

Resolution or Interest Oriented Policy? International Influence on the Cyprus Conflict Between 1960-1974

Çözüm ya da Çıkar Odaklı Politika mı? Kıbrıs Çatışması Üzerinde 1960-1974 Yılları Arasındaki Uluslararası Etki

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ABSTRACT

When discussing the geopolitical dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus consistently emerges as one of the prominent islands in the region. Hence, the island has experienced a significant degree of international influence. The influence primarily stems from discourses surrounding peace and security, yet this study contends that the actuality diverges from this perspective. Basically, the argument posited in this article asserts that the involvement of foreign actors in the affairs of other states does not lead to the establishment of lasting peace or security. The era between 1960 and 1974 stands out as a particularly supportive timeframe for this assertion. This study aims to present the narratives of key international and regional actors during the Cyprus Crisis, thereby documenting this specific historical era. In this context, Greece and the UK are particularly noteworthy whereas Türkiye with its common history plays the most important role in keeping peace in accordance with the international law. Thus, the primary objective of this study is to uncover the underlying reality or reason behind the discourses through the implementation of a case analysis. In fact, the main idea presented in the study suggests that the prompt achievement of peace and security could be facilitated without the involvement of international actors without any ties to the region. The study provides insight into the objectives of international actors and the potential challenges faced by Cyprus.

In the article, Turkish, British and American archive documents, Turkish and British newspapers, as well as domestic and foreign copyrighted works on the subject were used.

Keywords: Cyprus, Enosis, Taksim (Division), International Influence, Türkiye

ÖZ

Doğu Akdeniz'in jeopolitik dinamikleri tartışılırken Kıbrıs'ın sürekli olarak bölgenin öne çıkan adalarından biri olduğu görülmektedir. Bu nedenle de ada önemli derecede uluslararası etkiye maruz kalmaktadır. Etki öncelikle barış ve güvenlik etrafındaki söylemlerden kaynaklansa da, bu makale gerçeğin bu perspektiften farklılaştığını savunmaktadır. Temel olarak bu makalede ileri sürülen argüman, yabancı aktörlerin diğer devletlerin iç işlerine karışmasının kalıcı barışı sağlamadığı ve güvenliği tesis etmediği gerçeğini ortaya koyuyor. 1960 ile 1974 yılları arasındaki uluslararası gelişmeler sözü edilen iddiayı destekler niteliktedir. Bu çalışmada, Kıbrıs Krizi sırasındaki kilit uluslararası ve bölgesel aktörlerin anlatılarından hareketle spesifik olarak döneme mercek tutulmaya çalışılmış ve döneme ait gelişmeler belgelenmeye özen gösterilmiştir. Özellikle Yunanistan ve İngiltere sürece müdahale eden iki uluslararası güç olarak ön plana çıkarken, Türkiye'nin ortak tarihiyle uluslararası hukuka uygun olarak barışın korunmasında önemli bir rol üstlendiği gözlenmiştir. Çalışmada bir vaka analizi uygulanarak söylemlerin altında yatan gerçeklik ya da esas sebep ortaya çıkarılmaya çalışılmıştır. Çalışmanın ana fikri, adada barış ve güvenliğin sağlanmasının, bölgeyle hiçbir bağlantısı olmayan uluslararası aktörlerin katılımı olmadan da gerçekleştirilebileceği yönündedir.

Makalede Türk, İngiliz ve Amerikan Arşiv Belgesi ile Türk ve İngiliz gazetelerinden ve diğer yandan konuyla ilgili yerli ve yabancı telif eserlerden faydalanılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs, Enosis, Taksim, Uluslararası Etki, Türkiye

1. Introduction

Cyprus remains a prominent concern in the East Mediterranean region due to its important geographical location, geopolitical significance, and historical relevance. Since the handover of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire to the British, the island has not lost its importance for Türkiye. Türkiye has been dealing with the Cyprus issue and making significant efforts to bring it into accordance with international law. For instance, the agreement in Zurich on February 11, 1959, was achieved due to proactive efforts of the political leaders in Greece and Türkiye. Subsequently, on February 19, 1959, Greek, Turkish and British officials namely Harold Macmillan, Konstandinos Karamanlis, and Adnan Menderes, convened in London to engage in the signing of the fundamental agreements pertaining to the matter of Cyprus. The Zurich and London Agreements were formulated and endorsed by the respective leaders of the communities residing on the island. These agreements were grounded in the fundamental values of independence, political collaboration between the two communities, and social autonomy. The three aforementioned states, in their role as guarantor states, were dedicated to safeguarding the autonomy, geographical wholeness, security, and principles outlined in the Constitution of the newly accepted independent Republic of Cyprus. All parties involved reached a consensus through formal agreements that acknowledged the same political rights and status of both groups (Turkish and Greek Cypriots) residing on the island. Nevertheless, Enosis proponents, notably the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, saw the aforementioned agreements as an act of treachery. According to their perspective, it is argued that Turkish Cypriots should only be granted minority rights rather than any political rights. Unfortunately, this thought killed hundreds of people on the island. On the other hand Türkiye clearly expressed its concerns on the potential harm to the newly accepted regime and has repeatedly issued diplomatic warnings to Makarios, urging him to cease these detrimental actions and uphold the existing state of affairs on the island through peaceful methods in accordance with the international law.¹ Despite numerous efforts, on December 21, 1963, Minister of Interior Affairs Polycarpos Giorkatzis, as the leader of the illegal Akritas organisation, launched a series of widespread and deliberate attacks on the Turkish Cypriot community.

The objective was to eradicate the existing rule on the island, which had been established through international agreements, and compel the Turkish Cypriots to

1 İsmail Şahin, "Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs'ta Statükoyu Koruma Çabaları ve Makarios'un Ankara Ziyareti," *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, V. 9, No. 42, 2016, p. 779-796.

acknowledge and embrace their minority status. The political representation rights of the Turkish Cypriots were unlawfully seized in the emergence of this system that violated international law.² Within this context, Türkiye's actions can be considered decisive in protecting its cultural and historical existence in Cyprus.

In contrast, Greece maintains that the matter concerning the society of Cypriot Greeks is a Greek concern. Prominent international actors such as Britain, the United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have been actively engaged in seeking a resolution to the aforementioned issue, while Greece and Türkiye, the two nations with the most stake in the matter, have encountered a deadlock. Nevertheless, the conflict persists without a resolution. The Cyprus question remains a subject of ongoing contention in contemporary discourse. The period spanning from 1960 to 1974 is widely regarded as a highly significant and intractable era. This study posits that an increased level of foreign assistance is directly correlated with a heightened severity of the crisis. Within the present framework, the article aims to examine the discourses, objectives, endeavours, and outcomes of the primary actors involved in the crises that transpired between the years 1960 and 1974. First, a historical background is provided, while subsequently perspectives of the parties involved are delivered. By providing British, Turkish and Greek perspectives, this article aims to prove that the involvement of the international community did not lead to a peaceful resolution. Ontologically it has been applied to the Critical Social Science method to draw a definitive conclusion including the peace and security dimension next to a historical narrative. Within this context, the document analysis among qualitative research techniques is commonly used while conducting case analyses. Consequently, this brings attention to both the case itself and the underlying international discourses which constitutes a serious gap in the literature.

The literary discussion in this sense, focuses mainly on the cases. It is hence possible to find many articles and scholarly discussions about the Cyprus crises between 1960-1974. However, the international involvement claiming to bring peace and security to the island has not been comparatively explored so far. Within this context, this article will concentrate on British, Turkish and Greek discourses by trying to understand whether there is a resolution based or interest-oriented policy.

2 Altuğ Günar, "Güney Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi'nin (Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin) Avrupa Birliği Üyeliğinin Kıbrıs Sorununa Etkisi," *Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları*, No. 37, 2020, pp. 95–118.

