

## THE EU'S BLACK SEA SYNERGY<sup>1</sup>

Neziha MUSAOĞLU\*  
Ertan EFEGİL\*\*

### ÖZET

Bulgaristan ve Romanya'nın tam üye olması, Türkiye ile tam üyelik müzakerelerini yürütmesi ve Rusya, Ukrayna, Beyaz Rusya ve Moldova ile yürüttüğü yakın ilişkilerden ötürü, Avrupa Birliği, günümüzde Karadeniz bölgesinde etkin bir güç haline gelmiştir. Dondurulmuş çatışmalar, petrol ve doğal gaz taşımacılığı ve ekonomik ve ticari avantajlarından dolayı, bölge, Avrupa Birliği'nin çıkarları için hayati önem arz etmektedir. Bu sebepten ötürü, Birlik, Karadeniz Sinerjisi yaklaşımını üretmiştir. Bu yaklaşıma göre, Birlik, Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü gibi bölgesel örgütler ile ilişkilerini geliştirmeyi ve bölge devletlerine teknik ve mali yardımda bulunmayı arzu etmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Avrupa Birliği, Karadeniz, Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü, Rusya, İyi Komşuluk Politikası

### AB'NİN KARADENİZ SİNERJİSİ

#### ABSTRACT

Today the European Union is a Black Sea power, because of full membership of Bulgaria and Romania, accession negotiations with Turkey, close relations with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. In the meantime the region is strategically so important for the EU's interests, due to the frozen conflicts, oil and gas transportation, and economic and commercial advantages. For that reason, the Union adopted a Black Sea Synergy. In that approach, the EU desires to develop its relations with the regional organizations, such as BSEC, as well as to provide additional technical and financial assistance to the regional states.

**Keywords:** European Union, Black Sea, BSEC, Russia, Good Neighborhood Policy.

---

<sup>1</sup> The paper has been prepared before the Russia's military operation against the Georgian forces that used the force against the South Ossetian military units; therefore, it does not contain any chapter on that issue. It has been presented at the international conference, organized by Sakarya University, Department of International Relations, named as "Blue Black Sea" on August 22 – 23, 2008, Adapazarı, Turkey.

\* Yrd. Doç. Dr. Trakya Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

\*\* Doç. Dr., Sakarya Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

## INTRODUCTION

Collapse of former Soviet Union inspired the leaders and people in Europe with the hopes of uniting the continent again that was divided by the Stalin's policies pursued just after the World War II as well as by the ideological competition between two superpowers, and of creating creating more peaceful international environment based on mutual cooperation, sympathy, peace and stability. But the developments emerged in 1990s produced opposite concepts: fighting, insecurity and hopelessness.

For that reason, the European Union accepted ten newly-independent European countries, including Republic of Cyprus and Malta, as full members of the Union in order to guarantee its national security, to prevent reemergence of new dividing lines in the European continent and to put an end to the fightings in the Eastern European countries. But the enlargement did not end the Union's challenges. On the contrary, the Union was confronted with new unavoidable questions. In this respect, by the enlargement, the Union formulated new foreign policy in order to deal with new questions and thus produced a new concept – the Wider Europe and then the European Neighbourhood Policy, that encompasses Russia, Western Former Soviet Republics (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova), the Baltic countries, South Caucasia, the Middle East and North Africa. But the Union has not pursued a single comprehensive foreign policy strategy toward the regions. It means that the Union has followed different strategies toward the regions by taking into account their different questions and local characteristics. For example, it formulated the Barcelona Process for the Middle East countries, and the Northern Dimension for the Baltic countries.

In this connection, due to the full membership of Bulgaria and Romania, accession negotiations with Turkey, close relations with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, and Greece's active foreign policy, the Union is now a Black Sea power. Thus the Union was left no choice but to concern with the region due to its geopolitical position, oil and gas transportation, frozen conflicts, and economic and commercial advantages. Despite its several strategies formulated for each region, the Union has not produced any comprehensive strategy for the Black Sea region. But it adopted a new approach, called as Black Sea Synergy.

