Araştırma Makalesi * Research Article

One Paradigm Many Orders: Realists' Conceptualizations of International Order

Tek Paradigma Birçok Düzen: Realistlerin Düzen Kavramlaştırmaları

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Abstract: As the relative decline of the United States and the rise of China have become the focus of international relations studies, the concept of "international order" has also been frequently debated in recent years. These debates touch on very different points in the IR discipline and are addressed at different levels. The main reason for this situation is that the concept of order, like any other concept, is portrayed in different ways by students of international politics. Despite being a paradigm that has lost favour in recent years, Realist theories have been at the centre of these debates for a long time. This study will explore how Realists conceive of international order. Considering the fact that Realism contains hundreds of large and small theories and approaches, the study selects theorists and homogeneous theories that clearly conceptualise order. For this reason, Hans Morgenthau, Robert Gilpin and Patrick Porter from Classical Realism and Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer from Structural Realism will be selected and their conceptualisations of order will be discussed.

Keywords: International order, classical realism, structural realism.

Öz: Görece ABD'nin gerileyişi, Çin'in yükselişi gibi konuların uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarının merkezini oluşturmaya başladığı bu dönemde "uluslararası düzen" kavramı da buna paralel olarak son yıllarda sıklıkla tartışılan bir kavram olmuştur. Bu tartışmalar IR disiplininde çok farklı noktalara değinmekte ve yine farklı seviyelerde ele alınmaktadır. Bu durumun asıl sebebi her kavramda olduğu gibi düzen kavramının da IR çalışanları tarafından farklı şekillerde tasvir edilmesidir. Her ne kadar son yıllarda gözden düşmüş bir paradigma da olsa, Realist teoriler bu tartışmaların uzun süredir merkezinde yer almaktadır. Bu çalışmada da Realistlerin uluslararası düzeni nasıl tasavvur ettiği incelenecektir. Realizm içinde irili ufaklı yüzlerce teori ve yaklaşım barındırması hasebiyle düzen kavramlaştırmalarını net bir şekilde yapan teorisyenler ve homojen teoriler seçilmiştir. Bu sebeple Klasik Realistlerden Hans Morgenthau, Robert Gilpin ve Patrick Porter; Yapısal Realizmden de Kenneth Waltz ve John Mearsheimer seçilerek onların düzen kavramlaştırmaları tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası düzen, kasik realizm, yapısal realizm.

INTRODUCTION

What is the international order? And how is it constructed? Are values, identities and ideologies effective in establishing and maintaining it? To what extent does it influence state behaviour? Are there preferable or undesirable orders? Such questions have been a central focus in realist theories regarding international order. Given that realism is a comprehensive paradigm that entails hundreds of theories, large and small, it is obvious that its conceptualisation of order needs to be classified or organised. With this in mind, the goal of this paper is to reorganise the conceptualisation of order in classical and structural realism by two aspects. Firstly, it seeks to ascertain the impact of the theorist's level of analysis on their conceptualisation of international order, and to compare this with that of other theorists. Secondly, it aims to determine the extent to which the theorists adhere to their own theories, and thus to the level of analysis that is the starting point of their theories, in their conceptualisation of order.

While the idea of international order is supposed to be understood as a state of peace or the absence of conflict, world history has not been free of war or conflict. Consequently, IR studies have come to accept this reality and have tailored their conception of order to fit it. While the text below will cover multiple understandings of the concept of international order, a common theme across these perspectives is that order refers to the "absence of a chaotic environment". It is important to note that, like anarchy, order should not be conflated with the absence of war. The presence or absence of order can affect the actions of actors in international political and regulate their behaviour. However, it is possible that actors may sometimes act in opposition to the given order. Such opposing behaviour does not necessarily negate the presence of the order. For example, the existence of "illiberal" states like North Korea or Afghanistan may not be sufficient to disprove the existence of a "liberal world order".

Having said that, it is difficult to define the concept of international or world order as a state of absence of war, but it is possible to see conceptualisations that imply a relative reduction in the number of wars and conflicts. For example, Anne Marie Slaughter from the liberal wing (2004: 15) defines the international order as the institutionalised state of cooperation and adequately limited conflicts. The British School, referring to the international community, defines the international order, in summary, as a model or arrangement that enables the community of states to achieve its basic objectives (Goh, 2013; Navari, 2000). Stacie Goddard (2018: 18-21), who describes herself as a Realist-Constructivist, points out that legitimacy is also socially constructed and that the powerful are the decision-makers on what is legitimate, and therefore the basic goals within the order are prepared by the powerful. Could one of these goals be the dollar-based economic order that sustains the US economy? Carla Norrlof (2010) argues that the security umbrella provided by the United States has enabled the US to recover the capital it has invested in a way that is many times more profitable..