When it comes to literary discussions, İsmail Şahin is one of the most important scholars to be read. Şahin's scholarly contributions offer a nuanced exploration of the Cyprus issue by delving into the historical and contemporary dynamics that shape the island's geopolitical landscape. His works, particularly "The Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement between Türkiye and TRNC" and "Türkiye's Efforts to Maintain the Status Quo in Cyprus and Makarios' Visit to Ankara" provide a comprehensive analysis of the diplomatic and legal manoeuvres undertaken by Türkiye to safeguard the political rights of Turkish Cypriots and maintain regional stability. Şahin's critical examination of the Zurich and London Agreements, alongside his detailed account of Türkiye's strategic efforts and legal frameworks, not only enhances the understanding of Türkiye's role as a key regional actor but also bridges historical events with present-day maritime and territorial disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. His work is instrumental in filling gaps in the existing literature by highlighting Türkiye's proactive stance and offering a balanced perspective on the complex interplay of international law, regional politics, and historical grievances. On the other hand, Constantinos Adamides and Costas M. Constantinou, in their chapter "Comfortable Conflict and Liberal Peace in Cyprus" from the book *Hybrid Forms of Peace: Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies*, make a significant contribution to the literature by presenting a nuanced analysis of the Cyprus conflict and the role of international actors. Their work critically examines the prevailing dichotomy in conflict resolution approaches, emphasising the limitations and challenges faced by international entities such as the UN, NATO, and dominant nation-states in managing internal state and identity concerns. They introduce the concept of "comfortable conflict," highlighting how prolonged conflicts can become normalised and perpetuated by various actors, leading to a state of quasi-peace that maintains stability without achieving genuine resolution. This perspective challenges the traditional view that powerful nations are inherently capable of restoring peace, instead suggesting that their involvement often leads to a superficial liberal peace that fails to address the underlying issues of identity and governance. Adamides and Constantinou's work contributes to the literature by critiquing the efficacy of international interventions and promoting a deeper understanding of the complexities in achieving lasting peace in conflict regions like Cyprus. Another name contributing to the literature is George-Henri Soutou. Soutou's work, particularly in his book *L'Alliance incertaine: Les Rapports Politico-Strategiques Franco-Allemands 1954-1996*, makes a significant contribution to the literature on the geopolitics of Cyprus and the broader strategic considerations of global powers. His analysis highlights the intricate web of political and strategic interests that have historically shaped the

policies of the UK, the US, and other international actors towards Cyprus. Soutou's detailed examination of the UK's strategic priorities and its deep-seated concerns about the involvement of Greece and Türkiye in Cyprus elucidates the longstanding British interest in maintaining a strategic foothold in the region. This perspective is crucial for understanding the complexities of international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the geopolitical imperatives that drive foreign policy decisions. It is possible to expand the literary discussion pages-long. In this context, it is plausible to deduce that there exists a notable gap in the existing body of literature, specifically in terms of research pertaining to interventions grounded in discursive approaches. This article posits that the international participation in the Cyprus issue is mostly driven by interests. It suggests that existing viewpoints on the matter have thus far been superficial and calls for a reassessment.³ In the context of our argument, focusing on the period from 1964 to 1970 provides a more distinct basis for substantiating our claims.

To ensure a thorough examination, the initial section of this essay will provide a historical context. The subsequent section will examine the British perspective over the period from 1960 to 1974, encompassing its manifestations on the island, discourses, and reasons. The third section will entail an analysis of the ongoing presence of Türkiye, followed by a comparable investigation into the condition of Greece on the island. The focal point of all components including the timeframe from 1960 to 1974 centres on a consistent thesis, which asserts that an increase in international participation leads to more profound and intricate crises.

2. Historical Background and Importance

As known, in 1878 Britain gained only unofficially control over Cyprus. However, the island was fully and unilaterally occupied by Britain in 1914, and Britain's sovereignty was definitively established through the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Throughout this period, both Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities coexisted under British rule. Neither Greek Cypriots nor Turkish Cypriots had a word to say over their homeland, as Britain asserted its dominance to exploit the strategic position of the island. The inability of either community to independently decide on matters reflected the overarching control exerted by Britain, driven by its strategic interests in Cyprus. Following World War II, as Britain adopted a policy of gradual decolonisation, issues

3 Constantinos Adamides ve Costas M. Constantinou, "Comfortable Conflict and Liberal Peace in Cyprus," *Hybrid Forms of Peace Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies*, ed. Oliver P. Richmond, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, pp. 242-259.

related to the status of Cyprus began to emerge and cause international concerns, starting from 1950. For the Greek Cypriots, the main desire was the Enosis system dating two centuries back. Historically, the concept of Enosis, which is the desire of the Greek Cypriots to unite Cyprus with Greece, first emerged in 1791. Greece openly shared its Enosis aspirations with the international community in 1828, and Greek Cypriots advocating for the union of the island with Greece actively pursued this goal between 1925 and 1959.⁴ Until that time, Britain, which had pursued a pro-Greek policy on the island, relinquished this stance by opposing the Enosis concept. In 1931, the Greek Cypriots rebelled against the British rule, citing tax legislation as their reason. The rebels' defeat ushered in a period of autocratic British rule, known as "Palmerocracy" (Παλμεροκρατία), which persisted until the onset of World War II.⁵ During World War II, they reiterated their demands for annexation, rejected British proposals for constitutional arrangements, and declared Enosis as the only acceptable solution. Greece also endorsed the Greek Cypriots' annexationist aspirations. On February 27, 1947, the Greek Parliament unanimously approved the decision for Cyprus to unite with Greece. Subsequently, on November 21, 1949, Greece brought the issue to the UN, advocating for the recognition of self-determination rights for the Greek Cypriot population and the necessity of Cyprus' union with Greece. However, the UN did not accept Greece's Enosis proposal. In response, the Greek Cypriots unilaterally decided to unite with Greece through a referendum, a decision that was not recognised by the UN.⁶ During the years of the Second World War, Britain realised its obligation to abandon its strict rule on the island and pursue a search for a solution through an autonomous governance model. Successive plans were formulated by Britain for Cyprus, including Lord Winster in 1947, Jackson in 1948, First McMillan and First and Second Harding in 1955, Radcliff in 1956, Second McMillan in 1958, and the Spaak Plan in 1958. These plans shared the common goal of establishing autonomous administration on the island while maintaining Britain's sovereignty. However, the Greek Cypriots, viewing these plans as contrary to their Enosis aspirations, refused to accept any of them.⁷

In the 1950s, there was initially no sharp reaction from Türkiye to the developments on the island. The Democratic Party Government primarily considered the Cyprus issue

4 Müge Vatansver, "Kıbrıs Sorununun Tarihi Gelişimi," *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, V. 7, 2012, pp. 1497–1530.

5 Ilia Xypolia, *British Imperialism and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus, 1923-1939: Divide, Define and Rule*, Routledge, London, 2017, p. 59.

6 Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*, Routledge, London, 1978, p. 122.

7 Müge Vatansver, "Kıbrıs Sorununun Tarihi Gelişimi," p. 1497.

as an internal matter of Britain.⁸ Undoubtedly, the government's approach was significantly influenced by the fact that the island was under British sovereignty, by Britain's status as an ally of Türkiye in NATO, and by the intention to sustain good neighbourly relations with Greece.⁹ On the other hand, in shaping such an approach towards Cyprus, the need for Türkiye to ensure its own existence and security against Soviet expansionism also played a significant role for the ruling DP government. As a NATO member, Türkiye prioritised efforts to enhance and secure its regional security. Greece's appeal to Britain to unite Cyprus with its own territory led Türkiye to focus on its ideal of forming a Balkan Alliance with Greece. Consequently, this resulted in the Turkish government of the time adopting a passive stance in Cyprus policy.¹⁰ Between 1950 and 1960, it is observed that the Democratic Party government gradually pursued four distinct policies regarding the Cyprus issue. These can be summarised as follows: from 1950 to 1955 a passive stance agreeing with the preservation and maintenance of the status quo on the island, which involved recognition of British administration; from 1955 to 1956, the proposal for annexation of the island to Türkiye; in 1956, the pursuit of the Taksim (Division) thesis; and in 1959, the establishment of an independent, bi-communal Cyprus Republic under the Zurich and London Agreements.¹¹ According to the decision emerged from the Zurich and London Agreements, under the guarantee of Türkiye, Greece, and Britain, a bicomunal, parliamentary, and constitutional order was established in Cyprus based on the population ratios of the Greek and Turkish communities. Following the elections held on December 13, 1959, Archbishop Makarios was elected President as the leader of the Greek community, and Dr. Fazıl Küçük was elected Vice President to represent the Turkish community. On August 16, 1960, with the entry into force of the Constitution, the Independent Republic of Cyprus was formally established.¹² The Independent Republic of Cyprus was quickly recognised by the United Nations.¹³ The future of the Independent Republic of Cyprus was jeopardised with the commencement of actions by the Greek Cypriots to execute their Enosis plans. From 1963 onwards, the Greek Cypriots again, aimed to realise the Enosis concept by implementing the Akritas Plan, which sought to expel Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus.

8 *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009, p. 593.

9 Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, ODTÜ Geliştirme Vakfı Yayınları, Ankara, 2007, p. 103.

10 Rıfat Uçarol, *Siyasi Tarih (1789-1994)*, 4. Baskı, Filiz Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1995, p. 742.

11 Yakup Kaya, Bülent Yeter, "The Cyprus Issue During Democrat Party Rule," *Afyon Kocatepe University Journal of Social Sciences*, V. 20, No. 2, 2018, pp. 215–229.

