A Contribution of Social Work to the Discourse on the Theory-Practice Relationship [1]

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Abstract

The question of the theory-practice relationship is one of the core questions of philosophy and the social sciences. How should the proportions between theory and practice best be determined? Social work joins this discourse from a logic of applied sciences. It can develop an appropriate answer that can be generalized if it first participates on that discourse. For that, the theory-practice relationship is first distinguished from the theory-practice proportion. Because while a proportionality points to communication, which could be determined vertically in one way, in the case of the relationship is horizontality at the centre of the debate, which refers to the consent of the other actor. Therefore, the following paper will first distinguish the philosophical question of how the relationship between knowledge and action should be determined from the sociological question of how the proportion between knowledge and action is in a given profession. After an introduction, the genesis of the theory-practice communication the question is put what can be deduced from this distinction for social work. Depending on the viewpoint, the relationship can either be transformed into communication through mediation between theory and practice, or theory can be separated, decoupled from practice. In a third proposal developed here, this theory-driven relationship and/or proportion can be viewed from the logic of theory-practice complementarity.

Keywords: *Theory-Practice, Kant, Luhmann, Habermas, Social Work, Programs*

Sosyal Hizmetin Teori-Uygulama İlişkisi Söylemine Katkısı

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Öz

Teori-pratik ilişkisine dair tartışma felsefenin ve sosyal bilimlerin temel konuların başında gelir. Teori ile uygulama arasındaki oran en iyi nasıl belirlenmelidir? Bu soru yaşanılan zamana ve benimsenen bakış açısına bağlı olarak farklı mekânlarda değişik şekillerde yanıtlanmıştır. Sosyal hizmet var olagelen teori-pratik ilişkisine dair bu genel söyleme katıldıkça, kendi yönergesine uygun ama genelleştirilebilecek bir yanıtta geliştirebilir. Bu çalışmada teori-pratik ilişkisi teori-pratik orantısı sorusundan ayrılır ve ayrılmalıdır da. Çünkü orantı tek taraflı ve dikey olarak belirlenebilecek bir iletişime işaret ederken, ilişki söz konusu olduğunda tartışmanın merkezinde yatay sosyal etkileşimlerin olduğu varsayılır. Bu bize orantıda söylemdeki diğer aktörlerin rızasının alınması gerektiğine de bir gönderme yapıldığını göstermektedir. Bu nedenle, bu makale öncelikle bilgi ve eylem arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl belirlenmesi gerektiğine dair felsefi soruyu, belirli alanda var olan bilgi ve eylem arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl olduğuna dair sosyolojik sorudan ayrıştırılacaktır. Çalışmada bu genel sorunsala giriş yapıldıktan sonra teori-pratik iletişiminin sosyal hizmetteki sonuçlarına bakılacaktır: Savunulan bakış açısına bağlı olarak, bu ilişki ve/veya orantı ya teori ve pratik arasında aracılık kurulmak yoluyla ilişkiye dönüştürülebilir ya da teori pratikten ayrıştırılarak birbirinden uzaklaştırılabilir. Bu çalışmada geliştirilen üçüncü bir öneride, teoriye dayalı bu ilişki ve/veya orantı, teori-pratik tamamlayıcılığı mantığından görülebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Teori-Pratik, Kant, Luhmann, Habermas, Sosyal Hizmet, Programlar*

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Introduction

The relationship between theory and practice is one of the most important questions in social science. Is there a knowledge that motivates man to freedom, to justice? In ancient Greece practice was seen as a negative precondition of freedom whereases enjoyed only by those who belonged to the polis. Today, the theory-practice relationship is not only continued, but also intensified, with corresponding suggestion proposing either a decoupling of theory from practice or their mediation. The connection between theory and practice is either seen from theory as a form of practice or the theorisation of practice.

From the point of view of social work as an applied science, the question is how social work understands the relationship between theory and practice, i.e. cultivates it in its institutions. Historically, social work arose out of practise (Natorp, 1904, § 16). On the other hand, a practice without a theory is nothing more than just doing. It could not be differentiated from costume, tradition and habits. A brief examination at the existing literature on social work theories would make clear the condensed tension between theory and practice in social work (Obrecht, 2000, p. 207-223; Motzke, 2014; Engelke et al., 2008; Wernet, 2003; Duke, 2018; Winkler, 2021, p. 15-95). According to Rauschenbach and Züchner is theory „something like the epitome of science remote from life", that's why social work professors have little prestige so they use a dirty trick to gain respect (2012, p. 151). This observation gives us a test to the (unnecessary) ambiguities in social work regarding theory and practice relationship (May, 2010, p. 20). We have to distinguish not only theory and practice relationship and/or proportionality, we have also to take apart that discussion from ideologies as set of idee confront reality with possibilities. (Parsons, 1951, p. 224, 235-237). Theories as abstract conceptual systems and rare knowledge can be used as a means of power. Precisely this phenomenon was the focus of Michael Foucault's work. Still, theories are a way of reflecting on social world despite social, psychological, structural, cognitive, etc., limitations of our imagination.

A good theory captures the main characteristics of social reality with a view to the respective explanatory goal and does so as simply as possible and as complex as necessary. Second, the discourse on the functions of social work theories like as mean of power has to be separated (1) from discourse about the proportionality of social work theories with the practice and (2) from the general discourse on the relationship between theory and practice. Relation differs from proportionality because the later is the result of a comparison between et least between to different thing in their being. From the viewpoint of comparison the ambiguity between theory and practice exists not only in social work, but also in sociology (Oevermann, 1997, p. 135-140; Diekmann, 2007, p. 141; Burawoy, 2021, p. 16-42). It is one of the fundamental questions of philosophy and the social sciences (Habermas, 1978). The theory-practice relationship has been an object of research in social research and philosophy since antiquity (Kant, 1997; Bloch, 1974; Habermas, 1978; Bourdieu, 1977). Therefore, the first question is what exactly is meant with the relationship between theory and practice. And the question from the perspective of social work as an applied science is whether social work practice needs a theory? To put it more pragmatically, does the success of social work practice depend on its theory at all?

Mediation or Decoupling

From the research perspective, theory and practice are seen as two complementary components of the scientific endeavour. To deepen, we can see with Diekmann that a theory is composed of a core and a periphery. The core consists of definitions of basic terms and basic assumptions and of connections that are usually difficult to test empirically, while the periphery includes the rules for the practical measurement of the variables that are derived from the core. When the basic assumptions of the theory are mathematically formalized, Diekmann speaks of a model (Diekmann, 2007, p. 141). In this logic, models are a subset of theories. Theories and models can be defined as constructs that depict the complex reality of social world as simply as possible. The statements, hypotheses and assumptions derived from them can be falsified by social research, which is carried out using qualitative and quantitative methods (Diekmann, 2007).

