

SOME REMARKS ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN HEIDEGGER AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

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Herakleitus says that "physis likes to remain hidden¹". This is a sentence that could even be expressed by Heidegger. Today the question of being veiled is being challenged by some psychoanalytical approaches which examine basic premises of Heideggerian thinking². Today's question is that to what extent the question of hiddenness of Being is important and what is the meaning of its cessation to remain hidden.

Today can it be said that reading Heidegger in line of the paths of his thinking would contribute to deepen our comprehension of truth, namely forgetfulness of truth? Under the pressure of plenty numbers of articles on Heidegger, the question of what is the meaning and contribution of reading Heidegger still needs to be responded meticulously. Is Heidegger actually a refreshing path for us to overcome the crisis into which modern scientific mind had fallen long time ago? If the answer is yes, to what extent, with the words of Heidegger, humans are being gathered (logos) within thinking (logos)?

Posing radical but naive questions against Heidegger is not a futile performance in so far as a social or ontological meaning is searched. In such a consuming speed of re-readings of the classical texts, and in such an academic process of postmodern pastich, beyond the recycling value what is the "real concern" with the questions posed by Heidegger? And what are the real concerns of the questions posed against Heidegger? If in finding satisfactory answers to these questions, readings do not contribute us to develop our notion of social and ontological Being, where would Heidegger's task of *aletheia* (unveiling and remembering) lie? This point must be taken serious even by firm readers of Heidegger, namely by those regarded Heidegger merely an oasis.

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¹Capelle, W., Socrates'ten Önce Felsefe, p., 133.

²Actually Heidegger uses, in Nedir Bu Felsefe?, the terms logos, thinking and gathering synonymously. Although seemingly strange, Heidegger underlines the original and omitted meaning of the word. Aristotle too uses the logos synonymously with gathering. What is meant by logist is the accountant of the city state. Aristo, *Atinalılar Devleti*, tra.by S. y. Baydur, Maarif Matb., Ankara, 1943. p. 92.

Psychoanalytic approach in this sense of the word, presents an opportunity even to those who are very engrossed in the philosophy of Being through its analysis of language and unconscious. Despite from a different point of view, psychoanalysis deals with the question of forgetting, not only in psychiatric level but also in cultural and social levels. For that reason both dissenting traditions should be regarded to be a search of the truth which had already been forgotten. Heidegger, in his saying that "philosophy has long before forgotten the question of Being" posits his fatal judgement that is strikingly similar with that of Sigmund Freud. This similarity is both an adulation and a challenge. Then let's foremost think on how today can a searcher of forgotten truth take part in the question of Being without mystifying Heidegger and pastiching him within academic agenda.

Although several critique of modern science and technology are severely made by many circles, Heidegger's and Freud's are very different in their rank. From early romantics to utopic and romantic socialists, from conservatives to Marxists and ecologists in different degrees and contexts, these critiques had tried to reveal the truth of science and technology upon which modern civilization based. In following pages, I am going to try to display distinctive and conflicting characteristics of Heideggerian and Freudian traditions in terms of their evaluation of modern civilization. In spite of the sharp differences with the rest, there are also incompatible view points between two by virtue of their approaches to the question of being.

Both for Heidegger and Freudian tradition, the question of oblivion deserves to be studied for both approaches owe their presence to the concept of oblivion. It's not important if it's ontological or psychoanalytical. Oblivion for Heidegger -as a Being thinker- is not regarded to be a matter of subjective forgetting. What lies behind forgetting, according to Heidegger, is the wish of Being. Although Heidegger uses the words such as oblivion and angst in his early writings, he is told to has given up using these concepts due to the subjective implications of the words. For Heidegger, like Freud, remembering is not a matter of conscious action of Cartesian subject. Remembering is out of the will of any certain subject. Remembering, rather than the voluntary act, is the will of the thing which comes to the mind. In Heidegger's denial of conscious and voluntary construction of the world, some seeds of the radical critique of Enlightenment and its conception of conscious men can be found. Both Heidegger and Freud in their approach to the modern subjectivity shares the same suspicion and distrust. This is why they regard the question of remembering separately from subject-centred understanding.

By the question of forgetting, Freud unprecedentedly discovers the unconscious, while Heidegger mystically reaches the concept of aletheia. Lotus and lethe (a-letheia), are the root words of the concept of aletheia. Aletheia is appearance of the truth. Lotus etymologically means long sleep and forgetting. But the sleep is not peculiarly of men, but of the physis. As some animals has went to sleep during the winter, even physis goes to sleep during decades. Other meaning of lotus is forgetting. As well known, it's a name of plant when eaten which makes people forget from where they come and who they were. A-letheia, in this sense, is remembering through un-veiling of the truth, end of sleep, end of ignorance with the will of Being.

There is no need to indicate that this conception is very resembling with that of psychoanalysis. Actually what Freudian conception too tries to do is nothing else but to explore who the conscious man actually is and from where his personal history be

learned. Psychoanalysis is nothing, in this sense, but a return to the **history of child**. Alike this, Heidegger's approach is a return towards the **childhood of history**, namely **pre-Socratic** roots of thinking in conflict with modern thinking. Both develop their ways, psychoanalysis of Freud and thinking of Heidegger. Both confronts the obliviousness of the time in which the otherness is pushed to the darkness of the modern age. Both declare that their approaches were new and revolutionary and imply a break in the history of manhood.

