NATIONALISM, STATE AND CULTURAL SURVIVAL

Dr. Nafiz Tok

Niğde University
Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences

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Milliyetçilik, Devlet ve Kültürün Korunup Yaşatılması
Özet

Bu çalışma, milliyetçi hareket ve çatışmaların etnik milliyetçiliğin ayrımcı karakterinin bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıktığı görüşünü reddederek, bunların çoğunun yaygın olarak yurttaşlık milliyetçiliği ya da siyasi milliyetçilik olarak bilinen milliyetçilik anlayışına tepki olarak ortaya çıktığını ve kültürlerinin korunmasını ve yaşatılmasını amaçladığını savunuyor. Yurttaşlık milliyetçiliğinin (siyasi milliyetçiliğin) tamamen siyasi açıdan ya da etnik kültür ve kimliklerden bağımsız olarak sunulması milliyetçi hareket ve çatışmaların ne üzerine olduğunu gizliyor. Milliyetçiliğin kaçınılmaz bir kültürel boyutu vardır. Ernest Gellner'in tanımladığı gibi milliyetçilik aslında kültür ve devletin evliliğidir. Bu yüzden devlet ve kamusal kurumların sosyo-kültürün (ulusal kültürün) yeniden üretiminde hayati bir rolü vardır. Bu durum ulusal azınlıkların niçin kendilerini yönetmek için bir takım siyasi hak ve güçler talep ettiklerini açıklıyor. Bu tür hak ve güçlere sahip olmadıkça ve kültürlerini kurumlaştırmadıkça, ulusal azınlıklara mensup bireylerin baskın çoğunluk kültüre yaşamsal bağımlılığı kültürel asimilasyona yol açıyor. Ulusal azınlıkların kültürlerini koruyup yaşatmak için kültürlerini kurumlaştırmaları gerekiyor. Ulusal azınlıkların kültürel değişimlerinin şekli, oranı ve yönü üzerine kendilerine belli bir derece hakimiyet verecek olan bir takım hak ve güçleri talep etmeleri bu bağlamda anlaşılabilir. Sonuç olarak bu çalışma siyasal olanla kültürel olan, siyasi güçle ulusal kültürün yeniden üretilmesi arasındaki ilişkiyi ortaya seriyor.

Abstract

This paper rejects the view that they are the result of the exclusive characteristic of ethnic nationalism. It argues that most of the present nationalist movements emerge as a reaction to what is commonly known as civil or political nationalism, aiming to protect the survival of their culture. The presentation of civil nationalism in purely political terms or as independent of ethnic cultures and identities obscures the grounds on which nationalist movements and conflict exist. Nationalism has an inevitable cultural dimension. Indeed as Ernest Gellner defines it, it is the marriage of the state and culture. Thus the state and public institutions have a vital role in socio-cultural (national) reproduction. This explains why national minorities demand some sort of rights and powers of self-government. To protect their cultural survival they need to institutionalise their culture. Indeed precisely for this reason it is reasonable for them to demand some sort of rights and powers of self-government which will give them some control over the rate and direction of cultural change. Hence, this discussion clarifies the relationship between the political and the cultural, political power and socio-cultural reproduction.

Nationalism, State and Cultural Survival

Perhaps until the end of the cold war, for many people, the age of nationalism seemed to be over. We were at the beginning of a post-national era. However, it soon became clear that this assumption was wrong. The world has, surprisingly, witnessed the re-emergence of nationalist movements and conflicts. They have arisen not only in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but all over the world, even in Western Europe and North America. The main characteristic of the present nationalist movements is that they are disintegrative, and secessionist. An ethno-cultural group claims nationhood, and on this basis the right to self-determination on its territory, while the larger political community against which it claims some sorts of rights and powers of self-government regards it as part of the nation and claims authority over it. Typically, in an already existing so-called nation-state, a group claims that they form a distinct nation with the right to self-government, while the nation-state denies this right.

The aim of my discussion in this paper is to provide a plausible account of nationalism that explains the nature and sources of the present nationalist movements and conflicts. Why do some groups reject the national identity of the larger political community and assert that they have a distinct national identity, claiming on this ground that they are entitled to some sort of rights of self-government? Why do they aspire to form their own political community? What is the relationship between national survival and self-government rights? These questions, I shall argue, cannot be properly answered by an account of nationalism that does not acknowledge its cultural dimension. I shall argue that nationalism is about culture, cultural survival; therefore any plausible account of nationalism has to acknowledge this cultural dimension and recognise people's attachment to their culture.

Civic nationalism that defines the nation either in purely political terms without any ethno-cultural components or as of having a single national culture which is independent of all ethno-cultural particularities cannot therefore account for the present nationalist movements that are motivated with an aspiration for cultural survival. In the first section of this paper I shall discuss

whether this understanding of nationalism is viable. I shall object to the common view that the recent nationalist conflicts and movements are the result of the exclusivity of ethnic nationalism, which defines national membership in terms of shared descent. Instead I shall argue that most present nationalist movements and conflicts have emerged as a reaction to what is commonly known as civic nationalism and aim to protect the survival of their culture. I will show how civic nationalism, because it overlooks the ethno-cultural components of nationalism, disguises the real issue over which nationalist movements and conflicts emerge-socio-cultural reproduction.

In the second section, I shall consider the issue of cultural protection in relation to national minorities, arguing that modernization, progress and cultural interchange are inevitable and desirable for a culture, and so, therefore, is cultural change. Then I shall attempt to distinguish the desirable changes that occur as a result of progress and modernization from the changes that are a threat to the existence of a culture and therefore raise concerns about cultural protection. I shall show the relationship between national survival, cultural institutionalization and self-government rights. At the end of the discussions in this paper the relationship between the political and the cultural, between political power and socio-cultural reproduction, and thereby the reason behind the aspiration of national minorities for self-government rights in order to institutionalise their culture will become clear.

