



## A MORE ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY: DOMESTIC FACTORS OF TURKEY'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY DURING SECOND TENURE OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY

Araş.Gör. Samet YILMAZ\*   
Oğuzhan ÖZDEMİR\*\* 

### ABSTRACT

*Turkey pursued a more active foreign policy during the second tenure of the Justice and Development Party between 2007 and 2011. In this period, Turkey increasingly involved itself in issues concerning the Middle East. The Justice and Development Party government tried to increase Turkey's influence on Middle East politics. The reason for why the government pursued a more active and assertive policy could be found in Turkish domestic political developments. In the second tenure of the government, Turkey's national capacity increased, and so, the government sought to convert it into influence in the region. Also, the government strengthened its position within the state, thereby be easier to conduct foreign policy actions. The paper will elaborate on these developments along with the domestic factors of Turkey's Middle East policy referring to the auxiliary hypotheses of neoclassical realism.*

**Key Words:** Foreign Policy Autonomy, The Justice and Development Party, Active Foreign Policy.

**JEL Classification:** F50, F59, N45

## DAHA AKTİF BİR DIŞ POLİTİKA: ADALET VE KALKINMA PARTİSİ'NİN İKİNCİ İKTİDAR DÖNEMİNDE TÜRKİYE'NİN ORTA DOĞU POLİTİKASININ DÂHİLİ ETMENLERİ

### ÖZ

*Türkiye, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin 2007-2011 yılları arasındaki ikinci iktidar döneminde daha aktif bir dış politika izlemiştir. Bu dönemde Türkiye, artan ölçüde Orta Doğu'daki meselelere dâhil olmuştur. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'daki etkinliğini arttırmaya çalışmıştır. Hükümetin Orta Doğu'da daha aktif ve iddialı bir dış politika izlemesinin sebepleri Türkiye'nin dâhili politikasında ortaya çıkan gelişmelerle açıklanabilir. Hükümetin ikinci iktidar döneminde, Türkiye'nin dâhili kapasitesi artmış ve hükümet bu artışı Orta Doğu'da etkiye*

\* Research Assistant, Uludağ University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, e-mail: sametyilmaz@uludag.edu.tr, TÜBİTAK 2211-A Scholarship Student.

\*\* PhD Candidate in Human Geography, University of Leeds, e-mail: gyoo@leeds.ac.uk.



*dönüştürmeye çalışmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra, hükümet dâhili politikadaki konumunu güçlendirmiş ve bu durum hükümetin dış politikada daha serbest eylemde bulunabilmesini sağlamıştır. Bu çerçevede makalede, Türkiye'nin dâhili politikasındaki gelişmeleri ve bu gelişmelerin Orta Doğu politikasına olan etkileri, neo-klasik realizmin yardımcı varsayımları temelinde analiz edilecektir.*

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Dış Politikada Özerklik, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Aktif Dış Politika.*

**JEL Sınıflandırması:** *F50, F59, N45*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Following the Cold War, Turkish rulers has tried to increase influence of Turkey in the Middle East. Since demise of the Soviet Russia marked the end of so-called bipolar international system, Turkish officials had the opportunity to be more active in neighbouring area (Sayari, 1997; Özdemir, 2010: 272). The first manifestation of such an approach was the active role of the President Turgut Özal, the Prime Minister of the Motherland Party (MP) government between 1983 and 1989, and later the 8<sup>th</sup> President of the Republic of Turkey, during the First Gulf War. Özal believed that the end of the Cold War brought about new opportunities for Turkey to follow an active and assertive policy in the region. Such a policy would also enhance position of Turkey in world politics (Ataman, 2003). Similarly, during the Coalition Government, led by Bülent Ecevit, comprised of the Democratic Left Party (DLP), the Nationality Movement Party (NMP) and the MP between 1999 and 2002, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, İsmail Cem from the DLP, claimed that the traditional Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) was severed its ties from its own roots, and devoid of historical dimension. Turkey should be intersection point of a culturally and historically vast area ranging from Europe to the Middle East and the Central Asia since Turkey, with its civilizational assets, has close cultural ties with its neighbouring regions (Cem, 2001: 1-20). In this sense, Cem commenced “Neighbourhood Peace Initiative” to establish a new relationship pattern with Iraq to promote a peaceful milieu in the region (Cem, 2001: 79-81). However, these initiatives in the 1990s were ineffective since domestic political situation hampered to implement an active foreign policy in the region. While Özal faced opposition from the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the Parliament, the Coalition government was in weak position in domestic politics.

During the second tenure of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party<sup>1</sup>) government, between 2007 and 2011, led by highly influential leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey pursued a more active policy, and was more assertive in the Middle East in comparison to the government's first tenure. Though the program of the Party toward the Middle East was not radically changed, the

---

<sup>1</sup> AK Party is the official abbreviated form of the Justice and Development Party.



government was more willing to participate in regional developments. So, what is the stimulus for the government to pursue a more active and assertive policy in the Middle East politics? This is the core question to be addressed in this article.

The study will analyze the government's assertive and active policy in the Middle East during its second tenure within the auxiliary assumptions of neoclassical realism. The main purpose of the study is to prove that the rising national capacity and strengthened position of the government within the state created incentives for Turkey to be more active and assertive in the Middle East. It is worth noting that rather than explaining Turkey's foreign policy toward the Middle East in the given period, the paper will demonstrate the factors that pushed the government to pursue such a policy. In doing this, the main focus of the article will be domestic political factors of Turkey, not systemic factors in international politics.

It should be noted that the structure of the international system during the mentioned period will be taken as given since after the Cold War ended, there has not been a fundamental power shift in the international system. The Cold War ended with the demise of the Soviet Union, and the USA remained the sole power or superpower in the international system. During this time, there has been no open challenge against the US supremacy. In addition, it could be said that the change in government in 2000, along with the influence neoconservatives within US politics had an effect on harnessing American state power, and therefore on its foreign policy. However, such a change was not the result of the power structure of the international system; but because of the organization of USA government; thus, it is ignored in the study.

