

# Ripeness Levels and Their Relations with the Success of the Negotiation Method: CPP-NPA, TTP, IRA

## Olgunluk Seviyeleri ve Müzakere Yönteminin Başarısıyla İlişkileri: CPP-NPA, TTP, IRA

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### Abstract

*Conflict arises for a variety of reasons. Parties may fail to achieve clear success in the conflict process and achieve their goals. In such a situation, conflict causes the parties to reach the mutually hurting stalemate. The realization of this situation by the parties signifies the ripening of the conflict. In a ripening conflict, alternative methods come to the fore. At this point, one of the preferred tools is the negotiation method. A similar process takes place in low-intensity conflicts between states and terrorist organizations. After prolonged conflicts, contacts between the parties occur and thus negotiations are initiated. However, the negotiation method isn't always end with successful, and it is possible to return to the conflict environment at different phases of the negotiation. This study argues that there are different levels of ripeness. At the same time, it is evaluated that there is a significant relationship between the levels of ripeness and the probability of success of the negotiation method.*

**Key Words:** Ripeness Theory and Levels, Negotiation Method, CPP-NPA, TTP, IRA.

### Öz

*Çatışmalar, çeşitli nedenlerden dolayı ortaya çıkmaktadır. Taraflar, çatışma sürecinde kesin bir başarı elde etme ve amaçlarına ulaşma konularında başarılı olamayabilmektedir. Böyle bir durumda çatışmalar, tarafların karşılıklı zarar görülen çıkmaza girmesine neden olmaktadır. Tarafların bu durumu fark etmeleri, çatışmanın olgunlaşması demektir. Olgunlaşan bir çatışmada ise alternatif yöntemler ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bu noktada tercih edilen araçlardan biri müzakere yöntemidir. Devletler ile terör örgütleri arasında yaşanan düşük yoğunluklu çatışmalarda da benzer bir süreç yaşanmaktadır. Uzun süren çatışmaların ardından taraflar arasında temas kurulmakta ve neticesinde müzakerelere başlanmaktadır. Ancak müzakere yöntemi, her zaman başarılı olmamakta ve müzakerenin farklı aşamalarında tekrar çatışma ortamına dönülebilmektedir. Bu çalışmada, olgunluğun çeşitli seviyeleri olduğu savunulmaktadır. Ayrıca olgunluğun seviyeleri ile müzakere yönteminin başarılı olma ihtimali arasında özel bir ilişki olduğu değerlendirilmektedir.*

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Olgunluk Teorisi ve Seviyeleri, Müzakere Yöntemi, CPP-NPA, TTP, IRA.

### Introduction

The conflict begins between the two parties because of differences of opinions on various issues or disputes of interests. In a conflict, the parties can use physical/personal/direct, psychological/structural/indirect<sup>1</sup>, and cultur-

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1 Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.

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al violence<sup>2</sup> against each other. The most problematic of these is physical violence. There are various political, economic, and social reasons for parties to use such force. There are many examples of physical violence, from a fight between two people to a war between two armies. This includes the attacks by terrorist organizations that lack legitimacy and the counterterrorism by states that are legitimate actors fall within the context of low-intensity conflicts in unconventional warfare.<sup>3</sup> Because states use force to destroy terrorist organizations and terrorist organizations resort to violence in order to achieve their political goals. At this point, conflict is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” as the Prussian general Clausewitz put it in his work *On War*.<sup>4</sup>

Not all conflicts end by making the enemy adopt the will. Some conflicts seem to take a very long process. In Colombia, there was a violent process that lasted continuously for about 60 years. Faced with the situation, after some time parties’ resort to other means. The crucial detail here is the ripening of conflict and the use of non-violent methods instead of military force. Apart from, as the ripening of conflict, contacts and negotiations take place between the parties to end the violence and ensure reconciliation. In this process, in which the negotiation method is used as one of the means to counterterrorism,<sup>5</sup> it becomes apparent that negotiations don’t always lead to success. This situation raises some questions about how ripeness the conflict is.

Although there are various criteria for the ripening of conflict, it can be said that they are insufficient. This is because the ripening of a conflict isn’t a guarantee that the negotiations will be successful. In this context, there is a direct relationship between the ripeness level of the conflict and the probability of success of the negotiation method. In short, for conflicts that show signs of ripeness, the negotiation method is either successful or unsuccessful. At this point, there is an important connection between the success or

6, No. 3, 1969, p. 167-173.

2 Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1990, p. 291-292.

3 Ümit Özdağ, *Türkiye’de Düşük Yoğunluklu Çatışma ve PKK*, Üç Ok Yayınları, Ankara, 2005, p. 11-20; Ivan Molloy, *Rolling Back Revolution: The Emergence of Low Intensity Conflict*, Pluto Press, 2001, p. 17.

4 Carl von Clausewitz, *Savaş Üzerine* (trans. Şiar Yalçın), May Yayınları, İstanbul, 1975, p. 44.

5 Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 8; Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy*, Third Edition, Routledge, 2011; Brigitte L. Nacos, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Routledge, Sixth Edition, 2019, p. 255-274; Gus Martin, *Terörizm: Kavramlar ve Kuramlar* (trans. İhsan Çapçioğlu-Bahadır Metin), Adres Yayınları, Ankara, 2017, p. 250-251; Dean G. Pruitt, “Negotiation with Terrorists”, *International Negotiation*, Vol. 11, Issue 2, 2006, p. 373-374; Seth G. Jones-Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida*, RAND, California, 2008, p. 18-19; Adam Roberts, “Countering Terrorism: A Historical Perspective”, Andrea Bianchi-Alexis Keller, ed., *Counterterrorism: Democracy’s Challenge*, Hart Publishing, 2008, p. 25-26.

failure of the negotiation method used to end various conflicts and the ripeness level of the conflict.

In this study, by examining various conflicts within the framework of ripeness theory, it is argued that there are different ripeness levels and that there is a direct relationship with the success of the negotiation method. It is seen that the negotiations, which were initiated over the claims that some conflicts have ripeness, didn't result in peace. It is believed that the deterioration of negotiations in different phases and the success of the negotiation method in some conflicts are related to the level of ripeness. Although ripeness is accepted as a level of conflict, it is claimed that ripeness has levels within itself.

The study consists of four parts. In the first part, the ripeness theory is discussed. In the second part, the negotiation method is examined. In the third part, the ripeness theory is divided into levels. In the last part, the ripeness levels are examined using the terrorist organizations Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA), and Irish Republican Army (IRA). It is expected that the study will make an important contribution to the literature by dividing ripeness into levels and finding that the success of the negotiation method is related to the ripeness levels. There is no study in the literature on these topics.

