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The Difference as the Individual Beings in Duns Scotus’ Metaphysics

Abstract

In this article, Duns Scotus’s metaphysics will be examined in terms of the universal concepts and the individual beings as difference or one. These problems will be discussed in the perspective of Duns Scotus’ metaphysics that is related to transcendentals and being. Duns Scotus is the philosopher of being of beings and the individual beings as the difference because he does not destroy the individual being under the essence of the universal concepts, which is the object of metaphysic. In terms of his metaphysic the universal concepts that are the essence of beings are connected to the individual beings. In order to be able to understand the problem of the individual beings and the universal concepts like species and genius, we need to know what his metaphysics is. Therefore, in this study, firstly the relationship of metaphysics and the universal concepts will be explained; secondly, what the individual being as difference is. As a result, I argue that Duns’ the idea of individual beings belongs to the difference that is the one.

Keywords

Duns Scotus, Metaphysics, God, Categories, The Individual Beings and the Difference.

Introduction

Duns Scotus, who is called “the subtle doctor”, is a philosopher who lived towards the end of the high scholasticism¹ in the Middle Ages. On his philosophy has the effects of different philosophers such as Augustine, Roger Bacon, Aristotle and Avicenna, who is an Arabic thinker. On the other hand, he influenced different philosophers like Spinoza, Heidegger, Gilles Deleuze in later century by his ontology. Duns Scotus' philosophy or metaphysics is actually related to being, individual being and the logic of the first intentions and the second intentions. He explains what metaphysics is and what the individual being is and what the univocal being as the one is. We can say that he is the philosopher of being and the individual being because he does not destroy the individual being under the universal concepts, which are the subject of metaphysics. I argue that the individual beings have an important place in Duns Scotus' philosophy because of the effect of Aristotle and Avicenna in the high scholasticism. When we try to understand his metaphysics, we see that the individual being and the difference in itself are the same things, and, on the other hand, the universal terms cannot be understood without the individual beings. The universal terms are extracted from the individual beings but they are not the essence of the singular beings. He considers the relation of the universal terms and the individual beings as difference in itself. He says that being is the univocal or one, but this one or univocal being cannot be conceived without understanding his logic that is related to the categories. In this article, I will discuss the relation between the univocal being in his metaphysics and individual difference in itself. Firstly, the metaphysics of Duns Scotus will be evaluated in terms of being and essence. Secondly, what the univocal beings that is related to the universality and individual beings will be discussed, and finally, the difference and individual being will be examined in terms of the ontology of Duns Scotus.

1. Metaphysics

Metaphysics is the science of being of beings. It means that metaphysics does not explain what the individual beings are because it is about transcendentals. Since metaphysics is the science of transcendentals, its main problems are the being, the good, and the truth. Thus, the object of this science is not the individual being that exist out of the mind or the external world. Because the science of metaphysics does not give information about the external world that belongs to the individual beings, the objects of metaphysical reflection are the concepts that are produced by the intellect. For this reason, to explain what metaphysics is, we should explain what the transcendental, essence and categories that belong to metaphysics in Duns Scotus' philosophy are.²

¹ Scholasticism is a method applied in philosophy and theology which uses an ever and ever recurring system of concepts, distinctions, definitions, propositional analysis, argumentation techniques and disputational methods, as terminist logic (Antonie Vos 2006: 223).

² I will explain these terms in the following sections of the article.

Metaphysics is the first of all science because it explains the transcendentals that cannot be conceived by the sense, but by the concepts of intellect that does not exactly signify the external individual beings. Since it is the transcendental science that lies beyond all other sciences, it is the highest science (M. B. Ingham and M. Dreyer 2004: 57). This idea is in line with Aristotle who argues that metaphysics is the science of the super-sensible, unchanging sphere of being. But, it is important to note that although one of the objects of metaphysics is the being of beings, God of the religions is not among the objects of metaphysics. In contrast, the problem of it is the being of beings that is the univocal. On the other hand, its object is not the material objects, it is the being or qua being. Duns Scotus does not accept the traditional arguments about metaphysics because these arguments say that the subjects of metaphysics is the substance or the being but Scotus says that the one subject of metaphysics is the being or the substance, the other subjects are the truth and good. According to traditional ideas, the accidents of the substance are not the subject of metaphysics, but Scotus says that accidents is the subject of metaphysics (Peter King 2003: 17) It means that God cannot be the subject of metaphysics because God is the necessary being and he claims that the necessary being cannot be the primary subject of metaphysics, but the accidents of God can be. Therefore, it can be said that Dun's way of thought is not onto-theology because Duns considers that God's existence is the necessary being and therefore can be demonstrated, thus existence or being cannot be starting point (Antonie Vos 2006: 88). On the other hand, "metaphysics investigate the way beings are related one another (Peter King 2003: 8), but since everything depends on God, he is the main object of metaphysics.

