its economic and political-ideological conditions since the late 1970s.¹ In many countries, especially in the Western world, the renewed interest of political and academic circles in the public sector result from a number of factors, inter-linked in a variety of combinations. The economic and financial challenges and difficulties of the 1970s and 1980s, including slowing down growth rates, changing international commodity market and increasing international competition originated by mainly East Asian economies, made it increasingly difficult for Western governments to control their economies and to extract revenue from them by mainly reaping the private economy. This led to budgetary deficits, then sharp increase in public sector borrowing, foreign debts and interest rates, and eventually high inflation and unemployment. This situation became more serious with the rising demands for welfare services and their increasing costs. This gave rise to the changes in ideological perceptions about the role of government in social and economic life and then the collapse of post-war consensus based on Keynesian economic management and the institutional-universal welfare state in the Western world. All these developments placed new demands on cutback and privatisation policies at first stage and then on the search for the most suitable efficiency scrutiny and improvement programmes for the public sector. The collapse of command-and-control economies in the former Soviet Union and Central-Eastern Europe and the failure of government-dominated development strategies in developing countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s completed the picture. Thus, in practice, economic and political-ideological conditions overlapped and reinforced each other. As a consequence, the whole landscape of the public sector has changed over the last two decades.

The issue of government size and performance (i.e. public sector efficiency) is, in fact, nothing new. This perpetual problem is reflected very well by the views of general public, politicians and academics on government and its bureaucracy (see Downs and Larkey, 1986; Goodsell, 1994). However, reform efforts in the public sector before 1980s were undertaken as mainly a technical activity to improve the ability of government within the sphere of the traditional public administration understanding. The size and performance of government has become a lively issue again since the late 1970s between politicians, academics and practitioners with the simultaneous and contradictory effects of budget deficits and taxpayers' pressures. Since then, governmental failure has been considered as a political-ideological problem in addition to its technical (economic-managerial) aspect. The debate of the post-1980 period has, therefore, been about the appropriate role, size and capacity of government in society. In other words, it has been about redefining the boundaries between

the public and private sectors in favour of the latter in the face of governmental failure and improving the capacity of government in undertaking the new role envisaged for it within the limits of its new size. With the effect of this debate, the opposition to the “big government” (see Rose, 1984) has gained ground since the late 1970s; and then the “withdrawal of government” (see Christensen, 1988), developed to overcome the problem of big government, has become the official policy of many liberal-conservative governments in Western Europe and North America. This ideological climate has spread to other countries and affected even some social democrat governments. Under these conditions, the role, size, values, structure and functioning of national public sectors and civil services have been affected deeply all over the world.

Purpose of the Paper: In the post-war period, it was not commonly acceptable to question the size and performance of the public sector. The unions reacted strongly against the idea and most policy-makers tacitly accepted their arguments (Rosen, 1984). In the last quarter of the twentieth century, however, significant change in this attitude can be observed at both academic and political circles (Christensen, 1988: 56). In the face of strong criticisms against the size and performance of government, efficiency, in both allocative and productive senses, has become a global pressure on governments (Welch and Wong, 1998). At the beginning of 1980s, Sir Bancroft (1981), then Head of the British Home Civil Service, was talking about a “smaller”, “leaner” and also “fitter” civil service. With the impacts of this global pressure appeared in many different parts of the world, cutting back the size of the civil service and searching efficiency-oriented institutions and mechanisms within the civil service, has become a favourite goal of many governments since the early 1980s.

As in the case of other national civil services, the Turkish Civil Service has long been attacked by political, academic and business circles, and media from different ideological standpoints on several grounds. It has strongly been argued that the Turkish Civil Service has been oversized, overstaffed, bloated and cumbersome; has become self-interested and unresponsive to the public; has been infected by widespread corruption; and, therefore, has lost its ability to manage public affairs efficiently. It has also been claimed that the Turkish Civil Service has become one of the main obstacles to the economic development that has been mainly fuelled by the Turkish private sector recently (see Güner, 1975; TÜSİAD, 1983; Çapoğlu, 1997; Aktan, 1999a). While Turkey is a member of the OECD and the G-20 and an official candidate for full membership of the EU, some of her socio-political and administrative features (e.g. political spoil and nepotism, corruption, and widespread waste in public bureaucracy) still resemble those of developing countries. Therefore, the origin of a need for a comprehensive civil service reform programme aiming efficiency in Turkey comes from both severe pressures from outside circles, mainly the EU and

international financial institutions such as the IMF, the OECD and the World Bank (see Güler, 1996), and endogenously perceived requirements for development objective based on the private sector which are mainly articulated by the Turkish bourgeoisie (see TÜSİAD, 1983). Taking the general trend on this issue within the OECD and, in particular, the EU regions as a yardstick, Turkey clearly does need to take a serious action in this direction.

In brief, the fierce criticisms against the role and size and widespread dissatisfaction with the structure, operation, and performance of the Turkish Civil Service lead us to analyse the staffing aspect of the Turkish Civil Service. Unfortunately, there is no simple and objective way to establish an optimal size of civil service and debates on the issues of governmental and organisational size still continue (see Lane, 1993; Goodsell, 1994). It cannot be denied, however, that civil service staffing is inseparable part of the size and performance problems of the civil service. Staff cutback strategy should be examined in order to get some clues in sorting out these problems. In this paper, staff cutback strategy will be examined with special reference to the strategy pursued by the Motherland Party (MP) (*Anavatan Partisi-ANAP*) Governments under Mr. Turgut Özal's premiership in the period of 1984-1990 in Turkey.

In order to solve heavy political and economic crises experienced in the late 1970s the New Rightist movement, constituted itself in the MP, tried to establish a "new hegemony" (see Jessop, 1983) in Turkey during the 1980s. With its liberal orientation in economic issues and conservative orientation in moral issues, the MP under the leadership of Mr. Özal was an agent ready for action. Partly with the personal ideological choice of Mr. Özal and partly as a result of the worldwide tendency, the MP pursued such an aim enthusiastically (see Tünay, 1993). As in the many Western cases, this attempt was identified with the policy of withdrawal of government.

Staff cutback strategy pursued in many Western countries is mainly based on two aims: ideological aim (i.e. to reduce the size and the role of government) and economic aim (i.e. economic efficiency). These anti-government aims were shared by the MP governments in Turkey as well. The MP Governments aimed to have a smaller size and more efficient-effective bureaucracy with the effect of New Right ideology. However, a certain political interest (i.e. rendering the bureaucracy into a loyal and party-book one) was also sought by them through the pressure of staff cutback over the bureaucracy. Thus, the staff cutback strategy was also used as an indirect tool to achieve this political-party interest.

Many strategies of the MP Governments pursued within the framework of the policy of the withdrawal of government (e.g. trade liberalisation and privatisation) produced reactions in national and international public opinions.

In order to avoid any possible reactions from the opposition parties and the civil servants, the MP governments, however, preferred to follow a “low-profile strategy” in the field of staff cutback. As a matter of fact, the elimination and purge operations of the Military Regime (1980-1983) and the transition from the civil service status to the contracted personnel status in the state owned enterprises and public utilities during the MP Governments attracted more attention of some writers (see, for example, Dodd, 1990: 52; Younis, Ibrahim and McLean, 1992: 27-30). Whereas, the staff cutback strategy pursued by the MP Governments was the most significant attempt, with that of the previous Military Regime, in the modern history of the Turkish Civil Service. Moreover, the MP Governments were the most important civilian governments attempted to cut the size of the Civil Service under the conditions of competitive politics. Therefore, it is worthy to examine this strategy in the face of the importance of its political-ideological and economic aims and its affects on the Civil Service.

Since the MP Governments shared similar ideological aims and followed, more or less, similar socio-economic policies adopted by many liberal-conservative governments in Western countries, it is expected that the MP Governments (1984-1990) could cutback the size of the Turkish Civil Service in terms of employment or, at least, restrain the growth of the Civil Service staff. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to find out: **(i)** empirically whether and to what extent the Turkish public sector in general and Turkish Civil Service in particular was cutback by the MP Governments in terms of its staff aspect; **(ii)** what sorts of (e.g. historical-political, socio-economic, legal, and bureaucratic) constraints and opportunities appeared on the road of staff cutback strategy; and **(iii)** basic patterns of change in the size of staff in the Turkish Civil Service as a result of the implementation of the staff cutback strategy during this period.

Scope of the Paper: The scope of the paper is restricted in several points. **(i)** Since the Civil Service is the main body of the Turkish public sector; and civil service staff is seen as an undeniable part of the size and performance problems of the public sector, this study has been devoted to the analysis of the staff cutback strategy pursued in the Turkish Civil Service.

(ii) Although the staff cutback strategy was used by the Military Regime in the early 1980s, only the 1984-1990 period, so-called the “Özal Period”², has been analysed. However, some general comparisons have been made between the period of Military Regime (1980-1984) and the period of MP Governments (1984-1990) in order to understand the general trends in public employment in the Turkish public sector as a whole as well as in the Turkish Civil Service.

(iii) Since the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments has been analysed at one aspect of macro-level (i.e. the general effects of the staff

cutback strategy on the “size” of the staff in whole civil service), the other aspect (i.e. “composition” of the civil service staff) of macro level has been omitted.³ Meso-level (i.e. departmental or agency level effects of the cutbacks) and micro-level (i.e. professional or individual effects of the cutbacks) issues have, in principle, also been excluded from the analysis. Therefore, apart from some general remarks, empirical efficiency results and detailed explanations about organisational, intra-organisational, professional and individual aspects of staff cutback strategy have not been included in this paper.

Perspective and Method of the Paper: The civil service has a kaleidoscopic nature because the issues concerning the civil service go beyond legal-bureaucratic problems and arise from economic-financial difficulties and problems of a political-ideological in nature. The civil service is, therefore, at the point of intersection of various disciplines such as political science, public law, public administration, administrative history, economics, and management. In this paper, the civil service has been mainly treated from the point of view of political economy of bureaucracy. However, the importance of a historical-comparative perspective of bureaucracy has always kept in mind.⁴ It is believed, therefore, that our perspective is broad enough to accommodate the various dimensions of the civil service (e.g. political interactions; institutional arrangements and managerial practices; bureaucratic culture) in order to explain the staff cutback strategy properly. This differentiates our study considering the interrelationships between economics, politics and management from narrow economic or management studies on cutback management and from conventional reform studies based on traditional public administration concepts. With such a perspective, some powerful insights can be sought by going beyond the artificially created disciplinary boundaries in order to understand the true nature of the economics, politics and management of staff cutback strategy.