12 Murat Metin Hakkı, *Kıbrıs Çıkmazı*, Emre Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p. 31.

13 "Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti BM'ye Kabul Ediliyor," *Milliyet*, 1960, p. 1.

The events that drew global attention, such as the massacre of Turks by Greeks in the Kumsal area of Nicosia, known as the Bloody Christmas Incident in December 1963, cast a shadow over the peace and harmony sought to be established within the framework of the Independent Republic of Cyprus.¹⁴ Following the events, the leader of the Independent Republic of Cyprus, President Makarios, announced on January 1, 1964, the unilateral termination of the 1959-1960 Treaties. Türkiye, leading the initiative to bring the issue to the UN agenda, convened the Third London Conference in London. During the conference, representatives of Türkiye, Greece, and Britain, the guarantor powers of Cyprus under the Zurich and London Agreements, discussed the matter. While the Turkish side aimed to increase existing guarantees and preserve the status quo, the Greek side advocated for the Enosis ideal. However, the conference did not yield a permanent solution to the Cyprus issue.¹⁵ Moreover on November 30, 1963, Cyprus Archbishop Makarios proposed constitutional revisions known as the 13 amendments, in which Makarios tried to posit Turkish Cypriots into a position, even less eligible than a minority. This triggered a fresh crisis between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, resulting in the conflict. The 13 Amendments also known as the 13-item plan included changes such as Proportional Representation in Public Service which meant that ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in public service and the forces would be adjusted to reflect their population proportions.¹⁶ Hence the Turkish party was not content with such a plan and as tensions escalated in Cyprus and massacres against Turkish Cypriots intensified, the İnönü Government planned a military intervention in Cyprus in June 1964. However, the operation was hindered by a letter from US President Lyndon Baines Johnson, who employed a threatening language towards Türkiye, thereby preventing the execution of the operation.¹⁷ Greek Prime Minister Yorgos Papandreou, who was in the US for negotiations on the Cyprus issue, was accompanied by Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü during his visit to Washington DC. Although İnönü's visit to the US was criticised by the Turkish public following the Johnson letter, it is understood that Prime Minister İnönü did not want Türkiye to be perceived as being against peace, especially considering the peaceful stance of both the US and Greece. The US President seemed to aspire to take on a role akin to that of an arbitrator in the

14 Ulvi Keser, "21 Aralık 1963 Kanlı Noel, Kumsal Faciası ve Bugüne Yansımaları," *ÇTTAD*, V. 6, No. 23, 2011, pp. 93–121.

15 Mehmet Gönülbol ve Cem Sar, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1995*, Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara, 1996, p. 378.

16 "For the whole text of the 13 Amendments," <https://www.pio.gov.cy/assets/pdf/cyproblem/13%20points.pdf>. Accessed: 10 June 2024.

17 Yakup Kaya, "Türk Dış Politikasında Kıbrıs Sorunu," *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti-II Demokrasi ve Dış Politika 1938'den 2000'li Yıllara*, ed. Nurgün Koç, İdeal Kültür Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2021, p. 476.

issue on the island. The US took the initiative in restoring independence in Cyprus and implementing the London and Zurich Agreements, but concrete results did not emerge from the leaders' discussions during this process.¹⁸

Despite the initiatives led by the US, a peaceful solution could not be found in Cyprus, while EOKA (a violent pro Enosis group members) continued their atrocities against Turks. This persistent and aggressive stance of Greek Cypriots led the Turkish government to change its peaceful attitude. When the National Guard Forces, under the command of Grivas, refused to lift the general blockade on the island against Turkish Cypriots, the İnönü Government decided to intervene with Turkish jets on August 8-9, 1964, in Erenköy, successfully halting the massacres.¹⁹ Subsequent to Türkiye's action, the Turkish community residing on the island encountered economic constraints imposed by the Greek authorities.²⁰ Despite the influence of dominant powers such as the US and the Soviet Union, Türkiye embarked on such intervention, mindful of both its rights under international law and need for peace on the island. Following the military coup in Greece on April 21, 1967, which brought Colonel Papadopoulos to power, the Greeks, empowered by the administration, passed an Enosis resolution in the Greek House of Representatives on June 26, 1967.²¹ The attack launched by the combined Greek and Greek Cypriot forces on the Turkish villages of Geçitkale and Boğaziçi in Cyprus, along with the UN witnessed Turkish massacre, marked yet another crisis in 1967. In response, the Turkish Government declared that if such hostilities in Cyprus persisted, intervention would be inevitable, potentially leading to war with Greece. Consequently, the Greeks retreated from the occupied villages, and Greece was compelled to withdraw some of its forces from the island. Meanwhile, following their exclusion from the Republic Assembly, the Turkish Cypriots declared the Provisional Turkish Administration on December 23, 1967, appointing Dr. Fazıl Küçük as its head. In 1973, Rauf Denktaş, a prominent leader of the Turkish community in Cyprus, assumed leadership of the administration.²² Conversely, a rift emerged between the Greek Junta, determined to swiftly execute the Enosis Plan, and Makarios, who advocated for a more gradual approach. Consequently, Makarios was ousted from the

18 Fatma Gül Kesiktaş, "Kıbrıs Sorununun Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerine Yansıması: Johnson Mektubu (1960-1965)," *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü*, 2005, p. 100.

19 "64 Türk Jet Uçağı Kıbrıs'ı Sürekli Bombardıman Etti," *Vatan*, 1964, p. 1.

20 Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul, 2015, p. 729.

21 Hakan Gürkan, "Demokrat Partiden 12 Mart 1971 Askeri Müdahalesine Türk Dış Politikasında Kıbrıs Meselesi (1950-1971)," *Tarihin Peşinde-Uluslararası Tarih ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, No. 9, 2013, p. 114.

22 Yavuz Güler, "Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluşuna Kadar Kıbrıs Meselesi," *G.Ü Kırşehir Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, V. 5, No. 1, 2004, p. 109.

Cyprus Greek administration through a coup, and replaced by Sampson, an EOKA member, as President.²³ Türkiye condemned the coup in Cyprus and declared its non-recognition of the Sampson regime, which was supported by Greece. Similarly, the UK announced its refusal to recognise the Sampson regime that had seized power through the coup. However, the US refrained from condemning Greece and avoided declaring non-recognition of the Sampson regime. Despite Türkiye's request for support from the UK to intervene in Cyprus based on Article 4 of the Guarantee Agreement against the Sampson regime, which sought to expedite the Enosis process, Türkiye did not receive the positive response it desired. NATO announced that in the event of Türkiye's intervention in Cyprus, it would send troops to the island. In such an environment, the possibility of Türkiye intervening in Cyprus alone seemed remote.²⁴ In Türkiye, the Grand National Assembly granted Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit the authority to invoke the Guarantee Agreement and the legitimate right to self-defence as outlined in the UN Charter. On July 19, 1974, the Prime Minister was authorised to intervene in Cyprus. Moreover, it was decided that in the event of any aggression by Greece, war would also be declared against Greece.²⁵ Türkiye organised the First and Second Cyprus Peace Operations on July 20-22 and August 14-16, 1974, respectively, to halt the ongoing massacre on Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in Cyprus and to establish peace and stability on the island.²⁶ In the operations, Türkiye utilised both its rights under international law and its obligations as per the Guarantee Agreement to quell the unrest and disorder on the island and to establish a peaceful environment. As a result of the two operations, the areas where Turks were isolated were liberated from the grip of the Greek Cypriot invaders, and the massacre was brought to an end.²⁷ The Enosis advocate Sampson and the junta regime in Greece, which supported him, were compelled to step down in the face of the Turkish operation, unable to resist.²⁸ After the First and Second Cyprus Peace Operations, the US imposed a weapons embargo on Türkiye. In 1975, the autonomous Turkish administration in Northern Cyprus established the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, with Rauf Denктаş appointed as its leader. Western powers did not view the establishment of the Turkish Federated State favourably.²⁹ Although

23 "Kıbrıs'ta Darbe Oldu Makarios'un Akibeti Meçhul," *Milliyet*, 1974, p. 1.

24 Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, 2. Baskı, Alkım Yayınları, İstanbul, 2019, p. 702.

25 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA), "Fon No: 30-18-1-2, Kutu No: 317, Gömlek No: 47, Sıra No: 8," 1974.

26 "Mehmetçik Kıbrıs'ta," *Hürriyet*, 1974, p. 1.

27 "Ecevit: Artık Kimse Kıbrıs'ta Türk'ün Hakkına Dokunamaz," *Milliyet*, 1974, p. 4.