So the paper describes the EU's general foreign policy mentality, and then analyzes its approach toward the Black Sea region.

## **EU'S FOREIGN POLICY MENTALITY:**

### **THE WIDER EUROPE AND EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY**

After the end of the bipolar system, the Union was confronted with both the challenges and the opportunities. First of all the enlarged Union could become a powerful actor in the world politics by developing its abilities in the political and security fields. So it could increase its area of influence. Other opportunity was that the Union could raise its percentage in the world economy by developing its economic and commercial relations with other regional countries. ( Bonvicini, 2006, 21-25; Emerson, 2004,1-4) But despite these opportunities, as a result of its 2004 enlargement, the Union has faced with new challenges, such as ethnic nationalism, environmental issues, corruption, bad governance, and poverty; therefore, in order to feel itself secure, it has to deal with these challenges. Thus it has intended to create “a ring of friends” around its borders in order to realize its expectations as well as to eliminate the challenges. ( “EU and Black Sea Regional Cooperation”, 2007, 1 – 9; Aydın, 2004, 1 – 34)

In other words, the Union should encourage the regional leaders to form such countries based on democracy, good governance, respect for human rights, and free market economy. In this respect, it should spend efforts to achieve the following objectives: a) to reduce poverty, b) to create an area of shared prosperity and values based on free trade, deeper economic integration, c) to intensify political and cultural relations, d) to enhance cross-border cooperation, and e) to share responsibility for conflict prevention and conflict resolution. ( <http://www.w-europe.org>).

So at the end the Union would feel itself secure, develop its commercial relations with other regions, meet its energy needs, and remove the existing challenges. To expose these objectives, the Union should maintain the regional peace and security by encouraging the regional cooperation. However, carrying out of the economic, political and security reforms by the regional states is the precondition for the maintenance of the regional security and peace.

In this connection, the Union has planned to take serious steps in the following fields. ( Commission of the European Communities, “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood:”,2003,1 – 26)

### Security Field

a. Intensified cooperation to prevent and combat common security threats (terrorism, organized crime, customs and taxation fraud, drug trafficking, corruption and so on),

b. Greater EU political involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management (a more active role to facilitate settlement of disputes).

### 2. Political Field

a. Greater efforts to promote human rights, further cultural cooperation and enhance mutual understanding (deeper political relations, enhanced cooperation on justice and security issues, governance, dialogue between civilisations, free exchange of ideas, development of a flourishing civil society to promote basic liberties, exchange programmes).

### 3. Economic Field

a. Extension of internal market and regulatory structures (enlarged EU internal market, a common market based on four free movements),

b. Preferential trading relations and market opening (free trade agreements),

c. Perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons,

d. Integration into transport, energy, telecommunications networks, and European Research Area,

e. New Instruments for investment promotion and protection,

f. Support for integration into global trading system (WTO membership).

To materialize its objectives, the Union has planned to cooperate with the regional countries on the basis of bilateral (such as Action Plans and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements) and multilateral (such as INOGATE and TRACECA) levels. In its foreign policy, it has envisaged the conditionality principle, which means that the regional countries, who have a considerable progress in economic and political reforms, will get further more financial and technical assistances from the Union. Separately the Union has assumed that the creation of common free trade areas would encourage the neighbouring countries to cooperate with the Union as well as to make considerable progress in the reform process. ( Tassinari, 2006, 13 –

16; Commission of the European Communities, “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood:” 2003, 1 – 26)

### **BLACK SEA’S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE**

Although definition of the Black Sea region in the geographical terms is not easy, (Valinakis, 1999) that region is so important for the Union, because strategically locating at a juncture among Europe, Central Asia, and Middle East, the region constitutes a vital trade and political link. Due to its large population, it has an economic potential. As far as energy resources have been concerned, the region is a producer and a transit route of oil and gas. Thus with the assistance of that region, the Europe can diversify its energy resources and replace for declining of the North Sea production. ( “The Black Sea as Boundary or Bridge?:”, 2003; Aydın, 2004,1 – 34; Commission of the European Communities, “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, 2007)