A theory-practice reconciliation can be seen in applied science insofar as it practically examines a hypothesis (based on a theory). First of all, practice itself must be separated from theory and conceptual analysis (Oevermann, 1997, p. 95-109). Practice cannot be measured according to the goodness of the causal statements (cause-effect relationship), but according to their instruction of action (means-purpose relationship) (Dilthey, 1969, p. 47-48; Bourdieu, 1992). And from a lifeworld perspective, the goal of social research is indeed to grasp the laws of social reality, to understand them and, if necessary, to change them for a specific purpose (Merleau-Ponty, 1966). Research is done not to discover the laws of nature, but to understand the rules of social reality, the practice. The gist of this line was summarized by Karl Popper as follows: „A proposition expressing a norm, a decision or a suggestion for a certain course of action can never be deduced from a statement of fact." (Popper, 1992, p. 77)

In contrast to natural laws, social and normative laws such as commandments, prohibitions or rules can be changed, for example, to ensure peaceful coexistence. Since they do not describe immutable facts, the attributes *true* and *false* are only of metaphorical. The laws of reality are more presupposed in the sense that they are dependent on space, time and the social environment. The context determines the meaning (Merleau-Ponty, 1966, p. 76). These laws are made by people, for people and with people. They are revised and improved and become negotiable facts within a pre-constituted reality (Popper, 1992, p. 77). Thus, the difference between the natural laws of reality and laws of social reality is that the former are as they are, while the latter are as we want them to be. They are based on a value and belief system of a society (Parsons, 1951, p. 255-256).

To put it negatively, with modernity the different perspective, the pluralism in seen the objective, social and subjective world seems like a threat, drifting apart the dreamed-of unity of being and ought. From this defensive perspective, the question arises as to how purposeful rationality with value rationality, the system with the lifeworld, community with society, the sacred with the profane, knowledge, tacit knowing in the sense of Polanyi with instrumental thinking, the theory in the sense of the model can be put in a communication not only in research but also within the field of social work as a profession (Polanyi, 1966, p. 7).

There are two ideal-typical answers to this question of a communication between theory and practice within the social sciences, the most important representatives of which are Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann. Habermas (1986, 1992, 1996) would make a positive and Luhmann (1990; 1997) a negative proposal. They agree one the role of the scientist: embedded in the scientific community with the corresponding expectations, the scientist in his function must be able to bring together the theoretical with the empirical knowledge. He must not only be able to classify object according to certain methods for the purpose of pure knowledge, but also to be able to interpret it according to certain values. Interpretation, in turn, means the assessment, which is why the scientist is in the moment of making the judgment more in the role of the artist than the neutral observer (Weber, 1985; Gadamer, 2013). As a practitioner, he acts from „a matrix of non-rational orientation patterns (including the functional equivalents of magic) which, because they are not directly empirically grounded, can only be stabilized by being traditionalized" (Parsons, 1951, p. 228). In this context, the suggestion can be made that the role of the scientist should be considered together within an institution acting according to particular interests (Parsons, 1951, p. 269-271).

Habermas' proposal for mediation also goes in this direction, according to whom knowledge can be differentiated in *insight* and *cognition*. Habermas defines *insight* as the state of being able to justify a decision „on the basis of epistemic reasons" within a society (Habermas, 1996, p. 38). *Cognition* on the other hand places the pre-theorized knowledge in known contexts, checks its consistency and thus prepares it for a critical examination. A proposition is valid and correct in predicate logic if it is derived from principles formulated according to formal rules (Habermas, 1996, p. 38-40). Based on that conviction this mediation is given in Habermas' communicative action insofar as the social and the instrumental action are mediated with each other under an abstract and socially legitimate principle. Communicative action is the mediation of insight and cognition. Accordingly, a discourse community can traditions go hand in hand with technology. In this

sense, discourses in legal and academic practice are both an image of tacit knowing consisting of knowledge and ability, as well as a source of action orientation towards abstract principles such as freedom, legitimacy, human dignity (Habermas 1981, p. 229-297; Habermas 1992, p. 97-107).

Niklas Luhmann proposes another path, whose answer goes back to the tradition of Weber and Parsons (Weber, 1985; Parsons, 1949, § I, XIV; Parsons and Platt, 1973). Luhmann believes that everything must be binary coded from society's perspective; for example, just as all actions within society can be attributed to either cooperation or conflict, so all observations of science can be attributed to either knowledge or ignorance (Luhmann, 1990, p. 122-165; Luhmann, 1997, p. 339-340). What is neither knowledge nor ignorance, or neither conflict nor cooperation, which does not represent a clear decision, Luhmann simply calls communication. He exercises this core idea in different functional systems of society; love, art, business, law, education, science and so on. Here, theory has the function of reducing complexity, which every human being needs, but can only be offered, stabilized, and institutionalized in the long term in their functional systems (Demir, 2023b). Science here resembles an organism, a human body, which is not only guided by the brain (society) but is subject to it. Consequently, it requires the transmission of impulses, which Luhmann calls communication.

The difference between these two types of responses is that one is generated from facticity and the other is generated from the idee of mediation facts with validity. And this goes back to the fact that while Luhmann was a sociologist, Habermas is also a philosopher. In other words; while Luhmann provides the analysis of an existing society, Habermas also reports on a society that could and should have been established.

Three Ways to the Theory-Practice Communication in Social Work

The question arises, where is social work in this discourse and what does it propose to delve in it? Is there a third option available? To answer these questions, we must first remember that Immanuel Kant saw judgment as a mediator between reason and insight, understanding. Can that what Kant called *power of judgment* be mediated with Habermas idee of discourse (Kant, 1977, p. 127)? For that, we must remember that social work has in common with law since it is too an applied science, in which actions are also judged on the basis of *insight*. The question is how is what is conveyed in jurisprudence in the concept in the sense of justice between the individual and society, done in social work? An answer can be found in the principle of social work, according to which the theories of social work have to satisfy its *dual mandate*. Social work must meet the standards of science as well as, as the needs of institution of society, by taking into account its particular interests. Accordingly, the theories, models, approaches and programs of social work must not only meet scientific quality criteria according to certain *cognitions*, but also be able to generate *insights*, and has to generate good *instructions* that meet the principles of social work as a (human rights) profession (Staub-Bernasconi, 2007, p. 36-38; Scheu and Otger, 2011, p. 29). These objectives are only understandable and legitimised if it is derived from values that themselves correspond to the general interests of all those potentially affected, as Habermas would demand (1991, p. 124). The decisive question is, from which norms, sources or which theoretical knowledge and practical skills does social work derive its objectives and want to generate the research (based) instructions for action? Social work makes three suggestions on this question.

The first suggestion (I) is made from an epistemological point of view, according to which neither an explicit supply of sources, nor the questions nor the instructions for action in the practice of social work constitute an explicit theory (of the social work) needed. We may establish ad hoc that social work is about helping, without deriving it's ideas from the question of relationships and proportionality. We can now continue with Habermas; wo himself that we have a critical attitude towards immoral behaviour in everyday life even without the norms, theories and principles developed for this in science and philosophy. Habermas takes the position that practical questions do not need to be theorized: „Practical questions do not seem capable of theory. In fact,

our everyday moral institutions do not depend on an ethical theory, nor can they usually benefit much from it." (Habermas, 1991, p. 120). We may ones more state *ad hoc* that helping does not need a theory. Rousseau, the astute philosopher, observed that not even an animal „passes by a dead animal of its kind without trepidation." (Rousseau, 1984, p. 143). Herzog stated that „there are facts and truths that are independent of theory." (Herzog, 2018, p. 819) Helping, teaching, instructing and educating are „antropological universals", which can be achieved in the highest quality even without explicit theories (Herzog, 2018, p. 813, 821-825). From this point of view, social workers were able to help mothers, the poor and children, not because they had a good theory, but because they acted according to ethical standards in the sense of conventions, which can be seen a practice in the sense of skilful action (Dewe and Radtke, 1991; Grant, 2014).