1. Nationalism, Cultural Identities and the State

The nature of present nationalist demands and conflicts is commonly misinterpreted. They are commonly seen as a result of the exclusivity of ethnic nationalism, which defines national membership in terms of shared descent, so that people of a different ethno-cultural group cannot acquire membership.[1] They are seen to arise as a result of the denial of equal citizenship rights and liberties to the members of a national minority (a territorially concentrated ethno-cultural group). Ethnic exclusiveness, the denial of national membership to the members of ethno-cultural groups, is undoubtedly a cause of some nationalist demands and conflicts; however, the existence of nationalist movements in those Western, liberal democratic states, which do not define citizenship in ethnic terms, clearly indicates that the issue is not simply about claims to equal citizenship rights and liberties based on the exclusivity of ethnic nationalism. I argue that most of the present nationalist movements and conflicts have emerged as a reaction to what is commonly known as civic

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1 For the view that the recent nationalist movements and conflicts are the result of the exclusivity of ethnic nationalism see, for example Ignatieff (1994: 1-11).

nationalism, and aim to protect the survival of their culture. They have often emerged as a result of the attempts of civic nations forcibly to incorporate their national minorities (KYMLICKA, 1995: 132).

This claim might be surprising, since civic nationalism is commonly seen as compatible with democracy, peace and liberalism.[2] Civic nationalism is commonly portrayed in purely political terms:[3] those who live in the same state's territory, under the rule of the same government, form a nation and they are endowed with the equal citizenship rights and liberties, regardless of their ethnic and cultural identities and attachments. Membership in a civic nation requires no more than allegiance to the state, its political principles and institutions. Thus civic nationalism, aiming at no more than the achievement of a civic polity of individual citizens who are endowed with equal citizenship rights and liberties, and who are united by common laws, it is claimed, is open and inclusive. Given these characteristics, it should not be surprising that civic nationalism is commonly regarded by liberals as a better or preferable form of nationalism.

Why, then, should we charge civic nationalism with the responsibility for the emergence of the present nationalist movements and conflicts? Because it is precisely this idealized, purely political, portrayal of civic nationalism that obscures the cause and nature of present nationalist movements and conflicts by overlooking the ethno-cultural components of nationalism. In fact whatever form -ethnic or civic- it takes, nationalism has very much to do with culture; it is a very cultural phenomenon. Seeing it purely in political terms disguises the issues over which nationalist movements and conflicts emerge. This is why we have difficulty in understanding why the Indians in America, the Quebecois in Canada, the Scots in England, the Kurds in Turkey, or the Basques in Spain, all of whom enjoy full equal citizenship status, raise nationalist demands and form nationalist movements.

In what follows I will first consider why nationalism has an inevitable cultural dimension and why states engage in nation-building policies-the formation of and diffusion of an official national culture and identity throughout their territory. Given that nationalism cannot be defined in purely political terms because it has an inevitable cultural component, I will second, consider another model of civic nationalism. This model, although it acknowledges its cultural

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2 For the understanding of civic and ethnic nationalism see Ignatieff (1994: 3-4), and Kohn (1944: chapter 8) and (1994: 162-165). Recent liberal nationalists such as Tamir (1993) and Miller (1995) try to combine nationalism and liberalism and defend a liberal version of nationalism. However, they do not present nationalism in purely political terms; they acknowledge its cultural components. For an analysis of the roots of the dualistic approaches to nationalism -such as ethnic and civic, cultural and political, Eastern and Western- and for a critique of this dualism, see Spencer and Wollman (1998).

3 See for example again Ignatieff (1994: 3-4) and Walzer (1992: 99-101).

components, tries to present national culture as independent of ethno-cultural particularity, and the state as neutral regarding ethnic cultures and identities. However, as I will show, this model also does not reflect reality. States are not neutral toward all of their citizens' ethno-cultural identities. The formation of national culture and identity invariably involves the transformation of the dominant ethno-cultural group's culture into the national culture. The institutionalisation of the dominant ethno-cultural group's culture as the national culture disadvantages other ethno-cultural groups in terms of their socio-cultural reproduction and raises new nationalist demands. All of these considerations will show the inadequacy of both models of civic nationalism-a purely political understanding of civic nationalism without any ethno-cultural component and an understanding of civic nationalism as having a culture that is independent of ethno-cultural particularities-and how such understandings disguise the nature and cause of the present and perhaps many of past nationalist movements.

As recent modernist theories of nationalism suggest, modern societies require cultural and linguistic homogeneity as a functional imperative (GELLNER, 1983: 139-140; TAYLOR, 1997: 32-33). This is so at least for three reasons. The first reason is that modern societies as large scale economies require a geographically and occupationally mobile, educated and literate workforce (GELLNER, 1994: chapter 3, esp. 35-38). The second reason, as Will Kymlicka (1996: 10 and 1997: 56) notices, is that cultural and linguistic homogeneity seems essential to ensure equality of opportunity for all people throughout the territory of the modern state. The third reason is the concern for the achievement of social justice in modern large-scale societies (MILLER, 1994: 22 and 1995: 65-73, 85, 86) and maintenance of the unity and stability of the political community (MILL, 1993: 392), both of which require that members have solidarity in order to make the necessary sacrifices for each other and for their country (e.g., taxes and, if necessary, blood). This solidarity is generated by a sense of shared identity, which is facilitated by a shared homogenous culture and language.[4]

So, at least for these three reasons, cultural and linguistic homogeneity has been seen as a functional requirement of modern societies. For modern political societies, it becomes the political bond, and the mastery of the common culture and language becomes the precondition of political, economic and social citizenship (GELLNER, 1997: 29). Hence, as Ernest Gellner puts it, a nationalist imperative is born, requiring the marriage of the state and culture.

However, given that in reality, in the territory of most states, if not all, there is a plurality of ethno-cultural and linguistic groups, the cultural and

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4 Taylor (1997: 36-40) makes this point following the implications of Benedic Anderson's argument of the imagined communities.

linguistic homogeneity that is a functional imperative of the modern society has to be promoted by the state. States have to bridge the gap between the reality and the ideal of cultural homogeneity, and in doing so they have followed two main strategies: inclusion and exclusion. Those states that define their nationhood in ethnic terms have followed the exclusive strategy (such as Germany). However, most of those states that are considered to define their nationhood in civic terms have followed the inclusive strategy (such as France and Turkey). They have engaged in a process of nation-building, that is, promoting a common culture and language and diffusing it throughout the various peoples in their territory.

