

ON DISCLOSEDNESS AS THE PRIMORDIAL PHENOMENON OF TRUTH IN HEIDEGGER

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to revive and evaluate a relatively recent epistemological debate focused on Heidegger's primordial truth, specifically delving into the 44th section of *Being and Time*. Unfolding in five parts, the first establishes Heidegger's conception of truth, paving the way for a nuanced exploration of the ensuing discourse. Part two outlines the foundations of Tugendhat's criticisms, providing a critical lens for scrutinizing Heidegger's framework. The third and fourth sections articulate substantial criticisms, centering on the legitimacy of defining disclosedness as the most primordial truth within Heidegger's framework. Tugendhat's contentions are met with Dahlstrom's defense, countering claims by presenting alternative interpretations and highlighting the inherent errancy in human disclosedness. The final and fifth section advocates for Tugendhat's perspective, comparing Heidegger's position with pragmatist philosophers. The conclusion suggests that Tugendhat's claims persist either disregarded or inadequately addressed, leaving the criticisms unanswered. Notably, a comprehensive resolution seems elusive without resorting to hermeneutic violence against Heidegger's texts.

Keywords: Heidegger, Truth, Disclosedness, Tugendhat, Dahlstrom, Dasein, Uncoveredness

HEIDEGGER'DE KÖKENSEL HAKİKAT FENOMENİ OLARAK AÇIKLIK ÜZERİNE

ÖZ

Bu makale, Heidegger'in kökensel hakikat kavramına odaklı görece yeni epistemolojik bir tartışmayı Varlık ve Zaman'ın özellikle 44. bölümüne derinlemesine inerek canlandırılmayı ve değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Beş bölümden oluşan makalenin ilk bölümü, Heidegger'in hakikat kavramını açıklamak ve ardından gelen tartışmanın nüanslı bir soruşturmasına zemin oluşturmaktadır. İkinci bölüm, Tugendhat'ın eleştirilerinin temellerini ayrıntılı bir şekilde açıklarken, Heidegger'in sunduğu çerçeveyi incelemek için eleştirel bir bakış sunmaktadır. Üçüncü ve dördüncü bölümler, açıklığı (Alm. *Erschlossenheit*) Heidegger'in çerçevesi içinde en esasi hakikat olarak tanımlamanın meşruiyetine odaklanmaktadır. Bu bölümlerde Tugendhat'ın eleştirileri ve akabinde Dahlstrom'un alternatif yorumlar sunarak ve insanın açıklıktaki içsel hataları vurgulayarak Tugendhat'a karşı Heidegger savunusunu konu edinmektedir. Beşinci ve son bölüm, Heidegger'in pozisyonunu pragmatist filozoflarla karşılaştırarak Tugendhat'ın yorumunu savunmaktadır. Sonuç, Tugendhat'ın eleştirilerinin ya göz ardı edildiğini ya da yetersiz bir şekilde ele alındığını öne sürerek, eleştirilerin cevapsız kaldığını ve Heidegger'in metinlerine hermenötik şiddet uygulamaksızın kapsamlı bir çözümün mümkün görünmediğini vurgulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Heidegger, Truth, Açıklık, Tugendhat, Dahlstrom, Dasein, Açığa çıkarma

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1. Introducing Heidegger's *Primordiality and Disclosedness*

One of the central tenets elucidated in Martin Heidegger's seminal work, *Being and Time* (hereafter abbreviated as BT), pertains to his critical stance against the conventional dichotomy between subject and object. Heidegger contends that philosophical discourse often commits a foundational error by approaching the subject-object relationship from a standpoint that privileges the characterization of objects as merely present-at-hand (Ger. *Vorhandenheit*), rather than in their ready-to-hand (Ger. *Zuhandenheit*) state. Accordingly, presence-at-hand, ontologically, simply means *existentia*,¹ while readiness-to-hand or handiness "*is the ontological categorial definition of beings as they are 'in themselves'.*"² Thus, beings are present-at-hand when they are simply objects with no use such as a broken cellphone, yet they are ready-to-hand when they are in use, e.g., a functioning technological device. This particular mode of interaction with the external world accentuates the delineation between object and subject, relegating the former to the status of *res extensa* and the latter to that of *res cogitans*. Consequently, this delineation engenders pseudo-problems, manifested in debates concerning the existence of the external world.