## **2. NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND DOMESTIC INCENTIVES OF FOREIGN POLICY**

Realism is one of the most influential theories in international relations discipline, and represents orthodoxy within the field (Buzan, 2008: 53). Realist theories of international relations can be classified as classical and structural realism (Taliaferro vd., 2009: 16). Classical realists claim that desire for power is inherent in human nature, and thus, states constantly try to augment their power capacity (Waltz, 1992: 33). International politics is seen as a conflictual arena comprised of states pursuing their own interests (Elman, 2007: 12). Rather than making inferences about human nature and characteristics of statesmen, structural realists focus on recurring patterns in international politics (Elman, 2007: 13). It is basically deductive, and clarifies patterns of international politics in which anarchy is the permissive condition, utilizing their most important variable the relative distribution of capabilities (Taliaferro vd., 2009: 17). Neoclassical realism incorporates two variables in order to explain foreign policy actions: the distribution of capacity among states and domestic politics. Coined with the term neoclassical realism, Gideon Rose defines the theory as it follows:



*“(Neoclassical realism) explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical” (1998: 146).*

As can be seen in Rose's definition, a state's foreign policy actions are depended variable in neoclassical realism. It utilizes the relative distribution of capabilities as an independent variable. However, since systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level, it incorporates domestic politics of states as intervening variable (Taliaferro vd., 2009: 20). *“Neoclassical realism seeks to explain variation in the foreign policies of the same state over time or across different states facing similar external constraints. It makes no pretense about explaining broad patterns of systemic or recurring outcomes” (Taliaferro vd., 2009: 21).*

Neoclassical realists incorporate principle tenets of realism, so, they agree that states are situated in anarchical international milieu. They claim that rather than seeking for security or power maximization, states try to control and form their external environment against uncertainties in the international system (Taliaferro vd., 2009: 23). In addition, as the material capacity of states increases, states will tend to make more ambitious goals concerning their security and external environment. All states are inclined to have more influence in world politics, and can do this in line with material capability. As Rose puts it, *“as their relative power rises states will seek more influence abroad, and as it falls their actions and ambitions will be scaled back accordingly” (1998: 152).*

Despite controversies, neoclassical realism highlights the relational dimension of power, and partly embraces Robert Dahl's concept of power (Rose, 1998: 151). However, *“the impact of such power on policy is indirect and problematic”* Rose says (1998: 157). Hence, decision-makers' perceptions are the first intervening variable (Rose, 1998: 157). Neoclassical realism problematizes rationality. Since actual power calculations are difficult, perceptions and threat assessments (Lobell, 2009) are evaluated as the first intervening variable in foreign policy action. As Wohlfort puts it; *“A truly conclusive test of power that would yield incontestable results is difficult to imagine... For statesmen, accurate assessments of power is impossible” (1993: 10).*

Power and threat perception are the first intervening variable in neoclassical realism. The second is the ability of states to extract and direct national power to foreign policy actions (Rose, 1998: 161). As Zakaria says, *“statements, not nations, confront the international system”*, and



“statesmen will expand the nations’ political interests abroad when they perceive a relative increase in state power, not national power” (1998: 35). So, neoclassical realists make a distinction between national power and state power, or “national political power” in Christensen’s definition. Christensen defines the national political power as follows: “the ability of state leaders to mobilize their nation’s and material resources behind security initiatives” (1996: 11). So, ruling elites or governments should be capable of enforcing and following any security initiatives that they put in place.

There are different indicators in the neoclassical realist model that how resources are extracted from society into foreign policy actions, such as *elite consensus* outlined by Schweller (2004). However, the concept of foreign policy autonomy, casted by Norrin Ripsman will be harnessed in this paper. To Ripsman, state autonomy is “the ability of an entity to act upon its own preferences. States are structurally autonomous to the extent that their domestic political structures should allow them, *ceteris paribus*, to construct and pursue policies independently of societal forces and public opinion. Foreign policy autonomy refers to the structural capacity of the foreign policy executive to pursue policies when faced with public or legislative opposition” (2002: 43).

There are three indicators of structural autonomy: institutional structures, decision-making procedures and procedural norms. Institutional structures include constitutional norms, and signifies both the characteristics of democratic governance and also who is in charge of making foreign policy. Decision-making procedures are commonly informal norms –such as leader influence on party, or party discipline–, and determine behavior patterns. State officials could resort to informal relations to overcome formal impediments. Procedures, in fact, originated from procedural norms, create a broad consensus that determines the rights and responsibilities of political institutions. For foreign policy actions, legislative norms are quite important in terms of supervisory authority (Ripsman, 2002: 44-47).

In addition, these general political norms can influence foreign policy autonomy:

- “conventions, such as party discipline, which routinize support for the government, grant it greater autonomy;
- decision-making procedures that require the executive to consult the legislature prior to implementing policy curtail state strength;
- legislative norms that view the conduct of foreign relations as of utmost importance and that, therefore, stifle public dissent on matters of foreign affairs, grant the executive a freer hand;
- legislative norms that require representatives to scrutinize decisions closely in order to prevent excesses serve to constrain leaders;



• *political norms that inspire interpretations of existing foreign policy institutions that are favorable to the executive enhance autonomy; those that inspire interpretations favorable to the legislature detract from it” (Ripsman, 2002: 48).*

All in all, governments or presidents and foreign policy elites determine national security requirements. Governments are the main actors determining complex national interests since they have necessary means to pursue and understand international developments (Taliaferro vd., 2009: 24-25). Increased national capacity creates incentives for governments to pursue a more active foreign policy. Governments are supposed to be capable of using national capacities in foreign policy actions; this about state power and national political power.

It is quite obvious that domestic incentives of foreign policy actions could be handled by various approaches or theories in international relations discipline. In addition to foreign policy autonomy and national capacity, there are various factors which have impact on foreign policy actions such as psychological and cultural inclinations of decision-makers, domestic interest groups, quality of government, participation of civil society etc., and one of them can come forward as decisive factor depending on essence of foreign policy issue (Hudson, 2007). The reason of which neoclassical realism is used as an explanatory theory for this case is that it encapsulates core assumptions of realist research program in Lakatosian sense, and is principally a theory aiming to explain foreign policy actions. As a state-centric theory, without losing insights of realism, it improves explanatory power of realism through establishing auxiliary hypotheses (Yılmaz, 2015). Secondly, rather than a partial foreign policy theory, neoclassical realism has ideational roots to international politics in case of which foreign policy actions become more meaningful and comprehensible; that is to say, empiric data could be analyzed in terms of realism’s main tenets whereby producing more substantive explanations.

### **3. THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY: A NEW ACTOR IN TURKISH POLITICS**

The AK Party came to the power in December 2002 receiving 34 percent of votes in the general election, gaining 363 chairs in the parliament. The party was the dominant party in the parliament, and formed a one-party government. One-party governments, if party discipline is considered given, are advantageous in parliamentary systems (Hekimoğlu, 2009: 116-141). Therefore, gaining majority meant that the AK Party could make foreign policy actions without being impeded by the parliament.

In Turkey, the fundamental actor in foreign policy-making is the government. Since the government is responsible for conducting general policy of the state (Gözler, 2013: 342), foreign policy should be appropriate to the general policy. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is a member of



cabinet, whose main task is to conduct foreign policy in accordance with government's goals (Özcan, 2004: 839-843). In addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since scope of international relations is expanded, other ministries and bodies such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Customs and Trade, the Undersecretariat of Treasury can get involved in foreign policy decision-making processes for technical assistance, depending on feature of issue (Reçber, 2011: 24-30). Moreover, the National Security Council (NSC), which will be detailed below, is an effective actor having impact on foreign policy of Turkey.

