

Determinants of Success in International Mediation: Evidence From Cyprus and Northern Ireland Mediation Cases

Uluslararası Arabuluculuğun Başarısını Belirleyen Faktörler: Kıbrıs ve Kuzey İrlanda Arabuluculuk Vakalarından Bulgular

ABSTRACT

This article systematically analyzes mediation attempts of George Mitchell in Northern Ireland and Kofi Annan in Cyprus, a success and a failure of international mediation, respectively. Based on data collected through interviews in Northern Ireland and Cyprus as well as secondary resources, this comparative case study tests the explanatory power of the Contingency Model of Mediation. The analysis shows that the variables in the model are insufficient in explaining the outcome for these two cases. Additional context variables such as international pressure, informal peace initiatives, and language and additional process variables such as nature of the peace talks and role of the leaders have stronger explanatory power in determining the outcome.

Keywords: Contingency model mediation, Cyprus, international mediation, Northern Ireland

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Bu çalışmanın amacı George Mitchell'in Kuzey İrlanda'daki başarılı arabuluculuk girişimi ile Kofi Annan'ın Kıbrıs'taki başarısız arabuluculuk girişimini sistematik bir şekilde karşılaştırmaktır. Koşullu Arabuluculuk Modeli'nin açıklayıcı gücünü test eden bu çalışmada veriler Kuzey İrlanda ve Kıbrıs'ta yapılan yüz yüze mülakatlar ve ikincil kaynaklardan toplanmıştır. Analizler sonucu modeldeki değişkenlerin bu iki vakanın sonuçlarını açıklamada yeterli olmadığı anlaşılmıştır. Uluslararası baskı, gayri resmi barış girişimleri ve dil gibi bağlamsal değişkenlerin, ve barış görüşmelerinin ortamı ve liderlerin rolü gibi süreçsel değişkenlerin sonuçtaki farklılığı açıklamada daha belirleyici olduğu öne sürülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Koşullu arabuluculuk modeli, Kıbrıs, uluslararası arabuluculuk, Kuzey İrlanda

Introduction

This article explores the determinants of success in international mediation. The literature on international mediation has been trying to find a formula to explain the outcome of international mediation efforts. The question of "what determines the success or failure in mediation" has been asked by various scholars of conflict resolution, without a definitive answer. Despite the considerable number of studies on this topic, the researchers have not found a major theory to explain the outcome of international mediation. The complex nature of mediation and specific characteristics of each conflict make it even more difficult to find a common pattern between various cases.

Most of the existing literature acknowledges the need for more in-depth analysis of international mediation cases. It is this gap in the literature that this article is trying to address. By focusing on two well-known mediation efforts by Kofi Annan in Cyprus conflict and George Mitchell in Northern Ireland conflict, I believe that this study yields important, yet often overlooked, determinants of success in international mediation. The two cases are similar to each other in many aspects, such as both being on an ethnically divided island with similar number of fatalities during similar time period of conflicts and mediation efforts, with a major difference at the outcome. By looking at a successful and an unsuccessful case of international mediation, I will try to explore what determines the success or failure in mediation.

I analyze the cases by using "The Contingency Model of Mediation", proposed by Jacob Bercovitch et al. (1991). The context and process variables proposed in the model are independent variables and the outcome of mediation is the dependent variable of this study. Bercovitch et al. propose 8 hypotheses and tests them with 284 international mediation attempts in order to see the impact of each variable on increasing or decreasing the likelihood of success in mediation. I apply their findings to Cyprus and Northern Ireland cases. My goal is to understand whether the success of Georgia Mitchell's mediation in Northern Ireland and failure of Kofi Annan in Cyprus can be explained by Bercovitch et al.'s findings or



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Content of this journal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. other factors that are missing in the model have more explanatory power in mediation outcomes. This study does hypothesis testing and hypothesis building at the same. On the one hand, it tests the explanatory power of Bercovitch et al.'s hypotheses with two international mediation cases; on the other hand, it explores new variables that affected the outcome in these two cases.