But in the meantime the region has serious difficulties, such as frozen conflicts, mixed national and ethnic groups, bad governance, widespread unemployment, poverty, corruption, pollution, illegal migration, drug trafficking, organized crime, insufficient border controls, the political tensions between regional states, and the deficits in transport infrastructure. (Valinakis, 1999; Aydın, 2004, 1 – 34; Tassinari, 2006, 1 – 14)

### **EU’S BLACK SEA SYNERGY**

Due to the fact that the Union has existing relations with the regional states at the different levels, such as the strategic relationship with Russia, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements signed with Ukraine, Moldova, South Caucasian states, and the accession negotiations with Turkey, the Commission does not prepare an independent Black Sea strategy. ( Lynch, 2006; Çamlıbel, 2007; “EU aims to boost Black Sea cooperation”, 2007; “Boosting regional cooperation in the Black Sea Region: First Ministerial Meeting of Black Sea Synergy in Kiev”, 2008; Commission of the European Communities, “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, 2007, 1 – 13)

For that reason, the Union does not intend to create new institutions and/or bureaucratic structures. But it has prepared a Black Sea Synergy, which has been described as a complementary measure to the EU’s existing efforts. ( Emerson, 2005, 1 – 9)

Thus it desires to develop its relations with existing regional organizations, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and to provide additional technical and financial assistances to the regional states. (Valinakis, 1999)

As far as its aims are concerned, the EU expects to promote both regional cooperation within the Black Sea region as well as between the Union and the regional states. It demands creation of a comprehensive regional dialogue on the energy security and transportation issues. It wants to cultivate a better climate for peaceful resolution of the regional questions, such as Nagorno-Karabagh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria, and lastly stimulate democratic and economic reforms. ( “Towards an EU Regional Dimension in the Wider Black Sea Area”, 2006)

### **EU’S INSTRUMENTS**

Being appropriate for its Black Sea objectives, the Union has described the following sectors as cooperation areas: transportation, energy ( Tassinari, 2006, 1 – 14) The European, environment, maritime management, fisheries, migration, fight against organized crime, information society, and cultural cooperation. (Ferrero-Waldner, 2008; “EU aims to boost Black Sea cooperation, 2003)

At the bilateral level, the Union has signed Action Plans with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia. ( “The Black Sea as Boundary or Bridge?: Implications of EU and NATO enlargement, and the Regional Security”, 2003) In the energy field, it ratified energy cooperation agreements with Ukraine and Moldova. It has also two energy deals with Kazakhstan in which both parties have accepted energy supplies to the Union from Kazakhstan, which meant the extension of Odessa – Brody pipeline to Kazakhstan, and the cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. ( Commission of the European Communities, “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, 2007, 1 – 13; Tassinari, 2006, 1 – 14; “EU, Caspian, Black Sea Plan Common Energy Market”, 2006)

At the multilateral level, the Union plans to create a common energy market, known as Energy Road Map, within the framework of the Baku Initiative between the Union, Caspian and Black Sea countries. That market includes EU, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Russia as an observer. ( “Developing external energy policy for the EU”, 2007) In

the meantime, the Union has supported the Nabucco project. As a result it wants to construct a new trans-Caspian trans-Black Sea energy corridor. ( Commission of the European Communities, “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, 2007, 1 – 13)

Concerning the regional projects, the Union has supported TRACECA<sup>2</sup>, INOGATE, Black Sea Regional Energy Centre, Black Sea Environment Programme, Pan-European Transport Areas, and Black Sea Cross-Border Cooperation Programme. ( Commission of the European Communities, “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, 2007, 1 – 13; Valinakis, 1999)