In addition to those who analyse the international order in terms of military and state interests, it is also possible to consider it in terms of values. Alise Coen (2018: 1271-74) argues that the liberal international order will only work as long as states are committed to human rights and comply with international law. In recent years, studies emphasising a hierarchical rather than anarchic structure have become more popular. Ayşe Zarakol is one of the pioneers of this approach. Zarakol (2011: 246) analyses how the defeated East took its place in the order established by the victorious West. According to her, even societies/states such as Türkiye and Japan, which have adopted the values of the West, took a long time to gain a secure place in the international order built by the West. Nevertheless, they could not become one of them, but they were able to rise to the level of a close friend.

Different conceptualisations of international order have been briefly mentioned above. It is possible to diversify the literature review. However, in order not to break away from the theme of this study, it has been dealt with to a limited extent and studies that differ from each other have been included in order to show how diversified they are. The next section is devoted to those who explain how the international order should be and those who explain how and what it is. In this respect, while approaches that construct an imaginary international order will be discussed under the title of idealist orders, the title of realist orders will be the main area of discussion in this section and will be reserved for those who explain the international order in a relatively more materialistic way. As a matter of fact, the Idealist-Realist debate has a history of nearly 100 years and it would be difficult to discuss one

without the other. For this reason, in order to draw attention to the nuance between them, Idealist approaches are also included, albeit relatively briefly.

IDEALISTIC ORDERS

It would not be wrong to say that Hedley Bull (1977) is one of the first names to come to mind when it comes to international order. The main reason for this is that Bull is the first person to define a complete international order. According to him, international order is formed at the point where three basic principles of the community of states or international community are maintained. These are survival or invulnerability, honouring one's word, and protection of possessions (Bull, 2002: 1-10). While Bull uses the concept of international order only for states, he also includes non-state parts in the world order (Bull, 2002: 19). Both definitions of order refer to the articles of the Treaty of Westphalia on the one hand, and have normative content and describe the ideal on the other. As a matter of fact, his work gives advice on how to reform the international order formed by the system of states. For him, the main obstacle to establishing a world order is the existence of the system of states and this must be overcome (Bull, 1976: 9). In fact, it is possible to argue that E. H. Carr's 1939 work, which can be described as a critique of naïve idealism, contains many answers to Bull's 1977 work. But it is also natural that such naïve idealism was used during the detente period of the Cold War.

By 2003, another idealist conceptualisation of international order is encountered with Alexander Wendt. Wendt (2003) draws a linear history for the coming years and divides it into five phases. These are: system of states, system of societies, world society, collective security and finally the world state. Wendt, who makes a teleological inference, thinks that the salvation for people lies in establishing the world state and puts forward a series of orders in this direction. He even claims that the trend is in that direction. However, both answers he gives for this claim are insufficient.

The first answer is that in 1000 BC there were more than 600,000 political communities, whereas today there are about 200. So he says that the number is getting closer and closer to one (Wendt, 2003: 503). The course of empirical data can sometimes mislead scientists. It is even more risky to go further and make a future prediction. There are many examples of this in IR studies (Fukuyama, 1992; Layne, 1993). Neither, as Fukuyama claimed, was liberalism the final point of the world that can reach, nor, as Layne claimed, was NATO going to dissolve in the early 2000s and the world to become multipolar. So, theorists should not be fortune tellers.

Wendt's second answer is that states are now beginning to form regional sub-systems (Wendt, 2003: 503). However, it was also possible to see such subsystems in the age of empires in the 16th century. The Holy Romano-Germanic and Ottoman Empires, as well as China in the far east, had many states or political entities under their influence without incorporating them into their territories. Was the international order better at that time? Did it decline later and is it getting better again today? This kind of linear-idealist conception of history is called Aristotelian logic, and the logic of many philosophers from Aristotle to Farabi and Ibn Khaldun is constructed in this way. The philosophical perspective is not a favoured approach within the discipline of IR.

It is possible to list many other studies such as Bull and Wendt that emphasise what should be instead of the current international order. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible for such studies to penetrate the reality and change it. Because in order to realise the ideal, it is necessary to gather all the actors in the world and reach a consensus, or for one actor to come out and impose these principles on all the rest, or for a threat from outside the world. Of these, the last one seems to be the most realistic (Wendt & Duvall, 2008).

Among the idealist approaches, there are also those that focus on what is rather than what should be. Compared to others, these studies have received more interaction in the discipline of IR today. Although these approaches have normative content in their conceptualisations of international order, such as Bull and Wendt, it can be said that they try to shed light on the present. HST (Hegemonic Stability Theorists), which can be described as a common cluster where many clusters intersect, claim that the unipolar system is stable and will establish a relatively peaceful order by keeping other actors in line in general (Ikenberry vd., 2009). These theorists argue that the liberal-based international order

established by the United States has become a system from which almost everyone benefits. (Wohlforth, 1999).

While the theorists close to realism (Wohlforth) place more emphasis on unipolarity and the relative stability it provides, those close to liberalism (Ikenberry, Slaughter) emphasise the US and the international order built on its unique values. But they have one thing in common. This is why non-US actors should not challenge the relative hegemony of the US. To summarise, on the one hand, the message is that the US is militarily and economically very powerful and that any action against the US will have severe consequences, and on the other hand, that it would be pointless to destroy the "peaceful", "liberal" and "economic" order that the US has established, since everyone can benefit from it.

