The Effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Building the Capacity of Local Police Forces: Case of Kosovo

Birleşmiş Milletler Barışı Koruma Operasyonları'nın Yerel Polisin Kapasitesinin Geliştirilmesindeki Etkinliği: Kosova Örneği

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Abstract

Kosovo has historically been the scene of ethnic-driven regional conflicts among the communities. After the disengagement of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1992, the conflicts that had begun with the independence declarations of the Republics of SFRY eventually evolved into ethnic disputes between Serbs and Albanians. As the United Nations (UN) failed to resolve the conflict by diplomatic means, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) initiated an air campaign to stop armed attacks by Serbian Military Forces on the Albanian civil communities. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established in 1999 to restore peace and stability in Kosovo. One of the mandated tasks of the UNMIK was to establish the local police known as Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and to build its capacity. The objectives of this research are to determine whether the UNMIK was effective and successful in building the KPS's capacity. A set of new success criteria is developed and applied to evaluate the success of UNMIK in this mandated task. Data for this study were collected using official reports of the UN and

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the crime statistics of the KPS. As a result of the analysis, it was determined that UNMIK was successful in establishing a local police force.

Keywords: *United Nations, Peace Keeping, UNPOL, UNMIK, Kosovo.*

Öz

Kosova tarihsel süreç içerisinde toplumlar arasında etnik temelli bölgesel çatışmalara sahne olmuştur. 1992'de Yugoslavya Sosyalist Federal Cumhuriyeti'nin (YSFC) dağılmasının ardından, YSFC'ye bağlı Cumhuriyetlerin bağımsızlıklarını ilan etmesiyle başlayan çatışmalar, zamanla Sırplar ve Arnavutlar arasında etnik çatışmalara dönüşmüştür. Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) sorunu diplomatik yöntemlerle çözemezken, NATO Sırp Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin, Arnavut sivil topluluklarına yönelik silahlı saldırılarını durdurmak için bir hava harekâtı başlatmıştır. Bu kapsamda BM Kosova Geçici Yönetim Misyonu (UNMIK), Kosova'da barış ve istikrarı yeniden sağlamak için 1999'da kurulmuştur. UNMIK'in kendisine verilen görevlerinden biri, Kosova Polis Teşkilatı (KPS) olarak bilinen yerel polis teşkilatını kurmak ve kapasitesini geliştirmek olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu araştırmanın amacı, UNMIK'in KPS'nin kapasitesini geliştirmede etkili ve başarılı olup olmadığını analiz etmektir. UNMIK'in bu görevdeki başarısını değerlendirmek için bir dizi yeni başarı kriteri geliştirilmiş ve uygulanmıştır. İlgili verilerse BM'nin resmî raporları ve KPS'nin suç istatistikleri kullanılarak oluşturulmuştur. Yapılan analiz sonucunda UNMIK'in yerel bir polis teşkilatı kurmada başarılı olduğu tespit edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Birleşmiş Milletler, Barışı Koruma, UNPOL, UNMIK, Kosova.*

Introduction

Kosovo has been the core of the conflict in the Balkans after the disengagement of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1992, between Serbs and Albanians over Serbia's claim to Kosovo. Due to the vetoes by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and disagreement during the discussions at the UNSC to resolve the conflict, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) initiated an air campaign, which led to legitimacy discussions, to stop armed attacks by Serbian Military Forces on the Albanian civil communities. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) one of the peacekeeping operations (PKO) of the United Nations (UN), was established in 1999 following the NATO air campaign with significantly expanded executive

powers ranging from building the capacity of the institutions to collecting taxes. UNMIK remained in the country until Kosovo's independence was proclaimed in 2008 and transferred its powers to the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which is also another international organization. UNMIK still carries out its activities with a few coordination officers who are experts in their fields although the primary responsibility remains with EULEX.

In this context, one of the mandated tasks of the UNMIK was to establish the local police known as Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and to build its capacity to a level that it can operate alone without any international support. In this study, we will analyze UNMIK's effectiveness and success in building the KPS's ability in detail. As in other fields of the Social Sciences, there is no universally accepted definition of successful PKO and there are no criteria that reveal the success of PKO with absolute certainty. Since the success criteria differ from one researcher to another based on their own experience and understanding, evaluations of the same PKO may sometimes be significantly opposed. Therefore, we have developed a new set of success criteria by combining the experience and knowledge gained in three different peacekeeping operations as a practitioner and by reviewing the literature.

Recently researchers have shown an increased interest in UN PKOs, however, there is little published data on the success of the Police in particular. This study offers some important insights into the activities of the UN Police (UNPOL) to establish a local police force and to build its capacity. The study's primary purpose is to examine whether the UNMIK successfully established an effective local police force as highlighted in the UNMIK Mandate by using the new success criteria for PKOs. The study will provide some recommendations to the UNPOL decision-makers in order to improve the quality of the service of the UNPOL component in PKOs.

1. UNMIK

When NATO intervened in the crisis, 800,000 of the 1.7 million population of Kosovo became refugees in Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro while about 500,000 became internally displaced.[1] The humanitarian tragedy of the Bosnia and Herzegovina civil war represented an important example

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[1] UN, *Secretary General's Report on Kosovo*, http://undocs. org/S/1999/779, accessed 15.05.2019.

for the international community during the Kosovo crisis. The ineffectiveness of UNSC resolutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to vetoes and the loss of thousands of civilian lives led to the non-anticipation of UNSC resolutions in the Kosovo crisis and early intervention for humanitarian reasons. Due to the lessons learned from the Bosnian case, it became possible to prevent the escalation of the situation in Kosovo and the loss of tens of thousands of civilian lives.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) prepared the most comprehensive Mandate in UN history and envisaged the plan's implementation in less than two weeks. A few days later, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, which equipped UNMIK with all executive and administrative powers in Kosovo. With this decision, the UNSC demanded the immediate withdrawal of all SFRY military, police, and paramilitary structures from Kosovo and decided the simultaneous deployment of NATO's military force Kosovo Force (KFOR), and UNMIK personnel to the region.[2]

The UN made no distinction regarding the distribution of power in Kosovo. It gave all the powers of a traditional state (legislative, executive, and judicial powers) to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) as the head of the UNMIK. According to the UNMIK Mandate, all activities were to be divided into four distinct pillars for management. In the first pillar, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), also a UN organ, was responsible for humanitarian activities. The United Nations facilitated the second pillar's civil administration through UNMIK. In the third pillar, institution-building was assigned to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In the fourth pillar, reconstruction and economic development activities were given to the European Union (EU), a regional organization.[3]

Despite not being referred to as a "*Trusteeship Regime*," the UN has implicitly established one by taking over control of all Kosovo administrative units. After the UN Trusteeship Council's operations were suspended in 1994, the UN first used this model of administration in Kosovo without

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[2] UN, *Security Council Resolution 1244*, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1244, accessed 20.11.2020.
[3] Barış Özdal, *Avrupa Birliği Siyasi Bir Cüce, Askeri Bir Solucan mı?* Dora Yayınları, Bursa, 2020, p. 217.

referring to the name of the Trusteeship Regime.[4] As a result, unlike previous PKOs, the UN has taken on the responsibility of managing an entire region for the first time in recent history.

1.1. History of KPS

Before the death of President Tito in 1980, Kosovo, governed as an autonomous region within the SFRY, did not have a separate police force. Although the Serbs were the minority in the area, all police activities in Kosovo were conducted by a Serb-dominated police unit affiliated with Belgrade. As a result of the Belgrade administration's removal of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989, the expulsion of all Albanians from the SFRY Police Service, and the withdrawal of Serbs from the region, Kosovo's courts, prisons, and police stations were abandoned, and the police force structure collapsed. Therefore, it was of great importance to establish a professional and sustainable police force for Kosovo.

UNMIK oversaw the recruitment, postgraduate deployment, and on-the-job training processes of the local police while the OSCE undertook staff selection and all training activities at the Police Academy.[5] The number of police officers requested from the member states for UNMIK was the highest number of personnel assigned in all peacekeeping operations to date. In addition to UNMIK's mandate with the most significant number of police in the history of the PKO, the OSCE has also been tasked with the institutional building of responsible and accountable local police under UNMIK's supervision. The establishment and development of the KPS were carried out with the joint effort of the UNMIK and OSCE.[6]

UNMIK has appointed a special team to select candidates who would be recruited in KPS. This team has set criteria under four categories: minimum requirements, preferred skills, comprehensive exams, and psychological and physical health standards.[7] Written and oral exams, physical, medical, and

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[4] Tonny Brems Knudsen and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, "The Future of International Trusteeship: Conclusive Reflections", Tonny Brems Knudsen and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, (eds.), *Kosovo between War and Peace: Nationalism, Peacebuilding and International Trusteeship*, Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 15.

[5] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/1999/779, accessed 15.05.2019.

[6] Baliqi Bekim, "Security Sector Reform in Kosovo: From Institutional Transitions to the Democratic Consolidation", *Iliria International Review*, 2, 2012, p. 24-31.

