

The Rise of China and its Interplay with the Russian and Turkish Regimes

Adil YILDIZ

Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, University of Mississippi, Oxford

To cite this article: Adil Yıldız, “The Rise of China and its Interplay with the Russian and Turkish Regimes”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 20, No 79, 2023, pp. 51-66, DOI: 10.33458/uidergisi.1358275

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.1358275>

Submitted: 28 March 2022
Last Revision: 1 August 2023
Published Online: 12 September 2023
Printed Version: 17 October 2023

Uluslararası İlişkiler - International Relations
E-mail: uidergisi@gmail.com

All rights of this paper are reserved by Uluslararası İlişkiler (International Relations), which is published by the International Relations Council of Turkey (IRCT). With the exception of academic quotations, no parts of this publication may be reproduced, redistributed, sold or transmitted in any form and by any means for public usage without a prior permission from the copyright holder. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the author(s)'s and do not reflect those of the *Council*, editors of the journal, and other authors.

The Rise of China and its Interplay with the Russian and Turkish Regimes

Adil YILDIZ

Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, University of Mississippi, Oxford
E-Mail: ayildiz@go.olemiss.edu
Orcid: 0009-0005-0020-3726

ABSTRACT

How does the rise of China challenge the existing international order? What are the possible outcomes of the interplay between China's rise and the current trajectory of the Russian and Turkish regimes? Based on a qualitative analysis, I find two major dilemmas for the current power dynamics have resulted from China's challenging behavior in the international system. First, while China promotes steady relationships based on mutual interests facilitated by the rule-based international order, it also carries out actions which feed its aspirations for exploiting the current international institutions. Second, while China underlines the importance of a Westphalian style of sovereignty and non-interference, it also takes interventionist actions in both cyberspace and territorial space. Based on identification of China-Russia and China-Turkey interactions through the variations in the most 'central' domestic issues of the current governments in Russia and Turkey, I predict four possible outcomes, shedding light on the future policy directions in Russia and Turkey: 1) a prolongation of Putin's campaign in Ukraine, 2) an acceleration in the process of de-dollarization, 3) lasting Chinese influence on Turkey's Kurdish issue, and 4) an increase in Turkey's tendency toward a Chinese-style 'growth' model.

Keywords: China's rising influence, international order, domestic politics, China-Russia interactions, China-Turkey interactions

Research Article | Received: 28 March 2022, Last Revision: 1 August 2023, Accepted: 11 August 2023

Introduction

Many scholars acknowledge that China is an ascending power, yet there is not much consensus on the repercussions of its ascension. How China's rising power will shape the United States (US)-led international order has occupied the minds of many scholars. The literature on the effect of China's rise on the existing international order yields the fact that some scholars argue that a critical defiance against the existing (liberal institutional) international order is unavoidable.¹ For example, China has already challenged most of the present security

¹ John J. Mearsheimer, "Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order", *International Security*, Vol. 43, 2019, p. 7–50; Aaron L. Friedberg, *Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, New York, W.W. Norton & Co, 2011.

mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region, and contended against territorial precedents. Moreover, Beijing created recent international financing institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) vis a vis the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Other scholars argue that the future of the international order is not so concerning. They assert that China has been incorporated into the international (institutional) order throughout the past two decades. Consequently, although Beijing may seek slight alterations to the existing order, it will eventually endeavor to consolidate, not bring down, the present international order.²

In addition to attempting to identify the major challenges posed by the rise of China, this research also looks into the implications of China's rise for the current regimes of Russia and Turkey. China's institutional and economic growth undoubtedly predominate on many countries' national political agenda. Many countries, including Russia and Turkey compete to develop cooperation with China. In this article, I argue that there are certain domestic priorities (of Russia and Turkey), which should be taken as the baseline for a helpful analysis of the effect of China's rise on the present Russian and Turkish governments' policy prospects. As demonstrated later, there are certain issues affecting the regime's backbone of the Russian and Turkish governments, and as compared to others, these issues are more likely to put their regime's survival at risk. I pursue a research agenda to comprehend how Russia and Turkey's significant domestic issues induce their policy paths. The major characteristics of Vladimir Putin's United Russia (*Yedinaya Rossiya*) party and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP*) party include rule by law instead of rule of law,³ giving weight to the state (to which obedience is owed) rather than to individual citizens, and a strong emphasis on nationalism. Such characteristics are in contrast to many of the essential norms of the (liberal) international order (LIO).⁴ These characteristics, furthermore, are highly in accord with the features of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).⁵

Some scholars argue that the (liberal) international order is not really as liberal in practical terms as it has been depicted in theory. There has been a constant tension between an emphasis on state sovereignty (non-intervention in the domestic politics of sovereign states) and that on liberal norms favoring human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.⁶ China, beyond being a mere actor in defiance of the present international order, may attempt to drive the international order into a more state sovereignty-led trajectory, as it rises larger in influence. For instance, Beijing upholds a certain position, especially on the United Nations

2 G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011.

3 The rule of law holds law above politics, whereas the rule by law points to the power holders using law as a tool of political power. See the following piece for a distinction, Brian Tamanaha, *On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 3.

4 For a description of the LIO and its disputed elements, see: David A. Lake et al., "Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization", *International Organization*, Vol. 75, No 2, 2021, p. 225-257.

5 For an analysis of the characteristics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), see Jessica C. Weiss and Jeremy L. Wallace, "Domestic Politics, China's Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order", *International Organization*, Vol. 75, No 2, 2021, p. 635-664.