The determination of this perspective is very important but not an adequate step since the staff cutback strategy needs to be examined empirically in this paper. Politicians and their policy advisers have spoken of the need to cut public employment in the face of government growth in almost every country. However, cutback is not an easy task. A great deal of academic thought has been given to explain the problem of government growth, but there has been no comparable attention paid to explain how to achieve cutbacks; and how to analyse cutback strategy and its results. In this paper, a theoretical framework has been developed through reviewing the literature on “cutback management” (Dunsire and Hood, 1989) and “bureaumerics” (Hood and Dunsire, 1981) in order to empirically examine this strategy pursued in the Turkish Civil Service.

Basic Concepts of the Paper: Although some basic concepts for this paper (e.g. the policy of the withdrawal of government, staff cutback strategy)

have been defined in detail in sections concerned, another basic or key concept, “civil service”, needs to be clarified at this stage. The civil service has been part of the day to day vocabulary of public affairs but the underlying meaning of the term has been elastic both in English and Turkish.⁵ Since there is no well-established term in the Turkish language corresponding to the “civil service” in English, we can approach this problem in three ways in respect to the Turkish case: “Organisational structure”, “budget”, and “personnel”. Although the term civil service has never been defined both in the literature and legal-official documents in terms of organisational structure, the main part of the central government, excluding the Ministry of Defence and other bodies related to the Armed Forces, and some quasi-governmental bodies is considered as the equivalent of the British Civil Service. However, the Turkish central government covers many public services such as health, education, social security and internal security that are mainly provided by the central or local authorities-outside the Civil Service-in the U.K. Central government departments which are financed by the consolidated government budget (general and annexed budgets), special budgets and revolving budgets; and some civil central government bodies which are financed by fund budgets form the Turkish Civil Service in terms of budget allocations. Local governments, state-owned enterprises and public utilities, and some quasi-governmental bodies that are financed by their own resources as well as by the consolidated budget are out of the scope of the Civil Service. The Civil Servants’ Law (CSL) dated 1965 and numbered 657 (art. 4) has brought a broad definition of civil servant for personnel employed in the state-owned enterprises-public utilities, local governments as well as ones employed in the central government. This definition covers almost all public employees except workers, contracted and temporary personnel in the Turkish public sector and it goes beyond the scope of the paper since our main concern is the central government.

What we mean by the Civil Service for Turkey in this paper is that the central government departments (*merkezi hükümet kuruluşları/merkezi kamu yönetimi*)-except the Ministry of Defence and other bodies related to the Armed Forces and some quasi-governmental bodies-which are financed by the consolidated, special, revolving and fund budgets; and personnel (civil servants/*devlet memurları*) employed in those departments and universities, excluding ministers and members of the Parliament, members of the Armed Forces, civilian personnel employed in the Ministry of Defence and the National Intelligence Organisation, judicial officials, academic officials, personnel employed in the Presidential Office and the Parliament and personnel employed in some quasi-governmental bodies. Thus, it can be said that the Turkish Civil Service embraces civilian public servants (civil servants) of certain central government departments that are employed on a permanent statutory basis (see also Mihçioğlu, 1964: 90, 92). In this context, civilian public servants that are

employed on a similar permanent statutory basis in local governments and the state owned enterprises and public utilities are kept out of scope of the Civil Service. Also, some types of public servants (i.e. contracted personnel, temporary personnel, and workers) that are employed on a contractual basis in different levels of government do not normally take place in the scope of the Civil Service. In brief, the term Turkish Civil Service covers only central government departments and civil servants employed in those departments in this paper.

Structure of the Paper: In order to achieve the purpose of this paper mentioned above, **(i)** in the first section, political-ideological, economic and managerial background of staff cutback strategy will be examined within the general framework of the policy of withdrawal of government; the role and effects of staff cutback strategy in creating a limited and efficiency-oriented government (and civil service) will be established; and staff cutback experiences in the OECD region⁶, in particular the striking British experience in the period of the Thatcher Governments (1979-1990) which corresponds to the period in which the Military Regime (1980-1983) and the MP Governments (1984-1990) pursued similar strategies in Turkey, will also be overviewed; and then **(ii)** in the second section, the staff cutback strategy pursued by the MP Governments under the premiership of Mr. Özal in the Turkish Civil Service will be empirically examined in this context.

This endeavour will help us to understand the approach of the MP as an anti-bureaucracy political party to the Turkish public bureaucracy in general and to the issue of employment in the Turkish Civil Service in particular.

I. THE POLICY OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF GOVERNMENT: POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC AND MANAGERIAL BACKGROUND OF STAFF CUTBACK STRATEGY

Staff cutback strategy pursued in the public sector in general and in the civil service in particular is a highly controversial and intricate topic because of its political-ideological, economic and managerial dimensions. These dimensions of staff cutback strategy can only be understood if it is evaluated within the context of the general policy of the withdrawal of government.

I.1. The Policy of the Withdrawal of Government: Political- Ideological, Economic, and Managerial Dimensions

Since the opposition to the big government has gained political ground since the late 1970s, the withdrawal of government has become official policy of liberal-conservative governments in many countries. It should be pointed out

that the withdrawal of government is not a completely coherent policy because there is no clear-cut consensus on the phenomenon of big government. Therefore, governments have responded to the phenomenon of big government through various strategies. As Christensen states, withdrawal of government: «is an apt term used to characterise a multitude of political goals and policy strategies to which many governments of the 1980s adhere. What unites them is the belief that the public sector has grown too fat, and that a withdrawal of government from some of its present activities and from its present size will cure some of the evils for which they blame the public sector and more specifically the welfare state» (1988: 40). With this policy, government has been asked to return to the line of its traditional functions and to perform them efficiently. It has, therefore, important implications for national public bureaucracies since the role, authority and resources granted them have been more and more questioned and tried to be restricted (Rosenau, 1982: 256).

Variations in institutional structures and political-bureaucratic cultures among countries also explain why some governments put special emphasis on certain parts of this policy and therefore why they are successful in such areas. Despite such variations, this policy has political, economic and managerial dimensions evolved since the early 1980s. We can categorise its main sets of goals and strategies to achieve these goals (Christensen, 1988) as follows:

I.1.1. Redefinition of the Role of Government

The “government failure” (see Peirce, 1981; Le Grand, 1991; Pitelis, 1991; Wolf, 1993) and the “crisis of the welfare state” (see George and Wilding, 1984; Mishra, 1984, 1990; Taylor-Gooby, 1985; Pierson, 1991) have been main arguments to justify the “redefinition of the role of government” since the late 1970s. Government intervention in economy is usually justified on the ground of market failures. Government intervention may, however, introduce other distortions into the economy. It may result in a failure to achieve an efficient allocation of resources; a failure to satisfy consumers’ preferences; and an increase in bureaucratic waste and X-inefficiency. Thus, government failure has been a common problem as much as market failure. In close relation with government failure, the welfare state has been questioned and challenged in the face of efficiency and legitimacy problems concerning the state welfare provision. Welfare pluralism (i.e. commercial, voluntary and informal sectors beside government) has been encouraged to overcome the crisis of the welfare state. Demands to attribute less producing and regulatory role but more co-ordinating, facilitating and financing role for government have increased.

In this context, the following strategies have been pursued in order to redefine the role of government: **a)** “Deregulation of the economy” (i.e. lifting

regulatory constraints on the economy and abolishing public regulatory institutions and mechanisms; liberalisation and market reforms; transition from statutory regime to flexible regime in public employment); and **b)** “dismantling the institutional-universal welfare state” (i.e. replacing the institutional-universal welfare model with the residual-selective one through substituting income transfers for state provided and subsidised institutional services).

I.1.2. Rolling Back the Frontiers of the Public Sector

Since the public sector was considered too large by the liberal-conservative governments in the face of the new role assigned to government, the policy of rolling back the frontiers of the public sector has been pursued since the early 1980s (see Oxley and Martin, 1991; Jackson, 2003). This is not simply a case of reducing the provision of public services, but generally it emphasises transferring service provision to the private sector as much as possible and making whole economy more responsive to market discipline.

Within this framework, the following strategies have been used: **a)** “Reducing legislative and executive activities” (i.e. cutting down the number of legal-administrative documents); **b)** “reducing the scope of administrative structure” (i.e. cutting down the number and size of public organisations and the scope of whole administrative structure); **c)** “cutting back public expenditure” (i.e. budget cuts; efficiency savings; public sector pay freezes); **d)** “cutting back public employment” (i.e. recruitment freeze, early retirement; dropping or curtailing functions; rational use of workforce; contracting-out; hiving-off); **e)** “privatisation” (i.e. transferring ownership; the application of market principles into the public services; encouraging non-statutory, mainly private, provision of public services through franchising, contracting-out, user charges); and **f)** “tax reform” (i.e. tax cuts, reduction of tax scales, redesign of tax structure).

I.1.3. Changes in Values, Structures, Processes, Practices and Techniques in the Public Sector: The New Public Management

In addition to the demands for redrawing the role and size of government, there have been strong pressures to change the way of management of the public sector. Even if the public sector is downsized, whatever remained in the public sector could still function in a traditional bureaucratic way. Thus, the problem of management (i.e. efficient and effective use of resources) in this smaller public sector has still been waiting to resolve. This reality has forced governments to search a new system of management for this new public sector. The search for more efficient provision of public services has been expanded to a “general crusade” to reorganise the public sector and to introduce new forms of management to the civil service (Christensen, 1988: 55). Therefore, another

anti-governmental trend against the traditional values, structures, processes and techniques has gained ground and deeply affected national public sectors and civil services all over the world. A cost-conscious, de-bureaucratized, market-oriented and customer-favoured public service has become an “ideal” system to build. The provision of public services by more able managers and more flexible structures and processes in accordance with both efficiency criteria and wishes of consumers has become the central theme with the effect of the “new public management” (NPM) approach (see Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1993; Aucoin, 1995; Ferlie *et al.*, 1996; Minogue, Polidano and Hulme, 1998; Ömürgönülşen, 1997, 2000b) which have hitherto dominated academic thinking and the practice of public administration globally (Gray and Jenkins, 1995: 75-76).

