

Walking a Tightrope: Turkey between the EU and Russia in the Crimea Crisis

S. Sena TÜRKDOĞAN

Research Assistant, Department of International Relations, Istanbul Kultur University, Istanbul

To cite this article: S. Sena Türkdoğan, “Walking a Tightrope: Turkey between the EU and Russia in the Crimea Crisis”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 20, No 79, 2023, pp. 67-85, DOI: 10.33458/uidergisi.1325770

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.1325770>

Submitted: 11 March 2022
Last Revision: 21 June 2023
Published Online: 13 July 2023
Printed Version: 17 October 2023

Uluslararası İlişkiler - International Relations
E-mail: uidergisi@gmail.com

All rights of this paper are reserved by Uluslararası İlişkiler (International Relations), which is published by the International Relations Council of Turkey (IRCT). With the exception of academic quotations, no parts of this publication may be reproduced, redistributed, sold or transmitted in any form and by any means for public usage without a prior permission from the copyright holder. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the author(s)'s and do not reflect those of the *Council*, editors of the journal, and other authors.

Walking a Tightrope: Turkey between the EU and Russia in the Crimea Crisis

S. Sena TÜRKDOĞAN

Research Assistant, Department of International Relations, Istanbul Kültür University, İstanbul
E-Mail: s.turkdogan@iku.edu.tr
Orcid: 0000-0002-2649-7612

ABSTRACT

The Crimea crisis marked one of the latest critical points in the European Union (EU)-Turkey-Russia triangle. This article analyzes Turkey's position between the EU and Russia, after the events that unfolded in February 2014, by adopting Holsti's role theory. Developing a research map through official documents, this article assesses Turkey's two-sided strategic position, by asking the following question: How did Turkey's intertwined relationships with the EU and Russia affect its foreign policy formulation in the Crimea crisis? Turkey's role formulation during the Crimea crisis is defined by empirical data acquired through the official documents of EU institutions and the Turkish and Russian foreign policy ministries. MAXQDA software was utilized to provide a systematic qualitative analysis of the 123 official declarations. This article argues that Turkey's response to the Crimea crisis was affected by several factors stemming from its asymmetric relationship with Russia, its EU candidate status, and kinship with the Crimean Tatars.

Keywords: Crimea crisis, Turkey-EU relations, Turkey-Russia relations, Turkish foreign policy, role theory.

Research Article | Received: 11 March 2022, Last Revision: 21 June 2023, Accepted: 3 July 2023

Introduction

The Crimea crisis has been described as one of the latest confrontations between the West and Russia after the Cold War.¹ The crisis revealed existing cleavages and challenged global peace. Rather than being a regional dispute between Russia and Ukraine, it evolved into a transnational crisis which affected multiple actors. Since the beginning, scholars have devoted considerable attention to analyzing the Crimea crisis in various dimensions. One strand of the existing literature has focused on the impact of the dispute on EU-Russia relations.² In

1 Mai'a K. Davis Cross and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, "What Type of Power has the EU Exercised in the Ukraine-Russia Crisis? A Framework of Analysis", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 55, No 1, 2017, p. 4.

2 Clara Portela, Paulina Pospieszna, Joanna Skrzypczyńska and Dawid Walentek, "Consensus against All Odds: Explaining the Persistence of EU Sanctions on Russia", *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 43, No 6, 2021, p. 683-699; Helene

the other strand, some scholars have concentrated on the economic dimension of the EU's sanction policies in response to Russian policies in Crimea.³ Nevertheless, a third-country approach to the dispute has remained relatively narrow.⁴ This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature by providing an analysis focusing on Turkey's position in the Crimea crisis.

Turkey's intertwined relationship with the EU and Russia, its geopolitical position, and kinship with the Crimean Tatars tie Turkey to the dispute in multiple dimensions. This research assesses the EU-Turkey-Russia triangle in the Crimea crisis by adopting role theory as a guideline.⁵ Engineered by K. J. Holsti, role theory focuses on actors' expectations, perceptions, and commitments, while explaining foreign policy, and illustrates the multidimensional decision-making process of these actors. Turkey's relationship with the EU and Russia involves diverging interests and commitments, which leads to a two-sided relationship. By adopting role theory, the present research illustrates Turkish foreign policy formulation on a tightrope between the EU and Russia, by answering the following question: How did Turkey's intertwined relationships with the EU and Russia affect its foreign policy formulation in the Crimea crisis?

Turkey's role formulation is evaluated through empirical data obtained from official declarations and statements. By focusing on the period from the climax of the Maidan uprising in February 2014 to the ceasefire achieved with the Minsk Agreement in February 2015, this paper scrutinizes the initial phase of the crisis. By doing so, it provides insights to understand Turkey's position during the recent escalations between Russia and Ukraine. From February 2014 to February 2015, a total of 123 official declarations were made, which are systematically analyzed using MAXQDA software. This article suggests that Turkey's role formulation in the Crimea crisis was affected by multiple factors. First, Turkey avoided a direct confrontation with Russia due to the asymmetric nature of their relationship. Second, Turkey's EU candidate

Sjursen and Guri Rosén, "Arguing Sanctions. On the EU's Response to the Crisis in Ukraine", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 55, No 1, 2017, p. 20-36; Michal Natorki, "The EU and Crisis in Ukraine: Policy Continuity in Times of Disorder?", Dimitris Bouris and Tobias Schumacher (eds.), *The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity and Change in EU Foreign Policy*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017; Michal Natorki and Karolina Pomorska, "Trust and Decision-making in Times of Crisis: The EU's Response to the Events in Ukraine", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 55, No 1, 2017, p. 54-70; Mitchell A. Orenstein and R. Daniel Kelemen, "Trojan Horses in EU Foreign Policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 55, No 1, 2017, p. 87-102; Tatiana Romanova, "Sanctions and the Future of EU-Russian Economic Relations", *Europe - Asia Studies*, Vol. 68, No 4, 2016, p. 774-796.

- 3 Christian Dreger, Konstantin A. Kholodilin, Dirk Ulbricht and Jarko Fidrmuc, "Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Impact of Economic Sanctions and Oil Prices on Russia's Ruble", *Journal of Comparative Economics*, Vol. 44, No 2, 2016, p. 295-308; Konstantin A. Kholodilin and Aleksei Netšunajev, "Crimea and Punishment: the Impact of Sanctions on Russian Economy and Economies of the Euro Area", *Baltic Journal of Economics*, Vol. 19, No 1, 2019, p. 39-51; Tatia Dolidze, "EU Sanctions Policy towards Russia: The Sanctioner-Sanctionee's Game of Thrones", CEPS Working Document No. 402/January 2015, 2015; Romanova, "Sanctions and the Future".
- 4 Adam Balcer, "Dances with the Bear: Turkey and Russia after Crimea", Senem Aydın-Düzgüt (ed.), *Global Turkey in Europe III: Democracy, Trade and the Kurdish Question in Turkey-EU Relations*, Roma, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 2015, p. 27-41; Elin Hellquist, "Either with Us or against Us? Third-country Alignment with EU Sanctions against Russia/Ukraine", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 29, No 3, 2016, p. 997-1021; Hall Gardner, "The Russian Annexation of Crimea: Regional and Global Ramifications", *European Politics and Society*, Vol. 17, No 4, 2016, p. 490-505.
- 5 Kalevi J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No 3, 1970, p. 233-309.

status and NATO membership shaped its perceptions and commitments during the crisis. Third, with the increasing nationalistic tendencies of Turkish politics, kinship with the Crimean Tatars emerged as a crucial matter.