The most remarkable name in the second section is G. John Ikenberry. Ikenberry (2014:84) according to the view, three elements are needed for the establishment of international order. First, the leading state or group of states must have material means such as military and economic power in order to coerce and persuade other actors to join the order. Secondly, in order for the institutions and rules of the order to be accepted, it must have values such as democracy, human rights and justice that are accepted by everyone. Third, the order must be able to develop solutions to common problems and the actors within the order must benefit from this. Ikenberry puts forward the concept of "liberal international order" based on these three elements. According to him, in the new order that developed after the Cold War, just as pure/raw power is limited by the constitution in domestic politics, it can be claimed that the raw power of states is limited by values in the international environment and that the new order is institutionalised (Ikenberry, 2001: 19). In the liberal international order, the US is the order-maker and the actor whose power is restricted by values and institutions. Claiming that the liberal order, which he claims to be more than a 100-year project, was articulated with US President Wilson, its material capacity was established during the Cold War, and it spread to wider geographies after the US victory. Ikenberry admits that in recent years this order has entered a crisis due to developments in US domestic politics and the presence of rising anti-democratic powers such as China (Ikenberry, 2020: 12). On the other hand, the US withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan was one of the factors that triggered the crisis (Brooks vd., 2012). Ikenberry's solution to the crisis is to return to the roots of the liberal understanding of international order (Ikenberry, 2020: 307-311). The statement by the 2020-elected US President Joe Biden (2020) that he would build a coalition of democratic governments is indicative of the influence of Ikenberry's ideas within the US administration. After a brief literary critique of idealist orders, we can look at the realist conceptualisation of order, which is the main focus of this study, in more detail.

REALIST ORDERS

Every stance gains meaning with its opposite. Realism is the opposite of Idealism. Idealism existed first, and it is possible to claim that the destructive imagination of the Idealist world gave birth to realist theories (Carr, 2016). For this reason, realism's understanding of order is generally based on criticising Idealist orders or imaginations of order. As it will be analysed in its sub-headings, especially the works of Mearsheimer and Porter are in this direction. An important feature of realist theories is to explain the existing order in its own limited conception instead of making it better. The simplest definition of international order in this context is anarchic. It is possible to see this definition of order in which security is scarce most clearly in Waltz.

If realist theories have one thing in common, it is that each of them paints a pessimistic picture of international politics. Realists are pessimistic in their conception of human nature, the nature of states and the nature of international politics. In the realist world, every man will hang by his own bootstraps. In other words, each state thinks that it must provide its own security. Security is scarce and it is very difficult for states to ensure their security. Because the increase in the security of one state will take away from the security of others. This corresponds to a continuous and endless struggle. According to them, international politics is dominated by this security dilemma.

Under this topic, the ways in which the concept of international order is handled by realists will be categorised under four questions. In this section, the conceptualisations of order by classical and structural realists will be discussed, and the following questions will be addressed: how order is

achieved, who is the order maker, what is the nature of order, and whether there is a distinction between good and bad order.

Briefly, it will deal with those who try to conceptualise the international order within the framework of classical realism, in other words, around the lowest level of analysis, at the scale of the smallest units that can affect the event or phenomenon under study. For example, a study that argues that an international order is created on the basis of a leader's doctrine, ideology or the characteristics, power, etc. of states will be considered in this category. On the other hand, if an international order is conceptualised on the basis of the size of the system they describe, this time it will be evaluated under structural realism.

It is worth opening a separate parenthesis here as to why Neo Classical Realism (NCR) is not included. There are several reasons for this. First, as its NCR theorists argue that although the NCR is based on realist foundations, draws on many paradigms (Ripsman et al., 2016: 164). In the process of constructing their respective theories, each NCR theorist selects a number of variables from a bag containing all the variables that have been used in previous theories. In this context, it is not homogenous. Considering the names such as Gideon Rose, Stephen M. Walt[1], Randall Schweller, Peter D. Feawer, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, it will be seen that each of them constructs their constructs by making use of different variables. Second, is the NCR a methodological path for foreign policy analysis (Rathbun, 2008: 296)? Or is it a comprehensive theory that can explain international politics? When we add up all the NCR literature, it can be said that it can explain a large part of international politics even more comprehensively than its predecessors, the classical and structural realist theories. Taking both of these cases into account, it would be appropriate to describe the NCR as a *theorish* rather than a theory. Therefore, it is difficult to say that it has a consistent stance on order since it can benefit from the conceptualisations of international order of many theories.

International Order in Classical Realism

There are realists who think that the international order is formed, influenced and directed by the smallest parts. These have been especially the state-centred realists, also known as classical realists. Hans Morgenthau, Robert Gilpin and nowadays Patrick Porter are among this class of realists. Among these scholars, Morgenthau, as the founder of the theory, has also laid the foundations for international order. Accordingly, Morgenthau makes use of three elements in his conceptualisation of order. The first of these is leadership, the second is the balance of power, and the third is the world state.