The government shares some authorities with parliament. The most important responsibility of parliament in the Turkish governance system is to ratify treaties, to decide whether to dispatch Turkish military forces to foreign countries, and to give permission to foreign military forces staying on Turkish soil (Tanör, 2004: 817-820). This authority of the parliament is arranged in both the constitution and internal regulations of the parliament. Parliament uses these authorities through parliamentary acts (Gözler, 2013: 243-250). Thanks to its voting rate, the AK Party government had the opportunity to direct the parliament. Therefore, it could be said that the vote percentage fortified the foreign policy autonomy of the government.

Though the AK Party seemed influent in the parliament, there were significant factors delimiting the relative autonomy of the government. First was that the AK Party was relatively a new party, founded on 14 August 2001, and not organized within the state. It is well known that civil bureaucracy has been organized and potent in Turkey's state system since the foundation (Tuncel, 2011: 99-173). So, the party was confronted by this civil bureaucracy after the election. Second was the AK Party's political background. The party's founders came from the Welfare Party (WP), a party that resigned from government after the 28 February coup, and subsequently shut down by the Constitutional Court on account of anti-secular actions. The AK Party was originated from the WP's successor, the Virtue Party (VP), which was closed on 22 June 2001 by the court. After these developments, a new clique named "reformists" by the media (Nefes Kesen Yarış, Yeni Şafak, 15.05.2000) formed the AK Party breaking with their predecessors. Although the reformists claimed that they changed their political directions (Akşin, 2008: 180-181; Yönümüz Demokrasi, Yeni Şafak, 16.06.2001), the party had tensions with military and civil bureaucracy (Jenkins, 2010: 244-252). Thirdly, the TAF gained power following the 28 February coup. This power was concerned both internal and external policies of Turkey. The military used its increasing power by controlling the NSC, the principal organ in determining national security directions (Uzgel, 2006: 84-90; Aknur, 2010: 138-144). Lastly, the 2001 Economic Crisis negatively affected the government foreign policy autonomy since it hindered the flow of national resources to foreign policy actions.



These factors delimited the foreign policy autonomy of the AK Party government during its first tenure. This situation could be seen during the 1 March Bill process. After the elections, the USA started to put pressure on the Turkish government to participate in Iraqi military operations. However, the government could not pass on the 1 March Bill. The officials of both states agreed on an understanding of memorandum, and the Prime Minister Abdullah Gül and the politically banned leader Erdoğan tried to persuade both the party and public. However, the government failed to get the Bill through the parliament. The 1 March Bill process was significant for showing the constraints of the government in making foreign policy (Bölükbaşı, 2008; Bila, 2007).

#### **4. THE SECOND TENURE OF THE GOVERNMENT**

During the second tenure, the government has pursued a more active and aggressive foreign policy. The main reason of such an attitude was that Turkey's national capacity had increased since 2003, and Turkish ruling elites tried to transform it into the political influence in the Middle East. Turkish officials believed that Turkey should have more influence in the Middle East given its increasing national capacity. Secondly, the AK Party strengthened its position within the state system during this period. As the political position of the AK Party consolidated, the foreign policy autonomy of the government rose.

##### **4.1. Increasing National Capacity**

As noted above, when the AK Party came into power in 2002, Turkey was in economic turmoil. The AK Party took advantage of this situation. The Turkish public wanted to experience a new party, having blamed previous traditional parties for the country's economic turmoil (Tepe, 2010: 151; Akyol, Milliyet, 17.10.2002). From the beginning of 2003, Turkish economic conditions started to flourish, substantially due to the one-party government rule. The AK Party Government saw this increase in economy, and sought more influence beyond Turkish borders.

After the 2001 Economic Crisis, the current government started structural transformations in the economy, notably in the banking system. The AK Party continued this process in firmness, and in particular gave utmost importance to fiscal discipline. So, economic indicators of Turkey constantly developed in the 2003-2011 period.



**Table 1 Fundamental Economic Indicators**

Year	GDP Billion \$	GDP Growth (%)	GDP Per Capita thousand \$	Poverty Rate (%)	Inflation (CFI)
2003	303	5.3	4.5	28.1	18.4
2004	392	9.4	5.8	25.6	9.4
2005	482	8.4	7.1	20.5	7.8
2006	530	6.9	7.7	17.8	9.7
2007	647	4.7	9.3	17.8	8.4
2008	730	0.7	10.3	17.1	10.1
2009	614	-4.8	8.6	18.1	6.5
2010	731	9.2	10.1	-	6.5
2011	774	8.8	10.5	-	10

**Sources:** World Bank, OECD, Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt III: 2001-2011

According to the table, the GDP of Turkey was 303\$ billion in 2003. This figure raised to 730\$ billion in 2008, and despite the global economic crisis in 2008, to 774\$ billion in 2011. Approximately, there was 2.5-fold increase between 2003 and 2011. Similarly, while GDP per capita in 2003 was 8.5\$ thousand, it went up to 15\$ thousand in 2008, and to 17\$ thousand in 2011. Economic improvement had a positive effect on other spheres, and national level of development rose (OECD, 22.05.2017).

These figures are important since the AK Party officials frequently highlighted in order to prove that Turkey was developing in their tenure. Hence, their self-confidence was improved (Ünsal, 2013: 62). The government, under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan, thought that Turkey had experienced a great development since 2003. This perception or belief could be seen in Erdoğan's speeches and national addresses. Erdoğan believed that national capacity and international popularity of Turkey greatly increased during the AK Party's rein, and that this situation could be seen in all parts of the society. He claimed that Turkey entered a new phase aiming to flourish in all spheres. In his national address on September 2008 he said that, "Turkey is performing a multi-dimensional change, and certainly, it would be one of the most efficient, active and important actors in the world" (Erdoğan ulusa sesleniş konuşması yaptı, Hürriyet, 28.09.2008). Similarly, in his national address in 2009 he expressed that the Turkish economy was not affected by the 2008 global economic crisis as much as developed countries thanks to sturdy measures taken by the government. He also added;

*"The seven-year period has showed clearly how stable Turkish economy is. In the last days of 2009, we are looking at coming year with hope and enthusiasm. We evaluate 2010 as that Turkey will recover from the effect of economic crisis, and that our development energy will increase again, and*



*that the troubles our people suffer will disappear gradually” (Erdoğan'dan 2009'un hesap dökümü, Sabah, 30.12.2009).*

It is palpable there was a perception that Turkey's national capacity developed in the AK Party government term. This development was seen in international politics as well, Erdoğan claimed. He said during a party group meeting in 2011 that Turkey supported underdeveloped countries in all international institutions, and that the world appreciated Turkey's initiatives. In his view, Turkey was viewed in a favorable light by peoples in its near abroad, since the foreign policy approach of the AK Party was multi-dimensional, adding that Turkey flourished not merely in domestic politics, but also international politics. Thus, Turkey furthered its national reputation beyond national borders (2015 hedeflerine şimdiden ulaştık, Sabah, 30.06.2010; AK Party Official Website, 30.05.2017).

