

The Future of the Modern State: Rethinking the Discourse of “Failed State” with the Emergence of Network (Cyber) State¹

Modern Devletin Geleceği: Network Devlet Biçiminin Ortaya Çıkışı İle Başarısız Devlet Söylemini Yeniden Düşünmek

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ÖZET

Ağ teknolojisindeki gelişmelere paralel olarak devletin yapısal ve niteliksel bir dönüşüm yaşadığı tartışılmaktadır. Bir yandan sınırların buharlaşması ve karşılıklı bağımlılığın artması bu devlet yapısını giderek aşındırıyor. Öte yandan uluslararası alanda dijital bağlantıyı da güçlendiriyor. Böylece devletler küresel sorunlara çözüm bulmak amacıyla dijital ağlar oluşturmakta ve ağ devletine dönüşecek bir yapıya zemin hazırlamaktadır. Bu da küresel ağ yönetişimi ile birlikte siber güvenlik ve savunma mekanizmalarını vurgulayarak dijital egemenlik anlayışını ön plana çıkarıyor. Dahası devlet egemenliğini zayıflatan teknolojiye dayalı dönüşüm, başarısız devlet kavramını yeniden gündeme getiriyor. Temel sorunsal, devlet egemenliği dönüştükçe bu kavramın siyasi meşruiyeti nasıl etkilediğidir. Ancak dönüşüm karşısında sağlam bir siber güvenliğin ve savunma duvarının öneminin vurgulanması hem devletin ulusal bilincinin güçlenmesine yol açmakta hem de onun varoluşsal doğasına hitap etmektedir. Bu nedenle bu çalışmada başarısız devlet dönüşüm yoluyla sorunsallaştırılmakta ve nitel verilerin toplanması yoluyla teorik bir çerçevede analiz edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kavramlar: *Network (Siber) Devlet, Dijital Egemenlik, Devlet Dönüşümü, Uluslararası Sistem, Başarısız Devlet.*

ABSTRACT

Parallel to the developments in network technology, there are discussions that the state has experienced a structural and qualitative transformation. On the one hand, the evaporation of borders and the increase in interdependencies gradually erode this state structure. On the other hand, it also strengthens the digital connection in the international arena. Thus, states create digital networks in order to find solutions to global problems and prepare the ground for a structure that will turn into a network state. This brings the understanding of digital sovereignty to the fore by highlighting cyber security and defense mechanisms together with global network governance. Moreover, technology-based transformation, weakening the state sovereignty, brings the concept of the failed state back to the agenda. The main problematic is how this concept affects political legitimacy as state sovereignty transforms. However, the emphasis on the importance of a solid cyber security and the defense wall in the face of transformation both leads to strengthening of national consciousness of the state and appeals to the existential nature of the one. For that reason, in this study, the failed state is problematized through transformation and analyzed in a theoretical framework through the collection of qualitative data.

Keywords: *Network (Cyber) State, Digital Sovereignty, State Transformation, International System, Failed State.*

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INTRODUCTION

There are some fundamental approaches that define the state. One of these involves not only the obedience of the society to the authority of the state, based on the contract between them, but also a purposive approach including the state's responsibilities to provide social services, primarily security, to the society. Alternatively, it is described as the monopoly of legitimate exercise of power over a defined piece of land and it tends to emphasize means rather than ends. There is another approach evoking its legitimacy rather its actual characteristics, focusing on the rule of law. Accordingly, it is necessary for a state to have a defined territory (border), a permanent population (identity), an effective government, and a strong capacity (sovereignty). Although these definitions of the state do not directly emphasize its transforming entity, this makes it possible to compare it with the stage it has reached today. At its present from it cannot satisfactorily fulfill its basic functions, and it has begun to lose its power to form and manage social identities, it has incompetence in ensuring security and maintaining legitimacy, it cannot maintain the monopoly of the means of internal violence, and an independent sphere of sovereignty is steadily being lost (Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur, 2005: 15).

This is where the debate over "failed state" is sparked off. It is necessary to comprehend the nature of the state as well as its transformation and evolution in order to see in which direction it is evolving. Being able to see this long-term process is only possible by studying this transformation from its beginning (Ancient period). Therefore, it is important to be able to explain the transformation of the modern state by basing it on the underlying basic element that has been effective in different state forms since the Ancient Greek city-states, in order to analyze the problematic of the failed state within the theoretical framework.

This study reads the evolutionary process from a different perspective in which "technology" has a significant effect on the formation of different state forms from the ancient period to the present time. In every period, when certain technological developments interact with as the main background element in the development of prominent social, economic, military and political structures and bring about constructive or destructive changes in these areas, the state reacts rationally to these cumulative changes and transforms. This study, which sets out with such a method that reveals how the functions and functioning of the state are transformed with technology, and seeks to understand how the discourse of the failed state can affect the sovereignty and global order with regard to the point it has reached today. So, while functional transformation is the transformation in its basic functions or services such as war, security and economy, as in the way it fulfills its functions, and structural and qualitative transformation refers to the transformation in the state structure and the nature of its sovereignty.

A dysfunctional or failed state is the one that is unable to manage its traditional capacity in the face of the challenges, and lack autonomous economic management, which also is dominated by non-state actors and in need of an international governance. In this context, it can be claimed that a holistic (nation-based) form of sovereignty corresponding to the modern state structure has gradually dissolved with the effect of technological developments, but the network state form, which denotes the structural and qualitative transformation process, indicates that it still maintains the current state form with the understanding of cyber sovereignty. Accordingly, while the state transforms due to its existential nature, it also develops a sovereignty shield suitable for this

transformation. In order to understand the future of the modern state, it may be useful to briefly reveal the functional and operational transformation of this phenomenon with the effect of technological developments in the historical process.