Given these considerations, it becomes evident why civic nationalism cannot be defined in purely political terms, as an outcome of rational consensus, why it has an inevitable cultural dimension. If nations and national frameworks could be formed in a solely political way, based on nothing but the rationalist foundations of the social contract in the form of a constitution and a set of written or unwritten laws,[5] we would not perhaps be faced with the nationalist question. Indeed, the state would be of and for all inhabitants in the territory, and everyone could identify with a national identity that is indeed purely political. However, in reality a purely political construction of the nation based on abstract universal principles is an impossible task, since to reach a rational consensus on political principles and institutions, the members of the political community need already to have a pre-rational consensus–a shared communal culture and identity (NODIA, 1996: 104). Unless this pre-rational bond exist, it is not clear who are the members of the political community, and who are the participants in reaching agreement on political principles and institutions. Nationalism, as I argued above, requires the marriage of the state and culture; it has an inevitable cultural component. Hence culture has to enter into the equation.

At this point it is worth mentioning Maurizio Viroli's conception of republican patriotism, which I regard as a possible variant of civic nationalism. Viroli (1995 and 2000) attempts to distinguish republican patriotism from nationalism and to present the former as an antidote to the chauvinistic excesses of the latter. He defines republican patriotism as a passion for the republic and its citizens, for the political institutions and the way of life that sustain the common liberty of a people. However, Viroli tries to distinguish his *republican patriotism* from *civic nationalism* too. He considers civic nationalism in purely political terms. In his words, "Republican patriotism differs from civic nationalism in being a *passion* and not the result of *rational consent*; it is not a matter of allegiance to historically and culturally *neutral* universal political

5 For example Habermas (1994) and Rawls (1996) seem to think that a purely political construction of a nation and national framework is possible.

principles, but of attachments to the laws, the constitution and the way of life of a *particular* republic." (VIROLI, 2000: 273). Viroli tells us that in civic nationalism citizens are committed to abstract neutral political principles upon which they reach a rational agreement and to the state institutions which embody them, whereas in republican patriotism they are committed to the historically and culturally embodied particular versions of the political principles, and indeed it is the passion for this particularity that ensures their attachments to the *patria*. However, I do not think Viroli's distinction between republican patriotism and civic nationalism is plausible, for, as I already showed, a definition of civic nationalism in purely political terms, as Viroli understands civic nationalism, is not possible. Civic nationalism always has an inevitable cultural dimension. Viroli also presents to us a republican patriotism with particularity, culture and history. Hence once we acknowledge the particularity, the cultural dimension, of civic nationalism, what difference remains between civic nationalism and Virolian republican patriotism? What Viroli does is to provide us with a more plausible version of civic nationalism, acknowledging its particularity, its cultural dimension, but he names it "republican patriotism." His version of civic nationalism –"republican patriotism"– is simply more explicit about the particularist content of a polity. However, Viroli's version of civic nationalism as republican patriotism also cannot escape from our charge of the responsibility for disguising the real nature and causes of present nationalist movements and conflicts–for it does not take into account the possible political implications of ethno-cultural pluralism within a polity, and it therefore overlooks its own cultural dimension over which nationalist conflicts emerge, in spite of its acknowledgement that it has a cultural dimension (VIROLI, 2000: 268).

The key issue for civic nationalism is not, then, *whether* it should have a cultural component, *but how* this official national culture and identity could be formed in a way that is inclusive of all in the territory. What would be the relationship of the officially formed national culture and identity and the other, secondary local and ethnic cultures and identities? Would the official national culture and identity contain some elements of the secondary cultures and identities, or would it be created as a new culture and identity indifferent to the local and ethnic identities? The way in which the official national culture and identity is formed and their relationship with the pre-existing local and ethnic cultures and identities are very important in understanding the demands of present nationalist movements. Indeed, at the heart of the issue lies how this officially formed national culture and identity is perceived by the various ethno-cultural groups. If nationalism, as intended, is a centralising, unifying and modernising force created through the marriage of an official culture and the state, the official national culture should be able to achieve the allegiance of the entire people in the territory, whatever these people's local and ethnic attachments. Hence in an ideal marriage of culture and state, no group in the

territory of the state should have a claim to a distinct nationhood; each and every group should identify with the national culture and identity formed and sustained by the state.

Given that civic nationalism cannot be defined in purely political terms but has an inevitable cultural component and that the relationship between the officially formed national culture and identity and other local ethno-cultural identities is crucial for the achievement of unity and stability, most civic nations, in spite of their acknowledgement of having officially formed national cultures and identities, have tended to treat them as independent of the component ethnic cultures and identities. They have tended to present their nationalism with a common culture but one that is independent of ethnicity (e. g. USA, France, Turkey).[6] According to this widespread model of civic nationalism, the official national common culture and identity, which are presented as independent of ethnicity, are inclusive of all inhabitants in the territory, regardless of their ethno-cultural and religious backgrounds and identities. While the officially formed national culture and identity dominate, and operate within, political and public life, the ethno-cultural and religious identities are allowed to express themselves in the private realm. The state supports the official national culture and identity, but it would be neutral with respect to the ethno-cultural and religious identities of its citizens.[7]

However, though this model acknowledges that civic nationalism cannot be defined in purely political terms, its attempt to treat national culture and identity as independent of ethnic cultures and identities does not succeed. As we have seen, nationalism requires the marriage of the state and culture. National culture has to be based on a common language; that is, the political, social, educational and economic institutions have to be conducted in a certain standard common language. However, given that in the territory of most states there are a plurality of ethno-cultures, of ethno-linguistic groups, the decision about the official language, or about the language of social institutions, is a very important matter. To use a Gellnerian metaphor, there is often more than one candidate-bride. Whichever language is adopted for use by the societal institutions favors the ethno-cultural group that speaks that language. Its

6 For example French nationalism has had this implication. "France was a one and indivisible nation based on a single culture. To be its citizen was to transcend, indeed to shed, one's ethnic and other cultural particularities and to be assimilated into the French culture. Every French citizen stood in a direct and unmediated relationship with the French nation and enjoyed equality with the rest. Unlike the ethnically obsessed 'Anglo-Saxons' who cherish 'the right to be different' and end up ghettoising their minorities and fragmenting their nations, France recognised no ethnic minorities and rejected *all* forms of ethnic and religious self-consciousness" (PAREKH, 1998: 403).