28 "Sampson da Devrildi Yunan Hükümeti de," *Milliyet*, 1974, p. 1.

29 Rauf Denктаş, *The Cyprus Triangle*, Rustem & Bro, Nicosia, 1982, p. 80.

this solution put an end to the massacres on the Island, the international community was not convinced.

3. Geostrategic Importance of Cyprus in Regional and Global Energy Security

The island had continuously to consider its diplomatic ties with its NATO partners, faced potential external interference if it pursued constitutional amendments, and was compelled to cede a portion of its territory to British governance. The absence of a definitive resolution was evident among all factions residing on the island due to the presence of several paradoxes that were enumerated.³⁰

From a pragmatic standpoint, it is worth noting that Cyprus holds considerable importance due to its strategic location in facilitating the transportation and sale of oil and natural gas resources from the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Khazar region to Europe, with Iskenderun serving as a crucial transit point. Cyprus is also utilised for the commercialisation of Iraqi petroleum. The island possesses strategic geographical positioning that enables it to exert influence over the energy resources in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Basin catchment areas. The safety of the pipeline is of utmost importance due to its strategic location along an oil route spanning from the Persian Gulf to Europe. Cyprus possesses the potential to attain a prominent position in the realm of regional and global energy security, owing to its ability to exercise control over both present and forthcoming oil pipelines that would facilitate the transportation of crude oil from the Persian Gulf and Caspian Basin to the Mediterranean Sea.³¹ It is possible to expand this list in a natural manner. It might be argued that Cyprus possesses significant geostrategic potential for countries seeking to expand their international influence. It is intriguing to observe the efficacy with which intervening nations are able to persuade the general populace through the utilisation of discourses centred around international peace and security.

Given the strategic significance of Cyprus, it is logical to infer that the intense conflict that transpired between 1960 and 1974 was a direct consequence of its geographical location. It is widely recognised that throughout the period spanning from 1960 to 1974, the decisions taken by international organisations were significantly affected by a bipolar world order. Consequently, amid the internal strife in Cyprus,

30 İsmail Şahin, "Türkiye-Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Kıta Sahaneliği Anlaşması," *Adalet Dergisi*, No. 2, 2020, p. 53.

31 Fatih Mehmet Sayın, "Solution of the Cyprus Problem and Turkish Position," *Journal of Qafqaz University*, V. 24, 2008, pp. 53–62.

Greek Cypriots intermittently modified their conduct in order to align themselves with either NATO or the Soviet Union. There was a clear consensus that the current context and methods were not suitable for addressing an internal matter. If the primary objective was solely to maintain peace and security on the island, would that be the case?

A comprehensive understanding of the potential efficacy of foreign intervention in internal issues in Cyprus can be achieved by examining the perspectives of each guarantor party involved. The utilisation of the historical narrative approach in this study allows for the inclusion of many views, namely those of the British, Turkish, and Greek. The rationales behind international operations are reflected in noteworthy occurrences. In this instance, by adopting an interdisciplinary approach rather than a chronological narrative, this article will present each perspective of the interference and analyse it based on discourses and arguments.

4. “Cyprus should never be expected to attain full independence”

In 1954, Henry Hopkins, a British colonial minister, expressed the viewpoint that the attainment of full independence should not be anticipated for Cyprus.³² These words serve to emphasise the worldwide scope of the calamities that transpired in subsequent years. This elucidates the reasons behind the prolonged duration of the conflict. Türkiye, Greece, and the UK exhibited a shared reluctance to relinquish control over the island. Each individual possessed distinct motivations. According to Brian Edward Urquhart, a British civil officer in the field of foreign affairs, the situation can be characterised as follows: “Even though Türkiye and Greece are undesirable, they have mixed with the Cyprus Island, which is the strategic balance of the Eastern Mediterranean and caused work to the southeast flank of NATO. Cyprus is like the pin of a bomb in this region”.³³ It is evident that Britain expressed dissatisfaction with the involvement of both Greece and Türkiye in this particular issue. Throughout history, Cyprus has consistently held significant strategic importance for the UK, a status that remains relevant in contemporary times. This site is considered highly suitable for establishing a naval station due to its strategic location, serving as a gateway to Southeast Asia. The British presence on the island of Cyprus was deeply entrenched, to the extent that the potential loss of two-thirds of its military and government personnel would have a significant adverse impact on the

32 Andreas Theophanus, *The Cyprus Question and the EU: The Challenge and the Promise*, Intercollege Press, Nicosia, 2004, p. 26.

33 Anthony Eden, *Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden*, Houghton Mifflin Press, Boston, 1960, p. 415.

Cypriot economy upon independence. Furthermore, it is imperative to acknowledge that the US faced a significant risk in permitting communist states to intervene and assert control in the region, disguising their actions as assistance. Subsequently, the US experienced a sense of duty to engage in the matter as well.

Given that Cyprus holds strategic importance in terms of its control over many regions such as the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Caucasus, Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, Turkish Gulf, Aegean, Suez Canal, and Red Sea, it has consistently attracted the attention of global powers. Consequently, the US and the UK found it necessary to have a mutual understanding on the Greece-Türkiye issue. However, it may be argued that Britain held a prominent position for an extended period of time. For instance, the 13-item plan as mentioned in the historical background part, to put up by Makarios in support of Greece was collaboratively produced with the assistance of Arthur Clark, who contributed to the development of certain ideas for a revised constitution on the island.³⁴ In return, Clark was granted additional authority on the island. While one cohort of scholars characterises this relationship as primarily pertaining to personnel matters, another cohort presents British documents as evidence that the British government authorised Clark to clandestinely convey his perspectives to the archbishop. Clark expressed his remorse about Türkiye's rejection of this new constitution idea and emphasised that the protection offered in this crisis was exclusively intended for British nationals, without extending to any Turkish individuals.³⁵ The matter has progressively assumed a heightened level of significance. Despite the US' more collected approach in dealing with the seemingly unsolvable problem, Britain demonstrated a reluctance to relinquish control of the island. Following a series of unsuccessful cease-fire attempts, the parties involved ultimately reached a consensus to convene a meeting in January 1964, involving all relevant stakeholders. Nevertheless, the outcome of the meeting remained inconclusive. Britain seems to assume the duty of deploying a peacekeeping contingent. An endeavour was undertaken to depict this phenomenon on a worldwide level. The primary aim of the entity in question was to uphold its dominance inside the region, rather than to promote peace and stability. Consequently, it consistently engaged in interventionist actions, without any external assistance. Intriguingly, according to Mr. Anthony Verrier, the Defence Department's correspondent in 1964, it was suggested that the British military' involvement in Cyprus was not primarily aimed at establishing peace, but rather driven by alternative objectives.

34 George-Henri Soutou, *L'Alliance incertaine : Les Rapports Politico-Strategiques Franco-Allemands 1954-1996*, Fayard Press, Paris, 1996, pp. 361–363.

35 Christian Heinze, *Cyprus Conflict 1964-1985*, K. Rustem Brother Press, London, 1986, p. 299.

Verrier continued, “If the island is shared, these priorities cannot be maintained. Because of this, England must meddle in Cyprus’ domestic affairs”.³⁶ Ultimately, the intervention of the UN Force in Cyprus became necessary due to the unfavourable economic and military condition of Britain.

According to the US officials, British authorities exhibited a perceived lack of concern over the island. The aforementioned remark serves as a logical justification presented by the US to substantiate its engagement in the aforementioned matter.³⁷ Nevertheless, the British government’s continued attitude of interest towards this particular island exhibited the opposite approach. Cyprus’ most prominent Guarantor Power continued to hold its position. Moreover, through its military involvement, it was the most substantial contingent under the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). According to the US sources, it is contended that Britain did not endorse Türkiye’s decision to intervene in Cyprus in June 1964. It is argued that President Johnson’s well-known letter was the one factor capable of averting the crisis. This endeavour seeks to portray the US as assuming a dominant role akin to that of a guardian figure over Britain in the context of the Cyprus situation. In contrast, British records underscore the role of the British in preventing Turkish Cypriots from engaging in violent activities thus far.³⁸ In addition, Arthur Clark and Duncan Sandys extended an invitation to Cyprus Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou for a meeting scheduled on December 21, 1963, which coincided with the eve of the tragic event known as the ‘Bloody Christmas.’ The Bloody Christmas, as previously stated, was organised by the EOKA and several Greek Cypriot police officers on the nights of December December 21-24, 1963, against the Turkish quarter of Lefkosa (Nicosia). According to a UN report released on September 10, 1964, 374 Turkish Cypriots were killed during this campaign, 109 Turkish villages were forced to evacuate, over 2,500 Turkish houses were severely damaged or demolished, and between 25,000 and 30,000 Turkish Cypriots became refugees.³⁹ Taking into account this information, the purpose of the meeting was to engage in discussions.⁴⁰ The UK has conveyed its intention to assume a leading role in the resolution of the Cyprus issue. Throughout the duration of the war in Cyprus, Western nations held the belief that the Turkish Republic was making preparations for a

36 Anthony Verrier, “Cyprus: Britain’s Security Role,” *The World Today*, V. 20, No. 3, 1964, p. 131.

37 Claude Nicolet, “British Policy towards Cyprus, 1960-1974: A Tale of Failure or Impotence?” *The Cyprus Review*, V. 13, No. 1, 2001, pp. 89-101.