The article first provides the background to the dispute and a brief literature review on the actors' foreign policy formulation. Next, a theoretical framework that offers a blueprint with which to analyze Turkey's role formulation is presented. The third section presents a qualitative analysis of the official documents using MAXQDA. Subsequently, Turkey's position in the recent escalation between Russia and Ukraine is discussed, by comparing Turkey's role formulation in the beginning. This study concludes that Turkey leveraged the power struggles between the EU and Russia, and sought to form a strategic autonomous position in the Crimea crisis. Furthermore, Turkey's position in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine reaffirms its search for strategic autonomy from both the EU and Russia. This article contributes to the literature on Turkey's foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia and the EU, by focusing on the case of Crimea. The eruption of the war between Russia and Ukraine at the beginning of 2022 reveals the necessity to examine the origins of the dispute from multiple angles.

Background: The Crimea Crisis

Ukraine's geographical position between two global powers resembles a fork in the road which leads to either West or East. On the one hand, various factors such as corruption, the absence of good governance, insufficient reforms, and an oligarchic industrial structure fuel its high dependency on Russia.⁶ On the other hand, Ukraine sought to deepen its relationship with the EU by signing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1998. The double-edged sword that Ukraine has experienced regarding deepening ties with both the EU and Russia manifested itself in the origin of the incidents that led to the Crimea crisis.

In 2008, the Association Agreement (AA), which includes establishing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), was launched, to replace the existing PCA between the EU and Ukraine. The AA has aimed to establish close political association and economic integration between the parties. In 2012, delegations from the EU and Ukraine initiated the AA in Brussels. Although Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Lukashevich stated, "Russia has never spoken against the 'European choice' of Ukraine,"⁷ Russia's opposition to Ukraine's association agreement with the EU became apparent in mid-2013, when Russia imposed restrictions on Ukraine. In November 2013, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich did not sign the Association Agreement with the EU and sought to build closer cooperation with Russia. This sparked the incidents called *Euromaidan*, mass protests in the biggest Ukrainian cities, reaching a climax with the removal of President Yanukovich from office. In response to losing a pro-Russian government in Ukraine, Russia annexed the Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in March 2014.

6 Dreger, Kholodilin, Ulbricht and Fidrmuc, "Between the Hammer and the Anvil".

7 Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Reply by the Official Representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alexander Lukashevich to the Mass Media's Question Regarding Statements of Representatives of the European Commission (EC) Concerning the Prospects of Relations with Ukraine and Member States of the Customs Union (CU)", 29 August 2013, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1621429/ (Accessed 3 May 2022).

Scholars have described the Crimea crisis as one of the most critical confrontations between the West and Russia.⁸ Since the origin of the dispute resulted from the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, the EU has taken various initiatives to respond to the crisis. In an extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 3 March, the EU member states condemned the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, and called for dialogue between Russia and Ukraine.⁹ Three days later, the European Council organized an extraordinary meeting to discuss the situation in Ukraine. The EU member states called for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and expressed willingness to engage with the parties bilaterally and multilaterally in the search for a solution. After the referendum held in Crimea on 16 March, the EU imposed the first set of sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, against Ukrainian and Russian officials. The EU described the referendum as “illegal”, and condemned Russia for violating Ukraine’s constitution.¹⁰

Although the EU repeatedly condemned the Russian aggression, and forewarned that the destabilization in the region would have far-reaching consequences, member states failed to agree on a robust sanctions regime.¹¹ Russia responded to the EU sanction policy by introducing counter-sanctions that targeted agricultural products imported from EU member states.¹² Due to their different levels of alignment with Russia, a sanction decision targeting the entire economy of Russia was not achieved among member states. Some scholars have argued that the EU’s response to the Crimea crisis was comprehensive and effective.¹³ Others have criticized the EU’s policies and emphasized the lack of unity resulting from diverse interdependency with Russia.¹⁴

Crimea’s annexation marked one of the most severe breaches of international law and threatened the region’s stability. Turkey’s foreign policy formulation toward the crisis was affected by several factors, such as ethnic ties with Crimean Tatars, geographical proximity, candidate status regarding the EU, and its close relationship with Russia in various spheres. Being tied to the dispute in multiple aspects, Turkey’s foreign policy in the Crimea crisis has

8 Cross and Karolewski, “What Type of Power has the EU Exercised in the Ukraine–Russia Crisis?”

9 Council of the European Union, “Foreign Affairs Council”, 3 March 2014, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/03/03/> (Accessed 23 May 2022).

10 Council of the European Union, “Foreign Affairs Council”, 17 March 2014, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/03/17/> (Accessed 23 May 2022).

11 Economic sanctions were adopted only after the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight 17, resulting in the death of hundreds of European citizens. On 29 July, the EU adopted restrictive measures that limit the access of Russian state-owned financial institutions to the EU capital market, an embargo on trade in arms, an export ban on dual-use goods for military use, and curtailment of exports of specific energy-related equipment and technology for oil production and exploration.

12 President of Russia, “Указ о применении отдельных специальных экономических мер в целях обеспечения безопасности Российской Федерации”, 6 August 2014, <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46404> (Accessed 17 May 2022).

13 Sjursen and Rosén, “Arguing Sanctions”; Natorski and Pomorska, “Trust and Decision-making in Times of Crisis”.

14 Jolyon Howorth, “‘Stability on the Borders’: The Ukraine Crisis and the EU’s Constrained Policy Towards the Eastern Neighbourhood”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 55, No 1, 2017, p. 121-136; Orenstein and Kelemen, “Trojan Horses in EU Foreign Policy”; Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine between a Constrained EU and Assertive Russia”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 55, No 1, 2017, p. 103-120.

been described as vague and muted by scholars.¹⁵ On 2 March, the Turkish Foreign Ministry declared its support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, and described Ukraine as "a neighbor and strategic partner of Turkey."¹⁶ Turkey expressed serious concerns for the instability threat posed toward the security of the Crimean Tatars, emphasizing the kinship between Turks and Crimean Tatars.¹⁷ Nevertheless, Ankara delicately avoided holding Russia responsible, unlike the EU.