6 Lake et al., "Challenges to the Liberal Order".

(UN) principles of state sovereignty, social stability, and equality, while simultaneously marking off the liberal importance of individual freedoms and human rights, as well as rooting for more invasive international institutions.⁷

As previously stated, the domestic priorities of Russia and Turkey over certain issues should determine their policy prospects. To identify the fundamental domestic preferences of Russia and Turkey, this research utilizes a theoretical framework that has been developed in a previous study. Jessica Weiss and Jeremy Wallace have proposed a framework that highlights two domestic variables, which are ‘centrality’ and ‘heterogeneity’. The authors argue that these variables form “the domestic politics of a given international issue area in an authoritarian state.”⁸ Since Turkey and Russia are currently authoritarian states,⁹ such a framework appears appropriate to help explain the role of domestic politics in these countries.

While ‘centrality’ delineates how carefully an authoritarian government perceives an issue affecting its survival prospects, ‘heterogeneity’ characterizes the degree of influence of domestic disagreements and controversies on a government’s policy. For instance, the Russian government is increasingly becoming more likely to see the ongoing Ukraine issue as central to its domestic and foreign policy prospects. On the other hand, the Turkish government’s capability of securing the nation’s territorial integrity has been critical to justifying its actions in the Northern Iraq region.¹⁰ By contrast, trade and exchange rate policies are highly contested. One can see a domestic division in both countries. However, only the centrality variable is included considering the aim of this article; it intends to predict, based on the China -Russia and China-Turkey interplay, the possible policy directions in Russia and Turkey. I assume that if one aims to have a fruitful analysis in terms of the interactions between the rise of China and the current regimes in Russia and Turkey, they should look at the issues central to these governments and their interplay with China. The answer to the question of what the possible outcomes of such an interplay are should yield meaningful insights on the future direction of the potential policy paths in Russia and Turkey.

Weiss and Wallace use this framework to “illuminate the domestic parameters of China’s interests and efforts across the variety of issues, norms, and institutions that make up the international order.”¹¹ While they provide an agenda for researchers to investigate where China’s ascension, considering its domestic priorities, requires more ‘fundamental’ challenges to the present international order, this paper contributes to such a research agenda, by expanding on the cases of Russia and Turkey. By doing so, it develops two additional agendas through which researchers can examine what issues are central to the current Russian and Turkish governments’ policy maneuvers. These agendas yield theoretical insights that result from the

7 Rosemary Foot, *China, the UN, and Human Protection: Beliefs, Power, Image*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

8 Weiss and Wallace, “Domestic Politics, China’s Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order”.

9 Authoritarian states vary and also authoritarian leaders have different tendencies. See Barbara Geddes, *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2003. However, there is a concentration of power in the hands of Putin and Erdoğan, who typically dominate the coalition-building agenda, and have control over the military, the state agents, and the ruling party. Therefore, this article operationalizes Turkey and Russia in a similar way, although there are differing nuances.

10 For more details of the examples drawn within the paragraph, see the section: Centrality.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 637.

linkage between domestic politics and foreign affairs. Thus, the approach taken in this research is in line with that of the “domestic explanations of international relations”¹² camp, although the literature on securitization also provides helpful explanations for an understanding of state behavior toward domestic and foreign issues.¹³

The rest of the article continues as follows. First, I discuss the considerable challenges that the rise of China poses to the present international order. Second, I introduce the centrality variable, and discuss the implications of its variations in Russia and Turkey. Then I analyze the significance of these variations for the current Russian and Turkish regimes, and the possible outcomes of their interactions with the rise of China. Finally, I conclude with a review of my main points referring to what implications the rise of China poses to the present international order, and how it affects the prevailing policy paths of the current governments in Russia and Turkey.

The Challenge of China's Rise to the International Order

The rise of China is undeniably one of the major international phenomena of the current century. China's outstanding economic progress and effective tactics in foreign affairs are already considerably altering the dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region. Points at issue such as whether the forthcoming decades will observe even larger expansions in Chinese influence, and how the Chinese transformation of the international order will take shape – will it overturn the present order or adjust to it – have so far been the fundamental questions raised by many scholars. The latter direction falls into the positive beliefs among the leading scholars working on the (liberal) international order that China can be harmoniously merged into the existing order and dissuaded from overthrowing it. Such an assumption stems mostly from the effective functioning of existing international institutions and agreements, as well as the growing economic interdependence.

China has increasingly taken part in international organizations and multilateral agreements; its growing networks requiring Chinese collaboration even in terms of the lack of material profits in recent years have pushed China to adjust to the existing international norms.¹⁴ The constraining nature of international institutions imposes rules and regulations within the international system, and such established practices ordinarily frame and affect China's actions, driving the Chinese government into a rule-based transformation instead of it being a rogue type of nation on its way to becoming the hegemon power.¹⁵ For example, China has routinely had crucial deficiencies in labor standards, including poor working conditions, such as extremely low minimum wages and lack of overtime pay. China's joining the International Labor Organization (ILO) seems to have achieved growing compliance over

12 See Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Smith, Alastair, “Domestic Explanations of International Relations”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 15, 2012, p. 161-181.

13 See Başar Baysal, “20 Years of Securitization: Strengths, Limitations and A New Dual Framework”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 17, No 67, 2020, p. 3–20.