Similarly, Ahmet Davutoğlu, the advisory to Prime Ministry from 2003 to 2009, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009, is of the opinion that Turkey was supposed to have more influence in its near abroad. In his view, Turkish ruling elites had a narrow mind about Turkey's role world politics throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, and could not have considered consciousness and historical-geopolitical depth of Turkey. In this sense, Turkey should rearrange and tighten the relations with its near abroad thanks to its cultural diversity and geopolitical depth (Davutoğlu, 2001).

Davutoğlu outlined such a policy in numerous articles and speeches. In order to avail of Turkish historical and geopolitical depth, the main foreign policy tenets of Turkey should be “zero problem” toward Turkish neighbors, multi-dimensional foreign policy and soft power bolstering the previous tenets. If Turkey could solve problems with neighboring countries, and harness its soft power fortified by material power, it would be a central state in its periphery. To that end, Turkey's foreign policy was supposed to be pro-active rather than re-active, and be a center of attraction for both peoples and states in neighboring regions (Davutoğlu, 2008: 77-96; 2013).

#### **4.2. Strengthening Position of The AK Party**

In its first tenure, the position of the AK Party within the system was relatively weak, and the army was potent in both foreign and domestic politics. The army had bolstered its position within the political system creating bodies under its control, and had also been dominant in the NSC. However, the army's position in Turkish politics gradually declined in the course of the 2000s. This situation rendered it possible for the AK Party to make foreign policy decisions not impeded by other state institutions.

The first development rising foreign policy autonomy of the AK Party was amendments of the NSC's regulations. In fact, this process had begun before the AK Party reigned power. The NSC was



arranged in the 1982 Constitution, and its competence was determined by Law No. 2945, dated 9 November 1983. According to the constitution and the law, the NSC was comprised of the Prime Minister, Chief of Staff, Defense Minister, Interior Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Commanders of Air, Sea and Land Forces and Gendarmerie General Commander, chaired by the President. It was liable for determining national security policy of state and protecting constitutional order and the unity of state and society against internal and external threats. Its decisions were primarily considered by governments. In its original form, military officials were more than civil ones. With the amendments made on October 2001, Deputy Prime Ministers and the Justice Minister were included, and thus, the number of civil members were increased. Also, “primarily considered” phrase was changed as “evaluated”. Another amendment that was issued related to internal regulations of the NSC on July 2003. The most important innovation concerned the Secretary General of the NSC. Before that amendment, it had to be a military official. It could now include civil ones (Gözler, 2013: 352-355). These alterations were quite important since the government had the opportunity to break the army’s influence in determining national threats. In addition to legal amendments, the EU harmonization process and Ergenekon case weakened the army’s position within the state while strengthening civil authorities. So, the TAF’s role in the TFP was declined at the end of 2000s (Balci, 2015: 240-241).

Another factor was the presidential election in 2007. The election process was thorny. Before the elections, there had been secularism and headscarf disputes amid “Republic Protests” (BBC News, 27.05.2017; Cumhuriyet için tek ses, Sabah, 15.04.2007). In addition, the Chief of Staff, Yaşar Büyükanıt, stated that the future president should be loyal to Republic’s main tenets (Beş çarpıcı açıklama, Hürriyet, 13.04.2015). In this environment, the ruling party announced Abdullah Gül as their candidate. Gül was elected by the parliament on 27 April, gaining 357 out of the 361 votes from the parliament members. On the evening of voting, the Chief of Staff released a statement on its official website, later named “e-memorandum”, underscoring the importance of secularism and threats to internal unity of Turkey (Genelkurmay’dan çok sert açıklama, Hürriyet, 07.04.2007). Following the vote, the main opposition party appealed to the Constitutional Court, claiming that the first round of voting was illegal. The Court nullified the election, stating that 367 members had supposed to attend the voting (Seçimin ilk turu iptal, Sabah, 01.05.2007). Then, the ruling party took the decision for an early election. The 2007 general election took place on 22 July 2007, and the AK Party received 46.5 percentage of the vote. As a result, Gül was elected in the third round as the eleventh President of Turkey on 26 August.

Considering the Presidential election process together with 2007 General election, the idea that the AK Party strengthened its position could be put forward. There was a 12.5 percent increase in comparison to 2002 General Election. This situation was a strong indicator that the public supported



the government (Ünsal, 2013: 93). Thereafter, government officials frequently made reference to national will. Furthermore, the President was now from the ruler's party. During the Sezer tenure, there had been disharmony between the government and the President. With Gül's presidency, the government's maneuverability was improved.

In 2008, the AK Party faced a closure trial based on the charge that the party violated the principal of religion-state separation. This case could be viewed as an act of traditional bureaucracy against the AK Party. However, the Court's verdict was a cut in state funding for the Party (Ünsal, 2013: 99). Toward the end of the decade, the coup allegations against the AK Party government discredited the TAF in public (Ünsal, 2013: 99-104). The developments fortified the position of the government in both state and public opinion.

## **5. THE EFFECT OF INCREASING NATIONAL CAPACITY AND STATE POWER ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TO THE MIDDLE EAST**

The main foreign policy tenets of the government were outlined in the party program. According to this program, Turkey was supposed to embrace a multi-dimensional foreign policy based on cooperation since its geopolitical location provided many opportunities for such a role. In addition, the international situation following the Cold War was appropriate for Turkey's multi-dimensional foreign policy. This policy was supposed to be based on economic and cultural means rather than military alliances. In particular, the party gave the utmost importance to making cooperation with its near abroad. In this sense, Turkey had the responsibility of putting an end to chronic problems in the Middle East, which originating from its historical background. The management of such a policy would involve not just bureaucracy, but also the parliament and societal elements (AK Party Official Website, 30.05.2017). In this framework, the AK Party adopted a multi-dimensional foreign policy perspective, and the government tried to improve Turkey's relations with the countries in the Middle East (Güder ve Mercan, 2012: 73). These elements were operative for both the first and second tenures of the AK Party government.