Within this framework, the main debate and the related strategies developed around this debate are as follows: **a)** “Paradigmatic change in the approach to the public sector” (i.e. the critique of the traditional public administration approach and the emergence of the new public management approach); and **b)** “changes in values, attitudes, structures, processes, practices and techniques in the public sector” (i.e. importing business culture; the application of market-type mechanisms and managerial techniques).

I.2. Staff Cutback as one of the Significant Strategies of the Policy of the Withdrawal of Government

Staff cutback is one of the strategies of the policy of the withdrawal of government since the staff aspect of government is considered as one of the significant elements of the problem of big government.

I.2.1. The Strategy of Staff Cutback: Technical Aspects

The term “cutback” refers to actions associated with expenditure and staff reductions⁷ in the public sector since the late 1970s (see Hood, Dunsire and Thomson, 1988; Dunsire and Hood, 1989). The need for contraction of budgetary resources is the overriding factor behind staff cutback as well as expenditure cutback. The financial result of staff cutback strategy is particularly important since there is a direct relation between the number and type of staff and its financial burden on governmental budgets (see Hildreth, 1993).

Several factors affect the success of a cutback strategy in the public sector (see Ross, 1997: 176; Jones, 1998: 167-171): **a)** Consensus on political and economic necessities of cutbacks (e.g. political preferences and priorities; financial deficits); **b)** the political commitment and the technical ability of political power; **c)** bureaucratic traditions (e.g. bureaucratic resistance to change); **d)** social traditions (e.g. social values protecting all or certain groups

of employee in society); **e)** legal constraints (e.g. civil service regulations); **f)** the selection and use of cutback techniques.

There are various cutback techniques to be used by public managers authorised by the government. Each cutback technique has its own advantage and disadvantage. The combination of these techniques also affects the success of a staff cutback strategy. These techniques can be classified in different ways (see Levine, 1978; Rubin, 1985; Jones, 1998): **a)** "Voluntary-natural staff cuts" are based on either the personal will of public employee as in the case of early retirement schemes with benefits or natural attrition through retirement, resignation and death. Staff cut based on the will of public employee is the easiest way of staff cutback since it does not hurt anyone. **b)** "Non-voluntary staff cuts" are done by public managers without any consultation with public employees as in the cases of cuts based on performance, contracting-out and hiving-off. Since public employees are forced to leave their offices or, most importantly, their jobs, this type of cut is the most difficult way of cutback. **c)** "Across-the-board cuts" refer to "sharing the pain" by all public organisations, their sub-units, and all public employees, irrespective of impacts of cuts on the long-term capacity of the organisation and their sub-units. This type of cuts is easier for political and bureaucratic authorities because it is socially acceptable, easier to justify, and involves few decision-making costs. **d)** "Selective cuts" refer to making cuts in accordance with the contributions of organisational sub-units and public employees to organisational performance, irrespective of their distribution. Therefore, they involve costly process of decision-making.

Cutback techniques can also be grouped from the simplest one to the most difficult one: **a)** "Natural attrition" reduces the size of staff through resignation, retirement, and death. **b)** "Hiring freezes" and "personnel ceilings" prohibit an agency from filling vacated positions and authorising new ones. They are convenient short-run strategies to buy time and preserve options without hurting anyone already employed because they rely on natural attrition to diminish the staff size. In the long-run, however, they are barely the most equitable or efficient ways to seal down staff size. They may harm organisations, organisational sub-units and professional groups differently since attrition is likely to occur at different rates among them. **c)** "Hiving-off" is a transfer of staff to other in-house units, other public organisations or other employment status. Some degree of "creative accounting" or "statistical re-classification" usually creeps into figures of cuts. Therefore, it can be regarded as a way of "massaging" staff figures since the total size of employment is not changed even if the size of staff in a certain organisation or in a certain level of the government is reduced. **d)** "Early retirement" is a scheme in which public employees are encouraged or forced to retire if they are at a certain age and/or complete a certain length of service. In its voluntary type, an encouraging

benefit scheme is provided for them. If a generous early retirement programme is offered, the result is likely that anybody who is capable of getting a job in the private sector go off, while the mediocre stay behind. e) Various forms of “privatisation” (e.g. load-shedding; contracting-out) are very influential in diminishing the staff size. f) “Non-voluntary cuts-in-force” is the most difficult technique for cutback. The principal criteria used for decisions on such cuts fall into four groups: functional area (e.g. technical staff vs. general administrative staff; white collars vs. blue collars); positional level (e.g. higher ranks vs. lower ranks); service length (e.g. tenured employees vs. newcomers); performance.

I.2.2. Staff Cutback as a Tool for Limited and Efficiency-Oriented Civil Service

The problem with government is about both its role and size in social and economic affairs (“what are the functions that governments should involved in?”) and its way of operation (“how should government do its functions?). It has often been claimed that government is inefficient because either resources are allocated wrongly or public services are not supplied at minimum cost. Within this context, public sector managers face two efficiency problems in practice: First, they need to decide what kind and how much a public service should be produced (i.e. allocative efficiency); and second, they need to produce it at minimum cost (i.e. X-efficiency) (Jackson, 1988: 6-8; Jackson and Palmer, 1988: 200; Mulreany, 1991). Therefore, it has been argued that public spending and employment should be cut or, at least, restrained and the bureaucracy should be forced to work more efficiently.

First type of efficiency problem is more normative since there is no objective way to establish an optimal and universally accepted size for government. The mixture of financial difficulties and anti-government political orientation has led to the commitment to “cut” government through cutbacks and privatisation. The second type of efficiency problem is more operational-instrumental. Searching answer to this problem has led to the “performance improvement programmes”. However, these two problems are closely interrelated. In other words, first, government must be downsized (i.e. reduction in the relative share of the government in the national economy); and second, whatever remained in this smaller public sector should be better managed (i.e. providing at least the same level of public service with relatively fewer resources). Thus, the first problem has an external and economic nature; the second problem has an internal and managerial nature. The policy of withdrawal of government contains various strategies dealing with both of these problems. Staff cutback strategy is directly related to the size of civil service and affects the allocative efficiency of civil service through staff cuts. At the same time, it is indirectly related to the performance of civil service and affects the X-

efficiency of civil service through changing the composition and activity of civil service staff. Thus, the significance of staff cutback strategy in terms of both the size and performance (i.e. both allocative and X-efficiencies) of the civil service is quite obvious. However, as it can be expected, main attention has been given to the first problem in this paper since staff cutback is more often regarded as a strategy concerned with the reducing the size of the civil service within the general framework of the policy of withdrawal of government.

Although the staff cutback strategy of the MP governments will not be evaluated quantitatively in terms of its empirical efficiency results, the role and effect of this strategy in creating limited and efficiency-oriented civil service should be established since this strategy changes the size, structure and composition and then affects the operation of a civil service. It is certainly a tool which has a potential for betterment in terms of overall efficiency in comparison to the present situation by removing the factors considered as the sources of both allocative and X-inefficiencies in the civil service.⁸ Therefore, like many other strategies of the policy of withdrawal of government, staff cutback can be considered as a tool for a limited and efficiency-oriented civil service.

I.3. Main Trends in Public Sector Employment and Staff Cutback Experiences in the OECD Region during the 1980s

The main trends in public sector employment and overall results of staff cutback experiences will be examined with special reference to the 1980s that was the heyday of cutbacks especially in the OECD region. This brief examination of the liberal-conservative governments' cutback attempts in this period is likely to give some useful insights when the staff cutback record of the MP governments (1984-1990) is evaluated.

Public employment is one of the fundamental components of the public sector. Firstly, public employees provide services ranging from traditional public services to modern welfare services. Secondly, public employment is a substantial portion of total employment and it tends to grow faster than employment in the private sector. Thirdly, public employment is the principal source of income of millions of people and the pay of public employees makes a major claim upon tax revenues (Rose, 1986: 69). Fourthly, government is the biggest employer in an economy and the membership of trade union is quite high among public employees (Fredman and Morris, 1989). Finally, voting behaviour of public employees is considered as a reason for public sector expansion by public choice writers (Blais, Blake and Dion, 1991, 1997). All these factors bring an economic and political dimension to public employment.

Although there are some difficulties in defining public employment in terms of all levels and forms of government for a comparative study⁹, it can be said that over the post-war period, big government on an employment dimension has arrived in Western countries (see Rose, 1985). In most individual countries and for the OECD region as a whole, the share of general government employment¹⁰ in total employment increased steadily between the years of 1960 and 1980 (e.g. the OECD average is 11.0 percent in 1960; 13.2 percent in 1970; 15.3 percent in 1975; and 17.2 percent in 1980) (Saunders and Klau, 1985: 63). Public employment increased particularly in welfare services such as health and education (Rose, 1986: 79-80). As a matter of fact, the growth of public sector employment and financial burden of personnel expenditure on national economies in the 1970s (Oxley and Martin, 1991: 165-168) draw the liberal-conservative governments' attention to public sector employment.¹¹

The New Rightist political and academic circles have long argued that the public sector is overstaffed, public employees are overpaid and extremely well-protected by statutory laws and therefore they are not motivated to work efficiently (see Downs and Larkey, 1986: Chp.1). They have considered that "overstaffing" and "overpaying" are the basic reasons for inefficiency in the public sector. The size question was debated extensively including the desirable ratio of civil servants to total public employment, total labour force and total population; the total cost of civil service (i.e. personnel expenditure) to GDP; and techniques for ensuring the optimum use of civil servants. In this context, the staff cutback strategy took a significant place in the agenda of the liberal-conservative governments in the 1980s. Almost all OECD countries, whether they had liberal-conservative governments or not, tried to streamline the public sector; to freeze or reduce public employment; and to use civil service staff rationally through various measures in those years (see Rubin, 1985: Chp.1,2; Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Gore, 1993; OECD, 1993a, 1994, 1995; Jones, 1998: Chp.1). As "civil service" was considered as the most prominent status of public employment, a cutback strategy was pursued in national civil services as well as in the rest of the public sector. For example, both the Reagan and Thatcher administrations tried to "de-privilege" and then "discipline" their national civil services through cutback measures and private sector practices (see Pollitt, 1993: Chp.3). Thus, the size, composition and cost of civil service have become controversial matters. However, all these governments had to bear the worsening problem of unemployment in their minds while pursuing such strategies (Muhammad, 1988: 25; see also Dunsire and Hood, 1989).