14 Johnston, *China in International Institutions*.

15 Stacie E. Goddard, “Embedded Revisionism: Networks, Institutions, and Challenges to World Order”, *International Organization*, Vol. 72, No 4, 2018, p. 763–797.

time, many components of the ILO regulations having been incorporated into China's domestic labor laws.¹⁶ Another example comes within the scope of the international environment laws. It appears that there is some evidence of China's acquiescence with reference to an array of agreements and conventions. Although China has demonstrated a powerful concern for state sovereignty, there have been tabled Chinese-led multilateral environmental policies demonstrating increasing support for climate-related issues, as well as Chinese investments in new sustainable technologies.¹⁷

Many bureaucrats who approved China's accretion to the World Trade Organization (WTO) contended that larger economic and trade interdependence would bring about beneficial liberalizing results.¹⁸ China participated in the WTO in 2001 with the intent of achieving prosperity through incorporating fully into the international trade order. Since then, China, within the global trade order, has engaged in crucial policy initiatives and domestic policy amendments, to comply with the conditions required by WTO membership.¹⁹ The early assessments illustrated that China has made remarkable and legitimate efforts to enforce its rules in line with the WTO requirements.²⁰ But recent formal and anecdotal reports demonstrate that China's evolution into better and more legitimate policy exercises, especially in the areas of intellectual property protection, (keeping) trade secrets and cyber espionage, has recently halted or even moved backward.²¹ Besides, China obliges foreign companies to relocate technology as a requirement for entry into its markets. Even though American-led international constraints have led China to promise reforms, China's imperious methods on international corporations remain constant.²² It appears that China's performance in its compliance is complicated. While China usually continues to commit to the formal framework of the international order, yet this remains superficial in its practices. For instance, it seems formally bound to the WTO dispute resolution process, but it exercises such practices as superfluous antidumping inspections, in order to take reciprocal action against member states, which disrupts the WTO global trade regime and its norms.²³

China has increasingly pushed to the limits of international norms within the international institutions, stretching them so as to attain self-interested reforms. China's many actions have shown that it aims more than mere participation in the present institutions, instead taking up instrumental behavior to build up support for a Chinese model that demands changes in

16 Ann Kent, "China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations", *Global Governance*, Vol. 8, No 3, 2002, p. 350-351.

17 Thomas J. Christensen, *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power*, New York, W. W. Norton, 2016, p. 137-150.

18 Alastair I. Johnston, "China and a World of Orders", *International Security*, Vol. 44, No 2, 2019, p. 9-60.

19 Katherine Combes, "Between Revisionism and Status Quo: China in International Regimes", *Polis*, Vol. 6, Winter 2011-2012, p. 12-17.

20 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, *2002 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance*, Washington, D.C., 2002.

21 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, *2017 Special 301 Report*, Washington, D.C., 2017, p. 28; Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, *Update to the IP Commission Report*, Washington, D.C., National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017.

22 Yue Wang, "China First: Foreign Tech Firms Must Be Wary Under Xi Jinping's Rule", *Forbes*, 23 October 2017.

23 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, *2015 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance*, Washington, D.C., December 2015.

such institutions.²⁴ For example, China’s attitude toward international economic conventions embodies its aims. One can see that China has practically transformed into what can be characterized as a ‘selective revisionist power’ in the international order. It selectively urges new rules and pursues incremental changes in line with its own interests, instead of promoting radical shifts that can damage the existing political and economic stability. If China observes that its efforts in promoting such changes are not working in its favor, it creates and develop ‘parallel institutions’.²⁵ China has established such institutions as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which have brought with them questions about the existing global (financial) governance.²⁶

The Chinese government has also explicitly shown its intentions of intensifying the world leadership role of China in the coming years. Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a report at the 19th National Congress of the CCP, where he manifested the aspiration for China to “become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence” by the middle of the 21st century.²⁷ The report evinced an appeal to an expansion of China’s network of allies across the globe and pointed out its geographically strategic ambitions²⁸, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to allow Beijing to cautiously institute new standards for foreign investments independent of Western forums.²⁹

Russian and Turkish Domestic Politics and Shifting Global Power Dynamics: Centrality

Where do the authoritarian governments of Russia and Turkey find their primary source of legitimacy to support their policies, and how is the interaction of their domestic priorities with the shifting international order to play out? Relying on Moravcsik,³⁰ this article regards state priorities – the gains that a state pursues in the international order – as framed fundamentally by domestic preferences and perceptions, as well as the institutions that incorporate them. Considering the scope of this study, I take the (central) domestic priorities of the current Russian and Turkish regimes as a baseline for an analysis of the interactions of these priorities with the rise of China.

Domestic preferences are my unit of analysis, because I rely on an assumption that embeds “the determinants of foreign policy and international relations within the nation-state

24 Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Rise and International Regimes: Does China Seek to Overthrow Global Norms?,” Robert S. Ross and Jo Inge Bekkevold (eds.), *China in the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges*, Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2016, p. 189.

25 Bonnie Glaser, “China as a Selective Revisionist Power in the International Order,” *Yusuf Ishak Institute*, No 21, 2019.

26 Jonathan Dove, “The AIIB and the NDB: The End of Multilateralism or a New Beginning?,” *The Diplomat*, 26 April 2016.

27 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, 18 October 2017.

28 See also Seyedashkan Madani, “Beyond Geopolitics: A Geoeconomic Perspective of China-Iran Belt and Road Initiative Relations”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 19, No. 74, 2022, p. 53-72.

29 Glaser, “China as a Selective Revisionist Power”.

30 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No 4, 1997, p. 518.

itself.” Individual state actions are not constituted by the international order; by contrast, they form it. Encountering the same challenges, states may behave very differently. Foreign policies, like domestic policies, are contingent on domestic debate and deliberation.³¹ Domestic structures predominantly shape and condition state interests, which cannot be inferred from the structure of the international order.³² Therefore, one should look into the vested domestic preferences of a state, to understand the rationale behind its behavior. Following Weiss and Wallace,³³ I argue that one variable – centrality – embodies the essential domestic priorities of a given issue area in an (authoritarian) state. This reveals the variations between the current Russian and Turkish governments regarding the most central domestic issues that shape their regime support and regime survival. In the following section, I analyze this variable and the significance of its variations for the current Russian and Turkish regimes, and the possible outcomes of their interactions with the rise of China.

