TRANSFERABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS: NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AS AN EXAMPLE

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Abstract:

This article begins with the examination of models of analyzing the process of policy transfer, lesson drawing and policy streams with regard to initiating and directing factors and dynamics of the process. The paper continues with the assessment of administrative reform transferring by evaluating the necessity, major themes and transferability of administrative reform. Strategies for successful administrative reform transferring are emphasized. Special reference is given to New Public Management reforms perceived as a standard model of administrative reform for most countries in the 1980s and 1990s. It is argued that there is no single approach for reforming government or transferring administrative reform. In administrative policy transferring, every country needs to create an innovative perspective according to its economic, political and social circumstances rather than an imitative one.

Özet:

Bu makale, ilk olarak, politika transferi sürecini analiz eden ders çıkarma ve politika kaynakları modellerini, politika transferi sürecini etkileyen ve yönlendiren faktörler açısından incelemektedir. Bunu, yönetsel reform transferinin gerekliliği, başlıca temaları ve transfer edilebilirliği, başarılı bir reform transferi için önemli olan stratejilerin altı

çizilerek ve 1980'li ve 1990'lı yıllarda hemen hemen bütün ülkelerde yönetsel reform için standart kabul edilen 'Yeni Kamu Yönetimi İşletmeciliği Anlayışı' çerçevesinde yapılan reformlar göz önüne alınarak, değerlendirilmesi takip etmektedir. Sonuç olarak, hükümetlerin reform politikaları veya yönetsel reform transferi için standart bir yöntem bulunmadığı, her ülkenin kendi ekonomik, politik ve sosyal durumlarına uygun olarak, taklit edici değil yenilikçi bir model yaratmasının gerektiği tartışılmaktadır.

INTRODUCTION

Drawing from cross-national lessons in order to improve national policy is an idea that goes back centuries. In Ancient Greece, Aristotle examined other city-states for the sake of civic betterment. The American Founding Fathers studied the English Constitution in order to avoid its presumed defects. French thinker Tocqueville examined democracy in America because, as he explained to his French readers, "my wish has been to find there instruction by which may ourselves profit" (1954: 14). In our contemporary global world, policy makers in every society consistently cite the lessons that they draw from their past experiences or from other countries' experiences.

Administrative reform transferring is a universal claim of contemporary governments, but strategies of general applicability for achieving such reform transferring are far from being universally defined. In this paper, administrative reform is conceived as a deliberate policy and action to alter organizational structures, process, and behavior in order to improve administrative capacity for efficient and effective public sector. The advantage of this definition is its operational thrust compared with the view of administrative reform as "artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance" (Caiden, 1969, p. 8). The legitimate authority of the system usually sanctions substantive reforms, whether induced by internal organizational influences or external environmental forces.

POLICY TRANSFERRING

Dynamics of Cross-National Policy Transferring

Wolman defines policy transferability as "borrowing of policy from one political system for use in another" (1992: 27). Significant differences in relation n to the administrative reform agenda and favored solutions remain

between countries (and indeed within countries), yet the existence of common trends or even "fashions" is difficult to deny. One explanation for common trends is problem similarity. Comparable policies arise as a result of similar problems in more than one country. This is a classic, if limited, explanation of diffusion. Broad social, economic and technological forces have presented similar challenges to governments and policy-makers in many countries. Given that there are only a limited number of feasible solutions to problems, a certain commonality of response might be expected (Rose, 1993; Peters, 1996).

A second potential explanation is the growth of policy harmonization through international agreements or organizations (Bennett, 1991a). The distinctions between foreign and domestic issues have become blurred as more 'domestic' policies are decided in international arenas. Common responses may emerge as a result of agreed collective solutions imposed through international bodies or, in the case of the European Union, an emerging supranational body developing an authority greater than the sum of the collective will of its nation state partners (Mazey and Richardson, 1993). Moreover, some nation states may feel they have little alternative but to abandon part of their policy-making authority when, for example, they turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank for aid.

A third explanation for common policy trends is the growing phenomenon of interdependence in which action in one country imposes costs and demands a parallel response from another country. International competitive circumstances condition internal political response and create the environment for the transfer of similar administrative reform policies (Bennett, 1991a).