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Heidegger advocates for a recalibration of philosophical inquiry, urging scholars to recollect the overlooked question of Being, thereby transcending the facile demarcation between subject and object in the context of the ontic and ontological investigations. While the ontic investigations concern specific entities along with their descriptions mostly in connection with their presence-at-hand, the ontological investigations focus on disclosing an entity's manner of being what it is, mostly in relation to its readiness to hand. This retrieval necessitates a nuanced consideration of the intertwined nature of ontic and ontological investigations, challenging philosophers to revisit the intrinsic connection between entities and their ontological underpinnings. In essence, Heidegger impels scholars to reconceptualize their philosophical framework, steering away from a reductionist bifurcation that begets artificial quandaries, and instead, to reorient their focus towards a more comprehensive exploration of the profound ontological dimensions that underlie the fabric of existence.

¹ Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell, 2001, 42. (All quotes from BT appeal to German paginations to enable textual verification for the readers with different translations.)

² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 71. (Italics in the original).

Heidegger's demand for the reorientation of the focal point to the exploration of the profound ontological dimensions underlying existence is an objection against the correspondence theory of truth. As is known, roughly defining, the correspondence theory of truth takes truth as a relational property where truth of a proposition or a statement consists in its relation to reality. Yet, the relational aspect of truth in the correspondence truth theory evokes many epistemological concerns as well. As can be predicted, although it sounds like an ontological one, Heidegger's objection against the correspondence truth theory has many epistemological implications as well. Irwin indicates that

Heidegger does not accept correspondence, coherence, or pragmatics as the ultimate ground of truth. He, in fact, focuses his criticism on the correspondence theory, calling it the traditional account, finding its definition of truth, as *adaequatio intellectus et rei* (agreement of mind and things), to be unsatisfactory.³

Heidegger, in his exploration of the essence of truth, places particular emphasis on the Greek term *aletheia* (Gr. ἀλήθεια), commonly translated as 'disclosure'. He contends that the crux of truth's essence eludes comprehension within the confines of the traditional correspondence theory, which earlier philosophers endeavored to elucidate without success. Instead, Heidegger proposes that a nuanced understanding emerges when truth is construed as the revelation or disclosure of Being:

What in general does one have in view when one uses the term 'agreement'? The agreement of something with something has the formal character of a relation of something to something. Every agreement, and therefore 'truth' as well, is a relation. But not every relation is an agreement. A sign points at what is indicated. Such indicating is a relation, but not an agreement of the sign with what is indicated.⁴

Heidegger diverges from a preoccupation with propositional truth, as his objection does not entail a complete dismissal of the philosophical tradition. Instead, his conception of truth offers a "primordially appropriated" ⁵

³ Wiliam Irwin, "A Critique of Hermeneutic Truth as Disclosure," *International Studies in Philosophy* 33, no 4, (2001): 64.

⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 215.

⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 281.

perspective within the tradition. The term 'primordiality' (Ger. *Ursprünglichkeit*) encapsulates the original, foundational, and fundamental aspects of the entities under consideration, as expounded in BT.⁶ From Heidegger's standpoint, the spectrum of relations extends beyond the scope of agreements between designators and designata. While agreements inherently encompass relations, Heidegger asserts that the set of relations cannot be simplified to mere agreements. Consequently, he posits that "assertion is grounded in Dasein's uncovering, or rather in its disclosedness".⁷ In the discourse on the primordiality of truth, propositional truth is contingent upon Dasein's relations, transcending a mere alignment between a proposition and an object. As aptly articulated by Skirke, "propositional truth (or correspondence with reality) is a derivative type of truth that depends upon the more basic phenomenon of Dasein's disclosedness".⁸