Centrality

‘Centrality’ delineates the extent of how seriously an authoritarian government perceives an issue shaping its survival prospects. Issues that are already associated with a government’s self-definition of domestic policy priorities are more central than others. Such issues are more likely to draw the attention of the majority and arouse contention among the political elites, putting the government’s regime support in question. The possible ouster of the leader suggests the need for an extreme priority for anticipating and eliminating threats as they are about to arise. Employing a combination of oppression and alleviation tactics may appear to be an ideal strategy to cope with domestic discontent. The urgency for using such tactics increases with the degree of centrality of a given issue, yielding a stronger reason for authoritarian governments to focus on central issues. International issues diversify in how crucially they are linked to this process. Authoritarian leaders are more likely to pay attention and put effort into international issues that attract more domestic importance toward them. In sum, the more central the given issues are, the more likely it is that the leaders will conduct policies that consolidate their regime support, to mitigate the urgency of these issues, hence to lower their domestic threat level.³⁴

Russia and Turkey pursued parallel domestic political paths starting from the 1990s through the early 2000s. During these times, both countries carried out substantial domestic policy shifts, steering their political trajectories to stronger ties with Europe. In the case of Turkey, such domestic changes resulted in the beginning of Turkey’s accession process to the European Union (EU). Ultimately, pursuing a course of failed attempts at reconciliation with Europe, both countries underwent radical shifts in their regime type, following the

31 Andrew Moravcsik, “Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining”, Peter B. Evans et al. (eds.), *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, p. 5-6.

32 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies”, *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No 4, 1991, p. 484.

33 Weiss and Wallace, “Domestic Politics, China’s Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order”.

34 Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, “Global Norms and Major State Behavior: The Cases of China and the United States”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 19, No 2, 2013, p. 329-352.

rise of powerful and increasingly authoritarian rulers. The authoritarian Turkish regime has increasingly oriented toward and tapped into Turkey's nationalistic roots, dating back to the Ottoman Empire, along with an Islamist agenda.³⁵ On the other hand, the authoritarian Russian regime has increasingly turned back to its Soviet past and, moreover, allowed itself to define Russian politics through a nationalist and imperial approach.³⁶

The capacity of the Russian and Turkish governments to ensure their nation's defense and territorial integrity has generally been of critical importance to legitimizing their authority and justifying their behavior. Both Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin have several times highlighted unity to define their nation's characteristics. In order to justify their policy maneuvers, Erdoğan underscored "one nation, one flag, one homeland, one state", whereas Putin emphasized "one (holy) nation", "one people", "one language".³⁷ As the current authoritarian regimes of Russia and Turkey converge on a more nationalistic trajectory, Erdoğan and Putin are particularly concerned about protecting state sovereignty against foreign intrusion, and are taken up with proclaiming their great power status. This article, therefore, identifies nationalism – blended with political Islam in Turkey and a holy nation approach in Russia – as the main (central) pillar of regime support of the current Russian and Turkish governments. It should be expected that Moscow and Ankara will persistently devote their efforts to aspects of sovereignty that are more crucially associated with the central pillar of regime support, especially the preservation of territorial integrity, and ensuring actions for stability within their boundaries.

Sovereignty over Crimea has been central to the Russian nationalist claim that Crimea is part of Russian sovereign territory, and that ethnic Russians living in Crimea must be protected. The annexation of Crimea became a major issue that Putin claimed, "we are forced to begin the work to bring Crimea back into Russia" and he justified the Russian invasion of Crimea through his 'one nation' projection.³⁸ Moreover, some have argued that Putin's takeover of Crimea is an endeavor to restore the glory of Russia's pre-Soviet times, "asserting Russia's new place as one of the world's greatest civilizations."³⁹ In essence, the Putin leadership considered any step backward in Crimea getting annexed to Russia as a possible political weakness, as Stefan Meister noted following the Russian invasion of Crimea, "this is about the survival of Putin's system, for him, foreign policy has become a central instrument for internal legitimization."⁴⁰

35 Ihsan Yilmaz, *Creating the Desired Citizen: Ideology, State and Islam in Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, 2021, p. 103–126.

36 Emil Pain, "The Imperial Syndrome and Its Influence on Russian Nationalism", Pål Kolstø Helge Blakkisrud (eds.), *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–2015*, Edinburgh University Press, 2016, p. 46–74.

37 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "Yes for One Nation, One Flag, One Homeland, One State", Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, 11 February 2017; Vladimir Putin, "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", The Russian President's Official Website, 12 July 2021.

38 Jane Clinton, "Why Did Russia Annex Crimea? What Happened When Putin Invaded in 2014 and How Nato Reacted to Annexation", *iNEWS*, 29 January 2022.

39 Sophie Pinkham, "How Annexing Crimea Allowed Putin to Claim He Had Made Russia Great Again", *The Guardian*, 22 March 2017.

40 Marcus Lütticke, "Crimea is About the Survival of Putin's System", *Deutsche Welle*, 14 March 2014.

This study also identifies the fact that the Russian government is increasingly becoming more likely to see the ongoing Ukraine issue as central to its domestic and foreign policy prospects. There is a great deal of guesswork about what Putin is really capable of, and what he will manage to accomplish through the Russian invasion of Ukraine. More relevant to the aim of this article, the outcome of the war is becoming increasingly important to whether Putin will survive in power, considering the accumulating cost of the war imposed upon the Russian elites and the citizenry. Building off of such a cost, Freedman asserts that Russia will run out of weapons and money. He puts forward that Russia had a successful performance in the wars in Chechnya and Crimea because these wars were won through the efforts of special forces and separatists loyal to the Russian government, but the possibility of winning in Ukraine relies on the deployment of more extensive forces.