A fourth explanation is that certain non-state actors might be so influential that they can effectively impose common policies in various countries. Certain multinational companies might be in such a position when, for example, offering to establish a vehicle building or assembly plant given the scale and prestige of the investment involved. They could potentially dictate the terms of planning and subsidy arrangements in whichever country they locate. Another dimension to what Bennett (1991a) refers to as 'convergence' through penetration is where different multinational corporations are able to recognize a common interest in the harmonization of policy and set out to achieve a substantial uniformity of national policies. There is some evidence of such processes within the policy-making of the European Union (Mazey and Richardson, 1993).

Based on the above-mentioned possibilities, the emergence of similar policies may then be explained by various 'push' factors (Majone, 1991;

Dolewitz and Marsh, 1996; Nunberg, 1997). Such as, problem similarity, international influences, interdependence and powerful multinational actors may all contribute to 'policy convergence.' Yet, these forces do not provide a complete explanation. National governments and actors within the domestic policy process retain important roles and influences even in the case of highly dependent and poor developing countries (Bennett, 1991a). Despite all of the push factors identified above, the domestic political process remains a crucial filter in policy developments.

In summary, recognition of this argument leads to the perspective that policy transfer may be a product of pull as well as push factors. National government and domestic policy actors may pull overseas experience and practice into their policy debates and processes of policy formulation. There may be a process of policy transfer in which knowledge of policy solutions adapted by other countries is employed by policy-makers or policy activists in an effort to place issues on the agenda, to formulate policies, to argue for their adaptation, or to solve problems of implementation (Bennett, 1991a; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).

Major Characteristics of Policy Transfer

Push and pull factors cannot be easily separated in policy transfer. The distinction serves a useful analytical purpose, but for many policy issues push and pull factors are likely to be present together. The question is how, through various channels of interaction, policy makers and 'policy entrepreneurs' learn of the programs of their counterparts in other countries and how this experience influences the domestic policy process (Bennett, 1991b, p. 32)

Following McAdam and Rucht (1993) four elements of the process of policy transfer can be identified. First, a person, group or organization that serves as the emitter or transmitter; second, a person, group or organization that is the adapter or borrower; third, a policy item that is diffused; and fourth, channels of diffusion that may consist of people, organizations, or other media that link the transmitter and the adapter.

Accordingly, a framework for analysis must be able to explain the relationships and connections between these four elements. The transferring of a policy item may, as Bennett (1991a) suggests, lead to the emulation of policy goals. It can refer to policy content-statutes, administrative rule, regulations and so on. Finally, countries may transfer policy instruments, the institutional tools available to manage the policy (Hill, 1976). It is possible that the same goals may be adapted and then pursued using modified instruments. Equally there is no assumption that policy outcomes will converge just because the same policy

goals, content and instruments have been transferred. Differences in circumstances between countries make such an assumption groundless.

The channel of diffusion or the mechanism for communication between emitters and borrowers can also take a variety of forms. The work of McAdam and Rucht (1993) suggests that channels of diffusion may run along a spectrum from relational to non-relational. Some borrowing may involve direct intense interpersonal contact between transmitters and adapters. At the other extreme, it may depend on non-relational channels such as the mass media. The borrowing of some policy measures may occur through the anonymous offices of mass or non-specialized media. In the last decade or so, the green revolution leading to the widespread adoption of environment programs might provide an example (McAdam and Rucht, 1993). The role of aid organizations, professional associations, and consulting firms needs to be mentioned in the mechanism for communication.

Even if appropriate and high quality information is available, a certain minimal attribution of similarity on the part of the adopters vis-à-vis the transmitters will be required if a non-relational process is to occur. Strang and Meyer (1991), quoted in McAdam and Rucht, 1993 suggest that actors that find themselves in institutionally equivalent positions in different countries may be particularly in favor of this form of transferring. It may be that policy-makers in different countries transfer not on the basis of direct interpersonal ties but rather through "an amorphous process, depending more on information and a certain similarity or even identification of adopters with transmitters" (McAdam and Rucht, 1993: 59).