I. Heidegger's Critique of Modern Age

Heidegger criticizes and tries to surpass the limits of scientific and metaphysical qualities of the modern age. He is, in the Freudian sense, a discontent of modern civilization and its construction of the truth. Techno-scientific quality of modern age is what Heidegger finds very perilous. Its peril, thinks Heidegger, is resulted from both the catastrophic consequences of the technological innovations and from the Cartesian premises which destroy the paths towards the truth of Being. Heidegger believes that world is objectified by modern science and its technological instruments while, at the same time, **framed (Gestell)**³. I have no hesitation that if Marx had been asked about Heidegger's word framed, although he would understood what Heidegger meant by this word, would replace it with the word **commoditized**, in the sense that the world had long before lost its both natural and use value. But as we later notice in following paragraphs, Heidegger has a specific reason to use the words originated from early Greek word **eidos**, form. Henceforth nature, be organic or inorganic, is a **resource**, a **variable**, a **being-at-hand**. For Heidegger, one of the essential phenomena of our time is its science⁴, and the essence of what is called today science is **research**⁵. In modern age science is the **theory of the real**⁶, and the real is nothing but the framed object.

According to Heidegger, Max Planck's statement that "that is the real which can be measured" overlaps with the logic of Newtonian and Galilean systems. In these systems, Heidegger claims "nature" denotes a spatio-temporal connection of extended points or particles in motion- a comprehension which radically eliminates all qualitative features as well as ontological considerations⁷. This elimination is made to reach a cause-effect relationships so as to explain progressive chain of events. Newtonian and Galilean systems accompanied by scientific methodology, aim to measure and calculate the world quantitatively. This calculation, in modern scientific ages, is transferred to the labour process, as "human resources". From this point of view, man is no longer a part of nature, but a tool in the process of production. This is why for Heidegger, contemplative man, but man the labourer is the degenerate and destructed animal of modern technology. Human labour potentialized within scientific processes is the real criminal in the history of being, of which metaphysics only the destiny⁸. We don't exactly know that if Heidegger was familiar with the works of Marx, but it's striking to find some parallels in content with the expressions in the **Communist Manifesto**. Another romantic critic

³Heidegger, M., *The Question Concerning Technology*, p. 304.

⁴Heidegger, M., *The Age of World Picture*, p. 116.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁶Heidegger, M., *Science and Reflection*, p. 157.

⁷Dallmayr, F., *Heidegger and Psychotherapy*, p. 213.

⁸Gerretana, V., *Heidegger and Marx*, p. 54.

Walter Benjamin, having read Manifesto and influenced by its understanding of history, regards modern civilisation as a monument of brutality which is built on blood and tears⁹.

Like Heidegger yet few decades ago, Nietzsche too states that it is not the victory of science that differentiates the nineteenth century from the previous ones, but the victory of scientific method over science¹⁰. Nietzsche, as other discontents of modern civilisation, vehemently criticizes Cartesian tradition and its modern representatives such as Kant. Heidegger as a moderate follower and expert interpreter of Nietzsche puts that:

Since science becomes research through the projected plan and through the securing of that plan in the rigor of procedure. Projection and rigor, however, first develop into what they are in methodology¹¹.

What Descartes teaches us the method of scientific inquiry and of epistemological truth. In this method, we are, as much as possible, demanded to be objective and distanced from a given and objective world which is regarded to be merely the subject of study. The application of that methodology is based upon the well functioning of well-known dichotomy: **object vs. subject**. World as an object is distanced from conscious self so as to prevent any mutual interchange. For methodological aims to be realized, the science and its subject must be differentiated as "world" is differentiated within itself. Conscious and rational scientist is posited far from the subject with which he deal in the name of scientificity. Yet what is forgotten is that while man divides the "world" into the several parts, also divides himself, his cognitive apparatus. Modern man divides everything into the particles and analyzes. He investigates the vestiges. Modern investigation is very methodological in the sense it fragments the world and being so as to omit the question of Being. Modern life is under microscope.

The reason why modern science investigates life's small parts is its lack of confidence as well as its perfectionism according to Nietzsche. Modern period is in the intense need of feeling itself secure through finding exact causal explanations for every surrounding phenomena. This, namely modern science's lust for exactitude, is pathological says Nietzsche. But according to Heidegger, science's telos was not exactitude in its origin, claiming that Greek science did not search for exactness, but rather the wholeness of the experienced phenomena. This transformation in the scientific concern implies a change as well as a distortion. Heidegger claims that Greek science was never exact¹². Science could not be exact and did not need to be exact¹³. During the middle ages, *certitudo*, does not refer to exactitude, rather the limitation of what it is to where it is¹⁴.

⁹Benjamin, W., *Son Bakışta Aşk*, p. 42-43.

¹⁰Nietzsche, F., *The Will to Power*, p. 261.