The origin of the modern state dates back to the ancient Greek city-states. Although some values such as democracy, citizenship and civil society remain at the aristocratic level, they have a potential to pave the way for the modern state. In the ancient world, especially military technologies played a role in the administrative (regime) transformation of the state as well as its military functions.² This evolutionary beginning signifies the transition from the primitive city-state, in which state-subject relations predominate, to the city-state (Polis), where state-citizenship relations rise on the ground of democracy and civil society. From this point on, although the state evolved within the framework of partially liberal values mixed with aristocracy until the modern period, it shifted towards social liberalism, which established a popular base for it a little more with the influence of nationalism, and then continued its evolution in this direction by transitioning to neo-liberalism on a more global scale.³ In this sense, the liberal values adopted by the state did not

² In this period, some military technologies moved the city-state to a different point (Polis) within the framework of the effects they created on the political structure, giving an idea about the origin of the modern state. One of these, the hoplite, is often described as a heavily armed warrior identified by a particular set of weapons (helmets, spears, armor, and shields). It is also known that there is a stronger phalangeal technology inspired by hoplites. See. Fernando Echeverría, *Hoplite and Phalanx in Archaic and Classical Greece: A Reassessment*, *Classical Philology*, 107(4), 2012, pp. 291-318, p. 292. Since it is a rugged and mountainous terrain, the duties of the people's assembly related to the construction, use and command of technologies have influenced the development of the institution of democracy. See. Server Tanilli, *The Truth and Legacy of Centuries, Antiquity: East, Greece, Rome (Volume I)*, 4th ed., İşbank Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2018, p. 283. Hoplite democracy started to shape the social, economic and political structure together with the military structure. See. Christopher Vassilopoulos, *The Nature of Athenian Hoplite Democracy*, *Armed Forces & Society*, 22(1), 1995, p. 49-63., p. 50-51. In this context, military democracy developed and affected other fields. In addition to the ways in which these technologies are used, as the number of slaves captured in wars with military technological support increased, the number of labor employed on the land and surplus-product increased, they contributed to the military democratic regime and citizenship, as well as increasing the number and power of individual property owners. See. Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Social History of Western Political Thought, From Citizens to Lords, From Antiquity to the Middle Ages*, trans. Oya Köymen, 3rd Ed., Yordam Kitap, İstanbul, 2017, p. 30-31. In this sense, democracy nourishes the field of civil society or shapes this field depending on its content. Similarly, Hobsbawm made a connection between these two elements by saying that the expansion of political participation and political activities from the upper strata to the lower strata or getting out of state's monopolization (democratization) creates an area of civil society, but antidemocratic regimes such as dictatorship and fascism also require the existence of civil society. See. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *First Class Societies, Asian Mode of Production and Eastern Despotism*, trans. Kenan Somer, Birey ve Toplum Yayınları, Ankara, 1985, p. 13.

³ The democratic understanding that emerged under the influence of military technologies in the ancient period nurtured an autonomous civilian area (individual property owners). With the discovery of heavy plow and the expansion of arable agricultural lands in the Middle Ages, the increase in the need for labor power, ownership of land through concessions granted to the serfs and trading with the surplus product obtained from there, and also the further revival of trade by using the developing shipping and distant waterways gave birth to the merchant class (bourgeoisie). Stirrup, on the other hand, contributed to the development of this class by ensuring the continuation of trade in a safe environment due to its effect on ensuring the security in the region. See. Lynn White, *Medieval Technology and Social Change*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962, p. 1-2. Thus, the existing aristocratic civil sphere began to be replaced by a different aristocratic civil sphere and played a role in the formation of the modern state. Especially with the invention of military weapons such as gunpowder and cannon and the financial support of the bourgeoisie, the struggle of the king against the feudal lords and the Church influenced the absolutist state form. Afterwards, this class played a role in the formation of the modern nation-state form by investing and strengthening the capital obtained from trade in the direction of industrialization, expanding this struggle to include the absolute king and continuing with the political revolution it started with the support of the people. See. Leo Huberman, *From Feudal Society to the Twentieth Century*, trans. Murat Belge, 18th Ed., İletişim Publications, İstanbul, 2017, p. 86, 98, 193, 196. Therefore, in the process leading to the modern state, the aristocratic political culture continued to exist in a different form, there being an important effect of technological developments on its basis. If these technological developments had not had an impact on democracy and the existence of the civil society field, it would not have been easy to get out of such a field and build the modern state.

remain within its current borders, but began to spread to the world on a scale in the process, especially with the development of industry, transportation, information, communication and network technologies. Today, the traces of the political administrative understanding of the state are based on a very old history, indicating a long state history. Therefore, it is necessary to try to understand the underlying reason why the modern state is characterized as a failed state at its current stage by analyzing its transformed functions and functioning since then. Actually, as the political and administrative understanding of the state, which is shaped by liberal values with the effect of technological developments, gradually matured and spread, its function and functioning began to change and transform.

Likewise, Chase-Dunn and Inoue (2012: 162-163) agree that the formation processes of government forms also stem from the realist context in the form of war or power struggles, depending on the developments in military technologies and interstate interaction, thus confirming the validity of Charles Tilly's (1975) claim that "the state makes wars and wars make the state". They also mentioned that this realist perspective is a reason for the construction of global state formation that can resolve conflicts peacefully. Accordingly, the effect of technological developments on realism also played a role in the evolution of the political administrative understanding of the state and the transformation of its function and functioning.

Military technologies had an important role in the evolutionary process from the formation of city-states (Poleis) to the early modern state. In ancient Greece and Rome, advanced catapult technology was a factor in being able to capture fortified cities and establishing kingdoms and empires. Similarly, developments in firearms had a significant impact on the rise of (absolutist) nation-states in early modern times, putting in danger first the security of the fortress walls and then the independence these walls protected (Hacker, 1968). Their introduction provided the basis for further bureaucratic centralization within European governments and the consolidation of power under bureaucratic monarchies. (Batchelder and Freudenberg, 1983). The state also gained a new function and operation based on bureaucratic centralization. This situation required a nation-state structure that would challenge the feudal order or the old aristocratic political culture. In addition, in this period, it accelerated the bureaucratic organization of the central administration in order to meet the need arising from rapid urbanization as a result of migration from the countryside to the city, which was driven by the labor demand created by industrialization. This innovation was also reflected in the form of the state and consolidated institutionally and systematically after the French Revolution (Hobsbawm, 2008).