In most cases however, an element of interpersonal contact is likely to ease the process. First, borrowers have to be persuaded that their situation is similar to the potential transmitters' situation. This is a "non-trivial process of social construction" where direct contacts, even if minimal in number, are likely to dramatically increase the chances of adapters fashioning a vision of themselves as sufficiently similar to transmitters as to justify using their model (McAdam and Rucht, 1993). Second, borrowers may need to check the details of policy goals, content or instruments that are to be transferred. A direct contact of some sort is likely to provide essential information or at least useful encouragement. It is possible that third parties rather than the immediate proximate policy makers of the country of origin may provide the point of contact. Aid organizations, professional associations, and consultant firms can be the best examples for the point of contact. The following paragraphs move on to consider how to analyze the process of transferring. Two models, 'lesson drawing' and 'policy streams,' are reviewed which provide different frameworks for understanding the process and draw on different theoretical traditions.

Lesson Drawing in Public Policy

The first approach to be reviewed is closely associated with the pioneering work of Richard Rose (1991, 1993). The heart of lesson-drawing is the judgement made by policy-makers about "under what circumstances and to what extent can a program that is effective in one place transfer to another" (Rose 1991: 3). Rose stresses the element of rationality in the process, while recognizing the limitations imposed by time, information and political values. The theoretical frame is closely related to Simon's (1957) concept of 'bounded rationality.' The dominant image is of policy experts as "social engineers" (Rose, 1991: 4) seeking knowledge for instrumental purposes. These lesson-drawers are guided and constrained in their work by the political system.

Initiators and directors of the process

Dissatisfaction with the status quo triggers a search for new solutions, and policy-makers will expand the effort to draw lessons only when a gap between policy performance and expectations has created dissatisfaction (Dolewitz and Marsh, 1996). Lesson drawing is an exercise in active problem solving rather than an attempt to monitor possible policy options or to compete with or emulate others. Dissatisfaction may result from changes in aspirations, from uncertainty about the outcomes of present policies, from changes in the policy environment or from changes in political values (Rose, 1991; Dolewitz and Marsh, 1996). Arguing that 'blame avoidance' is a more powerful political incentive than claiming credit, Rose (1991:12) asserts "dissatisfaction works by sanctions. The stimulus for a search comes less from the uncertain promise of benefits than it does from the certain threat of pain if policy-makers do not do something to remove current difficulties".

If 'blame avoidance' fuels the search for solutions, then turning to experience elsewhere is a practical and therefore attractive option. Programs that have already worked, even though under different conditions, present less risk than untested ideas. The search for alternatives begins with what is most familiar and closest, though not necessarily what is geographically most proximate. Neighboring countries may share problems, but they may also have ideological differences, or differences in income, or levels of economic development. A shared political identity is likely to influence the choice of where to look for lessons (Rose, 1993; Peters, 1997).

The dynamics of the policy transfer process

Lesson drawing spans time and space, requiring thinking about whether the present circumstances of one country can become the future of another

country. Rose calls this manner of thinking "prospective evaluation" (Rose, 1991). Traditional evaluation typically answers questions about how well policies *have* worked. Prospective evaluation represents a more formidable challenge- speculation about how a program *will* work, based upon experience elsewhere. Policy-makers must therefore form some idea of the essential elements of the program. Their concern is how it works in the other country and the ingredients that are necessary to its success. Prospective evaluation is a practical activity governed by a concern to ensure that the transfer of a program is feasible. The interaction between the essential elements in the policy environment and the policy provides a 'working model' of the minimal requirements needed for the program to operate in a similar way elsewhere. By applying this 'conceptual model' to conditions in their own country, policy-makers may have some guide for assessing transferability.

If technical feasibility is overcome, there remains the test of political feasibility. Politicians will look at a policy in terms of whether they can organize a support coalition to push the change through. They will also consider whether it is likely to gain or lose support with their constituents. A program "must be doubly desirable, meeting both expert criteria for effective transfer and the politician's test of acceptable goals" (Rose, 1993: 44).