In this comparative case study research, I use a process-tracing method where I collected data from multiple sources. Academic and newspaper articles, books and memoirs of mediators, internet resources are used as secondary resources and during two field trips to Northern Ireland and Cyprus data was collected through interviews with academics, NGO representatives and some other influential people of the communities.

To better understand the gap in the literature that this study is addressing, the article starts with a literature review on international mediation and the Contingency Model of Mediation. Then I test the hypotheses in the model with a cross-case comparison of context and process of mediation in Cyprus and Northern Ireland. Lastly, I put forward additional variables that are missing in the original model yet are crucial determinants of outcome for the two mediation cases.

Literature Review

International mediation, defined as a type of conflict management where two or more disputing parties are assisted by a third party for settlement without using force (Kleiboer, 1996, p. 360), has been used as a conflict resolution method in international relations. For Bercovitch (1984), conflict and mediation are inevitable parts of the international system which is defined by anarchy, lack of rules and norms, and constant potential for conflict. Parties to a conflict uses mediation due to length and complexity of the conflict, costs associated with escalation, conflicts resolution efforts reaching an impasse, and desire to break a stalemate and engage in communication (Bercovitch, 1984).

Despite its long history in practice, academic analysis of international mediation is a relatively new research topic starting in the second half of the twentieth century (Burton, 1969; Young, 1967). Since then, various definitions of mediation have been put forward by scholars from disciplines as diverse as anthropology, law, psychology, political science, sociology and others (Doob, 1993; Dryzek & Hunter, 1987; Folberg & Taylor, 1984; Mitchell, 1981; Wall, 1981; Zartman, 1985). Since the beginning of academic work on international mediation, scholars and practitioners in the field were occupied with the question of "what are the determinants of success in mediation". As well-summarized in Kleiboer's (1996, p. 360-361) article titled "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation", several scholars of conflict resolution systemically analyze factors affecting mediation outcome using comparative case studies and quantitative research methods.

Due to its complex nature, "conflict" is a puzzling phenomenon which makes it difficult for scholars to find common patterns in analyzing its causes and formulating theories about its resolution. Adding a third party to manage this complex event makes it even more complicated for systematic analysis. Therefore, in the literature there is neither a commonly agreed definition of international mediation, nor a grand theory that explains its outcome. However, based on the accumulated knowledge on the topic, I can argue that there is a consensus among scholars of conflict resolution that the outcome of international mediation is a function of conflict context and mediation process. This consensus creates its own puzzling questions such as how to define context and process, which context and process variables matter the most, whether the context or the process affects the outcome more.

Bercovitch et al. (1991, p. 9-10) propose the contingency approach as a theoretical framework to identify process and context variables and to assess their relative impact on mediation outcomes. Inspired from social-psychological theories of negotiation (Druckman, 2005 and Sawyer & Guetzkow, 1965) the contingency model helps scholars to systematically analyze "the underlying structures and conditions" of a conflict and the complexities associated with the conflict resolution process (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000, p. 172). The model includes variables related to characteristics, role and goal of the mediator, the situation and context that the mediation is taking place, and outcome of the mediation. The analysis using the model not only looks at individual effect of each variable but also their interactive effect (Bercovitch, 1984; Fisher & Keashly, 1988; Gochman, 1993; Keashly & Fisher, 1996). The contingency model provides reproducible results for scholars through their analysis of context variables, their interactions, and mediator's behaviors and strategies. (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000, p. 172). As shown in Figure 1., the model identifies context and process variables as independent variables and the mediation outcome as the dependent variable.

Among context variables, nature of the parties is operationalized as regime types, relative power and previous relations. The nature of the dispute is analyzed by looking at duration and intensity of the conflict as well as issues at stake. The last context variable is the



Figure 1. A Contingency Model of Mediation (Bercovitch et al., 1991, p. 11)

identity and characteristics of the mediator. Process variable is strategies of the mediator during the mediation process as communication-facilitation, procedural or directive.