Turkish foreign policy has dramatically changed in the most recent decade. This transformation reflects a clear shift from the traditional Turkish foreign policy characterized by a Western orientation and detachment from the pre-Republican imperial history. Nationalism and anti-Western tendencies have gained importance, and replaced Turkey's commitment to the EU and multilateralism in the foreign policy sphere.¹⁸ A deteriorated relationship with the EU resulting from problems stemming from both parties has pushed Turkey and Russia progressively closer. Scholars have described the relationship between Turkey and Russia as asymmetric and essentially pragmatic.¹⁹ Turkey's strikingly asymmetric economic relationship with Russia²⁰ and dependency on Russian energy sources²¹ has placed Turkey in a position at which the "exit cost associated with severing ties" for Turkey is considerably higher than it is for Russia.²² In other words, Turkey's relationship with Russia appears as a serious constraint that affects its foreign policy behavior. Turkey has thus been forced to dance with the bear in the Crimea crisis, to avoid any direct confrontation with Russia, while seeking to maximize its own domestic interests.²³

One cannot grasp the full implications of the relationship between Turkey and Russia without taking into consideration Turkey's relationship with the West. Similarly, when analyzing Turkey-EU relations, the transformation in Turkish foreign policy formulation during

15 Balkan Devlen, "Don't Poke the Russian Bear': Turkish Policy in the Ukrainian Crisis", *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre*, May 2014, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/180832/a5fa13f65a0a0fcece44339be2957279.pdf> (Accessed 1 May 2022); Howard Eissenstat, "Neither East nor West: Turkey's Calculations in the Ukraine Crisis", *Middle East Institute*, 25 February 2022, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/neither-east-nor-west-turkeys-calculations-ukraine-crisis> (Accessed 3 March 2022); Michael A. Reynolds, "Why Turkey Has Been Quiet About Crimea", *Current History* Vol. 113, No 765, 2014, p. 290-292; Soner Çağaptay and James Jeffrey, "Turkey's Muted Reaction to the Crimean Crisis", *The Washington Institute*, 4 March 2014, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/turkeys-muted-reaction-crimean-crisis> (Accessed 4 May 2022).

16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, "No: 71, 2 March 2014, Press Release Regarding the Developments in Ukraine", 2 March 2014, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-71_-2-march-2014_-press-release-regarding-the-developments-in-ukraine.en.mfa (Accessed 26 May 2022).

17 Ibid.

18 Evren Balta, "The AKP's Foreign Policy as Populist Governance", *Middle East Report*, Vol. 288, 2018, p. 14-25.

19 Dimitar Bechev, "Russia and Turkey-What does Their Partnership Mean for the EU?", *EPC Policy Brief*, 13 February 2015, 2015; Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Evren Balta, and Andrew O'Donohue, "Turkey, Russia, and the West: Reassessing Persistent Volatility, Asymmetric Interdependence, and the Syria Conflict", *Istanbul Policy Center*, 2020; Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Turkey and Russia in a Shifting Global Order: Cooperation, Conflict and Asymmetric Interdependence in a Turbulent Region", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No 1, 2016, p. 71-95.

20 The trade balance between Turkey and the Russia was -19,345,583 US dollars in 2014 according to World Bank data.

21 Russia constitutes the top supplier of Turkey's natural gas to date.

22 Aydın-Düzgit, Balta, and O'Donohue, "Turkey, Russia, and the West", p. 9.

23 Balcer, "Dances with the Bear".

the last decade²⁴ requires a close examination of Turkey's ties with Russia. The Crimea crisis emerges as a crucial incident that allows researchers to explore the Turkey-EU-Russia triangle in times of crisis. Diverse commitments and perceptions about the EU-Russia axis constitute the main cornerstones of Turkish foreign policy. Engineered by Holsti, role theory allows for the investigation of national role formulations from a closer angle. Before investigating the foreign policy formulation of Turkey during the Crimea crisis, the next section will present a theoretical framework as a blueprint for the analysis.

Theoretical Framework: Holsti's Role Theory

Holsti introduced national role conceptions (NRCs) in his seminal article, to analyze the foreign policy behavior of actors in the international system.²⁵ Role theory investigates actors' behavior in international affairs through their sets of attitudes, decisions, expectations, perceptions, responses, and commitments toward other actors.²⁶ Holsti's role theory is based on three main concepts: role prescriptions, role performance and national role conception. The concept of role perception refers to the state's own "image" of the appropriate positions or functions in relation to the external environment.²⁷ Holsti describes NRCs as a policymaker's own identification of decisions, commitments, and actions or guidelines suitable to their state that are expected to be performed on a continuing basis in international affairs.²⁸ The statements of policymakers, especially heads of government/state or foreign ministers, and official declarations constitute the sources of NRCs.

Role prescriptions reflect the norms and expectations regarding the societal, cultural, institutional, or group associated with specific positions.²⁹ In the realm of politics, expectations arise both from the self (actor) and from other actors within the international structure.³⁰ Role expectations and role conceptions are regarded as the principal origins of behavioral patterns.³¹ The third component of the role theory, role performance, refers to "the attitudes, decisions, and actions governments take to implement".³² Leaders' role performance is influenced by their own perceptions, which direct them towards fulfilling expected role behaviors in order to achieve desired positions on the international system. The scope of an actor's role performance is largely determined by role expectations and conceptions, with the former being seen as the outcome variable and the latter as the explanatory variable.³³

24 Mustafa Kutlay and Ziya Öniş, "Turkish Foreign Policy in a Post-western Order: Strategic Autonomy or New Forms of Dependence?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 97, No 4, 2021, p. 1085-1104.

25 Holsti, "National Role Conceptions".

26 Ibid., p. 245.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., p. 246.

29 Ibid., p. 239.

30 Mehtap Kara and Ahmet Sözen, "Change and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Evaluating Pre-AKP and AKP Periods' National Role Conceptions", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 13, No 52, 2016, p. 49.

31 Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Erşen, "Reassessing the "Turkish Model" in the Post-Cold War Era: A Role Theory Perspective", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 15, No 2, 2014, p. 260; Holsti, "National Role Conceptions", p. 261.

32 Holsti, "National Role Conceptions", p. 240.

33 Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Erşen, "Reassessing the "Turkish Model"", p. 261.

FPA that utilizes NRCs, takes individual leaders or states as the level of analysis.³⁴ According to role theory, the formation of NRCs is shaped by factors such as geographical location, military capabilities, economic-technological levels, and domestic norms, and no state in the international system plays a single role – as opposed to the previous FPA literature.³⁵ Holsti’s approach outlines multiple foreign policy roles that the state plays in international affairs. Nonetheless, some scholars prefer to concentrate on specific roles³⁶ to investigate the formulation of a particular foreign policy.³⁷ This paper exemplifies such an effort by focusing on the foreign policy formulation of Turkey in the EU-Russia axis.

The novelty that role theory brings to FPA literature lies in its recognition of multiple role conceptions.³⁸ Holsti’s role theory highlights multiple perceptions, commitments, and expectations in investigating actors’ behavior in international affairs. Turkey’s foreign policy formulation in the Crimea crisis entails a number of diverse attitudes, perceptions, and commitments toward other actors. As a result of being a candidate country, Turkey is expected to adhere to the EU’s foreign, security and defense policy, which is included in the EU *acquis*. On the other hand, new opportunities and perspectives for cooperation between Turkey and Russia emerged after the Cold War.

The Crimea crisis has left countries that have close ties with Russia and the EU simultaneously between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Countries such as the United States, Canada, Norway, and Japan introduced sanctions against the Russian government. Nevertheless, countries with a high dependency or close relationship with Russia did not choose the path of sanctions. Even within the EU, some member states opposed adopting a sanctions regime that harms their relationship with Russia.³⁹ In a similar vein, Turkey’s relationship with Russia, characterized by asymmetric interdependence, constrained its strategy in the Crimea crisis. On the one hand, Turkey’s status as candidate to join the EU, and its NATO membership have located Turkey in the Western camp. On the other hand, Turkey’s foreign policy has been transformed in recent decades with its detachment from the West.