At the same time, skills also need science when it comes to reconstruction and reproduction. Especially since the experts rely on implicit knowledge, for Herzog the question arises of how „knowledge whose empirical evidence is controversial even in research can be made the basis of a vocational training process?" (Herzog, 2018, p. 821). There are two answers to this question. The hallmark of the first answer (*Ia*) is its justification against an explicit theory (of social work). This path includes the concept of the lifeworld developed by Alfred Schütz, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, Erwing Goffmann, in the pedagogy of Wilhelm Dilthy, Herman Nohl, Heinrich Roth etc., which in German speaking area of social work was particularly developed by Hans Thiersch and Lothar Böhnisch (coping with lifeworld). In this context, Ratke and Neuweg propose Polanyi's theory of tacit knowing, which encompasses both knowledge and ability without having to develop an explicit theory (Polanyi, 1966, p. 7; Radtke, 1996; Neuweg, 2000). Therefore, professionalism is not based on science but on the *ability* of professionals (Neuweg, 2000, p. 38; Dewe and Radtke, 1991). It should be noted that these proposals make a paradoxical situation visible precisely through their rejection of a theoretical justification of the practice of social work and social pedagogy; how should what is theorized be brought together with what social workers and social pedagogues experience, observe, recognize, know, etc. every day in the fields of social work and their addressees? Since the practical answer to this question is also given with a theory, it is not convincing. In other words, since it theorizes a practice that is supposedly not capable of theory with a theory that is seen as not necessary at all, it resembles a paradox as a viable proposal towards an approachable solution.

This problem arises mainly because they seem to forget the background to their own theorising. They steak on the common differentiation between objective and social reality by omitting the lifeworld. In this case, too, we recall that background of that theories is phenomenology developed in German-speaking countries primarily by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger and in France by Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Taking the point of view of Merleau-Ponty, the starting point is the question of the source of certain knowledge. In scientist behaviourism, the relationship between humans and nature is explained according to the stimulus and response scheme. In the intellectualist position, on the other hand, the elements of nature are understood as constructs of conceptual understanding, of consciousness. In other words, reality is seen as a product of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty wants to overcome both positions with a better proposal (Merleau-Ponty, 1976, pp. 5-36). The stimulus and response scheme fails because, according to the theory, not the elements but the behaviour is determined by structures and forms that cannot send stimuli as such. Against the intellectualist position, he argues that consciousness is not an original phenomenon, but is first developed in the confrontation in the lifeworld, in practice, out of behaviour. The structures and forms are not entered by consciousness into what we encounter in practice. Rather, the structures and forms are a component of reality itself. They do not arise as a result of human endeavours, but human endeavours are based on the structures and forms of social reality. Structures and forms of reality exist independently of individuals and individuals are acting based on these structures and forms (Merleau-Ponty, 1976, pp. 52-59).

He proposes the concept of *behaviour* as the starting point for clarifying the relationship between consciousness and nature in the sense of given reality (Merleau-Ponty, 1976, cap. 3). He specifies the concept

in his main work, *Phenomenology of Perception*. In the introduction, Merleau-Ponty poses the question of what phenomenology is. In answer, he states that phenomenology had already begun with G. W. Friedrich Hegel, i.e. long before Edmund Husserl, although the latter is considered the founder of phenomenology. With Husserl himself, Merleau-Ponty wants to go *to the things themselves*. This call implies that philosophy should take a step back beyond the constructs of science and thus go to the lifeworld itself. „The universe of science as a whole is founded on the ground of the lifeworld, and if we want to think science itself in rigour, to measure its meaning and scope precisely, we must first of all go back to that experience of the world of which science remains merely a secondary expression." (Merleau-Ponty, 1966, pp. 4-5).

For Merleau-Ponty the original experience is not cognition but feeling, which is not simply absorbed in reflection. He points out that for J. Gottfried Herder the word „feeling still had a very full [De: erfüllten] sense", which has been lost today (Merleau-Ponty, 1966, p. 274). Feeling „denotes an experience in which we are not given dead qualities but living qualities." (Merleau-Ponty, 1966, p. 75). He illustrates that idea with a example; a wooden wheel lying on the ground is something quite different for vision than a wheel carrying a load. The context in which this wheel appears plays a role, whether it is simply lying on the ground without function, without power, or whether it is a wheel that carries a load „in the balance of opposing forces." (Merleau-Ponty, 1966, p. 76). Embedded in a social time, in a history, we do not perceive things abstractly, as contextless objects. The perception of the object includes the lifeworld context between our feeling and what we see in the object or what we perceive the object to be. These bodily impressions help to shape our perception and the horizon of meaning in which things appear. In contrast, a thing without context has no meaning. (Merleau-Ponty, 1966, pp. 91-97).

Merleau-Ponty is not looking for a communication between theory and practice, but for something in which our own perception and „volitional fulfilment of a foreign intention is possible in us, or conversely the external fulfilment of our perceptive faculties, and thus like a mating of our body with things." (Merleau-Ponty, 1966, p. 370) He finds this mating in feeling (Merleau-Ponty, 1966, p. 249). Feeling is *communion* (Merleau-Ponty, 1966, pp. 251-252) Not a sum of juxtaposed organs, but a synergic system whose all parts are connected in the comprehensive movement of being directed towards the world. This being directed towards the world actually constitutes the unity of our body. Merleau-Ponty assumes that perception must always be described from two sides; on the one hand from the subject and on the other from the object itself, which is not simply there for us humans, but simply is (Merleau-Ponty, 1966, pp. 249-254). The task is to recapture this *communion*.

The second answer (*Ib*) is based on the idea research on the one hand and to the emergence of the applied universities on the other. From this application-oriented perspective, social work's relation to theories was fraught with tension from the start (May, 2010, pp. 33-38). In any case, there never was a social work theory in the sense of Kant, nor does it exist today. There are a variety of offers that are used in practice depending on the area and the preferences of the practitioner. In this respect, the question arises today, at least in Europa, which of these many minima theories is suitable for the specific case. We are faced with the multitude of offers that claim to be a theory without fulfilling the promise (Herzog, 2018, p. 817). In earlier societies, social work faced the problem of a lack of theories that were not guided by any political or religious image of man. From the systems-theoretical perspective, the later, the so-called critical theories were also the theories of the respective power formation, which is why they confuse criticism with professionalism. Today we face either a multitude of offers or the absence of a real choice worthy of the name of theory. With regard to the clarification of the theory-practice relationship, the question is now about the suitable theories for the special case in order to receive instructions for action.