As a result of their analysis, Berchovitch et al. propose that mediating in disputes among multi-party regimes can plausibly have a higher chance of success compared to disputes involving other regime types (p. 10). Therefore, the first hypothesis to be looked at on the two mediation cases of this article is that mediating between two multi-party states are more likely to be successful. The second variable that can potentially influence the mediation outcome is the level of power disparity among parties to the conflict. Berchovitch et al.'s findings show that the probability of success in mediation among parties of roughly equal power is as high as five times than among those with greater power asymmetries (p. 11). Therefore, the second hypothesis is that mediation attempts between parties with roughly equal power are more likely to be successful. The previous relationship between the parties can plausibly affect the conflict outcome. Berchovitch et al. find that a conflictual past among parties can negatively influence the current dispute and the mediation efforts (p. 12). On the other hand, previous friendly relations can contribute to the chance of successful mediation. The third hypothesis is that mediation attempts between parties with a history of friendship are more likely to be successful.

Following conclusions of Kressel and Pruitt (1989), stating that unfavorable dispute characteristics are likely to defeat even the most adroit mediators, Berchovitch et al. analyze the impact of the nature of the dispute on mediation outcome. The first variable related to the nature of the dispute is conflict duration which is related to timing of initating mediation. The conventional wisdom says that longer duration of a conflict event has a negative impact on likelyhood of success in mediation. Berchovitch et al.'s finding related to mediation timing, which is also the fourth hyphothesis of this article, is that mediation efforts taking place first to third month into a dispute are more likely to be successful (p. 13). Intensity of a conflict is also an important factor affecting outcome of the mediation, despite there is a lack of agreement on its definition. Operationalized by the number of fatalities, Berchovitch et al. find that low-intensity disputes (those that involves less than 1000 fatalities) are more likely to be successful (p. 13). Issues in a conflict are underlying causes, although not always easy to identify. Berchovitch et al. describes five issues; sovereignty, ideology, security, independence and other. Their analysis shows that mediation attempts in conflicts where territory and security are the main issues are more likely to be successful (p. 14). The last context variable is related to the identity and characteristics of the mediator. According Bercovitch et al., if the mediator is a government leader with prestige holding leverage over disputants, the mediation is more likely to be successful (p. 15).

The process variable is related to strategies of the mediator, which, according to Kochan and Jick (1978) is the most critical variable affecting mediation outcome. Bercovitch et al. propose three strategies of the mediator. Among those "communication-facilitation" strategy is where mediator's relatively passive role only includes opening the communication channels and tranfering information between parties without influcing the substance of mediation. In the "procedural" strategy, the mediator, in addition to facilitating communication process and information distribution, controls the structure of meetings and media publicity. In "directive" strategy, the mediator assumes a much more active role where he controls the content and process of the negotiations by using his leverage through incentives and ultimatoms. Their findings show that mediation attempts with directive strategies of the mediator are more likely to be successful (p. 16). In the following part of the article, these eight hypotheses affecting the likelihood of success in mediation will be tested with a cross-case comparison of mediation efforts in Cyprus and Northern Ireland conflicts.

Methodological Approach

Among several ways of collecting data for case studies, Yin (2003) names six most effective ones as documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation and physical artifacts. Despite examples of case studies where the entire study is based on one source of evidence, collecting evidence from various sources contribute to the validity and reliability of the study. Yin (2003) proposes that in order to address a broader range of historical, attitudinal and behavioral issues, scholars conducting case study research should collect evidence from multiple resources.

In the data collection for this paper two different methods were used in order to reach triangulated results. Firstly, documentary information which is relevant to every case study topic was collected. Various forms of documentary information were analyzed. Formal studies –academic articles, evaluations of the same topic, books written on the topic were the main sources of evidence. Moreover, in the Northern Ireland case George Mitchell's memoirs describing the process of mediation was the main source of evidence on mediation process.

Secondly, during two field visits to Northern Ireland and Cyprus, interviews were conducted with some NGO representatives, academics, policy makers and other experts on the issues. Focused interview type was chosen in which the researcher interviewed a respondent for a short period of time, in an open-ended nature and a conversational manner by some predetermined set of questions. The main purpose of the interviews was to have interviewees to contribute their perspective on the relative impact of variables derived from the model that plausibly affected the mediation outcome. The respondents were asked whether or not the determinants of success in international mediation proposed in the contingency model were explanatory for the two cases. In addition to documentation and interviews, being in the field gave me a better understanding of historical and behavioral factors affecting the process of international mediation.