Heidegger's conceptualization of truth is rooted in the Husserlian framework, and if we invoke the notion of appropriation, he appropriates Husserl's conception while discarding the concept of intentionality.⁹ The decision to jettison intentionality arises from its intellectualist connotations, which, Heidegger contends, consistently reverts to the dualism it seeks to avoid. As McGuirk articulates, Heidegger not only relinquishes intentionality but also "drops the notion of intentionality which, because of its intellectualist connotations, persistently falls back into precisely the dualism it seeks to avoid. Secondly, he abandons the truth condition that entities be uncovered *as they are in themselves*".¹⁰ This divergence requires clarification, particularly concerning Heidegger's assertion that "To say that an assertion 'is true' signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself".¹¹ In the correspondence theory of truth, an assertion is deemed true within a so-as relation, portraying things as they objectively are. Yet, Heidegger challenges this perspective by maintaining that assertions cannot adequately represent things. He posits, "The *Being-true (truth)* of the assertion must be understood as *Being-uncovering*. Thus, truth has by no

⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 7, 180.

⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 226.

⁸ Christian Skirke, "Tugendhat's Idea of Truth," *European Journal of Philosophy* 24, no 4 (2016): 832.

⁹ See Henry Pietersma, "Husserl and Heidegger," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 40, no 2 (1979): 194-211.

¹⁰ James N. McGuirk, "Aletheia and Heidegger's Transitional Readings of Plato's Cave Allegory," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 39, no 2 (2008): 169.

¹¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 218.

means the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the subject) to another (the Object)".¹²

Disclosedness emerges as a pivotal principle in Heidegger's understanding of truth, denoting a distinctive form of phenomenological truth encapsulated by the phrase "the disclosedness of being".¹³ Given the foundational significance of disclosedness, several interconnected concepts within Heidegger's framework come into focus. A nuanced exploration of these related concepts reveals a rich tapestry of meaning. To delve deeper into the intricacies of concepts interwoven with disclosedness, it is essential to recognize that when Dasein engages in disclosure, the *phenomenon* undergoes a transformation into that which manifests itself in a *reflexive* disclosure known as *apophansis*. This secondary human disclosing is characterized by a *letting-show-self*, unveiling layers of meaning. The potentiality for disclosure finds expression in the concept of *Erschlossenheit*, where the inherent capacity to reveal is inherent. The expanses where the act of discovery unfolds are described as *open*, forming a region receptive to the *discovery* of phenomenological insights.¹⁴

Heidegger posits, "With and through it is uncoveredness; hence only with Dasein's *disclosedness* is the *most primordial* phenomenon of truth attained".¹⁵ This assertion is complemented by another fundamental principle he accepts: "Dasein is in the truth".¹⁶ An examination of the intricate relationship between Dasein and truth reveals itself through four key points. Firstly, disclosedness in its general essence is an inherent attribute of Dasein. Secondly, thrownness characterizes Dasein's state of Being, constituting a foundational element for its disclosedness. This disclosedness is inherently factual, operating within a realm of meanings and relations.¹⁷ Thirdly, projection, denoting disclosive Being towards its potentiality-for-Being, is an integral aspect of Dasein's state of Being. Moreover, the most primordial and authentic disclosedness that Dasein can embody is identified as the truth of existence. The fourth point underscores that "Falling belongs to the state of Dasein's state of

¹² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 218.

¹³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 38.

¹⁴ See Graeme Nicholson, "Disclosure in Heidegger," *International Studies in Philosophy*, no 6 (1974): 140-141.

¹⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 220-221.

¹⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 221.

¹⁷ See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 181.

Being”,¹⁸ adding another dimension to the intricate interplay between Dasein and truth within Heidegger’s philosophical framework.