Kutlay and Öniş argue that Turkish foreign policy has evolved into a strategic autonomy in which Turkey seeks autonomy from the West, and is moving toward the Russia-China axis.⁴⁰ Taking advantage of the power struggles between the global powers, regional powers such as Turkey have acquired a more autonomous space for action. In the Crimea crisis, Turkey’s quest for strategic autonomy has been criticized for being “neither with East nor

34 Klaus Brummer and Cameron G. Thies, “The Contested Selection of National Role Conceptions”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 11, No 3, 2015, p. 273-293.

35 Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Erşen, “Reassessing the “Turkish Model””.

36 Lisbeth Aggestam, “Role Theory and European Foreign Policy: A Framework of Analysis”, Ole Elgström and Michael Smith (eds.), *The European Union’s Roles in International Politics*, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 31-49; Sebastian Harnisch, “Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German Foreign Policy”, *German Politics*, Vol. 10, No 1, 2001, p. 35-60.

37 Cameron G. Thies and Marijke Breuning, “Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role Theory”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No 1, 2012, p. 1-4.

38 Holsti, “National Role Conceptions”, p. 235, 246.

39 Orenstein and Kelemen, “Trojan Horses”.

40 Kutlay and Öniş, “Turkish Foreign Policy in a Post-western Order”.

West".⁴¹ Although in one sense the Turkish government sided with the West by describing the incidents as annexation, it also delicately avoided condemning Russia directly for the crisis. Similarly, Turkey did not join the sanctions against Russia for annexing Crimea. Following the previous literature, this study defines Turkey's national role conception in the Crimea crisis as autonomy-seeking power. The patterns of role formation for Turkey, on a tightrope between the EU and Russia, can be traced in official declarations and statements discussed in the following section.

The Crimea Crisis: The EU-Turkey-Russia Triangle

The Crimea crisis marked one of the latest incidents in which the multidimensional and complex nature of the EU-Turkey-Russia triangle can be observed. Turkey's two-sided strategic position in the dispute constitutes the heart of the present study. On the one hand, its status as candidate to join the EU, and its NATO membership have located Turkey within the Western alliance. On the other hand, close ties with Russia in various spheres, such as trade, energy, and defense, have resulted in an asymmetric relationship, in which the exit cost for Turkey is extremely high. Thus, one cannot grasp the full implications of the relationship between Turkey and Russia without taking into consideration Turkey's relationship with the West. In a similar vein, Turkey's changing foreign policy requires a close analysis of Turkey's ties with Russia when analyzing its relationship with the EU.

One of the key cornerstones of traditional Turkish foreign policy has been its commitment to the EU. Turkey's objective to become a member of the European Community dates back to its application for association in 1959. Following the Ankara Agreement of 1963 and Customs Union Agreement of 1995, Turkey was granted candidate status to the EU in 1999. Accession negotiations began in 2005, and commitment to EU political norms and the *acquis communautaire* has been constituted a crucial part of Turkish foreign policy formulation since then. Various issues stemming from both parties⁴² have resulted in the deterioration of relations since the mid-2000s, and Turkey has progressively moved away from Europe.⁴³ Nevertheless, the EU accession process continues to shape Turkey's foreign policy perceptions and commitments.⁴⁴

Another important aspect of Turkey's foreign policy formulation is its relationship with Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey's relations with Russia were characterized by the rapid development of economic cooperation. Economic and trade relations constitute the driving force behind increased cooperation between the parties.

41 Eissenstat, "Neither East nor West".

42 After Turkey refused to implement the Customs Union for the Republic of Cyprus (referred to as the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus by Turkey, as it does not recognize the RoC), 8 of the negotiation chapters were suspended in 2006. Furthermore, the RoC and France used their veto power to suspend the opening of further chapters. Problems within the EU resulting from the enlargements also affected Turkey's membership process.

43 Mario Zucconi, *EU Influence Beyond Conditionality: Turkey Plus/Minus the EU*, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

44 Eduard Soler i Lecha, "Hope and Despair: Understanding Change in Turkey-EU Relations", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 20, No 78, 2023, p. 21-42.

Nevertheless, the parties are positioned at opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes to foreign policy. Apart from the deep-rooted historical rivalry dating back to the Ottoman era, Russia's expansionist policies in the Black Sea region have raised security concerns. Russia and Turkey have had conflicting policies in situations of tension such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Syrian war, the Libyan war and the Kosovo conflict. Turkey has also made several official statements supporting the sovereignty of Moldova and Georgia against Russian policy.⁴⁵ Notwithstanding their major political differences in the foreign policy sphere, Turkey and Russia have chosen to focus on their common interests and to keep diverging interests on other issues at a "frozen level".⁴⁶

How did Turkey's intertwined relationships with the EU and Russia affect its foreign policy formulation in the Crimea crisis? This study examines Turkey's foreign policy formulation in the Crimea crisis by focusing on the EU-Turkey-Russia triangle. The empirical data obtained from the official documents of EU institutions and the Turkish and Russian foreign policy ministries were systematically analyzed using MAXQDA software. From the inception of the Crimea crisis until the ceasefire, a total of 123 official declarations were released. The main themes in the official declarations and statements are coded, and frequencies are calculated by utilizing qualitative software techniques. Each square symbol (see Table 1) reflects one frequency in the official documents. The symbol size illustrates the salience of the coding in official documents. The larger squares depict the most recurrent themes, and the smaller squares indicate a low level of frequency. Some of the themes in the code system are adopted by multiple actors, while others are actor-specific. For instance, the "condemning Russian Federation" theme only appeared in the EU's official declarations. Similarly, the "condemning Ukraine" theme is only repeated in Russian official statements. Those constitute actor-specific codings. On the other hand, themes such as "emphasis on Minsk Agreement" and "emphasis on OSCE mission" are common themes that appeared in all official declarations, but accompanying themes differ. All actors emphasize the importance of the "Minsk Agreement", but the Russian government criticizes Ukraine and the West for not complying with it. On the contrary, the EU accuses the Russian government of infringement on the Minsk Agreement. By allocating themes in the code system to the abbreviations of each actor, Table 1 illustrates the patterns of divergences and convergences between them.

45 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, "NO:158 - 26 August 2008, Press Release Regarding the Independence of Georgia", 26 August 2008, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_158_-26-agustos-2008_-gucistan_in-bagimsizligi-hk_.en.mfa (Accessed 26 May 2022); Seda Sevcen, "Turkey Stresses its Support for Moldova's Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty", *Anadolu Agency*, 18 November 2021, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-stresses-its-support-for-moldovas-territorial-integrity-sovereignty/2424610> (Accessed 4 May 2022).

46 Murat Önsoy, "Caught on the Horns of a Diplomatic Dilemma: the Ukrainian Crisis and Turkey's Response." *Südosteuropa. Zeitschrift für Politik und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 2, 2014, p. 256.