Context Variables

Nature of Parties

The independent variables related to the nature of the parties are regime type, relative power and previous relations between the parties to the conflict. The hypothesis related to regime types is that "mediation attempts involving two multi-party states are more likely to be successful". Both in Cyprus and Northern Ireland the number of the parties competing in democratic, i.e. fair and competitive elections, show that countries in both cases are multi-party democracies. In 1998 there were 8 political parties in Northern Ireland (Melaugh, 2012). And based on 2001 election results, there were 6 parliamentary parties in Republic of Cyprus and based on 2003 legislative elections there were 4 parties in House of Representatives in Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Interior, 2010). Moreover, Freedom House democracy score for both on the years of mediation attempts were 1.1, which is indicator of a functioning democracy (Freedom House, 2004). Since both mediation attempts took place in the context of multi-party democracy, they both are expected to have a higher possibility of success. The hypothesis related to relative power is that "mediation attempts between states with roughly equal power are more likely to be successful". Analysis of conflicts in Cyprus and Northern Ireland show that both conflicts were between parties with asymmetric power relations. In Cyprus case, TRNC forces are mainly backed by Turkish military and Republic of Cyprus is mainly backed by Greek military. Therefore, in order to understand the relative power of each party, it makes more sense to compare Turkish and Greek military powers. Turkey ranks 11th in global military power index with a score of 0.2109 while Greece ranks 28th with a score of 0.4954 (Global Firepower). Since the Turkish intervention to the island in 1974, the TRNC with the support of Turkish army has been militarily powerful side in Cyprus. When armed forces of TRNC together with Turkey compared to armed forces of Republic of Cyprus together with Greece, there is an asymmetrical power relation between parties to the conflict.

When the power relation in Northern Ireland is compared, the Loyalist paramilitaries have a numerical advantage compared to the Republican paramilitaries. The power asymmetry is clearer when the British armed forces in Northern Ireland are brought into the picture. Confronting the Loyalist paramilitaries supported by the British army, the Republican paramilitaries were in a weaker position in terms of military power (McAuley et al., 2008, p. 93). These comparisons suggest that both conflicts occurred between parties with asymmetric power relations. Therefore, mediation initiatives are expected to have a lower possibility of success.

The hypothesis related to history of relations between parties is that "mediation attempts between states with a history of friendship are more likely to be successful". The Greeks and Turks have been historical rivals in the region since the Ottoman Empire era. These two nations fought major wars during the first Balkan War and World War I. Following the independence of Greece from the Ottoman Empire, and the creating of Republic of Turkey, the tension between the two nations continue particularly over the issues related to continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. The relation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots has been one of antagonism especially after the island came under British rule in 1878. The inter-communal violence continued from the formation of National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) in 1955 till Turkish intervention to island in 1974 (Saylan, 2019, p. 1747-1748). Based on these records, it can be argued that the history of the relations between parties to the Cyprus conflict has not been a friendly one.

The analysis of history of relations in Northern Ireland conflict can be associated with the history of relations between Catholics and Protestants as this had been the main mobilizing factor in the conflict. The history of Catholics and Protestants particularly in Europe has been one of antagonism and war. The relation between Catholics and Protestants on the island of Ireland is not an exception to this. The relation between the two communities has always been unfriendly since the House of Tudor colonized the island in the 16th cc (Darby, 1995, p. 15). Therefore, it is also clear in Northern Ireland case that the parties have a history of unfriendly relations. For both of the cases, the mediation attempts are expected to be unsuccessful because of historically antagonistic relations between parties.