Among the realists, Morgenthau is one of the theorists who attributes the most importance to the concept of leadership, whether of an individual or of a state (Zhang, 2017). In Morgenthau's theory, it can be said that these two phenomena, namely the character of the individual and the character of the state, are closely related. According to him, since states, and especially the rulers of states, are the prime movers of the international order, the course of the international order will depend on their efforts (Amstrup, 1978). With this Morgenthau describes the defining characteristic of classical realism. It is the drawing of a straight line from the smallest indivisible part of international relations to the whole. In other words, a thick line runs from the leader to the international order. The aim is to explain international politics by starting from the leader or the person, linking him/her to the behaviour of the state, and linking the behaviour of the state to the international order. For example, if we wanted to describe today's international order based on Morgenthau's fiction, we would have to make a description of the order by taking into account how US President Joe Biden governs his country, the actions of his state, and consequently his influence and reaction to other states. Biden's actions will also affect the international order. In other words, in classical realism, the leader is at the first stage of order determinants. Accordingly, for Morgenthau, international order is an output of the impact-response processes with other states in line with the policies of the leaders of the most powerful state in international politics. The better and more capable the leaders are, the more peaceful the order will be.

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[1] In his balance of threat theory, Stephen M. Walt posits that the concept of threat can be understood in an abstract manner, as a function of psychological interactions. He delineates between concrete and inconcrete events and phenomena, and suggests that the threat level will fluctuate in accordance with geographical proximity, offensive/military capacity and perception of intentions (Walt, 1987, p. 5). In structural realism, we never quite sure about intentions and inconcrete concepts donot have a place in a materialist theory. That is why we recognise him as a member of the NCR theory.

As with any theorist, it is possible to see inconsistencies in Morgenthau's works. Although Morgenthau (1947: 155) emphasised the capacity of leaders to select the most rational option amidst an array of irrational alternatives, by 1976 he had shifted his perspective, suggesting that the leader's personality, party affiliation, and intentions were of little importance in foreign policy (Morgenthau, [1976] 2011: 143). Nevertheless, it may be necessary to accept that the first option may be more appropriate, respecting the unit-level analyses of classical realism.

Secondly, Morgenthau refers to the positioning of power in inter-state relations. Morgenthau often refers to the balance of power when characterising international order. While the balance of power defines an order, it also serves as an important building block for the establishment of an international order. Because situations where there is no balance of power will correspond to disorder in a sense. Morgenthau also characterises some states as the founders, protectors and drivers of order. He calls these states, which maintain the balance of power, holder, balancer or the holder of the balance (Morgenthau, 1948: 142). The existence of a holder state requires the presence of more than two great powers in international politics. In other words, the holder/balancer is the actor that will ensure balance in a multipolar system. According to Morgenthau, both systems pose a danger for international politics, since bipolar systems lead to polarisation and thus wars, and unipolar systems cannot be balanced. Because in bipolar systems there is no actor to hold competition. International politics is a place of power struggle and will continue until one of the poles dominates the other. Unipolar systems, on the other hand, are more dangerous as there is no holder/balancer. Whether democratic or autocratic, the lust for power of the single great power in the system will be unstoppable (Jervis, 2009: 206). Because power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely (Wolfers, 1962: 121).

In a multipolar system, the holder/balancer establishes order. It is the actor who directs, shape and shove the power struggle. The holder is the actor who benefits the most from the established order and will stand up to an actor who is dissatisfied with the status quo. It must be able to occupy a high position in the hierarchy of military and economic power in order to preserve the order. This actor to prevent revisionism is exemplified in 19th century Britain (Morgenthau, 1948: 144). Britain would use its holder/balancer role at times against France and at other times against Tsarist Russia. As Britain lost this ability at the beginning of the 20th century, the order was destabilised and a world war broke out (Morgenthau, 1948: 273). We mentioned above that for Morgenthau, the leader of a great power influences the order, whereas the leadership of the great power within the system can equally influence the order. Therefore, for Morgenthau, international order is the inter-state political network in which the balance of power is established and maintained by a holder/balancer actor.

Finally, Morgenthau (1948: 391) refers to the concept of the World State when characterising the international order. At this point, for him, order is synonymous with peace. He reinforces this with a question: why is there peace and order in a national society, but not in the international arena? Morgenthau's (1948: 391-398) answer is short and clear: "because we cannot speak of the sovereignty of a state in the international arena". Morgenthau sees the idea of a World State or World Government as a dream. As a matter of fact, pessimism, which is one of the main characteristics of realism, is also encountered in terms of order. Nevertheless, he describes the world state order in two ways. The first is the Wilsonian Utopia and the second is the Machiavellist Utopia (Morgenthau, 1945: 145-147). The world order, which he calls Wilsonian Utopia, points to an idealist world government in which the consent of each state is obtained. He likens Machiavellian Utopia to Niccolo Machiavelli's unity of the Italian city-states. Accordingly, one principality would have to come to the fore and dominate the others. In short, for Morgenthau, who sees both as impossible, the first is the manifestation of realism's fight with idealism, while the second is the summary of realism's fight with adventurous aggression.