Wicker (2004: 145) stated that the power of the nation-state in the 19th and 20th centuries stemmed from three basic concepts; the idea of the republic, capitalism (which enabled technological progress) and the nation (which emerged from the internal interaction between

In addition, the evolution of the modern state continued with the development of liberal values within the framework of a political administrative understanding that would cover the national and international arena, and the expansion of its sphere of influence, with the impact of important technological breakthroughs such as the industrial revolution (mechanization) and other industrial revolutions after it. In this context, with the development of information and communication technologies and network technologies as its advanced dimension, in an environment where globalization and interdependencies increase, international governance models are supported and the understanding of democratization and civil society is spreading globally. This reflects the dissolution and transformation process of the modern state. See. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Hiroko Inoue, *Accelerating Democratic Global State Formation, Cooperation and Conflict*, 47(2), 2012, p. 162-170.

capitalism and the state). Capitalism and the existence of the technology that created it were intertwined with the nation-state. Developments in industrial technology not only enabled the expansion of the domestic market, but also created a foreign market with the incorporation of communication, transportation and military technologies, thus leading to the construction of the capitalist system both nationally and internationally. In fact, Wallerstein (2004) explained the modern world system theory in connection with a capitalist economy. In this context, the modern state and its ideology had a close relationship with this system theory. The basic element that established the relationship between these two and led to transformations in this framework was technology. As a matter of fact, the destructions (depression caused by harsh working conditions) it created in the society affected the transformation of the modern nation-state by bringing about changes in the social, economic and political structure (emergence of the socialist ideology). In this period, while technological advances provided the development of the state and limited its economic function, it also laid the groundwork for its functional and operational transformation. This evoked Schumpeter's (1947) term "creative destruction"; innovation had destructive as well as creative effects (Schubert, 2013: 227).

To compensate the effect of the technological revolution, the state developed social policies (the strategy of trying to stabilize industrialization by intervening in the problems arising from it in order to sustain it)⁴ to curb the extreme capitalist effects, starting to turn into a welfare state after a while. Although social policies were introduced in certain historical intervals after industrialization, they were actually implemented after World War II. In this period, the state was involved in the economy and assumed regulatory and interventionist roles and functions in many areas (Sordi, 2017: 32). However, the emergence of problems such as the crisis created by the economic environment and the blockage of the capitalist process in the 1970s, the development of information and communication technologies (Industry 3.0) and the idea that they can be overcome through the effect of globalization and neo-liberal politics revealed the need for the state to withdraw from the field of economy. Because the currency, oil and raw material crises of this period, on the one hand, questioned the Keynesian regulatory economy, and on the other hand, contributed to the removal of the illusion of a crisis-free capitalism, leading to the dissolution of the welfare state and the transition to a period of developing market-state relations (Wahl & Irons, 2011: 43).

The modern state is transforming radically in the face of the new world created by both the information and communication technologies associated with the post-modern period and the developments in advanced network technology, defined as Industry 4.0, which is associated with the digital network era. This transformation has the potential to affect internal and external sovereignty, reflecting it as an area that should transform into a supra-state organization with the failed state conceptualization. Therefore, in the first part, the article discusses how its transformation within the framework of market state, digital state and network state forms has rendered it dysfunctional in the process; in the second part, it focuses on the possible effects of this evolution on the national and global level by supporting the structural and qualitative

⁴ The state is an organization that obtains resources through taxation and acts through policies to expand its political authority and control society. One of these is the social policies it develops to defend its territory and to enable production and trade. This perspective, which emerged in Europe after industrialization and spread around the world, is associated with the efforts of certain segments of society to regulate working conditions, improve wages, reduce environmental impacts on people's health, etc. See. Theda Skocpol & Edwin Amenta. (1986). States and social policies. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 12, 131–157, p. 132.

transformation process in the context of the failed state; In the third part, the problem of the failed state is sought to be resolved within the framework of the existential nature of the state.

1. THE FUTURE OF THE MODERN STATE

1.1. Market state

Technological developments, on the one hand, paved the way for the formation of the nation-state, on the other hand, brought the welfare state to the agenda with social pressures. However, the increase in social expenditures imposed on the state by the social democratic regime has brought with it a host of criticisms: it undermines incentives to work, destroys the ability to invest, creates self-serving welfare bureaucracies and fuels inflation, poses a threat to freedom, and corrupts the political system by having to make decisions about the allocation of resources that should be left to the market. Since the crisis environment that broke out as a result of these had an effect that accelerated capitalism in order to increase its power in the face of increasing international competition as well as a contractionary effect on the functions undertaken by the state, this process was tried to be overcome by making use of the newly developed information and communication technologies (Cousins, 2005: 202-237; Jones, 1993: 7).

The revolution in technology has revived capitalism and opened up space for the market and affected the organization of the state within this framework. According to Treverton, the market state is the product of the global economy, and unlike the traditional modern state, it is a structure that is governed by trade rather than conquest, and its sovereignty within its borders is permeable. The key to this formation is the information revolution that accelerates with these technologies. Information, on the other hand, is a capital resource that has become the basic raw material of the economy (2005: 89-90, 97-99). By creating a world that enables access to information and the construction a global economy, this technologies not only create international companies, organizations and non-state actors, but also change the role of the state and give it new function and functioning by reconstructing the distribution of power in the international environment in which they also shape the market.

The state is not asked to intervene in the economy and is expected only to guarantee an environment in which the free market can function. The idea that this kind of economic liberalism would promote political liberalism is reflected in the market state. However, comparing the thinkers Hayek and Polanyi, Filip tried to express that this situation, which is similar to modern market capitalism, creates destructive social consequences rather than improving freedom spreading to the bottom. Hayek (1994) considered socialist and welfare states to have tendency to produce totalitarian regimes, restrict freedoms and hinder the development of the market. He perceived market state based on individual welfare and freedom rather than welfare state interventionism. Polanyi (2001), on the other hand, foresaw a paradigm shift by providing a theoretical basis for the devastating consequences of economic globalization. He defended this by believing that the increasing inequality among people will move away from building an environment of freedom after a while, and for this reason, the state should intervene and reform as necessary to create positive freedom conditions. This idea is important in terms of both enabling the development of the market by the state and creating an opportunity to develop freedom at a relatively social level by making ethical and legal regulations regarding the functioning of the market instead of opposing the market

state itself (Filip, 2012: 83-84). This approach has created a reason for a different state organization where it can contribute to both democratization and the development of the market by undertaking a function and operation in which the state carries out administration processes with different stakeholders by making use of technological developments.

1.2. Digital government (e-government)

This form of state is made possible by information and communication technologies in the inner workings and services of the state. It has begun to fulfill its functions through digital means in intergovernmental processes, in connecting government and citizens to business and industry (government-to-business), and in most government-to-citizen services. However, while these technologies are the driving force in transforming government practice, method and efficiency, there is no one-size-fits-all approach as infrastructure requirement, system design and corporate governance differ between states (Hogeveen, 2020: 11). The role of the state is to include citizens and businesses in the management process by balancing collective needs and individual demands, protecting the private interests of different stakeholders, as well as providing more effective, efficient and quality services by using these technologies, thus constructing democratic participation, openness and accountability in such an environment (Teşu, 2012: 79-80).