¹¹Heidegger, M., *The Age of the World Picture*, p. 120.

¹²No need to remind, like other European philosophers and scientists, how Heidegger's mind was heavily influenced by ancient Greek as an idealized model.

¹³Heidegger, M., *The Age of the World Picture*, p. 117.

¹⁴Heidegger, M., *Nedir Bu Felsefe?*, p. 40.

The concept of limit is very central in Heidegger's thinking and synonymous with the word "from". Eidos and Idea are the derivations of the concept "form".

Yet today, certitude is the criteria for truth. For this reason the trust on the constant accessibility of absolute exactitude is, for Heidegger, the pathos of contemporary philosophy¹⁵. After this influence, the rigor of mathematical and physical sciences is any longer exactitude. There all events must be defined beforehand as spatio-temporal magnitudes of motion. Such definition is accomplished through measuring with the help of numbering and calculation¹⁶.

All process of measurability arises upon the subject-object distinction. And the central aim of Heidegger's thinking is to dismantle the Cartesian mind-body or subject-object distinctions the results of which is further oblivion of the truth of being¹⁷. Nietzsche, as a genuine sufferer from modern times, distinguishes the pathology of subject-object differentiation. And claims that the categories such as subject, object and attribute are fabricated and are imposed as a paradigm upon all the apparent facts. The fundamental false observation is that I believe is I who do something, suffer something, "have" something, "have" a quality¹⁸. By Nietzsche, this possessive and objective individual of the time is regarded not to be a liberated man but merely a result of catastrophic fiction.

In this process that Being has been forgotten and world has been perceived as an object, time and space too are separately regarded, not as different faces of Physis. In Newtonian and Galilean systems, time is objectified and measured as clock-time. From that time, time too is an issue of standing reserve. Time is irreversibly objectified and domesticated so as to serve the demands of modern capitalist age. Modern capitalism accompanied by flexible accumulation strategies is in a dramatic speed ever seen. Man challenges the time, while changing its givennes until recently. Time in our technologized world is both an object and a commodity. Technology is oriented to provide possible instruments of saving time. "How to use the time properly" is one of the most important strategical questions for some circles. Timing is saving. One of the most serious "questions" of our time is the question "how to use time adequately". In the menu of the modern age, time is instrumentalized as well as objectified. Technology is oriented to provide possibilities for a long life. Death corpses are stored in cool laboratories so as to re-animate them by the aid of possible technological developments in the near future. Man in his struggle with space, is about to get the victory, the turn is now for time. As David Harvey states that mankind has entered an era of high speed and rhytm by the help of capitalist technological developments¹⁹, man backed up by the last weapons of technological innovations is experiencing two processes at the same time. The first is the accelaration of the time. The second is the minimization of space. These are continuing processes whose effects will be later seen evidently.

If the transformation is that radical, what is the reason for today's urgent need for aletheia and for ending oblivion. In this manic and consuming process of academic re-

¹⁵Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁶Heidegger, M., *The Age of World Picture*, p. 119.

¹⁷Dallmayr, F., *Heidegger and Psychotherapy*, p. 211.

¹⁸Nietzsche, F., *The Will to Power*, p. 294.

¹⁹Harvey, D., *The Postmodern Condition*, p. 260-370.

cyling life, Heidegger's question of Being has a market value? Does it mean that, academic circles did hear the call of being and will they fulfill the task of thinking? Or rather, they are already searching of consuming it too? Using the words of Hölderlin, is our time (academic or not) capable of hearing the call of being and is Being ready to end hiding itself? If it is not so, what we suppose to hear is a simulation of it?

Then we reached to the question of the foregoing discussion that, -in this manic rhythm of life and the manic speed of time- where and how the question of Being will be able to reach us? While man passing each station within seconds, how would man be sure of that s/he didn't passed the vital station. *Manic rhythm* of postmodern Yuppie culture(s) is able to hear the call of being in the sense Heidegger meant? I think, the current stage of capitalism through which many cacophony produced does not give much people an occasion for being ready to the call of Being. And this condition seems to refute Heidegger's claim that questions are paths to toward an answer²⁰, as crises are paths to *the openness*.

II. Metaphysics of Modern Healing: Heidegger's Critique of Psychoanalysis

Heidegger, as an antagonist of scientific methodology, categorizes Freud within modern scientific tradition. In spite of accepting some peculiarities of psychoanalysis (particularly after he met Lacan) Heidegger severely crucifies Freudian psychoanalysis as a subdivision of techno-scientific process. Actually he is not completely wrong in his consideration of Freud's early writings and his positivist methodology. As well known Freud was an esteem medicine man of his time in Vienna. In the beginning of century Vienna was one of the developed research centers of scientific positivism. There a positivist understanding of sciences prevailed for a long time, and later influenced several scientist even from sociology and philosophy. From Mach to Lazarsfeld and Wittgenstein during the first half of 20th century, Austrian and Viennian traditions had been influential on several thinkers for there are radical differences from scientific tradition of Germany. Under the positivist influence of the term's atmosphere, Freud were studying on neurons. His studies are mostly oriented to the medical subjects. And as a natural result of this, his scientific understanding of human body and psychology is shaped under contemporary positivism.