Despite his weakening chances and the increasing costs of war, Putin still depends on nationalism as a means to hold onto power, claiming that he strives to return Russia to its lost glory and holy nation status. As the possibility of this is falling day by day, the continuation of war and violence in Ukraine may appear as the best strategy for Putin to stay in power. Putin acknowledging any kind of withdrawal would appear to be a victory for Ukraine, and this could trigger a larger hit to Putin's hold on power. De Mesquita and Siverson, in their study, discovered that political leaders who bring their nation into a war expose themselves to a domestic political hazard that puts the very essence of the retention of political power in jeopardy. Such a hazard is augmented by high costs and defeat. They also found that authoritarian leaders are more likely to pursue wars longer than their democratic counterparts, and are less likely to choose to participate in wars that have a lower chance of victory.⁴¹

Goemans elaborates on the implications of these domestic perils for both democratic and authoritarian leaders, occurring in the aftermath of defeat in war. He finds that authoritarian leaders may face a radically different fate depending on the outcome of a war, as compared to their democratic counterparts. Democratic leaders may simply lose their hold on power in a moderate way, such as through elections, whereas authoritarian leaders may expect severe punishments such as in the form of exile, imprisonment, or even death.⁴² Given the increasing centrality of Ukraine to Putin's domestic political agenda, in fact to his regime's very survival, the Russian government has invested heavily in continuing the war in Ukraine. Then it should be to the point that the ongoing Ukraine issue is currently the most central issue of Russia's domestic and foreign policy prospects.

The retention of the long-established boundaries of Turkey (territorial integrity) has been central to almost every Turkish government. Turkish territorial integrity has been mainly threatened by the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) terrorist attacks, as they claim self-determination, thus Kurdish independence from Turkey.⁴³ The Turkish government's capability to secure the nation's territorial integrity has been critical to justifying its cross-

41 Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No 4, 1995, p. 841–55.

42 Hein E. Goemans, "Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No 5, 2000, p. 555–579.

43 The U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2019*, Washington, D.C., June 2020.

border operations in Syria and Iraq. President Erdoğan launched such operations, announcing that “the risks and threats to national security posed by ongoing conflicts in regions near Turkey’s southern border are continuing to increase”.⁴⁴ While Turkish territorial integrity retains its importance to the survival of Erdoğan’s regime, its salience has recently diminished following a drastic deterioration in the Turkish economy, including the dramatic fall in value of the Turkish currency and soaring inflation.

The political atmosphere in Turkey has radically shifted from democratic pro-Westernism to authoritarian political Islamism under the Erdoğan regime. By tapping into a set of populist rhetoric such as “One Nation, One Flag, One Homeland, One State”, referring to Turkey’s Ottoman roots, and exploiting democratic institutions, Erdoğan has increasingly become a populist authoritarian leader.⁴⁵ His populist rhetoric and policy base mainly hinge on nationalist sentiments and Islamism.⁴⁶ While maintaining such a rhetoric and an anti-Western political agenda, ironically, his stance is circumstantial. Erdoğan has engaged in fostering closer relations with Russia and China, in spite of Russia being an Orthodox Christian majority state and China having no official religion, and subjugating and confining millions of Muslim Uighurs. In short, it is apparent that Erdoğan embodies a fundamental shift in Turkish politics, and his Islamism is a political means of achieving influence.

His political success, based on his nationalist and Islamist rhetoric, has held out until recently. Erdoğan captured full control of Turkey’s central bank in 2018, and very recently he has revealed his motives behind his unorthodox economic policy. He proclaimed, “they complain we keep decreasing the interest rate. Don’t expect anything else from me. As a Muslim, I will continue doing what our religion tells us. This is the command.”⁴⁷ His motive is essentially religious, which caused the Turkish lira to lose 44% of its value in 2021 alone.⁴⁸ Those who question whether the Erdoğan-directed worsening Turkish economy will bring an end to his regime have recently started to receive answers. Erdoğan’s approval rating hit an all-time low as the Turkish economy sank.⁴⁹ According to the year-end Metropoll’s (December 2021) survey, Erdoğan’s approval rate was 38.6%, and around 75% of respondents said that their trust in the government’s economic policies had diminished over the past year.⁵⁰ It is evident that Turkey’s ongoing economic crisis substantially threatens Erdoğan’s authoritarian presidency, thus his regime’s survival prospects. In other words, the economic trajectory of Turkey is the most central issue of support for the current Turkish government.

44 “Turkey Extends Syria and Iraq Military Missions by Two Years”, *Al Jazeera*, 26 October 2021.

45 Paul Lewis et al., “Revealed: the Rise and Rise of Populist Rhetoric”, *The Guardian*, 6 March 2019.

46 Ihsan Yilmaz “The AKP’s Authoritarian, Islamist Populism: Carving out a New Turkey”, *European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS)*, 5 February 5, 2021.

47 “Lira Plunges Again After Erdogan Cites Islam to Defend Rate Cuts”, *France 24*, 20 December 2021.

48 Natasha Turak, “Erdogan Blames Turkey’s Currency Problems on ‘Foreign Financial Tools’ as Central Bank Reserves Fall”, *CNBC*, 20 January 2022.

49 Kerim Karakaya and Çağan Koç, “Erdogan’s Poll Rating Hits All-Time Low as Economic Woes Grow”, *Bloomberg*, 24 May 2021.

50 Metropoll, *Turkey’s Pulse – December 2021*, <http://www.metropoll.com.tr/>; Kareem Fahim, “As Turkey’s Economy Struggles, Erdogan Goes It Alone”, *The Washington Post*, 21 January 2022.