As a result of the staff cutback strategy, employment growth in the general government sectors of OECD countries slowed substantially during the 1980s compared with the 1970s. As it is seen in Table (I.1), the average share of general government employment in total employment rose between 1979 (16.5

percent) and 1984 (18.0 percent), and stabilised thereafter at around 18.0 percent. However, the OECD average (weighted-15.6 percent and unweighted-18.2 percent) in 1990 was still higher than the average in 1979 (weighted-15.3 percent and unweighted 16.5 percent). Only in the U.S., the U.K., Australia and Japan, it fell slightly below the level of 1979. The British record (declined from 21.2 percent to 19.6 percent) also diverged from continental European cases.

Table-I.1: General Government Sector Employment in Some Selected OECD Countries (Share in Total Employment, %)

Countries	1979	1984	1990 (1)
Australia (2)	16.2	17.4	15.6
Belgium (3)	18.3	19.9	19.9
Canada	19.5	20.8	20.6
Denmark	26.9	30.2	30.1
France (2)	19.9	22.1	22.8
Germany	14.7	15.5	15.6
Italy (2)	15.8	16.6	17.4
Japan	8.8	8.7	8.1
Netherlands (2)	14.7	16.1	15.1
Sweden (3)	29.9	32.9	31.8
United Kingdom (2)	21.2	21.8	19.6
United States	16.1	15.3	15.5
Unweighted average for			
OECD (4)	16.5	18.0	18.2
Weighted average for			
OECD (4)	15.3	15.6	15.6

Source: Oxley and Martin (1991: 168)

Notes: (1) On latest year available

(2) Last year available is 1989

(3) Last year available is 1988

(4) Excluding Turkey. The share of general government employment (the central government and local governments) in total civilian employment in Turkey rose between 1984 (8.6 percent) and 1990 (9.1 percent) (see Table II.3 and II.4). This is not very different from some individual cases in the OECD region. It should be pointed out, however, that the level of general government employment in Turkey is almost half of the OECD average.

The Thatcher Governments' staff cutback strategy (1979-1990) in the UK is a striking example of staff cutback strategy in the OECD region (see Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Hood, 1995; Ömürgönülşen, 1995: 8-12). The Thatcher Governments came to office pledged to reduce not only public expenditure but also the size of public employment including that of the British Civil Service

(Dunsire and Hood, 1989: 13, 15). Thatcherists argued that the contraction of the Civil Service was vital for Britain's economic recovery; and believed that the civil servants were inherently privileged because they enjoyed job and income security (Wilson, 1991: 331-332). As a consequence of this strategy, public sector employment in the U.K. suffered from a relative contraction as well as an absolute one in this period. The Civil Service figures were more striking. The staff number in the Civil Service declined relatively as well as absolutely in the same period (see OECD, 1981, 1993b; Central Statistical Office, 1990, 1992; Treasury, HM, 1993). As Dunsire and Hood emphasised, «experience on staff reductions appears to be a story of remarkable success» (1989: 18). Even allowing for a certain amount of massaging (hiving-off, contracting-out, etc.), most of the cuts were achieved by changing methods, dropping or curtailing some functions, change in ownership and instilling efficiency spirit (see Reed and Ellis, 1987; Dunsire and Hood, 1989: Chp.6; Fry, 1986). This trend continued during the 1990s as well (see Cabinet Office, 1998/99).

The question raised in mind is concerned with to which extent liberal-conservative governments could implement their own policy prescriptions in the field of employment. In spite of the forceful rhetoric on the rolling back the frontiers of the public sector, including public employment, the overall result of this policy for the period of 1980-1990, except some sectional gains in few countries (e.g. the civil service staff cuts in the U.K.), seems not very successful. How can the limited effects of the cutback strategies, in particular that of staff cutback strategy, be explained? First of all, in spite of the anti-government climate, governments could not easily translate the ideological change into practicable policy proposals and then into the policy outcomes (see Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Mullard, 1993). Secondly, the effective resistance of the beneficiaries of public services, service producers, politicians and bureaucrats could be the most important reason for this result (see Butler, 1985; Brown, 1988: 14-15; Le Grand and Winter, 1987; Piven and Cloward, 1988). Many politicians could have not the courage to cut some public services and public service positions by considering their political fortune (Foster and Plowden, 1996: 6-7). Staff cutback was also perceived as an attack on the premises and privileges of bureaucrats. With the other strategies of the policy of withdrawal of government, it has been counterattacked by bureaucrats, at various degrees and in various successes in different countries, with mixed feelings of protecting the public interest and their own departmental and self-interests (Christensen, 1988). Thirdly, the cutback efforts were also defeated by institutionally complex structure of the welfare state, the structural features of Western societies over which policy makers have little control, and by an increase in unemployment due to recessions in the 1980s (Brown, 1988: 14-15). Finally, technical difficulties with planning mechanism (e.g. manpower and staffing planning, expenditure planning for wages and salaries, redundancy and

early retirement programmes) and practical difficulties with implementing cutback strategies could have formed another reason for the limited effect of the cutback strategies. In the face of such difficulties, many governments preferred to pursue “cosmetic” or “window-dressing” type cutback programmes as well as “real” cutbacks (Dunsire and Hood, 1989: 7-11).

If the overall effect of staff cutback strategy on national public sectors is taken into account, this can be observed in the last two decades: Public sector employment, in particular employment in the civil service, has faced serious cutback attempts though it could not be rolled back; and thus, the level of public employment, more or less, has been stabilised through cutback strategies. In this context, it can be said that the rhetoric of the liberal-conservative governments guided by the New Right ideology exceeded its achievement in the period of 1980-1990. This is true, but the significance of the recent changes occurred in the role of government and the landscape of the public sector cannot be denied. Since the early 1980s, the public sector has experienced a wide-range “restructuring”, not only in the Western world but also in transitional economies and developing countries including Turkey (see World Bank, 1997). The changes in the size and composition of public sector employment, and of the civil service, should also be taken into consideration within this context (see Ömürgönülşen, 2000a: Chp. I).

II. A GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MOTHERLAND PARTY GOVERNMENTS' STRATEGY OF STAFF CUTBACK IN THE TURKISH CIVIL SERVICE (1984-1990)

Since the early 1980s, the dominant opinion about the Turkish public sector is that it is too big, overstaffed and cumbersome. The Turkish public administration system, including the Civil Service which has traditionally been the most significant part of the Turkish public sector, has lost its flexibility to adapt itself to the requirements of social and economic development due to the political and economic crises of the 1970s. It has also been far from fulfilling its functions properly since it has suffered from the inadequacies in the positive law concerning its structure and personnel, and from over-politicisation. Therefore, public expenditure and public employment increased faster than the economic growth and the scope and quality of public services. Then, the Turkish public administration became a financial burden to the economy (see, for example, TÜSİAD, 1983).

The size and structure of the Turkish Civil Service was one of the areas with serious problems within the whole public administration system. In accordance with their claims to be striving towards the goal of withdrawal of government, the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime and the MP Governments pursued strategies to downsize and reshape the Civil Service. Before doing a

general assessment of the MP Governments' staff cutback strategy in the Turkish Civil Service in the period of 1984-1990, it may be useful to make some remarks on the general attitude of the Military Regime (1980-1984) towards the size of employment in the whole public sector as well as the size of employment in the Civil Service in order to understand and explain this strategy with its all aspects.

II.1. Some General Remarks on the Record of Military Regime's Staff Cutback Strategy (1980-1984)

While the Military Regime was rearranging the Civil Service regime in the early 1980s (see Emre, 1986; Karaer, 1987), it took some measures through the Technocratic Government to reduce the size of the Civil Service staff. In addition to the early purges made in the first year of the Military Regime in order to "clean up" the politicised civil bureaucracy (i.e. get rid of civil servants who were considered as inconvenient), some further cutbacks came to the agenda when the administrative reforms were announced in 1982. Although Prime Minister Mr. Bülend Ulusu disclaimed any intention to initiate mass cutbacks (Dodd, 1990: 58), it was stated in his Government's Programme that the Civil Service was much larger than was necessary and overstaffing would be eliminated gradually (Başbakanlık, 1982: 277). This approach to the civil bureaucracy was an upshot of the fact that, unlike the earlier ones, the Military Regime had, particularly in economic matters, "a less *étatist* orientation" (Heper, 1994: 669). This new orientation was, in fact, an extension of the economic policy, which was formed by Mr. Özal who was a technocrat at that time and put forward in 1980 by the Minority Government of the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*) under the premiership of Mr. Süleyman Demirel.

The Military Regime had three significant measures to achieve these aims. First, the Martial Order Law numbered 1402, which was put into effect in the period of 1980-1983, granted great authority to the martial law commanders to discharge civil servants from the public service. Moreover, the right to defence was not recognised to civil servants; and the ways of administrative objection and judicial review were closed. Within the first year of the Military Regime, a total of 18,000 public employees including the civil servants were either taken into custody or arrested and convicted and then received either administrative or penal punishments due to their illegal and/or partisan activities before the 1980 military intervention (*Yeni Forum*, III, No. 57, 15 January 1982; see also Heper, 1984: 66). 2,314 civil servants in the whole public sector (including 2065 civil servants in the central government-so called the Turkish Civil Service) lost their jobs in the period of 1980-1983 (DPB, 1988: 64-67). Second, the Law dated 1981 and numbered 2559 encouraged civil servants to be retired and granted an authority to the administration to retire civil servants who had completed twenty years in service; or who had completed ten years in

service and who were more than the age of fifty-five on January 31, 1982. A considerable number of public employees including civil servants were offered certain inducements for voluntary retirement; some who did not wish to leave, however, were forced to do so by unilateral action. It is clear that this Law aimed to eliminate some civil servants with political considerations and to reduce the number of civil servants (Çarıklı, 1981: 2-4). These two measures threatened the security of tenure in the Civil Service (Ömürgönülşen, 1989: Chp. III/V) but resulted in a limited achievement in terms of cutback. Third, the Military Regime also used hiring freezes as an effective means to reduce, or at least, not to increase the number of civil servants in the period of 1981-1983.