In conclusion, Morgenthau uses the concept of international order indiscriminately. He can also characterise any status quo as order. According to him, a situation to be secured by the victors of World War I and its legal/political counterpart, the League of Nations, also correspond to an order (Morgenthau, 1939: 477). At the time of Morgenthau's 1939 study, faith in international organisations and world peace had not yet been lost and the League of Nations had not yet disbanded. In other words, even if the trend towards idealism had faded 20 years earlier, there was still faith in the possibility of stopping Hitler and Mussolini peacefully. It is only natural that his study, written in such an

environment, should be able to argue that an international organisation, however unsuccessful, was able to bring order.

Robert Gilpin divides realist theories into two. On the one hand, there is "state-centred realism", which begins with Thucydides and Machiavelli and continues with Morgenthau and is based on the state and the interests of states. On the other side, there is "system-centred realism", which was established with Waltz and is based on the distribution of capabilities in international politics and its impact on states. In the light of this distinction, although Gilpin's name is associated with structural realism, he defines himself as a state-centred realist (Gilpin & Gilpin, 2001: 15). When we look at Gilpin's works, we can see that he approaches international order from two points. In both of his conceptualisations of international order, which he categorises under two topics as international order from a political perspective and international order from an economic perspective, he examines it from the level of state analysis.

Gilpin, (1981: 37) in political terms, he refers to the conceptualisation of order as the World Order and uses it synonymously with the international system. He states that the orders established and governed by the Roman Empire and the USA are different from each other. For him, a comprehensive theory of IR should pay attention to these differences and the characteristic features of each of them (1981: 38). In other words, it should emphasise whether the order under study is religious, ideological or regime-based. Nevertheless, as a realist, Gilpin's emphasis on power cannot be denied. Because according to him, the hierarchy of power can provide order and stability to a system, no matter what it is (Gilpin, 1988: 596).

According to Gilpin, the increase in the power of a state can change itself internally as well as affect other states. The state's interests will evolve and it will promote an ideology and order on this scale. In order to do so, it will need to gradually increase or maintain its prestige. Because the actor sitting at the top of the prestige hierarchy will also be the determinant of the new order (Gilpin, 1981: 210-231). Gilpin therefore attributes equal weight to power and prestige.

Robert Gilpin is a theorist who has emphasised political economy more than any other realist theorists. For example, Gilpin, one of the declinists of the 1970s and 80s such as Paul Kennedy, Samuel Huntington and David Calleo, justifies the relative decline of the United States economically (Gilpin, 1975). Again, in his conceptualisation of international order, he attaches particular importance to the economic situation. According to Gilpin (1987: 3-5), since the World War II, despite some interruptions, international politics has mostly been economically liberal. Gilpin, who belongs to the realist wing of the HST, which is a set of mixed theories, argues that the strong leadership of the USA has an important role in the liberalisation of international politics. (Gilpin & Gilpin, 2001: 97-102). However, Gilpin, as a realist, emphasises that the US followed this path not out of altruism but as a result of state interests. Gilpin argues that this relatively liberal order has continued after the Cold War, but the new era of globalisation has tried to add normative features to it. However, international politics is still state-centred, national and local. For this reason, the liberal order will not be successful enough (Gilpin & Gilpin, 2001: 10-12, 400-402).

Patrick Porter is one of the most significant classical realists of the last generation. Although there is no realist theory developed by him, he tries to resurrect classical realism in IR studies. In addition, with his recent works, he has also come to the fore with his opposition to the Liberal International Order approach like Mearsheimer, as will be discussed in the following section. The False Promise of Liberal Order: Nostalgia, Delusion and the Rise of Trump (2020) is in fact a realist response to liberal order supporters such as Ikenberry. But Porter's main characteristic is that he is the epitome of Niccolo Machiavelli in the 21st century.

First, Porter provides a clear definition of international order. Order is the hierarchical dictation of peace by the powerful on their own terms (Porter, 2020: 11). In Porter, we cannot talk about a rules-based order based on rules or norms. The powerful will always establish order.

The powerful do not establish their order by consensus, but by brute force (Porter, 2020: 10-34). He says that there are many examples of this in history. The Roman, Byzantine, Chinese and Ottoman Empires, the French and British Empires, and finally the United States of America, have all established

their own order by brute force. Whatever their regimes and administrations, all of them, including the one established by the USA, have the characteristics of empires. This imperial characteristic also authorises the founding actor to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. Other states may also consent to this. Otherwise, they can be brought into line by the brute force of the leader (Porter, 2020: 11, 29-30).