As appropriate for a rationally-based view of policy-making, the outcome of lesson drawing is policy learning. This may include lessons about 'what not to do,' as well as lessons about desirable programs to institute. In many instances, lessons will result in concrete transferring (Rose, 1993). The results of lesson drawing may be incorporated into policy change in a variety of ways. Rose (1993: 30-2) identifies five methods of drawing a lesson:

Copying: Enacting, more or less intact, a program already in effect in another country.

Adaptation: Making some adjustments to copy, with different circumstances, a program already in effect in another country.

Making a hybrid: Combining elements of programs from two countries.

Synthesis: Combining associated elements from programs in several places.

Inspiration: Using programs elsewhere as an intellectual stimulus for developing a novel program.

Rose points out that cross-national differences will usually require

adaptation rather than direct copying. But trade-offs exist in this process of policy crafting. As the programs that result from lesson drawing depart from the original model employed in the other country, the probability increases that the result will better fit new circumstances. However, guidance as to how the new policy will actually work diminishes as adaptation increases.

Policy Transfer and Policy Stream Models

An alternative model can be outlined that views policy change as less orderly and rational than the framework suggested by Rose (1993, 1991). Several writers (Wolman, 1992; Bennett, 1991a and 1991 b) have suggested that cross-national policy transfer is a messier and more diverse process than captured by Rose's concern with lesson drawing.

The alternative model is more descriptive and analytic while Rose's concerns extend to the prescriptive and practical. Its theoretical base incorporates some of the assumptions of bounded rationality implicit in Rose's model, including the constraints imposed by limited time and knowledge among policy-makers. It is a model associated with Cohen et al. (1972) "garbage can processes" and Kingdon's (1995) "policy streams." Here one enters a world of conflicting and ambiguous goals and unclear ways of proceeding. Multiple participants engage and disengage at different times in the policy process. Problems come and go from the policy agenda. Solutions and policies exist in separate streams. Politics and political events add a further element of uncertainty. Policies emerge out of this "primeval soup" when "windows of opportunity" present themselves. A crucial role is played by "policy entrepreneurs" found in a complex mix of "policy communities" who seize their chance to advocate a proposal or give prominence to a policy idea (Kingdon, 1995). Cross-national experience presents a valuable option to such policy entrepreneurs as they seek to influence their domestic policy process.

What initiates and directs the process

In Rose's model it is dissatisfaction that leads to the decision to engage in a selective search of foreign experience to help shape decision-making. In the policy streams model, 'policy entrepreneurs' both inside and outside government gather information in a more ad-hoc and casual manner, feeding it into the policy stream when the opportunity arises (Wolman, 1992). Information about foreign experience is constantly exchanged among policy activists both through personal contact and through the reading of reports, articles and books. The prospects for informal learning from overseas are enhanced by the rise of the 'global village' especially the rapid expansion of the Internet. The capacity for the transfer of news around the world is greater than

in the past. The world has also shrunk by the advent of mass travel. In a broad sense societies are more open than before, more exposed to foreign experience (Bennett, 1991b). As Henig et al. (1988) put it, "[a]s people and images move easily across national borders, they may carry with them anecdotes and evidence about policy innovations in other places."

A related phenomenon is the internationalization of policy communities. Governments, local authorities, professional groups, pressure groups and even social movements have access to international exchange mechanisms (Mazey and Richardson, 1993; McAdam and Rucht, 1993; Aucoin, 1990; Hoberg, 1991). Conferences, exchange visits, think tanks, and consulting firms all provide studies and investigations into the policies of other countries. Henig et al. (1988: 458) refers to the rise of a 'knowledge class' in each country that is similarly educated and capable of communicating through books, conferences and journals. These policy entrepreneurs "self-consciously mine the experiences of their or other nations for political and economic lessons that they can introduce elsewhere." Leading policy entrepreneurs within policy communities increasingly use foreign experience and evidence to support their claims and arguments.

