

Althusser'in ideoloji kavrayışı: Psikanaliz ve Marxist teori arasında

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Öz

Louis Althusser sosyal teori içinde ayrıcalıklı bir konuma sahiptir. Bu konumunu, sosyal bilimsel teori üretimini birçok disiplinin kesişim noktasında gerçekleştirmesine borçludur. Bu nedenle onu genel sosyoloji teorisi içinde, psikanaliz içinde ve daha özde Marxist teori içinde ele almak ve ortaya koyduğu çalışmaları bu alanlara birer katkı olarak değerlendirmek mümkündür. Ancak onu daha ayrıcalıklı kılan özellikle de özne, benlik ve ideoloji gibi bağlamlar üzerine yazdıkları ve her bir disipline bu alanda sağlamış olduğu katkılarıdır. Bu açıdan Althusserci düşünce beraberinde öznenin oluşumu ve bu oluşum içinde öznenin yabancılaşma ile olan doğrudan ve dolaylı ilişkisi üzerinden çalışan özgün bir izah girişimidir. Daha açık ifade etmek gerekirse yapısalcı düşünceyi, tıpkı Lacan'ın Freud'a uyguladığı gibi Marx'ın yaklaşımlarına uygulamış, ve yine tıpkı Lacan ve Freud için geçerli olduğu gibi Marx'ın değişmesi ve düzeltilmesi gereken bir durum olarak gördüğü "yanlış bilincin" yapısal ve kurucu özelliklerini ortaya koymuştur. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Althusserin marxist teoriyi yapısalcı bir imkanla genişletmesinin yanında onun özne yaklaşımının önemini ortaya koymaktır. Bu bağlamda bu makale, ideoloji kategorisinin Althusser tarafından nasıl incelendiğini özellikle şu sorularla ele almaktadır: Althusser'in metateorik bakış açısı nedir? Althusser'in yirminci yüzyıl Marksizmi içindeki özel yeri nedir? Althusser ideoloji teriminden ne anlamaktadır? Althusser'in Marksist ideoloji teorisine özel katkısı nedir? Althusser'in ideoloji teorisinin bir özne teorisi açısından anlamı nedir?

Anahtar kelimeler: Louis Althusser, Jacques Lacan, Marxizm, özne, ideoloji

Althusser's concept of Ideology: Between psychoanalysis and Marxist theory

Abstract

Louis Althusser has a privileged position in social theory. He owes this position to the fact that he produces social scientific theory at the intersection of many disciplines. For this reason, it is possible to consider him in general sociological theory, in psychoanalysis, and more specifically in Marxist theory, and evaluate his work as a contribution to these fields. However, what makes him more privileged are his writings on the subject, self and ideology and the contributions each discipline has made in this field. In this respect, Althusserian thought is an original attempt at explanation that works through the formation of the subject and the direct and indirect relationship of the subject with alienation in this formation. To put it more clearly, he applied structuralist thought to Marx's approaches just as Lacan did to Freud. And again, just as it was true for Lacan and Freud, he revealed the structural and constitutive features of "false consciousness", which Marx saw as a situation that needed to be changed and corrected. The main purpose of this study is to reveal the importance of Althusser's approach to the subject, as well as to expand the Marxist theory with a structuralist possibility. In this context, this paper deals with the way in which the category of ideology is studied by Althusser especially with the following questions: What is the metatheoretical standpoint of Althusser? What is the particular place of Althusser in the Marxism of the twentieth century? What is understood by Althusser by the term ideology? What is the particular contribution of Althusser into the Marxist theory of ideology. What is the implication of Althusser's theory of ideology for a theory of subject?

Keywords: Louis Althusser, Jacques Lacan, Marxism, subject, ideology

Introduction

Louis Althusser has a privileged position in social theory. This position is because he realizes the foundations of his social scientific theory at the intersection of many disciplines and insights. It is possible to consider him in general sociological theory, in psychoanalysis, or