Table 1. The Most Frequent Themes in the Official Statements and Declarations

Code System	EU	TR	RF
Adopting Effective Measures against Ukraine and West			■
Call for Compliance with the International Law and Agreements	■	■	■
Call for Dialogue	■	■	■
Call for an Objective Approach to the Crisis			■
Condemning Russian Federation	■		
Condemning the Incidents and Actions	■	■	
Condemning Ukraine			■
Criticizing Western Hypocrisy			■
Describing Events as Illegal	■	■	
Describing Events as Provocation			■
Emphasis on Annexation of Crimea	■	■	
Emphasis on Minsk Agreement	■	■	■
Emphasis on Russia's Outraged Position			■
Emphasis on the Kinship with Crimean Tatars		■	
Emphasis on the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission	■	■	■
Emphasis on the Strategic Partnership with Ukraine		■	■
Imposing Sactions on Russian Federation	■		
Meetings with the EU and NATO		■	
Meetings with Russian Federation		■	
Providing Assistance to Ukraine	■		
Supporting Ukraine's Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty	■	■	

The EU closely monitored the dispute from its inception. Until the ceasefire on 12 February 2015, the EU released 23 official declarations. The most frequent themes in the conclusions were the sanctions adopted against Russia, with a frequency of 31. Describing the incidents as illegal and supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty had the same frequency with a total of 19. Although the emphasis on sanctions is located at the center of the EU’s response, it is crucial to underline the scope of the sanctions. Although the EU introduced sanctions in the early stages of the crisis, they were mainly individual rather than robust and generalized. The EU’s sanctions regime in the Crimea crisis illustrates a normative power strategy rather than a military power strategy.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring mission, deployed in the crisis zone to observe and report impartially, constitutes another high-frequency subject in the EU’s official declarations and statements. The emphasis on the OSCE mission revealed the EU’s aim of keeping the crisis on the international agenda. By doing so, the EU sought to emphasize Russian aggression in the region, by revealing evidence from the battleground. Since the instruments of the EU did not include military power, it utilized its normative power to have a broader impact on the other actors’ strategies during the crisis, and to prevent Russian aggression.

The OSCE theme also ranked as the second most prevalent one in the declarations of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The Turkish government pursued a delicate balancing act during

the crisis by avoiding taking an explicit side. The frequent themes in the official documents represent this pattern. During the period between February 2014 and February 2015, the Turkish Foreign Ministry promulgated a total of 40 official declarations about the Crimea crisis. Turkish kinship with the Crimean Tatars constituted the most frequent theme within official documents. The Turkish government repeatedly emphasized this historical kinship with the Crimean Tatars, and its responsibility to protect their rights. By doing so, Turkey chose to pursue an autonomy-seeking strategy by emphasizing its own priorities rather than being on the side of the EU or Russia.

Devlen has described Turkey's delicate policy during the Crimea crisis through an idiom: Don't poke the bear.⁴⁷ Turkey did not join the West's sanctions regime against Russia. As the qualitative analysis depicts, the Turkish government avoided directly condemning the Russian government and holding it responsible. Nevertheless, Turkey repeatedly emphasized its support for Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and did not recognize the annexation of Crimea. Turkey's two-sided strategic position manifested itself in the crisis. Turkish officials held meetings with EU and Russian officials separately until the ceasefire was achieved. The conclusions from the meetings were similar, calling for dialogue and a political solution. Although compliance with international law and agreements is commonly emphasized by the EU, Turkey, and Russia, it most frequently appears in the official Turkish declarations.

From the inception of the Crimea crisis to the ceasefire achieved in February 2015, the Russian Federation released 64 official declarations. Similar to the EU and Turkey, the Russian authorities emphasized the OSCE mission 29 times in their official statements. Nevertheless, this emphasis was accompanied by claims of the hypocrisy of Western countries. The Russian government argued that the OSCE mission would reveal Ukraine's aggressive side in the dispute. The second most frequent theme in the official documents was describing events as provocation and emphasis on the Minsk Agreement, with a total of 27 reiterations each. In response to the EU's repeated statements about Russia's illegal acts in the region, the Russian government accused Ukraine and the West of provocative acts. Although the emphasis on the Minsk Agreement appeared to be common to the official statements of the EU, Turkey, and Russia, the denotation of this theme differed. While the EU repeatedly called for the compliance of the Russian government with the Minsk Agreement, Russia argued that the Ukrainian side had violated the Minsk Agreement. On the other hand, Turkey emphasized the importance of the Minsk Agreement, and invited the parties to respect the ceasefire.

Russia's response to the EU's sanctions policy can be traced in its official documents. Russian sanctions against the West appeared 20 times, and ranked as the fourth most frequent theme. Turkey's autonomy-seeking strategy manifested itself in the sanctions policy. As the table illustrates, the Turkish government avoided joining in with Western sanctions and, as a result, did not become a target of Russian counter-sanctions. By following a different approach, Turkey promoted dialogue and political solutions by pursuing meetings with both parties.

⁴⁷ Devlen, "Don't poke the Russian bear".

The patterns of frequent themes in the official documents illustrate the current state of the EU-Turkey-Russia triangle. From the inception of the dispute, Turkey followed an autonomy-seeking strategy, by exploiting the power struggle between the EU and Russia. Turkey's delicate balancing act stems from two crucial issues: the fact that Turkey is a long-standing NATO member and a candidate for the EU, and that alignment with the West has been the central element of Turkish foreign policy since the establishment of the Republic. Nonetheless, its deteriorating relationship with the EU, resulting from the decreasing prospects of membership and divergence of interests with the West, has led to a change in Turkish foreign policy formulation. Turkey's national role conception has evolved from a Western-oriented and moderate strategy to an autonomy-seeking strategy.

The systematic qualitative analysis illustrates the aforementioned factors affecting Turkey's position. Although the frequent themes in the Turkish Foreign Ministry statements follow a similar pattern to those of the EU's official declarations, central themes remain absent. While the EU has repeatedly described the events as an act of annexation and aggression, the Turkish government has given minor emphasis to explicitly calling Russian policies annexation. In a similar vein, although the EU has underlined the illegal acts carried out by the Russian authorities multiple times, Turkey has avoided stressing the theme of illegality. The main divergence between Turkey and the EU emerged from the sanctions policy. Former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's statements illustrate Turkey's decision not to support Western sanctions: "One power may attempt to turn the Crimea issue into a Tatar-Russian, and subsequently into a Turkish-Russian crisis; we will not let this happen".⁴⁸ During the Crimea crisis, Turkey neither sided with the West nor the East. Instead, it followed an autonomy-seeking strategy to maximize its interests. After the ceasefire was announced with the Minsk Agreement, Turkey continued to leverage the tensions between the EU and Russia.

Nevertheless, the re-escalation of the conflict posed complex challenges for Turkey. On 24 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his decision to launch a "special military operation" against Ukraine.⁴⁹ Putin described previous efforts to solve the problem by political means as "vain".⁵⁰ On the same day, Russian attacks were reported in major cities across Ukraine, including the capital Kyiv. In response, the EU introduced a ban on transactions with the Russian Central Bank and overflight of EU airspace by Russian carriers, along with individual restrictive measures.⁵¹ Turkey's response to the Russian aggression was rapid. The Turkish Foreign Ministry released an official declaration during the military operation, and described Russian acts as "unjust and unlawful".⁵² Furthermore, the Turkish government

48 Serkan Demirtaş, "Türkiye, Kırım'da Rusya ile ilişkilerini Riske Atmayacak", *BBC News Türkçe*, 15 March 2014, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/03/140315_kirim_turkiye (Accessed 2 July 2022).