For that reason it should not be suprising to find positivist effects in early Freud. What Heidegger severely criticizes is Freud's perception of Newtonian and Cartesian "nature" and "human nature". In that perception, the body is regarded to be a psychosomatic machine. And in its crudest form, for Heidegger, Freudian psychoanalysis seeks to trace symptoms of psychical illness within causality to a "malfunctioning" of the human body, the brain or the nervous system²¹. In Freud's early studies, human is perceived as a steam machine which is an association of "forces, functions, energy, sources and drives"²².

²⁰Heidegger, M., *The End of Philosophy and The Task of Thinking*, p. 431.

²¹Dallmayr, F., *Heidegger and Psychotherapy*, p. 223.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 223.

Heidegger is against the modern term's perception of human body whose first examples were seen in the unprecedented works of Leonardo Vinci. In Renaissance, not only an ideology of humanism appeared but also a new perception of human body too. In the works of Vinci, man is glorified as a mechanical machine created by God²³. During scientific revolutions of Renaissance, man is perceived as a perfect amalgamation of muscles and bones. The medicine of the time too is within this paradigm. Freud, as a scientist of modern age sees human body to be a domain of power, resource and *function-fulfilling machine*. But according to Heidegger, human existence is in essence never a mere object or machine that exists somewhere and it is particularly not a self-enclosed or capsulated creature²⁴.

For Richardson too, Heidegger thinks that Freud's metapsychology is merely the application of a neo-Kantian conception of science to human being. In it what Freud is looking for is an explanation of human phenomena through an unbroken chain of causality²⁵. The causality is based upon **libidinal energy**. Actually Freud -without hesitation- uses "the economics of the libido"²⁶. Man is regarded as if it is a **steam engine** that must be re-balanced in order to prevent its explosion. Furthermore, in Freudian thinking, happiness is a problem of the economics of the individual's libido. Finally **libido** is the energy of **human machine**. For Heidegger:

Freud is a classical example of the modern scientific mind, a mind that is totally oblivious to the being dimension of the objects it deals with...It's interested in their object character, their objectifiability, their capacity to be conceptualized in the presentations, measured, calculated, and finally controlled²⁷.

Freud, in this sense, is a firm follower of Cartesian method of inquiry. In this process, man is objectified in the hands of scientist as in the hands of science. By Cartesian psychonalysis what the fate for nature is, is also the fate of the man. Object-subject distinction is the necessary condition for Cartesian treatment. Modern science approaches man as it approaches nature. Man is **objectified** by scientific technology. As nature, man too **framed** and formulated as a source of energy. Heidegger claims that it is "the libidinal machine" what Freud studies on, but not being at all.

For these reasons, Heidegger opposes Freudian terminology and perception of human being which are under the heavy influence of Newtonian and Cartesian paradigms. The categories "ego", "super ego" and "id" resemble Cartesian presuppositions about subject. There, the libidinal unconscious is treated as a completely internal and privatized sphere, as an "innate" endowment of individuals segregated from interpersonal contacts or

²³In 1651, even Hobbes in *Leviathan* optimistically glorifies mechanistic comprehension of Renaissance. After Renaissance, Hobbes is influenced by the idea of mechanically constructed systems, And applied this idea to political theory. This is why Hobbes prefers artificiality against state of nature like the harbingers of the modern age. Hobbes, T., *Leviathan*, tra.by Semih Lim, Yapı Kredi Yay., Istanbul, 1993, p. 17.

²⁴Ibid., p. 212.

²⁵Richardson, Heidegger among Doctors, p. 54.

²⁶Freud, S., *Civilisation and its Discontents*, p. 25.

²⁷Richardson, Heidegger among the Doctors, p. 53.

social rules²⁸. In its orthodox interpretation of pschiatry, a quasi-naturalistic manner towards human behaviours is seen²⁹.

How can libido be entirely privitized without negating civilizing effect of social norms and language in human life? The emphasis of the school of orthodox Freudians has shifted over time, stressing libido and instinctual frustrations, to a position more akin to ego- and superego psychology to an emphasis on normatively regulated interpersonal relationships³⁰.

But in Heidegger's critique of Freud, though some verifying clues, other crucial parts of Freud thinking which are non-positivistic and implicitly non-Cartesian escapes from attention. These are stressed by Lacan who is the founder of a new Freudian psychoanalysis based on language and symbolic order. Actually if we carefully stalk Freud's studies and the formation of his science, we can notice a transformation in Freud's psychonanlysis and his mind. This transformation does not take place in a revolutionary way and as a break with the scientific roots. Rather it is like a river which tries to find its vein under terrain. Nearly most critiques of Heidegger on Freud, are fed from the early writings of psychoanalysis. Freud, having visited Paris and get informed about the importance of symbolic order and language in the construction of unconscious, re-orientates his studies. Under the new orientation, his later works include less medical approaches and more language, meaning and symbol examination.