1.1. God

Duns Scotus considers like Avicenna whether the problem of metaphysics is God. "Avicenna claims that God is not the subject of metaphysics because no science proves its own subject" and Duns writes "no science proves the existence of its subject is true" (Duns Scotus 1963: 10). There is one science about God but it is not metaphysics, which is concerned with the highest causes: the transcendentals. What God is cannot be known; it is known what God is not. In other words, Duns says that God can be known but its method is not metaphysics because God cannot be conceived by the intellect since the intellect can conceive the essence of representation of object, but God is not an object; therefore, he cannot be conceived by the human intellect. "God is the cause of contingency in things and God's will is the cause of contingency in things" (Duns Scotus 1994: 16) but himself of God is the necessary being as the first reason. On the other hand, the subject of metaphysics is not the necessary being it is the contingency. For example, when Aristotle says that the first reason is the energia, it does not mean that energia is necessary; it means that it is only the first being. Therefore, similarly, when it is said that God is the first reason, it does not mean that the first reason is God in Duns Scotus' metaphysics because the problem of metaphysics is the being of beings, true and good that should be conceived by the categories. Metaphysic is related to transcendentals that can be conceived by the ten categories; for this reason, the problem of it is the concepts that are the transcendental or the most

universal, but God is not the universal concept, God is the necessary being. Necessary being cannot be understood by the contingent being that is understood by the intellect.

Contingency has two different forms. The first is related to the essence of being, the second is related to circumstances or events that are connected with it. If any being changes by itself nature like corporal beings, then it is a contingent being. The second kind of contingency is related to events that are not necessary. According to this idea, "if a being is contingent in terms of its nature, then events and circumstances that are connected by it are either necessary in the sense of inevitable or contingent in the sense of avoidable, its foundation is also contingent, yet in the sense of mutable" (M. B. Inghman and M. Dreyer 2004: 90). To know what contingency and necessary is very important because of two reasons. The first reason is concerns whether being can be known or not, the second reason is to do with how it can be possible if it is not necessary being because it should be a necessary being in order to be able to know what the essence of something is. Because it always gets changed, it is not possible for it to know. Therefore, for both Ancient and Medieval philosophers it is important to have the certain knowledge of being in itself to know. As a result, every being has two attributes as necessary and non-contingency. If a thing is necessary, it cannot be behaved in a different way because it always has to act the same way. Since being can act in a different way, it is the contingent being. But, because God cannot be a different thing that he is become, God is the necessary as inevitable. If anything depends on another thing, the thing that is depended is the contingent being. For example, if x causes y, then since y depends on x, y cannot be necessary being. However, since God is the necessary being, he is not the object of metaphysics, which is the science of transcendental. The transcendental science belongs to the genus and they cannot be divided into the species; therefore, whatever is not contained under any genus is transcendental (Duns Scotus 1963: 3).

1.2. Transcendentals

The subjects of metaphysics are the transcendentals that are the one (*unum*), good (*bonum*) and truth (*verum*); for this reason, if we say that being is the one object of metaphysics, we are mistaken because if a word is a universal concept, it can be the object of metaphysics. Therefore, there are different types of transcendental concepts like necessary-contingent, actual-potential, infinite-finite, prior-posterior, cause-caused, independent-dependent, absolute-relative, one-many, substance-accidents, some-diverse, equal-unequal (Richard Cross 1999: 148). The question of metaphysics is what the essence is. The problem of the essence belongs to the universal concepts, but it does not belong to the individual being. When we ask the essence of something, this something is a concept that is universal. In this perspective, the philosophers actually say that the object of metaphysics is the being because the being is the most universal concept in the ten categories. Being exists in the two models as finite and the infinite. The finite beings are divided immediately into ten categories, but the infinite being that is God is not divided into categories because the categories do not belong to the infinite being, which is the necessary being. Being is the most common transcendental; therefore, it is the universal being and the univocal being. Being that is the univocal is

the first object of intellect because genera, species, individuals and the essential parts of genera and the uncreated being all include “being” quidditatively. In other words, all the ultimate differences are included essentially in some of these (Duns Scotus 1963: 4).