Like the Rose model, the policy streams model recognizes that shared values and a sense of commonality increase the likelihood that nations will exchange experience and seek to learn from one another. However, the emphasis is as much on opportunity as shared values. As Wolman (1992) comments, informal teaming between Britain and the United Stated is facilitated by a common language and the high flow of visitors and information contacts between the two countries. He goes on to note that some policy-makers saw the US-Britain connection as a mistake and that Britain would have done better to pay more attention to other European countries. However, such learning is made more problematic by the difficulties of language and informal exchange. More broadly, some countries appear to gain a reputation as leaders in a particular policy field. For example, it is obvious that Anglo-American countries have tended to be the leaders in administrative reform (Peters, 1997). The policy streams model of policy transfer departs from the Rose's framework in emphasizing the mix of potential factors to guide the search.

The dynamics of the process

The policy streams model emphasizes three factors that contrast with the Rose model in explaining the dynamics of transfer. First, the process can only be understood in the context of a broader policy debate. Second, the assessment of overseas experience frequently does not match the standards of prospective evaluation. Finally, the role of 'policy entrepreneurs' both in exporter and

importer countries is crucial and not as "unselfish" as implied in the Rose model.

Foreign policy alternatives possess a track record and novel origins and so may enjoy advantages over homegrown alternatives. However, they must still compete as just one current in the policy stream. Like other policy alternatives, cross-national transfer relies on the emergence of a "window of opportunity," which allows it to make it onto the agenda. Unlike the Rose model, which tends to suggest that foreign experience receives exclusive accumulated attention, the policy streams model emphasizes the predominance of competition in policy ideas (Wolman, 1992).

The policy transfer process is less deliberative and rational than that implied by the lesson drawing. Information gathering is often ad hoc and relies on provision from the promoters of the policy in the exporting country. Research and systematic investigation may be undertaken but transfer is just as likely to depend on tours, site-visits and showcase presentations. In an atmosphere of advocacy, little information may leak through to help towards a sober analysis. More attention is likely to be paid to the differences between the political, economic and social conditions in the exporting and importing countries. Yet, as Wolman (1992: 42) comments, "attempts at appropriate adaptations are made, although the level of analysis is not highly sophisticated". Because policy-makers often gain an impressionistic rather than analytical understanding of the program in the originating country, they can hardly determine the necessary conditions for a successful transfer.

For the alternative model, the use of the term policy transfer is significant because it challenges the assumption that policy-makers necessarily engage in lesson drawing. According to Bennett (1991b), elites and activists can use policy "evidence" in several different ways. Lesson-drawing incorporating cross-national ideas may be one form of "utilization," but this is only one possibility. Foreign policy experience may enter domestic debates by putting an issue on the political agenda, mollifying political pressure, emulating the actions of an exemplar, and legitimating conclusions already reached.

A policy that has been tried somewhere else possesses practical advantages over an untested idea, as Rose notes, and may gain access to the political agenda more easily. Yet there are a range of other factors that may contribute to foreign evidence being used to put an issue on the agenda. Foreign experience perhaps indicates that an issue deserves serious attention. It can fuel enthusiasm for a popular issue, "producing a desire to jump on the bandwagon" (Bennett, 1991b: 34). As the policy diffuses and spreads, decision-makers "may feel pressured by the cumulative effect of action in other

jurisdictions" and "develop a sense of insecurity associated with being in a minority or with resisting a trend" (Benett, 1991b: 35).

The policy experience of one country may also serve as a blueprint or a model to follow. Such "exemplars are most likely to be utilized after an issue is on an institutional agenda, and moreover after a policy decision has been taken," according to Bennett (1991b, p. 36). A legislative committee seeking wording for a statute, or an agency drafting or implementing a new program may search for models. The motivation for this type of program adoption may be similar to what Walker (1969) found in his study of policy diffusion in the American states. Policy-makers may compare themselves to others they see as policy leaders or as peers in similar circumstances. The process is driven by a concern to keep up with the 'leaders' rather than systematic lesson drawing. Finally foreign evidence may simply legitimate conclusions already reached. As Henig et al. (1988) suggest in the case of privatization, evidence is picked through in selective ways, "a sign that legitimization, rather than learning, may be the motivating factor."