The Rise of China and the Potential Outcomes of its Interactions with the Domestic Priorities of Russia and Turkey

As elaborated in the previous section, the trajectory of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the direction of the current Turkish economic meltdown are the issues most central to Putin and Erdoğan's regimes. While the Russian government has invested heavily in the war in Ukraine, Erdoğan has so far tried to turn a blind eye to the Turkish people's economic suffering. Instead, he has praised his recent economic policies and proclaimed that his country was fighting an "economic war of independence".⁵¹ His approval rate may fluctuate and even increase again, considering his 20-year consecutive electoral success and the opposition (The Nation Alliance – *Millet İttifakı*) delaying their nomination of a common candidate⁵² for the upcoming general election. However, recent polls indicate that as the Erdoğan-led economic deterioration continues, his approval rate decreases. As Hibbeler points out,⁵³ the direction of the Turkish economic decline is a pressing issue for the Erdoğan regime's prospects. Where do these issues interact with China? More concretely, how is the interaction of Russia and Turkey's central domestic issues with the rise of China to play out? This section addresses these questions.

China, as the to-be-dominant power, can influence the central issues of the Russian and Turkish regimes. Considering the geopolitical importance of Russia and Turkey, the interaction of China with these countries is inevitable. I assume that if one aims to have a fruitful analysis in terms of the interactions between the rise of China and the current regimes in Russia and Turkey, the central issues of these governments and their interplay with China should be looked at. The answer to the question of what the possible outcomes of such an interplay are should yield meaningful insights into the future direction of the potential policy paths in Russia and Turkey.

In spite of their past contrasts, China and Russia currently share common objectives, such as disrupting US and NATO power. They find themselves unified against a common rival. On March 1, China was one of the five countries that voted against disputing the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It further abstained in the UN General Assembly vote condemning the invasion.⁵⁴ China also lifted a set of import restrictions on Russian products following the invasion.⁵⁵ It is evident that China is showing support for Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. Blanchette argues that the worse things go for Putin in Ukraine, the more China will support him, with the aim of keeping Russia as its key strategic partner, even at a greater cost. Because it is likely that Beijing considers the possibility of a Russian defeat as a threat to its territorial aims in the Asia-Pacific region, where it is in a geopolitical rivalry with the US.⁵⁶ Therefore,

51 Laura Pitel and Tommy Stubbington, "Turkish Lira Falls as Erdogan Vows Victory in 'Economic War'", *Financial Times*, 23 November 2021.

52 Erdoğan's approval rate may be influenced by who the opposition candidate is, see Özlem Topçu and Şebnem Arsu, "The Mayor of Istanbul Could Prove Dangerous to Erdoğan", *Der Spiegel*, 11 February 2022.

53 Stefan Hibbeler, "Erdoğan's Economic Miscalculations", *IPS Journal*, 14 February 2022.

54 Julian Borger, "UN votes to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine and calls for withdrawal", *The Guardian*, 2 March 2022.

55 Evelyn Cheng, "China's Trade with Russia won't be Enough to Offset Sanctions, U.S. Says", *CNBC*, 25 February 2022.

56 Jude Blanchette, "The Worse Things Go for Putin in Ukraine, the More China Will Back Him", *The Washington Post*, 24 March 2022.

a rising China may provide stronger help to Russia in keeping a stake in Ukraine in the longer run. Xi Jinping has already enhanced his partnership with Putin, supporting Russia in its military campaign in Ukraine.⁵⁷ Putin, backed up by a greater power, will be better able to consolidate support for his war in Ukraine, and subsequently, for his regime's survival.

Another possible outcome is that the interplay between China and Russia may lead to an internationalization of the Chinese currency in Russia. Putin and Xi Jinping have, increasingly (following the economic sanctions on Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine), started to consider the use of their national currencies in bilateral payments to be the permanent method of transaction. This way, the Russian government expects to be less affected by the US-led economic sanctions. On the other hand, in its most recent Five-Year Plan, the Chinese government has shown its clear intention of building up more advanced yuan cross-border payment systems, to support their currency's internationalization. The de-dollarization actions have already been under way in bilateral trades between Russia and China, through replacing the dollar with the euro. However, the practice of switching to the euro has been recently interrupted by European sanctions. To overcome this problem, and to get around the SWIFT international payment system, China and Russia started to work out their own versions of payment systems.⁵⁸ In addition, Putin began to raise the stakes, by demanding roubles for Russian gas exports.⁵⁹ It is too early to reckon to what extent Putin's expectation to pay for gas in roubles will determine the direction of de-dollarization. But this, and China's effort to internationalize the Chinese yuan, are some signals that should be taken into account in making sense of the future trajectory of the China and Russia interplay.

The relations between China and Turkey appear to be improving. Although China's Uighur policy has led to some tensions between the two countries, with the Turkish economy in bad shape, Erdoğan has taken an instrumental approach that puts the Turkish economic collapse first. There was a tit-for-tat situation between China and Turkey regarding the Uighur and the Kurdish issues. It seems like China's attitude toward the Kurdish issue depends on Turkey's attitude toward the Uighur issue. For example, Erdoğan made a statement at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation: "we keep track of the situation of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in China with great sensitivity. Our expectation is that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation will show sensitivity to Uyghurs in line with its founding purposes." Following his statement, Beijing reciprocated by addressing the regions where Kurds are in the majority, accusing Turkey of human rights abuses in these regions, as well as claiming at the UN that Turkey's air operations in the Northern Iraq region have killed civilians and are against Iraq's state sovereignty.⁶⁰ Subsequently, Ankara turned to moderate talks with Beijing, with the intent of strengthening economic relations with China and attracting Chinese investment in

57 Edward Wong and Julian E. Barnes, "Russia Asked China for Military and Economic Aid for Ukraine War, U.S. Officials Say", *The New York Times*, 13 March 2022.

58 China's version of SWIFT: the Cross-Border Inter-Bank Payments System (CIPS), and Russia's version of SWIFT: System of Transfer of Financial Messages (STFM); Chris Devonshire-Ellis, "Russia And China To Develop SWIFT Avoiding International Financial Systems", *Russia Briefing*, 11 January 2022.