Lastly, the Union has deployed its border assistance missions in Moldova and Ukraine<sup>3</sup>( Commission of the European Communities, “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, 2007, 1 – 13) , and it also intends to facilitate further development of contacts between Black Sea towns, communities, universities, cultural operators and civil society organizations. ( Commission of the European Communities, “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, 2007, 1 – 13)

### **EVALUATION OF “THE SYNERGY”**

As mentioned above, the European Union has planned to have a close cooperation with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in order to provide the regional cooperation and stability, so that it will finance the BSEC’s projects. ( Commission of the European Communities, “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, Brussels, 2007, 1 – 13)

On the one hand the close cooperation between two institutions can make serious contribution to the regional development and create a synergy in the region. For example, due to the Union’s financial assistances, the BSEC can materialize its projects within a short term.<sup>4</sup> Their projects are

---

<sup>2</sup> The EU actively supports regional transport cooperation in order to improve efficiency, safety and security of transport operations. Further information see: Commission of the European Communities, “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, COM(2007) 160 Final, Brussels, 11 April 2007, pp. 1 – 13.

<sup>3</sup> It does not intend to deal directly with frozen conflicts. But they concerns a more active EU role through increased political involvement in ongoing efforts to address the conflict. The EU wants to monitor the crises, promote confidence-building measures and provide financial assistance to the conflicting areas in order to reconstruct their own areas.

<sup>4</sup> For example, the Union and Black Sea Bank for Trade and Development signed a memorandum of cooperation They will finance to small and medium sized enterprises and for projects in Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.

same. For example, BSEC desires to form a common energy market, interconnected power system, to improve region's transportation infrastructure, and to develop telecommunication systems. On the other hand although the BSEC cannot find solution to the frozen conflicts, it constitutes a constructive foundation for the regional countries to discuss their differences. ( Emerson and Vahl, 2002, 1 – 33; "EU and Black Sea Regional Cooperation", 2007, 1 – 9; "Black Sea Synergy: Strategies for Europe's New Frontier", 2007)

But its practical achievements are minimal and it has some fundamental deficiencies. Firstly, the expectations of the member states are different from the BSEC's objectives. Turkey and Greece want to increase their influence in the region. Ukraine wishes to break its dependence on Russia and to solve its domestic economic and political difficulties by improving its bilateral and multilateral relations. Other member states, such as Armenia and Azerbaijan, want to consolidate their state-building processes and to preserve their national securities. ( Valinakis, 1999)

Due to their different expectations and their problematic domestic structures, the member states see the BSEC as an instrument to realize their national interests; therefore, they do not give priority to the BSEC's institutional development. Secondly, the member countries describe themselves as belonging to different regions. Such as Bulgaria concerns itself as a country of South Eastern Europe; Georgia and Azerbaijan to South Caucasia; and Russia as a member of Commonwealth of Independent States. ("The Black Sea as Boundary or Bridge?: Implications of EU and NATO enlargement, and the Regional Security", 2003)

Thirdly, there are also serious institutional differences among the member states in the fields of economy, government, military, and social structure. Fourthly, the trade relations among them are not so developed. Lastly, BSEC does not have enough financial capability to finance its huge projects.

Secondly, the Union has to have close relations with Russia if it wants to preserve its national interests in the Black Sea region.<sup>5</sup> It is open that without the Russia's support, any regional project cannot be materialized.

---

<sup>5</sup> The relations between Russia and the Union cannot be described as strategic partnership. The bilateral relations are highly rhetoric. Economic interdependence has not spilled over into greater political cooperation. There are substantial differences between two sides on the foreign policy questions. For further information see: Don Lynch, "The Russia – EU Partnership and the Shared Neighbourhood", Analysis, No. 0, July 2004.