[7] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK,* http://undocs.org/S/2000/177, accessed

psychological examinations were conducted to select candidates. In addition, background checks were conducted to determine whether the candidates actively participated in the conflicts and whether they were involved in human rights violations. These standards have changed little, and the process has become institutionalized even when all the training and recruitment processes of the police were transferred to the KPS in 2003.[8] From this point of view, UNMIK has taken the first steps to establish a reliable local police force by using the methods used in the police recruitment processes of developed states. This was a step, which has been applied to a limited extent in other PKOs.

UNMIK laid the foundation of KPS by starting the training with the first group of 200 staff selected from 19,500 candidates on September 6, 1999. The training curriculum was prepared by the experts of the OSCE and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), affiliated with the US Department of Justice, before the end of the NATO airstrike.[9] OSCE and ICITAP experts visited refugee camps outside of Kosovo and identified people who worked as police, prosecutors or judges during the SFRY period, who could be assigned to the new force after the withdrawal of the Serbs.[10]

The high number of qualified citizens who applied to join the first core staff of the KPS and met the qualifications mentioned above has made the work of UNMIK administrators much more manageable. Besides, in contrast to other missions, the curriculum of the training to be delivered was developed by the OSCE's professional staff in training and not by the UN police, who have varying education and practices. Moreover, because the OSCE's trainers correctly estimated that it would take time to create an organization from scratch and fill the authority vacuum in the country, they chose to capitalize on their expertise by recruiting individuals with prior law enforcement and judicial experience.

15.05.2019.

[8] Morgan Green, Jonathan Friedman and Richard Bennet, "Building the Police Force in a Security Vacuum: International Efforts in Kosovo, 1999-2001", Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University, Princeton. https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfulsocieties/files/Kosovo%20Police%20ToU.pdf, accessed 13.12.2020.

[9] Green, p. 6.

[10] Steffen Eckhard, *International Assistance to Police Reform*, London: Macmillan Publishers, 2016, p. 59.

Within six weeks, 173 of the 200 candidates in the first group began working in the streets of Kosovo. UNMIK has planned and executed the selection and recruitment of police candidates effectively. Even though police salaries were relatively low, it had been easy to find qualified candidates due to the high rates of unemployment. The rate of minority representation in the new police force has been set at 15% and the basis for retaining Serbian and other minorities in the system has been established.[11] In addition, UNMIK has reserved 25% of the KPS for female candidates. In this respect, it has planned to create a more balanced organization than many European police forces, regarding gender equality.[12]

The personnel selection and recruitment process is crucial for a newly established police force, but training activities are equally important for expanding the capacity of the new organization. In this regard, KPS had a significant advantage over other UN PKOs. Steve Bennett, the Head of Police Training and Development for the OSCE and an expert in police training, personally designed and oversaw the KPS training curriculum. Thus, KPS began receiving qualified training at the same level of quality as its European counterparts from the beginning. The training, which was initially administered by interpreters, became the responsibility of the KPS in 2001, just two years after the war and when local police lecturers were trained. In 2008, 107 KPS trainers continued to provide training to KPS officers under the supervision of the OSCE. Bennett extended his work after the first badge was graduated and began working on the streets of the capital, spending nine weeks in the classroom and 19 weeks on the job. After recruiting sufficient staff, the training period was increased to 40 weeks consisting of 20 weeks of theory and 20 weeks of on-the-job training. In addition, the candidates participated in field training for two months after their three months of classroom instruction and then they exchanged locations with the school every two weeks in their field training until the training was completed. In this way, the candidates could put their theoretical knowledge into practice and identify problems on the spot. Each year, graduates return to the Police Academy for recertification in their competencies and further training in management

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[11] UNDP, *Assessment of Administrative Capacity in Kosovo,* 2005, p. 53, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Assessment%20Admin%20Capacity_Kosovo.pdf, accessed 28.05.2019.
[12] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK,* http://undocs. org/S/2000/177, accessed 15.05.2019.

and other specialities. In the field, the daily, weekly, and monthly performance of each candidate was evaluated by the UN police by following the on-the-job training program determined by the UNMIK headquarters for the candidates.[13]

As can be seen, a new system of on-the-job training for local police has been implemented, which has not been done in other PKOs. A monitoring and evaluation file was created for each KPS candidate using this new system during the on-the-job training process. Regardless of the unit, UNPOL personnel working with the KPS monitored and documented the KPS's performance on their duty. The KPS candidates, who couldn't meet the expected standards and had to be improved, were sent back to the police academy for further training. In line with the UNPOLs report, staff members whose performance was abysmally poor, who violated human rights, and who were unfit for the service, were dismissed. This practice enabled the active participation of UNPOLs in KPS selection, recruitment, and training processes. It also put a very positive impact on the willingness and cooperation of the local police toward the capacity-building activities provided by the Individual Police Officers (IPOs).

In summary, Kosovo, which was autonomously administered within the SFRY, has never had a local police organization of its own throughout its history. The police activities were performed by the officials assigned by the Yugoslav central government and these officials were predominately Serbs. Following the abolishment of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989, minorities were dismissed from the police force, and the overall control of the region was taken by the Serbian communities. After the intervention of the international community in the Kosovo crisis, a joint effort was put in place by UNMIK and OSCE to establish a new and independent police force known as KPS.

1.2. UNMIK's Capacity Building Efforts for KPS

One of the primary responsibilities of UNMIK, which was equipped with extraordinary powers by the UNSC, was to establish the local police force and increase its institutional capacity. Although some of the security concerns were resolved with UNMIK's inauguration, the desired level of public order could not be established due to the inability to reach a sufficient

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[13] Green, p. 9.

number of UNPOLs. Out of 4,700 international police designated for the mission, only 1,800 (including 1,100 FPU, that is Formed Police Units) were able to reach the region in December 1999, that is approximately six months after the mission started. When the first year of UNMIK was completed in March 2000, only 2,361 of the 3,618 police officers, who had been envisaged in the mission, could work in the region.[14] The number of police officers initially authorized for the mission could only be approached in September 2002 with 4,468 personnel from 49 states.

In addition, 169 unarmed UNPOLs from the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) were transferred to Kosovo to support the UNPOLs in Kosovo, whose number was 1,100 in the first phase. With the operation of the selection and recruitment process described in detail in the previous section, 200 KPS, who were the first graduates of the process, started patrolling the streets of Pristina, accompanied by UNPOL.[15] In Pristina and Prizren, where one-third of the crimes were committed, the UNPOL-KPS was jointly responsible for all policing activities, while there was a shortage of personnel in other regions.[16]

One of the accomplishments of UNMIK was the training of 998 IPOs who will supervise and instruct the KPS on the ground. Thus, the IPOs had a clear understanding of the Monitoring-Mentoring-Advising (MMA) activities they were responsible for, the topics they would provide training and consulting on, and their role in the mission. Even after their mandate, most PKOs appeared unaware of UNPOL's mission and its role in building the capacity of the local police.[17]

By May 2000, UNMIK reached 3,636 personnel, which is 77% of the planned international police number of 4,718 and took the responsibility of the capital city of Pristina. In this period, the total number of KPS reached 1,692, together with the police officers who completed their training, although the proposed plan was to increase the strength of KPS to 3,500 by

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[14] Anthony J. Miller, "UNMIK: Lessons from the early institution-building phase." *New England Law Review*, 39:1, 2004, p. 19.
[15] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/1999/987, accessed 15.05.2019.
[16] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2000/177, accessed 15.05.2019.
[17] Ibid, p. 4.

January 2001. On the other hand, the number of the UNPOLs, which would mentor, monitor, and advise KPS on their daily activities continued to be trained and their total number reached 1,600.[18] What is surprising here is that the number of the new police force surpassed the strength of the trained UNPOLs in only a year.

While training the KPS on the one hand, the UNPOL continued to provide all security services for the Kosovo citizens thanks to the executive UNMIK Mandate. Municipal elections held in October 2000 were UNMIK's most significant accomplishment in 2000, has increased the international community's confidence and support for UNMIK. In addition to UNPOL, KPS officers, who began their service after completing Police Academy training, contributed significantly to this success. At the end of the year 2000, the total UNPOL personnel in the country amounted to 4,000 individuals. Since the beginning of 2000, UNMIK police have investigated over 200 murders, 314 arsons, 82 rapes, abuses, and over 7,000 thefts and robberies.[19]

At the beginning of 2001, although the attacks against the Serbian minority increased, Serbian homes and Orthodox churches were torched, and KFOR-protected convoys carrying Serbs were attacked, UNMIK managed to complete the elections of the Kosovo Assembly, which was another accomplishment of the mission and the police. [20] By all means, this was the result of the successful training of the KPS officers in the Police Academy administered jointly by UNPOL and OSCE. The number of the KPS graduates who completed 19 weeks of training increased to 3,138, while the total number of UNMIK peaked at 4,446 in February 2001.