59 Nina Chestney, "Putin Wants 'Unfriendly' Countries to Pay for Russian Gas in Roubles", *Reuters*, 23 March 2022.

60 Nurettin Akçay, "Amid Tensions With Turkey, China Is Putting the Kurdish Issue in Play", *The Diplomat*, 4 December 2021.

Turkey. Even though now the Turkish government has taken a pragmatic approach, stepping back in its reaction to China's Uighur policy, the dormant political tension indicates that China being a rising power, Beijing in the future may become an influential actor in the Kurdish issue.

The rise of China in the international order, with its rapid-growing economy, has considerably attracted the attention of the Turkish government. Turkey's pragmatic approach aims to increase bilateral trade and strengthen intergovernmental ties between China and Turkey. Increasing tensions between the West and Turkey also play a role in Turkey paying more attention to China's rise in the global order.⁶¹ Erdoğan may seek remedies to the Turkish economic woes, hence aiding his regime's survival, by fundamentally shifting to a Chinese-based economic trajectory. Turkey's drastic currency devaluation brought about a large and cheap labor force, which is one of the corner stones of Erdoğan's Chinese model. In addition, Turkey has a key location in China's BRI, being placed at the center of an extensive trade route. In support of my point here, Ergenç also puts forward the idea that Turkey's engagement with the BRI is an example of Turkey's efforts to seek a Chinese-style economic model.⁶² It appears that the BRI is central to the rise of China, and the increasing chances of success of this project may intensify Turkey's tendency toward a Chinese-style growth model.

Conclusion

What are the challenges that the rise of China poses to the present international order? The analysis of this article yields two major dilemmas, based on China's challenging behavior in the international system. The first is that while China promotes steady relationships based on mutual interests facilitated by the rule-based international order, it also seeks aspirations for exploiting the current international institutions. It aims to gain more political influence by altering the current distribution of power controlled mainly by the US. The second dilemma is that while China underlines the importance of the Westphalian style of sovereignty and non-interference, it also takes interventionist actions in both cyberspace and territorial space. In the latter, China shows a commitment to the norms of non-intervention at the international level, but also attempts to bend the same norms, to its own benefit when it comes to the regional level. In sum, the challenges caused by the rise of China actually create several dilemmas implying that the interplay between China and the international order will persist in an intricate and formidable trajectory.

How is the rise of China to affect the prevailing policy paths of the current Russian and Turkish regimes? This article identifies the fact that the direction of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the course of the current Turkish economic hardships, are the most central issues for the survival of Putin and Erdoğan's regimes. China appears to be showing definitive support for Putin's war in Ukraine; it is firmly united with Russia against a common rival, the United States. By contrast, the relationship between China and Turkey seems to

61 Sinem Cengiz, "Turkey, China Place Economic Ties Ahead of Ideology", *Arab News*, 26 March 2021.

62 Leo Kendrick, "Erdoğan's Plan to Use 'Chinese Model' for Turkey Met with Skepticism from Experts", *Medyascope*, 9 December 2021.

be circumstantial. The tensions between China and Turkey over China's Uighur policy has resulted in retaliation by Beijing, condemning Turkey on the Kurdish issue. Turkey took steps backward, and is now focusing more on its economic failure. Turkey's geopolitical location gains importance through China's BRI and its future policy prospects in the Middle East. In addition to this, Erdoğan's Chinese-based economic rescue plan and Turkey's increasing attention to Chinese investments are some of the signs that should be taken into consideration in shedding light on the current Turkish regime's future policy directions.

The interaction of China's rise with Russia's central interests may accelerate the process of the internationalization of the Chinese currency. Moscow and Beijing have begun to view the adoption of their national currencies in bilateral payments as of general use in financial transactions. China and Russia are already working on their versions of payment systems to replace the SWIFT international payment system. Finally, it is apparent that China is giving support to Russia in its invasion of Ukraine, since it is probable that China calculates a possible Russian defeat as a threat to its territorial interests in the Asia-Pacific region, where it is in rivalry with the US. China's definitive support for Russia in its invasion of Ukraine is likely to prolong Putin's military campaign, increasing his chances of staying in power.

Bibliography

- Akçay, Nurettin (2021). "Amid Tensions With Turkey, China Is Putting the Kurdish Issue in Play", *The Diplomat*, 4 December.
- Al Jazeera (2021). "Turkey Extends Syria and Iraq Military Missions by Two Years", 26 October.
- Baysal, Başar (2020). "20 Years of Securitization: Strengths, Limitations and A New Dual Framework", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 17, No 67, p. 3–20.
- Blanchette, Jude (2022). "The Worse Things Go for Putin in Ukraine, the More China Will Back Him", *The Washington Post*, 24 March.
- Borger, Julian (2022). "UN votes to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine and calls for withdrawal", *The Guardian*, 2 March.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith (2012). "Domestic Explanations of International Relations", *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 15, p. 161-181.
- Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce and Randolph Siverson (1995). "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No 4, p. 841–55.
- Cengiz, Sinem (2021). "Turkey, China Place Economic Ties Ahead of Ideology", *Arab News*, 26 March, <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1832516>
- Cheng, Evelyn (2022). "China's Trade with Russia won't be Enough to Offset Sanctions, U.S. Says", *CNBC*, 25 February.
- Chestney, Nina (2022). "Putin Wants 'Unfriendly' Countries to Pay for Russian Gas in Roubles", *Reuters*, 23 March.
- Christensen, Thomas (2016) *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power*, New York, W. W. Norton, p. 137-150.
- Clinton, Jane (2022). "Why Did Russia Annex Crimea? What Happened When Putin Invaded in 2014 and How Nato Reacted to Annexation", *iNEWS*, 29 January.