38 Christian Heinze, *Cyprus Conflict 1964-1985...*, p. 299.

39 Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus, S/5950, 10 September 1964.

40 Christian Heinze, *Cyprus Conflict 1964-1985...*, p. 300.

potential military intervention. This prediction can be considered reasonably accurate. London authorities also examined the possibility of Turkish bombers targeting territory under British sovereignty. On December 25, 1963, British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home expressed the readiness of the UK to endorse the tripartite intervention proposal being formulated by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Chief of General Staff Cevdet Sunay. Subsequently, Greek and Turkish military forces would be deployed to the island under the guidance and command of British leadership. Based on the available information, it can be said that Britain holds a prominent role as a Western actor in the region. Furthermore, it seems that the US aimed to remove the British from their position as part of their pursuit to establish unipolarity. The concept of Enosis, which refers to the desire for the unification of Greek Cypriots with Greece, has persisted among Greek Cypriots, supported by their patron country Greece. This has remained the case, even in the face of the UK's objective discussions on the matter. Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, John Rennie, expressed concern regarding the potential consequences of premature Turkish knowledge regarding American support for Enosis. In a message addressed to Prime Minister Alexander Douglas, Rennie emphasised the disastrous implications that would arise if the Turks were to discover that the US had similarly conveyed their endorsement of Enosis. This communication occurred when American officials informed their British counterparts about their favourable disposition towards the concept of Enosis.⁴¹ Even in situations when two powerful governments aspire to monopolise decision-making authority, they are compelled to collaborate on matters that are of shared concern. The endorsement of Enosis was indeed supported by various entities, including the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, the Central Department of the Foreign Office, and High Commissioner William Bishop.⁴² Prime Minister Home also came to the decision to select Enosis on May 29, 1964.⁴³ Acheson was responsible for the organisation of the Geneva Conference, similar to how a letter from US President Johnson effectively prevented the Turkish government from intervening in June 1964. Viscount Samuel Hood was appointed by the British government to serve as their representative during Acheson's diplomatic mission to Geneva. Acheson harboured alternative intentions, encompassing clandestine schemes aimed at influencing either Türkiye or Greece to intervene in Cyprus, so deterring the opposing faction from engaging in acts of violence.

41 *The Churchill Archives Centre*, "John Rennie to Prime Minister Alexander Douglas-Home, Memorandum: Washington Talks: Cyprus," 1964, p. 2.

42 *The Churchill Archives Centre*, "William Bishop to Duncan Sandys, 'Cyprus: Possible Long-Term Solution of the Cyprus Problem,'" 1964, p. 1.

43 David Bruce, "Embassy Telegram from London 5762 SDSNF, 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP, Box 2084," 1964.

Irrespective of the political affiliation of the party involved, assuming the position of leadership was of utmost importance in this particular scenario. Nevertheless, due to the potential relinquishment of authority, Acheson and Ball made the strategic decision to lend their backing to Makarios in pursuit of Enosis during the month of August in 1964. The aforementioned approach proved to be a comprehensive failure, as anticipated. The British government acknowledged the potential negative consequences of rescuing Cyprus without considering the implications for Türkiye.⁴⁴ Lord Hood conveyed a message to the Foreign Office, as stated in his communication. It is reasonable to assert that the British government shown reluctance in granting the Turks authority over the island of Cyprus. The UK refrained from compromising the bilateral relationship due to its recognition of the geopolitical importance of Türkiye within the region. The US acknowledged the perspective held by Britain and mutually agreed to adopt a stance of vigilant observation towards Greece and Türkiye, intervening solely in circumstances where human lives were at imminent risk. This posed no issue provided that their interests remained secure. The observation phase took place between 1965 and 1967, a period marked by the inability of Greece and Türkiye to reach a consensus due to Makarios' strong reluctance to cede territory to the Turks. On April 21, 1967, Greece experienced a military coup d'état, during which Colonel George Papadopoulos assumed control of the government. As a result of the backing provided by the US, the influence of Russia-centric Communism had waned, leading to a rise in nationalism inside Greece. This scenario serves as a conspicuous demonstration of the bipolar world order endeavouring to reach a resolution on a momentous global matter. The Greek military regime proposed the provision of some military installations to Ankara as a reciprocal gesture for its acceptance of the concept of Enosis. Nevertheless, the Greek population was divided due to President Makarios' unwavering resistance to ceding any territory to the Turks. The events on the island came to the forefront once again in October 1967 when Rauf Denktaş, a well-known Turkish Cypriot in exile in Türkiye who was actively involved in safeguarding national interests, was detained upon his covert entry into the island. UNFICYP Chief of Staff General Michael Harbottle promptly advised General Grivas against initiating hostilities with the Turkish forces. The British ambassador in Ankara furnished details regarding the level of preparedness in Türkiye. According to certain analysts, Türkiye has experienced a decline in its influence in Cyprus and was in need of reclaiming its former position. Additionally, they would traverse from the island of Cyprus to the country of Greece. The issue was ultimately delegated by President Johnson to Undersecretary Cyrrup Vance for resolution.

44 Samuel Hood to John O. Rennie, "Letter," 14 August 1964, *FO 371/174753*, Doc. C 1015/1898, PRO, 1964, p. 2.

The British Embassy Counsellor in Washington was informed that the remaining course of action for Britain was to support solutions proposed by the US.

The British research conducted on the Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute, which was published in the early months of 1968, proposed a three-stage approach for addressing the matter.⁴⁵ The initial stage aimed at enhancing overall living circumstances, followed by bicomunal constitutional deliberations in the subsequent phase. The last step entailed the acceptance of the constitution by the Guarantor Powers, namely Britain, Greece, and Türkiye. During this period, Western countries within the NATO alliance accorded significant importance to the matter, as they harboured concerns regarding a potential partnership between Makarios and the Soviet Union. The NATO ministerial conference took place in Brussels, on November 15, 1968. The significance of upholding equilibrium within NATO with regards to Cyprus was deliberated upon by Panagiotis Pipinelis, the foreign minister of Greece, and İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, the foreign minister of Türkiye.⁴⁶ However, both parties failed to fulfil their commitments, resulting in a further exacerbation of the crisis.

Britain claimed that Türkiye's primary motivation was its economic resources, whereas Greece's main objective was to regain its historical borders. Two divergent viewpoints were articulated regarding the principal purpose of Türkiye and Greece. One perspective presents a comprehensive advantage, whereas the other is mostly driven by idealism and emotion.

On July 15, 1974, an attempted coup against Makarios took place by the Cypriot National Guard.⁴⁷ This observation serves as a prominent manifestation of unsuccessful attempts at mediation in both the US and the UK. A significant division emerged between British Foreign Minister James Callaghan and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, resulting in a major rupture. While the former primarily prioritised British interests, the latter perceived the Cyprus conflict as a matter concerning NATO.⁴⁸ During this particular time frame, the UK encountered an additional challenge. On July 17, 1974, Turkish President Bülent Ecevit formally sought permission from the British government to utilise British bases in order to intervene and reinstate constitutional governance. Britain expressed its objection by asserting that the appropriate course of

45 SDSNF, "Notes on Cyprus Discussions with the British," 17 January 1968, *SDSNF File*, POL 27 CYP.

46 Samuel Hood to John O. Rennie, "Letter," 14 August 1964, p. 2.

47 William Mallinson, *Cyprus: A Modern History*, I. B. Tauris, 2005, p. 80.

48 *Henry Kissinger to President Gerald Ford*, "Telephone Conversation," Declassified Documents Reference System, 1974, p. 2.

action for Cyprus would be a decrease in military personnel rather than an increase. Following the invasion by Türkiye, the British deployed a contingent of forces to be placed under the authority of the UN. Currently, Türkiye faced the imminent possibility of military intervention by the UK. The notion that the securitisation process is limited to certain actors within the international sphere is evident in the communication wherein Britain cautions Türkiye on the reduction of its military personnel and announces its intention to deploy its own troops. In a letter addressed to President Ford, US Secretary of State Kissinger cautioned that engaging in actions against Türkiye would be highly imprudent given the prevailing circumstances.⁴⁹ Due to Türkiye's prominent status as a key member of NATO within the area, the US exhibited reluctance in engaging in intervention. In late 1974, the government of Ankara shown a contempt for international warnings and proceeded to undertake direct action in response to the Cyprus Crisis, marking its inaugural involvement in the conflict. The Turkish government's decision-making was likely influenced by its recognition that there existed a divergence in perspectives between the US-led NATO and Britain.