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more specifically in Marxist theory and evaluate his work as a contribution to these fields. However, what makes him more privileged is his writings on the subject, self, and ideology and his contribution to each discipline through these concepts. In this respect, Althusserian thought is an original attempt at explanation that works through the formation of the subject and the direct and indirect relationship of the subject with alienation in this formation. To put it more clearly, he applied structuralist thought to Marx's approaches, just as Lacan did to Freud. He also revealed the structural and constitutive features of “inequality”, which Marx saw as a situation that needed to be changed and corrected, just as it was true for Lacan and Freud. The main intention of this study is to elaborate the importance of Althusser's approach to the Subject, as well as to expand the Marxist theory with a structuralist possibility. The first aim of this study, which tries to reveal how the contribution of Althusserian thought to social sciences works especially through the theory of the subject, is to reveal the metatheoretic foundations of Althusser's theoretical approaches. A second goal is to reveal the reasons for his privileged position in 20th century Marxism. Here, we see that the concept of over determination comes to the fore. The special meanings and emphases that he attributes to the concept of ideology will also be an important stop. Because his most important contribution to Marxist thought is undoubtedly his contribution to the theory of Marxist Ideology. Finally, the implications of this contribution for subject theory and psychoanalysis will be discussed. In doing so, revealing the trajectory of Althusserian theory of ideology in between Psychoanalysis and Marxist theory seems to be an important starting point.

1. Marxist Theory and metatheoretical standpoint

Althusser's work, as it is argued by McLennan, is “the most significant contribution to Marxist theory [especially of ideology] in many years” so that “no other figure generated such thought-provoking discussion and controversy” (McLennan et al., 1978, p. 77). Controversy or as Larrain puts it ambiguity stems mainly from the concept of ideology in Althusserian concept. On the other hand, it can be argued that this controversy appears as a possibility in the case of Althusser in order to open Marxism to some sort of non-Marxist planes. One can trace these non-Marxist planes or disciplines among the Althusser's non-Marxist interests. As an unorthodox Marxist (as well as a thinker) Althusser seems that he is under the influence of various philosophical tendencies. One among others is Hegelian dialectic although he is not an exact proponent of Hegel's general views. Another influence is apparent especially on the case of *The Ideological State Apparatuses* (ISA) in which there is an inevitable Gramscian influence. Also it is known that he took his concept of “over determination” from Freudian psychoanalysis, and that of the “interpellation” from Lacanian structuralist psychoanalysis. But besides these influences his main metatheoretical standpoint appears as shaped under the influence of Bachelard's (or Canguilhem's) French materialist tradition of rationalism (a tradition whose conventionalism and 'historical epistemology', ... must ultimately be traced back to August Comte) and Spinoza's rationalist philosophy, “with its total differentiation between rational knowledge and 'opinion' or 'imagination' derived from random sense experience” (Elliot, 2006, p. 38). So as Althusser himself declares clearly, he is not a Kantian or Hegelian but a Spinozist: “People always situate themselves in relation to someone, . . . but my reference point would be neither Kant nor Hegel; it would be Spinoza. . . I'm a Spinozist”¹. One can find this line of Spinozist thought in the corpus of Althusser easily, especially in his central concern about ideology that there is no history of ideology which is

¹ Quoted from Gregory Elliot, Althusser: The Detour of Theory (2006). Also see, Peter Dews' contribution “Althusser, Structuralism and the French Epistemological Tradition”, in Elliott (Ed.), Althusser: A Critical Reader (1994) for Althusserian discussion of Bachelard.

very similar with Spinozian definition in that ideology is not a starting point but a consequence.

So in his metatheoretical standpoint, that is to say, “in his resort to Bachelard and Spinoza, and in his alliance with structuralism, Althusser appears as “engaged in a synthesis of Marxism and 'bourgeois' philosophy.” (Elliot, 2006, p. 49) By the way of this engagement, Althusser's reading of Marx seems altered the Marxism of his contemporaries in favor of “contemporary non-Marxist discourses” (what Elliot calls the 'detour' of theory in Althusser, through a classical philosophical system of Spinoza) (Elliot, 2006, p. 50). His effort to define Spinoza – and not Hegel – at least epistemologically, as a genuine “historical predecessor” of Marx, undoubtedly provides Althusser with an interesting position in the 20th century Marxism.