Nature of Dispute

The hypothesis related to timing of the mediation is that "mediation attempts taking place one to three months into a dispute are more likely to be successful". Although a detailed history of the conflicts is out of the scope of this article, a brief historical summary is necessary here as a part of the contextual analysis. In mid-16th century, the island of Cyprus, although populated with people of Hellenic roots, was controlled by the Venetians. The Ottoman interest on the island following the fall of Constantinople (today's Istanbul) to Ottoman rule was demonstrated by the Turkish settlers sent to the island. As a minority in the island, these early Turkish settlers in the island started to live in harmony with natives of the island. Due to its strategic importance for Ottoman rule in the region, the Ottomans took control of the island in 1571. During the Ottoman period predominantly Greek Cypriot population grew to include 20% Turkish Cypriots composed descendants of soldiers and settlers of Turkish origin. In 1878, Cyprus came under British administration and in 1923, the sovereignty on the island passed from Turkey to Britain until independence was granted in 1960 (Fisher, 2001, p. 309).

During Ottoman time, Orthodox Church of Cyprus has the control over the affairs of the Greek Cypriots. Later during the British period, the two communities ruled separately in education, religion and cultural affair. During the four centuries before the independence, Turkish-Cypriot population was living both in separate and mixed villages with the Greek Cypriots, although usually in separate sections. In terms of actual inter-community violence in Cyprus case "*The Greek Cypriot community during the British rule deployed the idea of union with Greece (enosis) and formed EOKA in 1955. This campaign and its reactions caused loss of several hundred lives and alienation of Turkish Cypriots, who countered enosis with a call for partition into separate communities (taksim) each associated with its motherland. The Turkish Cypriots aligned themselves more with the British rulers and formed Turkish Defense Organization (TMT), which engaged in inter-communal fight with Greek Cypriots until a ceasefire was implemented in 1958" (Fisher, 2001, p. 310). By the time Kofi Annan started his mediation in 2002, the conflict already had a history of 47 years.*

Similarly, the beginning of the conflict in Northern Ireland can be traced back to House of Tudor in Britain in 16 cc. (or even to the first British settlers after Norman invasion in 12th cc.). The British government decided to implement a more comprehensive plan of colonization in the northern parts of Ireland and invited settlers, mainly from Scotland to start living in the northern part of the island. The settlers who came there during 17th and 18th century did not integrate with the local Irish. Although this was a part of British policy to secure the segregation of the natives from the settlers, the main reason of segregation was religious based. *"While the settlers practiced a different version of Christianity called "Protestantism", the indigenous Irish were mainly Roman Catholics. By 1921, only 10% of the south was Protestant while the percentage of Protestants was 70% in the north" (Darby, 1997, p. 20).*

Since the beginning of colonization, Irish people often tried to gain their independence from the British, and finally, in 1920, the British government agreed to give independence to the island. However, the Protestants in the north were afraid that their religious freedom would be restricted under the rule of mainly Catholic Ireland. The Protestants threatened to use force if they will be a part of a united Ireland and they mobilized private armies against it. The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, insisted that the island should be divided into two sections which are the northeastern six counties and the rest of the island. Irish Catholic leaders under significant pressure

accepted the offer and the Unionists accepted it, although reluctantly, as their first wish was for the whole of the island to remain within United Kingdom. This decision of partition led to a violent conflict between pro-partition groups and anti-partition groups. In 1923, those who accepted the partition achieved a victory and the Irish Free State was formally created. In 1938, it adopted the status of a republic, under the official name of Eire, although it is known internationally as the Republic of Ireland.

"The establishment of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland ensured the development of two sectarian states. The majority of the 4 million citizens of the Republic were Catholics and at the time of partition in 1921, Northern Ireland had a population of about 1.5 million, a million of whom were Protestant and mostly Unionist" (Darby, 1997). The Catholics were not happy with living in a state where there was a discrimination against them. When Protestants took power, they established a Protestant state, which discriminated against Catholics in housing, job, and political representation. Cameron Report (1969) documented the existence of such discrimination from 1921 to 1971, which was the main focus of late 1960s civil rights campaigns. However, the beginning of the final episode of the conflict can be considered as the beginning of "The Troubles" in 1968 (Coogan, 1996) or the formation of Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in 1966. When George Mitchell intervened the conflict in Northern Ireland as the mediator in 1995, the final episode of the conflict already had a history of 29 years. Both of the mediation attempts in Cyprus and Northern Ireland took place several decades later than the optimum time frame proposed in the hypothesis. Therefore, both mediations are expected to have a lower possibility of success.