As a result, for the first time in the recent history of Turkish Civil Service, the number of civil servants decreased from 1,312,000 to 1,294,000 in the whole public sector (Table II.1); and decreased from 995,000 to 991,000 in the Civil Service (i.e. the civil servants in the central government) (Table II.2) in the period of 1980-1982. Although the number of civil servants increased in both sections (+2.90 and +1.11 percent annually on an average respectively) between the years of 1982-1984, the rates of increase were very low in comparison with the rates before 1980 (Table II.1 and Table II.2). This increase can be explained by zigzags in the economic stabilisation programme and the general elections held in the fall of 1983. When we look at the whole period (1980-1984), we can see that the Military Regime, more or less, achieved its goal in terms of cutbacks. Although it could not roll-back employment in the public sector and in the Civil Service staffing, the rate of increase declined sharply: 0.50 percent annual average increase in total civilian public sector employment (from 1,940,000 to 1,979,000, Table II.3); 1.09 percent annual average increase in the numbers of civil servants in the Turkish public sector (from 1,312,000 to 1,369,000, Table II.1); 0.45 percent annual average increase in the Civil Service staff (from 995,000 to 1,013,000, Table II.2). The annual average rate of increase in the Civil Service staff in the 1970-1980 period was extremely high (11.77 percent) when it is compared with that in the 1980-84 period (0.45 percent) (Table II.2).

The size of the public sector and the Civil Service in terms of employment decreased in relative terms as well in the period of 1980-1984. The figures in Table (II.3) show that the share of civilian public sector employment in both total civilian employment (from 14.04 percent to 13.18 percent), total civilian labour force (from 12.42 percent to 11.62 percent) and total population (from 4.37 percent to 4.03 percent) decreased slightly. Also, the share of civil servants employed in the Civil Service both in total civilian employment (from 7.20 percent to 6.74 percent), total civilian labour force (from 6.37 percent to 5.95 percent) and total population (from 2.24 percent to 2.06 percent) decreased.

Table-II.1: Increase in the Numbers of Civil Servants in the Turkish Public Sector (1970-1990) (Thousands) (1)

Period/Year	Civil Servants	Annual Average Increase (%)
1) The Coalition Governments Period (1970-1980)		+10.00
1970	656	
		+ 7.80
1976	963	
		+ 3.95
1978	1,039	
		+13.14
1980	1,312	
2) The Military Regime Period (1980-1984)		+1.09
1980	1,312	
		- 0.69
1982	1,294	
		+ 2.90
1984	1,369	
3) The MP Governments Period (1984-1990)		+ 0.49
1984	1,369	
		- 4.38
1986	1,249	
		+ 7.31
1988	1,434	
		- 0.87
1990	1,409	

Source: DİE (1970a); DPD (1976, 1978, 1980, 1982); DPB (1984, 1986, 1988, 1990a, 1990b).

Note: (1) Figures indicate the staff numbers in post either in January or in July.

Table-II.2: The Evolution of the Numbers of Civil Servants in the Central Government (the Civil Service) of Turkey (1931-1990) (Thousands)

Period/Year	Civil Servants	Annual Aver. Increase (%)	Population per Civil Servants
1) Before 1970		+13.06	
1931	75		196.7
		+ 2.48	
1938	88		192.2
		+9.09	
1946	152		125.5
		+4.53	
1963	269		110.2
		+9.98	
1970	457		77.3
2) The Coalition Governments Period (1970-1980)		+11.77	
1970	457		77.3
		+ 8.64	
1976	694		59.0
		+ 4.25	
1978	753		56.6
		+16.07	
1980	995		44.7
3) The Military Regime Period (1980-1984)		+ 0.45	
1980	995		44.7
		- 0.20	
1982	991		47.1
		+ 1.11	
1984	1,013		48.4
4)The MP Governments Period (1984-1990)		+ 4.52	
1984	1,013		48.4
		- 4.35	
1986	925		55.6
		+14.16	
1988	1,187		45.3
		+ 4.25	
1990	1,288		43.6

Source: DİE (1931, 1938, 1946, 1963-64-65, 1970a, 1991); DPD (1976, 1978, 1980, 1982); DPB (1984, 1986, 1988, 1990b).

Table-II.3: Turkish Civilian Public Sector Employment in Comparison with Total Civilian Employment, Total Civilian Labour Force and Total Population (1970-1990) (Thousands) (1)

Categories	1970	1980	1984	(1990) (2)	1990
1) Civilian Public Sector Employment	-	1,940	1,979	(2,430)	2,325
a) The Central Government	-	-	1,232		1,557
b) The Civil Service (Civil Servants in the Central Government)	457	995	1,013		1,288
2) Total Civilian Employment (3)	12,583	13,813	15,019		17,935
3) Total Civilian Labour Force (3)	14,375	15,619	17,024		19,487
4) Total Population (4)	35,321	44,438	49,070		56,098
5) 1/2 (%)	-	14.04	13.18	(13.55)	12.96
6) 1a/2 (%)	-	-	8.20		8.68
7) 1b/2 (%)	3.63	7.20	6.74		7.18
8) 1/3	-	12.42	11.62	(12.47)	11.93
9) 1a/3	-	-	7.24		7.99
10) 1b/3	3.18	6.37	5.95		6.61
11) 1/4	-	4.37	4.03	(4.33)	4.14
12) 1a/4	-	-	2.51		2.78
13) 1b/4	1.29	2.24	2.06		2.30

Source: DİE (1970a, 1970b, 1980, 1984, 1990); DPD (1980); DPB (1984, 1990a, 1990b); DPT (1989).

Notes: (1) The figures do not include disguised unemployment; if it is included, the figures are expected to be doubled.

(2) For an explanation for this column, see Table (II.4), Note (1).

(3) Age 15+

(4) Estimates of mid-year population.

In brief, the Military Regime succeeded in not increasing the absolute size of the Civil Service and in reducing its relative size slightly. This is particularly so when one considers the absolute and relative increase in the size of the public sector and in that of the Civil Service, in the 1970s. While the Military Regime was trying to control the Civil Service and reduce its size, its efforts in this direction nevertheless had dysfunctional effects upon the latter. The morale of the civil servants was adversely affected. Many senior civil servants were alienated while at the same time a tendency of exodus from the Civil Service became more remarkable. There had been a long trend among senior civil servants to leave the Civil Service for better posts elsewhere (see Canman, 1975 and Bozkurt, 1980: 143-148) but the exodus in the early years of 1980s far surpassed the earlier trend (Heper, 1984: 68, footnote 17).

II.2 Some General Remarks on the Record of Motherland Party Governments' Staff Cutback Strategy (1984-1990)

After the restoration of democracy in the late 1983, the newly established MP under the leadership of Mr. Özal easily captured the power with its anti-government and anti-bureaucracy vision and rhetoric (see Ergüder, 1991). The MP Governments, at least in the first term of office, followed, more or less, the same restrictive policy pursued by the Military Regime concerning the size of the Civil Service. It was not surprising since Prime Minister Özal was as a forceful proponent of the policy of withdrawal of government followed by the liberal-conservative governments in Western countries (see Kuruç, 1985; Uras, 1993). Staff cutback strategy as well as the other strategies of this policy (e.g. privatisation, liberalisation) should be treated within this framework.

The Turkish Civil Service was severely criticised like the whole administrative system by the MP due to its over-centralised, over-bureaucratic, wasteful and inefficient, and overstaffed characteristics in the official party documents and in the public addresses of Mr. Özal (see, ANAP, 1983a, 1983b). In fact, the MP's general opinion about the Turkish Civil Service was in parallel with the views expressed in the TÜSİAD Report (1983) containing the private sector's criticisms of and reform proposals for the bureaucracy. It was argued in this Report that the Turkish public bureaucracy was over-bureaucratic, over-centralised, cumbersome, and overstaffed with unqualified and incompetent employees who received high salaries that they did not deserve as well as authoritarian and hostile to private enterprise. According to TÜSİAD, it was better for government to undertake only its traditional functions since the private sector was ready to undertake services to the public apart from these traditional functions. Furthermore, the public administration had to be in the service of the private sector. Therefore, the downsizing of the bureaucracy had

to be one of the crucial goals of any proposed reorganisation project. Many suggestions of the Report, including reducing the staff size of the Civil Service (1983: 23-30; see also Çitçi, 1982-1983: 122), found an opportunity to be put into practice when the MP came to power in the end of 1983.

The MP governments mainly used hiring freezes and personnel ceilings for certain segments of the Civil Service rather than across-the-board cuts within a given target. In fact, civil service guarantees (i.e. the security of tenure) provided for civil servants by the 1982 Constitution and the CSL numbered 657 were the legal obstacles for such cuts. Performance appraisal process was not operated properly since it was traditionally considered as a quarrel with one's bread and butter (see Ömürgönülşen, 1989: Chp. II/H, III/V). The MP Governments could overcome this issue only in the state owned enterprises and public utilities through contracted personnel system. In the Civil Service, some legal and technical limits were imposed to establish new positions and filling in vacant positions. These techniques were even sometimes applied in non-officially articulated manner. Despite the fact that there was not any pressure of labour union under the restrictive constitutional-legal rules on the rights of civil servants to establish labour union and participate in administration and that public opinion kept itself distant from political protest movements as a consequence of authoritarian legal measures enacted and de-politicisation policy pursued by the Military Regime, the MP governments preferred to follow a low-profile strategy. In order to avoid any possible reactions from the opposition parties and not to directly challenge the traditionally secure atmosphere of the Civil Service, the first MP government did not set a specific target for staff cuts. While such a strategy was minimising reactions in the beginning, it became a main obstacle in the long-run in convincing the civil servants and public opinion for the necessity of cuts since it did not clearly show the commitment of political power in this matter.