It is worth considering an additional point on the conduct of the US during the entirety of this procedure. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, born in the US in 1840, contributed to the field of maritime geopolitics by formulating strategic approaches that elucidated the impact of the sea on the destiny of nations. His work highlighted the role of colonial trade and maritime dominance in facilitating England's prosperity, despite its limited terrestrial military capabilities, as an insular nation that exerted control over neighbouring territories. The Admiral suggested that the US of America might potentially get comparable outcomes by employing an identical strategic approach.⁵⁰ His impact on the US President T. Roosevelt and other politicians was significant. Based on the acquired knowledge, it may be argued that the conflict surrounding Cyprus can be comprehended as a war driven by interests, rather than a deliberate effort to uphold peace and security.

5. “Cyprus is the place on which lots of concentration should be given”

Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Turkish Republic, once enquired of his army's general staff: “Let's assume that Türkiye was occupied once again. South shore is the last place where resistance battles take place. What could be the supply ways and

49 Mehmet Fatih Sayın, “Solution of the Cyprus Problem and Turkish Position,” *Journal of Qafqaz University*, V. 24, 2008, p. 56.

50 Mehmet Salih Emircan, Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nde Tören, Bayram ve Anma Günleri, *Kıbrıs Türk Mücahitler Derneği Yayınları*, Lefkoşa, pp. 80–95.

chances we would have?" After some time, he raised his finger to indicate Cyprus on the map: "Gentlemen there would exist no ways for supply of this region, unless Cyprus is in the hands of our enemies. Cyprus is the place on which lots of concentration should be given. This island is of great importance for us".⁵¹ Since the inception of the Turkish Republic, Cyprus has held significant importance within Turkish foreign policy. Individuals residing on the island, sharing common cultural practises, linguistic patterns, and ancestral heritage, are expected to stay under the jurisdiction of the Turkish government. The reputation of the Turkish Republic was adversely affected due to its observed instances of repression, violence, and infringement upon human rights. Cyprus occupies a strategically important location in the Eastern Mediterranean region and plays a crucial role in safeguarding the security of Türkiye's southern coastal areas. From an alternative perspective, oil and natural gas were transported to Iskenderun Bay through pipelines originating from Caucasia, the Middle East, and the Caspian Sea, thereafter, being traded on worldwide markets. Sales of Iraqi petrol continue to be conducted within the country. The harbours of Iskenderun and Mersin in Türkiye have emerged as crucial nodes for the country's export and import activities, garnering increasing attention over time. The harbours will serve as channels for global trade, facilitating the exportation of commodities resulting from the increased production anticipated from the GAP project. From this particular standpoint, it may be argued that Cyprus holds significant regional strategic significance. Throughout history, various governments have endeavoured to establish political and military dominance in the region surrounding the island. The occurrence of attacks targeting Turkish individuals on the Turkish side of Cyprus prompted Turkish Cypriots to establish defence organisations such as the Turkish Resistance Organisations, Black Gang and Volkan. The Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) was established on November 23, 1957, in a suburb of Nicosia by Rauf Denктаş, Burhan Nalbantođlu, and Mustafa Kemal Tanrısevdi. Initially, the group issued leaflets calling for passive resistance due to limited support and resources. However, by December 1957, they began organising more actively across Cyprus. In January 1958, Rauf Denктаş and Fazıl Küçük discussed Turkish support with Türkiye's Foreign Minister, leading to a plan to formally establish the TMT, which was later approved. The plan involved a covert organisational structure with leaders sent from Türkiye, and a focus on training a 5,000-strong force, eventually aiming for 10,000 members. By August 1958, the first group of officers, including the appointed leader Colonel Rıza Vuruşkan, arrived in Cyprus. This date is marked as the TMT's official establishment. The organisation quickly grew, absorbing smaller, less

51 *Halkın Sesi*, "Interview with Rauf Denктаş," 1963.

successful groups and sending members for training to Türkiye. The TMT was critical in uniting Turkish Cypriots in their resistance efforts. However, after a while, the Cyprus Turkish Resistance Organisation as well as other resistance organisations such as the Black Gang failed in sustainability and joined Volkan.⁵² In response to the aforementioned measures, Makarios presented a comprehensive proposal for a constitutional amendment consisting of thirteen key points. Upon the announcement of a constitutional change, the newspaper named ‘Halkın Sesi’ promptly asserted that it would lead to the erosion of Turkish rights and ultimately culminate in the expulsion of Turkish individuals.⁵³ Given the potential for an enduring conflict with Greece, the Turkish government, led by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Chief of General Staff Cevdet Sunay, devised a strategy known as a triangle intervention in response to the escalating crisis on the island. This unsuccessful initiative serves as an exemplification of the ongoing discourse surrounding peacekeeping, as each involved party endeavours to align its actions with its strategic goals. Greece took advantage of the situation by providing military support and delivering it to Greek Cypriots, while Türkiye also engaged in similar actions. However, Britain demonstrated a deliberate attempt to exclude NATO from participating in this discourse. Due to its persistent adherence to colonial practices, Britain maintained a managerial mindset in dealing with the Cyprus issue. It is well recognised that dominance practises, such as colonialism, entail the subjugation of one group of individuals by another. The observation that Britain is assuming a prominent role in the Cyprus dispute suggests its inclination towards exerting influence on all stakeholders involved in the conflict.

Specifically, the year 1964 is widely recognised as the year when Turkish Cypriots experienced significant employment losses and subsequently sought refuge from the governing authorities. During that period, Vice President Dr. Fazıl Küçük commenced engaging in public discourse regarding his inclination towards partition, as seen by his interviews. Consequently, the notion of Taksim started to acquire traction among the Turkish population. In contrast, Türkiye suggested the deployment of a permanent military force to the island in order to enhance the protection of its population against any Greek attacks during this course of action.

The heightened assertiveness of the Turkish population can be attributed to the prevailing perception that Greek Cypriots held prominent positions within the Cyprus

52 Mehmet Salih Emircan, *Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nde Tören, Bayram ve Anma Günleri*, Kıbrıs Türk Mücahitler Derneği Yayınları, Lefkoşa, pp. 80–89.

53 *Halkın Sesi*, “Interview with Rauf Denktaş,” 1963.

government on the global stage. The UK submitted an application to the United Nations Security Council due to concerns of potential action by Türkiye. Given the evident dominance of Britain over the UN in comparison to the NATO, it logically prioritised its submission for membership to the former. Although the UN exhibited clear support for Greece, the NATO prioritised Türkiye's preferences due to its prominent role as a regional power influencing NATO's policy interests. The present discord between two prominent Western entities, namely Britain as the preeminent force on one front, and the US on the other, might be interpreted as indicative of a lack of a mutually agreed objective pertaining to global peace and security. Conversely, it emulates the behaviours of each participant on the island, which is oriented towards maximising benefits.

On January 31st, 1964, a peacekeeping force known as UNFICYP, consisting of 10,000 individuals, was established. Greece was granted authorisation to deploy a contingent of 950 soldiers, while Türkiye was granted authorisation to deploy a contingent of 650 soldiers.⁵⁴ İnönü recognised the necessity of intervening as each political group continued to prioritise its own interests. He expressed concern that without a shift in their approaches, the establishment of a Western union would not be feasible.⁵⁵ On June 5, 1964, the Turkish government was in receipt of a correspondence from the President of the US, Lyndon B. Johnson. This letter was dispatched as a reply to the notification made by the US government on the decision made by İnönü. The issuance of the 'Johnson Letter' to Türkiye served as a clear indication that it should refrain from adopting any stances that could potentially jeopardise its diplomatic ties with Greece. This development indicated that both the US and the UK were experiencing mounting pressure to collaborate in order to prioritise and achieve objectives aligned with Western interests.