2. The Underpinnings of Tugendhat’s Criticisms

Navigating beyond the initial specifications on disclosedness and the Being of Dasein, the focus returns to the pivotal question of whether Heidegger can validly substantiate his contention that *disclosedness* stands as *the most primordial phenomenon of truth*.¹⁹ Ernst Tugendhat raises a critical voice against Heidegger, contending that labeling disclosedness as the most primordial truth phenomenon lacks adequate justification. In contrast, Dahlstrom staunchly supports Heidegger’s stance and challenges Tugendhat’s objections by presenting alternative interpretations and passages. Dahlstrom endeavors to showcase that the inherent errancy in human disclosedness is an integral aspect of Heidegger’s argument. For instance, Heidegger elucidates, “In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that ‘Dasein is in the truth’ states equiprimordially, that ‘Dasein is in untruth’”.²⁰ He further illustrates this dual nature through the example of Parmenides: “The goddess of Truth who guides Parmenides, puts two pathways before him, one of uncovering, one of hiding; but this signifies nothing else than that Dasein is already both in the truth and in untruth”.²¹ Before delving into Dahlstrom’s defense, it is pertinent to explore Tugendhat’s criticisms and his identification of terminological contradictions within Heidegger’s framework.

Heidegger’s ultimate conceptualization of truth diverges from the conventional paradigm of correct propositions verified through the correspondence theory. Instead, truth, in its pinnacle form, manifests as disclosedness—a departure stemming from Heidegger’s objection to the subject-object distinction. Here, disclosedness assumes the role of the most primordial

¹⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 221.

¹⁹ The debate has been an issue among several scholars and it is still a hot topic of the recent literature. For brevity, the present study focuses on the arguments of Tugendhat and Dahlstrom. Yet, for further studies with different aspects of the debate, see Itohowo Ignatius, “Heidegger’s notion of truth as *Aletheia*: a critical exposition,” *International Journal of Humanities and Innovation* 5, no 2 (2022): 74-79; Søren Overgaard, “Heidegger’s Concept of Truth Revisited,” *SATS* 3, no 2 (2002):73-90; Mustafa Polat, “Dasein and Truth in Heidegger’s Being and Time,” *Temaşa*, no 12 (2020): 92-105.

²⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 222.

²¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 222.

phenomenon of truth. This unique disclosure, intertwined with Dasein's four elements, is not positioned in opposition to falsity. Instead, it is juxtaposed against concealedness or hiddenness, both in the hermeneutical-phenomenological and propositional dimensions. As previously noted, disclosedness is an intrinsic attribute of Dasein, characterized by its four constituent elements. Notably, Heidegger refrains from framing this phenomenon in stark contrast to falsity, opting instead for a nuanced interplay with concealedness or hiddenness. There exists a conceptual containment within both coveredness and uncovering. The intricacy lies in the realization that once something is already uncovered, the prospect of further uncovering diminishes, making room only for uncoveredness. This nuanced understanding underscores Heidegger's assertion that only a concealed entity can truly be *un*-covered.²²

In reference to the sections (a) and (b) of the 44th topic in BT, namely *Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth*, Tugendhat discerns Heidegger's trajectory. He notes that, following an analysis of propositional truth, Heidegger posits that propositional truth is fundamentally an act of *uncovering*. Building on this assertion in section (b), Heidegger extends the concept of truth to encompass all that can be uncovered or unconcealed through any disclosure of Dasein. This expanded understanding becomes *the most original phenomenon of truth*. Tugendhat, in probing how Heidegger justifies the elevation of truth to the status of the fundamental philosophical concept, identifies a crucial step in section (a). Here, Heidegger asserts that the truth of an assertion resides in its disclosiveness, a process akin to projecting different possibilities, resembling a game with multiple strategically equal moves. This notion, where all possibilities are epistemologically equal, prompts Tugendhat to draw parallels with the principle of explosion in logic. Analogous to the logical principle suggesting that proving a contradiction in a system allows deducing the logical truth of any possible proposition, Tugendhat contends that a thorough analysis of Heidegger's proposition on propositional truth yields deductive implications for almost all aspects of his philosophy.²³

In his analysis of section (b), Tugendhat contends that Heidegger initially aligns with the Husserlian conception of truth, but then undertakes an

²² See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 219.