Following this, one of the main characteristics of Lacan's works is that his strong rejection of biologically based interpretations of mental illness. For him, biological explanations cannot explain madness. Madness is a discourse, an attempt to communication, that must be interpreted. He emphasizes that the personality is not "mind" but the whole being³¹. He states that psychoanalysis have to constitute itself against medical mind³². Psychoanalysis must put language before biology in treating. Namely the speech before mechanical-biological perception of human body. Since biology is always interpreted by the human subject through language, there is no such thing as "the body" before language³³.

Same tendency, despite not in the same extent with Lacan, can be observed in Freud's later works. *On Dreams, Civilization and its Discontents, Moses and Monotheism*, are some of them the main concern of which are not libidinal and biologic machine as such but language structures, laws and symbolic prohibitions that are rooted in culture. Many topics that Lacan brings forth are studied by Freud too. Here, one of the the contributions of Lacan lies at his stress on importance of Freud's thinking through advicing a close examination of his works. Lacan appreciates the Freud's work "Jokes and their relation to the Unconscious", saying that, it remained most unchallengable of his

²⁸Dallmayr, F., *Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory: A Lacanian Perspective*, p. 184

²⁹Dallmayr, F., *Heidegger and Psychotherapy*, p. 213.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 184.

³¹Sarup, M., *An Introductory Guide*, p. 8.

³²Lacan, J., *Ecrits: A Selection*, p. 72.

³³Sarup, M., *An Introduction*, p. 72.

works because where humour, in the malicious grace of the 'mind free from care', symbolizes a truth that has not said its last word³⁴.

Due to the reason mentioned above Lacan does not regards himself as a radical break with Freud. Despite his great contributions, Lacan is from Freudian tradition. If he isn't regarded so, it would be a misrecognition of Freud's contributions to him. This contribution is more evident in Lacan's statement that:

Freud's discovery was in the fields of effects in the nature of man of his relations to the symbolic order and the tracing of their meaning right back to the most radical agencies of symbolization in being. To ignore this symbolic order is to condemn the discovery to oblivion, and the experience to ruin³⁵.

In spite of spectacular transformations within Freudian tradition had taken place, namely from libidinal biology to culture and symbolic context, there are still some obscure points that whether Freudian psychoanalysis can be a path towards Heideggerian question of Being or not. For some, the answer is probably not. But despite this answer, we cannot derive the conclusion that the path is any longer closed forever. As every path has its own way for Dasein (*openness*), this one has too. Freud's -partial- oblivion of being is later substituted by Lacan through his innovation of symbolic being of man. Then from that moment, let's study the development of Lacanian type of psychoanalysis from Freudian heritage with elaborating the terminological and methodological differences. And later discuss on the relationship between Heideggerian type of Being question and Lacanian psychoanalysis besides similarities and contradictory points.

III. Language as House of Being or of Father ? Heideggerian Peace vs. Lacanian Authority ?

Heidegger's view on being thrown into the world at some points have similarities with Lacan's being thrown in to the language order. The metaphor of thrownness may help us from several points in order to make a further critical comparison between to traditions. This is very identical with Marx's perception of history, not because of its methodology and scientific approach perception, but because of its understanding of social being. When Marx, in *German Ideology*, said that there is no man as such independent from historical definition but the worker, the bourgeois and the peasant, he meant that man is shaped within the time's material conditions as well as of philosophical and conceptual ones.

Heidegger too regards history as a matter of limit and destiny. In *What is Philosophy*, indicates that his concern with philosophy is not a historical question about "what the philosophy is, how it began and developed". The question is a question of history, namely of destiny³⁶. Moreover, says Heidegger, "this is not "a" question of history on our existence for we are western and European, but historical question of our existence"³⁷. Heidegger too does not take history as narration coming from the past. But

³⁴Lacan, J., *Ecrits: A Selection*, p. 60.

³⁵Lacan, J., *Ecrits: A Selection*, p. 64.

³⁶Heidegger, M., *Nedir Bu Felsefe*, p. 17.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 17.

history is an imposition coming from today. What shapes destiny is not directly the past. But rather today's limits and possibilities. *Dasein* (openness), for him, as a possibility is also an issue of destiny. What Herakleitus said that *physis* likes to remain hidden means that *aletheia* is with not scientific research whose success is dependent on the performance of rational and conscious subject, but with its presence comes to us. *Aletheia* is a matter of non-subjectivist appearing and disappearing through *Dasein*. And the only thing one can do is to be ready for this by fulfilling the task of thinking.

Freudian and Lacanian understanding of thrownness has similarities with that of Marx and Heidegger. A mode of production or a symbolic order within language or the order of father. Lacan following this perception of thrownness says that it was certainly the Word that was in the beginning, and we live in its creation, but it is the action of our spirit that continues by constantly renewing it³⁸.

Lacan's thinking on language is very reflective of man's thrownness into an order. For Lacan, unlike Heidegger, language is not merely "the house of Being" in which peace can be found, but also "the house of the father" which is the reason behind Oedipus Complex. Symbolic order is the order of the father. The law is revealed clearly enough as identical with an order of language. Child's entrance into language is the main signification of man's thrownness into the world. Man's relation with language³⁹ is not an equal relation in which each sides has corresponding power. On the contrary, man is the subject (obedient) of the language order. It is not the man which makes language but the language makes the man within its order. Only where there is language is there world. Only where world predominates, is there history⁴⁰. Language, as Heidegger does, is regarded not to be simply a medium of communication. And man is not regarded as a dominator of it. Man is the subject (obedient) of language since the thing speaks of itself.