These aims and objectives are implemented with the support of the governance model, for the principles or values adopted are also important in terms of opening up the area where the market can function and expand and of solving the related problems. As Schout and Luining (2018) point out, Europe, aware of the complexities of addressing market-related issues in the neo-liberal process, has had to learn that further elaboration of the practice of market regulation requires new networks and institutions. In this context, progress in technology affects the structure, functioning, performance and change of organizations, supporting governance activities within the framework of the synergy created by the mutual interaction between the state, private sector and non-governmental organizations, thus encouraging both participatory democratization and making the market environment more sustainable (Reitz, 2006: 733).

In this period, the state's making the necessary legal arrangements for the free movement of the market is an indication that it has assumed a limited responsibility function. According to Berger (1990, p. 103), it is argued that the most important factor determining the scale and development potential of the market in Western countries is generally the state. Bruszt (2012, p. 111, 132) evaluated this change within the framework of the links between post-communist market reforms, state-building and democratization, and mentioned that state-building for a functioning market and for this, reforms should be carried out under democratic conditions. Previously, there has been an evolution from a minimalist government or single decision-making e-government approach to an understanding in which the market plays an active role in its functioning and encourages participatory management. This transition has manifested itself in the form of governance.

This form of coordination is related to the lack of state capacity in overcoming the problems and meeting the needs in the globalizing world. Therefore, the governance model undertaken by acting on a common idea with other stakeholders within the state can be expressed as an application that further deepens the understanding of e-government. The model is thought to enable it to fulfill

its functions in accordance with the principles it has adopted, since it can make the hierarchical state system flexible or horizontal. Thus, instead of an instrumental rationality in the hierarchy, Habermasian communicative rationality based on negotiation comes to the fore. Such governance requires redefining the relational dynamic between the state and citizens. This improves the process by expanding the means of achieving social goals (Alonso, 2009: 53).

According to Egger, the hierarchical government bureaucracy in the 20th century was the dominant organizational model used by the state to carry out its functions. However, increasingly complex societies and increasing problems have forced outsourcing to develop new governance models as they require partnerships and network models. At this point, Ansell and Gash (2008: 544, 561) mention that with the incorporation of international collaborative networks into national governance, both the understanding of governance has expanded and different governance models have been created, and that public policy making and complex forms of problem-solving with a collaborative governance approach including non-state stakeholders have been developed. As power dispersed and borders became more fluid, problems became both more global and more local. In the solution of these problems, states started to build a new government model by focusing on organizing resources and network management gained importance (Egger, 2008: 23).

With the acceleration of the inclusion of new networks and the dissolution of the national governance structure, the classical state understanding is gradually moving away (Barthwal, 2003: 285). This is because the state has to cooperate with networks of individual and collective actors who will organize the resources it needs in order to fulfill its functions, as its foreign opening accelerates and its dependency increases accordingly. This has brought with it a global understanding of digital network governance, in which the hierarchy is replaced by civic participation and the market environment is increasingly spread to support public services, government administration, and democratic processes (Bannister & Connolly, 2012: 4). In this context, according to Axford and Huggins, many local, national and supranational actors embrace the rhetoric of information and communication technology and advocate its application as a strategy to deal with a fast-moving world. This has revealed the idea of transnational governance, with a system of networks and flows in Europe where the main source of power is knowledge (2000: 189).

1.3. Network (cyber) governance

The speed of technological innovations in the 21st century has created the Industry 4.0 (artificial intelligence, robotics, internet of things, 3D software, cloud computing, cyber-physical systems) process, namely “fourth industrial revolution”. The term was coined for the first time in 2011, creating a world that can flexibly collaborate on a global level and includes the holistic transformation of systems within and between states, companies, sectors, and society as a whole (Schwab, 2016: 12, 67). Global problems in the digital world require finding carefully integrated solutions and creatively structured management capabilities (Egger, 2008). In other words, this brings up the network state form, which can be expressed as a digital-based intergovernmental network governance model (artificial intelligence governance) .

The nation-state form is gradually being eroded by the changes that occur within the framework of its interaction with the elements related to the structural fields with social, economic, military and political content such as capitalism, globalization, neo-liberalism, non-state actors and

interdependence, which technological revolutions have affected their development. However, it can be said that such global problems will be overcome with the establishment of a global network governance using new technological developments. Therefore, the network state form can be defined as a structuring or global organization that leads states to work together with a focus on finding solutions to global problems and to connect them through digital networks. In this context, McCormick (2007) tried to explain that Europe is going through a structural transformation process by pointing to the supranational organization.

The idea of coping with change and the problems that come with it paves the way for global politics and gives rise to the understanding of global governance (Steffek, Kissling & Nanz, 2008). Thus, the legitimacy of the state gains a more international context and the need for reorganization of international law arises (Warning, 2009). Given this situation, the Europeanization or internationalization of national governance is an enormous capacity-building effort in which different levels of government agree to work with similar “models and methods” supported by “hundreds of networks” between public administrations for good governance and practices. This is the scale-up of European management and practices all over the world, extending beyond the current region. In this multi-level context, national and international cooperation prevents centralization in authority-based networks, as institutions work together across borders rather than operating by themselves (Schout & Luining, 2018).

Maintaining economic competitiveness in the digital age requires innovative approaches. The digital strategy developed for that reason provides a strong foundation for global competitiveness in the fourth industrial revolution. This strategy is based on four pillars; technology working for people, digital economy, digital society and digital global perspective. In this sense, digital connectivity is gaining importance (Dekker & Okano-Heijmans, 2020). At this point, the concept of cyber security comes to the fore and evokes international cooperation and synergy to advance global network governance. Cyber security will be an important function of states as much as international cooperation. Drawing attention to this has brought the concept of digital sovereignty to the agenda. This conception of sovereignty is a much broader concept that includes a strong and innovative industrial base with adequate cybersecurity protection, but also preserves the capability of states (Burwell & Propp, 2020). This situation changed the meaning of traditional security and ceased to be an element provided only from the borders, and the security of the state in the digital environment began to be discussed.