## Ripeness Theory

It can't be said that violent conflicts between two or more actors always result in the victory of one side. For this reason, some conflicts continue, even if the level of violence changes. Ongoing conflict means a process that is unprofitable for all parties and causes heavy losses. This situation leads to a mutually hurting stalemate. As a result, the parties feel and perceive themselves in an uncomfortable and costly stalemate.<sup>6</sup> In such an environment, that is, after prolonged conflicts, when they realize that they can't impose their will on the other side by force or military means, it is accepted as "ripening of conflict" that they turn to alternative ways or think about a way out instead of letting themselves be hurt. The phase when this happens is the ripe moment.<sup>7</sup> In this context, ripeness theory explains the "why" and the "when" conflict parties resort to alternative means instead of violence.<sup>8</sup>

The founding father of ripeness theory is I. William Zartman. Zartman identifies objective and subjective elements in the ripening of conflict. These elements are directly related to conflict and ripeness. For as much as objective elements are objective evidence, such as physical harm and mutually hurting stalemate, on the other hand, subjective elements are associated

6 I. William Zartman, "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments", *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2001, p. 8.

7 I. William Zartman, "Ripeness": The Importance of Timing in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution", *E-International Relations*, <https://www.e-ir.info/2008/12/20/ripeness-the-importance-of-timing-in-negotiation-and-conflict-resolution/>.

8 Zartman, "The Timing of Peace Initiatives", p. 22-23.

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with perceptions. For the theory to work, objective indicators are needed to influence the subjective elements. Perceptions can also be directed by an external agent, namely a mediator.<sup>9</sup>

One of the most accurate examples of the ripening of conflicts within the framework of the ripeness theory is the Arab-Israeli wars. These states, which have conflicted with each other for many years, have never been able to achieve complete superiority and no agreement has been reached between the parties. After some time, however, various agreements were signed between the parties. At this point, Haass argues that it isn't the 1948 and 1967 wars between the Arab states and Israel; discusses why the 1973 Yom Kippur War led to the Camp David Accords.<sup>10</sup> In fact, the parties later showed the will to meet on a common basis, since they were harmed in the first wars and couldn't achieve any success. In this context, Zartman puts forward six propositions of ripeness. These:<sup>11</sup>

- Ripeness is necessary but not sufficient for negotiation.
- Conflict is ripe when the parties see themselves in a hurting stalemate and perceive the possibility of way out.
- The mutually hurting stalemate includes subjective and objective elements.
- Ripeness occurs in the process when the parties realize that they can't bear the costs of the hurting stalemate.
- A mediator isn't required. However, it can help the parties catch the ripe moment, empathize and tend to negotiate.
- Perception of a mutually enticing opportunity is necessary but not sufficient for continuing negotiations.

As can be seen in Zartman's theory and the propositions he puts forth, the conflict is ripe when the parties are at a stalemate. In this case, the question arises as to why not all ripe conflicts lead to reconciliation as a result of negotiations. At this point, this study argues that ripeness has levels in itself.

### **Negotiation Method**

In theoretical perspective, in a ripening conflict, the parties can resort to alternative methods to end the conflict. The crucial of these is the negotiation method, which aims to resolve the problem through negotiation and reaching a certain consensus. The negotiation method, which is used for the purpose of giving up violence and establishing peace, consists of different phases with

9 *Ibid*, p. 8-10.

10 Richard N. Haass, "Ripeness and the Settlement of International Disputes", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 30:3, 1988, p. 232.

11 Ira William Zartman, "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond", Daniel Druckman-Paul C. Stern, ed., *International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War*, National Academy Press, 2000, p. 226-243.

their own dynamics. There isn't any consensus among experts on the negotiations phases Darby and Mac Ginty divide negotiations into pre-negotiation, negotiation, peace agreement, and post-agreement reconstruction and conflict transformation.<sup>12</sup> Özerdem's phases are: preliminary negotiations, peace negotiations, peace agreement, ratification and implementation.<sup>13</sup> Guelke divides it into seven phases: pre-talks phase, secret talks, multilateral talks, negotiating to a settlement, gaining endorsement, implementing its provisions and the institutionalization of the new dispensation.<sup>14</sup> The phasing of Fisas is exploratory phase, preliminary agreement, pre-negotiation agreement, framework agreement/roadmap, partial agreements and protocols, general agreement, and finally implementation agreement and verification and resolution of disputes.<sup>15</sup> This work is phased as a pre-negotiation, negotiation, agreement and peacebuilding.<sup>16</sup>

The characteristics and dynamics of these phases vary depending on the type of the conflict. For example, the contact established between two conflicting states is within the scope of diplomacy. The parties know each other and recognize their legitimacy. However, contact between the state, which is a legitimate actor, and a terrorist organization, which has no legitimacy, can't be considered diplomacy. Secret contracts are known as back-channel negotiations.<sup>17</sup> In addition, a state doesn't recognize the terrorist organization and argues that it has no legitimacy. For this reason, it approaches the negotiation process with terrorist organizations with concern and caution. Another characteristic of back-channel negotiations is that they create a defence mechanism within themselves. This is because the negotiations between the parties are very fragile.<sup>18</sup> Negotiations are quite weak, especially against foreign interventions. Spoiler actors who want to sabotage the negotiations will exist during this period. But secret negotiations will be an obstacle for them.<sup>19</sup>

- 12 John Darby-Roger Mac Ginty, "Conclusion: Peace Processes, Present, and Future", John Darby-Roger Mac Ginty, ed., *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction*, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 352.
- 13 Alpaslan Özerdem, *Barış İnşası Kuram ve Uygulaması*, Nobel Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2013, p. 95.
- 14 Adrian Guelke, "Negotiations and Peace Processes", John Darby-Roger Mac Ginty, ed., *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction*, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 68.
- 15 Vıcenç Fisas, *Dünyada Barış Süreçleri: Kürt Sorunu İçin İpuçları*, Agora Kitaplığı, İstanbul, 2011, p. 17.
- 16 Mehmet Seyfettin Erol-Emrah Kaya, "Afganistan Barış Süreci: Küresel ve Bölgesel Aktörler", *Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 5(2), 2021, p. 412.
- 17 Andrew Fitz-Gibbon, *Talking to Terrorists, Non-Violence, and Counter-Terrorism: Lessons for Gaza from Northern Ireland*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 51-52.
- 18 Dean G. Pruitt, "Back-channel Communication in the Settlement of Conflict", *International Negotiation*, 13(1), 2008, p. 38.
- 19 John Darby-Roger Mac Ginty, "Introduction: Comparing Peace Processes", John Darby-Roger Mac Ginty, ed., *The Management of Peace Processes*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, p. 4.