The hypothesis related to the intensity is that "mediation attempts in low-intensity disputes are more likely to be successful". Here "low-intensity" is defined as conflicts with fatalities of 500 to 1000. In Cyprus case, during the Turkish intervention of 1974, approximately 5000 people lost their lives and 15.000 people were wounded from both communities. In Northern Ireland, only during the Troubles, over 3600 people were killed by the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries, and the British army (Fitzduff, 2000, p. xii). Since in the model, intensity is measure with the number of fatalities, both conflicts are high-intensity conflicts. Therefore, mediation attempts in both cases are expected to be unsuccessful.

The hypothesis related to the issues is that "mediation attempts in conflicts where sovereignty or security are the basic issues are more likely to be successful". Among four types of issues which are sovereignty, ideology, security and independence, the conflict in Cyprus is mainly about sovereignty and security. Whether there should be one sovereignty representing the whole island or two sovereign states representing each group, and the power sharing issue in case of a one-state solution are the major issues in Cyprus conflict. Interviewees from both communities also supported that Cypriots see security as the main issue in the conflict. Isolation makes Turkish Cypriots feel unsecure about their future, and Turkish troops on the island and possibility of another intervention makes Greek Cypriots feel unsecure (Anonymous, Interview with an academic by author, TRNC, 2010).

Similarly, the conflict in Northern Ireland is mainly related to the status of northern territories of the island of Ireland. The issue of whether it should unite with the rest of Ireland or stay as a part of the United Kingdom is entirely related to sovereignty over these territories. "Since Protestants feel unsecure as the minority community in the island of Ireland and Catholics feel unsecure as the minority community in Northern Ireland", security is the major issue of the conflict (Anonymous, Interview with an NGO representative by author, Belfast, 2009). Since the main issue in both conflicts is related to sovereignty and security, mediation attempts in both cases has a higher possibility of success.

Nature of Mediator

The hypothesis related to the identity and characteristics of the mediator is that "mediation attempts by impartial government leaders, with prestige and leverage are more likely to be successful". I analyze the two mediators based on three variables which are status, impartiality and leverage. In Cyprus case, Kofi Annan as Secretary General of the United Nations is an impartial mediator with low leverage. In Northern Ireland, George Mitchell as a United States senator is also an impartial mediator with low leverage. Both of the mediators do not fit to the definition of mediator with highest possibility of success. Therefore, mediation efforts in both cases are expected to have a lower possibility of success.

Process Variable

Strategies of the Mediator

The hypothesis related to the strategies of the mediator is that "mediation attempts with directive strategies of the mediator are more likely to be successful". The strategies of a mediator are classified under three categories which are communication-facilitation, procedural and directive. Although Kofi Annan played an active role as a mediator, as Secretary General on the UN, his role was to open communication channels between the parties and draft an agreement known as "Annan Plan". But with his limited leverage over the parties, his role was more of a communication-facilitation type than directive. His shuttle diplomacy between parties and taking individual initiative in filling the gaps in draft agreement and proposing it to the parties are examples of such strategy in the process (Anonymous, Interview with an academic by author, TRNC, 2010).

George Mitchell, mediating Northern Ireland conflict, took a rather more active role during the negotiations. He was success in bringing all political parties in Northern Ireland to the table and lay down the procedures for negotiations knows as "Mitchell Principles" (Mitchell, 1999). Similar to Annan, he also helped drafting an agreement and managed to keep influential parties on table despite on-going violence and spoilers (Cunningham, 2006, p. 494-497). His role, although more active than Annan, can be classified as procedural rather than directive. Since the hypothesis proposes that mediators with directive strategies have a better chance of success in international mediation, both mediators did not follow a path that can be defined as directive strategy. Therefore, both mediation processes were less likely to be successful.

When I analyze and compare the two cases based on these eight hypotheses, I reach an interesting cross-case conclusion which is summarized in the following table. Mediation efforts and the characteristics of mediators in both the Cyprus and Northern Ireland case correspond to higher possibility of success in two hypotheses and lower possibility of success in six hypotheses. In both cases two variables which are regime types and issues correspond to higher possibility of success. In other six variables, which are relative power, previous relations, duration, intensity, the identity of the mediator and the strategy of the mediator, both cases had a lower possibility of success. One of the most interesting finding is that the variables that match with highest possibility of success and lower possibility of success are the same variables for both cases. Table 1 summarizes the eight hypotheses for each case.