The record of the MP Governments should be examined in two periods: 1984-1986 and 1986-1990. In the period of 1984-1986, the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme was followed enthusiastically by the first MP Government. Within this framework, the staff cutback strategy was pursued strictly. Serious efforts were made to standardise the titles of civil service positions, to reduce the numbers of these titles, and to define functions, authorities, and responsibilities clearly. The authority of establishing new civil service staff positions was transferred from the executive body to the legislative body by the Decree having the force of law dated 1984 and numbered 190 (DPT, 1991: 36-37). Since the establishment of a civil service position could be possible with an act instead of a government decree, this put a significant break on the demands of individual departments from the Government to increase the number of civil service positions in their departments and to fill in them immediately. Recruitment freezes and natural wastage also helped the Government cutback the

number of civil service staff. The number of the civil servants in the Turkish public sector decreased from 1,369,000 to 1,249,000 (-4.38 percent annually on an average, Table II.1); the number of civil servants in the Civil Service also decreased from 1,013,000 to 925,000 (-4.35 percent annually on an average, Table II.2). The Government's rhetoric is supported by the figures for this period.

However, it is impossible to reach the same result for the period of 1986-1990. The number of civil servants in the whole public sector increased from 1,249,000 to 1,409,000 (+3.20 percent annual average increase, Table II.1); the number of civil servants in the Civil Service also increased from 925,000 to 1,288,000 (+9.81 percent annual average increase, Table II.2). Although between the years of 1988-1990 there was a small decrease (from 1,434,000 to 1,409,000; -0.87 percent annual average decrease, Table II.1) in the number of the civil servants in the Turkish public sector, this decrease almost entirely came from the re-classification activity in the state-owned enterprises and public utilities conducted by the second MP Government. Since 1985, only contracted personnel have been recruited for the state-owned enterprises and public utilities and the existing civil servants have been encouraged to be contracted personnel through additional financial incentives. As it is shown in Table (II.4), the number of civil servants declined sharply (-83.7 percent) and the number of contracted personnel increased remarkably (+34,728.6 percent) in the period of 1984-1990. If we look at the number of civil servants in the Civil Service, there was not any decrease between the years of 1988-1990; in contrast the size of Civil Service increased gradually (+4.25 percent annual average increase, Table II.2) (see Ömürgönülşen, 1990). However, when it is compared to the 1986-1988 period (+14.16 percent annual average increase, Table II.2), the period 1988-1990 can be called as a period of "restraint".

When we evaluate the whole period (1984-1990), it can be said that the achievement of the MP Governments was well behind their rhetoric: 2.91 percent annual average increase in total civilian public sector employment (from 1,979,000 to 2,325,000, Table II.3); 0.49 percent annual average increase in the numbers of civil servants in the Turkish public sector (from 1,369,000 to 1,409,000, Table II.1); 4.52 percent annual average increase in the numbers of civil servants in the Civil Service (from 1,013,000 to 1,288,000, Table II.2). The annual average rate of increase in the Civil Service (4.52 percent) in the 1984-1990 period was higher than that of the 1980-1984 period (0.45 percent), but it was still markedly lower than that of the 1970-1980 period (11.77 percent) (see Table II.2).

Table-II.4: Turkish Civilian Public Sector Employment (1984-1990)
(Thousands)

Categories	1984	(%)	1990(1)	(%)	Absolute Change (%)
1) The Central Government	1,231.8	62.2	1,557.2	67.0	+26.4
a) The Civil Service (Civil Servants)	1,012.5	(51.2)	1,287.7	(53.0)	+27.2
b) Contracted Personnel	3.6		17.4		+383.3
c) Temporary Personnel	12.8		42.8		+234.4
d) Workers	172.9		164.3		-5.0
e) Others (2)	30.0		45.0		+50.0
2) Local Governments	60.7	3.1	72.5	3.1	+19.4
a) Civil Servants	60.7		72.5		+19.4
b) Contracted Personnel	N/A		(0.8)		-
c) Temporary Personnel	N/A		(26.7)		-
d) Workers	N/A		(77.5)		-
3) State-Owned Enterprises and Public Utilities	686.1	34.7	695.5	29.9	+1.4
a) Civil Servants	296.2		48.4		-83.7
b) Contracted Personnel	0.7		243.8		+34,728.6
c) Temporary Personnel	62.9		20.5		-67.4
d) Workers	326.3		382.8		+17.3
4) Total Public Servants	1,978.6	100.0	2,325.2	100.0	+17.5
			(2,430.2)		
a) Civil Servants	1,369.4	(69.2)	1,408.6	(60.6)	+2.9
b) Contracted Personnel	4.3		261.2		+5,974.4
			(262.0)		
c) Temporary Personnel	75.7		63.3		-16.4
			(90.0)		
d) Workers	499.2		547.1		+9.6
			(624.6)		
e) Others	30.0		45.0		+50.0

Source: DİE (1991); DPB (1984, 1988, 1990a, 1990b).

Notes: (1) The 1984 figures do not include the staff (except the civil servants) employed in the local governments due to the lack of data. Also the 1990 figures for the public sector might be smaller than actual figures due to some central government departments and local governments did not hand in their actual staff numbers. The 1990 figures for the civil servants in the central government is corrected by using data published by the State Personnel Department in 1990 (DPB, 1990b). The 1988 figures are used for local governments for the year 1990. Therefore, the 1990 figures, in particular, for local governments are smaller than actual figures (est. approx. 50,000).

(2) This category mainly includes academic and judicial personnel and personnel employed in the Presidential Office and the Grand National Assembly. Civilian personnel employed in the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and the National Intelligence Organisation are not included due to both the lack of data and the secrecy of data. Figures for this category are calculated by the author.

When we look at the relative size of the public sector employment including the Civil Service, the figures indicate an increase in this period. The shares of civilian public sector employment and the Civil Service employment (i.e. civil servants in the central government) both in total civilian employment (from 13.18 percent to 13.55 percent and from 6.74 percent to 7.18 percent respectively), total civilian labour force (from 11.62 percent to 11.93 percent and from 5.95 percent to 6.61 percent respectively) and total population (from 4.03 percent to 4.14 percent and from 2.06 percent to 2.30 percent respectively) increased slightly despite the rhetoric (see Table II.3). The gains made during the Military Regime were lost in this period. In addition, the weight of the central government and the Civil Service in civilian public sector employment increased (from 62.2 percent to 67.0 percent and from 51.2 percent to 53.0 percent) at the expense of local governments and, in particular, state-owned enterprises and public utilities in this period (see Table II.4). This result is in accordance with the policy of the MP Governments concerning the reducing the role and size of government in economic activities but also indicates further centralisation of government in terms of public employment. This result also made the decentralisation and cutback programmes in the Civil Service more urgent in the near future.

It is generally accepted that factors such as the expansion in the role of government; the search for finding at least a partial solution for the unemployment problem; the lack of manpower planning at both country and departmental levels; and the attempts by governments to create civil service positions for their sympathisers contribute to the increase in the number of civil servants (see Gülmez, 1973; Topçuoğlu, 1975; Şaylan, 1980; Tutum, 1980; Güran, 1980; Oktay, 1983, 1986; Çitçi, 1988; Ömürgönülşen, 1990). The figures for the second half of 1980s show that these factors are of importance in the Turkish Civil Service. Also, the increase in the number of civil servants went in parallel with the economic difficulties in the 1970s and the second half of the 1980s. While the 1980-86 period was relatively stable in terms of economic and political life, the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme was jeopardised by alarming economic indicators (e.g. high inflation, increase in public expenditure, public sector borrowing requirements and external debts) in the 1986-1990 period (see DPT, 1993) due to mainly populist policy of the MP Governments in the face of successive general, local and by-elections and referenda. This correlation indicates the need for further research about political business cycles in terms of public employment as well as public expenditure.

Some points should also be clarified for the period of 1984-1990 in terms of staff cutback strategy. It is usually claimed that in developed Western countries the ratio of civil servants in total population is about 1.0 percent and it is argued that this ratio has already been exceeded in Turkey (see TÜSİAD, 1983). When we consider all the civil servants in the public sector (1,408,600), this ratio was 2.51

percent in 1990; when we take into account only the civil servants in the central government (so-called the Turkish Civil Service) (1,287,700), this ratio was 2.30 percent in 1990 (see Table II.2 and Table II.3). However, as Çitçi neatly points out, some truths are hidden while talking about the ratio of the number of civil servants to the total population being 1.0 percent in developed Western countries (1982-83: 126). For example, the “Civil Service” is considered in the U.K. as only one part of the public services. Apart from the Civil Service, education, police and social services are provided by local governments and health service is undertaken by the NHS. When the increase in the number of civil servants is discussed, those areas are not counted. Therefore, the size of the British Civil Service was only 1.01 percent in 1990. If we take into account health, education, police, and social services, in addition to the Civil Service, which are mainly provided by the central government in Turkey, this ratio would be 6.71 percent in 1990 (see Ömürgönülşen, 1995: 31; 2000a: 329).¹² As for the U.S. and Germany, it is observed that a similar mistake is made when only federal personnel-not state governments’ and local governments’ personnel—are considered as civil servants.¹³

In our opinion, it is more logical to treat the subject in terms of the ratio of civilian public sector employment in total civilian employment, total civilian labour force and total population. For example, the ratios in the U.K. in 1990 were respectively: 21.9 percent; 20.4 percent, 10.0 percent (see Ömürgönülşen, 1995: 10; 2000a: 82).¹⁴ In Turkey those ratios in 1990 were respectively: 12.9 percent, 11.9 percent, 4.1 percent (see Table II.3). The share of general government employment in total civilian employment in Turkey for 1990 is 9.1 percent whereas this ratio for the weighted average for the OECD region is 15.6 percent (and for the unweighted average is 18.2 percent) for the same year (see Table I.1). Although the ratios of Turkish public sector employment increased in the 1970s and stabilised in the 1980s, they have not reached the average ratios of developed countries.