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The pre-negotiation is the phase in which the parties contact each other secretly. During the pre-negotiations, the parties discuss various issues. The secrecy of the process is important for the future of the negotiations. Because a large part of the society may oppose the talks of states with terrorist organizations. The fear that terrorist organizations seek to generate in the population with attacks and the intensity of the damage they inflict on the civilian population increase the dose of opposition. In such an environment, parties can eliminate public pressure through secret negotiations.<sup>20</sup> Extreme pressure is exerted on governments in particular, and they can even be accused of “treason.” Eliminating the reactions for a while is important for the outcome of the negotiations.<sup>21</sup>

During the pre-negotiation, assorted topics such as the method to be followed in the negotiations, where they will be held, delegations and mediators are discussed.<sup>22</sup> After the pre-negotiations, the parties move to the negotiation phase. In this process, megaphone diplomacy is used as a tool. The society is prepared for the talks through respectable people and the media. Afterwards, the public is informed about the pre-negotiations and the negotiation process is officially announced to the public. But in general, not everything is disclosed, and some issues remain confidential.<sup>23</sup>

One of the most important issues in negotiations is the participants. In this phase, two methods are used. Either only delegations of the conflicting parties and perhaps a limited group or various representatives from all parts of society participate in the negotiations.<sup>24</sup> In here, there is a difference. Decisions are taken more quickly in narrow-scoped negotiations. However, the peacebuilding can be quite problematic. Segments whose demands and reactions aren't heard can resist the implementation of the decisions taken. On the other hand, it is very difficult to take a decision in wide-scoped negotiations in which participation from all segments of the society takes place. Because wide-scoped participation means that different demands are made. This situation makes reconciliation difficult. However, since everyone is listened to, peacebuilding is easy.<sup>25</sup> At this point, it can be said that for sound peacebuilding, it is more appropriate for groups from all parts of society participate in the negotiations.

The aim of negotiation is to change the party's attitude, understand

- 20 Niall O. Dochartaigh, “Together in the Middle: Back-Channel Negotiation in the Irish Peace Process”, *Journal of Peace Research*, 48(6), 2011, p. 768-769.
- 21 Guelke, “Negotiations and Peace Processes”, p. 70; Jonathan Powell, *Teröristlerle Konuşmak* (trans. Nuray Önoğlu), 2. Edition, Aykırı Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2016, p. 112-113.
- 22 Guelke, “Negotiations and Peace Processes”, p. 70-71
- 23 Kristen Sparre, “Megaphone Diplomacy in the Northern Irish Peace Process: Squaring the Circle by Talking to Terrorists through Journalists”, *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 6(1), 2001, p. 89-90.
- 24 Başar Baysal, “Kolombiya – FARC Barış Görüşmelerinde Katılımcılığın Rolü: Kadınlar, Kurbanlar ve Ordu”, *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*, 18:41, 2022, p. 122.
- 25 Anthony Wanis-St. John, “Peace Processes, Secret Negotiations and Civil Society: Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion”, *International Negotiation*, 13(1), 2008, p. 4.

that they can't always win or lose, build personal relationships and shared feelings, establish communications, develop ideas for a solution, and achieve results that build trust in the process. The actions to be avoided in this process are to defend only one's own interests, to worry about one's own existence, to be opportunistic, to take a defensive position, to stick to a slogan, and to simplify complex realities.<sup>26</sup> At this stage, it is important to adopt a win-win approach, not a zero-sum or win-lose strategy.<sup>27</sup>

Negotiations are open to the public. Therefore, issues such as representatives, participants, seating arrangements, venue, procedures, and how the negotiations are conducted are especially important. Because of these seemingly small details can become a matter of prestige and delay the discussion of the main issue.<sup>28</sup> Threats may arise in various phases of the negotiation method, especially in the negotiation phase.<sup>29</sup>

The agreement to be signed after the negotiations is a document that the violence will be ended by peaceful means. Nowadays, the importance of peace agreements is increasing, and its scope is expanding.<sup>30</sup> Agreements that ensure the institutionalization of peace contain significant content in terms of reaching the parties to power through democratic means, ensuring that human rights gain a structural status, resolving past problems and mistakes.<sup>31</sup> Shortly, agreements create the basis for negative peace as well as positive peace. In this process, peace agreements can include legal changes on a variety of issues, from reforms to amnesty.<sup>32</sup>

After the agreement, peacebuilding begins. However, this period is fraught with various risks, uncertainties, and vulnerabilities.<sup>33</sup> 30% of agreements are broken in the first two years,<sup>34</sup> 45% in the first five years, and 55%

26 Fisas, *Dünyada Barış Süreçleri*, p. 90-91.

27 Vicens Fisas, "The design and architecture of peace Processes", *NOREF*, April 2015, <https://noref.no/Publications/Themes/Peacebuilding-and-mediation/The-design-and-architecture-of-peace-processes-lessons-learned-in-the-wake-of-crises>, p. 2-3.

28 Guelke, "Negotiations and Peace Processes", p. 70-71.

29 Fulya Köksoy, *Çatışma Çözümü: Kuzey İrlanda ve Kolombiya Deneyimleriyle Barışa Giden Yol*, Nobel Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2020, p. 97.

30 Christine Bell, "Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 100, No. 2, 2006, p. 373-376.

31 Christine Bell, "Negotiating Human Rights", John Darby-Roger Mac Ginty, ed., *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction*, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 213.

32 Astri Suhrke et al., "Peace Processes and Statebuilding: Economic and Institutional Provisions of Peace Agreements", Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, March 2007, p. 24-25; Jasmine-Kim Westendorf, *Why Peace Processes Fail: Negotiating Insecurity After Civil War*, Lynne Rienner, 2015, p. 6-7.

33 Stephen John Stedman, "Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers", International Peace Academy-Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanford University, New York, 2001, [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ImplementingPeaceAgreementsinCivilWars\\_IPI2001.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ImplementingPeaceAgreementsinCivilWars_IPI2001.pdf), p. 7.