But the precondition for getting the Russia's support is to display that the Union does not have any aim to establish its hegemony over the region. Otherwise Russia has seen the Union's and/or other great powers' attempts<sup>6</sup> as an aggressive act aimed at forming their hegemony in its Near Abroad.<sup>7</sup> For that reason, Russia has pushed for closer security and economic agreements in the CIS framework, and thus it has seen BSEC as a threat to its regional interests. ( "EU seeks 'Deeper Partnership' with Ukraine",2007; "EU: German Presidency's Focus on Central Asia, Black Sea, Russia", 2006; Lynch, 2004; Valinakis, 1999)

Thirdly, the Union has not provided a common understanding among its member states when formulating its Black Sea Synergy. For example, Greece has played active role in preparing the policy. But the Northern countries, such as Denmark, has been much more attracted to the Union's Northern Dimension. On the other hand France and Spain has strongly supported the Barcelona Process; therefore, the Union has to obtain a consensus among the member states about its foreign and security policies. Otherwise its attempts will not be supported not only by the regional states, but also by some member states. ( Vahl, <http://www.eab-berlin.de>).

Consequently, implementation of the EU's Black Sea Synergy is not so much easy, because of the strategic competition among the great powers, the conflicts among the regional states, lack of political dialogue and lack of infrastructure for the regional cooperation. But in spite of these challenges, the EU's Synergy will make positive contribution to the regional development.

---

<sup>6</sup> For the United States, the Black Sea region is so important because of its energy resources and geographical position. It has three main policy goals: 1) support of sovereignty and independence of the regional states, 2) support of its own commercial involvement in the region's oil and gas production, and 3) future dependence on Russia's and Gulf oil. For further information see: Terry D. Adams, "Caspian Oil and Gas Development and the Black Sea Region: An Overview", in (ed.) Terry D. Adams, Michael Emerson, Laurence David Mee and Marius Vahl, *Europe's Black Sea Dimension*, Centre for European Policy Studies and International Center for Black Sea Studies, 2002, pp. 39 – 72; Yannis Valinakis, "The Black Sea Region: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe", *Chaillot Papers*, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, No 36, July 1999.

<sup>7</sup> For Russia, the Black Sea has been as gateway to the world's oceans; therefore, it is a natural bulwark for Russia. For the Russia's policies see: Mark Urnov, "Russia: Geopolitical Views and Domestic Political Context", in (ed.)Fabrizio Tassinari, Pertti Joenniemi and Uffe Jakobsen, *Wider Europe: Nordic and Baltic Lessons to Post-Enlargement Europe*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006, pp. 101 – 122; Alexander Sergounin, "Russian Views on the Wider Europe Concept", in (ed.)Fabrizio Tassinari, Pertti Joenniemi and Uffe Jakobsen, *Wider Europe: Nordic and Baltic Lessons to Post-Enlargement Europe*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006, pp. 123 – 132.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

“Black Sea Synergy: Strategies for Europe’s New Frontier”,(2007), European Report, Kennan Institute, 28 June.

“Boosting regional cooperation in the Black Sea Region: First Ministerial Meeting of Black Sea Synergy in Kiev”, (2008), IP/08/221, 13 February.

“Council Conclusions on Wider Europe – New Neighbourhood”, (2008), Doc. 10447/03, [http://www.w-europe.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/07/cc06\\_03.pdf](http://www.w-europe.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/07/cc06_03.pdf). (Date: March 10,).

“Developing external energy policy for the EU”, (2007), MEMO/07/533, 30 November 2007.

“EU aims to boost Black Sea cooperation”, (2007), RFE/RL, 11 April.

“EU and Black Sea Regional Cooperation”, (2007), Report on the International Workshop, Südosteuropa – Gesellschaft, Berlin, 26 – 27 March, pp. 1 – 9.

“EU seeks ‘Deeper Partnership’ with Ukraine”, (2007), RFE/RL, 27 March.

“EU, Caspian, Black Sea Plan Common Energy Market”, (2006), ENS, 30 November.

“EU: German Presidency’s Focus on Central Asia, Black Sea, Russia”, (2006), RFE/RL, 19 December.

“The Black Sea as Boundary or Bridge?: Implications of EU and NATO enlargement, and the Regional Security”, (2003), Stockholm, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 28 November.

“Towards an EU Regional Dimension in the Wider Black Sea Area”, (2006), working paper, International Centre for Black Sea Studies, 28 October.