The second suggestion (II) based on the idee that a theory does not require in the Kantian sense, but rather applicable, practically realizable concepts that are modelled at best. Accordingly, ideal types, approaches and models are needed here that raise their validity to effectiveness and efficiency within a specific discipline.

Accordingly, analogous to applied mathematics, mathematical sociology etc. in social work as a profession should develop and, if possible, formalize the appropriate models. In particular, the system-theoretical approaches, such as those of Obrecht and Luhmann can be assigned to an attempt at modelling. Werner Obrecht's approach to the systemic paradigm of social work is a particularly good example of this path, since he developed the approaches in social work based on Mario Bunge's models[4] and also formalized them to some extent. In the Obrecht model of the social, the phenomena are typically abstracted into concepts that elude everyday language (1996; 2000; 2001). Only professionals understand this language (Dubs, 2009, pp. 54-56).

This also includes the system theories of social work inspired by Luhmann (Stichweh, 1994; Kleve, 2007; Tenorth, 2013). Here and there, these approaches modify Luhmann's system theory and adapt it to the requirements of social work. Systems theorists in social work have specialized in problematizing the subject of social work with the conceptual complexity of Luhmann's social theory. This decision is based on the performance of the approach (Hünersdorf, 2012, p. 129). From this point of view, the relationship between theory and practice can be sought precisely in the paradoxes thanks to which society moves communication from 0 to 1 (Luhmann, 1993, pp. 320-322; 1997, pp. 366-367). Consequently, the proposal for inclusion is presented on the basis of the acceptance of the existing social structure based on exclusion (cf. table 3). This explanatory model is an offer intended to help individuals to see the reasons for their exclusion and, wherever possible and/or desired, to steer this fact into the desired state of 0 and/or 1, like inclusion (König and Volmer, 2019).

Historically, in the face of civil wars and devastation, social work has had to focus on the practical, on alleviating the terrible consequences of oppressive poverty. In this respect, there was in the perception of that actors no tension between theory and practice. Also from the genesis, the question of a relation and proportion of theory-practise arises out of confusion (Demir, 2022a; Demir, 2023g). In their actual being, they are the two side of a coin. This can be demonstrated with a reference of Pierre Bourdieu (Demir, 2023e; Demir, 2023f). Like Merleau-Ponty, he also distinguishes between subjective and objectivism knowledge. Phenomenological knowledge is built up by subjective experience which is by definition not reflexive in the sense of a methodological examination. Action based on that lived experience, self-evident in the sense of taken for granted, are driven form conditions of urgency, which exclude distance and the perspective of others and insofar detachment from reflexion, deliberation. Action is linked here with spontaneous, instinctive, repeated reaction of challenges, like in sport, music and rite. Accordingly, the meaning of self-enclosed and objectively adjusted to own needs are insofar not driven from universal principles (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 25, 87). They are like rites taking place „because, and only because, they find their *raison d'être* in the conditions of existence and the dispositions of agents who cannot afford the luxury of logical speculation, mystical effusions or metaphysical *Angst*." (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 96)

Objectivism on the other hand like to gain knowledge form regularities independent form individual tendencies, norms and wills, which triggers a radical discontinuity between theoretical knowledge and practical action (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 26). The main problem in that type of generating knowledge lies according to Bourdieu in antinomy created between the time of reflexive science and time of action. Theories must step out of the scheme of action, which is based on time, speed, irreversibility and synchronisation. Theories are developed calmly, without the compulsion to act immediately. Therefore, theories allow good models, rules and programmes to be developed after an event has taken place. Practice, on the other hand, takes place in a rhythmic, social, directional and therefore individualised time (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 42-52, pp. 98-112).„ As with music, any manipulation of this structure, even a simple change in tempo, either acceleration or slowing

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[4] See for that; Bunge, Mario (1973): *The Philosophy of Physics.* Reidel: Dordrecht. / Mahner, Martin und Bunge, Mario (2000): *Philosophische Grundlagen der Biologie.* Berlin: Springer.

down, subjects it to a destruction that is irreducible to a simple change in an axis of reference. In short, because it is entirely immersed in the current of time, practice is inseparable from temporality, not only because it is played out in time, but also because it plays strategically with time and especially with tempo." (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 82).

In scientific reflexion, on the other hand, there are no time limitation at all. On the contrary, scientist has to take their object out of time and needs of society to analyse their object by minimizing the uncertainty, why it needs a reference of *ceteris paribus*. Putting time out of space has an effect of totalizing the term used by developing the hypotheses, arguments. Bourdieu points out that there is necessarily a difference between the complexity of reality and its representation for the purpose of a scientific debate. In any case, the question of their communication remains unresolved even with this reference; how are theory and practice constituted in a given case and how should they be constituted? In particular, the question of oughtness can only be generated in a theoretical language. But this is not the business of sociologists, but of philosophers. While logic seeks to answer this question for all spaces and times, practical philosophy assumes from the outset that the norms, principles, values and pragmatic goals of the observer are dependent on the lifeworld. In other words, Bourdieu do not only attempts to describe the tension between theory and practice more clearly, refilling the intensity, but also develops the corresponding proposals with the appropriate terminology according to the complexity (Bourdieu, 1982, pp. 277-354).

Bourdieu wants to approach theory from a practical perspective, as Merleau-Ponty demanded that object has to be experience without given them a prior meaning. The theory-practice dichotomy is seen in both cases as constructs that can be thrown overboard. Also from the systems-theoretical point of view, what is called theory-practice tension is nothing other than the practical coding of a binary communication between theory and research, which are components of a single the unity called science (Stichweh, 1994, p. 228-245). From this reality, the question arises as to whether, instead of assuming a contradiction between theory and practice, the counter-pool should not be sought in the communications (Stichweh, 1994, p. 238-240).

This brings us to the *third suggestion* (III). We can start with the question of where critical social work stands in this landscape? Does it have any function at all? Because from a system-theoretical point of view, the practical question arises as to what exactly a (critical) theory should achieve if it does not enable social workers to include the excluded people out of profit generated by the society. On the other hand, the question from the point of view of theory-led social work is how it can generate instructions in accordance with its *dual mandate*, according to which it is not only obliged to people but also to society, without having to deviate from its principles like upholding human rights, without discriminating between people with or without citizenship in any given particular country. Is there a way for social work to contribute to the communication between society and individuals according to its own principles, for example by ensuring that this communication is neither terminated nor dictated by a single point of view or sphere?

An answer to this can be sought in the development of *programs*, which is also the third and last answer to the above question about the possibilities of a reconciliation of theory with practice (Luhmann, 1997, pp. 360-378). The starting point is the conviction that the human being is in fact an ensemble of facts, roles and expectations, who appropriates social reality according to these preconditions by gaining autonomy through a tension-filled balance between the general and the particular, between social expectations and individual preferences. If this anthropological premise can claim intuitive validity, then the question of the relationship and/or communication between theory and practice can be sought and observed in the actual action itself. Accordingly, social work can not only develop appropriate programs from the society (programs e.g. on the lifeworld, belonging, membership), culture (programs e.g. on inclusion, integration, participation, mediation, socialization) and personality (programs e.g. for identity formation, self-identity, self-efficacy, self-defence)

and for them, but can also be colonized out of them. Both options are given, which is why decisions become all the more important (Demir, 2023a, pp. 183-261). Programs as the embodiment of feeling like by Merleau-Ponty, or of tacit knowing, which is based on „mutual adjustment and mutual authority" become necessary for communicative mediation precisely at the time of the programming (Polanyi, 1966, p. 73).