7 Perhaps India, the major multi-ethnic democracy with a state culture and language different from its all ethnic-groups, is the example closest to this model of civic nationalism with a culture independent of ethnicity. However, it is an exceptional and uneasy case.

language, and ultimately its ethnic culture, is chosen as the core of national language and culture. The other ethno-cultural groups have to integrate to this national culture, which is ultimately that of the dominant ethno-cultural group.

So, in civic or political nationalism, contrary to its idealized claim, the state cannot be neutral in relation to the ethno-cultural identity of its citizens. National culture and identity have an ethno-cultural core, from the moment the decision on official language is made (KYMLICKA, 1995: 111 and 1996: 6-9). Moreover, the state is not neutral in relation to ethno-cultural identities. Government decisions on internal boundaries, public holidays and state symbols, etc., unavoidably involve recognizing, accommodating and supporting the needs and identities of particular ethno-cultural groups (dominant-majority ethno-cultural groups) (KYMLICKA, 1995: 108, 113). Indeed these decisions are decisions about nation-building projects. They are decisions about which particular ethnic culture(s) is (are) to form the official national culture. The formation of national culture and identity inevitably involves the transformation of a particular (dominant) ethnic culture into a national culture, and the integration of any other ethno-cultural groups into that national culture.

Therefore despite its pretence of being neutral between the ethno-cultural identities of its members, civic nationalism in practice recognises and sustains the dominant ethno-cultural group's culture and identity as the national culture and identity, and by institutionalising it as a societal culture it ensures the social reproduction of the dominant ethno-cultural group. It is neutral with regard to all ethno-cultural identities other than the dominant one, by allowing their expression in the private sphere. The preference for the dominant ethno-cultural group's culture and identity as national culture and identity means, for the other ethno-cultural groups, the denial of their immediate access to the official organs of social reproduction (WALZER, 1995: 322). They have to produce the sort of men and women of the dominant ethno-cultural group, since their life chances are tied up in that group's culture and identity, which is transformed into, and institutionalised as, the national culture and identity. Hence the other ethno-cultural groups are to be integrated through assimilation into the dominant ethno-linguistic group's culture (now national culture).

The institutionalization of the culture and identity of the dominant ethno-cultural group as national identity and culture disadvantages the other ethno-cultural groups in terms of their cultural survival. It not only secures the socio-cultural reproduction of the dominant ethno-cultural group, but it also turns national identity and culture into a means of absorbing the other ethno-cultural groups into the dominant ethno-culture. The present nationalist movements have emerged as a reaction to this assimilative process, demanding some sorts of rights and powers of self-government. They are motivated by a

desire to secure their socio-cultural reproduction, to protect their cultural survival.

Civic nationalism obscures the real nature of these nationalist movements by treating ethnic cultures and identities as if they were irrelevant to national culture and identity. It claims that the state is neutral to ethnic cultures and identities and does not take any active interest in their reproduction (WALZER, 1992: 99-100). Given this neutrality and given that everyone, regardless of his/her ethno-cultural background and identity, enjoys equal citizenship status, no one, according to the civic understanding of nationalism, is disadvantaged. Hence the state is of and for all individual citizens.

However, this self-portrayal of civic nationalism is misleading, for, as we have seen, the state is not neutral toward all of the ethnic cultures and identities of its citizens. Civic nation-building policies, in practice, recognise and sustain the dominant ethnic group's culture and identity as the national culture and identity and aims to assimilate (if necessary, coercively) the members of other ethno-cultural groups within it. Indeed the assimilation of the other ethno-cultural groups into the dominant one has usually been "justified" by an ethno-centric denigration of the former and by the claim that this assimilation is a requirement of progress. John Stuart Mill, for example, defended the assimilation of "inferior and backward" ethno-cultural groups into the "superior and civilised" ethno-cultural groups in the following famous statement:

> Experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another: and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race, the absorption is greatly to its advantage. Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Naverra, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilised and cultivated people–to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French protection, and dignity and prestige of French power–than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as members of the British nation (MILL, 1993: 395).

Not surprisingly the members of minority ethno-cultural groups have often disagreed. They have not seen their assimilation into the dominant ethno-culture as being their advantage or as a requirement of progress. On the contrary they have resisted assimilation.

As a result of their exclusion from the formation of national culture and identity, ethno-cultural groups have felt that the marriage is in fact of the state

and the dominant ethnic group's culture, and that this culture and identity do not reflect theirs. They have felt marginalised and invisible, that their existence is denied. They have perceived the state as of and for the dominant ethno-cultural group (BRUBAKER, 1996 cited in STEPAN 1997: 24 and n. 24). As a result they have felt that like second-class citizens (TAYLOR, 1997: 42), with only formal citizenship rights but without status or recognition, and they have experienced assimilative pressure. They have often found that the price required for their inclusion within the political community and for citizenship rights equal to those of the dominant ethno-cultural group is too high. This price is assimilation: to become and reproduce the sort of men and women of the dominant ethno-cultural group; to give up their *commitment* to their own history, culture and identity. However, "this commitment (though not any particular version of it)", as Michael Walzer (1995: 331-332) indicates, "is a permanent feature of human social life". Therefore "it cannot be overcome, but it has to be accommodated".

The presentation of civic nationalism in purely political terms or as having a national culture and identity that are independent of ethnic cultures and identities is misleading. It disguises the real cause of nationalist movements and conflicts by claiming that ethnic cultures and identities—over which these movements and conflicts arise—are irrelevant. It hides the relevant disadvantage that ethno-cultural groups, as a result of their exclusion from the formation of national culture and identity, face in terms of their recognition and their socio-cultural reproduction. It cannot explain the motivation of these new nationalist movements: *the protection of their cultural survival*.