The increasing national capacity of Turkey and strengthened position of the AK Party in internal politics enabled the government to implement more active and aggressive policies in the Middle East. During the first tenure, the government was elected by the vast majority of the population. However, the traditional balance of power between elected government, Turkish army and the bureaucratic system prevented the AK Party to become more autonomous in foreign policy decisions. Actually, the tension between the traditional actors and the elected government was not unprecedented. It is well-know that there are three determinants of the traditional TFP: Westernization, maintaining status quo and legitimacy (Güder ve Mercan, 2012: 70). Thus, traditional



Turkish ruling elites followed a pro-status quo foreign policy until 2000's (Güder ve Mercan, 2012: 59). In this sense, the Middle East was seen as "swamp" for decades by the traditional actors of TFP, and Turkey pursued a Western-centric foreign policy toward the Middle East. As mentioned above, Turgut Özal had similar problem with the traditional perspective. He was critical of the bureaucracy, and perceived that pro-status quo approach which was implemented by military and civilian bureaucracy was an obstacle to the changes he wanted to introduce (Altunışık, 2009). In this regard, the traditionalist understanding in the foreign policy was the first challenge faced by the AK Party government. However, after the 2007 elections, the government became more alleged to the Middle East, and initiated alternative policies towards the region as a result of more autonomy in foreign policy-making. Turkey increased its activism, and gained prestige in the region between 2007 and 2011; so, André Bank and Roy Karadag (2013) name this period as the "the Ankara Moment". The examples of such unprecedented activism could be seen in Turkey's relations with Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya until the Arab Revolt began. This active policy also shaped the nature of Turkey-Israel relations.

### **5.1. The Developing Relations with Iraq and Kurdish Regional Government**

The first ramification of increased national capacity to the foreign policy can be seen in Turkish-Iraqi relations, notably in the relations with Iraqi Kurdistan formed after the US intervention in Iraq. Following the Presidential Election in Turkey in 2007, the policy toward recognizing Iraqi Kurdish leaders as principal actors within Iraqi-Turkish relations symbolically started by Iraqi President Calal Talabani's official visit to Turkey. However, the rapprochement policy stipulated that the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) should support Turkey's struggle against the PKK, and also the regional government should implement more sensitive policies in Kerkuk which was a historically significant city for pro-nationalist groups since the 1920s (Özbağcı, 2012: 335). In order to improve political and economic relations, the AK Party government signed a series of agreements, known as High Council of Strategic Collaborations with both the Central Iraqi and Kurdish Regional Governments (Özbağcı, 2012: 336). Presumably, the agreements and multi-dimensional diplomatic and economic initiatives implemented by the AK Party government were aiming to reconstruct Turkish-Iraqi relations for the post-intervention period in Iraq (Yeşilyurt, 2013: 412).

The new relationship pattern with the KRG was distinctively different from the traditional tendency of the TFP on the basis of denying Kurdish Leaders as legitimate actors in Turkish-Iraqi relations. Until 2008, the leaders of the KRG were named as "tribal leaders", and disdained by Turkish public opinion. They were also described as unreliable figures in the media (Birand, Hürriyet, 29.10.2008; Barzani'nin Babası da Hainmiş, Hürriyet, 22.10.2007). However, during the second



tenure of the government, the negative discourse was diminished against the KRG. Explicitly, the new relationship pattern with the KRG was constructed on the basis of the idea that the Iraqi Kurdish had kinship with people of Turkey (Gül: Kürtler de Türkmenler de Bizim Akrabamız, Hürriyet, 13.01.2007).

Erdoğan paid an official visit to Iraq in 2009, and signed significant agreements in order to improve political and economic engagement. This was followed by Davutoğlu's visit to the Kurdish region. These agreements generally accepted as milestones in the history of the relations between Turkey and the KRG (Tür, 2012: 607). As a result, Turkey improved the extent of the interaction in many fields such as economy, energy, military and intelligence (International Crisis Group, 2008: 13-16). Kurdish region became a safe haven for Turkish investors, and Turkey became a transit country by selling out Kurdish oil to world markets via the Kerkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline (International Crisis Group, 2008: 13-16; Yeşilyurt, 2013: 409; Semin, 2011: 195). All the process during the second tenure and increasing capacity of the relations with Iraq and the KRG enabled Turkey to become more active in the region.

## **5.2. The Rapprochement with Iran**

Another manifestation of the increasing national capacity on foreign policy can be seen in the relations with Iran. Until the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the historical rivalry between two states played a significant role on both bilateral relations and regional politics. Following the revolution, Turkey had to adjust its foreign policy to the new situation since the USA began to isolate Iran from international politics, and imposed economic embargo on Iran. Despite this pressure, the AK Party government strengthened its ties with Iran, and the extent of the relations reached the peak point during the second tenure of the AK Party (Yeşilyurt ve Akdevelioğlu, 2013: 403).

The situation in Iraq and influence of the USA in the region forced both Turkey and Iran to improve the relations in many spheres. These improvements included political support, cooperation on energy and fighting against the terrorist organisations. In terms of energy, the existing agreement (1996) on exportation Iranian gas was extended in July 2007, November 2008, and lastly October 2009 consensuses. Turkey's priority over these consensuses was to produce natural gas in the South Pars region in Iran, and to transfer Iranian gas to Western markets. Although the USA opposed to agreements between Iran and Turkey, the AK Party government did not retreat from its intention, and prepared a road map to improve the relations which were based on the energy collaboration (Yeşilyurt, 2013: 459). Furthermore, the Turkey-Iran economic trade volume doubled between 2007 and 2011 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, 20.05.2017). As well as the economic interaction, the Turkish-Iranian partnership made progress against the PKK. Iran increased the pressure on the PKK as



a reflection of the regional collaboration which is created between Turkey, Iran and Syria (Yeşilyurt ve Akdevelioğlu, 2013: 402-403).

As a result, Turkish decision makers maintained political and economic relations with Iran despite of the isolation and containment policies. In this term, Turkey supported Iran both in international and regional levels and, pursued more moderate policies. During the nuclear crises between the Western countries and Iran, the AK Party leaders adopted a diplomatic solution in order to avoid any destructive effect of a probable Western military intervention on Turkey-Iran relations (Ayman, 2012: 577-578). In 2010, Turkey did not support the proposal, which was proposed by the UN Security Council including military and economic sanctions against Iran. In addition, Turkey intended to make a nuclear exchange deal with Brazil, which was completely contradicted to the traditional pro-American TFP (Oğuzlu, 2010: 79-85).

The rapprochement policy toward Iran is one of the most significant indicators of Turkey's increasing activism in the region. In terms of foreign policy, the rapprochement was performed despite the fact that the USA, which was the most influential power in the international politics at that time, increased the pressure on Iran. It is obvious that the intervention of Iraq fostered anti-American sentiments in the region, an also damaged the American image in the world. Nevertheless, the dominant role of the USA in the region could not be deniable at this period. In terms of domestic policy in Turkey, the rapprochement policy with Iran was very sensitive topic for the ultra-secular traditional actors. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Turkish bureaucratic elites and the army perceived Iran as a big threat to the secular system of the Republic of Turkey. In 1997, the military memorandum led to resignation of the WP. It is well-known that Erbakan's activism to establish close relations with Muslim countries was one of the significant reasons of the "post-modern coup" (Uzgel, 2003: 183). Yet, the AK Party government advocated the importance of the rapprochement policy with Iran despite the objections of both the internal and external actors.