49 President of Russia, "Address by the President of the Russian Federation", 24 February 2022, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843> (Accessed 2 November 2022).

50 Ibid.

51 Council of the European Union, "Russia's Military Aggression against Ukraine: Council Imposes Sanctions on 26 Persons and One Entity", 28 February 2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/28/russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine-council-imposes-sanctions-on-26-persons-and-one-entity/> (Accessed 2 November 2022).

52 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, "No: 62, 24 February 2022, Press Release Regarding the Russian Federation's Military Operation Against Ukraine", 24 February 2022, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_62_rusya

underlined its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. On 28 February, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced Turkey's decision to implement the Montreux Convention to limit naval transit through the straits amid the Russia-Ukraine crisis.⁵³

While Turkey converged with their Western allies in supporting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, it also avoided "burning bridges with Russia".⁵⁴ The eruption of war between Russia and Ukraine increased the pressure on Turkey's delicate balancing policy. Although Turkey voted in favor of the United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia, it did not emulate Western sanctions nor close its airspace to Russian carriers.⁵⁵ Turkey's role formation included much more complex dimensions compared with the time of the Crimea crisis. By signing an intergovernmental military framework deal, and providing substantial amounts of military equipment to the Ukrainian government, including Bayraktar TB2 drones, Turkey deepened its defense cooperation with Ukraine.⁵⁶ On the other hand, Turkey expanded its energy cooperation with Russia by means of avoiding participation in the West's sanctions. Turkey has assumed a mediator role between Russia and Ukraine, in line with its balancing policy since the Crimea crisis. For instance, Turkey and the United Nations' joint diplomatic efforts facilitated the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July, which prevented posing a major threat to global food security.⁵⁷

Turkey's strategic position on the intercontinental crossroads between Europe and Asia has become more crucial amid the economic problems caused by the Russia-Ukrainian War. As Dalay stresses, Turkey continues to seek autonomy in its foreign and security policy, despite the evolved nature of the conflict.⁵⁸ Turkey has leveraged power struggles between the West and Russia to enhance its position as an autonomous regional power, which is not located either in the West or East.⁵⁹ Turkish role formation in the Crimea crisis has demonstrated Turkey's quest for further strategic autonomy. Years after the inception of the Crimea crisis, Turkey has maintained relations with the West and Russia, consequently becoming closer to its desired global position.

federasyonu-tarafından-ukrayna-ya-yonelik-baslatilan-askeri-operasyon-hk.en.mfa (Accessed 1 November 2022)

53 Anadolu Agency, "Turkiye Warns All Countries against Warships Going through Turkish Straits", 28 February 2022, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-crisis/turkiye-warns-all-countries-against-warships-going-through-turkish-straits/2518827> (Accessed 1 November 2022).

54 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Caught in the Middle: Turkey's Position Amidst Russia's War on Ukraine", 11 April 2022, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/11/caught-in-middle-turkey-s-position-amidst-russia-s-war-on-ukraine-event-7853> (Accessed 1 November 2022)

55 United Nations, "General Assembly Resolution Demands End to Russian Offensive in Ukraine", 2 March 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152> (Accessed 1 November 2022)

56 Anadolu Agency, "Ukraine Ratifies Draft on Military Framework Deal with Turkey", 18 November 2021, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/ukraine-ratifies-draft-on-military-framework-deal-with-turkey/2424865> (Accessed 1 November 2022).

57 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Joint Coordination Centre Opens in Istanbul to Facilitate Safe Export of Commercial Foodstuffs and Fertilizers from Ukrainian Port", 27 July 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/turkiye/joint-coordination-centre-opens-istanbul-facilitate-safe-export-commercial-foodstuffs-and-fertilizers-ukrainian-ports> (Accessed 1 November 2022).

58 Galip Dalay, *Deciphering Turkey's Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in its Relations with Russia*, SWP Comment, No. 35/2022, 2022.

59 Eugene Chausovsky, "Turkey Is the Biggest Swing Player in the Russia-Ukraine War", *Foreign Policy*, 11 August 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/11/turkey-russia-ukraine-war-swing-player/> (Accessed 1 November 2022)

Conclusion

“If the West had spoken out against the invasion of Crimea in 2014, the Russian-Ukraine crisis would have been prevented”.⁶⁰ Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, which hosted the first high-level contact between Russia and Ukraine at the level of foreign ministers amid the escalation of the crisis, made headlines internationally. The Western response to the Crimea crisis has preoccupied international relations literature. Nevertheless, as former Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu states, “Crimea is the problem of Ukraine first and then of the world”.⁶¹ Being tied to the dispute in multiple ways, Turkey’s foreign policy formulation in the Crimea crisis illustrates overshadowed dimensions of the conflict. This article has sought to contribute a deeper understanding of Turkey’s foreign policy in the Crimea crisis by investigating the reasons that constrained its response.

Turkey’s role formation during the Crimea crisis was evaluated through empirical data obtained from official declarations and statements. By focusing on the inception of the crisis, this article presents multiple expectations, perceptions, and commitments that shape Turkish foreign policy, and illustrates the multidimensional decision-making process. This article suggests that Turkey’s role formation in the Crimea crisis was affected by several factors. First, Turkey’s response was constrained due to the asymmetric nature of its relationship with Russia. Second, Turkey’s commitments stemming from its EU candidate status and NATO membership shaped its role formation. Third, the violation of the Crimean Tatars’ rights emerged as a crucial issue due to increasing nationalistic tendencies in Turkish politics. Turkey’s intertwined relationship with the EU and Russia resembles walking a tightrope. Although Turkey did not recognize the annexation of Crimea, and has frequently supported the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, it did not join in with Western sanctions. By leveraging power struggles between the West and Russia, Turkey followed a strategic autonomous position in the Crimea crisis.

Turkey’s delicate balancing act that sought to avoid taking sides with the EU or Russia continues to be relevant in the current state of affairs. Almost a decade after the inception of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the current war erupted. Turkey’s response to the Russia-Ukraine War illustrates similar patterns to the Crimea crisis. Although it is still early to provide a comprehensive analysis, Turkey’s cautious position vis-à-vis Russia, and its commitments to the Western alliance, emerge as the main cornerstones of Turkish foreign policy formulation in the recent escalation. This article seeks to present the initial response of Turkey to the Crimea crisis, which provides important clues to its position in the ongoing war. By providing a systematic qualitative analysis through the data obtained from official declarations and statements, it depicts the patterns of divergence and convergence between the EU, Turkey, and Russia.

60 Anadolu Agency, “If the West Had Spoken out against Invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian-Ukraine Crisis Would Have Been Prevented”, 11 March 2022, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/antalya-diplomacy-forum-2022/if-the-west-had-spoken-out-against-invasion-of-crimea-in-2014-russian-ukraine-crisis-would-have-been-prevented/2531961> (Accessed 5 July 2022).

61 Demirtaş, “Türkiye, Kırım’da Rusya ile İlişkilerini Riske Atmayacak”.

Due to its focus on the EU-Turkey-Russia axis, this article does not include other actors relevant to the dispute. Focusing on other actors, such as the US or China, would illustrate other dimensions that might be undiscovered. Furthermore, since this research focuses on Turkey's initial response to the Crimea crisis, the empirical material is limited to the period from the climax of the Maidan uprising in February 2014 to the ceasefire achieved with the Minsk Agreement in February 2015. An approach focusing on the actors' role formation in the long term will extend the existing analysis and build new horizons for further research. Considering the re-escalation of the tensions, the Russia-Ukraine War will continue to be relevant to International Relations literature in the future.