Subsequently, Rauf Denktaş, a Cyprus nationalist who had been exiled to Türkiye, was detained by Greek Cypriot soldiers on October 31, 1967, while attempting to gain entry to the island. This event marked the commencement of the 1967 crisis.⁵⁶ At this juncture, Turkish Cypriots applied pressure on the Turkish Republic by asserting their abandonment of expectations for a military intervention from Türkiye. According to British accounts, the Turkish government perceived a decline in its status in Cyprus and

54 Jan Asmussen, "United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)," *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, ed. Joachim A. Koops, Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen ve Paul D. Williams, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p. 16,

55 NSCHF, "Cyprus Crisis, Tel. No. 1599 from United States Embassy in Ankara to the State Department," 1964, p. 44.

56 Rauf Denktaş, *Hatıralar*, Boğaziçi Publishing, İstanbul, 1965, p. 44.

sought to restore it.⁵⁷ According to these sources, it was asserted that Türkiye will extend its territorial ambitions from Cyprus to Greece.

These discourses are commonly employed to galvanise the global sphere, and there exist several instances of such discourses. Ultimately, the US became involved in the conflict and appointed Undersecretary Cyrus Vance to mitigate the circumstances. As a result, Greek troops agreed to withdraw from the island on November 30, 1967. The US, UK, and Türkiye have all officially acknowledged this endeavour as a success. The formerly upbeat atmosphere, however, quickly transformed. Under the guidance of Alparslan Türkeş, Turkish nationalists persistently advocated for the invasion, intervention, and reclamation of the island, asserting its rightful ownership by the Turkish people.⁵⁸

Throughout the entirety of the process, the US exhibited a greater preoccupation with preserving amicable relations between Türkiye and Greece inside the framework of NATO, rather than prioritising the matters of Taksim or Enosis. In order for NATO to effectively accomplish its objectives in the region, it was imperative for the relations between Greece and Türkiye to maintain stability. Consequently, the US of America made efforts to facilitate a resolution between the two nations. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Russia was actively strengthening its political and economic relations with Türkiye, while simultaneously displaying a clear bias towards Greece. This bias can be attributed to Russia's awareness of the CIA's backing of the Greek military dictatorship. In 1974, NATO and the UN underwent a shift in their position towards Türkiye, adopting a significantly more diplomatic approach. In the absence of any transgressions by these players that would infringe upon the boundaries of the opposing party, no issues would arise. The Western nations held three primary concerns during this period, namely the mitigation of the perceived threat emanating from the Arab world towards Israel, the reduction of Russia's influence, and the acquisition of access to valuable natural resources. In contrast, Türkiye pursued two primary objectives. The first objective entailed securing access to affordably priced natural resources for the government. The second purpose involved diminishing its reliance on financial assistance from NATO.

The events that transpired on July 15, 1974, involving the overthrow of Makarios, led by Greek forces, revealed the existence of a clandestine desire for Enosis on the Island. Consequently, Bülent Ecevit responded decisively by deploying soldiers to the

57 *DEFE*, "Records of the British Minister of Defence, 11/539," 1967.

58 *MMTD*, "Parliamentary Records MMTD," 1967, pp. 343–348.

island, resulting in the escalation of a fresh conflict between Türkiye and Greece.⁵⁹ The question of whether NATO should initiate a military action in support of Türkiye without Russia's involvement has been raised. This observation signifies a notable change in the favourable stance of NATO and the UN towards Türkiye.

On July 20, 1974, at 05.30 Bülent Ecevit commenced the Atilla operation in Cyprus by establishing communication with William B. Macomber, the US ambassador to Ankara, and apprising him of Türkiye's decision to pursue an independent trajectory.⁶⁰ As expected, Turkish military forces arrived on the island on July 20th. Military personnel began to establish permanent residences in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea region. Interestingly, while possessing the capability to intervene in Türkiye, global Western forces made a conscious decision to refrain from doing so during that specific period. Ecevit made an abrupt effort to present himself as the accomplished protector of the island. He was commonly referred to as 'Karaoğlan', a term that symbolised the affection and admiration of the entire Turkish population. In contrast, Necmettin Erbakan, the individual who formed a coalition with him, aimed to appropriate the accomplishments of Cyprus under an Islamic framework.

The escalation of the fighting in the Aegean Sea coincided with the deteriorating conditions on the island of Cyprus. The President of Türkiye extended an offer to Greece, urging them to either reconcile their differences or consider withdrawing from NATO. On August 14, 1974, Greece declared its withdrawal from NATO's military wing as a form of protest against the alliance's perceived complacency, citing a scarcity of munitions and waning international backing as hindrances to its ability to engage in military action against the Turks. Subsequently, Ankara assumed authority over around 36% of the northern area of the island. There was a noticeable increase in Türkiye's involvement on the island. At present, Türkiye was commemorating this advancement, whilst Greece was organising protests against the US.

6. The Struggle for Enosis

The Greek faction, known as EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kiprion Agoniston/National Organisation of the Cypriot Warriors), was established under the leadership of General to be Lieutenant Colonel⁶¹ Gregorias Grivas, and commenced efforts towards achieving

59 Ronald Meinardus, *Die Türkei-Politik Griechenlands*, p. 303.

60 CIA Report/SitRep, Gerald Ford, NSA Kissinger Scowcroft West Wing Office Files.

61 Despite the fact that he is a retired lieutenant colonel, he was appointed to be Lieutenant General after his arrival in Athens in 1959.

Greek authority in Cyprus prior to 1950. The Greek-Turkish conflict in Cyprus was ignited by the aforementioned acts. While France asserted that these actions were perpetrated against the British, it became evident that Greek Cypriots were intent on forcibly removing Turkish Cypriots.

The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus was ultimately realised in 1960 through the signing of the Zurich and London Treaties. The guarantor powers involved in the observation were Türkiye, Britain, and Greece. The inaugural President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, espoused the subsequent perspectives towards the nascent Republic: “These results are certainly not complete, but the current reality has not completely blocked the way of our pursuits. With the London and Zurich Treaties, our hopes and aspirations have not been fully realised. A bastion and starting point were obtained to continue our campaign through peace. We will continue our struggle to achieve victory from this bastion and starting point.”⁶²

The establishment of this republic was perceived by Greek Cypriots as a significant advancement in their pursuit of Enosis (Greek Mandate). Consequently, Makarios expeditiously presented his widely recognised proposition for constitutional modifications, encompassing matters such as taxation, the establishment of a military force, the imposition of restrictions on the participation of Turks in state affairs, and the delineation of borders through the establishment of distinct municipalities.⁶³ Disputes arose between the President of Cyprus, Mihail Christodulu Muskos (Makarios), and his Turkish deputy, Fazıl Küçük. Consequently, the Greek population’s aspiration for Enosis (unification) and the Turkish population’s aspiration for Taksim (division) progressively grew in intensity. The memorandum put forth by Makarios had a clear disregard for the idea of equality, instead advocating for the establishment of a unitary state under Greek governance. However, it ultimately faced international rejection. Consequently, the Akritas Plan, implemented by the Greek side, gained significant traction as a means to impose punitive measures on the Turkish Cypriot population. The Akritas Plan was formulated with the aim of conveying to the international community that the issue of Cyprus had not been fully resolved despite the foundation of the new Cyprus Republic. The primary objective was to intensify the struggle while preventing external interventions, ultimately achieving Enosis through the implementation of a “fait accompli” strategy.⁶⁴

62 Fazıl Küçük, *The Cyprus Mission and Greek Brutality*, Devlet Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002, p. 14.

63 Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, Alkım Publishing, İstanbul, 2019, p. 785.

64 *Official Records of the General Assembly*, Question of Cyprus, A.33.115. S12722, 1978.

The event known as ‘Bloody Christmas’ occurred on 24 December 1963, as documented by Turkish sources. In the meantime, it has been documented that British High Commissioner Arthur Clark conveyed his dissatisfaction to Glafkos Clerides, the spokesman of Greek Cypriots, regarding Türkiye’s unfavourable stance towards constitutional modifications. The individual also stated that the presence of British soldiers on the island serves the purpose of safeguarding British nationals and deterring external meddling.⁶⁵ Considering the absence of Turkish involvement in this particular instance of a double date, it is reasonable to infer that the British party directed their attention towards the Greek side. In a timely manner, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Spyros Kyprianou, was extended an invitation to engage in discussions with Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of the British Commonwealth, and Arthur Clark. The UK demonstrated its inclination to assume a prominent position in addressing the issue of Cyprus. Nevertheless, the Turkish leadership was cognizant of the fact that engaging in a unilateral attack would inevitably result in a protracted conflict with Greece. Due to this rationale, a tripartite intervention concept was formulated by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Chief of General Staff Cevdet Sunay, which was subsequently acknowledged by British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home on 25 December 1963. Consequently, Turkish and Greek military personnel would establish a presence on the island under the authority of the British administration. Colonel Tzouveleakis, representing the Greek side, and Colonel Evsöz, representing the Turkish side, were assigned under the direction of General Peter Young. Regrettably, their joint efforts did not provide the desired outcome.⁶⁶

The frequency of violent conflicts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots escalated. On January 22, 1964, Christos Xanthopoulos Palamas, the Foreign Minister of Greece, proposed the concept of a NATO alliance including Italian and French military forces operating under the command of the US. Nevertheless, Sir Evelyn underscored the rationale of advocating for the establishment of a community via the British Commonwealth, as opposed to NATO. Consequently, a discourse regarding the potential for collaboration between Anglo-American entities was initiated. However, it can be observed that the collaboration between Anglo-American entities appeared to have an underlying power struggle as both parties vied for dominance. The move faced significant criticism from the Russian government. Despite receiving help from Russia, Makarios also refused to accept it. Out of concern over potential intervention by

65 George-Henri Soutou, *L’Alliance Incertaine : Les Rapports Politico-Stratégiques Franco-Allemands 1954-1996*, p. 361.

66 *Foreign Office 371/174748*, “Record of Private Meeting of the Security Council 05:00,” 15 February 1964; Foreign Office to Ankara, 1964.