34 John Paul Lederach, "After the Handshake: Forging Quality Implementation of Peace Agreements", Humanity United, <https://humanityunited.org/after-the-handshake/>.

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in the first 10 years.<sup>35</sup> For this reason, the period when the agreement is signed and peacebuilding is started is very risky. Implementing the agreement and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process has problems and risks, such as expectations, new relationships, passing decisions to the necessary institutions,<sup>36</sup> and resurgence of hostilities, economic issues, past traumas, lack of confidence, incompatibility.<sup>37</sup>

Especially the DDR is related to the management of the weapons and ammunition owned by the organization during peacebuilding. The weapons left by the organization are destroyed and, if necessary, security reform is discussed.<sup>38</sup> In this process, it is important for the parties to cooperate, to eliminate the problem of trust, to adopt a transparent attitude, to reintegrate the militants who laid down arms, and to ensure a normal life. It is important to create various job opportunities, provide psychological support, ensure their safety, and not ignore the human rights of the militants who have laid down weapons. Furthermore, peacebuilding and DDR are intertwined concepts. The realization of one without the other is impossible.<sup>39</sup> At this point, the quality of a peace agreement is equal to the quality of the peacebuilding, that is, the implementation process.<sup>40</sup> In addition, the ripening of conflict continues in the peacebuilding process as well as negotiations. Because the agreement signed after the ripening of the conflict may contain some problems and deficiencies. In such a case, the parties can eliminate the defects of the agreement through various negotiations that they will carry out in a determined and good-faith manner. Otherwise, a ripening of the conflict may lose this feature in one day.<sup>41</sup>

### Ripeness Levels

Contacts with various organizations and subsequent negotiations fail at different phases of the negotiation method. One of the reasons for this is that the ripening of conflict or negotiation doesn't necessarily guarantee peace. However, the steps taken are unsuccessful, especially due to the abuse of the talks by terrorist organizations. The realization of ripeness generally shapes

- 35 HD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, "Charting the roads to peace: Facts, figures and trends in conflict resolution", Mediation Data Trends Report, 2007, [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/39741/07\\_oslo\\_charting\\_FINAL.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/39741/07_oslo_charting_FINAL.pdf), p. 13; Westendorf, *Why Peace Processes Fail*, p. 7-8.
- 36 Felix Colchester et al., "Implementing Peace Agreements: Supporting the Transition from the Negotiation Table to Reality", *Discussion Points of the Mediation Support Network (MSN)*, Mediation Support Network, No: 10, 2020, <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/MSN%20Discussion%20Points%20Nr.10.pdf>, p. 5.
- 37 Özerdem, *Barış İnşası Kuram ve Uygulaması*, p. 135-138.
- 38 Alpaslan Özerdem, *Savaş Sonrası Yeniden Yapılanma: Eski Savaşçıların Silahlandırılması, Terhisi ve Yeniden Entegrasyonu*, Nobel Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2013, p. 14-16.
- 39 *Ibid*, p. 9-12.
- 40 Lederach, "After the Handshake".
- 41 Terrence Lyons, "Successful peace implementation: plans and processes", *Peacebuilding*, 4(1), 2016, p. 71-73.



the parties' perceptions and thoughts for the negotiations. In other words, the parties turn to alternative paths arising from the mutually hurting stalemate. In this process, peaceful means come to the fore. However, some of the meetings held tend to be fragile, while others are unaffected by the conflicts on the ground. In this context, which level of ripeness gains importance.

In this context, three ripeness levels were established: insufficient, partial, and full ripeness. Firstly, in conflicts that have reached insufficient ripeness, the parties aren't opposed making contact and negotiation. However, their beliefs and hopes that a peace agreement and healthy peacebuilding will occur are quite weak. On the other hand, there is a high probability that the parties or one party will abuse the negotiations. The parties to these conflicts also consider gaining a high level of profit from the negotiations. If this expectation isn't realized, they don't plan the agreement. Therefore, the fragility in the established contacts and negotiations is at a high level. Moreover, negotiations conducted after these conflicts are more easily affected by from spoilers. As a result, negotiations initiated after conflicts of insufficient ripeness often fail.<sup>42</sup>

Second, at partial ripeness, the parties are in favor of initiating contacts, negotiations, and continuing negotiations. However, they are skeptical about the agreement and the peace process. They have important question marks about the DDR process. This is because, as a result of the demonization of each other by the conflicting parties for many years, lack of confidence is at a high level. The states have low confidence that all militants will all lay down their arms and surrender and destroy all weapons. The terrorist organizations, in turn, doubt that the necessary conditions will be created and that their security will be guaranteed in the process of integration into normal life after they lay down their arms. At this point, although the negotiations aren't abused, the indecision about laying down arms is increasing. To overcome this indecisiveness, guarantees can be given with the involvement of neutral third actors such as the United Nations (UN). In partial ripeness, the parties' expectations regarding the gains to be obtained from the negotiations are at a more controllable level. This is because the parties become more aware that they won't win or lose everything completely. Therefore, they enter into more balanced expectations. At this level, negotiations are less fragile and small-scale attacks by spoiler may be ineffective. The probability of the negotiation method to be successful in partial ripeness is higher than in insufficient ripeness.<sup>43</sup>

Finally, full ripeness is the process in which the negotiation method is carried out in the most systematic way. The parties don't abuse the negotiation process as they don't harbor bad intentions and have a strong notion

42 Emrah Kaya, *Terörizmle Mücadelede Müzakere Yöntemi: ETA-LTTE-PKK-FARC*, Nobel Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2022, p. 446.

43 *Ibid*, p. 446-447.

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of reconciliation. The goal of the parties isn't to become stronger by abusing the negotiations, but to end the violence through constructive negotiations. For this reason, the spirit and purpose of the negotiation method is adhered to. In this way, the fragility and lack of confidence in the negotiations are at the lowest level. Even if conflicts occur during the negotiation, it won't affect the functioning of the negotiations, the psychology of the parties and the result of negotiation. At this point, the continuation of the organisation's negotiations despite the assassination of the FARC leader can be cited as an example.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, the expectations of the parties regarding the gains to be obtained from the negotiations are significantly balanced and controllable. More easily compromises are made to lay down the gun and build trust. Finally, the conflicts in which the negotiation method is most likely to succeed are those that are fully ripe.<sup>45</sup>

Ripeness and its levels are influenced by various factors. Aggestam attributes the ripeness level to how political leaders perceive conflict, even though the local, regional and international environment is favorable for the peace process.<sup>46</sup> In addition to how political leaders view the conflict, other factors that affect ripeness include the presence of states that support terrorist organizations; the ideological, religious, ethnic, or separatist reasons for the conflict; the reinforcement of the perception that terrorist organizations can achieve their goals by increasing their offensive capacity; and the attitudes of the parties during negotiations.