The transfer of Kosovo's security responsibility to the KPS began in the second year of UNMIK's presence in the country, indicating success in and of itself. However, the selection and training of the upper and middle-level ranks were not left to the Kosovo government. Instead, an organizational chart and a thorough analysis of the needs in these ranks were created before

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[18] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2000/878, accessed 15.05.2019.
[19] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK,* http://undocs.org/S/2001/218, accessed 15.05.2019.
[20] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2001/926, accessed 15.05.2019.

a planned training study was conducted as an excellent example of institutional capacity building.[21]

At the beginning of the second year, the number of KPS reached 4,392, and KPS began patrolling and conducting criminal investigations on its own in some areas.[22] The Police Academy began providing further training in criminal investigation, crime scene investigation, ballistics, and intelligence gathering.[23] During this period, a remarkable decrease was observed in severe crime types such as murder, kidnapping, arson, and looting.[24] Therefore, 2002 was one of the milestones for enhancing the KPS's capacity, training it in various areas of expertise and effectively combating crime.

On the third anniversary of the Police Academy's establishment, the number of KPS officers reached 5,240 with the participation of the students who graduated from courses run only by the local police trainers and serious crimes such as murder, kidnapping, rape, and robbery decreased significantly. KPS has completed its deployment in all regions, and, for the first time, Serbs in Mitrovica region joined the KPS and began working. The voluntary participation of the Serb communities in the KPS indicated that the ethnic groups accepted the jurisdiction of the newly established local police force. In addition, the number of KPS officers serving in Kosovo for the first time surpassed the number of UNPOL and the results of the capacity-building efforts became more visible. In 2003, KPS began to take over the police duties previously performed by KFOR and UNPOL, using the available resources. The KPS conducted preventive patrols in Mitrovica, which was populated by the Serb minority and considered the core of the conflicts while assuming full control of two police stations in Pristina and Gilan for the first time. [25] In addition, the convoy security provided for minorities was reduced by 85% during this period and KPS started intelligence-gathering activities with

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[21] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2001/565, accessed 15.05.2019.

[22] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2002/62, accessed 15.05.2019.

[23] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2002/436, accessed 15.05.2019.

[24] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/1999/779, accessed 15.05.2019.

[25] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2003/113, p. 5, accessed 15.05.2019.

the technical support of UNMIK.[26] All these improvements can be seen as indicators of the successful capacity building implemented by the UNPOL.

In this period, an increase in the effectiveness of KPS's preventive activities contributed to the declining trend of common crimes. In particular, the capture of the perpetrators of the attack on the railway in Mitrovica, the seizure of 36 kg of heroin as a result of the work on organized crimes, the trial of war crimes, and increased technical capacity to follow up on counterfeit crimes had shown the way the KPS has taken in building its institutional capacity.[27] On the other hand, however, the murder of three Serbian citizens in the Pristina region, the shooting of the former Serbian deputy mayor in the town of Klokot, and the rise in attacks against Serbs in Kosovo began to cause concern.[28]

The events of March 2004 were a significant setback and disappointment for efforts to stabilize Kosovo. During the events organized by Albanian nationalists against minorities, mainly Serbs, houses, schools, and health facilities were destroyed and minorities were threatened and forced to abandon their homes. During the events that resulted in the deaths of 11 Albanians and 8 Serbs, 65 UNPOL and 58 KPS personnel were injured.[29] Numerous violent incidents had occurred before these events. Still, UNMIK could not read the people's expectations for independence, despite its technical and logistical capabilities and KPS was similarly unprepared for the widespread violence that ensued. Nevertheless, despite all the negative observations, the KPS's general stance during the events was viewed as a success in enhancing professional capacity.[30]

To establish the institutional framework of the KPS, the OSCE and UNPOL prepared the legal documents regulating the organizational structure, standard staff, and ranking principles to recognize the KPS's significant

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[26] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2003/421, accessed 15.05.2019.
[27] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2004/71, accessed 15.05.2019.
[28] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2003/675, accessed 15.05.2019.
[29] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK,* http://undocs.org/S/2004/348, accessed 15.05.2019.
[30] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2004/613, accessed 15.05.2019.

contribution to reducing violence during the 2004 events. Thus, KPS was institutionally prepared for its post-independence role and the transition period was managed effectively. As a result, KPS has become an institution in Kosovo in which ethnic diversity was best represented according to 2005 evaluations.[31] In the same period, the number of personnel selected, recruited, and trained by the OSCE exceeded 6,000.[32]

The transfer of responsibilities to KPS suspended due to the March events was rescheduled and the total number of police stations handed over to the KPS's administration increased to 15. The responsibility for the training at the Police Academy was left entirely to KPS and the efforts to establish Riot Forces were accelerated.[33] The new Crowd Control Unit (CCU) commissioned by 240 police in the first phase successfully handled many sensitive social incidents, including Serbian Prime Minister Boris Tadic's visit to Kosovo.[34]

The year 2005 was marked by an increase in serious incidents across the country: the most senior Serbian officer in the KPS was injured in a bomb attack, a rocket was fired on a bus in transit near Prizren, and a hand grenade left under a KPS vehicle exploded near the UNMIK headquarters. Despite all these challenges, 33 police stations across the country, the Regional Police Headquarters of cities other than Mitrovica, and units of Community-Based Policing, Crime Scene Investigation, and Violence Against Women were left entirely under the control of the KPS. The number of KPS to serve in the CCU established to intervene in riots increased to 1,700 in the same period. [35] It is seen that UNMIK and KPS, which were caught unprepared and often criticized after the events in March 2004, carried out important works in 2005 in increasing the institutional capacity of the KPS and the responsibility for ensuring security across the country was largely transferred to the KPS.

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[31] Troebst, p. 36.

[32] Katy A. Crossley-Frolick and Oya Dursun-Ozkanca, "Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice in Kosovo: Comparing the Kosovo Security Force and Police Reform Processes", *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 6:2, 2012, p. 121-143.

[33] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2004/907, accessed 15.05.2019.

[34] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2005/335, accessed 15.05.2019.

[35] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK,* http://undocs.org/S/2006/45, p. 6. accessed 15.05.2019.

As the number of KPS reached the planned 7,335 officers at the end of 2006, new police recruitment was suspended. However, the Police Academy developed management skills training for the middle and high-rank officers of KPS. Carsten Twelmeier, who was experienced in police training and responsible for the Police Academy, managed to include the Academy in the Bologna process, to provide a police education at EU standards.[36] In 2006, a decrease was recorded in all crime types including the 70% decrease in ethnic-based crimes.[37] Overall, these improvements support the view that the capacity building of the KPS, starting from zero in 1999 to 7,335 officers trained to EU standards in 2006 was a significant achievement for the UNMIK.

After eight years of interim rule by UNMIK, the people of Kosovo anticipated a final decision regarding their future in 2007. Numerous social demonstrations were held to force the international community to decide on independence. With the successful conclusion of the local elections, the total number of elections organized by the UNMIK administration rose to five and discussions began on whether the UNMIK should withdraw from Kosovo. Although Ahtisaari's report on the final status of Kosovo was submitted to the UNSC and even though the EU, USA, and Russia, known as the Troika, were unable to reach an agreement, the Assembly of Kosovo convened on 17 February and declared its independence which was to be recognized by 42 states within four months. Training, capacity building, and all other responsibilities regarding KPS were transferred to EULEX upon Kosovo's independence.[38]

The transfer of authority from UNMIK to the KPS was completed in four stages. In 2001, KPS took over all patrol duties, gaining experience and knowledge of patrol methods, while patrolling jointly with the UNPOL. In the second phase, KPS managers were gradually given control of all police stations in Kosovo. KPS took on middle management units in the third phase and all types of upper management levels in the final stage. The first two phases occurred at 32 police stations in each of the six police districts, while the last two steps occurred at the UNMIK and KPS headquarters. Three

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[36] Eckhard, p. 70.
[37] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK,* http://undocs.org/S/2007/134, accessed 15.05.2019.
[38] UN, *Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK*, http://undocs.org/S/2008/354, accessed 15.05.2019.

years after UNMIK assumed responsibility for all policing activities in Kosovo in 1999, the KPS established its authority throughout the country. Examining crime statistics reveals that KPS also achieved considerable success. After the conflict, serious crimes such as murder, kidnapping, and arson declined sharply. However, it is difficult to determine how much of this success can be attributed to KPS because the UNPOL was also active during this period. Even though the murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants in Kosovo appears to be high, it remains similar compared to other states in the region. Between 2005 and 2011, the murder rate fluctuated between 2.6%, and 3.2%, compared to 2.2% in bordering Macedonia and 1.6% in Serbia. [39]

It would not be incorrect to conclude that the OSCE and UNPOL were successful in Kosovo. Nonetheless, several significant factors have contributed to this success. First, the majority of the people of Kosovo did not view UNMIK as invaders and supported them. Second, the police were selected from tens of thousands of candidates, so various options existed.[40] In addition, as Doyle and Sambanis stated in their study, the state of education, development, and the rapid intervention of the international community were other indicators of success.[41]

It should not be forgotten that between 1999, and 2008, the international community made substantial investments in Kosovo. Three and a half billion Euros have been transferred by the OSCE, IMF, EU, World Bank, Western states, and non-governmental organizations to ensure long-term peace and stability and build institutions and enhance capacity. Additionally, substantial human and technical resources have been allocated. In the first two years of UNMIK, 557 dollars per capita was expended, which doubled the investment in Bosnia and was nearly ten times that of Afghanistan.[42]

According to surveys measuring citizens' trust in Kosovo institutions, it has been determined that the KPS's institutional development process has been a success. The OSCE surveys conducted in 2007 showed that the KPS was the second most trusted institution in the country. The studies of 2009

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[39] Green, p. 12 and 17.
[40] Troebst, p. 39.
[41] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Pperations*, Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 107.
[42] Skendaj Elton, "International Insulation from Politics and the Challenge of State Building: Learning from Kosovo", *Global Governance*, 20:3, 2014, p. 479.

and 2010 revealed the KPS as the most trustworthy institution in Kosovo. Despite the low salary of KPS, the limited occurrence of bribery was perhaps the most important achievement of the new police force. In the survey conducted by the "Civil Enterprise Forum", a Kosovo non-governmental organization, in 2007, only 39 of the 1,200 respondents declared that they had bribed the police.[43] Therefore, this result has been one of the indicators that KPS has attained an institutional identity and professionalism.