Alexander **Sergounin**, (2006) “Russian Views on the Wider Europe Concept”, in (ed.)Fabrizio Tassinari, Pertti Joenniemi and Uffe Jakobsen, Wider Europe: Nordic and Baltic Lessons to Post-Enlargement Europe, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, , pp. 123 – 132.

Benita **Ferrero – Waldner**, (2007) “Black Sea Synergy: The EU’s approach to the Black Sea region”, Speech/08/77, 14 February 2008; “EU aims to boost Black Sea cooperation”, RFE/RL, 11 April.

Cansu **Çamlıbel**, “EU looking for involvement in Black Sea politics”, (2007), Turkish Daily News, 13 April.

Commission of the European Communities, (2007), “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, COM(2007) 160 Final, Brussels, pp. 1 – 13, 11 April

Commission of the European Communities, (2003) “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, COMM (2003) 104 Final, Brussels, pp. 1 – 26, 11 March

Don **Lynch**, (2006) “The EU and the Black Sea”, EU Institute for Security Studies, 24 February.

Dov **Lynch**, (2004), “The Russia – RU Partnership and the Shared Neighbourhood”, Analysis, No. 0, July.

Fabrizio **Tassinari**, (2006), “A Synergy for Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Guidelines for an EU Initiative”, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 105, pp. 1 – 14 , June.

Fabrizio **Tassinari**, (2006), “Introduction”, in (ed.) Fabrizio Tassinari, Pertti Joenniemi and Uffe Jakobsen, Wider Europe: Nordic and Baltic Lessons to Post-Enlargement Europe, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, pp. 13 – 16.

Gianni **Bonvicini**, (2006), “The European Neighbourhood Policy and its Linkage with European Security”, in (ed.) Fabrizio Tassinari, Pertti Joenniemi and Uffe Jakobsen, Wider Europe: Nordic and Baltic Lessons to Post-Enlargement Europe, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, pp. 21 – 25.

Marius **Vahl**, (2005) “The EU and Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Some Challenges for BSEC”, [http://www.eab-berlin.de/uni/neue\\_nachbarn\\_ws0506/vahl.pdf](http://www.eab-berlin.de/uni/neue_nachbarn_ws0506/vahl.pdf) (date: 12 March 2008);

Mark **Urnov**, (2006) “Russia: Geopolitical Views and Domestic Political Context”, in (ed.) Fabrizio Tassinari, Pertti Joenniemi and Uffe Jakobsen, Wider Europe: Nordic and Baltic Lessons to Post-Enlargement Europe, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies , pp. 101 – 122.

Michael **Emerson** and Marius **Vahl**, (2002), “Europe’s Black Sea Dimension – Model European Regionalism, Prêt-à-Porter”, in (ed.) Terry D.

Adams, Michael Emerson, Laurence David Mee and Marius Vahl, Europe's Black Sea Dimension, Centre for European Policy Studies and International Center for Black Sea Studies, pp. 1 – 33.

Michael **Emerson**, (2004) “Deepening the Wider Europe”, Eurojournal.org, pp. 1 – 4 , March.

Michael **Emerson**, (2005), “The Black Sea as Epicentre of the Aftershocks of the EU's Earthquake”, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS Policy Brief, No 79, , pp. 1 – 9, July.

Mustafa **Aydin**, (2004) “Europe's next shore: the Black Sea region after EU enlargement”, Occasional Paper, Institute for Security Studies, No. 53, June, pp.1 – 34.

Terry D. **Adams**, (2002) , “Caspian Oil and Gas Development and the Black Sea Region: An Overview”, in (ed.) Terry D. Adams, Michael Emerson, Laurence David Mee and Marius Vahl, Europe's Black Sea Dimension, Centre for European Policy Studies and International Center for Black Sea Studies, pp. 39 – 72.

Yannis **Valinakis**, (1999), “The Black Sea Region: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe”, Chaillot Papers, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, No 36, July.