²³ See Ernst Tugendhat, "Heidegger's Idea of Truth," in *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Language*, Vol III, ed. by Christopher Macann, London: Routledge, 1992, 80-81.

unjustified elimination, resulting in a self-enfeebling transformation of Heidegger's conception of truth. Tugendhat delineates this transformation through three sequential steps: Firstly, Tugendhat quotes Heidegger, stating, "The assertion is true when it so indicates or discloses the state of affairs as it is in itself".²⁴ Secondly, Tugendhat observes Heidegger's elimination of 'so-as' from the initial statement, yielding the modified proposition: "The assertion is true means: it discloses the state of affairs in itself".²⁵ Thirdly, Tugendhat notes the further elimination of 'in itself', resulting in the final assertion: "The assertion is true means: it uncovers the state of affairs".²⁶ According to Tugendhat, this sequence leads Heidegger to the conclusion that "The truthfulness (truth) of an assertion must be understood as its disclosedness".²⁷ In essence, Tugendhat argues that Heidegger equates asserting with picking up, discovering, or to-be-uncovering.²⁸ This perceived elimination, according to Tugendhat, weakens Heidegger's conception of truth, rendering it internally inconsistent.

Under the condition that we interpret assertions as either pointing out or uncovering, as per Tugendhat's analysis, a distinct dichotomy emerges: True assertions unveil things, while false assertions conceal them. Consequently, the sufficient conditions for truth in an assertion boil down to its function as an uncovering. However, Tugendhat introduces a crucial nuance. If the act of pointing out is considered the primary function, both true and false assertions partake in this act. In other words, if pointing out is the criterion, it fails to serve as a reliable discriminator between truth and falsity. Tugendhat emphasizes that for the distinction between true and false assertions to be meaningful, the concept of 'uncovering' requires specification. Without such clarity, the term risks becoming ambiguous, making it challenging to differentiate between uncovering and covering. Thus, the ability to discern true statements from false ones hinges on the unambiguous specification of the meaning of 'uncovering'.²⁹

²⁴ Tugendhat, "Heidegger's Idea of Truth", 82.

²⁵ Tugendhat, "Heidegger's Idea of Truth", 82.

²⁶ Tugendhat, "Heidegger's Idea of Truth", 83.

²⁷ Tugendhat, "Heidegger's Idea of Truth", 83.

²⁸ See Tugendhat, "Heidegger's Idea of Truth", 83.

²⁹ See Tugendhat, "Heidegger's Idea of Truth", 84

3. Tugendhat's First Criticism and Dahlstrom's Reply

Tugendhat levies two criticisms against Heidegger based on the considerations discussed. The first critique centers on Heidegger's reasoning that "If the truth of the assertion according to section (a) lies in uncovering, then it follows (or so he reasons), that in fact all letting be encountered of inner worldly beings is 'true'".³⁰ Tugendhat underscores how Heidegger's argumentation blurs the distinction between the narrow and broad senses mentioned earlier. He points out, "One sees that the thesis at which Heidegger had arrived in section (a), a thesis with regard to truth as uncovering which is only insightful in so far as one takes the term in the narrow sense, has actually been understood in the broad sense".³¹ According to Tugendhat, the central question ceases to be about the possibility of distinguishing between *true* and *false* assertions in the realm of circumspective concern. Instead, concern is broadly characterized as a mode of truth, with the focus shifting beyond the original narrow sense. Tugendhat argues that to address these issues adequately, Heidegger should have extended disclosure beyond intentionality and objective representation. Instead, in Tugendhat's view, Heidegger not only leaves the discovered truths in connection with the truth of assertion in obscurity but also neglects the potential for broadening the truth-relation in the context of disclosure. In essence, Tugendhat asserts that rather than expanding the specific concept of truth, Heidegger resorts to assigning the word 'truth' a different meaning. According to Tugendhat, the broadening of the concept's meaning, encompassing all modes of disclosing, becomes trivial if one simply regards the truth of assertion as inherently disclosive in general.

In his response to Tugendhat, Dahlstrom clarifies Heidegger's perspective in his *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*. He contends that Heidegger is advocating for the disclosedness of being, a conception that inherently excludes any falsity. Dahlstrom acknowledges the challenge of presenting a well-circumscribed account of this primordial truth within Heidegger's framework but asserts that Heidegger's entire analysis aims at interpreting disclosedness as it is in itself.³² Dahlstrom characterizes Heidegger's interpretation as taking the form of a transcendental argument or a scientific discourse, contending that it

³⁰ Tugendhat, "Heidegger's Idea of Truth", 88.