2. Success Criteria

As discussed earlier, there is no generally accepted set of success criteria for PKOs. PKOs are typically categorized into two groups. Traditional PKOs, which emerged due to the international community's efforts to prevent armed conflicts between states, generally assumed the responsibilities of monitoring the borders between the conflicting states, controlling the created buffer zones, conducting disarmament activities, and providing the necessary political atmosphere for peace negotiations. Thus, Traditional PKOs primarily engaged in activities involving military missions and their success was relatively straightforward. Since the mission's primary objective was to end interstate conflict and border violations, achieving this objective alone was the mission's success.

After the failures of the PKOs conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Somalia in the first half of the 1990s, which the UN Secretary-General acknowledged, the UNSC began assigning tasks to the Extended PKOs, whose powers and responsibilities were expanded. The military and police forces assigned to these new missions have taken on new and extensive functions that go well beyond those of the traditional PKOs. Separation of combatants, disarmament of parties, organization of fair and democratic elections, distribution of humanitarian aid, protection of children and women, protection of UN and other international organization personnel, assistance in the development of the state's capacity, observance of ceasefire agreements, and monitoring of no-fly zones are examples of these tasks. In comparison to the first generation of PKOs, evaluating the success of PKOs, which include these new, complex, and independent duties, is highly challenging.

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[43] Green, p. 15-16.

Some researchers consider fulfilling the tasks outlined in the Mandate, which includes the responsibilities assigned to the PKO by the UNSC, as the most critical success criteria. From this perspective, it is impossible to state that every PKO is successful because the Mandates are complex and exhaustive and comprise all of the mission's intended objectives. UNSC resolutions represent the ideal on paper. Nevertheless, it is a big challenge to determine how many of these comprehensive and complex tasks are necessary for success. UNMIK was mandated to create a safe environment for the refugees to return to the place of their origins and regained their property rights. Even if this fundamental task, which was clearly stated in the Mandate has not been fully accomplished, the mission's success can be attributed to the fact that Kosovo has developed a self-sufficient institutional infrastructure in about eight years.

In our study, the accomplishments of the missions will be measured primarily by the institutional capacity, and number of the local police, along with crime rates. In addition, we will include additional factors that we have determined will affect the mission's success.

2.1. The Authority and Responsibilities allocated to the PKOs in the Mandate

PKOs are established with a Mandate following UNSC resolutions. The tour of duty, the strength of the personnel, authorities, and responsibilities of the operational force, as well as tasks assigned to the mission, and the amount of logistical and financial support allocation are detailed in the Mission's Mandate. Although each PKO has distinct characteristics, the Mandates adopted by the UNSC in recent years have assigned similar tasks and responsibilities. What differs in the Mandates are the strength of the personnel, logistics resources allocated, and authorities assigned to the mission. Therefore, the number of personnel assigned to achieve similar goals and the logistical support given to them directly affects the mission's success.

From this perspective, it is clear that the UNSC keeps the number of personnel and the amount of logistical support high for some missions by issuing a comprehensive Mandate. In contrast, these resources are kept limited for the other missions. In our case, UNMIK Mandate granted the authority to independently exercise all police powers, which is known as 'Executive Power'. While UNPOL's missions are limited to co-location and MMA activities in most of the PKOs, UNPOL in Kosovo was authorized to conduct all policing activities on its own, enjoying the Executive Power. Among those powers,

arresting, stopping, searching, interrogating, conducting patrol, searching the facilities, establishing checkpoints, etc., were authorized to be exercised independently by the UNPOLs in the absence of the local police.[44] This comprehensive implementation of the powers specified in the Mandate is one of the most important factors influencing the success of PKOs.

2.2. Crime Numbers

The most important indicator of the mission's success for the police is whether the number of crimes committed in the conflict zone has decreased following the assignment of the PKO. Since existing law enforcement agencies have become ineffective in post-conflict societies, it is common to observe an increase in all types of crime, particularly crimes against property, such as theft and looting, and crimes against persons, such as rape and kidnapping. However, if the crime rate continues to rise in the years following the deployment of the PKO mission, it is considered that the mission has not had the desired effect and may be a failure.

In post-conflict societies, it is typically challenging to obtain accurate crime statistics. Due to the security forces' weakness and the citizens' reluctance to report crimes on the assumption that their complaints will not be addressed, the numbers recorded do not accurately reflect the actual number of crimes. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that these numbers are the only information available for the researcher to analyze the measures taken by the security forces to combat crime. Consequently, one of the success criteria for our study will be the impact of UNMIK's efforts to reduce crime rates in Kosovo.

2.3. The Number of Local Police after the Capacity Building Activities

An additional significant indicator of the mission's success is the increase in the number of local police and their geographical deployment across the country. In addition, regardless of the rise in the number of police officers, there has been an emphasis on improving the unique quality of the police for particular areas where it required special expertise beyond the essential police functions, as well as enhancing the institutional capacity of the police organization as a whole. The number of police officers per citizen

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[44] UN, *Security Council Resolution 1244*, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1244, p. 4., accessed 20.11.2020.

is used as the primary evaluation criteria to demonstrate the institutional ability of the host country.

The initial strength and capability of the local police are also crucial to the mission's success. In some conflict zones, there is no separate police force responsible for security and the armed forces provide this service instead. In some countries, protection is provided by the local police force before the conflict. Security service is civilian and provided mainly by the police in most states. Therefore, re-evaluation of this service provided by the military mindset and the restructuring of the institutions take longer than the one provided by the police before.

2.4. The Number of UNPOL Deployed to PKOs

Another indicator is the number of UNPOLs sent to the conflict zone by the international community. The number of police assigned by the UNSC to intervene in post-conflict societies directly impacts the stability and peace of the region in question. It is highly important to deploy enough of number IPOs to deliver the mandated tasks in the PKO. Likewise, it takes longer than planned if the number of IPOs remains limited comparatively to the scope of expanded tasks.

Similarly, it is essential to consider the fact that the country's initial conditions at the time the mission is established also affect its success. Initial conditions include the existence of a central government, the status and dependability of law enforcement, the efficacy of the judicial system, and the applicability of the peace agreement. It is necessary to calculate in detail how the financial resources for the upcoming work are to be acquired, as well as the duration and scope of the personnel, logistics, and all other forms of international community support.

2.5. The Speed of the PKO Deployment

The speed with which the international community intervenes in a post-conflict region is an additional factor influencing the success of the PKOs. The international community has a crucial window of opportunity at the onset of PKO responses. After a conflict, the local population is weary of endless disputes and expects international support to arrive quickly. When the support is delayed, the parties to the conflict lose faith in the international community and the political conditions necessary for peace vanish.

Therefore, perhaps the first condition for the success of the PKOs is the deployment of the necessary police forces and troops to the conflict zone

to prevent further loss of life through adequate preparation and planning for the effective and swift implementation of the UNSC's Mandate. The quicker the intervention is, the quicker the end of the conflicts comes together with the beginning of peace negotiations and the establishment of the political environment that will lead to the country's stability.

2.6. *Geographical Features of the Region PKOs Deployed*

The geographical structure of the regions where missions are conducted can also be counted as a factor influencing success. Examining the Mandates of the PKOs reveals that the tasks assigned to UNPOL are remarkably similar, including the tasks of establishing, training, and expanding the local police forces. Therefore, it requires additional time and resources to reach regions outside of the capital and complete the assigned tasks in host countries that are geographically large and densely populated.

It is easier to build the capacity of the local police in smaller and less populated states than in the states/regions that are geographically large and have a large population. In geographically expansive states, it takes considerable time to train and equip the local police to the point where they can provide security across the entire state.

2.7. *Willingness of the Local Police in Capacity Building*

Local governments must accept change and international assistance for the mission to be successful. Research reveals that international donors cannot develop institutional capacity without the willingness and support of the host nation. One of the requirements for the appointment of PKOs is the *'consent'* of the host state. The UN emphasizes implementing this principle and does not appoint any PKO without the *'consent'* of the host state. It is not the consent mentioned in this study but rather the willingness and support of local partners to change.

The success of the PKO is significantly influenced by the interest and willingness of local police officers in the training and technical assistance provided to them by the international community. It has been observed that the local police in many states where PKO is deployed are aloof towards UNPOL, which came to support them, and that they show resistance to the UNPOL by not voluntarily participating in training or not receiving technical advice. This resistance results in the PKO failing to carry out its mandates tasks and remaining in the field longer than anticipated. In addition, PKOs typically lack sanctions designed to break the local police's resistance to

institutional capacity-building. Therefore, the contribution of UNPOL officers to the mission is limited to the willingness of the local police to voluntarily accept this contribution.