- Combes, Katherine (2011) “Between Revisionism and Status Quo: China in International Regimes”, *Polis*, Vol. 6, p. 12-17.
- Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property (2017). *Update to the IP Commission Report*, Washington, D.C., National Bureau of Asian Research.
- Devonshire-Ellis, Chris (2022). “Russia And China To Develop SWIFT Avoiding International Financial Systems”, *Russia Briefing*, 11 January.
- Dove, Jonathan (2016) “The AIIB and the NDB: The End of Multilateralism or a New Beginning?”, *The Diplomat*, 26 April.
- Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip (2017). “Yes for One Nation, One Flag, One Homeland, One State”, Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, 11 February.
- Fahim, Kareem (2022). “As Turkey’s Economy Struggles, Erdogan Goes It Alone”, *The Washington Post*, 21 January.
- Foot, Rosemary (2020). *China, the UN, and Human Protection: Beliefs, Power, Image*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Foot, Rosemary and Andrew Walter (2013). “Global Norms and Major State Behavior: The Cases of China and the United States”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 19, No 2, p. 329-352.
- France 24 (2021). “Lira Plunges Again After Erdogan Cites Islam to Defend Rate Cuts”, 20 December.
- Friedberg, Aaron (2011). *Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, New York, W.W. Norton & Co.
- Geddes, Barbara (2003). *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
- Glaser, Bonnie (2019). “China as a Selective Revisionist Power in the International Order”, *Yusof Ishak Institute*, No 21.
- Goddard, Stacie (2018). “Embedded Revisionism: Networks, Institutions, and Challenges to World Order”, *International Organization*, Vol. 72, No 4, p. 763–797.
- Goemans, Hein (2000). “Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No 5, p. 555–579.
- Hibbeler, Stefan (2022) “Erdogan’s Economic Miscalculations”, *IPS Journal*, 14 February.
- Ikenberry, John (2011). *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Jinping, Xi (2017). “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, 18 October.
- Johnston, Alastair (2019). “China and a World of Orders”, *International Security*, Vol. 44, No 2, p. 9–60.
- Karakaya, Kerim and Çağan Koç (2021). “Erdogan’s Poll Rating Hits All-Time Low as Economic Woes Grow”, *Bloomberg*, 24 May.
- Kent, Ann (2002). “China’s International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations”, *Global Governance*, Vol. 8, No 3, p. 350-351.
- Lake, David, Lisa Martin, and Thomas Risse (2021). Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization. *International Organization*, 75(2), 225-257.
- Lewis, Paul, Caelainn Barr , Seán Clarke, Antonio Voce, Cath Levett and Pablo Gutiérrez (2019). “Revealed: the Rise and Rise of Populist Rhetoric”, *The Guardian*, 6 March.
- Lütticke, Marcus (2014) “‘Crimea is About the Survival of Putin’s System’”, *Deutsche Welle*, 14 March.
- Madani, Seyedashkan (2022). “Beyond Geopolitics: A Geoeconomic Perspective of China-Iran Belt and Road Initiative Relations”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 19, No. 74, p. 53-72.

- Mearsheimer, John (2019). “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order”, *International Security*, Vol. 43, p. 7–50.
- Metropoll (2021). *Turkey’s Pulse – December 2021*, <http://www.metropoll.com.tr/>
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1993). “Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining”, Peter B. Evans et al. (eds.), *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, Berkeley, University of California Press, p. 5-6.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1997). “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No 4, p. 518.
- Nathan, Andrew (2016). “China’s Rise and International Regimes: Does China Seek to Overthrow Global Norms?”, Robert S. Ross and Jo Inge Bekkevold (eds.), *China in the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges*, Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, p. 189.
- Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (2002). *2002 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance*, Washington, D.C.
- Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (2015). *2015 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance*, Washington, D.C.
- Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (2017). *2017 Special 301 Report*, Washington, D.C., 2017, p. 28.
- Pain, Emil (2016). “The Imperial Syndrome and Its Influence on Russian Nationalism”, Pål Kolstø Helge Blakkisrud (eds.), *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–2015*, Edinburgh University Press, p. 46–74.
- Pinkham, Sophie (2017). “How Annexing Crimea Allowed Putin to Claim He Had Made Russia Great Again”, *The Guardian*, 22 March.
- Pitel, Laura and Tommy Stubbington (2021). “Turkish Lira Falls as Erdogan Vows Victory in ‘Economic War’”, *Financial Times*, 23 November.
- Putin, Vladimir (2021). “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, The Russian President’s Official Website, 12 July.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1991). “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies”, *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No 4, p. 484.
- Tamanaha, Brian (2004). *On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 3.
- The U.S. Department of State (2020). *Country Reports on Terrorism 2019*, Washington, D.C.
- Topçu, Özlem and Şebnem Arsu (2022) “The Mayor of Istanbul Could Prove Dangerous to Erdoğan”, *Der Spiegel*, 11 February.
- Turak, Natasha (2022). “Erdogan Blames Turkey’s Currency Problems on ‘Foreign Financial Tools’ as Central Bank Reserves Fall”, *CNBC*, 20 January.
- Wang, Yue (2017) “China First: Foreign Tech Firms Must Be Wary Under Xi Jinping’s Rule”, *Forbes*, 23 October.
- Weiss, Jessica and Jeremy Wallace (2021). “Domestic Politics, China’s Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order”, *International Organization*, Vol. 75, No 2, p. 635-664.
- Wong, Edward and Julian Barnes (2022). “Russia Asked China for Military and Economic Aid for Ukraine War, U.S. Officials Say”, *The New York Times*, 13 March.
- Yilmaz, Ihsan (2021). “The AKP’s Authoritarian, Islamist Populism: Carving out a New Turkey”, *European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS)*. February 5.
- Yilmaz, Ihsan (2021). *Creating the Desired Citizen: Ideology, State and Islam in Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, p. 103–126.