Relationship between politics and policy

According to Peters, most of the literature on the diffusion of innovation is "apolitical and disregarded the role the political institutions play in the transfer of ideas among countries" (Peters 1997: 78). Consistent with Kingdon's 'policy streams' framework, the model of policy transfer outlined above lowers the barriers demarcating the technical arena of policy from the political world. Administrators or bureaucratic policy experts may be involved in collecting information or crafting proposals. But the sources they use are not always politically neutral, and are likely to be from policy advocates rather than critics. The role of policy entrepreneurs becomes more important in this model. Prospective evaluation may be attempted, but it may be inadequate and underdeveloped. The partisan needs of politicians, who are themselves policy entrepreneurs, and to whom the policy technicians answer, may influence the process of policy transfer. Rather than policy developing as a technical exercise within political constraints, in this model policy represents the 'convergence' of the technical and political, channeled by a wider variety of actors (Wolman, 1992; Bennett, 1991b). Policy transfer, as with all policy change, is a chaotic activity with limited rationality. Public pressure, media attention, crises and opportunities may create unpredicted and urgent political demands. Change may sometimes be random, unexpected, and dramatic. The process is certainly messier than the relatively ordered world described by Rose.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM TRANSFERRING

Since the end of the 1970s, the entire Western world-the United States, Great Britain and other Western European administrations-and the other side of the globe as well-Australia and New Zealand-appears to have moved into an era of severe administrative reforms. The cluster of reform ideas dominant in international discourse during the 1980s provided a global diagnosis and a standard medicine for the ills of the public sector around the globe. It was suggested that the medicine would have beneficial effects whether used in established democracies, in the former Warsaw Pact countries or in third world, or in less developed countries. Trust of market and 'managerialism' were the key aspects of the doctrine (Olsen and Peters, 1996: 13). The old public administration emphasizing due process and rules was declared old-fashioned and dysfunctional. Reformers advocated replacing old public administration with *New Public Management* focusing on goals and results and getting lessons from private sector techniques in public sector reform. These ideas are primarily developed in the Anglo-American context, and diffused by international organizations such as OECD, IMF, and the World Bank (Peters, 1996). Although the influence of NPM varies across Western democratic regimes, trend reports on developments of administrative reforms of the OECD (1990, 1993, 1995) confirm that most developments point in the same direction. That is, the introduction of ideas, models, and techniques of public management. These include the adoption of business management techniques, great service and client orientation, the introduction of market mechanisms and competition in public administrations as well as the reduction of the size of government with regard to its legislatures, executives and central administrative agencies.

The adoption by many Western administrations all over the world of the same kind of NPM, is highly remarkable and in fact quite surprising. For the principles of business management might, to a large extent, be universally applicable all over the world, as business firms operate in the same worldwide market. Universality does not definitely hold true for public administrations. Various states and administrations throughout the world fundamentally differ in economical, socio-political, cultural, constitutional, and institutional senses as do the ways in which these public administrations are managed. Even within the relatively small subset of Western countries, the administrative differences are enormous. The differences in states, governments, and administrations between the Unites States and Europe and within Europe itself, make the common adoption of the same kind of public sector management indeed quite surprising.

The Necessity of Administrative Reforms

There are several explanations for the fact that the 1980s and 1990s have been the 'golden age' of administrative reforms throughout the western world. The most obvious is the financial-economic need to reform. The economic recessions after the oil crisis of the 1970s resulted in enormous deficit of public budgets and the Western welfare state proved unaffordable. These financial crises have led to budgetary restraint and downsizing of public employees, as well as attempts to privatize government operations and to deregulate private economic initiatives (Peters, 1996; Aucoin, 1990; Rockman, 1997). The need to cut back in the public sector, especially the enormous size of the inevitable retrenchments, provides the major explanation for the necessity of drastic reforms in the structure and functioning of Western governments and administrators.