2.8. *Qualification and Education of UNPOLs Assigned to the PKOs*

The quality and level of education of international police officers contributing to PKOs are also closely related to the success of the mission and the development of the local police's capabilities. One of the most significant obstacles confronted by PKOs is that police officers from various nations have varying levels of policing education, knowledge, and experience. Unless common and standardized training is provided, each police organization from different states unwittingly brings their own policing expertise and methods to the mission area. This creates confusion among the local police, who may receive different advice and assistance from IPOs of different countries on the same issue and casts doubt on the professionalism of the international police.

Member states are responsible for the pre-mission training of personnel selected for assignment to the PKOs. With a training period of at least two weeks and the application of the standard training curriculum sent by the UN, it is intended that the personnel employed are to know the PKO, the duties outlined in the mission Mandate, and the host country. However, most states do not take this training seriously and prohibit employees from participating. Therefore, personnel with different levels of education and experience from different countries are not able to perform in an integrated and holistic approach. In addition, implementing the Mandate is hampered by international police officers being unfamiliar with local penal codes. The international police, which is to advise the local police in areas deemed necessary, should have at least a basic understanding of the applicable laws.

2.9. *The Development Status of the States Contributing Personnel to the PKOs*

The development rate of the states contributing police to the PKO is one of the factors affecting the effectiveness and success of the UN missions. The development of the states also indicates the capacity of the police assigned to the mission. It is undeniable that the police forces of the states, which are at the top of the Human Development Index (HDI) compiled by the United Nations Development Program, are institutionally structured and equipped far better than the states which are at the bottom of the HDI. On the other hand, when this ranking is used as a basis, it becomes clear that the personnel

contributions of the HDI top-ranking states to the PKOs are minimal. As of May 2023, eight of the ten top IPO contributing countries are from Africa. Likewise, nine of the ten top FPU contributing countries are from Africa.[45]

Statistics from the UN Peacekeeping Operations website confirm that the contribution of personnel from the European continent to the PKOs has decreased significantly in recent years. In contrast, the contribution of African personnel has generally increased in the missions. Due to the inability to receive sufficient contributions from the European continent, the UN has focused on training the police forces of African states. On this basis, it is intended to provide international police support to the PKOs assigned in Africa and to prevent problems arising from cultural differences by employing African police forces in Africa.

2.10. Interest and Support of the International Community

The international community's determination to restore peace and stability in the conflict zone and the support of multiple international organizations also contribute to the success of the missions. While the international community pays little attention to certain conflict zones, multiple international organizations attempt to lead others. When regional conflict and instability are likely to spread to other regions, more than one organization typically steps up to assume responsibility.

International organizations' interest in the conflict zone is advantageous for the international community in sharing responsibilities and carrying out the mandated tasks more effectively. Different organizations have different expertise in various fields and contribute to developing PKOs' capacities. For instance, instead of the United Nations, the OSCE assumed responsibility for police training in Kosovo and its personnel with huge experience played a significant role in the rapid training of local police.

2.11. The Continuity of the PKOs

Continuity of missions with the same mandate is unquestionably one of the essential factors in the success of PKOs. In the case of short-term appointments of PKOs with different names in the conflict zone, even though

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[45] UN, *United Nations Police*, Police Contributing Countries, https://police.un.org/en/police-contributing-countries, accessed 16.07.2023.

the conflict has been resolved, it is impossible to establish permanent stability and expand the capacity of the institutions.

Establishing a PKO and implementing its Mandate requires a comprehensive and complex procedure. Time is necessary for UN officials to effectively communicate with local authorities in the conflict zone to be intervened, establish mutual trust, and carry out the mission's responsibilities. Frequent changes in senior officials, the closure of the PKOs, and the assignment of a new PKO result in the erasure of institutional memory of the previous missions, and the resumption of all activities. Therefore, the continuity of the mission and the senior officials contribute to the success of the PKO.

3. The Analysis of the UNMIK's Success by Using the Success Criteria

In order to evaluate the success of the mission in capacity building of the KPS during the UNMIK's tour of duty in Kosovo, the new set of success criteria explained above will be applied to the UNMIK in this section.

3.1. The Strength of the UNMIK Mandate

UNMIK, deployed to maintain Kosovo stability, has the most comprehensive, detailed, and strong Mandate in UN history. UN delegated the SRSG all the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, that are, all the powers of a classical state, without making any distinctions regarding the division of power in Kosovo.[46] With these extraordinary powers at its disposal, UNMIK assumed control of all administrative divisions in place of the Belgrade administration, which was forced to leave Kosovo.

When the UNMIK Mandate is analyzed, it becomes clear that it has a variety of tasks that have never been encountered in any PKO before. The UNMIK's mandate included broad responsibilities like "*building all the institutions needed by a democratic society*" and more traditional assignments such as ensuring security, establishing law, and facilitating the transition to civilian rule. Some tasks included establishing and developing democratic institutions, running local governments, rehabilitating the infrastructure, securing human rights, and ensuring the safe return of refugees. In comparison

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[46] UN, *Security Council Resolution 1244*, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1244, p. 4., accessed 20.11.2020.

to the number of police officers assigned in other PKOs, members of the international community have been asked to provide a large number of police officers to meet a significant increase in UNPOLs. It was the highest number of UNPOL personnel allocated in all missions to date. In addition, UNMIK was given the authority to use all police powers independently (*executive power*), which enabled the mission to maintain safety and stability in Kosovo. Additionally, apart from UNPOLs, many military and civilian personnel were deployed to support UNMIK activities in their own capacity.

As discussed earlier, the finance and resources available for UNMIK were double the international investment in Bosnia and ten times that of Afghanistan. Between 1999 and 2008, the international community made substantial investments in Kosovo through the OSCE, the IMF, the EU, the World Bank, Western states, and non-governmental organizations. Therefore, the analysis of the "*Mandate,*" which is the first success criterion of our study shows that UNMIK's executive strong mandate, as well as the resources allocated to the mission, supported UNPOL in establishing and increasing the capacity of an effective local police force.

3.2. Total Crime Numbers in Kosovo

Despite being the only PKO deployed in Kosovo, it took a considerable amount of time to obtain official data and crime statistics for the duration of the UNMIK mission, which lasted approximately nine years. After several interactions with the UN and EU, the UN HQs in New York reported that crime statistics were unavailable since they had been transferred to the EULEX mission. In contrast, the EULEX mission stated that they had the data only after the 2008 independence of Kosovo. Before 2008, Kosovo Police did not share the statistical data they possessed and claimed that UNMIK was responsible. The numbers for UNPOL and the KPS were obtained from the SRSG's reports to the UN General Assembly and crime statistics analyzed in the study were obtained from the KPS after our extensive correspondence.

Attempts were made to obtain crime statistics from the information reports about UNMIK that the UN Secretary-General regularly submitted to the UNSC. However, it was understood that this information was included in the reports presented during the mission's first two years but not shared in subsequent years. For this reason, the KPS crime statistics were used as the basis for uniformity and consistency rather than the first two years of UNMIK records. Although there is a significant disparity between the data of UNMIK and that of KPS for the first two years, the available data

show a striking similarity in terms of the increase/decrease trend of crime. After the Serbian army entered Kosovo, particularly in the first two years of UNMIK's establishment, the police were insufficient in number, uneducated, and ill-equipped, unable to collect reliable data, inadequately distributed throughout the country, and unable to classify crimes consistently. Additionally, it was known that the number of crimes may not be accurately reflected in the statistics for various reasons such as the lack of trust towards the police forces, fear of retaliation, incapacity of the police to collect data and register crimes etc.

As explained above, the actual crime numbers in a country that goes through an armed conflict may not be reflected in the crime statistics. Therefore, for this study, instead of including all types of crime statistics, only six major crime types (murder, kidnapping, rape, demonstrations, robbery, and arson), which harm the overall security perception of the communities, have been used to analyse the success of the mission. The six crime types used in the evaluation of crime statistics were provided directly by the KPS in 2021 after several attempts. Here, instead of all kinds of crime, an assessment was made of six major crimes that are important for the mission and are frequently committed in post-conflict environments.

As seen in Graph 1, there was no significant change in the total number of crimes but a tiny increase during the service of UNMIK in Kosovo. When the annual change in the total number of crimes committed throughout Kosovo is analysed, it is seen that it followed a horizontal course between 1999 and 2003. In other words, despite the efforts of UNMIK to increase the capacity of the local police in Kosovo for years, it is understood that the total number of crimes recorded in six crime types has not changed significantly. Although it can be said that the increased number of KPS did not have any positive impact on crime reduction, we have an alternative explanation for this finding. The slightly increased crime numbers reveal that the KPS managed to register more crimes that were not recorded during the first years of the UNMIK mission due to the lack of manpower and trust towards KPS.