Porter's work can be considered a modern iteration of Machiavelli's The Prince, offering insights and guidance to the US administration. In essence, Porter's book offers a contemporary interpretation of Machiavelli's advice to the Medici family, presented in a format that is accessible to 21ˢᵗ century readers. According to him, the order of international politics is not liberal and the US, as the leader of this illiberal order, should act accordingly. International politics is not in a period when the US can pursue a comfortable policy alone, as it was in the 90s. The system is now multipolar and the relative leadership of the US is under threat. It should abandon the idea of global leadership and strategically resort to a balance of power policy. The first thing it needs to do for this is to withdraw from the Middle East, which is no longer important for it, and to accept that it will enter into a serious struggle with China. In particular, it should distance Russia and China from each other and encircle China this time as it did the Soviets in the Cold War. In other words, the role of conservatism that Morgenthau assigned to Britain in the 19th century, Porter proposes for the US in the 21st century (Porter, 2020: 10-34, 156, 191-198, 237-240).

Porter's conceptualisation of international order is simple. However, he realises that a mere hierarchy of power will not bring order. He resorts to domestic politics to fill the concept of order. He claims that the democratic, libertarian and pro-free market domestic politics of the USA makes it a better leader than China. Because for Porter, China has an autocratic regime, is oppressive and will choose a harsher way of coercion than the US against states that do not obey it (Porter, 2020: 44). Indeed, Porter has good empires and bad empires. This is very natural. classical realism uses and relies on the smallest level of analysis that cannot be further reduced. Whereas in structural realism, as will be explained in a moment, there should be no inherently good or bad hegemon (Waltz, 2004: 3).

International Order in Structural Realism

Structural Realists have used the concept of international order in place of many concepts. Anarchic or hierarchical structures, stability or peace, distribution of power / capabilities or international system, or power relations established by a hegemonic actor in its sphere of influence have all been used in the name of international order. All of these concepts can correspond to an order in themselves. Each conceptualisation of order is intertwined and interrelated. In other words, each can be considered as a series of sub-orders. This shows that structural realism, which claims to be simple, does not remain constant at the level of systemic analysis. In anarchic orders, where the level of analysis is not high enough, it looks from the systemic level, while in Systemic and Hegemonic orders, it reduces the level of analysis to the state level and looks from the point where it can see the Great Powers.

Figure 1. *Orders according to structural realism*

It could be argued that our criticism of the variability of the level of analysis of structural realism is unfair and that we have confused the levels of analysis with the unit of analysis. When talking about systemic and hegemonic orders, they analyse the distribution of capabilities and hegemonic actors. This makes their unit of analysis the Great Powers and hegemonic actors.

That is true up to this point. But it also means that they analyse international politics from their point of view. In other words, it means explaining international politics by reducing it to the Great Powers and their influence. In fact, Waltz's definition of structure, like anarchy, corresponds to a combination of the organising principle and the distribution of capabilities (Waltz, 1982: 88). It will be seen that in the explanations of order in which the number of poles and their effects are in question, it will be seen that they prioritise a situation that is at the initiative of the units, such as the distribution of capabilities, instead of variables such as anarchy affecting each unit at the levels of analysis. This is Waltz's (1990: 37) that they are functionally the same and that they differentiate the states, which he calls units, behaviourally from each other (Waltz, 1982a: 82-83). It is possible to see this situation in Mearsheimer rather than Waltz. Because Mearsheimer in a way transformed structural realism, which is a theory of international politics, into the theory of Great Power politics. Therefore, the flexible levels of analysis of structural realism complicate it.

The first concept that structural realism uses as order is anarchy. Until the emergence of structural realist theory with Waltz in 1979, no realist had given such importance to the concept of anarchy. Although classical realists such as Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Gilpin also used the concept of anarchy, the nature of their theories emphasised man and his nature. When the level of analysis of the realist theoretical perspective increased with Waltz, anarchy became the most important factor. Anarchy corresponds to the absence of a government that governs states. It is the opposite of world government or hierarchy (Waltz, 1990: 30; Milner, 1991: 71). While hierarchy is a feature of domestic politics, anarchy is at the heart of international politics (Waltz, 1979: 102-128). With reference *to the Social Contract*, people will want to be governed by delegating their responsibilities to a higher authority. In this relationship of rulers and ruled, the order will be hierarchical. In international politics, states will always want to rule. The desire to rule in each of them has become an obstacle for states to determine an authority above them and has made the order anarchic.

In an anarchic order, states cannot govern each other, but anarchy will guide them with the order it creates. International politics is under the shadow of the use of force and violence by states against each other in an anarchic order (Waltz, 1979: 102). In domestic politics, too, people can use force and violence against each other. This is not what distinguishes anarchy from hierarchy. In domestic politics

there is a higher authority to punish those who commit acts of violence. If you are subjected to violence, there are law enforcement agencies and a legal system to defend your rights. What makes international politics anarchic is that when faced with violence, there is no superior authority to call for help or to protect your rights on your behalf (Mearsheimer, 2001: 51). You'll have to look after yourselves.