1.3. The Univocal Being

The univocal being is the one of the main problems of Duns Scotus' metaphysics. The problem connects to the being that is the subject of metaphysics. What is being? Being is the most common concept; therefore, it is the primary object of intellect. Since it is the most common object of intellect, it can be conceived by the second intentions. In this ground, being is the first and most basic object of intellect because it is not a genus terms but, a univocal concept of the whole concepts. Being that is the univocal concept is the necessary condition of metaphysics (M. B. Ingham and M. Dreyer 2004: 28). According to Duns, if any concept does not need any other concept in order to be able to be understood, it is the univocal concept. The univocal concept is sufficient unity itself. In terms of this view, the unity of all human cognition is grounded in the univocity of being. It enables both the mind and the language to say something about the realm beyond the physical and thus, metaphysical thought can be possible.

Being is the univocal because all things are connected to each other in beings. Therefore, being and the univocal or unities are the same things and logically equivalent. “Scotus considers that all things have a unity because of relations between all objects, and this relation is sufficient so that the whole things are a unity with each other” (R. Cross 2002: 122). Duns Scotus considers that everything is related to each other and, has a unity or the unity of the order, that is, the relation of unity. In other words, in between everything exists a connection. For example, if x causes y, then y depends on x (R. Cross 2002: 123). Because of this relation in beings, being is the univocal. On the other hand, the term univocal being is not a transcendental term because the relation between the individual beings cannot be conceived by what the univocal being is because the univocal terms can be conceived by the relation between the individual beings, but we do not know what the individual beings are because our intellect is not enough to understand every individual being one by one. The substance on individual being is the singular that cannot be divided into any other thing. In contrast, the universal term can be divided into different terms because of their complex structure. For example, terms such as wisdom and perfection can be used both for God and Being. First, perfection is thought in terms of created being, but since the created beings are not perfect we cannot use it for them. Second, we make some limitations in the conception of perfect. And third, some new concepts are added to simple concept like the most perfect (R. Cross 2002: 38). According to Duns Scotus, the nothing of terms are not perfect until some new terms are added to simple complex. In other words, they become complex concepts as some new terms are added in this processes. We first sense the finite things, and later we produce infinity from these finite things, and because we cannot use infinity for finite things, we use it for God because our intellect produces the second intentions from the first intentions and then the universal terms.

1.4. The Universals

The universals are the problem of metaphysics because metaphysics is not related to the individual beings, in contrast, the aim of metaphysics is the knowledge of the wholeness of being that is the most universal concept because we cannot know the external world that is the outside of concept that is the individual or the singular. Therefore, the universal concepts are derived from sensation of individual beings. What is the term universal? The term universal is related to species and genus. In other words, a universal term is the concept of intellect like the man. To put it in a different way, the term universal is the essence because the essence does not belong to the singular or individual being. Since they have an essence, they need to be explained by the intellect. According to Duns Scotus, the nature is always apprehended by the intellect as universal not as singular (T. B. Noone 2003: 108). “Like Avicenna, Duns Scotus thinks that the nature never exists apart from concrete things outside the mind or thought in the mind and there is, nonetheless, a natural priority enjoyed by the nature with respect to either manifestation of the nature within the intellect or without” (T. B. Noone 2003: 109).

The problem of the universals that is transcendental is the first and basic object of intellection. In terms of this view, the problem of being or common nature belongs to the intellect because the subject of intellect is the universal. In other words, the universal and thought or essences are the same things because thought is not possible without the universals that are the common terms.

What are the common terms? The common terms can be thought in three ways: first, they can be thought in terms of material beings. In this view, only common terms such as man pertain to its object or to individual objects. According to this consideration, the common terms refer to the genus terms and the genus terms are the collection of species. In this point of view, the sense of term is essential to its object. For example, Socrates and Plato are identities because both of them are human beings, on the other hand, they are different from each other as individual beings; therefore, they cannot be conceived with reference to the universal terms or the higher categories. “Socrates and Plato may in one sense belong together in the same species, but in other sense they are irreducibly diverse” (N. Widder 2001: 440). Second, what is signified by common terms is considered absolutely according to its quidditative being. Third, the significance of the common terms can be considered, as something that is understood by the intellect. The common terms or nature are given to us by the genus terms, but they do not give us the difference among them. The common nature that is given by the genus terms signifies an essence that is given by the intellect; therefore, “an essence acquires cognitive being by the virtue of an intelligible species” (Giorgio Pini, 2002: 102).