I would like to conclude the discussion in the first section of the paper with a few remarks on how we should understand civic nationalism given that its presentation in purely political terms, or as independent of ethnic cultures and identities, is misleading. Most of the civic nationalisms are, as we have seen, inclusive through assimilation. Therefore they are civic in the sense that members of minority ethno-cultural groups are equal members of the political community with equal citizenship rights, provided that when they enter the public sphere they strip off their ethno-cultural attachments and identities and express them only in the private sphere, whilst in public life identifying only with the dominant ethno-cultural group's identity. If minority ethno-cultural groups do not resist the imposition of the dominant group's culture and identity on them, and accept and even seek integration, through assimilation, with the national culture, as long as they are not discriminated against and excluded from full national membership, the nationalism is indeed civic, open and inclusive. To the extent that they resist assimilation and the imposition of the dominant ethno-culture and identity, and to the extent that the state (the dominant group) as a result insists on non-voluntary assimilation, the

nationalism might be perceived as intrusive, expansionist and even aggressive. Civic nationalism's providing members of minority ethnic groups with citizenship rights equal to those of the dominant ethno-cultural group cannot legitimise non-voluntary assimilation. True civic nationalism should offer more than this. It should be not only open and inclusive, but also accommodative without being assimilative. Since the construction of a national culture that is drained of all cultural particularity (even that of the dominant-majority), all ethno-cultural significance, is not possible, in a true civic nationalism minority ethno-cultural identities need to be visible and accommodated at the national level. Hence the political culture of a proper civic nationalism is a multicultural kaleidoscope of ethno-cultural identities that are visible and accommodated at the national level. Indeed an understanding of civic nationalism and of public political culture as such is a requirement of justice for actual, culturally identifiable persons, for and these are the persons for whom what respect is required in the public sphere.

2. Modernization, Cultural Change and Cultural Protection

In the first section I have claimed that the present nationalist movements are motivated by an aspiration for cultural survival. They demand certain rights and powers of self-government for the protection of their cultural survival. This aspiration to maintain their distinct cultures is interpreted by some commentators as a concern for preserving the "purity" and "authenticity" of their cultures. The idea of cultural preservation is understood as maintaining a culture as frozen and unchanged in its traditional form, thus causing the worry that it requires insulating a culture from the outside world and therefore that it is anti-progressive. For example, in observing that in the modern world, in the wake of the globalization of trade, mass migration and the development of international institutions and communications, there is an enormous amount of interchange between cultures, Jeremy Waldron (1995: 100, 106-7) questions the very notion of distinct cultures. He claims that because of the mutual influence and interchange between cultures, there is no meaningful way to say where one culture ends and another begins. The only way to preserve a distinct culture intact, he argues, would be artificially to cut it off from the general course of human events (WALDRON, 1995: 101). Hence, he objects to the very idea of the protection of a culture through minority rights since this, he thinks, requires insulating it from the outside world and the possibility of progress (WALDRON, 1995: 100).

However, this understanding of the protection of a culture as static, unchanged and insulated is a misinterpretation. Most minority national groups do not desire to preserve their culture unchanged in its *traditional form. They*

favor progress, economic development and modernization.[8] They want to secure both their access to the wealth, income, power, opportunities and other achievements of the modern world and the recognition and survival of their culture. It is for precisely the achievement of this dual aspiration that they demand some sort of rights and powers of self-government. They want to participate in "the general movement of the world" *with* their own cultural identity by modernizing their culture and integrating it with the modern world, but not in J. S. Mill's favored way–assimilation into a larger "more civilized" nation.[9]

The protection of their existence as a distinct cultural group, as they see it, does not preclude modernization, change and progress. On the contrary, their desire to maintain their distinct culture along a continuous line of progress by modernizing and transforming it but protecting it from disintegration requires them have some degree of control over their own collective affairs, "over the rate and direction of cultural change" (KYMLICKA, 1995: 102). Hence minority national groups do not want to protect their culture in isolation but in progress,

8 Indeed nationalism, as we saw in the first section, has been a requirement of modernisation. However, it has also been a modernising force or vehicle. In the very beginning -in the age of nationalism- nationalism was a requirement of modernisation, but afterwards, and still today, for the newly emerging nationalist movements, modernisation has been a requirement of nationalism. Nationalism as a modernising force has been more salient in the nationalism of developing and previously colonised countries. For example, Turkish Nationalism emerged as part of the aim to modernise the country. For Turkish nationalists, modernisation was the only solution to the military threat and interference from the Western Power. This was a reactionary nationalism by a people whose state proved inferior in certain economic, technical and military respects when confronted by Western powers. Hence Turkish nationalists used nationalist ideology to create a modern-secular state, to modernise the state and society. Although it emerged as a reaction to Western Political, technological and military superiority, it had cosmopolitan connotations. Its main target was "catching up with the contemporary civilization". It was an outward-looking nationalism, inspired by the belief that there were many cultures, but only one universal civilisation, which was defined in Enlightenment terms "as the onward material and moral march of humanity": *the Contemporary Western Civilisation.* "The Turkish nation would, thus and perforce, develop its identity within the world community of civilized nations, [by] adopting the best practices of the world, which is to say the highest agreed standards of conduct." For this universal or civilized theme of the Turkish Nationalism (MANGO, 1996/97: 87-88).
Just like Turkish Nationalism in Turkey, Japanese Nationalism aimed to modernise Japanese society under a nationalist ethos. On Turkish and Japanese nationalism as a modernizing vehicle or, in Alter's term, as 'reform nationalism' (ALTER, 1989: 23-25). Today all national movements aim to integrate with the modern world, perhaps with the exception of those of Native American Indians' and Aboriginal Peoples.
9 As I already mentioned in the previous section, J. S. Mill (1993: 395) saw the assimilation of smaller nations into more civilised larger nations as a requirement of the progress and as the best or only way of integrating them with the modern world. However, minority national groups have resisted assimilation and desired to integrate with the modern world, keeping their own national identity, by modernising their culture.

and precisely for this reason it is quite reasonable for them to demand some sorts of self-government rights.[10]

However, if modernization, progress and cultural interchange are inevitable and desirable for a culture how can we know which changes pose a threat to the integrity of a culture and which changes do not? Which changes are a result of progress and modernization and therefore desirable, and which changes are threats to the existence of a culture? When does a culture cease to exist? Will Kymlicka makes a useful distinction in relation to these questions. He distinguishes *culture as the character of a historical community from the cultural structure as a context of choice* (KYMLICKA, 1989: 166-67). He claims that it is not the character of the culture but its existence that is important. According to him, changes in its character are inevitable and indeed desirable as a requirement of modernization and progress, but they do not threaten its existence.