One of the serious problems of the Turkish public sector is that it is unbalanced in respect to the distribution of staff to the different levels of government (the central government and the state owned enterprises-public utilities vs. local governments), different regions (developed regions vs. underdeveloped regions), public services and programmes (administrative and subsidiary services vs. technical and welfare services), and public organisations and their sub-units (headquarters vs. local offices). While demand for welfare services (e.g. education and health) and some local services is very high, their levels of supply are quite low and varied due to inadequate budget appropriations and staff numbers (see Oktay, 1983: Chp.3, 4, 1986). This unbalanced staff structure of the Turkish public sector (and the Civil Service) has always been very influential on overstaffing arguments. Therefore, the issue of overstaffing in the Turkish public sector should be examined very carefully.

CONCLUSION

The 1980s were the heyday of the policy of the withdrawal of the government pursued by the liberal-conservative governments in many Western countries. Staff cutback was also used enthusiastically by those governments as one of the strategies of this policy in accordance with New Right ideology. In the face of the crisis of Turkish economy and the heavy politicisation of Turkish bureaucracy, a pragmatic strategy of elimination and staff cutbacks was also adopted and carried out by the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime (1980-1983) in Turkey. This attempt eased the political resistance to following ideology-driven cutback attempt of MP governments (1984-1990) within the framework of the withdrawal of government.

Elimination and purges in the Turkish civil bureaucracy had generally been made either directly by the military as a part of the state elite or the civilian part of the state elite with the help of the military under the extraordinary political conditions. Under the conditions of competitive democratic politics, the effects of the elimination and cutback programmes of governments formed by anti-bureaucracy parties were rather limited. On the one hand, *étatist* or government-led mixed-economy policies pursued by governments and the prominent place of the civil bureaucracy in the state elite protected the civil bureaucracy against serious attempts of elimination, purges and cutbacks. Also, the post-1960 constitutional and legal arrangements about the security of tenure provided the civil servants with enough legal protection against such attempts. On the other hand, the governments formed by anti-bureaucracy parties did not seriously attempt to launch cutback programmes since they gradually invaded the civil bureaucracy with their sympathisers and followed populist rather than efficiency-oriented employment policies in the 1960s and 1970s. This pattern had continued until the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme put forward in the early 1980 in the face of serious economic crisis of the late 1970s. In the 1980s, with the serious decline both in the reputation of *étatist* and government-led mixed economy policies and their political and socio-economic prestige, the civil bureaucracy in general and the Civil Service in particular became more vulnerable to ideologically-oriented and large-scale staff cuts. If we put the pragmatic and depoliticising elimination and staff cutback strategy of the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime aside, the MP Governments was the most important civilian governments attempted to cut the size of the Civil Service.

In this paper, we have attempted to analyse the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments in the period of 1984-1990. According to the findings of this study, despite the New Rightist rhetoric of the MP Governments, their staff cutback strategy was not successful enough. The MP Governments could not

cutback the size of the Turkish Civil Service in terms of employment. The civilian public sector employment in general and the Civil Service employment in particular increased in both absolute and relative terms in this period. However, the overall effects of the MP governments on the growth of the Turkish Civil Service was much restrictive than the previous governments except the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime.

If the record of the MP Governments is examined in two periods, 1984-1986 and 1986-1990, the first MP Government for the 1984-1986 period can be considered as the most successful one in terms of staff cutbacks in the modern history of the Turkish Civil Service. Therefore, this short-period can be called as a period of “cutback”. However, the political will of the Government on this issue was melted away after 1986 in the face of increased political competition and bureaucratic resistance. In the first half of the 1986-1990 period (i.e. 1986-1988), the numbers of civil servants increased sharply, but this increase was put under pressure in the second half of the period (i.e. 1988-1990). Therefore, it is not possible to name the whole period (1984-1990) as a period of cutback but it would not be a mistake to call as the “restraint years” since the rate of increase in the Turkish Civil Service staff was lowered remarkably. It should also be noted that the development of the staff cutback strategy was also in good accordance with the general tendency of macro economic indicators under the MP Governments. The 1984-1986 period was more successful than the 1986-1990 period in terms of both staff cutback and macro-economic indicators.

There are various factors affected the record of staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments. Firstly, in spite of the relative weakness of the civil bureaucracy in the 1980s in comparison to previous decades as a consequence of the increased fragmentation within the civil bureaucracy in terms of its legal status, socio-cultural origins and economic rights in the post-1950 period, the resistance of the traditional bureaucratic elite, which was the legacy of the bureaucratic ruling tradition, was the one of the most significant obstacles to the success of the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments. In the face of the lack of support from political parties, labour unions and public opinion, the only serious opposition and resistance against this strategy came from the traditional bureaucratic elite, which was not sympathetic to the programme of the MP Governments (Heper, 1990a: 326; Heper and Sancar, 1998: 150-151). It should be, however, emphasised that because of the fragmentation in the civil bureaucracy, the bureaucratic elite was no longer an advocate of all civil servants in the Civil Service. Thus, middle and lower echelons of the traditional Civil Service could not get enough support against cutbacks and reorganisations from the higher echelons of the Civil Service in general and newly created alternative economic bureaucracy of Mr. Özal in particular.¹⁵

Secondly, the civil service guarantees (i.e. the security of tenure) provided for civil servants by the 1982 Constitution and the CSL numbered 657 was other main obstacle in achieving large-scale cuts in the Civil Service. Since the MP Governments could not manage to change constitutional and legal rules in order to reduce the effect of civil service guarantees and ensure the proper operation of performance appraisal process, their attempts were limited with the modest contributions of natural attrition, hiring freezes and personnel ceilings.

Thirdly, some socio-economic and bureaucratic factors such as the higher demands for welfare services, the pressure of persistent unemployment problem on governments, the persistence of political patronage in the recruitment system of the Civil Service, and the lack of manpower planning in the personnel administration system of the Civil Service, which are usually considered as the main causes of the growth of public employment in Turkey, can also be counted as other important reasons for the limited effect of the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments.

Fourthly, in order to avoid any possible reactions from the opposition parties and the civil servants, the first MP government did not set a specific target for staff cuts before starting the cuts. However, such targets were clearly determined in the successful cases of staff cutbacks (e.g. the British case). While the MP governments' low-profile strategy was minimising reactions in the short-run, it became a main obstacle in the long-run in convincing the civil servants and public opinion for the necessity of cuts since it did not clearly indicate the commitment of political power on this issue.

Finally, the Office of the Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Personnel Department were main agents in designing and implementing the staff cutback strategy. However, a top-down approach was adopted and initiatives at departmental level were not encouraged. Cultural and motivational aspects of the strategy were ignored to a large extent as well. Since the meso and micro-level analyses of the staff cutback strategy are out of scope of this paper, we are not able to make any judgement about the certain effects of motivational factors at individual and departmental levels on the level of success of the staff cutback strategy. However, it seems that these factors were likely to be influential on the limited success of the staff cutback strategy.

In brief, like other liberal-conservative governments' attempts in many countries with few exceptions (e.g. the Thatcher Governments in the U.K.) for the same period, the attempts of the MP governments under the premiership of Mr. Özal to have a smaller size and more efficient-effective bureaucracy with the effect of the New Right ideology failed eventually since their cutback strategy did not produce all intended results. The MP Governments "could not cutback" the staff size of the Turkish Civil Service but "restrained" the growth

of the Civil Service staff. It can also be said that the assumed efficiency gain could not be achieved in terms of allocative efficiency due to the failure in cutting back the size of the Civil service staff. Despite this disappointing result for the MP Governments in the short-run, it should be admitted that the size, composition and performance of the Turkish bureaucracy and the Turkish Civil Service has been seriously questioned for the first time in Turkey. Some legal-administrative guarantees and social-economic rights of public servants and civil servants were restricted in this period (see Ömürgönülşen, 1989: Chp.III/V; Arslan, 2005: Second Chp./III). This was the most significant legacy of the MP Governments under the premiership of Mr. Özal.

What is the future of cutback policy? By considering political developments, demographic trends, and technical improvements concerning public services, various scenarios about the future of cutbacks can be developed. As Dunsire and Hood indicate there might be three scenarios: First, civil service cutbacks will appear as a temporary hiccup in the long-term development of government growth as a result of the erosion in the political commitment and energy in the long-run. Second, cutbacks will bottom out relatively soon into a new lower plateau due to both practical limits of automation and contracting-out of government operations and bureau-shaping strategies to be followed. Third, it presages a continuing process of cuts in the civil service well into the twenty-first century due to a profound shift in popular expectations of the role of government, further managerialism of civil service culture, and the flowering of the information technology and automation (1989: 208-217).

We are expecting a gradual increase in the numbers of civil servants in the short-term in Turkey, and actually which is happening in the first half of the 2000s, due to increasing welfare needs of the public (e.g. education and health); internal security and socio-economic development needs of the Eastern and South Eastern regions of Turkey. As a matter of fact, a large number of positions were created in order to win general and local elections and to crackdown on the separatist and sectarian terrorist activities in the 1990s (see DPB, 2000 and onwards). Moreover, the issue of overstaffing in the Turkish Civil Service should be examined very carefully. Although the ratios of Turkish Civil Service employment sharply increased in the 1970s and more or less stabilised in the 1980s, they have not reached the average ratios of developed countries if the scope of Civil Service in Turkey is taken into consideration. One of the serious problems of the Civil Service is that it is unbalanced in respect to the distribution of staff to different geographical regions, public services, and public organisations and their sub-units. The Civil Service staff in general administrative and subsidiary services at the headquarters of the civil service departments is relatively fat in comparison to those in technical and welfare services at provincial/regional offices. While demands for welfare services and

local public works are very high, the levels of supply of these services are quite low and varied due to inadequate budget appropriations and staff numbers. This unbalanced staff structure of the Turkish the Civil Service has always been very influential on overstaffing arguments.

However, staff cutback is likely to return to the agenda of governments in the face of economic difficulties. As a matter of fact, the prolonged economic crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s have already forced the recent Turkish Governments to reconsider the size of the Civil Service by considering the prescriptions of the IMF and the World Bank as happened in the 1980s. Turkey's resolution to become a full member of the European Union has also obliged these Governments to upgrade the efficiency of the Civil Service in terms of its size, structure and composition, and operation. In the medium and long-terms, the Turkish Civil Service is likely to face cutbacks as happened in 1980-1982 and 1984-1986. These cutbacks, at least, will be achieved in general administrative and subsidiary services that are the focus of debates about bloated government and that are more suitable for contracting-out and hiving-off as a consequence of the progress in the automation and information technologies. It should be, however, emphasised that if the security of tenure regime for civil servants is not modified in accordance with modern performance appraisal systems, coming governments will be content with modest staff cuts based on hiring freeze and early retirement and cosmetic staff cuts based on contracting-out and hiving-off.