There have been many changes in the structure of governments and in the relations the states have with society since the 1970s and early 1990s. The 'New Right' Reagan revolution and Thatcherism in the United Kingdom are well known examples. Also there have been serious administrative reforms in other centralized governments like France and Sweden (Peters, 1994). What is especially remarkable about the contemporary administrative reform movement is the similarity of the changes being implemented and the similarity of the discourse about change in the public sector occurring in many of those countries. The expectations from administrative reforms are the same for all the governments: more efficient, more effective, small, transparent, and less expensive government (Peters, 1997; World Bank, 1997). According to Kickert, "Public sector reform is in fashion and no self-respecting government can afford to ignore it. How a fashion is established is one of the most intriguing questions of public policy. Part of the answer lies in *policy diffusion* brought about by the activities of international officials, by meetings of public administrators, and so-called policy entrepreneurs" (Kickert, 1997: 15; also see Ömürgönülşen, 2000).

Major Themes of Administrative Reform of the 1980s and 1990s

In all the leading western democracies, the reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s drew upon previous dissatisfaction with government and upon the work of previous commissions or groups that studied the problem. Britain's Fulton Report in 1968 argued that members of the British higher service lacked management skills. Australia's Coomb's Commission Report argued that financial and management systems needed greater simplicity and more integration. Canada's Glassco Commission argued for decentralization and greater managerial discretion. The Grace Commission in the United States

simply argued that government should be operated like a business (Ingraham, 1997).

As Kaboolian points out, "[c]ommon to reform movement in all countries is the use of the economic market as a model for political and administrative relationships… While the reform movements vary in depth, scope, and success by country, they are remarkably similar in the goals they pursue and technologies they utilize" (Kaboolian, 1998: 190). The core reform ideas and principles included in most national efforts of the past three decades are frequently put with the term 'managerialism'. Managerialism relies on an essentially private-sector set of techniques and practices, largely raised by public choice and market theories (Peters, 1997; Aucion, 1990). Greater efficiency is a primary objective of managerialist reforms. In virtually all cases, the senior civil service was a target of reform with the use of performance contracts, often in combination with greater authority and discretion in budgetary and personnel matters, as a common feature (Kettl, 1997).

In all these cases, the message was the same. Administrative reform is an important policy tool in improved governmental performance. It is a subset of all policy performance, not a separable set of technical efforts. As a result, the reforms that eventually ensued emphasized not only significant downsizing, but also significantly improved management capabilities. NPM is accepted as the 'gold standard for administrative reform' for almost all countries. The main idea for reforming government was that if government was guided by private sector principles rather than (Weberian) rigid hierarchical bureaucracy, it would work more efficiently and more effectively. Surveys conducted by the OECD (1990, 1993) attempted to categorize the most important initiatives in the various OECD countries. These surveys clearly demonstrate the extent and depth of recent administrative reform initiatives. The OECD surveys identify a number of trends that seem to be common to all countries, such as: Increased result and cost consciousness, service provision and customer orientation, performance budgeting, human resources management, and performance control and evaluation of results.

Transferability of Administrative Reforms

The shift from bureaucratic administration to business-like professional management was promoted as a strategy fitting for all levels, and branches of the public sector, local as well as central governments, and every kind of administrative culture in any country whatsoever. NPM has been presented as a remedy to cure management ills in various organizational contexts, as well as in various areas of policymaking, from education to health care.

According to its general applicability in various settings, the style of NPM obviously differs depending on the political and historical conditions of the administrative cultures under which it has to operate. Therefore, it should be obvious that NPM is not a monolithic administrative reform doctrine that operates similarly in all countries, governmental levels, and agencies (OECD, 1993). At the very least, differences in the state and administration need to be considered before an idea of public management is transferred to another country. According to specific (political) goals or national administrative cultures, NPM approaches differ in two main respects. First, there are substantial differences in the role the states take on in the reform process, and second, there are essential differences in the orientation of reforms: the targeted subject matters with which to improve efficiency and goal attainment in public service.

Interestingly, the implementation of the NPM is not only restricted to developed countries but has also extended to developing and transitional societies in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. All these developments in the study and practice of public administration lead us to think about the importance of transferability of administrative reforms. Some academics and practitioners believe that there is a new global paradigm in public management and that the rise of NPM is inevitable (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).