In contrast to the path of theory (I) and models (II), the advantage of programs (III) lies in the fact that the theories and models explicitly form the premises of the actions in the programs. They are made explicit, worked out, taught and reflected on in cases where the question arises, and play a crucial role in the practice of social workers. In fact, the programs only unfold their theoretical and/or practical relevance in practice itself, in (communicative) action. The second advantage of program are, that they are omnipresent in the age of digitality and social work as an applied science predestined to generate other programs. They are a suggestion of how existing social science theories, models that can be implemented in practice, rules/algorithms, social work instructions and decisions can be generated (Demir, 2022b). Thirdly, because the starting point in the programs is the question of a good communication between theory and practice and/or theory and research, instead of a definitive clarification of the relationship between them, the theory-practice proportion and/or theory-research relationship can be theorized in programs without contradicting oneself. Programmes are not structurally linked to any of these approaches. Rather, they represent practical, i.e. effective and efficient ways of generating solutions to theoretical and/or practical questions.

Finally, especially as there cannot be a single theory of social work due to social pluralism and as theory pluralism is the norm today, the question now is which of these many, already existing theories should be used to guide action for which many and daily (newly) arising specific questions? This question can also be answered without a final clarification of the relationship and/or probationally, exactly defined communication between theory and practice. Programs are a response to precisely this realisation; instead of attempting to generate a definitive answer, every answer developed with a scientific system is to be understood as a temporary suggestion to the question in accordance with the principle of fallibility. Programs have the function of maintaining communication despite the probability of fallibility. In this respect, programs are a perfect conceptualisation of actions toward a *communion* from theory with practice and/or *communication* between theory and practice. In short, programs are a better proposition because they (1) can be driven from social work principles, (2) accommodate the perceived tension between theory and practice (3) translate that tension into communication, (4) indicate a specific place for (theoretical) communication and finally (5) correspond to the concept of an applied science by generating specific instructions for action on a specific question or a specific problem.

**Two Conclusions and Proposals**

Two conclusions can be drawn from the discussion above. Firstly, we in social work have to make on proposal to question about right proportion between theory and practice. A theory-led practical proposal will be made for this end. Second, we in social work need also to make a proposal to the question of the relationship between theory and practice. For that helping as a program of social work is proposed.

The first conclusion is about a theory-led practical proposal. It is a program, in which theories and models brought together by suggesting a proposal for the proportion between theory and practice. For this we first adopt the perspective of systems theory by starting at the individual level. The discipline that deals most with type of individuals is psychology. And here at the latest since the concept of the big fives, which were also didacticized with the acronym OCEAN (Oponnes, Consciousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism), the door to the design of ideal types, typification and modelling of characteristics of people was opened. In this context, Groat and Musson (1995), based on Kolb's (1984) Learning Styles Inventory (LSI) and Honey and Mumford (1986) catalogue of questions, developed the following typologies, their definition and presentation.

They first determined the two axes; concrete vs. abstract and safety vs. resilience/challenge. Then they arrange the personality types mentioned by Kolb, Honey and Mumford for the respective dimension and identify four types: activist, thinker, theorist and pragmatist:

Table 1

Theorist, Pragmatist, Reflextor and Activist

„Activists want to learn something new, like immediate involvement in activities, and enjoy the challenge of problem-solving. Reflectors prefer to gather and assimilate as much information as they can from as many sources as possible, and like time to consider; they do not like to commit themselves to a course of action before they are ready. Theorists like to explore complex ideas and concepts, and prefer to use their observations and experiences to build their own models and theories. Pragmatists want to learn techniques, and like to practise and experiment; they prefer to address real-world problems." (Groat and Musson, 1995, p. 55)	Concrete Pr | Ac Safety Re | Th Challenge Abstract Pr = Pragmatist Ac = Activist Re = Reflextor Th = Theorist

On this basis and adapted to the question, we can now summarize the previous discussion using two dimensions: On the vertical line we can distinguish between a high level of abstraction and concrete instructions for action. So, we can assign theories of Kant, Habermas or Luhmann to the axis of high level of abstraction. On the other hand, we can consider a concrete plan, for example instructing an employee to accompany a client home, to a concrete set of instructions. We expand this axis with the dimension of explanation and description/evaluation. A theory is both very abstract and therefore able to explain a number of phenomena. On the other hand, while programs can also have a high level of abstraction, their level of abstraction depends on the theory from which they are generated and, unlike theories, they are also descriptive and evaluative, coming from a very specific community, society, insight and/or or out of interest. Programs make neither claim of the truth and/or validity of their statements or instructions, nor claim of generality. This is rather the purpose of the models. What has been written can now be represented as follows.

Table 1

Programs as Products of Principles and Instructions

	level of abstraction		
explanation	theory vita contemplativa (reflectors/ thinkers)	program approach (theorist)	description and rating
	Model concept (researcher/pragmatist)	concrete plan, strategy, tactics (user/activist)	
	Instruction		

According to this representation, (a) programs are a product of abstract principles and describe practical instructions and (b) thinker, theorist, pragmatist and user do not in opposition two each other, but complement each other in the development of proposed solutions to problems in the lifeworld in which they find themselves in action (Demir, 2023d). What is called vita contemplative is not a quality of the theorist but

of a thinker. For their part, theoreticians, if they do, are in the opposite pool of researchers/pragmatists and not of thinkers (Dewey, 2004; Mill, 2009). The theory of feeling developed by Merleau-Ponty can demonstrate this to the highest degree. Basically, theorists should be called programmers who rely on research. At the same time, researchers/pragmatists complement each other with the thinker types. From this perspective, what is called research is nothing other than the search for truth, on the basis of which the knowledge is then used to make good decisions in the sense of Karl Popper (1992, p. 69-101).

The second conclusion and suggestion is that the *relationship* between theory and practice can be reconciled in helping. To ground this proposal, we must first remember the purpose of social work: whatever differences there may be within social work in terms of theories, models, and/or method preferences, the motivation to help is what characterizes the social work as profession. Social workers want to help maintain the communication between the actors. For grounding these idea, Thole's table is indicative (Thole, 2012, p. 28). The intention behind this table is to clarify the problem of determining the unity of social work as a profession and discipline. But instead of a clarification, it worsens the existing state of ambiguity, especially since it does not seem to follow any taxonomy in the sense of systematics. What is good about the table of Thole is that it makes clear social work is about helping.