### **5.3. The Tightening Relations with Israel**

In the case of Israel, bilateral relations steadily worsened during the given period. Until 2000, Israel had been regarded as a strategic partner by Turkish policy-makers. Turkey's inactive position in the Middle East and the regional threats from Syria and Iran forced the traditionalists to improve relations with Israel around intelligence and technology (Aytürk, 2012: 619-623). Naturally, this relation was strongly supported by the TAF. According to Kaliber (2013: 38), the army signed many bilateral security agreements with Israel without seeking the consent of the government in the 1990s. On the other hand, isolated by Arabs in the region, Israel try to establish strong relations with a Muslim majority country like Turkey. However, two internal factors changed the nature of the



relationships with Israel. Firstly, the army's influence in the foreign policy-making process was gradually weakened in 2000s. Secondly, during the AK Party government, the changing political perspective to the Middle East and new partnerships with Arab states led to decrease political dependency to Israel. Thus, the government tried to ensure a peaceful and stabilize milieu in the region by seeking solutions to problems between Israel and Arab states. For instance, Turkey played a mediator role in Israel-Palestine and Israel-Syria peace negotiations. Furthermore, Turkey played an important role in releasing an Israeli Soldier, Gilat Salit, captured by Hezbollah (Aytürk, 2012: 621; Yeşilyurt, 2013: 438-442). Thus, Turkey emerged as a reliable partner for both Israel and Arab countries.

Nevertheless, during peace negotiations, Israel launched "Operation Cast Lead" in the Gaza Strip against the HAMAS. Presumably, the offensive act of Israel led to freeze the ties between Turkey and Israel (Aytürk, 2012: 623). President Erdoğan viewed this operation as an insult against his effort for peace talks. This incident was followed by Erdoğan's discussion with Simon Peres in Davos, known as the "one minute occasion" in Turkish public opinion. One year later, the Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon publicly humiliated the Turkish ambassador in Israel. The last and most significant turning point in the relations between Turkey and Israel was offensive act of Israel against the flotilla, named as "Mavi Marmara", organized by a Turkish NGO to end the Israeli blockade on Gaza. Nine people were killed, and tens of activists were wounded by the Israeli army. This incident was heavily criticized by the AK Party government, and caused deterioration in the relations between Turkey and Israel. In addition, though the Gaza Flotilla was organized by an NGO, the government made no attempt to prevent it from reaching Gaza, and some members of the party even encouraged the process. In addition, "Mavi Marmara" occasion could be viewed as an important example of the AK Party government's new policy based on utilising NGOs or charity organisation to become more active in the region (Aytürk, 2012: 631). It is clear that the deterioration in Turkey-Israel relations was a reflection of Turkey's increased autonomy in the second period.

As a result, the strong relations with Israel were not an indispensable part of the TFP for the AK Party policy-makers. Furthermore, all of these political crises affected the US foreign policy as well, and despite its efforts, political influence of the USA seemed not enough to protect the relations between the two significant partners of it in the region. Naturally, the AK Party's political priorities in the Middle East were also shaped by the internal factors. The reaction against Israel's irredentist policies in the region and the Palestinian issue were welcomed by the majority of public opinion. Hence, the determination of the relations with Israel was also due to the support of the public opinion and its reflection to the parliament.



#### **5.4. Contradictory Policies Toward the Arab Spring**

The AK Party's active and assertive policies could also be found in the Arab Spring. It is well-known that the Arab Spring has brought about significant political transformations in a vast geography ranging from the Middle East to the North Africa at that time (Oguzlu, 2011; Pirinççi, 2014). Initially, the Arab Spring was seen as an opportunity to expand Turkey's influence on the Middle East. The AK Party government anticipated that the potential moderate Islamist regimes would be a better partner than former authoritarian leaderships for Turkey (Bank ve Karadag, 2013: 301). Due to this motivation, the AK Party decision-makers pursued a pro-revolutionary policy, different to the traditional TFP that avoided engagement with the Middle East. In this process, the TFP was primarily formulated by President Erdoğan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu. For instance, Davutoğlu defined these revolutions as legitimate civil movements, which was conforming to the progress of history (Dışişleri Bakanı Davutoğlu: Arap Baharı Kaçınılmazdı, Cihan, 16.12.2011). He also argued that the "zero problems with neighbours" policy, which was pursued by the government until 2010, needed to be reformed to 'zero problems with peoples who live in neighbour countries'. Nevertheless, the AK Party leaders worried about their economic and political interests in some countries since those interests could be affected by the destructive effects of the Arab Spring. (Öniş, 2012: 50). This dilemma forced the AK Party elites to pursue contradictory policies. Although the Prime Minister Erdoğan publicly supported the Tunisian revolution, and called for the President of Egypt Mubarak to withdraw from his position, he was more prudent in Syrian and Libya cases (Başbakan Erdoğan Mübarek'e Seslendi, Habertürk, 01.02.2011). When civil demonstrations began in Libya in 2011, the AK Party elites approached to these incidents with high caution due to the Turkish public-private economic investments in this country. One reason for this behaviour was the rapid acts of Western countries, especially France's intervention to the former regime in Libya. When the Libyan civil war began, Erdoğan criticized the potential intervention of NATO. However, the coalition intervention led by France forced the AK Party elites to change their attitudes (NATO'nun Ne İş Var Libya'da? Sabah, 28.02.2011; Ünsal, 2013: 52). Despite the fact that the AK Party government initially opposed to a probable military intervention to Libya, developments forced government to alter its stance. Yet, Turkey remained a reluctant participant in the process (Öniş, 2012: 52).

The situation in Syria was different from others. Even though the Turkey-Syria relationship reached an unprecedented volume during the AK Party's rule, when the Arab Spring began, the relations rapidly deteriorated. During the 1990s, two countries were on the threshold of war because of Turkey's PKK problem. However, Turkey and Syria initiated a rapprochement policy in economic and



political areas in the 2000s. During the second period of the AK Party, the government increased its trade with Syria through abolishing visas, free trade agreements and improving mutual tourism capacity (Tür, 2011: 35-38; 2012: 613). For the political factors, the government supported the Syrian government against sanctions led by the USA, and Turkey played a mediator role in Syria-Israel relations. Although Turkish initiatives on Syria-Israel relations were disrupted, Syria assumed Turkey as a reliable partner in eliminating regional crisis (Tür, 2012: 613). Thus, the relations reached the peak until the Syrian civil war broke out. When the Arab Spring spread to Syria, and demonstrations started in Der'a, the AK Party leaders avoided intervening in the Syrian crisis for a while. Then, Prime Minister Erdoğan publicly urged the President of Syria Bashar al-Assad to implement legislative regulations, followed by Davutoğlu's official visit to Damascus to discuss and encourage the regime to carry out needed reforms in 2011 (Türkiye-Suriye İlişkileri: İnişler ve Çıkışlar, Al Jazeera Türk, 30.05.2017). However, these efforts failed, and peaceful demonstrations turned into a civil war throughout Syria. In this situation, the government anticipated that Assad would be forced to withdraw from his post, like other counterparts in the Middle East. In order to play a significant role in Syria's future, the Turkish government provided Syrian opposition groups with the opportunity to stay and organize in Turkey (Suriyeli Muhafifler İstanbul'da Toplandı, Habertürk, 23.08.2011).