In Duns' philosophy, the universals depend on the individual beings. The universals do not directly represent singular things, but the essence of universal terms refers to the individual beings although this essence is the common essence between the singular beings. According to Avicenna, as the individual beings exist in the extra-

mental world that is independent from the human mind, the universal terms exist in the human mind.³

1.5. The Essence

What the essence has been a controversial subject of metaphysics since Ancient Greek philosophy. It is always controversial because philosophers discussed what the essence is. They try to understand whether the essence belongs to the universal concepts or the individual beings. This debate has been continuing since Plato who says that the essence is independent from individual being. And later, Aristotle argued that the essence belongs to the individual being and we can learn by our sense what the essence is. When we came to the scholastic time, Duns Scotus considers it like Aristotle but not the exactly same. According to Duns Scotus, the essence can be considered in three different ways. First, it is thought that the essence exists in the extra-mental world as an individual; second, as it is in itself and third, it exists in the mind as a universal. Duns Scotus adopts the third way of thinking. For this reason, common terms do not belong to extra-mental world, but individual beings exist in there.

Therefore, for him the essence is related to the universal terms such as humanity, rationality, animality, thus, the individual beings do not have any essence. Since the essence is an immaterial thing or not material thing, it belongs to the universal terms that are the general concepts, and since its object is the general terms or the universal concept, the essence is the object of consciousness which concerns concepts. In terms of this view, the object of consciousness is not individual beings that are one; its object is the universal concept that is produced by the sensation and the intellect. At this point, the problem is: how can the intellect create the universal concepts by abstracting from the individual beings? In view of Duns' philosophy, we firstly experience the individual beings, and after the sensation of these individual beings, the intellect makes an abstraction from the common nature of the share in between the individual beings, and then the intellect creates the species, later the genus and finally the universal concepts. For example, when I see two individual being such as Peter and George, the mind conceive them as the human by using a universal concept like the human being.

Henceforth, the essence is a thing that is always identity by itself because it does not change depending on time and space. It is the common nature, the universal concept. It can be only understood what the common term is. For example, when we say that "human's essence is the rational animal" like Aristotle said, this essence does not refer to any individual human being because it is the essence of the universal concept, which is the human being. If rationality was the essence of individual being, then Peter could not exist without this essence, but Peter can exist without it. Therefore, the individual being of Peter is independent from rationality. On the other hand, the concept of humanity cannot be thought without rationality. The essence is the one for the same

³ This debate actually depends on the medieval philosophy. In the medieval philosophy, according to realist, the universals do not depend on the human mind, they exist outside of the mind, but the conceptualists and the nominalists say that the universals depend on the mind, in other words, the universals are predict of individuals.

species. Thus, the rationality is an attribute for Peter, but it is the essence for the concept of the humanity. In other words, Peter's essence is the common thing that is shared by all humanity (M. B. Inghman and M. Dreeyer 2004: 101). As a result, metaphysics does not explain the individual being because it tries to explain how the intellect creates these universal terms by using the categories.

1.6. Categories

What the categories know is necessary in order to conceive what the essence or being is since Aristotle. In philosophy of Aristotle, the categories belong to being; being can be known by ten categories like substance or quantity or quality or relative or where or when or being-in-a position or having or doing or being affected (Aristotle Categories: 1b25). According to this view, these categories describe being and being is known by the intellect with these categories. For this reason, the relation of being and categories is very important to understand Duns' metaphysics. Duns Scotus separates categories into two different ways that are related to logic and metaphysics. Metaphysics approaches categories as independent from logic, but according to logic they belong to the intellect, not being. In Scotus's philosophy they belong to being like Aristotle said, but they cannot give information about the individual beings because the categories explain the singular being by translating it into genus and species terms. As what being is can be understood by metaphysics by using categories, metaphysics understand with two different separations to being. One of them is conceptual that is the second intention and the other is categorical that is the first intention. While the first intentions do not depend on the intellect, the second intentions or the concepts that represent the extra-mental world depend on the intellect.