The anarchic order of structural realism does not mean non-stop war and violence, which is the state of nature in Hobbes. Nor does it mean a totally peaceful order. States always act in consideration of the possibility of another's use of force and violence. In other words, they prioritise their security. Anarchic order puts states in a race for security (Mearsheimer, 2001: 408-409). In structural realism, it is not anarchy that produces wars; wars are about how power or opportunities are distributed (Mearsheimer, 2001: 412-413). This leads us to another conceptualisation of order by structural realists.

The distribution of power or capabilities or polarity is another pattern used by structural realists as international order. Unipolar, bipolar and multipolar systems have each been used as an order when appropriate. In these orders, which are considered as systemic orders in this study, the distribution of capabilities has an important impact on the behaviour of states. Because a balanced distribution of capabilities can bring order and stability to international politics, while an unbalanced distribution will bring instability.

According to structural realism, the most stable system is bipolarity as it brings relative peace and stability within itself. In international politics, the opportunities are concentrated on two sides and a relative balance is achieved. Each of the poles does its best to prevent the emergence of another power. The balanced nature of the system will bring order to it (Waltz, 1967: 211). Because each pole has one actor to fear and the others have only two actors. In other words, states will be afraid of how many great powers there are besides themselves. The fewer the actors to be feared, the more stable and organised the system is (Mearsheimer, 2001: 53-54, 66-70). Structural realists either ignore unipolar orders (Mearsheimer, 1990, 2001) or they see it as a momentary event (Krauthammer, 1990; Mastanduno, 1997; Sheetz & Mastanduno, 1997). This is because after the historical threshold analysed by the realists (the Treaty of Westphalia), no unipolar order has been encountered. Waltz also points out that the unipolar order is a very recent phenomenon. "Can the United States be reasonable and tolerant and maintain order in this new order in which it is the only great power?" Waltz asks (Waltz, 1993: 187-195). According to him, historically and theoretically speaking, this would not be possible.

Structural Realists attach so much importance to stability and balance that Mearsheimer divides multipolar systems into balanced and unbalanced ones (Mearsheimer, 2001: 333). Balanced multipolarity is more stable because power is distributed roughly equally among states. In unbalanced multipolar systems, on the other hand, there will be at least one major power seeking to establish hegemony. Realists refrain from calling such systems order, arguing that uncertainty leads to disorder. To reiterate here, in cases where there are systemic orders, the anarchic order still persists. The orders are intertwined.

The last sub-order in structural realism is the hegemonic order, which is embodied by John J. Mearsheimer. According to him, none of the great powers is satisfied with the status quo. Each of them is a revisionist actor. They will want to change the order in their favour and eventually become hegemons. Mearsheimer argues that no great power has ever been able to become a global hegemon on its own and even cannot become one. This is the tragedy of great powers that strive to become global hegemons despite the fact that they cannot. Instead, one finds regional hegemonies of great powers (Mearsheimer, 2001). These regional hegemonies are the smallest scale orders in structural realism. The orders established by Japan between 1895-1945, by the USA and the USSR during the Cold War, and by China in the 1990s are all examples of hegemonic orders. Since they are the most powerful actor in the order they have established, they have a vertical relationship with the states included in the order. They depend on the hegemon in politics, economy and defence industry.

At the beginning of this chapter, we briefly mentioned that the systemic and hegemonic ordering of orders in structural realism does not fit the level of analysis of the theory. It would be appropriate to think of Mearsheimer's hegemonic orders as closed boxes and to summarise his general theory as an explanation of the relationship between these closed boxes. These varying levels of analysis not only put

the theory in a methodologically difficult situation, but also lead to the imposition of normative features on a materialist theory. The most obvious example of this is the naming of the order allegedly established under the leadership of the USA after the Cold War as the Liberal International Order (Mearsheimer, 2018, 2019).

Mearsheimer's "The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities" (2018) targets the liberal order that the US is trying to establish. Again under the title of classical realism, Patrick Porter's "The False Promise of Liberal Order: Nostalgia, Delusion and the Rise of Trump" (2020) also mentions the conceptualisation of liberal order. Therefore, liberal orders are the main target of these two works written in close proximity to each other. But with one difference. While Porter argues that the order established by the US is not a liberal order, but an imperial order formed by a hierarchy of power like its predecessors (Porter, 2020)Mearsheimer argues that the US has established a liberal order, but that it is not sustainable (Mearsheimer, 2018, 2019). In other words, while Porter was able to fill his conceptualisation of order with realist notions, Mearsheimer borrowed his conceptualisation of order from Liberal theorists. Contrary to Porter, Mearsheimer did not explain order with realist notions, but rather instilled normativity into the theory. Kenneth Waltz, the founder of structural realism, also dealt with the same issue and stated that although the USA has a liberal-dominated government, it acts with its material capacity in international politics (Waltz, 2000: 38).