International cooperation in technology policy is deemed necessary to ensure that the world's liberal democracies are economically competitive, their citizens are empowered, and issues such as global health problems, peacebuilding, human rights, cyberspace and climate change are resolved. In particular, it is emphasized that such a governance approach is not just a matter of the state and that states are not necessarily central actors but are influenced by external stakeholders and powers, and it is stated that network state can take many forms, which may or may not include public governance (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 1999: 447; Löffler, 2003; Scharpf, 1978). In this sense, Avant et al. stated that this organization has critical aspects as well as the necessary ones. Some advocate the participation of new actors pursuing collaborative results in collaboration with and independently of national governments and intergovernmental organizations, while others advocate the transformation of the global order by supporting national interest and sovereignty

against the constraints of global governance. In other words, although the conflict between these two lanes has not been resolved yet, it is thought that both innovations that can increase the effectiveness of global governance and national trends against it will shape the global order (Avant, Kahler, Pielemeier, et al., 2017: 1)

2. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF STRUCTURAL AND QUALITATIVE TRANSFORMATION

In the environment offered by Industry 4.0, while the phenomenon of the state on the verge of a structural and qualitative transformation process with the network state form or the understanding of global governance is being discussed, discussions on the world (government) state form or the ideal of global federation have also been added to this. This leads the transformation to debates of a systemic transformation in the global order. In other words, while the distributed network governance ecosystem among the actors relatively prevents the formation of a top-down system (Verhulst, Noveck, Raines, et al., 2017: 101), it can evolve into a centralized situation in the possibility of a world state, affecting internal and external sovereignty. This phase requires rethinking the failed state discourse.

2.1. Failed state (internal sovereignty)

The state is a phenomenon which is as abstract as it is concrete. The phenomenon of the modern state, as expressed by Chesterman and others, manifests as an entity in which depersonalized, formalized and rationalized political power is integrated into a comprehensive social order, manifesting itself as an entity embodying the political mission of the society with its institutions. However, with the loss of function of these institutions, the state, which started to take shape within the framework of a new structure that would weaken the idea of the abstract state, stands out as an organization in which it is directed and transformed to find alternative or less regular means. Although it refers to a network of authorized institutions that make and implement high-level decisions of a regionally defined political entity, it moves away from this position with its dysfunction and is characterized as a failed state. At this point, the state in a globalizing world, surrounded by technological developments, has faced with the changes in the fields related to social, political, economic, military and international structures which also raise global security problems (Chesterman, Ignatieff & Thakur, 2005: 2, 18).

Annan (2000, p. 7) emphasized that states cannot overcome these difficulties alone and therefore they will have to manage their common activities and interests together. This vulnerability, according to Rotberg, is referred to as the eroded state legitimacy crisis. This is because the transformations that occur in the state due to technology require the reduction of responsibilities in the public sphere by imposing a reduction, the policies followed in order to overcome the weakness of this feature, which it has gained, in its inability to cope with the globalizing world, are adapted to technocratic normative models and intervention methodologies (2004: 10-14-16). In this sense, the failed state discourse points to the functioning and harmonization of the state in such a way as to integrate it into the changing global order. In other words, the failed state in the transition to the network state form can be defined as a global discourse that brings along the sharing of sovereignty under the name of reviving and strengthening the dysfunctional state and transforming intervention in this area depending on the change in the

global order (Krasner, 2004; Huria, 2008). This can also be read as an effort to partially realize the power and ability of the state to make decisions as the decisive actor in the global order.

One of the important functions of the network state will be to build a robust cyber security and defense infrastructure as a result of the risks created by technology. This is because security and stability risks created by international technological spread, cyber-attacks or wars will be among the concepts that will be heard frequently. As Dorussen et al. (2016) mentioned, networked interdependencies have the potential to trigger conflict as well as cooperation in the international environment. In this case, there is a possibility that those included in the system will become a failed state. In addition, Castells (2010: XVIII) stated that despite the potential of networks to serve to establish a global system that can affect all states, this structure excludes some, causing a geography of social, economic and technological inequality. This situation draws attention to the possibility that inadequate or weak states cannot be included in the system and turn into failed states.

In the new global order, where the eroded nation-state structure is preserved by cyber means, capturing, using, damaging and locking the system and stopping the service flow by interfering with the sovereignty by these means may create failed states that cannot fulfill their economy, security and defense functions. In such a situation, a network structuring infiltrating the area where the state shares its sovereignty to fulfill its new functions acquired in parallel with the transformation (narrowing) of its functions has the potential to collapse this area. As in the case of Estonia, cyber-attacks not only prevented the government and major sectors of its economy from carrying out their day-to-day business, but were also under a cyber blockade, as it was unable to provide or receive information beyond its national borders at the time of the attack, delaying its response to internal and external threats (Russell, 2014: 69). Here, there is a situation where the sovereignty of the state is locked as a result of cyber-attacks, and as a result, many areas are affected and cannot fulfill their functions and suffer damage.

A similar situation seems likely to occur in other states with a digital sovereignty understanding in the networked world. In fact, according to Danky and Briggs, in the Russia-Ukraine Wars in 2014 and 2022, Russia fought against Ukraine not only with its conventional means but also with its cyber attacks, using hybrid warfare tactics. In these attacks, in addition to physical attacks against Ukraine's power plants, it also carried out cyber attacks, damaging state institutions and trying to undermine trust in these institutions. These combined operations can be characterized as targeting resilience or weaponizing vulnerabilities. This is based on the intention to prevent functioning communities from rebuilding in the wake of conflict. For example, the deliberate attempt to prevent farmers from returning even after the war by spreading thousands of land mines in agricultural areas in Bosnia can also be seen in cyber operations (2013: 39, 43-44). Because disabling state institutions through cyber attacks can pave the way for both public reaction and chaos as a failed state, as well as military interventions with political content.

The proliferation of dysfunctional states leads successful states to work towards a transition to the form of a world state by undertaking global security measures. Here, it can be said that the failed state discourse and its political consequences are related to the structural and qualitative transformation of the state. In connection with this issue, Brooks (2005: 1184-85, 1195-96) argues

that if the current form of the state as a form of social organization is no longer viable, there is a need for transformation.

In short, technological developments enable a supra-state organization in the face of changes they created in structural areas and emerging global problems. This structural and qualitative transformation process is supported by the failed state discourse and is tried to be reinforced in the process. This transformation of the state also enables the spread of the Western political and administrative understanding. It can be said that these developmental processes are related to the interaction to the extent of which technological developments can spread or transform the international field through the transformation of the state, and to what extent this field can be effective in the transformation of the state.