"Duns Scotus tries to explain what the relation between the concepts and the extra-mental things is. He says that a concept cannot be produced by the act of understanding because when the intellect understands something, it does not produce anything, instead, it finds its object as something given to it by way of an intelligible species" (Giorgia Pini 2002: p. 105). In order to be able to understand what this idea is, some extra information should be given about the intelligible species and the act of understanding itself. The thing or real qualities that exist in the mind are the intelligible species and they are the real terms of the act of understanding. In other words, the objects of understanding are the real intelligible species; the object is the thing that is understood by the act of understanding and the intellect. To put it different words, the act of understanding is a real quality in the intellect. According to Duns Scotus, all knowledge is derived from the senses by the simple apprehension. He considers it different from the other philosophers such as Socrates and Plato because thinkers before Scotus consider that the individual being can be understood via the universal concepts. For example, the individual human being can be understood by knowing the term human that is a species term, but instead of this argument he thinks that the genus species or genus terms can only be understood by conceiving the individual beings. This is possible with the first intentions.

The first intentions are one of the main objects of metaphysics. Since metaphysics gives us information about the first reason of being, it is related to the first

reason. This idea is the foundation in the Aristotle's metaphysical comprehension that starts with "all men, by nature, desire to know." (Aristotle *Metaphysics* I: 980a21). What do they want to know? The human being wants to know what the first reason is because the first reason is the main matter of being of beings. Therefore, being or qua being is the subject of the first reason. Qua being is the univocal being that will be explained later in this article. "If two things can be understood by the same concept, which is in turn signified by the same name, such things are univocated under such term, whether or not they have the essence of the same kind" (Giorgia Pini 2002: 173).

Duns Scotus explains this process in the two different ways. Firstly, the intellect turns toward the extra-mental things by the first intentions that are the categories, and then it reflects on itself and produces the concepts. In other words, the first intentions cause the second intentions that are concepts because the second intentions are produced by the intellect. When the intellect returns to the object in order to find an essence in the object, it finds an essence considered as one in many. For example, the definition of the human concept is that "the human being is the rational animal" according to Aristotle. The rational animal is an essence for the singular human being, but since it is the common term between them, it does not refer to the singular human being. Therefore, the object and its mode of understanding is not the same thing. The intellect creates the universal concept as the common nature from the singular human beings; therefore, the universal concept and its object are not the same things. "Being universal is only the mode in which our intellect understands its object, not properly of the object itself" (Giorgia Pini 2002: 109).

The second intentions or concepts like genus and species are not the first intentions that are the categories. The second intentions are produced by the first intentions in order to understand the individual beings. These second intentions that represent the extra-mental world with the help of the first categories are the general terms. Here the important question is how does the intellect create the second intentions? When the intellect directs to any object, it finds an essence that belongs to all of them and this essence is one in many which is the universal and the intellect produces the second intentions. In other words, since the essence exists in the object of the intellect, the intellect understands its object under the mode of universality without understanding the mode of the universality itself (Giorgia Pini 2002: 109).

According to Duns Scotus, to understand the general term depends on the intellect that concerns the first intentions. The relation of the first intention and the second intentions of the intellect are necessary so as to understand what the essence of something is. Does the essence belong to the first intentions or the second intentions? Duns Scotus tells us that the general terms can be understood by means of the intellect, which produces the second intentions. The objects of the second intentions are concepts that represent the external-world that is given by the first intentions. This process is explained with three different stages. First, the essence exists in the extra-mental world; second, as it is in itself and finally, as it exists in the mind as the universal (M. B. Inghman and M. Dreyer 2004: 103). Duns Scotus takes the essence in terms of the third approach because for him the essence exists in the universal terms not in the individual being that is the individual difference. Therefore, the object of the intellect is the concepts of the first intentions. And the intellect tries to understand the concepts that

are created by the intellect by using the first intentions. In other words, the intellect cannot conceive the extra-mental world without concept. He expresses that a name represents the thing immediately, but not the concept or the second intention.