As a result of this (meta)theoretical standpoint, as it is argued by Barrett, it is both necessary and difficult mission to locate Althusserianism and Althusser's thought in the history of Marxism. It is because for Barrett exactly that the concept of ideology that is purported by Althusser, like that of Gramsci, entails a recasting of Marxism as new framework of theoretisation. But for Barrett it seems clear that, “in Althusser's case the theory of ideology that he put forward was a more fundamental break with anything recognizable as classical Marxism than is the case with Gramsci”. In his very argumentation Barrett insists that Althusser represents a limit position in the 20th century Marxism (from which Marxism has to recover or move away), “rather than a 'stage' through which Marxism has passed” (Barrett, 1991, p. 82-83). So it is self-evident in case of Althusserian concept of ideology that Althusser's main approaches challenges the fundamental basis of Marxism, especially that of humanism. For Althusser, Marx appears as a thinker in his initial period influenced by Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Feurbach. However, then – in a momentous epistemological break with his past which Althusser dates at 1845 - discovered that a new system of social analysis which (according to Althusser) he has founded upon as “theoretical anti-humanism” (Barrett, 1991, p. 85). While thinking in this line Althusser insists in his famous text “Marxism and Humanism” that in the couple term, namely “humanism – socialism” there is a striking theoretical unevenness. For Althusser, in the framework of the Marxist conception, “the concept 'socialism' is indeed a scientific concept, but the concept 'humanism' is no more than an ideological one” (Althusser, 1969/2005, p. 223). Althusser in his distinction between science and ideology or humanism and socialism, appears exactly cognate with his philosophical ancestor: Spinoza. Because it is Spinoza who develops a theory depends on the difference between the imaginary and the true knowledge which is employed by Althusser to think the Marxist opposition between science and ideology. As Elliot puts it, “what is at work in the case of Althusserian distinction between science and ideology is Spinozian three folded distinction of knowledge. First leg of this distinction is the imagination or opinion which depends on random experience and generates falsity, and other two that are reason and intuition which generates “true” (knowledge)” (Elliot 2006, p. 77). Therefore, it is apparent that through a conjunction of Marx and Spinoza, especially in “Marxism and Humanism” his main goal is to define the theoretical value of the concept of socialist humanism. As he concludes:

When I say that the concept of humanism is an ideological concept (not a scientific one), I mean that while it really does designate a set of existing relations, unlike a scientific concept, it does not provide us with a means of knowing them. In a particular (ideological) mode, it designates some existents, but it does not give us their essences. If we were to confuse these two orders we should cut ourselves off from all knowledge, uphold a confusion and risk falling into error. (Althusser, 1969/2005, p. 223)

As it is clear from this passage, Althusser conceives that the production of knowledge of real objects by the production of their adequate concepts was the result of a specific

practice: theoretical practice. Therefore, as Elliot points, in his structural analysis “Althusser's first move was to insist that theory was not the (abstract/spiritual) obverse of (concrete/material) practice, but itself exactly such a practice” (Elliot, 2006, p. 79). As a consequence of this view, as Larrain points, Althusser's initial position in his relation to Marxism is “to prove that humanism is an ideological concept which Marx replaced in his mature work by scientific (or theoretical) concepts like 'social formation', 'productive forces', 'relation of production', and so on” (Larrain, 1983, p. 97). On the other hand, for McLennan, one can find Althusser's main contribution to Marxism, in his account of the nature of this social formation which is based upon a particular reformulation of the classic structure/superstructure unity (McLennan et al., 1978, p. 79). Through this important conception, say social formation, Althusser obtains his major medium to reformulate basic conceptions of Marxism, in favor of his Structuralist reading of it. By this reading and reformulation, Althusser transforms the whole problematic of the Marxist dialectic (base/superstructure) submitting it to the primacy of materialism. What is important the emphasizes of social formation as a reformulation of classic Marxist concepts are in turn: the necessary relative autonomy of the (political and ideological) superstructures which are essential conditions of the social formation; their over determining effect on the principal contradiction (the economic); and also continuing determination by the economic “in the last instance” (even though, in real historical terms that “lonely hour of the last instance never comes”). Through this reformulation Althusser, more profoundly than Gramsci, mainly challenges the economism of the 20th century Marxism that for him “there is never an original essence or single cause; there is always a complex articulation of determinations and levels, which is ever pre-given in the real concrete whole” (McLennan et al., 1978, p. 79). Here Althusser adopts Freudian term “over determination” to describe the patterns of multiple interactions and reciprocal causations among the different “levels” in a social formation. Althusser tries to explain his aim to use term “overdetermination” thusly:

In constituting this unity, they reconstitute and complete their basic animating unity, but at the same time they also bring out its nature: the “contradiction” is inseparable from the total structure of the social body in which it is found, inseparable from its formal conditions of existence, and even from the instances it governs; it is radically same movement, and determined by the various levels and instances of the social formation it animates; it might be called over determined in its principle. (Althusser, 1969/2005, p. 100–101)

In this sense, in opposition to an expressive totality (which depends on Hegelian simple contradiction) a social formation always exists as a structured complex whole. In very close relation with this complex whole, also Althusserian concept of ideology borrows something from this complexity. Like social formation, also as a level or instance of it, ideology is not a single, homogeneous substance in Althusserian approach (McLennan et al. 1978, p. 83). As McLennan puts it one can find in *For Marx*, especially under the heading of “Contradiction and Overdetermination,” ideology is conceived as a level which together with economic and political levels, comprises a social formation. Again in *For Marx* but now in “Marxism and Humanism”, concept appears as a system of representations through which people live their relationship to the historical world. Elsewhere in *Reading Capital* “the status of concept is principally epistemological”. Here Althusser opposes an ideological theoretical practice to a scientific theoretical practice in which latter operates upon the results of the former. This means that ideological theoretical practice formulates false problems whose solutions are already produced outside the process of knowledge (Larrain, 1979, p. 157). Therefore, in the case of scientific solution, for Althusser, there should be epistemological break between science and ideology. In this sense of the ideology, as McLennan puts it the main characteristics of ideology are;

that its conceptions are motivated by extra-theoretical “exigencies”, that the “problems” which ideology sets itself are false problems, in that their solutions have been prefigured in the “questions” asked by extra-theoretical interests. [and thirdly] the mode of analysis, of, or mediations between [these two aspects] is a kind of relatively autonomous “mirror” or structure of recognition, however technically sophisticated. (McLennan et al., 1978, p. 86)

Here Althusser, through the emphasis of autonomous “mirror” or structure of recognition of the mode of analysis, wants to underline the theoretically closed nature of ideology which seems different that of science. On the other hand, especially as a third emphasis as to ideology, one can find very different but quasi-consistent conceptualization of ideology in Althusser's other important contribution namely *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* (ISA). Here what is at stake for Althusser is that ideology constitutes the fabric of society in so far as it is the medium in which all history occurs, and the relay by means of which men “live” their relation to their real conditions of existence. In this last approach in which Althusser's another most important contribution to Marxist theory of ideology occurs, by the way of his two folded predispositions that are; ideology as a medium of reproduction of relations of production and its material existence in the ISA. Here Althusser also adds another important conception that is derived from Lacanian structuralist psychoanalysis that is ideology appears as a mechanism which constitutes subjects by interpellating them (Larrain, 1979, p. 158). Let us focus on these important emphasizes that is elaborated in ISA by Althusser.

2. The Althusserian Emphasis of Ideology

The first emphasis in ISA is the reproduction of relation of production through ideology (or ideological state apparatuses). Here Althusser, as Barrett (1991, p. 96) puts it, advances a revolutionary idea in Marxist thought: the thesis that we have to understand “reproduction”, and in particular the way a social formation must reproduce itself over time, and not restrict ourselves to an analysis of production. This claim of Althusser came in a time in which classical Marxism had concentrated almost exclusively on production so that Althusser's emphasis on reproduction exposed the obsessional “economism” and “productivism” of European Marxism. Doing so, for Barrett, Althusser comes up with an interesting “sociological” account of reproduction, he focused on the division of labor and the role of family in reproducing labor power and the relations of production.² On the other hand, pursuing Gramsci's distinction between the state and civil society Althusser draws a distinction between the repressive apparatuses of the state and the state's ideological apparatuses. For him

all the State Apparatuses function both by repression and by ideology, with the difference that the (Repressive) State Apparatus functions massively and predominantly by repression, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology. (Althusser, 1971, p. 149)

In ISA, after elaborating the importance of the reproduction of means of production (especially focusing on that how it works through the ideological state apparatuses), Althusser now details his ultimate definition of ideology, under the heading of “On ideology”. Here Althusser seems conscious of his task's difficulties while proposing a general theory of ideology: “I should like to venture a first and very schematic outline of such a theory.” But besides this position, he seems also as much as in a mode of modesty: “The theses I am about to put forward are certainly not off the cuff, but they cannot be sustained and tested, i.e.