Türkiye, the UK sought recourse by submitting an application to the UN Security Council, ultimately leading to the establishment of the UNFICYP. During that particular era, there was a noticeable surge in the favourable perception of Russia within Greece, coinciding with the growing prevalence of communism. Additionally, during that period, President Makarios of Cyprus underwent a shift in his stance, transitioning from advocating for Enosis (union with Greece) to advocating for complete independence for the island.

Previously, the Soviet Union, via the news agency TASS, said that the state of affairs in Cyprus was a matter of global significance. Russia expressed its desire to participate in the decision-making process by advocating for the transfer of the UNFICYP to the Security Council, so enabling it to have a voice in the matter.⁶⁷ Following the discernible involvement of the Soviets in the aforementioned occurrence, the US made the decision to assume full administrative control. In this context, the US exemplified one of its objectives in countering communism.

In September 1965, a notable shift occurred as Stephanos Stephanopoulos assumed leadership from Papandreou. During this transition, Stephanopoulos publicly expressed support for Enosis, the Greek mandate, while expressing disagreement with Makarios' advocacy for absolute independence. The selection of General Grivas as the commander of the Greek forces deployed on the island of Cyprus was made. On April 21, a military coup led by Colonel George Papadopoulos resulted in the overthrow of the government of Greece. According to certain scholars, the involvement of the CIA provided support and reinforcement to the coup.⁶⁸ Consequently, as a result of the backing from the US, there was a notable surge in nationalism, whereas the influence of communism under Russian dominance experienced a drop. The Greek military regime formally requested the establishment of military sites from Ankara, proposing a potential agreement that would involve the acceptance of Enosis. President Makarios vehemently opposed the allocation of any territorial concessions to the Turkish population. Meanwhile, the advent of Grivas on the island resulted in the development of a dual authority system, known as the Makarios-Grivas system, inside the region. The military government explicitly expressed its refusal to collaborate with Makarios.

67 *Foreign Office 371/174748*, "Record of Private Meeting of the Security Council 05:00," 15 February 1964; Foreign Office to Ankara, 1964.

68 Solon Gregoriadis, *Istoria tis Diktatorias*, Kapopoulos Publishing, Yunanistan, 1975, p. 134.

According to accounts from the UK, there was a systematic escalation of Greek attacks under the leadership of Grivas. In this particular case, Britain exhibits a position that is contrary to the plans of the US to uphold its position as the primary decision-maker, while the US also assumes a prominent role by evidently capitalising on Greece's foreign policy. During the period from 1970 to 1974, Greece made efforts to exert control over Cyprus by utilising General Grivas. It is worth mentioning that the assistance provided by the US, both in terms of resources and ideological backing, played a significant role in enabling this endeavour. In contrast, the Turkish Government, in response to Grivas' actions, issued a warning over the possibility of intervention. In summary, there was an international demand for the departure of Grivas and his contingent of Greek soldiers who were armed with Greek weaponry.

Nonetheless, the UK and the US maintained significant apprehensions regarding the relationship between Makarios and the Soviet Union. This concern ultimately functioned as an additional rationale for the UK and US acting in concert. Consequently, NATO was recognised as the crucial entity requiring sustained stability. During the NATO ministerial meeting held in Brussels on November 15, 1968, an agreement was reached between Greek foreign minister Panagiotis Pipinelis and Turkish foreign minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil to give precedence to maintaining a balance within NATO.⁶⁹

On July 15th, 1974, Makarios was ultimately deposed in a coup, with the objective of establishing a Cypriot administration that aligned more closely with the Greek junta. On July 4, 1974, a meeting was convened by NATO Secretary General Luns with the aim of mitigating the escalating tensions between Türkiye and Greece concerning the territorial disputes involving Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. Regrettably, the Cyprus issue attained its zenith prior to the implementation of any proposed measures. Subsequently, a truce was proclaimed on July 22, 1974 in response to a request from the UN, following reports of the Greek National Guard's alleged destruction of a Turkish village. The Republic of Türkiye recommenced its military activities on July 27, 1974, coinciding with the worsening situation in Cyprus, which subsequently led to an escalation of the Aegean Sea dispute. The Turkish President extended an invitation to Greece to re-join the NATO, notwithstanding Greece's previous decision to withdraw from NATO's military wing on August 14, 1974, as a means of expressing dissatisfaction with its perceived lack of action. NATO promptly convened a crisis conference, during which Franz Krapf, the German delegate, notably expressed sympathy for his Greek

69 *The National Archives (TNA)*, "FCO 9/782 (1968–69), 'Cyprus. Intercommunal talks. Part II,'" 1969.

counterpart and deliberated on NATO's lack of action throughout the discussion. Greece also attributed responsibility on NATO leaders, namely the US, whom they perceived as being passive. During the course of the conference, the British representative issued a cautionary statement to the Turkish representative, expressing concern that the Western nations would gradually lose their empathetic disposition. Nevertheless, Ankara disregarded these concerns and proceeded to seize control of the northern region of the island in 1974. Ankara exhibited the resolve to engage in intervention due to its recognition of the divergent interests held by the US and the UK during the majority of the crisis.

Conclusion

The Cyprus dispute, a complicated and long-standing issue in the Eastern Mediterranean, has been heavily influenced by international initiatives over the years. Despite several efforts by international organisations such as the UN, NATO, and significant nations like as the UK, Greece, Türkiye and the US, a long-term solution has proven elusive. This essay contends that the nature of these interventions, which were primarily motivated by geopolitical objectives rather than real peace-building initiatives, has aggravated the conflict rather than resolved it.

The period 1960-1974 demonstrates the essential involvement of foreign actors in defining the course of the Cyprus issue. The Zurich and London Agreements, which were originally intended to create a balanced political framework for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, quickly became points of dispute. The agreements, while well-intentioned, were weakened by Greece's and Türkiye's different nationalistic agendas, both of which are motivated by profound historical and cultural connections to the island. Greece's constant quest for Enosis, or unification with Greece, and its refusal to recognise Turkish Cypriots as not even a minority caused a standoff that international actors were unable to overcome.

Hence, it is possible to infer that the international community's approach to the Cyprus issue has been mostly interest-driven, with an emphasis on strategic and geopolitical advantages rather than resolving the Cypriot people's core complaints. External powers frequently prioritised regional security and strategic interests over promoting a true, equitable solution for the island's residents. This resulted in a type of "comfortable conflict," as characterised by Adamides and Constantinou, in which the conflict grew normalised and lasted without making meaningful progress toward peace.

Türkiye, on the other hand, has continuously highlighted the significance of maintaining Turkish Cypriots' political rights and security, reflecting its historical and cultural ties to the region. Despite repeated warnings and diplomatic efforts to protect the island's constitutional structure, Turkish concerns were generally overwhelmed by other foreign actors' larger geopolitical objectives.

The conflict's complexities were exacerbated by the British geopolitical interest in keeping a presence in the region. Britain's engagement was less about settling the conflict and more about protecting its own geopolitical interests in the face of competing ambitions from Greece and Türkiye.

Indeed, the Cyprus war exemplifies how international actions motivated by national interests can exacerbate rather than settle regional conflicts. While Greece and Türkiye have legitimate interests in the island because to their long-standing social, cultural, and historical ties, the international community's inability to prioritise a fair and inclusive resolution has exacerbated the problem. Moreover, Greece's refusal to recognise Turkish Cypriots has made the dispute intractable. Thus, the continued international participation has not only failed to bring peace but has also exacerbated differences and prolonged the Cypriot people's suffering. Within this context, it can be stated that a change towards genuine, interest-neutral mediation is required for any prospect of a long-term solution to the Cyprus issue.

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