Since the second intentions do not represent the extra-mental world, they only represent the concept of concepts that are produced by the first intentions. "An intention, however, is founded not on a property of an extra-mental thing but on a property of a thing as understood by the intellect, which for Duns Scotus is a concept and a mental entity." (Giorgia Pini 2002: 110). The second intentions do not belong to the objects; they do not signify the objects of outside mind. The second intentions are the object of intellect; therefore, the extra-mental things that play a causal role in the production of the first intentions are not the cause of second intentions. Duns Scotus says, "When the intellect considers as one concept related to another, it establishes a relationship between them and this relationship is the second intentions." (Giorgia Pini 2002: 113). As a result of this relation, the second intentions are not absolute because they change from one relation to another. When they are compared to each other, it is seen that while the first intentions are absolute, the second intentions are relative entities because they can change according to whether they become the genus or the species. In other words, while the first intentions can be understood in terms of the categories, the second relations can be understood according to rational relations that are produced in between the ideas or concepts. For this reason, they exist only in the mind as the object of intellect. These second intentions that are the rational relations are explained in three ways. First, the intellect considers the extra-mental things via the first intentions. Second, the intellect tries to understand the concepts that are given by the categories. In addition, this second stage has two different acts. First, the intellect considers on the concepts that are produced by the first intentions and second, the intellect compares the concepts. Therefore, "An intention is something pertaining to purely mental entity." (Giorgia Pini 2002: 126). In other words, "the relationship between the things and the concepts are accidental because it is not part of the extra-mental things to be understood by the intellect." (Giorgia Pini 2002: 133). As a result, the second intentions are not the concepts of the things that are objects. They are the concepts of concepts. In this perspective, the relation in between the individual beings and the second intentions are important because the individual beings are different from each other, but this difference cannot be conceived by the second intentions that are the genus and species because they are not the same with the individual beings. For example, the essence of the concept of human being and the singular human beings are not the same because they do not have the same essence. Therefore, when Duns Scotus says that the being is the univocal being, this univocal being is related to individual being as difference in itself.

2. The Difference as Individual Being in itself

What the difference is the problem of metaphysic because this problem is related to the essence of beings. There is a difference between metaphysicians and logicians in terms of conceiving the nature or the essence. Metaphysicians consider that the essence is understood by the first intentions that belong to beings, but logicians believe it to be

conceived by the second intentions like genus and species. Duns Scotus considers like metaphysicians that say the first intentions are the essence of beings. He says that if we do not conceive the first intentions as natural reality, then we cannot separate them. In addition, every separation has a reason; thus, there is not a separation without reason. If we can consider in terms of this logic, then we can easily explain the reason of division of things as genus and species because they have the different nature as individual beings. However, here is an important question; while we can explain the reason of division between the different species, we cannot easily explain the division among of the same species like human being. For example, although each human being belongs the same species as human being, they are the different because of the singular difference.

The difference or differentia is a term that is related to the first intentions and it is an abstract name that signifies the relation between two things. The difference is taken as the first intentions, and then it signifies a concrete name. For example, when we say that Socrates is an old man, and another time when we say that he is a young man, there is a concrete name different from each other in here. There are two different names as old and Young Socrates. The difference between two names is that they are two names that signify two different things but the object of them is the same. On the other hand, Aristotle says that the substantial differentia is not in the subject, it depends on the category or the first intentions. For instance, both man and rationality is not in the subject, they are the quality because they are the category of quality, but for Duns Scotus, the substantial difference is identical to the substance itself and the differentia is not a quality. According to him, the difference is found only in the realm of being or the substance.

The substance that is only real is the one; the other things are the accidents that are not real. When the object is considered as the one object, then it is real object but it is not enough in order to be able to conceive the one object because there is another relation to the object, it is related to true object that belongs to the cognition. In view of Duns Scotus, "Insofar as the object is the object of cognition, it can be called true object" (Heidegger 1978: 83). Therefore, the transcendental philosophy is related to this relationship. Every individual object is the one object when it cannot be conceived by the cognition, but without cognition we cannot know what the object is; therefore, every individual object is the object of cognition at the same time. As a result of this knowledge, "the true is the constituted in cognition (Heidegger 1978: 89).