² For this argumentation, as Barrett puts it, Althusser uses Marx's 1868 letter to Kugelman in order to prove that Marx understood the importance of understanding the need for a society to reproduce its conditions of production as well as simple production, but subsequent Marxists had neglected (Barrett, 1991, p. 96).

confirmed or rejected, except by much thorough study and analysis” (Althusser 1971, p. 159). He multiplies his position's peculiar difficulty and risk, by insisting that the theory of ideology which is elaborated by Marx in *The German Ideology* was not Marxist. Because of this opposing nature of Althusser's concept of ideology with that of Marx, one can find basically the main contribution of Althusser to Marxist conception of ideology. But just before focusing on this contribution of Althusser, there is one thing which is to be outlined. As Larrain (1979, s.158, 1983, p. 91) puts it this is the very point at which Althusser distinguishes between the theory of ideology in general and the theory of particular ideology. The particular theory of ideologies refers to the concrete historical social formations, and depends on a certain combination of modes of production and on a specific class struggle. For Althusser as long as the concept taken on in this sense, “ideologies (defined in the double respect suggested above: regional and class) have a history.” But on the other hand and contrary to particular ideologies, in the case of ideology in general there is an “omni-historical reality” in the sense in which that structure and functioning are immutable, present in the same form throughout what we call history” (Althusser, 1971, p. 161). Therefore, ideology in general has no history. For Althusser in the case of ideology in general, constituting proposition in this vein, is very consistent with the formulation pointed in German ideology, because for him:

in *The German Ideology*, this formulation appears in a plainly positivist context. Ideology is conceived as a pure illusion, a pure dream, i.e. as nothingness. All its reality is external to it. Ideology is thus thought as an imaginary construction whose status is exactly like the theoretical status of the dream among writers before Freud. For these writers, the dream was the purely imaginary, i.e. null, result of 'day's residues', presented in an arbitrary arrangement and order, sometimes even 'inverted', in other words, in 'disorder'. For them, the dream was the imaginary, it was empty, null and arbitrarily 'stuck together' (bricolé), once the eyes had closed, from the residues of the only full and positive reality, the reality of the day. (Althusser, 1971, p. 159 -160)

In opposition to this positivist context Althusser's aim is to adopt the terms of *The German Ideology* (1846/1998, p. 42) (“They have no history...”), but reconstruct it in a context which is not historicist or positivist but exactly structuralist especially in the sense that there is no a strict distinction between imaginary and real, or false and true. Through this argumentation Althusser believes that “on the one hand . . . it is possible to hold that ideologies have a history of their own (although it is determined in the last instance by the class struggle); and on the other . . . it is possible to hold that ideology in general has no history, not in a negative sense (its history is external to it), but in an absolutely positive sense” (Althusser 1971, p. 160-161). This two dimension, or type of ideology appear in a resemblance with the famous negative-positive distinction of the Marxist theory of ideology. Most of his critics among them Larrain takes Althusser in an ambiguity when he attempted to put both dimension in a melting pot. To Larrain (1983, p. 91), in this line of thought the influence of Lenin's theory is apparent, “but this does not prevent Althusser from keeping some elements of negative conception which he tries to articulate with the Leninist approach to ideology.” But here Althusser seems to produce something different which appears at a glance as a theoretical complexity, and proposes to take negative conception (ideology has no history) in a structuralist-positive manner and defines ideology as a cumulative of all his particular definitions that one can find throughout of his work. In a special moment of ISA, he asserts that: “ideology is a representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence”. From this definition what is self-evident that ideology in practical terms, is in no way false consciousness (Coward and Ellis, 1977, p. 74). And “ideology is not produced because a small group of men invent falsified representations of reality or because men express the alienated character of their conditions of existence” (Larrain, 1979, p. 159). For Althusser in the problem of ideology, the error occurs neither because of priestly deceive (the solution of 18th century) nor does it a result of “the imaginary transposition and distortion of men's real conditions of existence, in short, for the alienation in

the imaginary of the representation of men's conditions of existence" (the solution of Feuerbach and young Marx), but exactly because of "their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there" (Althusser, 1971, p. 163 – 164). So the cause of the imaginary deceive of ideology is not the false consciousness (and there would be no (who knows) true one), and for Althusser there is only the imaginary nature of the relation with conditions of existence. In price of this imaginary relationship or a relationship of relation, "ideology has not an ideal existence but a material existence; it always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices" (Althusser, 1971, p. 166). That is to say error or deception comes from neither the reality nor its deliberately transpositioning or inversion, but exactly from the very nature of relationship with it, which is inevitably imaginary and practical for Althusser.