³¹ Tugendhat, "Heidegger's Idea of Truth", 88.

³² See Daniel O. Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Conception of Truth*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 405-406.

“takes the form of a transcendental argument or a scientific discourse, the original truth is construed in assertions for which there are contraries”.³³ According to Dahlstrom, this original truth is manifested in assertions that lack contraries. Despite this transcendental approach, Dahlstrom acknowledges that “propositional truth or, more precisely, the bivalency criterion of meaningful talk about truth, on which Tugendhat rightly insists, remains in force”.³⁴ While accepting Tugendhat’s insistence on propositional truth, Dahlstrom maintains that Heidegger’s conceptualization of truth allows for interpreting disclosedness as the most primordial truth, arguing that Heidegger’s framework permits an interpretation of this idea of truth that is not only applicable to propositions but also encompasses a broader understanding of truth rooted in the disclosedness of being.

4. Tugendhat’s Second Criticism and Dahlstrom’s Reply

Tugendhat’s second criticism centers on Heidegger’s conceptualization of truth as an event, “That he calls disclosure in and of itself truth leads to the result that it is precisely not related to the truth but is protected from the question of truth”.³⁵ In other words, Tugendhat contends that by terming disclosure in and of itself as truth, Heidegger severs its connection to truth and shields it from being questioned. Tugendhat poses a challenging inquiry to Heidegger: “In what manner can one inquire into the truth of this horizon, or is it not rather the case that the question of truth can no longer be applied to the horizon itself?”³⁶ whereby he questions how one can investigate the truth of a horizon as the question of truth may become inapplicable to the horizon itself. Tugendhat’s line of reasoning suggests a fundamental problem: while discussing truth in the context of understanding and its horizons is feasible, the act of questioning the truth of the horizon itself seems to lose its significance. Tugendhat implies that such an inquiry would become circular, effectively investigating the truth of a truth, thus presenting a challenge to Heidegger’s characterization of truth as an event detached from conventional truth considerations.

³³ Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Conception of Truth*, 423.

³⁴ Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Conception of Truth*, 423.

³⁵ Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth”, 91.

³⁶ Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth”, 89.

Dahlstrom, in response to Tugendhat's concerns, posits that propositional truth relies on the presupposition that entities can indeed be uncovered or hidden within the horizon to which our attention is directed. He argues that 'the something further' Tugendhat perceives as missing in Heidegger's inference, particularly when equating disclosedness as the most original truth, can be elucidated through an examination of Heidegger's conception of *sense*. Dahlstrom contends that, unlike talking, sense does not presuppose language, contrary to language which does presuppose sense and talking. Existential sense, in Heidegger's framework, is what being-here originally projects itself upon or toward. It serves as the horizon for understanding, enabling, and co-constituting understanding without actively coming into consideration in the process.³⁷ In this way, Dahlstrom suggests that the missing element that Tugendhat perceives can be addressed by delving into Heidegger's conception of sense, providing a nuanced understanding of how entities are disclosed within a horizon, and how sense plays a foundational role in this process.

In his analysis of sense in BT, Dahlstrom distinguishes three uses of sense. The first is an original, existential-hermeneutic sense, the second is a derivative, existentiell-hermeneutic sense, and the last is a derivative, apophantic sense. The first sense pertains to the sense of being-here, constituting the horizon against which being-here projects itself. This sense remains inherent for as long as existence persists. The second sense refers to the function of something utilized, and the third pertains to the significance of a word or assertion when mentioned,³⁸ not in use—for instance, 'Aristotle' as the name of Aristotle. Each sense functions as a horizon, but it is the disclosedness in the second sense that facilitates the possibility for entities to be uncovered or concealed, thereby allowing propositions to be either true or false. Disclosedness, in this context, enables perceptual and propositional truths as well as illusions by co-constituting the process of uncovering or concealing. The *as* structure of uncovering, both in general and concerning the uncovering of an assertion, occurs in view of the unity of this timely horizon. Addressing the crucial question of why Heidegger labels disclosedness as the most original truth, Dahlstrom posits that "Heidegger labels this truth 'most original' because it is the horizon of every other 'truth', that is, because it is necessarily—albeit

³⁷ See Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Conception of Truth*, 399-400.