In the world of language, subject is spoken (in dreams, jokes, myths, in unconscious etc.) rather than speaking⁴¹. Man speaks but it is because the symbol made him man⁴². From these statements we can derive that Lacan agrees with Heidegger on the fact that language is the house of being. But this house is not a mere shelter or refuge as Heidegger thinks, but a nurse and mother (or the worse, the father of psychoanalysis). Beyond this, it gives birth to man, language is the precondition of becoming aware of oneself as a distinct entity. It is the I and Thou dialectic, defining subjects within their mutual opposition. But dialectically language also is the vehicle of a socially given, culturally based prohibitions and laws⁴³. In Freud's formulation, the ego is a result of the re-regulation of pleasure principle in front of reality principle. Later Freud reformulated ego to be a result of identification relationship with parental figures⁴⁴. However for Lacan, not libidinal drives (such as Eros and Thanatos) but subject-to-

³⁸Lacan, J., *Ecrits: A Selection*, p. 61.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁴⁰Heidegger, M., *Existence and Being.*, p. 276.

⁴¹Lacan, J., *Ecrits: A Selection*, p. 69.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 65

⁴³Sarup, M., *An Introductory Guide*, p. 9.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 16-17.

subject relation within language, called intersubjectivity, is the beginning of the formation of the ego identity.

Here despite convergences between Lacan and Heidegger, a sharp divergence on the quality of language emerges. That is Lacan's qualification of language and symbolic order to be the locus for authority and power. I don't think that Heidegger's view is compatible with that of Lacan on this subject. In Lacan's formulation, both language and society represents the "law" or the "name of the father", the latter standing as the symbol and the guardian of the social or symbolic order⁴⁵. Language's power of give birth to the man comes from forcefulness. The rule of the father forces child to obey it. As the language forces him to obey it. Lacan, in order to prove the power of language, uses language studies of the structuralist antropologists. There Strauss stress the overlap between language order and tribal order in terms of the prohibitions so as to prevent incest. Matrimonial alliance regulates the exchange of women. And the exchange of the gifts are determined by the marriage. The marriage tie is governed by an order of preference whose law concerning the kinship names is, like language, imperative for the group in its forms, but unconscious in its structure⁴⁶. The law of man is also the law of the language since the first words of recognition directed over the first gifts. The gifts are already symbols in the sense that pact is established through⁴⁷.

By being born into the language, child acquires an ego and a sense of self-identity, mainly by relying on personal pronouns which enables which enable the child to differentiate between "I" and others or between "mine" and "yours"⁴⁸. Symbolization starts where the child gets its first sense that something could be missing: words stands for objects, because they only have to be spoken at the moment when the first object (the mother) is lost⁴⁹. Symbolic order as an order of normative prohibition- as the "No" and "Name of Father" (le nom [non] du père) forever militating against the amorphous union and reunion of child and image and of child and mother⁵⁰. The subject emerges when it's inserted into the signifying order as soon as it begins actively to speak. It's the moment when the fullness of imaginary union with the mother is lost forever, only to be chased unincreasingly as the impossible dream⁵¹. Lacan, in the sense of the break with the mother, sees the Oedipus complex as the axis of humanisation, as a transition from the natural register of life to a cultural register of group exchange and therefore of laws, language and organisation. In this system, child at first does not merely desire contact with the mother and her care; it wishes perhaps what is lacking in "her": the phallus. At this stage child is not a subject but a "lack", a nothing. At the second stage, the father intervenes depriving child from its mother; from the object of its desire. The child encounters with "the Law of Father". The third stage is that of child's identification with father. As far as it's impotent, this symbolic replacement with father substitutes its lack. Otherwise it's not possible to reach the object of desire; the mother. But despite that

⁴⁵Dallmayr, F., Heidegger and Psychotherapy, p. 227.

⁴⁶Lacan, J., Ecrits: A Selection, p. 65-66.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 61.

⁴⁸Dallmayr, F., Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory, p. 196.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 196.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 197.

⁵¹Richardson, W.J., Lacan and non-Philosophy, p. 126.

identification, father symbolically castrates the child, separating him from his mother⁵². In the process of differentiation, the true function of the Father is fundamentally to unite (and not set in opposition) a desire and the Law⁵³. This desire is no longer bound with the object. This is an alienated demand within symbolic processes of language. This is the vital point that which also distinguishes Freud and Lacan. In Freud, the driving thing is the libido, while in Lacan this is desire. A concept taken from Hegel⁵⁴. Desire is constructed and alienated to its real subject (the mother). This construction, as Freud displayed, takes place within Fort-Da game.