In this respect, the social work internal debates deal with the question of when, how, by what means, who should/can/must be helped *first.* The differences are due to the fact that the available means are to be put in relation of urgency, to the scarce resources available, for which logically there are different solutions, possibilities, ways, decisions, communications and programs. Based on this common ground; if we define social work with Solomon as a manual of empowerment (1976, p. 19), with Habermas as the science of discourse ethics and see its goal in the deliberation and participation of all those who may be affected (Habermas, 1991, p. 124), or define with Obrecht as „as an integrative applied science" (1996) and see its objective in turn with Obrecht in the fulfilment of needs (1999), or define social work as profession of the welfare state and consider its objective with Luhmann in inclusion (1997, p. 618-634), or determine social work with Thiersch et al. (2012, p.175-196) or Thole (2012, p. 19-70) to the preservation of the lifeworld, with Scherr to establishing the inviolability of human dignity (2012, p. 283-296), or assign with Staub-Bernasconi to make social work to a profession of human rights and it aim ascertain in the preservation of these rights (2012, p. 267-282), finally if we define social work with Heite (2008) as a profession of recognition, then we can deduce from all these definitions, objectives and at least implicitly communicated values that social work is concretely and positively about the promotion of belonging (membership) and, formulated negatively, about avoiding poverty and homelessness (no membership) in the sense of Hannah Arendt (2009, p. 601-625).

They are two sources of guidance on helping, preserving human dignity, preserving and/or promoting belonging and/or membership in a community, maintaining communication in social work; either through maintaining civil rights or human rights. These terms have been discussed in detail elsewhere (Demir, 2023c). Here we must content ourselves with stating that civil rights are acquired within a community - these rights are only possessed by members of a community. With a model of inclusion, we can sociologically determine that, for example, the refugees present are excluded from the catalogue of civil rights. In the teaching and practice of social work, the question can be put what are the reasons for the exclusion of refugees from the rule of law and democracy, what consequences does this fact have for the community (Demir, 2023d). These questions can also be tackled without a theory and without own normative objectives. The core of this path is the concept of membership, which can also be offered by organizations (Luhmann, 1997, p. 826-847; Falck, 1997).

Human rights, on the other hand, are the rights that all people have regardless of their memberships and affiliations. With the approach of integration, participation and/or recognition, on the basis of human rights in the teaching of social work, it can be argued that, in the words of J. J. Rousseau, humans are born free, logically social work should also enable them to remain free. This goes back to philosophical considerations,

which is why theories and normative objectives become necessary. Within this social expectation space, the concept of integration can be differentiated into social and system integration (Marshall, 2007, p. 31-74; Habermas, 1981, p. 524-531; Habermas, 1998, p. 166-235; Luhmann, 1997, p. 618-643). It was expected that social integration would be achieved through common language, religion, history, and system integration through institutions such as law, education and organizations such as the army and/or social security. The aim was for these lines of integration to come together in the democratic constitutional state (Habermas, 2013). Under these conditions, social work would have the task, on the one hand, of developing the instructions for this integration and, on the other hand, of ensuring that the segregation and/or marginalization of individuals and groups is prevented.

The decisive advantage of the programs lies in this case in the fact that we can convey the perspective of the action and system theory at the same time (Luhmann, 1997, p. 360-392). Especially since from the point of view of human and civil rights the human being is at the centre, we can place the affiliation from a normative point of view and the membership of the people in the organizations from a system-theoretical point of view at the centre of the considerations. In the teaching, research and practice of social work, the question can be asked how human and civil rights, how belonging and membership can be mediated with each other? In practice, the question can be asked how everyone can be integrated into a rule of law- and democracy-based order? In order to optimize the communication between them, the respective programs can be developed from different perspectives and implemented in practice.

From the logic of the profession of social work, a society can make its decisions according to the following two principles, action coordination and norm of action. From the logic of action coordination, every decision can be counted among the paths of cooperation and/or conflict. From the logic of the norm of action, every decision can be made either on the basis of inclusion and/or exclusion. The resulting policies or possible orders of society are integration, deliberation and participation, assimilation, marginalisation and separation (Kymlicka, 2003; Reinders, 2003; Geissler, 2004; Berry, 1997, p. 9-11; Pateman, 2012; Habermas, 1981, p- 384; Habermas, 1998, p. 413-429). Apart from integration, deliberation and participation are other suggestions that can be logically derived from what has been said already. Integration means in that context that a segment of society is motivated to adapt its values and principles to a qualitatively and quantitatively superior part of society as a whole. Deliberation means engaging in public discourse. And participation means getting involved in decision-making.

According to the type of society, there are corresponding programs towards one of these orders, integration, deliberation, participation and assimilation on the one hand, marginalisation and separation on the other. From this logic we can see that the respective theories, models, concepts and programs complement each other in practice (Oevermann, 2002, p. 57-63). They are complementary once initiated as programs. The table 3 below is indicative for that.

Table 3

Four Possible Decisions by a Society

Action coordination Norm of action	Co-operation (compromise)	Conflict (consensus)
Inclusion	Integration Deliberation Participation	Assimilation
Exclusion	Marginalisation	Separation

In summary, social work has in common with the law that it also helps, communicates, mediates and also acts best under conditions of democratic rule of law. Like the law, social work can best convey its theories, principles, basic assumptions, images of man with their practice, instructions for action and develop the programs necessary for this. As in law, social work programs can also be derived from a philosophical-human rights theory of man or from a sociological-communal model of the citizenship as a sphere of legality. The first case deals with programs that are developed from a juridical theory of law. In the second case, it is a question of programs that are obtained from a legal provision or legitimation of the law. And indeed, depending on the society, social work makes the appropriate weighting. Both in social work and in law, teaching, searching and helping is about defining, delimiting, theorizing, modelling and, in practice, about preserving and/or promoting human dignity, for which human and civil rights serve as a guide. Social work can best theorize this objective under conditions of democratic rule of law and demand and promote it in the form of belonging and/or membership. In that case social work can be define as a profession of helping to unify theory with practice in democracy as the theory and practice unity at all.

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Genişletilmiş Öz

Amaç

Teori-pratik ilişkisine dair tartışma felsefenin ve sosyal bilimlerin temel konularındandır. Teori ile pratik, bilgi ile beceri arasındaki ilişki ve oran en iyi nasıl belirlenmelidir? Diğer çalışmalardan farklı olarak burada öncelikle teori-pratik ilişkisi teori-pratik orantısından ayrıştırılır. Çünkü orantı tek taraflı, nesnel ve matematiksel belirlenirken, ilişkide etkileşimler çift taraflı sosyal iletişime dönüştürülür. İlk soru, bu ilişki ve oranın ne zaman ve nerede nasıl bir evrim geçirdiğiyle ilgilidir. Bu evrim vita activa kavramından hareketle bilimdeki değişimlerle gösterilir. Vita activa animal laborans'un yaşamına karşılık gelen çalışma, homo faber'de yapma ve özgürlerin polisi'de, kamudaki eylemi anlamına geliyordu. Vita activa modern toplumla önce kamusal olandan koptu ve dünyadaki şeylerle aktif fiziki ilişki anlamına geldi. Ardından toplumun çıkarları baz alınarak düşünme, konuşma ve eylem artık sadece toplumsal çıkarları olan aktörün özellikleri olarak görüldü. Ancak Galilei ve Kant'ın bilimi yeniden kurgulamalarıyla bu anlayış ve de teori-pratik iletişimi tekrardan belirlendi. Tartışmanın amacı bu gelişimi kendi mantığı işleyişinde göstermektir.