I agree with Kymlicka that it is not the character of a culture at any given moment but its existence that is important. The characters of cultures change as a result of modernization, progress and cultural interchange, but they still continue to exist. The changes in the characters of cultures are desirable and, to a certain degree in modern world conditions, inevitable. However, does the fact that the character of a cultural structure can change without jeopardising its existence mean that the changes in the character do not change the cultural structure? If not, does this mean that when the structure is affected the existence of the culture is endangered? Kymlicka seems to think so, and indeed his argument about the value of culture as a primary good is entirely dependent upon maintaining the distinction between the character of the culture and the structure of the culture.

This distinction between *culture as a context of choice* and *culture as the character of a historical community* is crucial to Kymlicka's argument for cultural membership as a primary good (KYMLICKA, 1989: 166-169). "It is the existence of [a stable, or secure] cultural community viewed as a context of choice that is a primary good, in its capacity of promoting meaningful options for us, and aiding our ability to judge for ourselves the value of our life-plans", but not the protection of the character of a given cultural community (KYMLICKA, 1989:

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10 Indeed in the absence of some sorts of rights and powers of self-government, of the necessary institutions that ensure their socio-cultural reproduction, minority national groups, out of insecurity, might tend to protect their culture in its traditional form. In fact they might see protecting it in its traditional form without as the only way to protect it. On the other hand a national culture that possesses some sorts of rights self-government that ensure its socio-cultural reproduction and that therefore is secure is more likely to wish to integrate with the modern world by modernizing and liberalizing its culture. The desire to integrate with the modern world and have access to wealth, income, career and power might provide a minority national culture with an incentive for modernization and liberalization, provided that it has self-government rights that ensures its survival.

169, 166). For the latter does not promote meaningful individual choice, but it restricts it (KYMLICKA, 1989: 167). Indeed "the very reasons we have to value cultural context of choice argue against....[protecting] the character of a given cultural community" (Kymlicka, 1989: 169). What Kymlicka claims here is that the changes in the character of a cultural community do not jeopardise the existence of its structure. Changes in a culture's character need not be the changes in its structure. Hence, cultural structure can be maintained as unchanged even when the character of the cultural structure is radically changed (KYMLICKA, 1989: 167). Unless this distinction can be maintained, Kymlicka cannot show the importance of cultural membership as a primary good. Unless this distinction can be maintained, protecting a culture in its structural sense entails the need to protect it in its character sense, and protecting it in its character sense will not promote its members' ability to choose, but will instead limit this very ability (KYMLICKA, 1989: 167). Therefore cultural membership can no longer be seen as a primary good.

As John Tomasi (1995: 587-95) in his excellent critique of Kymlicka's defence of minority rights shows, in Kymlicka's formulation, this distinction cannot be maintained and therefore Kymlicka cannot show that cultural membership is a primary good. However, if this distinction between culture as structure and culture as character cannot be maintained, and if the structure is affected by changes in the character, when and how is a culture stable or secure and when and how is a culture is endangered? This is the question which I would like to address.

What follows first relies heavily on John Tomasi's analytical critique of Kymlicka. I will apply his approach to various cultural communities and will show that Kymlicka's distinction between culture as structure and culture as character cannot indeed be maintained. *In all cases changes in the character are changes in the structure.* After concluding that the structure is affected and altered by changes in character, I will next argue that not every structural change leads to cultural extinction. Whether a culture maintains or ceases its existence is dependent on the nature of the changes in its structure—on whether the changes in the structure occur as *transformation or as disintegration*. The nature of the changes in the structure–transformation or disintegration–in turn depends on whether the culture in question is institutionalised, whether it has some sorts of rights and powers of self-government that give its members some control over the rate and direction of the cultural change. If changes in the cultural structure occur as a transformation of an already institutionalised, socially embodied culture and do not endanger its socio-cultural reproduction, then despite the structural changes, the culture maintains its existence. If the changes in the cultural structure occur when the culture lacks the necessary institutions for its socio-cultural reproduction, and therefore the changes in the

structure amount to its replacement with another culture that is an institutionalised one, then in this case the changes in the structure threatens the culture's very existence.

Let us now closely examine Kymlicka's distinction between culture as a context of choice and culture as the character of a historical community and see why this distinction cannot be maintained in a way that can serve Kymlicka's aim: to show that cultural membership is a primary good. How does Kymlicka distinguish between these two? He tells us when culture is used in the *character sense*, changes "in the norms, values and their attendant institutions in one's community (e.g. membership in churches, political parties, etc.) would amount to loss of one's culture " (KYMLICKA, 1989: 166). However, despite changes in the character sense, cultural community, or cultural structure as a context of choice, itself continues to exist (KYMLICKA, 1989: 167). If changes "in the norms, values and attendant institutions" do not pose a threat to the existence of a culture, when is its existence endangered? Which sorts of changes threaten its existence?