Graph 1. Total Number of Crimes Recorded in Six Major Crimes in Kosovo Between 1999 and 2008[47]


What is surprising is that there was a significant increase in the total number of crimes committed in Kosovo in 2004 during March. It is seen that the turmoil and security environment in the country is reflected in the number of crimes reported. The number of crimes, which remained horizontal until 2006, peaked in 2007 and continued at the same rate until 2008 when independence was declared. The study indicates that KPS, together with UNPOL, successfully kept the crime rates under control from 2000 to 2004 at the beginning of the establishment of the new police force. The increase in 2004 is the outcome of the unrest and demonstrations, which can be seen as ordinary for all countries facing the same incidents. The severe escalation in 2007 can be explained by the protests for the independence of Kosovo backed up by the political groups and the different communities. Therefore, again this rapid rise in crime rates should be eliminated to make an objective analysis. According to these data, we can state that the UNPOL's effort to establish an effective local police force was successful in combatting criminality in Kosovo.

3.3. Change in the Number of KPS over the Years

It was stated in the previous section that the main objective of PKO is the protection of conflict-affected civilians. In addition to this critical assignment, UNPOLs another primary task is to establish or reconstruct

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[47] Compiled by the authors via the data obtained from the KPS.

the local police forces that adhere to democratic policing standards. In line with these general rules, UNSC authorized UNMIK to establish and train the KPS, plan the personnel selection and recruitment process, supervise the trained police on the job, and provide necessary technical support. The figures given below regarding the numbers of KPS in Kosovo were created by examining the reports submitted to the UNSC by SRSG through Secretary General between 1999-2008.

Graph 2. Numerical Change of KPS between 1999 and 2008[48]

What is striking about the data in Graph 2 is that the number of police officers was only 200 in 1999 when UNMIK was established, but it increased by approximately 12.5 times and reached 2,516 in the following two years, hitting 5,240 in 2002 and doubling in the following two years. These results suggest that UNMIK achieved significant success in the first three years of its mission by increasing police numbers. The rapid increase in police officers contributed remarkably to UNMIK's efforts to fight against crime effectively and to maintain lasting peace. The capacity increase continued until 2006 when the number of police officers surpassed 7,000 and continued on a horizontal trajectory until the mission was terminated. Consequently, Kosovo's required number of KPS has been met within the

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[48] Compiled by the authors via the data obtained from the reports submitted to the UNSC by SRSG through Secretary General between 1999-2008.

first six years. These results indicate that UNMIK was highly successful in building the capacity of the police in a short period.

Graph 3. Change in Citizen/KPS Ratio (Number of Police per 100.00 people) between 1999 and 2008[49]

Numerous factors influence the success of the police. However, one of the primary factors is that the necessary number of police officers providing security services to the citizens has been reached. The average number of international police officers assigned per 100,000 citizens is 220, whereas the average for the EU is 318.[50] From this perspective, it is clear that the international community has been incredibly successful in establishing KPS and expanding its capacity.

Graph 3 shows that the citizen/police ratio in 1999, when UNMIK was appointed, was only 11, but after the first year, it increased more than 13 times and reached 148. Within three years of the mission's establishment, the citizen/police ratio miraculously exceeded the international rate of 220 and hit 308. In the following years, the EU average of 318 was also exceeded, reaching a peak of 421 in 2006 and 403 in 2008 when the mission was closed. Based on

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[49] Created by the authors by dividing the population of Kosovo by the number of KPS between 1999-2008.
[50] European Commission, *Eurostat, Your key to European statistics*, http://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20190104-1, accessed 21.02.2022
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both international and EU standards, it is seen that UNMIK has achieved significant success in terms of increasing the local police capacity in numbers.

3.4. Change in the Number of UNPOL over the Years

It is well known that IPOs are individual officers brought from different countries to build the capacity of the local police and to provide technical assistance during co-location activities. At the same time, FPU is formed by police units tasked with intervening in riots and protecting UN personnel and facilities. These two units collectively form the strength of UNPOL.

Graph 4. Numerical Change of IPO-FPU (UNPOL) between 1999 and 2008[51]

When the UNSC decides to intervene in post-conflict communities, the number of police forces and troops assigned is one of the key elements that directly affect stability and peace in that region. The UN does not have a stand-by police force to step in during international crises. Member states are requested to provide personnel after the UNSC appoints the PKO. The number of UNPOLs that the UNSC assigned and the Mandate are crucial to the mission's success.

As can be seen from Graph 4 above, 1,100 IPOs were initially assigned when UNMIK was established in 1999. This number alone is far higher than most of the PKOs' approved strength through their mission in the

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[51] Compiled by the authors via the data obtained from the reports submitted to the UNSC by SRSG through Secretary General between 1999-2008.

host country. The number of IPOs increased by more than three times the following year, reaching 3,454. Despite the yearly decrease, this number remained higher than 3,300 until 2002. Over the next three years, it decreased gradually, dropping to 2,391 in 2005 and 1,500 in the final three years of the mission. The most exciting finding of this study was that the number of IPOs, who were responsible for the capacity-building activities assigned to the UNMIK, is the highest in the UN Peacekeeping history. As an example, the maximum approved strength of the IPOs in Haiti was 1,671 which was never met. The actual number deployed to the mission in Haiti was only 760 until the earthquake of 2010, which caused more than 220,000 casualties. Even after this catastrophic incident, the number of IPOs remained at approximately 1250. However, in Kosovo, the initial number of IPOs responsible for MMA activities was 1,100. According to these data, we can infer that the high number of IPOs has successfully achieved the expected role of capacity building of KPS in Kosovo.

3.5. *The Speed of the UNPOL Deployment*

The speed of intervention of the PKOs to be deployed in the post-conflict region is another aspect that affects success. The international community has a crucial moment of opportunity to intervene at the very beginning. The local population is weary of the constant wars and demands international support as soon as possible after the conflict. When this aid arrives late, the parties of the conflict stop believing in the international community and the political climate required for peace negotiations is no longer present. For this reason, it is essential to reach the approved strength of UNPOLs authorized in the mission's Mandate.

Graph 5. Numerical Change of UNPOL between 1999 and 2008[52]

In other words, the first years of international intervention are crucial to the mission's success. The PKO must utilize the full strength of its staff as soon as possible to meet its objectives and deliver mandates tasks. As seen in Graph 5, UNMIK began its mission in Kosovo in 1999 with 1,100 IPOs assigned at the initial phase of the mission. IPOs increased by more than three times the following year and this was an increase not seen in any other PKO mission. This increase brought the total number of IPOs to the maximum number of personnel assigned for the mission. UNMIK had the most significant number of IPOs to support the development of the local police's training and capacity from the very beginning of the mission and kept this advantage throughout.

3.6. *Geographical Features of Kosovo*

The deployment of the local police throughout the country is another criterion for the missions' success. One of the elements influencing the success of the mission is the geographic composition of the areas where the missions are conducted. The tasks assigned to the PKOs with their Mandates are very similar. Compared to geographically large states with large populations, it is believed that it is easier to maintain peace and stability in smaller states with fewer residents and to implement the Mandate. It takes

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[52] Compiled by the authors via the data obtained from the reports submitted to the UNSC by SRSG through Secretary General between 1999-2008.

quite a long time for the local police in larger states to become sufficiently prepared and trained to provide security throughout the entire state.

Kosovo is a small country with an educated population, in which all infrastructure projects were completed during the rule of the former SFRY and each region was easily accessible. Additionally, since the Balkans were close to continental Europe, the European nations intended to prevent a conflict from spreading to their borders. From this viewpoint, it is evident that Kosovo's population and geographic structure have provided a significant advantage for UNMIK. The mission's success was closely related to the geographic distribution of local police nationwide, as increasing the number of local police officers alone was insufficient. Capacity-building activities for KPS have begun in all the regions in Kosovo as soon as UNMIK began its mission. In other words, plans to establish, expand, and assign local police forces across the nation have been made and carried out from the beginning. In Kosovo's five cities and all its sub-administrative divisions, police presence was guaranteed and necessary care was taken to ensure that all ethnic groups were represented in the KPS structure. It was concluded that UNMIK successfully reorganized local police across the nation with the advantage of the geographical features of the country.

3.7. Willingness of the Local Police

The willingness of local police to cooperate is another criterion by which we can evaluate the PKO's success. Numerous studies have demonstrated that without the host state's support and willingness, international organizations can't increase the capacity of local institutions. Regarding the police forces, the interest and desire of the local police officers to receive training and technical support from the international community significantly impact the PKO's success. In many states, where PKO is deployed, the local police appear to be distant from UNPOL, who came to support them, refuse to participate in the training voluntarily, and generally display resistance. Due to this resistance, the PKO either fails to carry out its tasks or remains in the field longer than anticipated. Furthermore, PKOs generally do not have any sanctions in place to overcome this opposition to the institutional framework.

The local police officers in Kosovo became more enthusiastic and interested as a result of UNMIK's active participation in all facets of the training and capacity-building activities, which began with the KPS's selection and recruitment process, the development of the training curriculum by OSCE professionals, and the support of co-location activities with numerous IPOs.