There is a shortcut from this inevitable material practice to the notion of subject in Althusserian conception of ideology. As Coward and Ellis argue, "it was Althusser who emphasized the term subject within a theory of ideology" and there are many explicit implications of Althusserian conception of ideology for a theory of Subject. If ideology exists through the material existence, and in an apparatus and its practice, or practices, and if this very materiality, and "practice of ideology expresses a will, a purpose, a fixed position or tendency" which reproduces the existing contradictions then this fixed position suits well to subject category in the ideology theory of Althusser (Coward and Elliss, p. 77). Therefore, to Althusser "there is no practice except by and in an ideology" and "there is no ideology except by the subject and for the subject" (Althusser, 1971, p. 170). In this sense, ideology in the Althusserian conception appears a system of representation which entails subject position. As Larrain (1983, p. 97) points, from this perspective, "subjects are nothing but supports, they are "produced" for certain representations, they are the place of crystallization of certain objective practices". Althusser describes this production mechanism of ideology as an interpellation of individuals which constitutes them as Subjects: "all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of the subject" (Althusser, 1971, p. 173). So, for Althusser, there is in no way an omni-historical or pregiven subject category which precedes (or overcomes, or gets out side) the plain of the ideology in which every individual (even before the birth) becomes subject unconsciously and unintentionally in a Lacanian vein, through an interpellation, and through identification with (overdetermination of) the Subject of ideology in general.

Conclusion

There are many reasons to claim that Althusser's thought, which we can consider as a Spinozist in a metatheoretical context, constructs a social scientific pantheism through his unique concept of ideology. Here, it means that this conception of ideology offers an important alternative to the Hegelian and Marxist origins of false consciousness and completely destroys an outside from which Ideology can be escaped. In this respect, Althusserian thought makes an important contribution to social scientific theory with the way it dates the formation of the subject and the special meaning that gives to it. From this point of view, Althusser's contribution to sociological theory in the context of the subject is at least as strong as symbolic interactionists. Althusser is aware of this contribution and underlines his debt to Freud and Lacan (Althusser, 1964/1996). According to Althusser, the western mind has realized the inclusion of psychoanalysis in its heritage, especially in the field of sociology, in a culturalist and anthropological context. Examples of this also appear in different forms in other fields. However, according to Althusser, psychoanalysis is a science with an original study object in itself, and Lacan, who fixes the study object of this science as unconscious, has a different place in him. Lacan's proposition, in particular, "unconsciousness structured as

language” (Lacan, 1998, p. 203)³ is a key to much of what Althusserian thought has to say about ideology. Ideology, as a concept that was produced by associating mind and consciousness in the writings of Destutt de Tracy right after the French Revolution, was associated with the unconscious in Althusser's hands. This is a form of association that is not an error or a distortion, but maps subjects within a structural determination. From this point of view, Althusserian thought is shaped by an alternative perspective to the philosophy of consciousness and renews the “cogito ergo sum” dictum in the Cartesian formulation as “I am not where I think” with a Lacanian intervention (Zizek, 1993, p. 206). From this point of view, the concept of “overdetermination” emerges as an important guide for the social determination of the subject. Likewise, the Althusserian conception of ideology has very important uses in terms of social theory. Society as an ideological context without an outside appears as an important social understanding in the hands of social scientists. Undoubtedly, Lacanian-Althusserian thought will continue to work as an important moment for understanding the formation of social subjects between two extreme poles that emerge as action and structure at the heart of social sciences.

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³As Lacan argues: “If psycho-analysis is to be constituted as the science of the unconscious, one must set out from the notion that the unconscious is structured like a language” (Lacan, 1998, p. 203).