### **The Cases of TTP, CPP-NPA, and IRA**

#### **TTP**

During the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, some militants of the Afghan Taliban and terrorist organization al-Qaeda fled to Pakistan. These groups, espousing radical religious arguments that came together in Pakistan, officially established the TTP in 2007, whose roots date back to the early 2000s. The TTP's main objectives are the enforcement of Sharia law, attack foreign forces in Afghanistan, and wage jihad against the Pakistani army. At this point, the main target of the TTP is the Pakistani security forces, defined as apostates, and civilians. TTP carries out its attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPP).<sup>47</sup> Once

44 Harvey F. Kline, *Between the Sword and the Hall: The Santos Peace Negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia*, The University of Alabama, 2020, p. 46-49; Carlo Nasi, "The peace process with the FARC-EP", Fabio Andres Diaz Pabon, ed., *Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia: Transitioning from Violence*, Routledge, 2018, p. 37.

45 Kaya, *Terörizmle Mücadelede Müzakere Yöntemi*, p. 447.

46 Karin Aggestam, "Refraining international conflicts: "Ripeness" in international mediation", *Paradigms*, 9:2, p. 91.

47 Qandeel Siddique, "Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for its Growth in Pakistan's North-West", DIIS Report, 12, 2010, [https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/104682/RP2010\\_12\\_Tehrik\\_e\\_Taliban\\_web.pdf](https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/104682/RP2010_12_Tehrik_e_Taliban_web.pdf), p. 7-11.

established, the TTP had a significant impact on the balances in the region. Because while Islamabad supports the Taliban; the TTP, which was considered the Pakistani Taliban, was attacking Pakistan. Despite this, there have been various attempts to negotiate between the Islamabad administration and the TTP.<sup>48</sup>

The first agreement between Pakistan and the groups that were the predecessor of the organization before the TTP was established was the Shakai Agreement of 24 March 2004. Nek Mohammed Wazir, who signed the agreement, supported the Taliban. Nek Mohammed was one of the names that influenced the formation of the TTP within the Pakistani Taliban.<sup>49</sup> Within the scope of the agreement, it was decided amnesty, compensation, not to touch the Mujahideen and allow them to live in the region, not to attack Pakistan and not to take part in the actions in Afghanistan. The condition of not participating in the actions in Afghanistan is proof of the difference between the group with which the agreement was signed and the Taliban. Because it wasn't possible for the Afghan Taliban to give up on their aims by making an agreement with Pakistan. Due to uncertain issues between the parties, Pakistan launching an operation and the U.S. killing Nek Mohammed with a drone attack, the agreement broke down after about 50 days.<sup>50</sup>

Between 2002 and 2009, 13 agreements were signed to end conflicts in the region. Some of these agreements were signed with the Pashtun tribes, others with the founders of the TTP, such as Baitullah Mehsud. Pashtun identity is gaining importance here. This is because, in addition to its religious identity, the TTP is also a Pashtun nationalist.<sup>51</sup> However, these agreements were generally broken due to TTP's attacks and Pakistan's military operations. The TTP saw the ceasefire and negotiation processes as an opportunity to gain strength again and abused it. This is an indication that the conflict hasn't ripened sufficiently for the organization.<sup>52</sup>

However, the insufficient capacity of the parties, inexperience in negotiations, see negotiations as zero-sum, the lack of a systematic process, the fact that the parties don't come to a common point in the long-term even though

48 Muhammad Sohaib Subhani et al., "Pakistani Newspapers on Peace Talks with Tahrik e Taliban Pakistan", *Journal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies*, Vol. I, No 1, 2015, p. 47-48.

49 Daud Khattak, "Reviewing Pakistan's Peace Deals with the Taliban", Combating Terrorism Center, <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/reviewing-pakistans-peace-deals-with-the-taliban/>.

50 Sohail Habib Tajik, "Analysis of Peace Agreements with Militants and Lessons for the Future", *Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Conflict and Peace Studies*, Volume 4, Number 1, Jan-Mar 2011, <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/140.pdf>, p. 6.

51 Safdar Hussain, "Pakistan's Achievements in War on Terror But at what Cost: A Special Review of the Current Decade", *Pak Institute for Peace Studies*, 2019, <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Pakistan%E2%80%99s-achievements-in-war-on-terror-but-at-what-cost-a-special-review-of-the-current-decade.pdf>, p. 62-67.

52 Arshad Ali, "Peace Talks with the Pakistani Taliban: Challenges and Prospects", *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2013, p. 12.

they come to a short-term agreement, seeing violence as a tool and normalizing violence, failure to abide by agreements, failure of peacebuilding, unstable dynamics of the region, competition between regional powers, foreign intervention, differences in religious interpretations, TTP's ties with other terrorist organizations, the Durand Line, controversial issues such as the TTP's unwillingness to lay down arms and state-Pashtun/tribal relations are the main reasons for the breakdown of agreements.<sup>53</sup>

Various attempts to negotiate between the parties continued. On March 2, 2014, TTP declared a ceasefire in return for the Islamabad administration releasing the captured TTP militants. However, since some releases were delayed on 17 April, the TTP broke the ceasefire and conflicts resumed. In February 2014, Pakistan announced its National Internal Security Policy 2013-18. In this context, policies have been adopted to engage in dialogue with relevant people, isolate terrorists from support areas, and increase deterrence to neutralize threats. In addition, it was aimed to win the people and act as a deterrent in the counterterrorism. However, TTP carried out an attack on Karachi Airport in June 2014. Thereupon, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, named after the sword of the Prophet of Islam, was launched and the National Action Plan was announced at the beginning of 2015.<sup>54</sup> Then, in December 2014, the TTP attacked a military school in Peshawar. More than 150 people, including 134 children, lost their lives in the attack.<sup>55</sup> It is stated that TTP weakened because of the operation. However, the organization couldn't be terminated, and it continued attacks.<sup>56</sup>

The last meeting between the parties took place in June 2022 and a ceasefire was declared. Thus, it was accepted that negotiations were made between Islamabad and TTP. It was thought that this negotiation would be effective in establishing peace.<sup>57</sup> While the Taliban played a mediator role in the talks, Islamabad was represented by a delegation led by Faiz Hamid, the former Head of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). During the negotiations, the Pakistani delegation offered to allow the TTP to return to the country in exchange for laying down arms, disbanding the organization, declaring a permanent ceasefire, and engaging in politics. TTP found the offer attractive but insufficient. The organization asked Pakistan to reduce its military presence in FATA and to stop the step that enabled FATA to be more connected to the

53 Babar Sattar, "Talking peace again", DAWN, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1084592>; Ali, "Peace Talks with the Pakistani Taliban", p. 13.