Table 1. Cross-Case Conclusions		
Eight Hypotheses	Cyprus	Northern Ireland
Multi-Party Democracy	YES	YES
Roughly Equal Power	NO	NO
History of Friendship	NO	NO
Intervention in One to Three Months	NO	NO
Low Intensity	NO	NO
Territory and Security Issues	YES	YES
Government Leader with Leverage	NO	NO
Directive Strategies of Mediator	NO	NO

Analysis of these two cases based the determinants of success put forward by Bercovitch et al. shows that theoretically both of the mediation attempts are expected to fail. However, in reality while Kofi Annan's attempt was unsuccessful in Cyprus, George Mitchell's attempt was successful in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the conclusion is that context and process variables in the Contingency Model of Mediation and quantitative conclusions of Bercovitch et al. has a limited explanatory power over the outcome of these two cases.

Additional Variables

As a part of the purpose of this research, I explored additional variables that affected the result of mediation efforts. Analyzing the documents and interviews, I found additional three context variables and two process variables, which had dramatically affected the success and failure of the two mediation cases.

To start with additional context variables, the intensity of international pressure played an important role on the outcome of two mediations. The US president Bill Clinton gave promises to American citizens of Irish origin that he will put efforts towards solving the conflict in Northern Ireland. Therefore, after he got elected as president, he considered Northern Ireland issue as a personal one and pressured the parties to find a solution to the conflict. Towards this goal, he authorized George Mitchell as the mediator to the conflict. The US was not the only international actor which was pressuring for a solution. The EU also pressed for a solution as it finds such a conflict within the EU territories shameful and contradictory to the basic values of the union. In addition to political pressure, the EU also invested considerable amount of funds to the peace process in Northern Ireland (Anonymous, Interview with an NGO representative by author, Derry/Londonderry, 2009). However, when I analyzed the context in which mediation attempt took place in Cyprus, I do not see similar pressure from major international powers and intergovernmental organizations. Although this conflict was also within the European territories, the EU did not pressure and invest enough to make parties reach a solution. By declaring that the Republic of Cyprus would become a member of the EU on May 2004 with or without a solution to the conflict, it can be argued that the EU even played a destructive role in the peace process (Anonymous, Interview with an academic by author, TRNC, 2010). If the EU had used its "carrot" (membership to the EU) more constructively, the mediation effort of Kofi Annan could have ended differently. The conclusion is that the international pressure was relatively high in Northern Ireland and low in Cyprus case.

Another additional context variable is the involvement of civil society in the peace process. In Northern Ireland, the number of peace projects at grassroots level and the number of NGOs operating in this area was much higher than those in Cyprus. The amount of the EU funds available for such projects in Northern Ireland made it easier to support the formal efforts with efforts at grassroots level (Anonymous, Interview with an NGO representative by author, Belfast, 2009). In other words, what is called "Track II" efforts were more active in supporting the formal negotiations in Northern Ireland. Although there were informal initiatives in Cyprus, the grassroots level peace initiatives were relatively weak. The grassroots projects in Northern Ireland and relatively low in Cyprus.

Yet another additional context variable is language which was repeatedly emphasized during the interviews. In Northern Ireland, both parties' and the mediator's native language was English. That played a crucial role in facilitating the communication and decreasing the misunderstandings. At grassroots level, speaking the same language increased the chance of social interactions between two communities. However, in Cyprus case, Turkish side speaks Turkish, Greek side speaks Greek and as a diplomat from Ghana, Kofi Annan speaks in English. Therefore, the mediation process continued with the help of interpreters, which made it more vulnerable for misunderstandings. Moreover, since two communities speak different language, the interactions between them were also limited. So, language played a facilitating role in Northern Ireland, but a destructive role in Cyprus.