³⁸ See Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Conception of Truth*, 400-401.

unthematically—presupposed by (posited with) every other truth”.³⁹ Thus, according to Dahlstrom, Heidegger designates it as such because it serves as the horizon for every other truth. It is necessarily presupposed, albeit unthematically, by every other truth. Dahlstrom sheds light on the *so-as* aspect of the discussion by emphasizing that disclosedness “reveals itself as it is ‘in itself’—and is therefore true—and because ‘this self-disclosing co-constitutes the process whereby entities are uncovered or concealed’—it is therefore original”.⁴⁰

5. Is Disclosedness the most Original Truth?

To illustrate, the debates whether Nietzsche reifies the *will* to power are actually the debates between those who look for a ground on that is reified on which Nietzsche’s criticisms can be directed to him and those who argue the absence of such a ground. Although many philosophers among the American pragmatists followed a destructive path against the philosophy, Heidegger did not pioneer them in this manner. As a systematic philosopher, upon directing his criticisms against the correspondence theory of truth, he proposed an idea of truth. However, the problems that Tugendhat pointed out were inevitable, since Heidegger both rejected any primordality that can exist without Dasein, and also verification of *veritas* apart from *veritas*, he still defined *aletheia* as the most original phenomenon of truth.

Heidegger’s propensity for falling into contradictions appears to distinguish him from several other philosophers who similarly reject the correspondence theory of truth. In particular, American pragmatists like Sellars, Dewey, and notably Rorty, vehement critics of the correspondence theory, do not establish a foundational standpoint for their critiques, in a way that it can be targeted as the targets of their criticisms. Unlike Heidegger, who engages in systematic philosophy and proposes an alternative conception of truth, these pragmatists do not provide a substantial ground upon which their objections to the correspondence theory can rest. It is this particular dimension of Heidegger’s conception of truth that, in a circular manner, renders the notion of truth susceptible to criticisms akin to those directed at the correspondence truth theory. Notably, Dahlstrom’s responses to Tugendhat’s critiques fail to provide a

³⁹ Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Conception of Truth*, 402.

⁴⁰ Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Conception of Truth*, 402.

definitive resolution, highlighting the persistent challenges embedded in Heidegger's framework. It becomes apparent that resolving these issues may require adopting a pragmatist interpretation of Heidegger rather than adhering strictly to a systematic philosophical approach. However, such a solution risks tailoring Heidegger's ideas to achieve resolution, potentially introducing a perspective not genuinely inherent in his philosophical system. Let me elucidate the reasons behind the problematic nature of Heidegger's systematic position when juxtaposed with a particular theme in Nietzsche. The debates surrounding whether Nietzsche reifies *the will* to power essentially revolve around two camps: those seeking a reified ground upon which Nietzsche's criticisms can be addressed, and those arguing for the absence of such a foundational ground. Despite the destructive paths taken by many American pragmatist philosophers against traditional philosophy, Heidegger deviates by not pioneering such a deconstructive approach.

As a systematic philosopher, when critiquing the correspondence theory of truth, Heidegger not only presents criticisms but also puts forth his own conception of truth. However, as pointed out by Tugendhat, Heidegger's inevitable challenges arise from his simultaneous rejection of any primordially existing without Dasein and the verification of *veritas* apart from *veritas*. Despite these complexities, Heidegger still defines *aletheia* as the most original phenomenon of truth. As highlighted by Heidegger himself in *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*, he acknowledges his error in rigidly equating truth solely with *aletheia*.