54 Hussain, "Pakistan's Achievements in War on Terror", p. 29-31.

55 NDTV, "Pakistan On Alert As Nation Marks 1 Year Since School Massacre", <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-on-alert-as-nation-marks-1-year-since-school-massacre-1255486>.

56 Madiha Afzal, "Terrorism in Pakistan has declined, but the underlying roots of extremism remain", Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/15/terrorism-in-pakistan-has-declined-but-the-underlying-roots-of-extremism-remain/>.

57 Umair Jamal, "Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Declares Unilateral Ceasefire", The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/tehrrek-e-taliban-pakistan-declares-unilateral-ceasefire/>.

center with the amendment made in the Constitution in 2018. Although the Pakistani delegation said that the first demand of the TTP could be discussed, they opposed the second demand.<sup>58</sup> Thereupon, the ceasefire process broke down in November and the TTP started its attacks again.<sup>59</sup> Later, TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud stated that they had the capacity to carry out attacks for a long time thanks to the “weapons and spirit of liberation “ in Pakistan.<sup>60</sup>

### CPP-NPA

Founded in 1968-1969, CPP-NPA is a Maoist-Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization based in the Philippines.<sup>61</sup> The founding leader Jose Maria Sison saw the ideas of Mao Zedong as an advanced version of Marxism and Leninism for that age and as the main tool for success.<sup>62</sup> Sison was also the chief advisor to the National Democratic Front (NDF),<sup>63</sup> which was formed in 1973 to unite socialist organizations and groups under one roof. Although the CPP is a political organization, it started to take up arms, acting on the argument of the pressure of the administration, and as a result, it established its armed wing, the NPA. In 1986 it was claimed that the CPP-NPA had 30,000 militants. It was also active in 62 of the country's 73 provinces and had the capacity to influence 20%. Although it didn't actually rule any part of the country, it acted as a sovereign. The main purpose of the organization was to bring together those who oppose the “US-Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship”.<sup>64</sup> The organization has supported the struggle of Muslims in Bangsamoro and their right to self-determination.<sup>65</sup>

The first contact between the Philippine government and the CPP-NPA dates to 1986. Since this date, the number of contacts and negotiations has been more than 40. In 1986, Corazon Aquino, who advocated democratization in the country, became president. In addition, Sison and Bernabe Buscayno,

- 58 Asfandyar Mir, “Five Things to Watch in the Islamabad-Pakistani Taliban Talks”, USIP, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/five-things-watch-islamabad-pakistani-taliban-talks>.
- 59 Daud Khattak, “‘Clouds Of War Are Gathering’: Pakistanis Brace For Bloody Year As TTP Ends Cease-Fire, Intensifies Attacks”, RFE/RL, <https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-taliban-ttp-cease-fire-attacks-analysis/32202135.html>.
- 60 Nic Robertson-Saleem Mehsud, “Pakistan's Taliban problem is America's too”, CNN, <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/15/middleeast/taliban-afghan-pakistan-ttp-america-problem-intl-hnk/index.html>.
- 61 F. A. Mediansky, “The New People's Army: A Nation-wide Insurgency in the Philippines”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1986, p. 1-2.
- 62 Jose Ma. Sison, *Foundation for Resuming the Philippine Revolution: Selected Writings 1968 to September 1972*, International Network for Philippine Studies (INPS) and Aklat ng Bayan, Inc., 2013, p. 5.
- 63 In some studies, CNN is used by combining the initial letters of CPP-NPA and NDF. Richard Javad Heydarian, “The quest for peace: the Aquino administration's peace negotiations with the MILF and CPP-NPA-NDF”, NOREF, March 2015, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189990/6a4a521651243abd9d63bafa322d7da9.pdf>.
- 64 Misagh Parsa, *States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines*, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 267-269.
- 65 E. San Juan Jr., *U.S. Imperialism and Revolution in the Philippines*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 105-106.

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one of the leaders of the NPA, were released. Preliminary negotiations, which started in 1986, were disrupted by the attack of the organization in January 1987.<sup>66</sup> It is thought that the contacts established again in October 1990 will be successful. Because the CPP-NPA stated that it could be negotiated without preconditions, but it was unsuccessful.<sup>67</sup>

Negotiations started again in the following period. This has been a two-stage process. The first is the preliminary interviews covering the years 1992-1995.<sup>68</sup> The Hague Joint Declaration was signed because of the negotiations held in The Hague, Netherlands on 31 August-1 September 1992. Accordingly, it was decided in the declaration that (1) to resolve conflicts through negotiation, (2) the aim of the negotiation is to ensure a lasting and just peace, (3) the negotiation would be held after temporary agreements were made on the important issues on the agenda, (4) it should be in accordance with acceptable principles such as sovereignty, democracy and social justice, (5) to take confidence-building measures for negotiation and to put an agenda on human rights, socio-economic, political and constitutional reforms and ending hostilities.<sup>69</sup> In 1994, negotiations between the parties were continuing. On 14 June, the Breukelen Joint Statement was announced, which is an indicator of trust-building and goodwill and forms the content of future talks. The Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees was signed on February 24, 1995. Two days later, the Joint Agreement on the Ground Rules of the Formal Meetings Between the GRP and NDFP Negotiating Panels, which set the framework for official negotiations, was accepted.<sup>70</sup>

After that, the second part of the official negotiations covering the years 1995-1998 was started. The Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) was signed on 16 March 1998.<sup>71</sup> However, negotiations were suspended in 1999 after the CPP-NPA took some policemen hostage and the administration granted the US military access to all ports and bases. Contact was made again in 2001.<sup>72</sup> Although negotiations were held at various levels and frameworks, no final