If two things are distinct from each other, they are the individual beings, but if two things are not distinct, they are identical. Duns Scotus makes a separation between two kinds of identity, the formal identity and the real identity. According to him, when there is an identity between the same species, it is the formal identity. For example, since all individual human beings have the same nature as the rational being, they have the formal identity although they are not the same, except rationality. On the other hand, if two things have the real identity, they are the same because they have the potency to be actually the same (Harold Robbins 1978: xviii). While the identical things cannot be separated from each other, different things can be separated. When this problem is thought in terms of the individual beings, they are not the same because every individual being is different, but our intellect perceives them as the same by using the

first and the second intentions. Therefore, there are another division in order to explain this situation as the conceptual distinction. The conceptual distinction is made by the second intentions. For example, the same star, like Venus, is considered both as the morning star and the evening star. Since they are the same in terms of object, but they are not identical in terms of concept. For this reason, there is the conceptual difference in between them. According to this idea, if two things cannot be separated as extensially, they are identical, but if they are different meanings as concept, they are not identical. In other words, they are the single objects in reality, but they can be different in their definitions. For example, the psychological faculties and the will are really identical with the soul, but formally distinct from one another (Peter King 2003: 23). Thus, if the object is the same but the definitions are changed, then the formal definitions are produced via formal distinctions, we can produce distinctions, differences in the world. What is the real distinction or difference? The real distinction is to see being different from one thing to the other things. The thing that is formally distinct is really identical, but it is the individual beings as one.

2.1. The Individual Difference as One

What is the individual being? The individual being has a nature that cannot be transferred to any other being because it is proper it. This nature is neither the common nature that is shared by the whole same species nor genus because it belongs to the individual being only; it is the one that is the numerical. Thus, this nature is the numerical difference. According to Duns Scotus, the nature of the individual beings has a different nature than the outside of understanding or the intellect, but this nature cannot be known with the common nature, which is the universal terms that belong to metaphysics. The reason of the universal terms is the intellect. The meaning of this argument is that since the essence or the common nature belongs to the universal terms, the individual beings do not have the essence because the essence is produced by the intellect, but this essence does not belong to them. Therefore, when we ask what the individual being is, the answer is that it is the numerical difference (M. B. Inghman and M. Dreyer 2004: 105). But, this idea does not mean that every individual being has a different nature because if it was like that, then we could not explain how two different things belong to the same species. On the other hand, although the individual beings are the different, we do not know the essence of them because of our intellect structure because the individual beings can be sensed but they can be understood by the second terms, therefore, though they have the different essence, they are conceived with the same essence. For instance, all the human individual beings are the different, but they can be known under the same species as human being that is the rational being. In terms of this idea, the difference in itself is the one, but the essence of something is not the singular because the essence belongs to the universal terms that is the genus and the species. Hence, the common nature or essence is not singular.

According to this view, each human being takes his essence from the human nature that is the general concept and the human nature that is the general concept is divided in all of the human individual beings, but this does not mean that the whole individual beings are the identical. This view has two perspectives. First, since all the

human beings belong to the same essence, they are identical; on the other hand, they are formally different. For instance, since Socrates and Plato have the same nature as the human beings, they are identical, but as they have an individual being, they are formally different. If anything has a formal difference, then it does not need any other thing, it can exist independently. According to Duns Scotus, the nature and the person are not the same things because the person does not refer to the nature; likewise, since the nature or the essence does not belong to the singular being, the nature does not refer to the person. Because it signifies the essence of universal, it does not signify the individual being that is different in itself. As we have seen before, the essence is produced by the intellect as the general term. When we sense the individual beings, we cannot find any substance being common in it, but the intellect produces the general term by using the categories. "A common nature is properly located in the category: substance as such is in the category of substance: quantity as such is in the category quantity; quality as such (wisdom, whiteness) is properly in the category of quality (Richard Cross 2002: 18).

Things can be conceived by the understanding, but in itself things that are the ultimate difference cannot be known without the universal concept because they are the individual beings, which do not have an essence. The essence is the object of intellect that conceives with the concepts. The concepts are the second intentions that explain the concepts of concepts, not the concepts of things (Giorgio Pini, 2002: 136). Therefore, the second intentions are not representation of the external objects, which are the individual beings.

In addition, every individual being is the individual difference or the ultimate difference. "A differentia is the ultimate if it does not itself have a differentia" (Peter King, 2003: 19). When any substance cannot be divided anymore, then we take the ultimate difference that is undivided. In this view, the ultimate difference that is related to undivided substance cannot be decomposed, therefore, it is purely qualitative. In other words, it is one because one is the singular and undivided substance; since it does not have a component, it cannot be decomposed. In the ultimate difference it is immediately prior to the individual. Since each specie is distinct from another specie, there is a distinction between the individual beings. Therefore, every individual being that has an individual essence is the different. And the principle of individuation is the cause of their difference, uniqueness and numerical unity (M. B. Inghman and M. Dreyer 2004: 116). In reality, two individuals that belong to the same species are different from each other, but in terms of common nature, the difference between two individuals is formal and numerical. In other words, two individual beings are distinct from each other in the intellect, but in reality they are only different as numerical not as the nature.