Why is *aletheia* not translated with the usual name, with the word "truth"? The answer must be: Insofar as truth is understood in the traditional "natural" sense as the correspondence of knowledge with beings, demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as the certainty of the knowledge of Being, *aletheia*, unconcealment in the sense of the opening, may not be equated with truth. Rather, *aletheia*, unconcealment thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth. For truth itself, just as Being and thinking, can be what it is only in the element of the opening. Evidence, certainty in every degree, every kind of verification of *veritas* already move *with* that *veritas* in the realm of the prevalent opening. *Aletheia*, unconcealment thought as the opening of presence, is *not yet truth*. In any case, one thing becomes clear: to

raise the question of *aletheia*, of unconcealment as such, is not the same as raising the question of truth. For this reason, *it* was inadequate and misleading to call *aletheia* in the sense opening, truth.⁴¹

Wrathall interprets the passage in question as Heidegger's mistake lying in his failure "to make clear that 'truth' had been used to refer to these quite distinct things: (1) propositional truth—truth 'understood in the traditional 'natural' sense as the correspondence of knowledge with beings', and (2) unconcealment, or a 'making manifest of . . . '".⁴² Consequently, despite Heidegger's objection to the object-subject distinction, he inadvertently introduces an epistemological division that muddles the truth of entities with the truth of Being. Dahlstrom's arguments, as acknowledged by Heidegger himself and argued on textual ground, fail to fully address these fundamental controversies. Dahlstrom's interpretations do not altogether dispel Tugendhat's arguments, leaving them standing without a conclusive rebuttal. While there is a prevailing tendency in secondary literature to dismiss Tugendhat's criticisms, the responses offered are weaker than the controversial interpretations Tugendhat infers.

Pointing out the weaknesses of Dahlstrom's defense, Smith maintains that "This is clearly insufficient as an interpretation of Heidegger, however, for Heidegger's aim is precisely to go beyond propositional truth, not to couple disclosedness as primordial truth with correctness once again".⁴³ Irwin narrates another instance of Heidegger retracing his steps as follows:

The natural concept of truth does not mean unconcealment, not in the philosophy of the Greeks either. It is often and justifiably pointed out that the word *alethes* is already used by Homer only in the *verba dicendi*, in statement and thus in the sense of correctness and reliability, not in the sense of unconcealment. ... In the scope of this question, we must acknowledge the fact that *aletheia*, unconcealment in the sense of the opening of presence, was

⁴¹ Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*, in "Heidegger: Basic Writings", ed. David Farrell Krell, San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993, 446.

⁴² Mark A. Wrathall, "Heidegger and Truth as Correspondence," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 7, no 1 (1999): 71.

⁴³ William H. Smith, "Why Tugendhat's Critique of Heidegger's Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem," *Inquiry*, 50, no 2 (2007): 170.

originally experienced only as *orthotes*, as the correctness of representations and statements. But then the assertion about the essential transformation of truth, that is, from unconcealment to correctness, is also untenable.⁴⁴

Tugendhat, on the other hand, when he yields his two criticisms, he neither judges Heidegger from an outer perspective nor overinterprets him. His arguments, as well as the exposition of the adoption and, if we may use, appropriation of Husserlian conception of truth into *BT*, are both explicit and reasonable, in addition to being still unanswered with a reply that eliminates the problems completely.

Contrastingly, Tugendhat, in presenting his two criticisms, abstains from passing judgment on Heidegger from an external perspective or engaging in excessive interpretation. His arguments, along with the elucidation of the incorporation and, if we may employ the term, appropriation of Husserlian conception of truth into *BT*, remain explicit and rational. Importantly, these criticisms persist without receiving a response that effectively resolves the underlying issues.

Conclusion

Heidegger's error resides in the formulation of his truth concept, wherein correctness and truth become entangled, paving the way for robust criticisms, notably by Tugendhat. This entanglement compelled Heidegger to reevaluate and correct himself in subsequent works. While the debate on this matter persists among Heidegger scholars, it is evident that Tugendhat's critiques have endured without definitive resolution. When one considers Heidegger's broader body of work, it is not unreasonable to posit that, across various texts, Heidegger himself seems to align with Tugendhat's insights. The unresolved tension surrounding this issue underscores its significance within the discourse on Heidegger's philosophy.

⁴⁴ Wiliam Irwin, "A Critique of Hermeneutic Truth as Disclosure," 69-70.

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