Additionally, a relationship of trust grew between the KPS officers and the IPOs, and as a result, the local police's support for the process increased. Each IPO monitored the KPS, for which it was responsible, for its development in the co-located unit and offered consultation individually in the areas deemed necessary. In addition, the KPS personnel, who took their field training after their education at the Police Academy and who were still in the status of candidate civil servants, were more willing to cooperate, knowing that if the result of the performance report filled by the IPOs was negative, they would be sent to training again. If their performance was found entirely inadequate, they would lose their job. From this point of view, it has been understood that KPS personnel were willing to get international support and cooperation, which led to the success of UNMIK.

3.8. Qualification and Education of UNPOL Assigned to the UNMIK

UNPOL's qualifications and educational status are used as other success criteria. Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of the mission and the development of the local police force are directly correlated to the level of skill and education of the international police who are to conduct MMA activities in the PKOs. IPOs participating in the missions have varying levels of police training, expertise, and knowledge. It should not be surprising that IPOs bring their own policing knowledge and practice, which they got in their respective states, to the mission area, if they cannot receive standard training on their responsibilities from the UN. The professionalism of the police sent by the states to the PKO is another issue that frequently arises in all missions. There are several well-known acute issues, including poor planning, inadequate training provided before or during the task, the inability to build institutional knowledge due to frequent relocations within the mission, the failure to place personnel in units appropriate for their expertise and experience, and a lack of skill in UNPOL selections.

Mission personnel develop different practices due to their varied education and work experience across the globe and due to their lack of knowledge of the relevant local penal codes, and these problems cause significant issues with implementing the Mandate. It is evident that the international police, who are invited to assist the local police in expanding their capabilities, should at least have a basic understanding of the local laws in place. Moreover, MMA activities are entirely unrelated to standard police procedures and can only be performed by qualified professionals.

A comprehensive two-week pre-mission training with a curriculum developed by the UN is required for the personnel participating in the missions. There is no UN control over the states whether this training is provided since it is the member state's responsibility. It is evident that, in practice, most member states do not provide this fundamental training to their personnel. Thus, the staff members who are to play a crucial role in the PKOs are sent to the missions unprepared. Additionally, this two-week training is more about preparation and acclimating to the mission's conditions than the tasks performed in the mission.

In Kosovo, UNMIK trained about 1,000 IPOs who would later monitor and supervise the KPS in the field during the mission's first year. The support given by the IPOs in the mission was directly related to the training on boosting the institutional capacity of the local police force and to the MMA activities, whose curriculum was developed by OSCE experts. 91% of the staff received training for the job they would perform at the outset of the mission, given that only 1,100 IPOs assigned to UNMIK at the beginning of the task. As a result, the staff members learned what to focus on in their area, what topics they would provide training and consultancy, and what role they would play in the mission. The mission had a significant advantage in carrying out the obligations assumed in the Mandate because it was definite that all the personnel who joined UNMIK in the years that followed received the same training gradually. As in many other PKOs IPOs appear to be unaware of UNPOL's ongoing mission and its role in enhancing the capabilities of the local police, even after their Mandate has expired, this education of IPOs in UNMIK was an essential step for the mission's success. Therefore, it seems that UNMIK succeeded in training the UNPOLs, who would assist their local counterparts, and this, in turn, has positively affected the mission's success.

3.9. The Development Status of the States Contributing Personnel to the UNMIK

The development status of the states that provide personnel contribution is another indicator of success. The efficiency and success of UN missions are directly affected by the level of development of the nations providing personnel to the PKO. The member state's development rate also indicates the education and growth of the IPOs assigned to the PKO mission. The police departments of the states with the highest scores on the HDI list have far better institutionalization and professionalism than those of the states with the lowest scores. However, based on this ranking, it is

seen that the personnel contributions of the developed states to the PKO missions are pretty limited.

It is commonly known that Europe's personnel contribution has dropped significantly over the past few years. European nations prioritize the peace missions by the OSCE and the EU and do not send many personnel to the UN PKOs. It is acknowledged that African nations have contributed more in recent years. Therefore, the UN focuses on educating the police forces of the African nations as the contribution of the European nations remains limited in recent years.

Graph 6. Participation Percentages of IPOs Participating in the UNMIK Mission by Continent[53]

The most exciting aspect of Graph 6 is that the states providing IPOs to UNMIK are concentrated in three continents: The first continent was Europe, which was directly affected by the conflicts in Kosovo as the refugees sought shelter in the neighbouring EU countries. The second continent was Asia, the primary source of FPUs contributing to the PKOs. The third one was the American continent, including the USA which had initiated the NATO air campaign. A closer inspection of the graph shows that the European

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[53] Compiled by the authors via the data obtained from the reports submitted to the UNSC by SRSG through Secretary General between 1999-2008.

continent made the most significant contribution and that the contribution rate rose annually. In the first year of UNMIK, the European continent alone provided 35% of the IPOs taking part in the mission; by 2006, this number rose to 60%. Aside from Europe, the contribution of the other continents has never come close to 30%. Therefore, this critical contribution from European states has been the most crucial factor in training and structuring the KPS as a police organization by European standards. From this data, we can assume that IPOs from European countries, which are at the top of the HDI list, have contributed to building a thriving local police force in Kosovo.

3.10. Interest and Support of the International Community to UNMIK

The interest and support of the international community are other criteria for PKOs to be successful. The success of the missions is influenced by the determination and backing of the international community and international organizations to restore peace and stability in the conflict zone. While some conflict zones receive little attention from the international community, numerous international organizations work to influence others. When regional conflict and instability are likely to spread to other regions, more than one organization wants to take on responsibility. However, from time to time, the national agendas of the leading states in the conflict zone may cause more than one international organization to be interested in the region. International organizations' involvement in the conflict zone is advantageous for sharing responsibilities and successfully performing the tasks outlined in the Mandate. Different organizations that have expertise and specialization in various fields contribute to the capacity building of PKOs.

UNMIK appeared to have the backing of numerous international organizations, which is an uncommon situation in other PKOs. According to the Mandate, UNMIK activities were intended to be managed in four different pillars, even though the SRSG was given full management responsibility of the country. The UNHCR was put in charge of the first pillar's humanitarian aid initiatives. UNMIK assisted the UN in carrying out the second pillar's civilian administration. While the OSCE, a regional organization, was responsible for building the institutions in the third pillar, the EU, another regional organization, was responsible for restructuring and economic development in the fourth pillar.

Experts from the OSCE and ICITAP also developed the police training curriculum. In this context, KPS stood out against other newly established

police forces founded by UN missions. Steve Bennett, the OSCE's Head of Police Training and Development and a specialist in the field of police training, created a unique training program for KPS and personally oversaw its execution. Certain PKOs may, of course, receive some limited assistance from international institutions but no UN mission has undertaken the responsibility to which international institutions have not directly contributed, as it was in the case of Kosovo.

3.11. Continuity of the UNMIK

Continuity of missions under the same Mandate is undoubtedly one of the critical elements in PKO's success. Even though the conflict ended when PKOs with different names were temporarily appointed in the conflict zone, creating long-term stability or boosting the institutions' capacity is impossible.

Establishing a PKO and applying the Mandate necessarily require a comprehensive and intricate process, as stated in the sections above. It requires time for local authorities in the conflict zone where the UN is intervening to build trust with UN representatives and for the mission to carry out its tasks effectively. The institutional memory of the previous assignment is reset with a new PKO. All activities are resumed when senior officials frequently change or their PKOs are closed, and a new mission is assigned. As a result, the continuity of the task and senior officials helps the PKO succeed and achieve its objectives.

Although each of the established peace missions appears to fall under the scope of the UN and one mission is a continuation of the other, each mission has a unique budget, management structure, senior officials, and Mandate. As a result, when the mission is completed, the experience gained and the bilateral relationships built with the host state administrators end. However, when the next mission begins, the previous gains are mainly reset and everything starts over. Because of this, the police's professionalization, training, and capacity-building efforts are also interrupted with each mission completed. The areas that need to be improved may also change depending on the political objectives of the states which fund the new mission. In contrast to operations in other regions, UNMIK was the first and still only peacekeeping mission in Kosovo to be commissioned by the UN from the start, despite having a lengthy mandate. As it is evident from the information we have provided, UNMIK, which transferred all of its authority to EULEX after the independence of Kosovo, was run by a single PKO between 1999 and 2008, which led to the success of the mission.

Conclusion

This study aimed to assess whether the UNMIK was successful in building the capacity of the local police force known as KPS, which was one of the mandated tasks of the mission. After giving brief information on the background of the conflict that has endangered the stability of Kosovo for decades, the intervention of the international community in Kosovo through UNMIK after the NATO airstrike was explained. The history of the local police force and the UNMIK's effort to establish and develop the KPS was also summarised in the first part of the study.

The eleven success criteria for the PKOs set and developed by the authors of this study have been introduced as there were no tangible criteria available to evaluate the mission's success with absolute certainty. The overall success of the UNMIK/UNPOL was evaluated by applying each of the success criteria. The first criterion as '*authority and responsibilities allocated to the PKO in the Mandate*' has identified that the UNMIK mandate was executive and all the powers of a classical state were delegated to the mission. This strong mandate enabled UNPOL to use all police powers independently and this helped the mission to maintain safety and stability in Kosovo while training and monitoring the KPS in the field. Therefore, the analysis of the Mandate reveals that UNMIK's executively strong mandate and the resources allocated to the mission supported UNPOL in establishing and capacitating an effective local police force.