Since every individual being is different from another, the individual beings cannot be explained by the universal terms because the universal terms cannot explain why they are different from each other. However, in terms of logic, individual beings are not distinct from each other; species and geniuses are different, but since the same species belong to the same genus, they have the same nature. For example, both human being and cat are under the genus of animal, on the other hand, both human being and cat are different from each other in terms of the specific difference. In addition,

although every individual human being is under the genus of human being, they are different from each other as the singular being. Then, the problem is that if every individual being is different from each other, how can the mind know the universal concepts? In order to know the universal concept, first the human mind has to sense what the individual being is, and second it produces the concepts by using the first and the second intentions. For this reason, the universal concepts that are the essence of the individual beings can be known by the intellect.

The individual being that has an essence or existence is the only being (Harold Robbins 1978: xvi), and since the individual being has a concrete existence, it is singular, which means that it can be divided and undivided. The singular being is undivided in itself because it is numerical. Therefore, “every object is one object in itself and by itself (Heidegger 1978: 36). Since this individual object is the one object, it cannot be undivided and it is simple. However, according to another idea, the one is divided and multum (Heidegger 1978: 41). On the other hand, for both ideas the one is positive. According to Duns Scotus, since the one is multitude, multiplicity, it is different from another one. This multiplicity is related to the theory of meaning. *Ens* or being is the one but the meaning of the one is multiple, and a multiplicity is possible by the one, it is not possible without the one. As a result of this idea, being is becoming by the aggregation of the one that is numerical. Therefore, the one is difference because each one is different one. For example, six rocks make up a different quantity according to seven rocks. When one rock is added to six, then the six rocks stop having the form of six and gain from the seven a form which is surely different from the former (Heidegger 1978: 59). In terms of Duns Scotus, being is the one and the one is distinct in the quantity object. In other words, every individual being is the one that is difference.

In other words, the one is an irreducible ultimate. For example, two apples are not the same because each one is different from the other in terms of spatiality, fruits. For this reason, the one is the individual that is multiplicity. As a result, “difference lies in the degree of reality. Therefore, there is the one reality, it is the one. The one infinitum as reality centred in itself and absolute is the highest value and the incontestable measure of all reality” (Heidegger 1978: 77).

Conclusion

The problem of the difference as the individual being is connected to three main problems. One of them is metaphysics, which is about transcendentals that are the one, the good and the truth. Since it is concerned to transcendentals, it cannot conceive what the individual being is. The second is related to the problem of the essence. The essence belongs to the universal concepts, not the individual beings in itself difference. Therefore, the essence of individual being cannot be known, the essence that we know is about the universal concepts. And third, while the common terms are general, the individual beings are many. Therefore, the difference is related to the individual beings that are multiple.

Duns Scotus'un Metafiziğinde Tekil Varolanlar Olarak Fark

Özet

Bu makalede, Duns Scotus'un metafiziği tümel kavramlar ve fark olarak tekil varolanlar açısından incelenecektir. Hem modern hem de çağdaş felsefede önemli etkileri olan Duns Scotus en genel anlamda varolanların varlığının ve fark olarak tekil varolanların filozofudur. Çünkü o, tekil varolanları tümel kavramların özü altında yok etmez. Bu nedenle onun metafiziği açısından, varlığın özü ile ilgili olan tümel kavramlar tekil varolanlarla bağlantılıdır. Bu bağlamda, tekil varolanlar ve tümel kavramlar, cinsler ve türler problemlerini anlamak için bizim onun metafiziğinin ne olduğunu bilmeye ihtiyacımız var. Bu nedenle makalede ilk olarak metafizik ve tümel kavramlar ilişkisi açıklanacak; sonrasında ise tekil varlığın ne olduğu irdelenecektir. Sonuç olarak bu çalışmada şunu savunmaktayım, Scotus'un tikel varolanlar ideası bir olan fark'a aittir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Duns Scotus, Metafizik, Tanrı, Varlık, Kategoriler, Tekil Varolanlar ve Fark.

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