Since Kymlicka tells us that what is a primary good is the existence of culture as a context of choice in its capacity of providing options and meanings, we can say that when the capacity of a culture to promote meaningful individual choice is endangered, its existence is jeopardised. Changes in the character of a culture (in the norms, values and attendant institutions) change the options and meanings available for choice, but they do not as such threaten its existence, for they do not threaten its members' ability to choose;[11] indeed they promote this very ability. For example, after it became a republic, Turkey was modernised and secularised. The character of the Turkish society radically changed (roughly from a conservative, religious, largely rurally oriented way of life to a modern, secularised, more liberal urban one). The range of options for choice changed and expanded; new life-styles, options, values and beliefs appeared, while some of the old ones disappeared. In the past Turkish people shared a conception of good, a way of life based on religion. However, today, as a result of modernization and liberalization–though imperfect and with still much to be done–Turkish society exhibits a large diversity: there are secular people and atheists as well as those who are religious; there are liberals, socialists, Kemalists, conservatives; there are environmental movements, women's rights movements, human rights movements, youth movements; there

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11 Here the speed of change of a culture's character might be important. When changes in the character of a culture is very rapid and profound, some people might be both deprived of their former meaningful options and left behind by these rapid and profound changes unable to integrate into the community's new practices and options. Thus these people's ability to choose might be diminished. When this happens, the existence of the culture is endangered, and this could provide a basis for their cultural protection. However, actual cases of this kind are uncommon. See for this point (PATTEN, 1999: 13-15).

are civil servants, workers, farmers, business owners; there are those who like classical music, Western pop music, jazz, Turkish pop music, Turkish folk music, Turkish traditional art music, arabesk music and so on. These radical changes in the character of Turkish culture have not jeopardised its existence, since they have posed no threat to its *function as a context of choice*. The changes in the character of the Turkish culture have not restricted its members' ability to choose; on the contrary, by facilitating the entrance of new options and meanings, they have promoted the ability to choose. Unlike the example of the Turkish case, when changes occur not only in the character of the culture but go beyond that to threaten its ability to promote meaningful choices, the existence of the culture is in danger. The cultural context of choice is no longer stable, or secure. However, this is not very helpful. We now need to know when and by which sorts of changes a culture's ability to promote meaningful individual choice is threatened.

For Kymlicka, threats to the cultural structure undermine the culture's ability to promote meaningful individual choice. However, on the other hand he claims that even when the character of a cultural community is changed, the cultural structure of the community can be unchanged. That changes in the character of the culture are not changes in the cultural structure as the context of choice is important to his argument about the value of culture as a primary good. Thus in Kymlicka's argument, cultural structure needs to be defined independent of its content; otherwise the protection of the cultural structure will result in the protection of the character of the culture, and cultural membership cannot be defended as a primary good. We need to know what remains unchanged in a culture when changes occur in its character, because this is what seems to constitute the cultural structure on Kymlicka's account.

What are the components of the cultural structure? Kymlicka defines cultural structure in terms of language, history and cultural heritage.[12] In Kymlicka's formulation, then, changes in the character of a cultural community should not affect the community's language, history and cultural heritage. If they do, the cultural structure as context of choice is no longer a primary good, since its protection will result in the protection of the character of the culture, undermining its members' ability to choose.

Are not changes in the character–the norms, values, and their attendant institutions–changes in the history, language and cultural heritage of the group? Recalling our earlier example, after Turkey became a republic, the character of

12 See (KYMLICKA, 1989: 168), where culture in the structural sense is defined ..."in terms of the existence of a viable community of individuals with a *shared heritage (language, history, etc.)*". See also p. 165: "...The range of options is determined by our cultural heritage" and "the processes by which options and choices become significant for us are linguistic and historical processes".

the Turkish society was radically changed. Having once been defined in terms of religious affiliations, it was redefined in modern secular nationalist terms. The institutions such as the Caliphate and Sultanate, which traditionally characterised the society and with which members of the community identified, were abolished. The traditional religious society with its social and political institutions was transformed into a modern, republican and secular one with a number of reforms. The religious orders, lodges and cells were closed; religious legal codes were abolished and replaced with Western legal civil codes. Even a law called The Hat law was issued, ordering the wearing of rimmed hats and western clothing. After the Second World War, the transition to a multi-party democratic system, the adopting of liberalisation measures, urbanisation and modernisation started to liberalise and democratise the society.

This radical transformation has fundamentally changed the character of society, its norms, values and institutions. The society, as I mentioned above, started to exhibit a large diversity in terms of beliefs, values and life styles. The members of Turkish society began to make choices radically different from those they had made before the foundation of the Republic. Have these changes in the character of the society not been changes in the history of the Turkish society, or its cultural heritage itself? The change from a traditional religious society to a modern secular one has been a significant change in Turkish history,[13] and is historically significant as a change in the Turkish culture. What then remains as unchanged seems to be the language. It seems that Kymlicka grounds his entire distinction between changes in character and changes in structure on the stability of the community's language. He seems to mean that even though changes in the character of a culture are changes in the history and cultural heritage of a community, as long as the language is stable and does not itself change, the existence of the culture in the structural sense is not in danger.

However as John Tomasi (1995: 592) indicates "even when, as a taxonomical matter, a language does not itself change," the changes in the character of community can, easily and in profound ways, change the options and beliefs the cultural structure transmits via linguistic processes. Moreover, with the new options and beliefs, new words, concepts and expressions might enter the language, and some old concepts and words might become insignificant or wither away. The modernisation of society might require standardisation, reconstruction or even reinvention of the language through certain reforms. This is very salient in the transformation of Turkish society. The

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13 Indeed these changes were designed to break the ties with the (Ottoman) history and heritage. They were meant to change the Turkish history in both senses: in the sense of making a new history and in the sense of writing and inventing a new history. This newly made and invented history was needed by the new secular modern republican state and its society.