Bibliography

- Aggestam, Lisbeth (2006). "Role Theory and European Foreign Policy: A Framework of Analysis", Ole Elgström and Michael Smith (eds.), *The European Union's Roles in International Politics*. London, Routledge, p. 31-49.
- Anadolu Agency (2021) "Ukraine Ratifies Draft on Military Framework Deal with Turkey", 18 November, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/ukraine-ratifies-draft-on-military-framework-deal-with-turkey/2424865> (Accessed 1 November 2022).
- Anadolu Agency (2022). "Turkiye Warns All Countries against Warships Going through Turkish Straits", 28 February, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-crisis/turkiye-warns-all-countries-against-warships-going-through-turkish-straits/2518827> (1 November 2022).
- Anadolu Agency (2022). "If the West Had Spoken out against Invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian-Ukraine Crisis Would Have Been Prevented", 11 March, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/antalya-diplomacy-forum-2022/if-the-west-had-spoken-out-against-invasion-of-crimea-in-2014-russian-ukraine-crisis-would-have-been-prevented/2531961> (Accessed 5 July 2022).
- Aydın-Düzgüt, Senem, Evren Balta, and Andrew O'Donohue (2020). "Turkey, Russia, and the West: Reassessing Persistent Volatility, Asymmetric Interdependence, and the Syria Conflict", *Istanbul Policy Center*.
- Balcer, Adam (2015). "Dances with the Bear: Turkey and Russia after Crimea", Senem Aydın-Düzgüt (eds.), *Global Turkey in Europe III: Democracy, Trade and the Kurdish Question in Turkey-EU Relations*. Roma, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), p. 27-41.
- Bechev, Dimitar (2015). "Russia and Turkey -What Does Their Partnership Mean for the EU?", *EPC Policy Brief*, 13 February.
- Brunner, Klaus and Cameron G. Thies (2015). "The Contested Selection of National Role Conceptions", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 11, No 3, p. 273-293.
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2022). "Caught in the Middle: Turkey's Position Amidst Russia's War on Ukraine", 11 April, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/11/caught-in-middle-turkey-s-position-amidst-russia-s-war-on-ukraine-event-7853> (Accessed 1 November 2022).
- Chausovsky, Eugene (2022). "Turkey Is the Biggest Swing Player in the Russia-Ukraine War", *Foreign Policy*, 11 August, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/11/turkey-russia-ukraine-war-swing-player/> (Accessed 1 November 2022).
- Council of Europe (2022). "Flight MH17 Shot down by a Russian-supplied Buk Missile 'Most Convincing Scenario by Far', Says PACE", 23 June, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/flight-mh17-shot-down-by-a-russian-supplied-buk-missile-most-convincing-scenario-by-far-says-pace> (Accessed 1 July 2022).

- Council of the European Union (2014). “Foreign Affairs Council”, 3 March, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/03/03/> (Accessed 23 May 2022).
- Council of the European Union (2014). “Foreign Affairs Council”, 17 March, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/03/17/> (Accessed 23 May 2022).
- Council of the European Union (2014). “Adoption of Agreed Restrictive Measures in View of Russia’s Role in Eastern Ukraine”, 29 July, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22023/144159.pdf> (Accessed 20 May 2022).
- Council of the European Union (2022). “Russia’s Military Aggression against Ukraine: Council Imposes Sanctions on 26 Persons and One Entity”, 28 February, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/28/russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine-council-imposes-sanctions-on-26-persons-and-one-entity/> (Accessed 2 November 2022).
- Cross, Mai’a. K. Davis, and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski (2017). “What Type of Power has the EU Exercised in the Ukraine–Russia Crisis? A Framework of Analysis”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 55, No 1, p. 3-19.
- Çağaptay, Soner and James Jeffrey (2014). “Turkey’s Muted Reaction to the Crimean Crisis”, *The Washington Institute*, 4 March, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/turkeys-muted-reaction-crimean-crisis> (Accessed 4 May 2022).
- Dalay, Galip (2022). *Deciphering Turkey’s Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in Its Relations with Russia*. SWP Comment, No. 35/2022.
- De Ploeg, Chris Kaspar (2017). *Ukraine in the Crossfire*. Atlanta, Clarity Press.
- Demirtaş, Serkan (2014). “Türkiye, Kırım’da Rusya ile İlişkilerini Riske Atmayacak”, *BBC News Türkçe*, 15 March, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/03/140315_kirim_turkiye (Accessed 2 July 2022).
- Devlen, Balkan (2014). “Don’t Poke the Russian Bear’: Turkish Policy in the Ukrainian Crisis”, *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre*, May, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/180832/a5fa13f65a0a0fcee44339be2957279.pdf> (Accessed 1 May 2022).
- Diez, Thomas (2005). “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe’”, *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, Vol 33, No 3, p. 613-636.
- Diez, Thomas and Ian Manners (2007). “Reflecting on Normative-power Europe”, Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams (eds.), *Power in World Politics*. New York, Routledge, p. 173-188.
- Dolidze, Tatia (2015). “EU Sanctions Policy towards Russia: The Sanctioner-Sanctionee’s Game of Thrones”, *CEPS Working Document*, No. 402/January 2015.
- Dreger, Christian, Konstantin A. Kholodilin, Dirk Ulbricht and Jarko Fidrmuc (2016). “Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Impact of Economic Sanctions and Oil Prices on Russia’s Ruble”, *Journal of Comparative Economics*, Vol. 44, No 2, p. 295-308.
- Duchêne, Francois (1972). “Europe’s Role in World Peace”, Richard Mayne (eds.), *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*. London, Fontana, p. 32-49.
- Duchêne, Francois (1973). “The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence”, Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager (eds.), *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community*. London, Macmillan, p. 1-21.
- Eissenstat, Howard (2022). “Neither East nor West: Turkey’s Calculations in the Ukraine Crisis”, *Middle East Institute*, 25 February, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/neither-east-nor-west-turkeys-calculations-ukraine-crisis> (Accessed 3 March 2022).
- European Council (2014). “Extraordinary Meeting of EU Heads of State or Government on Ukraine”, 6 March, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2014/03/06/> (Accessed 23 May 2022).