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- 66 GMA News Online, "TIMELINE: The peace talks between the government and the CPP-NPA-NDF, 1986 – present", <https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/special-reports/634324/timeline-the-peace-talks-between-the-government-and-the-cpp-ndf-1986-present/story/>.
- 67 Christine Bell-Helia Farahnoosh, "Chronology of the Peace Process and Peace agreements between the Philippines and the National Democratic Front", PSRP, Briefing Paper 03, 2015, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a0898bed915d3cfd0002d4/61540-Briefing-Paper-Philippines-Chronology.pdf>, p. 2.
- 68 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, "Signed Agreements", <https://gphndfpeacetalks.wordpress.com/signed-agreements/>.
- 69 The University of Edinburgh, "The Hague Joint Declaration (September 1, 1992)", <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/569>.
- 70 National Democratic Front of the Philippines, "Declaration of Undertaking to Apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977", [http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/1\\_ph\\_ndfp\\_2005\\_20-11d48a9675a2eaeaba19db0162c8ab09.pdf](http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/1_ph_ndfp_2005_20-11d48a9675a2eaeaba19db0162c8ab09.pdf), p. 103-113.
- 71 *Ibid*, p. 129-143.
- 72 Bell-Farahnoosh, "Chronology of the Peace Process...", p. 2-3.

agreement was signed.

Negotiations started again in 2011. It was overturned in 2013 when the parties couldn't agree on the demands. A year later, contacts were made again, but it was inconclusive. Pre-negotiations were held again to start the negotiations on 15-16 June 2016. With Rodrigo Duterte's transition to the country's administration, the negotiations accelerated. Although the parties couldn't agree on various points, peace talks started under the facilitation of Norway and a ceasefire was declared. In this process, past agreements, accelerating the process, release of prisoners and amnesty were the most important topics. The second round of negotiations was held on 6-10 October 2016 and the third on 19-25 January 2017. However, due to some conflicts, the negotiations were terminated. Pre-negotiations, which had been confidential, resumed in March. Although the fourth round was held on 3-6 April 2017, the process was broken again. Negotiations officially ended in November 2017 and CPP-NPA was listed as a terrorist organization in December.<sup>73</sup>

Although a new negotiation process hasn't been initiated due to the developments, it is difficult to say that the parties have given up on the negotiation method. In a statement made in January 2022, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity gave the message that the negotiations will be successful if the CPP-NPA militants don't attack the government forces and stick to the process during the negotiations.<sup>74</sup> The Philippines administration also announced that re-negotiations could be held in December 2022. According to the statement, it is understood that the administration still has strong belief that a final agreement can be reached through negotiation.<sup>75</sup> Shortly after Sison's death, the CPP-NPA also announced that it was open to negotiations.<sup>76</sup> This indicates that a new negotiation may begin in the Philippines. The opinions of the parties on the negotiation and agreement are an indication that the conflict has ripened at a partial level.

## IRA

Founded on November 25, 1913, the IRA is an organization that fought for independence against Britain. In the 1960s and 1970s, the IRA underwent a split. One of the organizations established during this period was the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)<sup>77</sup> and continued to be called the IRA.<sup>78</sup>

73 GMA News Online, "TIMELINE: The peace talks between the government...".

74 OPAPRU, "Should peace talks resume with CPP-NPA-NDF?", <https://pia.gov.ph/press-releases/2022/01/25/should-peace-talks-resume-with-cpp-npa-ndf>.

75 Catherine S. Valente, "Govt open to peace talks with 'Reds'", *The Manila Times*, <https://www.manilatimes.net/2022/12/09/news/govt-open-to-peace-talks-with-reds/1869516>.

76 Xianne Arcangel, "CPP says it's 'always open' to resumption of peace talks after Sison's death", *CNN Philippines*, <https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2022/12/18/cpp-peace-talks-joma-sison.html>.

77 Alvin Jackson, *Ireland, 1798-1998: War, Peace and Beyond*, 2nd ed., Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 370.

78 Demokratik Gelişim Enstitüsü, "Hayırlı Cuma Anlaşması: Genel Açıklama", London, 2013, <https://www.democraticprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/TURKISH-PDF.pdf>, p. 13.

The IRA was an ethnic-separatist terrorist organization that used sectarian values.<sup>79</sup> The fact that the British were on the island, and they were Protestant were the most important problems for Catholic Irish nationalists. Because this organization purposed the Protestant English to be expelled from the island and the union of the two Irish administrations. As a result of the conflicts experienced in this period, the period known as The Troubles (1968-1998) began.<sup>80</sup>

The British divide the attacks of the IRA into two periods. The first is the period of riot (1970-1971) and the second is the period of terror (1972-1997). The aim of the IRA was to spread the conflicts over a long period of time, to make the region unsafe for London, to make it unmanageable, to wear away at the extensions of the state and to continue the conflicts. The IRA was also targeting civilians in this process.<sup>81</sup> The London administration, on the other hand, used various counterterrorism methods, primarily military force, against the IRA. However, secret contact with the organization was also established. In this context, it is seen that the negotiation method is actively used.

The first secret contact was established between 1972 and 1976. During what is also called the First Northern Ireland Peace Process, the Sunningdale Agreement was signed. The agreement signed in 1973 was very similar to the Good Friday Agreement, which was accepted in the future. However, that process would fail.<sup>82</sup>

The Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed between England and Ireland on 15 November 1985. This agreement formalized the Dublin government to be consulted in the internal administration of the region, while also recognizing the political identity of nationalist groups.<sup>83</sup> Also, Northern Ireland's status won't be changed without the consent of the people. The parties would work on security, identity, human rights and reconciliation issues. While security is important for the London administration, the agreement became the indicator and strengthening factor of the harmony between the parties.<sup>84</sup> At this point, it is possible to say that the conflict continues to ripeness for the London. Because the England, which sees the IRA attacks and Northern Ireland as a domestic problem, followed a policy of including a "foreign" actor such as Dublin in the solution of the problem.

In 1988, a new process was entered. Negotiations started between Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn-Fein, who is seen as the political wing of the IRA,

79 Cenk Korhan Demir, *Sebeplerinden Mücadele Yöntemlerine Etnik Ayrımcılık Terörizm: PIRA, ETA, PKK*, Nobel Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2017, p. 161.

80 Elçin Aktoprak, "Din ve Millet: Kuzey İrlanda Örneğinde Bir Azınlık Milliyetçiliği Olarak Katoliklik", *Alternatif Politika*, 7:2, 2015, p. 340-341.

81 Köksoy, *Çatışma Çözümü*, p. 148-149.

82 Thomas Hennessey, *The First Northern Ireland Peace Process: Power-Sharing, Sunningdale and the IRA Ceasefires 1972-76*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 1.