Ottoman Turkish language, which was a mixture of Turkish, Arabic and Persian, was replaced with contemporary Turkish. The Arabic script was replaced by the Latin alphabet. An attempt has been made to purify the language by removing Arabic and Persian words. Indeed these reforms in language deliberately aimed to change the traditional religious character of the society, and they were significant changes, opposed by the supporters of the old traditional system. In the Turkish case, changing the character of the society required changing the language. The Turkish case can be considered an unusual and extreme example of changes in cultural character. However, for our purpose it clearly shows that *changes in the character of a stable cultural community are changes in that culture's structure as a context of choice.*

Consider another example, this one showing how changes in character affect structure in relation to an unstable or insecure minority ethnic cultural community, such as the diaspora Circassian communities. After their forced mass migration, the character of these communities was radically changed. As a result of interactions with their host societies, new options, beliefs, lifestyles and values appeared and some of the old ones disappeared. Their pagan-oriented religious practices were replaced with Islamic ones. Moreover, changes in the character of their host societies further changed the character of the diaspora Circassian communities. They were modernised, and further liberalised (in most of the countries they were already in many senses more liberal than their host societies). All of these changes in character have been changes in their history, culture and even language. In addition, the history, culture, and language of the diaspora communities and those of the homeland community diverged, as did those of the various diaspora communities themselves later. How these changes in character have radically changed these communities' structure can be understood easily by comparing the Jordanian, Israeli, Turkish and American Circassian communities. These communities have very different beliefs, options, values and life-styles. Hence the changes in the character of an unstable, insecure cultural community change its *structure* just as in the case of a secure, stable cultural community. It seems that Kymlicka's distinction between character and structure does not work. If this distinction does not work and changes in character are changes in structure, then the question we should be asking is how we can determine which changes in the structure pose a threat to the existence of a cultural community and which do not.

It is not that the cultural structure of *a secure, or stable* cultural community remains unchanged even when its character radically changes. It is not that a culture is secure unless its structure is affected and changed by the changes that take place in its character, but, rather, it is secure, *if the changes in its structure will not be destructive.* Changes in character are changes in structure. However, whilst changes in structure do not threaten the existence of a stable, secure culture as a

context of choice, they may threaten the existence of a minority culture, if it is not secure, or stable. The question should then be asked, what provides stability or security for a culture?

The stability and survival of a national culture depend on its institutionalisation: whether it has the sorts of rights and powers of self -government needed to maintain it. In the conditions of the modern world, unless a national culture has the necessary public institutions and powers, its cultural and social reproduction cannot be maintained.[14] Majority or minority, for every culture, changes in its character are changes in its structure. However, changes in structure are not destructive for an institutionalised national culture–dominant-majority culture–whereas they *are* destructive for a national minority culture, lacking any rights and powers of self-government essential for its survival. We can call the first *cultural transformation and the second cultural disintegration.*

What determines the nature of the change in structure–whether it is transformation or disintegration–is whether culture has the necessary institutions for its maintenance. In both cases the changes in character are changes in structure. However, in the case of a cultural transformation, the institutionalised, socially embodied culture, despite the changes in its structure, is capable of social and cultural reproduction. It can reproduce the sort of men and women it favors by transmitting its shared identity, and this gives the culture a sense of sameness, and continuity, despite the changes in its structure. In the case of cultural disintegration, the culture is not institutionalised; it lacks the public institutions and powers needed for its maintenance. Because of this lack of institutionalisation, in contemporary conditions the survival of its members depends on their ability to function within the institutionalised culture of the majority. While the members of the culture identify with their own non-institutionalised culture, the majority culture increasingly serves them as a context of choice in public life. As a result, the minority culture is unable to reproduce itself and its people and it starts to produce the sorts of men and women of the institutionalised culture.[15] Then the cultural structure of the minority is gradually replaced with that of the institutionalised majority. Since the changes in the structure occur not as its transformation, but as its replacement by the majority's institutionalised cultural context, the result is disintegration, or extinction. This explains why national minorities demand powers and rights of self-government for the protection of their cultural survival.

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14 For the role of the state, its institutions and especially the public mass education system in sustaining national culture and identity (GELLNER, 1983).

15 This is a mechanism of erosion for a national minority culture. For a discussion of this assimilative process, see the previous section.

Changes in the character of a cultural community, then, are changes in its structure as a context of choice, but changes in the structure do not in all circumstances pose a threat to the existence of a culture. When culture is institutionalised, structural changes do not threaten its existence, whereas when it lacks the necessary institutions for its maintenance, these changes can pose a threat to its existence. Another conclusion of this discussion is relevant to Kymlicka's argument about culture as *a primary good*. Since changes in character are changes in structure, Kymlicka cannot show us that culture as a context of choice is a primary good. To recall Kymlicka's argument once more, the distinction between culture as character and culture as structure aims to show that despite radical changes in character, structure can be unchanged. Changes in character are not threats to the existence of the community, since culture as a context of choice, which is a primary good, promoting meaningful individual choices, is unchanged, but when the changes jeopardise the structure, the very existence of the community is in question. However, as we have seen, changes in character are changes in structure. We cannot distinguish the two. Kymlicka's distinction cannot therefore tell us when the existence of culture is endangered. Moreover, if changes in character are changes in structure and if, when the structure is threatened, the existence of the culture is in danger, then the protection of the structure results in the protection of the character. In Kymlicka's formulation this—the protection of a culture in the character sense—is no longer a primary good, since it undermines the very reason why we value cultural membership and defend its protection—the promotion of individual autonomy.

3. Conclusion

According to the account that has been suggested in this paper, recent nationalist movements are motivated by the aspiration of cultural protection. In contrast to the common belief that they are a result of the denial of equal citizenship status to the members of minority national groups, my account suggests that they emerge as a reaction to cultural assimilation. I have argued that the presentation of civic nationalism in purely political terms, or as independent of ethnic cultures and identities, obscures the grounds on which nationalist movements and conflicts exist. An understanding of nationalism grounded in such assumptions is an inadequate one. Nationalism has an inevitable cultural dimension. Indeed, as Ernest Gellner defines it, it is the marriage of state and culture. In modern societies, culture is sustained by the state and its institutions; thus state and public institutions play a vital role in socio-cultural (national) reproduction. This explains why national minorities demand some sorts of rights and powers of self-government. Unless they have these rights and powers and institutionalize their culture, their members'

dependency on the institutionalized dominant-majority culture will lead to their cultural assimilation. To protect their cultural survival, they need to institutionalize their culture. However, cultural protection does not mean freezing the culture in its traditional form. In the modern world conditions, change, modernization and progress are inevitable, and most national movements aspire to these transitions. Indeed, precisely for this reason it is reasonable for them to demand rights and powers of self-government that will give them some control over the rate and direction of cultural change whilst protecting their culture. I hope that the discussion in this paper has clarified the relationship between the political and the cultural, political power and socio-cultural reproduction.

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