Tasarım ve Yöntem

Çalışmada hermenötik metot kullanılmıştır. Hermenötik antik çağdan beri kullanılagelen ana teori ve yöntemlerin başında gelir. Hermenötik İmmanuel Kant'ın *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nden bu yana düşünme, anlama ve çevirinin epistemolojik gerekliliği olarak anlaşılmıştır. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960) *Wahrheit und Methode (Gerçek ve Yöntem)* eserinde hermenötiği bitmeyen bir söylem olarak tanımlar. Wilhelm Dilthey bu yöntemi sosyal pedagoji ve sosyal hizmette ilk sistematik olarak kullananlardan biridir.

Teori-pratik iletişimi söylemine katılmanın bir yolu bilgi ve eylem arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl belirlenmesi gerektiğine dair felsefi soruyu, belirli bir konu, disiplin ve meslekte var olan bilgi ve eylem arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl olduğuna dair sosyolojik sorusundan ayırmaktır ve ayrılması gerektiğine vurgu yapmaktır. Olması gerekene dair belirlemelerde İmmanuel Kant, Jürgen Habermas ve Niklas Luhmann'ın teorileri esas alınacaktır. Durum tespitine dair tartışma ise direkt sosyal hizmet biliminin ve sosyal pedagoji temsilcileri olan

Werner Obrecht, Werner Thole, Walter Herzog und Ulrich Oeverman'ın çalışmaları üzerinden sürdürülecektir.

Bu ayrışımın doğru olduğundan hareketle, soru teorinin pratikle nerede sentezleştirileceğidir. Acaba araştırma (research) teori ile pratiğin yeni birliği olarak görülebilir mi? Araştırma hem vita activa anlamında eylemi hem de bilgiyi içermektedir. Ve yaşam dünyası perspektifinden bakıldığında da sosyal araştırmanın amacı doğanın kanunlarını keşfetmek değil de sosyal gerçekliğin yasalarını kavramak, anlamak ve gerekirse belirli bir amaç doğrultusunda değiştirmektir. Bu araştırmayla da mümkün. O halde ikinci soru acaba bu yaşama müdahale sorusuna teoriye gerek duymadan sadece araştırmayla karşılık vermek mümkün mü? Çalışmada bu sorulara teorik düzlemde cevaplar geliştirilmektedir.

Fakat sosyal hizmet ve sosyal pedagoji sadece teorik soruların yöneltildiği bir disiplin değil, tersine bunlar aynı zamanda birer profesyonelleşme alanlarıdırlar. Bu yüzden de teori-pratiğin birliği olarak araştırma profesyonelleşme mantığıyla örtüşmeyebilir. Her halükârda, yöneltilen sorulara cevaplar geliştirmek için öncelikle bu söyleme katılmak gerek. Uygulamalı bir bilim dalı olarak sosyal hizmet bu söyleme tabii ki var olan birikimi edinerek ama günün sonunda kendi mantığı ile katılacaktır. Sosyal hizmet var olagelen teori-pratik ilişkisine dair söyleme katıldıkça, kendi yönergesine uygun ama genelleştirilebilecek bir yanıtta geliştirebilir. Sosyal hizmet ancak bu katılımla (eleştirel) bir bakış açısı geliştirebilecektir. Katılım disiplinin değil profesyonelleşmenin gerekliliğidir. Bu tespit bize araştırmanın disiplinin teori-pratik birlikteliği olabileceği ama profesyonelleşmenin teori-pratik birlikteliğinin ne olduğu sorusuna başka bir cevap aramamız gerektiğini söylüyor.

Bulgular

Birinci bulgu vita activa kavramındaki dönüşümün bilimdeki değişikliklerle ilişkili olduğudur. Galileo Galilei gözlemin ancak özel koşullar altında ve uygun araçlarla yapılabileceğine dair yeni bir standart belirledi. Bu araç teleskoptur. Artık bu gözlük sayesinde doğru, güzel ve iyi olana ışık tutulacaktır. Bu yeni gözlem yöntemi, eski vahiy ve otorite yöntemini geride bıraktı. Bu değişim sadece buharlı makineleri değil, Amerikan ve Fransız Devrimlerini de mümkün kıldı. Immanuel Kant bu tarihsel bütünlük içinde eski teori-pratik ilişkisine yeni bir öneriyle müdahil olur; Kant teoriyle açıklayıcı bir kalıbı, ilke ve kurallardan oluşan kavramsal bir sistemi kasteder. Bununla birlikte özellikle de doğa bilimleriyle karşılaştırıldığında sosyal bilimler doğanın değişmez yasalarıyla değil, ortak yaşam alanını düzenleyen yasalar, kurallar ve davranış kodlarıyla ilgilenir. Ahlak, sosyal gerçeklik yasalarına bir örnektir. Ahlakın yasaları sosyal yaşama haklar ve ödevler şeklinde yansır. Ancak ahlak bir doğa yasası değil, olmasını dilediğimiz beklentilerin sosyal birlikteliği düzenlemesine ikna olmadır. Bu yüzden Kant yasayı evrensel olma ihtimali olan bir hukuk prensibi çerçevesinde her bireyin özgürlüğünün, herkesin özgürlüğüyle uyum içinde olması koşuluyla sınırlandırılması olarak tanımlar. Kamu hukuku bu evrensel pratik tutarlılığının hem içsel hem de gerektiğinde dışsal zorlayıcı yasaların mümkün bütünlüğüdür.

Yasalar gelenekler ve normların aracılığıyla ama kurum ve organizasyonlar sayesinde yaşamdaki etkinliklerini sağlarlar. Bu tespit bizi ikinci bulgu olan teori-pratik orantısının doğuşu ve gelişimine götürecektir. Çünkü oranların belirlendiği yer kurum ve organizasyonlardır. İnsanlar doğuştan ölümlerine kadar organizasyonlar aracılığıyla yaşamlarını idame ederler. Onlarla olan orantısal ilişkileri sayesinde mutlu, özgür ve prestij sahibidirler. Bu organizasyonların en önemlilerinden birisi de üniversitelerdir. Üniversiteler, öğretmenler ve öğrenciler topluluğu olarak antik okul fikrinden, önce manastırlarda etik bir topluluk fikrinde vuku buldular, daha sonra Humboldtçu üniversiteler lehine giderek dünyayı sarmalamaya başlayan bir anlayışla geliştiler. Modern organizasyonlar olarak üniversiteler bir yandan Galileo'nun gözlem çizgisi ve öte yandan da Kant'ın teori çizgisi üzerine kurulular. Bu teori-araştırma ve genel-özel ikilemi kararlarda birey-toplum iletişimine dönüştürülür. İçeriğe dair karar birey tarafından verilirken, birlikteliğe dair her karar evrensel olma ihtimali olan prensipler ışığında ortak akılla, birlikte geliştirilmiş normlarla verilir.