Mearsheimer not only degenerate structural realism, but also abandoned the offensive realism he himself founded with the *Great Delusion*. However, with offensive realism, without adding any normative factor, he could have explained why the US is trying to become a global hegemon and why this will end in failure. He could have painted an offensive realist scheme by using examples such as the US using the expansion of NATO to prevent the emergence of new regional hegemons; the US supporting actors such as India and Japan and putting the responsibility of containing China on their shoulders; the US's interest-oriented relationship with the Gulf countries; the US welcoming the UK's departure from the European Union in order to prevent the European Union from growing too much; and many other examples. But Mearsheimer has been at loggerheads with liberal theorists, especially Ikenberry, for so long that it is not difficult to say that the "enemies" are now trying to look alike.

As a result, Mearsheimer degenerate the theory as much as the NCR students. If we were to adapt Thomas Hobbes' phrase "*homo homini lupus est*" (Man is the wolf of man) to this damage Realists have done to Realism, *"Realis Realismus lupus est"* (Realists are the wolf of Realism) would be an appropriate expression.

CONCLUSION

To summarise, this study examines the conceptualisations of order in the two most influential theories of the realist paradigm, classical and structural realism. Hans Morgenthau, Robert Gilpin and Patrick Porter in classical realism and Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer in structural realism are analysed. However, each theorist has been criticised within the framework of his own theoretical construct. In other words, it is possible to see this study as a realist critique of realism. Moreover, this is an attempt has been made to reorganise these realists' conceptualisations of order. However, new categorisations are still possible. For instance, while one group takes a more theoretically based approach (Waltz, 1967b), another group may focus on US strategies and actions in terms of their practical implications (Brooks et al., 2012; Posen, 2014). This study will transfer itself to new studies that observe the distinction between practice and theory.

Table 1. *Ordering realists' orders*

	CLASSICAL REALISM			STRUCTURAL REALISM	
	HANS MORGENTHAU	**ROBERT GILPIN**	**PATRICK PORTER**	**KENNETH WALTZ**	**JOHN MEARSHEIMER**
HOW TO ESTABLISH AN ORDER?	Power + Ideology	Prestige	Brute force	Stability	Stability
WHO IS THE ORDER-BUILDER?	Leader or Holder	Hegemon	Empire	Anarchy	Hegemon
THE NATURE OF THE ORDER	Stable	Economic	Hierarchic	Anarchic	Hierarchic
IS THERE A GOOD / EVIL ORDER?	Yes	No	Yes	No	Both Yes and No

In Table 1, the conceptualisations of international order by five realist theorists are summarised with the answers given to four questions. The fact that different names give different answers to the same questions within the same paradigm is related to the dimension from which they view the concept of international order. In other words, the levels of analysis used were effective in the given answers. For example, the main reason why Waltz describes the nature of order as anarchic is that he sees all actors as units with similar functions from the systemic level of analysis. In the same question, Porter calls it hierarchical because he observes from the state level of analysis that the Great Powers behave like empires and have their own hinterlands. The similarities between the different theories in the table can also be explained by the basic characteristics of realism. For example, Gilpin and Mearsheimer point to the hegemon as the order builder. In both of them, regional hegemons are the providers of order in their respective regions.

This study, which attempts to categorise realist theorists' conceptualisations of order, has tried to reveal to what extent the theorists are consistent with their own theories in their conceptualisations of order. Kenneth Waltz's structural realism has the best consisted order conceptualization comparing to his theory. On the other hand, John Mearsheimer is the least consisted scholar. Because, whereas Waltz adheres to the limits of structural realism and a fortiori attributes the construction of order to a higher authority, such as anarchy, which shapes and shoves states, Mearsheimer, on the other hand, delegates this role to units. The most complex conceptualisation of order among the theorists can be found in Morgenthau's works. It is possible to associate the aforementioned inconsistencies in the texts of the founder of the realist paradigm with the birth pauses of the paradigm. Because, this period coincided with the initial stages of the development of the discipline, during which the levels of analysis had not yet been determined and the boundaries of the theory had not yet been drawn. Patrick Porter has clearer definition of order: "empires build hierarchies by brute force". Nevertheless, he displays a lack of objectivity in contrast to Robert Gilpin. In this regard, Gilpin deserves respect in the time of the rise of structural realism with Waltz. To sum up, Table 1 is a parsimonious form of Realists' conceptualizations of international order.

In IR academia, for the time being, these order debates are conducted within the framework of a liberal and values-based international order. However, most realists accept the world as it is. For example, while European Union President Ursula von der Leyen described Russia's strikes on Ukraine's infrastructure and energy facilities in 2022 as a "war crime" (Anadolu Agency, 2022) in 2023, Israel's cutting off Gaza's water supply and striking its infrastructure and energy facilities as "Israel's self-defence" (Politico, 2023) realists will not be surprised. Although it may seem like a cruel stance, for realists both are inhumane. Unfortunately, this hypocritical stance is inherent in international politics. Different approaches of realist school are also the theories that explain why. As a matter of fact, as the crises in international politics deepen, it seems that the discussions on international order will increase in parallel and the explanations of realists will be needed more.

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