Yet implicitly for Lacan too, order is not the only attribution of language. At least Lacan tries to find a new possibility. In the search of it, Lacan gets closer with Heidegger as ever before. Lacan, using an instrument of psychoanalysis, believes that this negativity may be overcome. The possibility is speech. Whether psychology sees itself, says Lacan, as an instrument of healing, of training, or of exploration in depth, it has only a single medium: the patient's speech. And all speech calls for a reply⁵⁵. There is no speech without a reply, even if it is met only silence⁵⁶. Then the function of the language is not to inform, but to evoke. What is sought in speech is the response of the other. What constitutes me as subject is my question⁵⁷. Now what is meant by a conversation is the act of speaking with other about something. Then speaking (logos) also brings about the process of coming together⁵⁸. We all are a conversation. Even if it is communicated nothing, the discourse represents the existence of communication; even it denies the evidence, it affirms that speech constitutes truth; even if it is intended to deceive, the discourse speculates on faith in testimony⁵⁹.

The speech of psychoanalysis is oriented toward the silence of the being which lies in the unconscious and destined to the oblivion. For this reason the dialog with unconscious is the single method of psychoanalysis against being forgotten. In that process what is taught to the subject is to recognize his unconscious as his own history, through perfecting the historization of his existence with its 'turning-points'⁶⁰.

Until Freud, unconscious is not even noticed. And contrary to Heidegger's supposition, it is not a creation of Cartesian method nor a fiction of subjectivism. Unconscious is dated back to the emergence of language and symbolic order. And it is structured like a language. Yet this language like structured unconscious is not allowed to be remembered. It is suppressed or forgotten. The unconscious is of man's history that is marked by a blank or occupied by a falsehood: it's the censored chapter. As psychoanalysis displayed, "it can be evidently seen that the hysterical nucleus of the neurosis in which the hysterical symptom reveals the structure of a language. And the

⁵²Sarup, M., *An Introductory Guide*, p. 10.

⁵³Lacan, J., *Ecrits: A Selection*, p. 321.

⁵⁴Dallmayr, F., *Heidegger and Psychotherapy*, p. 228.

⁵⁵Lacan, J., *Ecrits: A Selection*, p. 40.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁵⁸Heidegger, M., *Hölderlin and The Essence of Poetry*, p. 277.

⁵⁹Lacan, J., *Ecrits: A Selection*, p. 42.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p. 52.

background of that is hidden in the past of patient's childhood. This transformation is also a kind of broken and converted language⁶¹. It is Freud who discovered the libidinal stages of the child through the analysis of adults and intervened in the little Hans's case only through the mediation of his parents. He deciphered a whole section of the language of the unconscious in paranoid delusion⁶². For Lacan, contrary to Heidegger's claim, what Freud discovered in the unconscious is not the unbroken chain of psychic causality but the hidden power of speech, and that it's structured not really like a thermodynamic machine but like a language⁶³. While for Freud, the unconscious has a perilous aspect to be overcome by treatment, Lacan regards the unconscious as the locus of truth.

Language is the original openness of whatever is that is preserved in different ways by mankind. Insofar as humans are together with other Daseins and remain essentially related to other humans, language is, as such, dialogue⁶⁴. Language (logos) is a gathering process that collects all beings together within itself and in relation to one another⁶⁵. Heidegger's claim is that logos is gathering in the sense that all beings are involved in Being⁶⁶. And Aristotle's usage of the word "logos-logist" in *Athanaen Politeia* is not totally different; accountant.

IV. Philosophy vs. Psychoanalysis

Lacan, reversing the Cartesian logic, says that "*I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think*"⁶⁷. This expression has two important consequences in relation to the locus of conscious subject and the limits of philosophy. The Lacan's critique of Cartesian subjectivity; the ego of the will, the ego of the omnipotence has been discussed above. There the conclusion reached is that the ego doesn't speak but spoken; doesn't think but is thought; and finally does not be but is. Lacan with de-centralizing the subject from the thinking process and from the symbolic order of language, makes clear of *human being's madeness*.

Man contrary to the Cartesian subject is no longer at the centre of universe. The subject is no longer omnipotent subject. According to Lacan what makes the subject is not its consciousness, but its unconscious. And repeats that "*I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think*". This is the aletheia of the unconscious against its being forgottenness. For him, the subject that truly articulates is the unconscious, the unconscious as subject, which he refers to as the "subject of the unconscious"⁶⁸. The unconscious is the part of the concrete discourse, in so far as it is transindividual, that is not at the disposal of the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his conscious discourse⁶⁹. Contrary to Cartesian philosophy, what form the subjectness is not mere

⁶¹Ibid., p. 50.

⁶²Ibid., p. 36.

⁶³Richardson, Heidegger among Doctors, p. 57.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 55.

⁶⁵Dallmayr, F., Heidegger and Psychoanalysis, p. 228.

⁶⁶Heidegger M., Nedir Bu Felsefe, p. 22.

⁶⁷Sarup, M., An Introductory Guide, p. 11.

⁶⁸Richardson, W.J., Lacan and non-Philosophy, p. 122.