2.2. World (government) state

Chase-Dunn and Inoue spoke of the continuation of the imperial ideal throughout the centre although it is difficult to talk about a global state in a situation where the state is partially defined according to its interaction with other states and an anarchic international system and the influence of industrial technology on capitalism first revealed the Eurocentric world system and then the system of institutionalized states as it spread to the colonies. In particular, it is mentioned that new pioneering technologies cause the existing state system to gradually lose its autonomy and build hegemony by providing an environment that reveals interstate cooperation institutions, integration and democratization. The hegemony here is emphasized in that global governance institutions develop consensus-based authority elements. In this context, as technological advances occur, as capitalism expands and increases globalization and interdependencies, the common authority that increasingly dysfunctional states rely on in the face of global problems is Europeanized or, in a broader sense, Western political administrative understanding spreads to the world. Thus, major organizational changes may tend to disrupt the current world order when existing institutions are inefficient in the face of global catastrophes and when citizens turn to international state organization instead of failing institutions that cannot overcome them. Here, technological advances are crucial in producing the conditions needed for global state formation, but this evolution is an assumption that will require the long-term process of channeling technological and political power to democratize the institutional elements of this state form (2012: 162, 170).

Mitrany developed a functional theory in the form of an international federation to deal with world problems. In general, federalism refers to the structure in which states come together for general purposes while preserving their identities. However, the reflection of this in the international environment is stated as the European (or Western) or world federation. This desire for union does not arise spontaneously. Ideas about federation can be imposed from outside on states that are not self-initiative, or they can be manifested in the form of promoting federalization in opposition to other political groups. Here, it can be thought that there is a new understanding of nationalism rather than a new internationalism. Accordingly, the universal public demand for social security in addition to political security is aimed to be transformed into a channel for international unity. In this context, while federation used to be adopted to distribute central power, now it is brought to the agenda for central planning. Today, this structuring, which network technologies can make possible in the face of problems and needs, is attributed to the continuation of activities related to international unity on common issues, provided that there is no outside interference in

sovereignty. Therefore, the functional approach evokes a process leading to the world state within the framework of the effects created by these technologies on a global scale (1948: 351-357).

Similarly, Gibbins (2000: 673) states that technological advances have created a borderless world, making the traditional federation approach, designed for a regional and divided political world, look outdated. He also mentioned that the global spread of democratization, human rights treaties, market economy and consumerism, enabled by technology, is gradually liberating people from peoples and places and moving them towards global integration. In this sense, Heater (1996: X, XII) argues that there is a parallel development between world citizenship as the consciousness of the individual's belonging to the community of all humanity and the world state. In addition, starting from Mitrany's functionalism approach, he spoke of the belief that the divisive (preventing world citizenship and state with the consciousness of nationalism) and aggressive (threatening global security) power of the nation state will be steadily and completely reduced with a growing network of global governance arrangements around the world.

In this transformation process, there are ongoing debates between the views of particularism/diversity and unity/universality. On the one hand, there are those who argue that the anarchic structure in which states exhibit competitive behaviors should be maintained in order to survive in the digital/cyber international system, as Wendt (1992) states, or, as Waltz (1979) puts it, that there is no central authority that can say what states should do and their limits. On the other hand, there are also those who argue that it is difficult to maintain this structure in the face of changing conditions and global problems in recent years and that there is a need for management under the umbrella of international unity. In other words, as a reflection of the evolution of the world state or from a decentralized network to a centralized network in the cyber system, there is a mechanism in which there is a superior authority above the states that can make and implement decisions on certain issues, and this operates through legal and authoritative networks.

In this context, Hafner-Burton et al. stated that it is necessary to retest the non-hierarchical organization of international relations through network analysis and that network power is generally related to centrality. He even tried to present a network-based structural analysis that challenges the traditional power approach, stating that France has a highly centralized network power in social terms and that this has the effect of shaping the flow of information receiving and giving in other networks (states). A network's taking the central power and investing in that center requires thinking about the concept of sovereignty as well as making the network efficient (2009, p. 559, 561, 570). Therefore, it is important to discuss the possible effects of the structural and qualitative transformation of the state in the international system and structure, in order to understand the course within the framework of the problematic of the failed state.

2.3. International system and structure (external sovereignty)

According to Buzan, while sovereignty defines the structure of the international system, the structure of this system defines the structure of the state system. In this sense, while the relations of sovereign states with each other create an anarchic international structure, this structure also produces a competitive, self-seeking and self-sufficient state system structure. This anarchic structure will continue as long as the states do not challenge this structure. States can transform themselves (partial sovereignty as in the Middle Ages) without disturbing this structure. However, a

systemic change in which a higher authority emerges will affect the structure. In this case, the structure becomes partially hierarchical, resulting in states being subordinate to the world federation (2015, p. 128, 153). It should be noted that the developments in network technology can have a significant impact and share in this assumption that a change in the system of states can affect the structure and lead to a world state. Now, thanks to the global penetration of these technologies, it is mentioned that states are interconnected and, as an advanced stage, states cluster around a central network. In fact, Poggi (2016: 3) might have predicted a similar situation while thinking that political science has been trying to forget the state phenomenon in recent years.

While the state's inability to fight against global problems alone and becoming increasingly dysfunctional is overcome through establishing international functional networks, this situation has a potential to transform the international system and structure. Here, unlike the global governance operating in a decentralized network, there are possible effects of the transition to a global federation that can evolve into a centralized network in the process. Despite the thought that states will have cyber-sovereign walls and will be protected, the fact that the world government, which is the central network in a world where many issues are globalized, has a say in certain issues concerning global problems, creates a concern that the anarchic structure in the cyber system may be transformed.

Such a system is reminiscent of the hierarchical (sub-) system that occurred in the form of a feudal state in the past, but here it appears in a transformed form under the influence of more different technological developments than before. In this context, it is seen that the world system can be transformed with the transformation of the state sovereignty, and even transformation can occur in continuity (Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1992: 85-86). However, as Hoffmann points out, in the case of a member state of the federation, there is a hierarchy of legal statuses according to the amount of sovereignty restricted in favor of other states or international institutions. The nature and extent of this hierarchy varies with each international system. Sovereignty, then, is a bond of powers that can be maintained, limited, or lost and divided in varying ways. At a point where it can be assumed that sovereignty has disappeared, the hierarchy becomes sharper and state equality remains legendary (1961: 207, 235).