Secondly, I found two additional process variables, first of which is the nature of the peace talks. In Cyprus, Kofi Annan was mediating between presidents of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Since in both communities, presidents are elected, they represent their constituen-

cies. So, during peace talks the opposition leaders, and therefore, their constituencies were not represented. This exclusive nature of the peace talks in Cyprus played a negative role during the referenda for Annan Plan. However, in Northern Ireland, George Mitchell came up with a formula which enabled even smaller parties to have representatives on negotiation table. Not only main Unionist and Nationalist parties but also neutral parties such as Alliance party or small parties such as Women's Coalition were present on the negotiation table. This inclusive nature of peace talks played an important role in getting a high percentage of "YES" votes for the agreement in the referenda. Exclusive nature of Cyprus negotiations, and inclusive nature of Northern Ireland negotiations made a crucial impact on the result of the mediation attempts.

The second additional process variable is the role of leaders during the negotiations and referenda. In Northern Ireland, after inclusive negotiations, almost all parties on the table reached a consensus on the draft agreement. Since the agreement was mutually created and satisfactory for all parties, leaders of both communities followed a "YES" campaign before the voting. However, in Cyprus, the leaders of the two communities were not satisfied with the agreement from the beginning. Since neither of them wanted to be seen as deal-breaker in the eyes of international community, they both agreed to the terms of the agreement. (Anonymous, Interview with an academic in TRNC by author, 2010). Contrary to what they agree on table, both leaders started a "NO" campaign before the referenda. Although the "NO" campaign of the Turkish leader was not successful, since majority of the Turkish community voted for the agreement, it had a negative impact on votes of the Greek community that voted "NO" to the agreement. In Northern Ireland the leaders played a constructive role in affecting the public vote for the agreement, while in Cyprus the leaders played a destructive role with their "NO" campaigns.

Table 2 summarizes the differences between the two cases based on additional context and process variables which have higher explanatory power in the outcome of success and failure of the mediation attempts in Cyprus and Northern Ireland than variables in the Contingency Model of Mediation.

Context Variables:	Cyprus	Northern Ireland	
International Pressure	Relatively Low	Relatively High	
Informal Peace Initiatives	Relatively Low	Relatively High	
Language	Different	Same	
Process Variables:			
Nature of the Peace Talks	Exclusive	Inclusive	
Role of the Leaders	Destructive	Constructive	

Conclusion

The aim of this research is to find the answer to the question of "what are the determinants of the success and failure in international mediation?" By examining the mediation efforts of Kofi Annan in Cyprus conflict and George Mitchell in Northern Ireland conflict, I try to understand and explain the effects of context and process variables on outcome of mediation.

To this end, the determinants in Jacob Bercovitch et al.'s Contingency Model of Mediation are used as independent variables. Eight hypotheses related to context and process variable are tested with two cases. Based on data collected by two methods (documentary information and interviews), I examine the cases to understand whether or not they are in line with the eight hypotheses. At the end, I find that each case falls under the category of higher possibility of success in two hypotheses which are "multi-party democracies" and "territory and security issues". For the remaining six hypotheses, the cases fall under the category of lower possibility of success. From this analysis, I conclude that theoretically both mediations attempts should have been unsuccessful. However, in reality Cyprus case was a failure while Northern Ireland case was a success.

During the data collection part of the research, I explored other possible determinants of success and failure that are lacking in Bercovitch et al.'s model. Low level of international pressure, low number of informal initiatives, different languages, exclusive nature of the peace talks, and destructive role of the leaders were determining in unsuccessful outcome of Kofi Annan's mediation in Cyprus. On the other hand, high level of international pressure, high number of informal initiatives, same language, inclusive nature of the peace talks, and constructive role of the leaders had positive ramifications on successful outcome of George Mitchell's mediation in Northern Ireland.

Finally, by examining the two case, it can be argued that because of the complex nature of international mediation, hypotheses of Jacob Bercovitch et al. and the variables in the Contingency Model of Mediation are not sufficient to explain the success or failure of mediation attempts. Additional context and process variables should also be examined in order to have a better understanding of international mediation outcomes. As a future research proposal, the additional variables proposed in this research can be examined on in-depth analysis of other international mediation cases. Moreover, these news variables can be added to future quantitative models.

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