The second criterion was the trend of '*total crime numbers*' after the intervention of the UNMIK between 1999 and 2008. The statistics obtained by the authors from the KPS after long negotiations have shown that the KPS together with UNPOL successfully kept the crime rates under control from 2000 to 2004 at the beginning of the establishment of the new police force. The increase in 2004 is the outcome of the demonstrations and the severe escalation in 2007 can be explained by the protests for the independence of Kosovo which can be seen as extraordinary conditions and should be eliminated to make an objective analysis. According to these data, we can refer that the UNPOL's effort to establish an effective local police force was successful in combatting crimes in Kosovo.

The third criterion which was '*change in the number of KPS over the years*' has confirmed that UNMIK achieved significant success in the first three years of its mission by increasing police numbers. Within three years of the mission's establishment, the citizen/police ratio miraculously exceeded

the international rate of 220 and hit 308. In the following years, the EU average of 318 was also exceeded, reaching a peak of 421 in 2006 and 403 in 2008 when the mission was closed. Consequently, Kosovo's required number of KPS officers has been met within the first six years. These results have indicated that UNMIK was highly successful in building the capacity of the police in a short period.

The fourth criterion as *'change in the number of UNPOLs over the years'* has proved that the initial number of IPOs in the UNMIK was far higher than most of the PKOs' approved strength and even increased by more than three times the following year. The most exciting finding of this study was that the number of IPOs, who were responsible for the capacity-building activities allocated for the UNMIK, is the highest in the UN Peacekeeping history and this fact has supported UNPOLs success in the mission.

Another success criterion which was *'speed of the UNPOL deployment'* has reassured that the first years of international intervention are crucial to the mission's success. UNMIK began its mission in Kosovo in 1999 with 1,100 IPOs assigned at the initial phase of the mission. IPOs increased by more than three times the following year and this was an increase not seen in any other PKO mission. This rapid increase brought the total number of IPOs to the maximum number of personnel approved for the mission.

The sixth criterion as *'geographical features of Kosovo'* has shown that the deployment of the local police throughout the country is important for the mission to be successful. The mission's success is closely related to the geographic distribution of local police nationwide. Capacity-building activities for the KPS have begun in all the regions in Kosovo as soon as UNMIK began its mission. In Kosovo's five cities and all sub-administrative divisions, police presence was guaranteed, and necessary care was taken to ensure that all ethnic groups were represented in the KPS structure. Thus, we can conclude that UNMIK successfully reorganized local police across the nation with the advantage of the geographical features of the country.

Another criterion which was the *'willingness of the local police'* has demonstrated that the KPS officers became more enthusiastic and interested as a result of UNMIK's active participation in all facets of the training and capacity-building activities. This was the result of the involvement of UNPOL in the selection and recruitment process of the KPS. Monitoring and reporting of each KPS officer have built a strong relationship between the UNPOL and the KPS and the reporting mechanism which affects the service

of the individuals in police, forced the KPS officers to collaborate more. It has been understood that KPS was willing to get international support and cooperation and this fact led to the success of UNMIK.

The eight criterion as *'qualification and education of UNPOLs assigned to the UNMIK'* have also proved that IPOs, who conduct MMA activities in the PKOs, have varying levels of police training, expertise, and knowledge. Thus, they bring the policing knowledge and practice of their own state to the mission area, when the person participating in the missions cannot receive standard training on their responsibilities from the UN. In Kosovo, however, UNMIK trained about 1,000 IPOs, which is 91% of the strength, who would later monitor and supervise the KPS officers in the field during the mission's first year. Therefore, it seems that UNMIK succeeded in training the UNPOLs who assisted the local counterparts and that this training has positively affected the mission's success.

Another criterion which was *'the development status of the states contributing police to the UNMIK'* has indicated that the UN member state's development rate also indicates the education and growth of the IPOs assigned to the PKO mission. The police departments of the states with the highest scores on the HDI list have far better institutionalization and professionalism than those of the states with the lowest scores. The contribution of the European countries that are at the top of this list was higher than the contribution of other continents in the case of UNMIK and in 2006 alone the percentage of the European contribution to the mission reached 60%. Therefore, this critical contribution from European states has been the most crucial factor in training and structuring the KPS as a police organization by European standards.

'Interest and Support of the International Community to UNMIK' was another criterion for PKO to be successful. International organizations' involvement in the conflict zone is advantageous for sharing responsibilities and performing the tasks outlined in the Mandate successfully. Different organizations, that have expertise and specialization in various fields contribute to the capacity building of PKOs. In Kosovo, the ICITAP and the OSCE supported UNMIK to train the new KPS force which, in turn, has affected the success positively.

The last criterion was the *'Continuity of the UNMIK'* as a single mission from beginning to end. Most of the PKOs are closed after a period of time and another mission is established in the same country with a different

name. Although each of the established peace missions appears to fall under the scope of the UN and one mission is a continuation of the other, each mission has its unique budget, management structure, senior officials, and Mandate. As a result, when the mission is completed, the experience gained and the bilateral relationships built with the host state administrators end. However, in Kosovo, UNMIK was the only mission throughout the crisis and this fact enabled UNPOLs to deliver their mandated tasks without any interruption.

The study has identified that UNMIK was successful in general but particularly in establishing and building the capacity of the KPS by implementing the eleven different criteria that affect the success of the PKOs. The data used in this study suggests that UNPOL has achieved significant success in terms of increasing the local police capacity to international and EU standards.

Geniş Özet

Kosova tarih boyunca güç mücadelesine sahne olmuş ve çatışmaların merkezinde yer almış, YSFC'nin dağılmasının ardından ise tam bağımsızlık talebiyle ortaya çıkan Arnavutlar ile Sırplar arasında başlayan çatışmalar, zamanla etnik temelli bir savaşa dönüşmüştür. Sıcak savaşın BM'nin aldığı kararlara rağmen durdurulamaması ve sivil Arnavutlara yönelik silahlı saldırıların artması üzerine NATO tarafından hava harekâtı başlatılmıştır. Bu gelişmenin ardından taraflar arasındaki çatışmalar son bulurken, Kosova'da barış ve istikrarı yeniden sağlamak için 1999'da UNMIK görevlendirilmiştir. UNMIK'in Yetki Belgesi'nde sayılan görevlerinden birisi de KPS'nin kurulması ve kapasitesinin geliştirilmesi olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu araştırmanın amacı ise UNMIK'in kendisine verilen bu görevi başarılı şekilde yerine getirip getirmediğinin araştırılmasıdır. Başarının uluslararası kabul gören belirli kriterleri bulunmadığından UNMIK'in bu görevdeki başarısını değerlendirmek için tarafımızdan bir dizi yeni başarı kriteri geliştirilmiş ve uygulanmıştır.

Bu bağlamda çalışmamızda öncelikle UNMIK'in görevlendirilmesine giden süreç açıklanmıştır. Ayrıca Kosova'da KPS'in kurulması öncesinde güvenliğin sağlanma biçimi ile yerel polis gücünün yapısı aktarılmıştır. UNMIK'in yerel polisin kapasite artırımı konusundaki çabalarının analiz edilebilmesi amacıyla tarafımızdan bazı başarı kriterleri geliştirilmiş ve her biri ayrı ayrı UNMIK'e uygulanarak misyonun başarısı detaylı olarak analiz edilmiştir.

Analiz sonucunda UNMIK Yetki Belgesi'nin uluslararası polise çok geniş alanda çalışma yetkisi vererek kapasite artırımı çalışmalarının etkili şekilde yürütmesine sebep olduğu, suç sayılarının zaman içinde KPS tarafından kontrol altına alınabildiği, KPS'in yıllar içinde uluslararası polis/vatandaş sayısı oranına hızla ulaştığı, UNMIK'te görev alan UNPOL sayısının diğer BKO'larda görevlendirilen uluslararası polis sayısından fazla olduğu, UNMIK'in BM Güvenlik Konseyi kararı sonrası hızla çatışma bölgesinde görev aldığı, Kosova'nın coğrafi olarak dar bir alanda yer almasının misyonun başarısı için avantaj sağladığı, yerel polisin kapasite artırım çalışmalarına etkin şekilde motive edildiği, UNMIK bünyesinde görevlendirilen UNPOL'un nitelik ve eğitimlerinin başarıya önemli katkı sağladığı, UNMIK misyonuna UNPOL desteği veren ülkelerin gelişmişlik endeksinde üstlerde yer aldığı, uluslararası birçok toplum ve organizasyonun UNMIK'e farklı kapasitelerde destek verdiği ve UNMIK'in sorumlulukların 1999 yılında EULEX'e devredilene kadar tek isim ve misyon altında görev yaptığı tespit edilmiştir.

Daha net bir biçimde ifade edersek, başarı kriterlerinin uygulanması sonucunda, UNMIK'in yerel polis teşkilatının kurulması ve kapasitesinin inşası konusunda etkili ve başarılı olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.

Conflict of Interest Statement:

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Author Contribution Statements:

The authors contributed to the study equally.

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