At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the head of the main opposition People's Republican Party Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu accused the government of being a puppet of Western powers, and of acting as Western's spokesman in the Syrian and Libyan crises (Kılıçdaroğlu, Başbakan'a sordu: Askeri müdahale mi olacak? Milliyet, 10 Ağustos 2011). Nevertheless, the new anti-Assad politics continued, though the main opposition party and some other political groups harshly criticized the government (Miş, 2011: 279-280). However, domestic factors and increased national capacity enabled the government to become more autonomous in regional issues, and the AK Party eliminated other traditional actors. Presumably, the government considered the revolutionary movements as an opportunity to increase Turkey's influence in the Middle East, and also anticipated that Turkey would become a role model country for the new regimes (Davutoğlu: Arap Baharı Türk Baharıdır da, Haber 7, 19.05.2017). To do so, the government allowed the Syrian National Council, the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups to organize in Turkey (Ünsal, 2013: 158-159). Consequently, the government pursued an assertive policy to control the post-revolutionary regime in Syria by supporting the opposition groups.



## 6. CONCLUSION

This paper attempted to analyse the domestic factors of TFP toward the Middle East during the second tenure of the government, referring to the auxiliary hypotheses of neoclassical realism. In doing this, the international system is viewed as given, since there was no radical change within the international system in given period. The effect of changes in the national capacity of Turkey on ruling elites and the position of the government within the state are held as the primary variable for the explanation. The developments of TFP actions during the mentioned periods proves that Turkish ruling elites tried to increase Turkey's influence in the Middle East because of the increase in national power and in foreign policy autonomy.

The approach of the AK Party government towards the Middle East was similar in the first and second tenures. However, the government was in a weak position since the AK Party was a newly-founded party, and its organizational capacity within the state was not enough to ensure unity in state organs. The 2001 economic crises also impeded the government to pursue an active foreign policy in this term. So, the foreign policy autonomy of the government was low in the first term, and therefore was not able to canalize national power resources to foreign policy action. This impotency can clearly be seen during the 1 March Bill process. Despite an intense effort of both Erdoğan and Gül, majority of the public was against taking part in the military operation against Iraq with the USA, and therefore the parliament did not approve the bill. This does not mean that the government was not able to conduct its foreign policy actions but it does mean that the government was not able to execute foreign policies to which public opinion and other state organs were opposed.

As the Turkish economy improved and the AK Party government grew stronger within the state, the ruling elites saw the opportunity to be more effective and active in external affairs. In the second tenure, the influence of Turkey in the Middle East gradually improved, which was paralleled with national power and foreign policy autonomy. The Turkish government approached with Iranian government though heavy pressures by Western camp; harshly criticized Israel about the Palestinian issue; established close relations with KRG; and supported Syrian opposition against the Assad regime despite heavy criticism in Turkish domestic politics. All of these initiatives made by the government was about to exert more control around Turkish external milieu. The same situation was seen in Libya. Initially, the government stated that Turkey was opposed to a probable military operation. However, as the Western camp toughened its stance against the Kaddafi regime, Turkey changed the previous rhetoric, and participated in the military operation in Libya. This development was significant in showing the limits of Turkey in the region.



## REFERENCES

- Aknur, M. (2010) “TSK’nın Dış Politika Üzerindeki Etkisi”, Cüneyt Yenigün ve Ertan Efeğil (eds.) Türkiye’nin Değişen Dış Politikası, Ankara: Nobel Yayıncılık.
- Akşin, S. (2008) “Siyasal Tarih (1995-2003)”, Bülent Tanör, Korkut Boratav ve Sina Akşin (eds.) Türkiye Tarihi: Bugünkü Türkiye 1980-2003, İstanbul: Cem Yayın Evi.
- Altunışık, M. B. (2009) “Worldviews and Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East”. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 40, 169-192.
- Ataman, M. (2003) “Özalist Dış Politika”, *Bilgi: Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, (2): 47-62.
- Ayman, S. G. (2012) "Türkiye-İran İlişkilerinde Kimlik, Güvenlik, İşbirliği ve Rekabet", Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Nurcan Özgür Bakırcıoğlu ve Özlem Terzi (eds.) 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, İstanbul: Der Yayınları.
- Aytürk, İ. (2012) "Türkiye-İsrail İlişkileri", Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Nurcan Özgür Bakırcıoğlu ve Özlem Terzi (eds.) 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, İstanbul: Der Yayınları.
- Balcı, A. (2015) “Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar”, 4. Baskı, İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayıncılık.
- Bank, A. ve Karadağ, R. (2013) “The ‘Ankara Moment’: the politics of Turkey’s regional power in the Middle East, 2007-2011”, *The World Quarterly*, 34(2): 287-304.
- Bila, F. (2007) “Ankara’da Irak Savaşları: Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Gizli Belgelerle 1 Mart Tezkeresi”, İstanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık.
- Bölükbaşı, D. (2008) “1 Mart Vakası Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası”, İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.
- Buzan, B. (2008) “The Timeless wisdom of realism?”, Steve Smith, Ken Booth ve Marysia Zalevski (eds.) *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cem, İ. (2001) “Turkey in the New Century: Speeches and Texts Presented at International Fora (1995-2001)”, 2nd edition, Mersin: Rustem Publishing.
- Christensen, T. J. (1996) “Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, And Sino-American Conflict 1947–1958”, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.



Davutoğlu, A. (2001) “Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu”, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.

Davutoğlu, A. (2008) “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, *Insight Turkey*, 10(1): 77-96.

Davutoğlu, A. (2013) “Teoriden Pratiğe Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar”, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.

Elman, C. (2007) “Realism”, Martin Griffiths (ed.) *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Routledge Press.

Gözler, K. (2013) “Türk Anayasa Hukuku Dersleri, Bursa”: Ekin Kitapevi Yayınları.

Güder, S. ve Mercan, M. H. (2012) “2000 Sonrası Türk dış politikasının temel parametreleri ve Orta Doğu politikası” *İnsan ve Toplum*, 2(3): 57-92.

Hekimoğlu, M. M. (2009) “Anayasa Hukukunda Karşılaştırmalı Demokratik Sistemler ve Türkiye”, Ankara: Detay Yayıncılık.

Hudson, M. V. (2007), “Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory”, Maryland: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers.

International Crisis Group (2008) “Türkiye Ve Irak Kürtleri: Çatışma mı İşbirliği mi?”, *Ortadoğu Raporu*, 81: 13-16.