Bununla birlikte uygulamalı sosyal bilimler Humboldtçu üniversitelerden farklılık gösterirler. Burada teorik felsefe, matematik ve sosyoloji yerine, uygulamalı felsefe, matematik, sosyoloji vs. öğretilir. Ama günün sonunda bilgi üreten bir kurum olarak burada da gerçekleştirilen en önemli eylem araştırmadır. Soru uygulamalı bilimlerdeki araştırmaların hangi teoriyi baz olarak nasıl bir ilişki ve oranla yapılması gerektiğidir.

Sınırlılıklar

Çalışma sosyal hizmet bilimi ve sosyal pedagojiyle sınırlandırılmıştır. Amaç sosyal hizmette sürdürülen teori-pratik ilişkisi ve oranının felsefi söylemle ilişkilendirerek belirlemek olduğu için araştırmanın sınırlılıkları da bu bağlamda görülmelidir; epistemolojik teori-pratik söylemi filozofların ve sosyal bilim teorisyenlerinin araştırma alanı. Elinizdeki çalışma bu tartışmanın sosyal hizmete yansımalarını konu ediniyor. Tespitler, eleştiriler, belirlemeler ve öneriler sosyal hizmet bilimiyle sınırlıdır. Çalışmanın ikinci sınırlığı seçilen kaynaklarla ilgili; burada sadece Almanca konuşulan alandaki literatür taranmıştır. Çalışma bir örneklem teşkil ettiği için buradaki mantıksal örgü önemli. Kısaca, ilişki ve orana dair, ya da bilim ve yaşam dünyasına dair yapılan tespitler genel geçerlilik iddiasında bulunurken, Avrupa veya Amerika'daki uygulamalı sosyal bilimin gelişimine dair tespitler doğası gereği tabii ki sadece bahsi edilen mekanlar için geçerli.

Öneriler (Teorik, Uygulama ve Sosyal)

Soru teori-pratik ilişkisi ve orantısı tartışmasından sosyal hizmet hangi çıktıların gösterilebileceğidir. Bu ise bir yandan Jürgen Habermas'nın arabuluculuk diğer yandan da Niklas Luhmann'nın ayrıştırma anlayışları üzerinden sürdürülecektir. Habermas'ın arabuluculuk, iletişimsel eylem ve söylem anlayışının temelinde onun Kant'tan hareketle bilgiyi önce içgörü ve biliş olarak ikiye ayırması üzerine kuruludur. Habermas bu ayrımıyla teori ve pratiği iletişimsel eylem nosyonu aracılığıyla söylemlerde birbiriyle buluşturur. Luhmann ise başka bir öneri de bulunur. Luhmann'a göre teoriyi pratikle dolayımlamak yerine onları birbirinden ayırmak gerek, çünkü bunlar kendilerine özel kodlamalar, programlar ve medyaya sahip iki ayrı biçimdir. Nasıl ki elma armut değil, pratikte teori olmadığı gibi teoriymiş gibi ele alınmasına da gerek yoktur.

Bunun sosyal hizmetteki bir sonucu; savunulan bakış açısına bağlı olarak bu ilişki ve/veya orantı ya teori ve pratik arasında aracılık kurulmak yoluyla iletişime dönüştürülebilir ya da teori pratikten ayrıştırılarak uzaklaştırılabilir. O halde soru, başka bir olasılığın olup olmadığıdır. Bu soruya olumlu yanıt verilmektedir. Bunun için ise önce sosyal hizmette teori-pratik iletişimine dair öneriler üç seçeneğe indirgenerek tartışılmaktadır. İlk öneriye göre sosyal hizmet uygulamasında ne açık bir kaynak teminine ne de eylem talimatları için açık bir (sosyal hizmet) teorisine ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Sosyal hizmet teoriden değil, pratikten ortaya çıktı ve aynı mantıkla devam etmeli. İkinci öneri, Kantçı anlamda bir teorinin değil en iyi ihtimalle sayısallaştırılmış uygulanabilir fikirlerin, yaklaşımların, modellerin gerekli olduğu fikrine dayanmaktadır. Son öneriye göre ise sosyal hizmet, insan haklarını savunmak gibi kimi temel ilkelerinden taviz vermeksizin yalnızca insanlara değil topluma karşı da yükümlü olduğu „ikili görev" anlayışına uygun olarak uygulanabilir programlar üretmelidir.

Çalışma iki sonuç ve öneriyle sonlandırılmaktadır. Birincisi, teori ve pratik arasındaki doğru orantıyı belirlemek için teori odaklı bir uygulama önerisi yapılmıştır. İkinci öneri meslek olarak sosyal hizmetin teori ve pratiği ilişkisine dair geliştirilen yardım programdır. Çünkü yardım etmek teoriyle olabileceği gibi teorisizde mümkün.

Özgün Değer

Çalışmaya hermenötik geleneğe gönderimle teori-pratik ilişkisinin sosyal hizmetteki gelişimine paideia kavramıyla başlanılacaktır. Dilthey göre paideia, antik Yunan ruhunun görkemli bir eseridir. Paideia hem bireyin sanatsal yaratıma katılımı hem de çağın kültür üretimini mümkün kılan öz anlamına geliyordu. Paideia bu birey, toplum, sanat ve de bu bütünlüğün birlikteliğidir. Buna karşın Dilthey paidagogia'yı erkek çocuğa erkek lider tarafından eşlik edilmesi ve denetlenmesi anlamına geldiğine işaret eder. Paidagogia'ya anlamlandırılarak edinilenden bilgiden farklı olarak derinlikli içsel ilişkisi kurulmaksızın yüzeysel kaydetme öğretimi vurgulanır. Buradan bakıldığında belirli kurallara uymak paideia'nın değil paidagogia'nın, lise eğitimini bitiren her insanın sahip olduğu varsayılan rasyonalitenin sonucudur. O Kant'ın kavramıyla özerklik değil heteronomidir. Özerklik ancak bu kuralların gelişimine katılmakla başlar.

Bu temel ayrımla birlikte burada içerik olarak teori-pratik ilişkisi ve orantısı, bunların faklı zaman ve mekanlardaki izdüşümleri tek bir sosyal zamanda düşünülmüştür: Sosyal hizmet teori-pratik ilişkisi ve orantısının belirlemesinde birey, toplum ve kültür üçlemine dair teorik, profesyonelleşmiş bir meslek olarak pratik eylem biçimlerini geliştirmesinde uygulanabilir ve de bu ikisinin iletişimini sağlayan programların geliştirmesinde etkin oldukça meşrutiyetini anlata- ve anlamlandırabilir. Çalışma sosyal hizmet bilimcilerinin eylem veya sistem teorilerine olan yatkınlığa bakmaksızın, bu iki ekollün temel önermelerini de dahil eden ancak günün sonunda asıl belirleyici olanın bu üç alanı birlikte, birbiriyle iletişim halinde düşünmek gerektiğini gösteren yeni, özgün bir girişimidir.

Araştırmacı Katkısı: Ali DEMİR (%100).