- Gardner, Hall (2016). “The Russian Annexation of Crimea: Regional and Global Ramifications”, *European Politics and Society*, Vol. 17, No 4, p. 490-505.
- Gehring, Thomas, Kevin Urbanski, and Sebastian Oberthür (2017). “The European Union as an Inadvertent Great Power: EU Actorness and the Ukraine Crisis”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, No. 55, Vol 4, p. 727-743.
- Götz, Elias (2017). “Putin, the State, and War: The Causes of Russia’s Near Abroad Assertion Revisited”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 19, No 2, p. 228-253.
- Hahn, Gordon M. (2018). *Ukraine over the Edge. Russia, the West and the “New Cold War”*. Jefferson, McFarland.
- Harnisch, Sebastian (2001). “Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German Foreign Policy”, *German Politics*, Vol. 10, No 1, p. 35-60.
- Hellquist, Elin (2016). “Either with Us or against Us? Third-country Alignment with EU Sanctions against Russia/Ukraine”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 29, No 3, p. 997-1021.
- Holsti, Kalevi J. (1970). “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No 3, p. 233-309.
- Howorth, Jolyon (2017). “‘Stability on the Borders’: The Ukraine Crisis and the EU’s Constrained Policy Towards the Eastern Neighbourhood”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 55, No 1, p. 121-136.
- Kara, Mehtap and Ahmet Sözen (2016), “Change and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Evaluating Pre-AKP and AKP Periods’ National Role Conceptions”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 13, No 52, p. 47-66.
- Karagiannis, Emmanuel (2014). “The Russian Interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea Compared: Military Performance, Legitimacy and Goals”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 35, No 3, p. 400-420.
- Kholodilin, Konstantin A. and Aleksei Netšunajev (2019). “Crimea and Punishment: the Impact of Sanctions on Russian Economy and Economies of the Euro Area”, *Baltic Journal of Economics*, Vol. 19, No 1, p. 39-51.
- Kutlay, Mustafa and Ziya Öniş (2021). “Turkish Foreign Policy in a Post-western Order: Strategic Autonomy or New Forms of Dependence?”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 97, No 4, p. 1085-1104.
- Kuzio, Taras (2017). “Ukraine between a Constrained EU and Assertive Russia”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 55, No 1, p. 103-120.
- Kuzio, Taras (2018). “Euromaidan Revolution, Crimea and Russia–Ukraine war: Why It is Time for a Review of Ukrainian–Russian Studies”, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, No. 59, Vol 3-4, p. 529-553.
- Larson, Deborah Welch and Alexei Shevchenko (2014). “Russia Says No: Power, Status, and Emotions in Foreign Policy”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 47, No 3-4, 2014, p. 269-279.
- Manners, Ian (2002). “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No 2, p. 235-258.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye (2008). “NO:158 - 26 August 2008, Press Release Regarding the Independence of Georgia”, 26 August, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_158_-26-agustos-2008_-gurcistan_in-bagimsizligi-hk_.en.mfa (Accessed 26 May 2022).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye (2014). “No: 71, 2 March 2014, Press Release Regarding the Developments in Ukraine”, 2 March, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-71_-2-march-2014_-press-release-regarding-the-developments-in-ukraine.en.mfa (Accessed 26 May 2022).
- Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2020). “Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the Netherlands’ Decision to File an Interstate Lawsuit with the

- European Court of Human Rights against the Russian Federation in Connection with the MH17 Crash”, 10 July, https://archive.mid.ru/ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/_/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4217767?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB (Accessed 3 May 2022).
- Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013). “Reply by the Official Representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alexander Lukashevich to the Mass Media’s Question Regarding Statements of Representatives of the European Commission (EC) Concerning the Prospects of Relations with Ukraine and Member States of the Customs Union (CU)”, 29 August, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1621429/ (Accessed 3 May 2022).
- Natorski, Michal (2017). “The EU and Crisis in Ukraine: Policy Continuity in Times of Disorder?”, Dimitris Bouris and Tobias Schumacher (eds.), *The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity and Change in EU Foreign Policy*. London, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Natorski, Michal and Karolina Pomorska (2017). “Trust and Decision-making in Times of Crisis: The EU’s Response to the Events in Ukraine”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 55, No 1, p. 54-70.
- Nicolaidis, Kalypso and Robert Howse (2002). “‘This is my EUtopia...’: Narrative as Power”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No 4, p. 767-792.
- Orbie, Jan (2006). “Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 41, No 1, p. 123-128.
- Orenstein, Mitchell A. and R. Daniel Kelemen (2017). “Trojan Horses in EU Foreign Policy”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 55, No 1, p. 87-102
- Öniş, Ziya and Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2016). “Turkey and Russia in a Shifting Global Order: Cooperation, Conflict and Asymmetric Interdependence in a Turbulent Region”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No 1, p. 71-95.
- Önsoy, Murat (2014). “Caught on the Horns of a Diplomatic Dilemma: the Ukrainian Crisis and Turkey’s Response”, *Südosteuropa. Zeitschrift für Politik und Gesellschaft*, Vol 2, p. 250-264.
- Parlar Dal, Emel and Emre Erşen (2014). “Reassessing the “Turkish Model” in the Post-Cold War Era: A Role Theory Perspective”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 15, No 2, p. 258-282.
- Portela, Clara, Paulina Pospieszna, Joanna Skrzypczyńska and Dawid Walentek (2021). “Consensus against All Odds: Explaining the Persistence of EU Sanctions on Russia”, *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 43, No 6, p. 683-699.
- President of Russia (2014). “Указ о применении отдельных специальных экономических мер в целях обеспечения безопасности Российской Федерации”, 6 August, <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46404> (Accessed 17 May 2022).
- President of Russia (2022). “Address by the President of the Russian Federation”, 24 February, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843> (Accessed 2 November 2022).
- Reynolds, Michael A. (2014). “Why Turkey Has Been Quiet About Crimea”, *Current History*, Vol. 113, No 765, p. 290-292.
- Romanova, Tatiana (2016). “Sanctions and the Future of EU–Russian Economic Relations”, *Europe - Asia Studies*, Vol. 68, No 4, p. 774-796.
- Schilde, Kaija (2017). “European Military Capabilities: Enablers and Constraints on EU Power?”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, No. 55, Vol 1, p. 37-53.
- Sevencan, Seda (2021). “Turkey Stresses Its Support for Moldova’s Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty”, Anadolu Agency, 18 November, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-stresses-its-support-for-moldovas-territorial-integrity-sovereignty/2424610> (Accessed 4 May 2022).
- Sjursen, Helene and Guri Rosén (2017). “Arguing Sanctions. On the EU’s Response to the Crisis in Ukraine”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 55, No 1, p. 20-36.

- Soler i Lecha, Eduard (2023). "Hope and Despair: Understanding Change in Turkey-EU Relations", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 20, No 78, p. 21-42.
- Thies, Cameron G. and Marijke Breuning (2012). "Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role Theory", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No 1, p. 1-4.
- Tsygankov, Andrei (2015). "Vladimir Putin's Last Stand: the Sources of Russia's Ukraine Policy", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol, 4, No 31, p. 279-303.
- United Nations (2022) "General Assembly Resolution Demands End to Russian Offensive in Ukraine", 2 March, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152> (Accessed 1 November 2022).
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2022). "Joint Coordination Centre Opens in Istanbul to Facilitate Safe Export of Commercial Foodstuffs and Fertilizers from Ukrainian Port", 27 July, <https://reliefweb.int/report/turkiye/joint-coordination-centre-opens-istanbul-facilitate-safe-export-commercial-foodstuffs-and-fertilizers-ukrainian-ports> (Accessed 1 November 2022).
- Van der Pijl, Kees (2018). *Flight MH17, Ukraine and the New Cold War*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- Whitman, Richard G. (1998). *From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union*. London, Macmillan.
- Zucconi, Mario (2020). *EU Influence Beyond Conditionality: Turkey Plus/Minus the EU*. Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan Cham.