⁶⁹Lacan, J., Ecrits: A Selection, p. 49.

conscious thinking yet the unconscious. The "I" is not the real one, its the "I" of the language that is differentiated within signifying chain. What makes "I" is not the conscious being of man yet the language's system of signification. Man is made in relation to his differences within symbolic order. As "The son", "the Oedipus" and "the murder" are made through language, as "the law", "the evil" and "the desire" are made too.

The "madness" of man is more evident in the case of desire. Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need⁷⁰. The separation from the mother is provided by the help of Fort-Da game. There in so far as the lost -of mother- takes place, the emergence of the ego identity too develops. The formation of ego identity is thus depended upon the loss of mother. This loss is not merely real lost but also symbolic. Since symbol manifests itself as the murder of the thing⁷¹. Unless the absence of the thing emerges, there won't be any symbolic order. Symbol is the substitution of the lost. I identify myself in language, only by losing myself in it like an object⁷². The moment when the child is born into language is also that in which 'desire becomes human'.

The second critique of Lacan is against philosophy. The occupation of the conscious subject. While Plato saying that there is no role of the chance in the life of a philosopher man. He means that every thing in the life of a philosopher is (and ought to) decided in guidance of the faculty of rational thinking. Lacan, in a similar way with his critique of the conscious subject of Cartesian thinking, criticizes the philosophy as realized from Socrates to Hegel, from the ironic presupposition that all that is rational is real. What is his additional critique is his indication that the philosophy is not aware of the language order through which thinking is realized. Philosophers, for Lacan, think that rational thinking is a given faculty or a matter of decision. What philosophers do not consider is the fact that philosophy is not possible without language like structured unconscious. Language as a precondition for unconscious, is also the precondition for philosophy. Philosophers' choices are not out of the language.

What they could do is already shown within language. The act they prefer to be virtuous are indicated within the signifying chain of the language. Compare with the others, they have no priority. All's presence is closely related to the presence of the others (the wrong doing, evil, etc.). But philosophy does not seem to recognize the other. That is unconscious. The unconscious is the condition of conscious subject. The good deed (and the obedience to the law of the father) is highly appreciated while Oedipian ones are punished and insulted.

Freud in *Civilisation and its Discontents* claims that ethics, aesthetics and philosophy are sublimations of the impotency and deficiencies of (in the widest sense of the word) life. Nietzsche too, due to this, is against Socrates for he vehemently destroys the richness of life. He thinks that philosophy reduces life into an ethical dictum. He regards Socratic philosophy as the philosophy of the slave, of the decadent man. Christ too is a part of this decadent philosophy. As Socrates accepts to drink the poison, Christ too accepts to die. Slaves (in metaphorical sense) are for dying. Yet it is not that sort of

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 311.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 104.

⁷²Ibid., p. 86.

philosophy which Nietzsche craves, rather he prefers Dionysian-like a way of life, with its unlimitedness and unrepressedness.

If it is so, namely, Socrates is a break with ancient thinking, at what points this separation emerges? Heidegger has an answer to that question. The answer is short: Herakleitos and Parmenides (pre-Socratics) are not philosophers yet⁷³. Since philosophy belongs to a different essence and historicity that will later come by Socrates. It is a different way of thinking. Pre-Socratics are rather "being thinkers".

Though the pre-Socratic "being thinking" is not philosophical in the traditional meaning, they too are criticized with the same arguments. But what is clear for Lacan, is the primacy of language/speech over being: "Being is the being of signification"⁷⁴. We can see from these terms Lacan's antipathy to the notion "world":

The world, conceived as a whole, with what this word comports..remains.. a view, a look, an imaginary grasp. The world is symmetrical with the subject. The world is the equivalent, the mirror image, of thought⁷⁵.

For Lacan there is no truth before is course of the truth, nor the truth of being. Each truth has its' own signifying chain so to get the result. Lacan's statement has similarities with that of Ricoeur. According to Ricoeur, the system of the language is out of time and always exists. The question "who is talking?" is not valid in this meaning. There is no world in language, as no time and subjectivity. But "the discourse", distinct from the language, has a subjective and temporal moment⁷⁶. The symbolic function of the language is realized within discourse⁷⁷. The discourse has always to be about something⁷⁸. Which calls for the other is not the language, but the discourse. The foundation of communication lies here⁷⁹.

Philosophy for Lacan is accessible only to conscious thought, and what is primordial in specifically human experience is not being, but language and speech. There is no pre-discursive reality. Every reality is founded in and defined by a discourse⁸⁰. This implies the point that that is being is a function of speech. It was the mark of the old ontologies to so emphasize the copula "is" as to isolate it as a signifier⁸¹. The starting point is the function of the signifier. Lacan's rejection of philosophy is a direct consequence of this thesis about the primacy of language over (metaphysical) being⁸². Language is versus truth claims of Socrates and other philosophers.

⁷³Heidegger, M., *Nedir Bu Felsefe?*, p. 24.

⁷⁴Richardson, W.J., *Lacan and non-Philosophy*, p. 129.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁷⁶Ricoeur, P., *Anlamlı Eylemi Bir Metin Gibi Görmek*, p. 28.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁸⁰Richardson, W.J., *Lacan and non-Philosophy*, p. 128.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 128-129.

⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 132.

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