3. THE FAILED STATE PROBLEMATIQUE

Sustainability issue, in the face of technological advances that creates challenging situations, is a concept that refers to the broader needs of society as a whole (Ward, 2012: 38). This approach reflects not only the effort to transform the state, but also the idea of making it sustainable. However, instead of reconciling this transformation with the understanding of sustainability, it is also important to try to understand how the discourse of the failed state acts as a bridge to the transformation process.

3.1. Intervention as a tool of political legitimacy

The spread of the political administrative understanding to the world scale in parallel with the transformation of the state in the global context requires thinking about the effect of the failed state discourse on hegemonic expansion. In today's interconnected world, the failed states that are perceived as serious risk in matters related to global security, especially in the West, stems from the

idea that rich states can both maintain their prosperity and increase their power, and also want to deter and control potential threats (Krasner & Pascual, 2005: 153; Pašagić, 2020). In other words, this discourse triggers the tendency towards technocratic formulas that see security, legitimacy and development as necessary and emphasize certain capacities for such states, making it possible for the West to spread hegemonically to the world with its political and administrative values (Call, 2008: 1504-1505). In addition, despite this attitude of the international community, the existence of states that are still dysfunctional seems to serve the structural and qualitative transformation of the existing state structure rather than the continuation of it. More openly, Nay (2013: 327) stated that despite the implementation of a peace and development strategy regarding state institutions and processes, the established powers in the international arena are trying to maintain their hegemonic position.

Since a supra-state organization is overlapped with the belief that it can be sustained within the framework of democracy, civil society and citizenship (identity problem in complex societies and social harmonization (Kaplan, 2009) that are compatible with the global understanding. Therefore, the effect created by the discourse of the failed state makes room for the area that needs to be transformed by removing their authoritarian structures or breaking their solid shells by carrying out remedial works in dysfunctional states. In particular, global governance based on technology accelerates and deepens democratization and thus broad participation (Simon, Bass, Boelman & Mulgan, 2017: 10). Thus, the Western political and administrative understanding spreads beyond its current borders, increasing its hegemony in the global order and preparing the ground for the transformation. Buzan's view that (2015: 129), "the system is oligarchic mostly because relations between a group of minorities dominate it" or Bull and Watson's view that (1984: 1), point out "the development of global international society has been the expansion function of the West" sheds light on this issue.

Tatum stated that this discourse has an intrusive effect on the transformation of the state for the construction of a liberal global order, embedded in Western policies since the 1990s, and represents a new way of thinking in international politics. He justified this by saying that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the focus shifted from totalitarianism to this discourse, expressing a political approach in securitizing the institutional form of the state and ensuring its global expansion (2021: 110-111). In this process, where the state has started to gain a global context, this discourse comes to the fore again with the evolution of the network state. This time, within the framework of the reasons that led to the increase of dysfunctional states in the cyber system, the decentralized global network begins to evoke the ideal of transition to a global federation in the direction of centralization of governance and accordingly the possibility of systemic and global order transformation (Brooks, 2005: 1159).

Issues affecting the change in the international system have brought international security and policy issues to the agenda. As Buzan et al. emphasized, the consequences of the transformative intervention carried out under the name of securitization could not produce a solution to deal with an existential threat to national states (Buzan, Weaver & Wilde, 1997), on the contrary, it was claimed that it served a political function as it brought more problems than it solved. Here, national states are made vulnerable under the guise of a legitimized intervention and integrated into an organization that is intended to be transformed in a global context. In other words, by keeping such

states at certain margins of international relations , it is aimed to both control them and prepare the necessary groundwork for the construction of a new global order. As Hashi (2015: 84, 86-87), who draws attention to this issue, tries to express, this discourse has an instrumental side that tries to legitimize the intervention.

As a result, it can be said that while technological developments play a role in the transformation process of the state, the failed state discourse imposes a political legitimacy function on the intervention element that serves this process. In this context, according to Chandler (2006), the intervention begins to express the changing theoretical approach in terms of associating sovereignty with state capacity rather than political independence, and playing a role in the transformation of the state by relatively de-sovereignty under the view of reshaping sovereignty as empowerment rather than undermining it. In addition, discussing the moral dimension of applying such a transformative intervention to the state may be the subject of another research. Particularly on this issue, Walzer (2017: 134, 162-163) underlines the moral dimension despite its legitimizing side, while mentioning that although the intervention has a threatening aspect to political independence, it can sometimes be justified, but this situation is still extremely limited.

3.2. Strengthening of the current state form and transition to the successful state

They began to be challenged by the globalization of economic relations, which undermined the capacity of national states to use their power and resources for economic growth. This situation, as stated by Jessop (2015: 82), firstly in the literature, the carving of national states; secondly, the transition to a form of governance based on network and partnership in which a hierarchical system is horizontalized inside; and thirdly, the internationalization of the policy regimes of sovereign states and their transition to global politics, and the shaping of global governance. This course can be interpreted as an evocation legitimizing instrumental aspect of the failed state discourse in the globalization of the foreign policy of state transformation, but it can be misleading to reduce it to mere political instrumentality. It can be interpreted as an evocation of the legitimizing instrumental aspect of the failed state discourse in the globalization of the foreign policy of state transformation. This is because, even if this discourse describes the current state form as a failed state, it also contains potentials that will push it to a successful state. On the one hand, failed states are created, especially in the context of neo-liberal economy, that are made foreign-dependent and pulled into the circle of transformation (Reno, 1999), on the other hand, situations that lead to their strengthening in the military context and thus balance their weaknesses and lead them to success are also revealed.

The effort to transform foreign policy into global politics and its effect on national policy regimes can be compared to the intermestic nature of international relations, in which one state's foreign policy formulations affect another state's domestic policy or vice versa (Reiners & Turhan, 2021). Intermestic relations involve influencing domestic politics much more than security relations (Barilleaux, 1985: 761). In this context, it is in line with this approach that Europe exhibits neo-liberal approaches in its foreign policy towards other states, influencing their domestic policies and transformations, and even this foreign policy has been upgraded to global politics in the process and led to large-scale transformations.