Aucoin observes that "an internationalization of public management is taking place in every government of developed countries. A good deal of comparative learning is thus being attempted. This internationalization of public management parallels the internationalization of public and private sector economies" (1990: 134). Nevertheless, another school of thought treats the universal application of NPM and the administrative reform movement with skepticism and reservation. Hood points out that "the movement away from progressive public administration in the 1980s was in fact far from universal," and that "it does not necessarily follow that administrative reforms were undertaken for the same reasons or will automatically have the same results in different countries" (1995: 109). Even though Hood denies the universality of NPM, he does not reject the applicability of NPM to a number of countries. According to Hood, "like many other philosophies, NPM was presented as a framework of general applicability of 'a public management for all seasons.' The claim to universality was based on two main areas: portability and diffusion of NPM, and political neutrality" (Hood 1991: 8).

Strategies for Administrative Reform Transferring

There is no single solution or approach for reforming government. There are too many lessons, successful experiences of other countries (Toonen and

Raadschelders, 1997). Every single country "needs to identify its priorities according to [its] circumstances, drawing upon the mix of other experiences" from other countries and "look at achievements and implications." Administrative reform programs should have "clear vision, objectives, and simple priorities" (Kaul, 1996: 39). Wolman gives us some valuable suggestions for successful administrative reform transferring.

To be successful, a policy transfer must pass several hurdles. It must be capable of adoption through the political system. Once adopted, it must be effective (that is, it must successfully address the problem it is expected to solve in the recipient country), and it must be capable of survival (that is of sustained support to enable it to continue to exist and to appear and to operate effectively). Different aspects of a policy setting might be relevant to each of these hurdles. The question is whether the various aspects of a policy's setting in the recipient country are suitable as a host for policies that have operated in the different setting of the originating country. Important aspects of a policy's environment include its institutional and structural setting, the national political culture, public opinion, relationship to the other policies, and the countries' level of economic development, wealth, and economic structure (Wolman, 1992).

Governments have to demonstrate a clear vision of the future based on values that are widely shared in society and leadership quality. This requires political commitment and continuity; team building for the management of administrative reform; and the setting of priorities and tangible, realistic objectives. Administrative reform, if it is to be effectively implemented, requires a holistic approach, integrating the multiple human resource, financial, technical and structural factors involved within a dynamic environment (OECD, 1995: 78). Kaul emphasizes the "importance of securing the highest level of political authority to an administrative reform program. Equally important is the institutionalization within the government machine of the skills necessary for the continuation and development of good management in government" (1996: 136). High-level national leaders must shepherd the reform programs, and politicians throughout the system need to agree to support reforms that would curtail their ability to distribute patronage. Political support is also needed from middle and lower level bureaucrats. Moreover, there should be a broad political and social acceptance of change and reform; for this, it is essential that policymakers communicate and discuss the costs and benefits of policy options with all involved, including through a dialogue with the private sector, non-governmental organizations and other parts of the civil society.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The wider international experience of public sector reform suggests that the origins of ideas of public administrative reform and policies to which they give rise are multiple and diverse. It is rare for a set of reforms to be taken straight from a management textbook or transplanted directly from another country. The process is actually much more complex and dynamic. Ideas are being continuously generated, rediscovered, refined, rejected, borrowed, and transferred across boundaries. Thus, no single formula would work for every country; rather the ideas should be tailored to specific countries and regions. Therefore, countries need innovative perspectives rather than imitative in cross-national administrative reform transferring identifying priorities according to economic, political and social circumstances.

The Rose model of lesson drawing, then, needs to be complemented by the looser policy transfer model in providing a descriptive framework for examining cross-national policy transfer. It also needs to be supplemented in its guidance and advice to policy-makers. The Rose model of lesson drawing requires particular circumstances if its processes of prospective evaluation and methodical assessment are to succeed. The broader dynamic of policy design may be defined as "the process of inventing, developing and fine-tuning a course of action with the amelioration of some problem or the achievement of some target in mind" (Dryzek, 1983: 346). Cross-national analysis offers huge benefits to such a process.

Experiences from other countries may help policy-makers identify the scope for feedback and control in putting the policy into effect. It may also indicate those who need to be encouraged into action to make the proposal work. This style of policy analysis provides not so much a technical mechanism for choice, but rather it offers alternatives, options and ideas. Cross-national policy studies could make a substantial contribution to such a process of policy design.

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