83 Brian Barton, "The Historical Background to the Belfast Agreement", Brian Barton-Patrick J. Roche, *The Northern Ireland Question: The Peace Process and the Belfast Agreement*, Palgrave, 2009, p. 22.

84 Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 240-243.



and John Hume, the leader of the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP). After the declare to the public in the first period, the process was carried out secretly for five years. In addition, Adams would explain that there is no “military” solution and that an “alternative” path to independence must be found.<sup>85</sup> This statement contains two different messages. Firstly, the emphasis that military methods can’t achieve results shows that the conflict has ripened to a certain extent for Sinn-Fein and the organization. However, the discourse of an alternative path for independence reveals that full ripeness hasn’t been achieved and that both the political party and the IRA won’t compromise their goals while giving up on the method they use.

Hume’s most important feature in this process was his criticism of the IRA’s policies and its violence. The IRA even attacked he and his family. He was trying to persuade the IRA to change its current attitude. The relationship established between Hume and Adams would have a significant positive impact on the process.<sup>86</sup> On Christmas of 1990, the IRA declared a three-day ceasefire for the first time in 15 years. Afterwards, the Downing Street Declaration was published in December 1993 as part of the negotiations between Adams and Hume. In August 1994, the IRA declared a ceasefire in anticipation of a negotiation in which Sinn-Fein also participated. Although the IRA broke the ceasefire with an attack in 1996, a new negotiation process was started with the participation of the London and Dublin governments, SDLP and various unionist parties a few months later. After Tony Blair won the election and the IRA declared a ceasefire, Sinn-Fein also participated in the negotiations in 1997.<sup>87</sup>

The most important factors on the way to the Good Friday Agreement signed on April 10, 1998, were the secret negotiations, the intention of the parties for reconciliation, the mutual trust created by this, and the favorable conditions created with the support of states such as the US.<sup>88</sup> The Good Friday Agreement was ratified by referendums in Ireland and Northern Ireland with rates of 71% and 94% respectively. According to the agreement, the borders could only be changed at the request of the people, anyone could define himself as British, Irish or Anglo-Irish, and the necessary steps would be taken for full equality by removing sectarian-based inequalities in the region. Along with these, three pillars were determined in the agreement. First, it was decided to establish democratic institutions in Northern Ireland and the issues of representation in the parliament were discussed. Secondly, the relations between Ireland and Northern Ireland were regulated. Finally, it was decided to establish the Anglo-Irish Council for British-Irish relations. The disarmament process of the IRA was started in 2001 and on July 28, 2005, the organization announced that it would resort to democratic means. Although the Real IRA

85 Dean G. Pruitt, “Readiness Theory and the Northern Ireland Conflict”, *American Behavioral Scientist*, 50(11), 2007, p. 1523.

86 English, *Armed Struggle*, p. 263.

87 Pruitt, “Readiness Theory and the Northern Ireland Conflict”, p. 1523-1524.

88 Demokratik Gelişim Enstitüsü, “Hayırlı Cuma Anlaşması”, p. 21.

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and the Continuity IRA, which didn't accept the process at this stage, continued their attacks, the threat of terrorism was eliminated as a result of peace-building.<sup>89</sup>

### Conclusion

A conflict may not always result in the victory of one side. This situation causes the conflicts to be continuous and inconclusive. As a result, the conflict enters a mutually hurting stalemate. Due to the damage and pressure caused by the stalemate, the parties turn to alternative ways to solve the problem. The emergence of the stalemate, the burden caused by the damage, and the desire to turn to new alternatives are signs of the conflict ripeness. After ripeness, contact is established between the parties and negotiations begin. While some negotiations resulted in reconciliation and agreement; some negotiations fail, and the parties return to conflicts.

In this context, the ripeness of a conflict doesn't necessarily guarantee peace. The reason why the negotiation method fails despite ripeness and negotiations is related to the ripeness levels. In this context, it can be said that insufficient, partial and full ripeness has occurred through the terrorist organizations of TTP, CPP-NPA and IRA. Because the probability of success of the negotiation method is directly related to the ripeness level. Accordingly, while ripeness is a phase of conflict; it is also divided into levels within itself.

Ripeness, which can be divided into insufficient, partial and full levels, is important for the success of the negotiation method in conflicts that have reached a mutually hurting stalemate. In this process, the main basic criteria are how much the parties desire reconciliation, the degree of distrust between them, whether they abuse the negotiations, their loyalty to the spirit of the negotiations, the effect of spoilers and conflicts on the negotiations. If the idea and belief of reconciliation is weak, it is seen that the conflict hasn't ripened even if it has reached stalemate. In this context, the negotiation method fails. In partial ripeness, on the other hand, the negativities are at a lower level. In other words, the idea and desire for reconciliation is stronger. Negotiations with the contribution of neutral actors are more likely to be successful.

Finally, the negotiation method is largely successful at its full ripeness level. When a conflict is fully ripe, the negotiation method can turn into an effective tool for terrorist organizations to lay down their arms. In this context, the opinions of the parties and their requests for reconciliation are the most crucial factors. On this basis, the importance and usability of the negotiation method is directly related to how ripe the conflict is. For example, while the Sunningdale Agreement, signed during the initial negotiations with the IRA, didn't bring any results; the adoption of the Good Friday Agreement, which has similar characteristics, is one of the most important proofs that it is important how much the conflict has ripened. At this point, although there is a great deal of similarity between the Sunningdale Agreement and the Good Friday

89 K ksoy, atıřma özümü, p. 198-205.

Agreement, the signing of the second agreement is an indication of the full ripeness of the conflict. Thus, it is understood that the negotiation method gives a positive result in a fully ripened conflict.

When evaluated within the framework of examples, it is seen that the conflict between Pakistan and TTP has insufficient ripeness. Although the parties claim that they have come to an agreement, the signed agreements are not permanent and break down quite easily. In addition, the perception that they can achieve their goals through conflicts is still strong. In the case of CPP-NPA, it can be said that the conflict has partial ripeness. After a long conflict, the CPP-NPA lost power and the perception of the organization that success could be achieved through attacks weakened. In this context, it is possible to reach an agreement between the parties under the control of a third neutral actor. The IRA, on the other hand, is evidence of full ripeness between the parties. The disarmament of the IRA, the acceptance of the Good Friday Agreement and the absence of any conflict until today are indicators of this.

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