After the opening up process started within the framework of neo-liberal policies, it was ensured that the states were given a role that reduced their economic functions and created the

market environment. However, while their resources are released to the market and shaped in this direction, they are weakened by internationalization despite economic growth. It can be said that the political administrative values that come with the policy of trying to weaken the power economically or partially leaving the hierarchical government system with the forms of governance are welcomed in terms of serving more internal democratic institutionalization and the understanding of the rule of law in the context of rights and freedoms. This global policy is based on norms or principles that will facilitate the spread of the West and is structured in a way that supports the competitive environment. Such an environment may cause national states to mobilize their will to power, and to transfer a certain percentage of their share in the face of global economic growth to this field in order to increase their military power and capacity and to invest in military technologies. Paradoxically, while the state is aimed to be weakened and rasped in terms of its economic resources and authoritarian political structures, it acts in the direction of increasing and consolidating its military power. In this sense, as Davies (2016: 2) states, it cannot be said that neo-liberalism reduces state power, on the contrary, the competitive environment it offers is a factor that triggers the will to power and power policies.

Globalizing neo-liberal policies in parallel with technological developments create a state that narrows its function in this area for economic growth, but also increases its military function ontologically with security and defense motives. In this respect, the network state model triggers the will to power in the form of investing in military technologies against cyber warfare or attacks, as well as being an indicator of opening up. While this situation creates an impetus for success (strengthening) in a way that preserves the sovereignty of the state, it can also evolve into an authoritarian regime. In fact, it is essential to activate national cyber security and defense mechanisms in the form of multi-space top governance, where there are interdependencies and complex relationships, there is a possibility of erosion of capital and authoritarian attitudes of states due to security-related tensions. Nevertheless, in the face of these ruptures and frictions, more democratic and sustainable alternatives are created, and so both the authoritarian attitudes of the states are tried to be stretched a little and constructive actions are taken to maintain the neo-liberal flow (Jessop, 2015: 85-86).

Trying to concretely analyze the actions of the state in the cyber international system can give an idea about its existential nature. Based on some behavioral models explained by Matsumoto, first of all, North Korea tries to isolate itself from the digital system, but in a global economic system this is not easy and it has to be a part of it, albeit limited. Secondly, China is trying to develop its cyber capabilities for economic growth, while emphasizing authoritarian statism. Due to its authoritarian structure and increasing its cyber capabilities, it causes Austria and Japan to take national security measures to protect the national economy and leads Estonia and some other powers to form digital alliances in the face of possible attacks. Thirdly, state institutions in Europe and America generally are trying to maintain the balance of security and freedom together. In addition, many African countries are in the process of being included in this environment by making regulations on cyber infrastructure.

When these behavioral models are examined, both the realist and liberal operational characteristics of the state come to the fore. While the realist action creates a security dilemma by increasing the cyber arms race, harming and failing the states with cyber-attacks, and controlling the

cyber agenda of the small states by the big powers by establishing digital alliances for cyber security, the liberal action primarily makes cooperation and integration the foreign policy rather than creating more anarchy. In fact, while another type of behavior, which is the creation of a hierarchical network society based on cooperation and integration, is brought to the agenda, a complex structure based on interdependence can mobilize realist actions as well as liberal actions (Matsumoto, 2013). Therefore, conflict and cooperation are shaped by network dynamics; network analysis allows to see the nature of the state (Hafner-Burton, Kahler & Montgomery, 2009: 569).

Despite the systemic and structural transformation debates, as Hollist and Rosenau (1981, p. 5) argue, the current world order and the long-term structures that support it are still maintained; however, since the form of interstate relations in the international environment has shifted to the cyber world, the anarchy and the struggle for survival of states are shaped in accordance with this environment. So much so that Garon warns that the third world war is not inevitable, but that it can be experienced in the form of cyber wars between national states entering the cyber arms race. This approach gives an idea that the state continues to maintain its will to power despite its global economy connections in the cyber system (2018: 2). In short, despite the ideal of a world state, it can be said that there is a tendency towards strengthening of national states in the cyber world. In this sense, even if the transformation creates the failed state problematique, it can affect the strengthening of the successful state phenomenon. This is related to the existential nature of the state.

SONUÇ

While certain technological developments have brought about constructive or destructive changes in structural areas in the historical process, the state has internalized these changes cumulatively and carried out its transformation in a rational way. This evolution is also related to how or in what direction technology is used, as stated by Acemoğlu and Johnson (2023), who associate the way of progress with the choices made about technology. It has continued this transformation with a particularly liberal capitalist consciousness as well as a realist point of view. This situation has also confronted it with the difficulties of channeling technological developments to its evolution in this direction.

There is a close relationship between the transformation of the state in its function and functioning and its transformation in the understanding of sovereignty. The sovereignty area, which has narrowed due to the transformation in its functions, has begun to be filled and transformed by the integration of governance structures. This course, which may bring about the structural and qualitative transformation of the state, brings the failed state discourse to the agenda again. This discourse, as initially articulated by Fukuyama (2004), aims to transform such states by making remedial (liberalizing bypass) interventions and supporting governance practices in order to ensure global security, where weak or failed states are seen as the source of serious problems in the world. In other words, this transformation is designed to help states maintain their national existence in accordance with the neo-liberal global order. Afterwards, this discourse corresponds to the transformation of the state and the global order by expressing a supra-state organization due to the proliferation of dysfunctional states and their inability to overcome global problems.

The failed state discourse has contributed to the structural and qualitative transformation process of the modern state under the influence of technological developments at the level of Industry 3.0 and Industry 4.0. However, even if the state evolves in different ways depending on the changing structure and conditions, it still continues to play a key role in the international arena. The network state form is the most obvious example of this, and although national states come together and work in a common network on certain issues, being equipped with a solid cyber infrastructure and cooperating on this issue within the framework of the understanding of digital sovereignty are emphasized. Therefore, according to Scheuerman (2015, p. 200, 202), a decentralized cyber-global system consisting of partially sovereign or semi-autonomous units is maintained, although the presence of a supreme authority creates the perception of a centralized international system in matters concerning global peace and security.

Finally; this discourse creates a paradox between the transformed state and the successful state: The state that is attempted to be transformed because it is characterized as failed does not necessarily reflect the successful state status. This is because the state tries to adapt to transformation in the face of changing conditions, but this does not mean that it will compromise from its own nature. In other words, although the modern nation-state structure has been dissolved in the process of technology-driven transformation, it tries to maintain its existence by developing a (cyber) sovereignty shield in accordance with this transformation. Therefore, this article shows that the more deeply you can understand the transformation of the state, the better you can analyze the possible effects and changes in the international system and structure.

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