Jenkins, G. (2010) “Semboller ve Gölge Oyunu Ordu-AKP İlişkileri 2002-2004”, Hakan Yavuz (ed.) *AK Parti Toplumsal Değişimin Yeni Aktörleri*, çev., Bayram Sinkaya, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi.

Kaliber, A. (2013) “The Post-Cold War Regionalisms of Turkish Foreign Policy” *Journal of Regional Security*, 8(1): 25-48.

Lobell, S. L. (2009) “Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model”, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell ve Norrin M. Ripsman (eds.) *Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy*, The State, and Foreign Policy, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Miş, N. (2011) “Suriye.”, *Ortadoğu Yıllığı*.

Oğuzlu, T. (2010) “Türkiye-Brezilya-İran Antlaşması’nın Türk Dış Politikası Bağlamında Değerlendirilmesi”, *Ortadoğu Analiz* 2(18): 79-85.

Oğuzlu, T. (2011) “Arap Baharı ve Yansımaları”, *Ortadoğu Analiz*, 3(36): 8-16.



Öniş, Z. (2012) “Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest”, *Insight Turkey*, 14(3): 45-63.

Özbağcı, Ş. Y. (2012) “Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri”, Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Nurcan Özgür Bakırcıoğlu ve Özlem Terzi (eds.) 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, İstanbul: Der Yayınları.

Özcan, G. (2004) “Türkiye Dış Politikasında Algılamalar, Karar Alma ve Oluşum Süreci”, Faruk Sönmezoğlu (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, İstanbul: Der Yayınları.

Özdemir, E. (2010) “Turkey's Middle East Policy in the Post-Cold War Era”, *History Studies Ortadoğu Özel Sayısı / Middle East Special Issue*: 271-285.

Pirinççi, F. (2014) “Arap Baharını Yeniden Düşünmek”, *Ortadoğu Analiz*, 6(65): 6-8.

Reçber, K. (2011) “Diplomasi ve Konsolosluk Hukuku”, Bursa: Dora Yayıncılık.

Ripsman, N. M. (2002) “Peace-Making By Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on The Post–World War Settlements”, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Rose, G. (1998) “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, *World Politics*, 51(1): 144-172.

Sayari, S. (1997) “Turkey the Middle East in the 1990s”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 26(3): 44-55.

Schweller, R. L. (2004) “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing”, *International Security*, 29(2): 159-201.

Semin, A. (2011) “Türkiye’nin Irak Politikası Işığında Kuzey Irak Açılımı”, *Bilge Strateji*, 3(5): 179-205.

Taliaferro, J. W., Lobell, Steven. E. ve Ripsman, N. M. (2009) “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy”, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell ve Norrin M. Ripsman (eds.) *Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy, The State, and Foreign Policy*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tanör, B. (2004) “Türkiye’de Dış İlişkilerin İç Hukuk Rejimi”, Faruk Sönmezoğlu (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, İstanbul: Der Yayınları.

Tepe, S. (2010) “İslami Eğilimli Bir Parti Olarak Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin Değişim Vaatleri, Çelişkileri ve Sınırları”, Hakan Yavuz (ed.) *AK Parti Toplumsal Değişimin Yeni Aktörleri*, çev., Bayram Sinkaya, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi.

Tuncel, G. (2011) “Sivil Toplum ve Devlet”, Malatya: Bilsam Yayıncılık.



Tür, Ö. (2011) “2000’lerde Türkiye-Suriye İlişkilerinin Siyasi-Ekonomisi”, *Ortadoğu Analiz*, 3: 35-38.

Tür, Ö. (2012) "Türkiye'nin Irak ve Suriye İlişkileri", Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Nurcan Özgür Bakırcıoğlu ve Özlem Terzi (eds.) 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, İstanbul: Der Yayınları.

Uzgel, I. (2003) “Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 34: 177-211.

Uzgel, İ. (2006) “TDP’nin Uygulanması”, Baskın Oran (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Ünsal, Ü. (2013) “Dönemin Bilançosu”, Baskın Oran (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt III: 2001-2011*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Waltz, K. N. (1992) “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory”, Robert L. Rothstein (ed.) *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Pr.

Yeşilyurt, N. (2013) "Ortadoğu'yla İlişkiler", Baskın Oran (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt III: 2001-2011*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Yeşilyurt, N. ve Akdevelioğlu, A. (2013) “AKP Döneminde Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası” İlhan Uzgel, Bülent Duru (eds.) *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, 3. Baskı, Ankara: Phoenix Yayınları.

Yılmaz, S. (2015) “Neoklasik Realizm: İlerletici mi? Yozlaştırıcı mı? Lakatosyan Bir Değerlendirme”, *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, (46): 1-18.

Zakaria, F. (1998) “From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role”, Jersey: Princeton University Press.

## **NEWSPAPERS**

2015 hedeflerine şimdiden ulaştık, *Sabah*, 30.06.2010.

Akyol, T. “AKP’nin arkasında ne var?” *Milliyet*, 17.10.2002-20.10.2002.

Barzani’nin Babası da Hainmiş, *Hürriyet*, 22.10.2007.

Başbakan Erdoğan Mübarek’e Seslendi, *Habertürk*, 01.02.2011.

Beş çarpıcı açıklama, *Hürriyet*, 13.04.2015.

Birand, M. A. “Bizim Aşiret Reisleri Beyaz Sarayda” *Hürriyet*, 29.10.2008.



- Dışişleri Bakanı Davutoğlu: Arap Baharı Kaçınılmazdı, Cihan, 16.12.2011.
- Erdoğan ulusa sesleniş konuşması yaptı. Hürriyet. 28.09.2008.
- Erdoğan'dan 2009'un hesap dökümü, Sabah, 30.12.2009.
- Genelkurmay'dan çok sert açıklama. Hürriyet, 07.04.2007.
- Gül: Kürtler de Türkmenler de Bizim Akrabamız, Hürriyet, 13.01.2007
- Kılıçdaroğlu, Başbakan'a sordu: Askeri müdahale mi olacak?, Milliyet, 10 Ağustos 2011.
- NATO'nun Ne İşi Var Libya'da?, Sabah, 28.02.2011.
- Nefes kesen yarış, Yeni Şafak, 15.05.2000.
- Seçimin ilk turu iptal, Sabah, 01.05.2007.
- Suriyeli Muhafifler İstanbul'da Toplandı, Habertürk, 23.08.2011.
- Yönümüz demokrasi, Yeni Şafak, 16.06.2001.

#### **ELECTRONICAL SOURCES**

- BBC News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>, (27.05.2017).
- Al Jazeera Türk, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr>, (30.05.2017).
- Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, <http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr>, (20.05.2017).
- Haber7, <http://www.haber7.com/>, (19.05.2017).
- OECD, <http://www.oecd.org/>, (22.05.2017).
- AK Party Official Website <https://www.akparti.org.tr>, (30.05.2017).
- World Bank, <https://www.worldbank.org/>, (20.05.2017).