Many Western governments as well as the MP Governments made almost all possible mistakes in staff cutbacks. Thus, Turkish governments in near future will have a considerable advantage to derive lessons from the experience of former governments. Staff cuts should trim fat but not cripple the Civil Service. Otherwise, public services cannot be provided in the intended manner and quality, particularly if the lower bureaucratisation level (i.e. the ratios of public sector employment) of Turkey is taken into account. Therefore, a great deal of work for national-level studies and cross-national comparisons is needed to understand the various factors affecting a staff cutback strategy.

NOTES

¹ For a detailed analysis of recent changes in the public sector and its effect on public sector employment, see Ömürganülşen (2000a: Introduction, Chp.I). For a comparative analysis, for example, see OECD (1995); Löffler (1997); Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000).

² The MP was founded in 1983 with the transition to democracy after the three-year long Military Regime and stayed in power between December 1983 and November 1991. The first two MP Governments (December 1983-December 1987; December 1987-October 1989) were led by Mr. Özal; the third MP Government (November 1989-June 1991) was led by Mr. Yıldırım Akbulut; and the fourth MP Government (June

1991-November 1991) was led by Mr. Mesut Yılmaz. In this paper, only the 1984-1990 period in which the cutback strategy was pursued has been covered. Although Mr. Özal was elected by the Turkish parliament as the President in November 1989 and this is a politically neutral post according to the 1982 Constitution, he acted as a backseat driver of the Akbulut Government. The Akbulut Government was, at least in its first year, guided by Mr. Özal without any diversion of policies of the second Özal Government. This influence gradually eroded towards the end of 1990 and, in particular, during the Yılmaz Government in the second half of 1991. In the face of this reality, the first year (1990) of the Akbulut Government has been included in the analysis, but 1991 has been omitted. In other words, the Özal period (i.e. the first and second MP governments) has mainly been subject to examination. However, year 1990 has also been included in the analysis since the first year of the Akbulut Government is usually considered as an extension of the second Özal Government. In addition to the policy continuation, a technical necessity about official data used in this paper has forced us to include the 1990 figures in our analysis but omit the 1989 and 1991 figures from the analysis. Reliable official figures were published biennially by the State Personnel Department in the 1980s and 1990s. The 1990 figures in *Public Personnel Survey* (DPB, 1990a) were also partially corrected by the figures in *Civil Servants' Occupied and Vacant Positions Statistics* (DPB, 1990b). Therefore, year 1990 for which civil service staff data is available has been chosen as an end of the period instead of 1989, in which the premiership of Mr. Özal came to an end, or 1991, in which the MP was ousted from political power. Furthermore, the economic policies of the third and fourth MP Government's were substantially distorted by the indirect effects of the Gulf War in 1991 (see DPT, 1993) and they did not show any serious intention for staff cutbacks in 1991. The period of Coalition Governments (1991 onwards) has also been excluded from the analysis since the Coalition Governments did not pursue such a strategy.

³ Staff cutback strategy affects not only the "size" of the civil service but also its "composition". A reduction of a certain percentage overall does not necessarily mean that each civil service department, bureau or professional group lost staff by that amount (Dunsire and Hood, 1989: 20). We cannot understand fully what the staff cutback has meant unless we break down the figures. However, this attempt goes beyond the aim and scope of this paper. Political ideologies, competition among political parties, social and economic trends, financial difficulties, and the self-interest-seeking behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats shape the basic patterns in staff cutback management. A set of explanations for the patterns of change in the size and composition of staff in a civil service (i.e. the conventional-popular party-political explanations, the social-economic trend explanations, the bureaucratic process explanations and bureaucratic self-interest explanations) and some related hypotheses can be developed through reviewing the literature of "bureaometrics" (see Hood and Dunsire, 1981) and "cutback management" (see Dunsire and Hood, 1989) in public bureaucracies in order to empirically analyse the staff cutback strategy pursued in the Turkish Civil Service. For the first comprehensive attempt in the Turkish literature to analyse the staff cutback strategy of a government with many aspects by means of a theoretical model, see Ömürgönülşen (1995; 2000a). For the application of this approach to the British case, see Dunsire and Hood (1989); Hood (1995); Dunleavy (1989a, 1989b).

⁴ Although the MP Governments put the staff cutback strategy into effect with similar ideological and economic aims shared by many liberal-conservative governments in various Western countries, this strategy should be analysed in the context of historical-traditional characteristics of the Turkish Civil Service. It is not likely that the economic and administrative experiences of one set of countries, especially those of Western countries, will be repeated elsewhere (Heper, 1977: 66-67). Without considering their cultural relativeness, reform programmes and strategies should not be transferred from Western countries, in particular Anglo-American countries, to other countries (Hood, 1995a). This is particularly true for staff cutback strategy since it is closely related with political-bureaucratic traditions and socio-economic circumstances of a country. Otherwise, an analysis of staff cutback strategy would be a futile attempt of playing some quantitative figures in historical-cultural vacuum. Therefore, any analysis of the bureaucracy in Turkey cannot be attempted without reference to the "strong state" and "historical bureaucratic ruling" traditions inherited from the Ottoman Empire (see Heper, 1974; 1985) and the effects of this heritage on the contemporary setting (see Heper, 1987). In brief, the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments, which can be considered as a significant part of the political-ideological and economic programme of an anti-bureaucracy political party to put the Turkish Civil Service under its control and tame, should be examined within this context. Due to the page-limit, such a historical-comparative perspective could not be developed enough in this paper; but even its mention when it is necessary supports our approach. For a detailed analysis on this issue, see Ömürgönülşen (2000a).

⁵ Although the Civil Service is regarded as the most important part of the British central government, there is a lack of clarity about this term in the British public administration literature (Wood, 1981: 480; Drewry and Butcher 1991: 9-17; Dowding, 1995: 17-20). Similar problems arise when we try to compare the size of civil service between countries, using the British vocabulary with reference to the central bureaucracies of other Western countries. Some public employees are not really part of the civil service at all, even though they are locally classified as civil servants (Rose, 1983: 164).

⁶ For international comparisons in terms of developed countries, more reliable and comprehensive OECD figures are preferred in this paper.

⁷ Several terms such as decline, retrenchment, downsizing and cutback have often been used synonymously to refer actions associated with expenditure and staff reductions since the late 1970s (Jones, 1998: 6). The term cutback is often used for those actions in the public sector. Others involve structural-behavioural changes as well as expenditure and staff reductions. Scholarly interest in such actions in the public sector is, in fact, relatively new. The literature suffers from being non-cumulative, widely dispersed, fragmented, confusing and sometimes contradictory (Jones, 1998: 8). Some studies are only interested in organisational level analysis but others choose broader perspective to cover the whole or certain sections of the public sector. For more information about technical and socio-psychological difficulties with planning and implementing such strategies, see Levine (1978; 1979); Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian, (1982); Robinson (1985); Rubin (1985); Dunsire and Hood (1989); Hardy (1989); Jones (1998).

⁸ It should be, however, emphasised that staff cutback strategy may not automatically ensure efficiency in the civil service. If it is not applied with necessary care, it may result in decline in morale and performance. Although staff cutback is advocated on the

ground of limited and efficient government, there is no well established consensus on how cutback affects organisational performance and the morale of staff. The “leaner means fitter” (i.e. higher efficiency) argument is sometimes counterattacked by the “leaner means weaker” (i.e. greying and demoralised bureaucracy) argument (see Hood; Roberts and Chilvers, 1990). In this paper, we do not deal with these issues but some dysfunctional effects of staff cutback are theoretically discussed and/or empirically determined by some studies in the British (see Reed and Ellis, 1987; Hood, Dunsire and Thomson, 1988; Hennessy, 1990: 680-687) and American contexts (see Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian, 1982; Rubin, 1985; Volcker Commission Report, 1990; Jones, 1998).

⁹ Public employment is a quite concrete measure of people working for government from the viewpoint of economists in comparison to more volatile measure of public expenditure, Public employment/total employment, public employment/total labour force, public employment/population ratios, and public employment per capita are also important relative measures. However, even this measure has its own practical difficulties for the purpose of comparison in terms of defining the boundaries of the terms such as government employee, public employee or civil service employee due to the different status of public corporations, local governments, quasi-independent agencies in different countries and in terms of counting part-time, seasonal or contractual employees (see Heller and Tait, 1983: Chp.III; Rowat, 1990: 212-213).

¹⁰ General government employment only covers employees in the central, state and local governments. Public sector employment as a broader term also covers employees in the state owned enterprises and public utilities (Heller and Tait, 1983: 6).

¹¹ Rose (1985) revealed large differences between developed OECD countries, in the proportion of public employment in total employment, in the proportion of employee working for the different levels, parts and services of government, and in the rate of growth of public employment. There are also significant differences in terms of absolute and relative measures of public employment between developed and developing countries and great variations among developing countries (Heller and Tait, 1983: Chp.III,IX; Özgediz, 1983:8,Table.3). Wealth, geographical size and population directly affect the size and composition of the public employment in a country (Rowat, 1990).

¹² For the figures for the U.K., see Central Statistical Office (1990, 1992); OECD (1993b).

¹³ For country cases, see OECD (1993a).

¹⁴ For the figures for the U.K., see Central Statistical Office (1990; 1992); OECD (1993b).

¹⁵ For a detailed analysis of this relatively “new” phenomenon which represents the breaking point in the modern history of Turkish bureaucracy, see Ömürgönülşen (2000a: Chp. III,IV,V). Also see Heper (1989: 466-468; 1990a: 326, 330; 1990b: 611); Güler (1996: 60-64). This “alternative bureaucracy” is an outcome of transition from statutory regime to flexible regime in public sector employment in Turkey in the post-1980 period (see Aslan, 2005: Second Chp./III).

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