

NATO's Securitisation of Climate Change in the Arctic

NATO'nun Arktik'te İklim Değişikliğini Güvenlikleştirme

Sevgi BALKAN ŞAHİN*
Özge ÇETİNER**

*Assoc. Prof., Çağ University,
Department of International
Relations, Mersin, Türkiye,
ORCID: 0000-0001-7227-4359,
email: sbalkan@cag.edu.tr

** Res. Asst., Çağ University,
Department of International
Relations, Mersin, Türkiye,
ORCID: 0000-0002-4243-2624,
email: ozgecetiner@cag.edu.tr

Geliş Tarihi / Submitted:
02.02.2024

Kabul Tarihi / Accepted:
01.04.2024

Abstract

This study analyses how and why the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) securitises climate change in the Arctic. The study recognises that climate change has not only endangered the environmental security of the Arctic but has also intensified geopolitical competition over the region's resources and trade routes as a threat multiplier. Regarding the impact of the changing structure of the region from the "cooperation front" to the "competition area", the study reveals that NATO considers climate change as a part of the collective defence dimension of its organizational identity, along with increasing geopolitical competition, to develop an integrated approach in its Arctic policy. Drawing on the Copenhagen School and social constructivism, the study presents that NATO resorts to securitisation discourses that concretise the threat to address climate change within the scope of its organizational identity.

Keywords: NATO, Climate Change, Social Constructivism, Copenhagen School, Organizational Identity

Öz

Bu çalışma, Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü'nün (NATO) Arktik'teki iklim değişikliğini nasıl ve neden güvenlikleştirdiğini analiz etmektedir. Çalışma, iklim değişikliğinin yalnızca Arktik'in çevresel güvenliğini tehlikeye atmakla kalmayıp, aynı zamanda bir tehdit çarpanı olarak bölgenin kaynakları ve ticaret yolları üzerindeki jeopolitik rekabeti de yoğunlaştırdığını ortaya koymaktadır. Bölgenin "iş birliği cephesinden" "rekabet alanına" doğru değişen yapısının etkisine dikkat çeken çalışma, NATO'nun artan jeopolitik rekabetle birlikte Arktik politikasında bütünsel bir yaklaşım geliştirmek için iklim değişikliğini örgütsel kimliğinin kolektif savunma boyutunun bir parçası olarak gördüğünü ele almaktadır. Kopenhag Okulu ve sosyal inşacılıktan yola çıkan çalışma, NATO'nun iklim değişikliğini örgütsel kimliği kapsamında ele almak için tehdidi somutlaştıran güvenlikleştirme söylemlerine başvurduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: NATO, İklim Değişikliği, Sosyal İnşacılık, Kopenhag Okulu, Örgütsel Kimlik

Introduction

Since the 1990s, the norms constituting global environmental governance have been revealed within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) framework, the Kyoto Protocol (1997), and the Paris Climate Agreement. In the 21st century, many countries have failed to take action under these global norms. The scope and intensity of climate change risks like severe weather situations, floods, and deforestation are thus predicted to increase exponentially in the upcoming years.¹ Climate change has adversely affected the Arctic region more rapidly and to a greater extent.² Causing the Arctic to warm faster than the global average as a whole, climate change may bring about difficult-to-manage threats such as socio-economic inequality, geopolitical competition, and conflicts. Due to rapid warming, permafrost, ice sheets, glaciers, and sea ice are melting, and the snow season has shortened. These changes have led to severe implications, including an increase in extreme weather situations, the endangerment of certain species, the rise of new health problems, and food insecurity in the Arctic.

Despite its detrimental effects, climate change has also created opportunities for financial gain. The melting Arctic ice has created new transportation routes previously inaccessible due to the frozen seas. It has also provided opportunities to access Arctic reserves like oil and gas. The expanding number of maritime routes and the presence of about 90 billion barrels of oil and 48 trillion cubic feet of natural gas³ have attracted the attention of great powers and the area's coastal states. Competition over trade routes and resources has intensified among the coastal states, Denmark, the United States (the U.S.), Norway, Russia, and Canada,⁴ as well as the European Union (EU) and non-Arctic states, particularly China. Another actor that has joined this geopolitical competition in the Arctic is NATO. This study examines how NATO acting upon its collective defence identity securitises climate change issues in the Arctic. Although securitisation of climate change can lead to growing anxieties and ontological insecurity due to disruptions in routines and rising uncertainties, this study shows that NATO uses securitisation to strengthen its collective defence.

The Arctic has been extensively examined in the literature on geopolitics,⁵ territorial disputes,⁶ and international law.⁷ The existing literature on climate change in the Arctic has assessed the potential impacts of changing climate for the future of Arctic security.⁸ Moreover,

1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "Climate Change 2023 Synthesis Report", 2023, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf, accessed 10.11.2023.

2 Rob Huebert, Heather Exner-Pirot, Adam Lajeunesse and Gullidge Jay, "Climate Change and International Security: the Arctic as a Bellwether", *Center for Climate and Energy Solutions*, May 2012, <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/arctic-security-report.pdf>, accessed 24.10. 2023.

3 Hooman Peimani, "Melting of the Arctic Sea Ice", *Asia-Pacific Energy Research Centre*, November 2015, https://www.apec.org/docs/default-source/Publications/2015/12/Melting-of-the-Arctic-Sea-Ice---Significance-for-the-APEC-Economies-Energy-Security/Melting_of_the_Arctic_Sea_Ice_-_Significance_for_the_APEC_Economies_Energy_Security.pdf, accessed 20.10. 2023.

4 Kathrin Keil, "The Arctic: A New Region of Conflict? The Case of Oil and Gas", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 2014, 49:2, p. 164.

5 Veera Pauliina Suvanto, *Geopolitics of the Arctic: Challenges and Prospects*, MA Thesis, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, 2016.

6 Valery Konyshchev and Alexander Sergunin, "Russia's Policies on the Territorial Disputes in the Arctic", *Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy*, 2:1, 2014, pp. 55-83.

7 Lisa Mardikian and Sofia Galani, "Protecting the Arctic Indigenous Peoples' Livelihoods in the Face of Climate Change: The Potential of Regional Human Rights Law and the Law of the Sea", *Human Rights Law Review*, 23:3, 2023, pp. 1-24.

8 Dick Zandee, Kimberley Kruijver and Adája Stoetman, "The Future of Arctic Security", *Clingendael Report*, April 2020, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/Report_The_future_of_Arctic_security_April2020.pdf, accessed 20.10. 2023.

recent research has made a substantial contribution to evaluating the roles of different actors. Padrtová has demonstrated which actors in the U.S. securitise climate change, including in the Arctic region.⁹ Lamazhapov has evaluated Russia's securitisation of environmental issues by adding concerns for the Arctic region.¹⁰ Furthermore, Akikie has discussed the role of NATO, highlighting the issues of resurgent Russia and climate change, two problems essential in shaping the Arctic security environment.¹¹

By making use of the conceptual tools of social constructivism and the securitisation theory in the Copenhagen School, this study provides a contribution to the emerging literature on the increasing presence of NATO in the Arctic by examining how NATO has securitised climate change to justify the measures it has taken within the framework of its collective defence identity. The Copenhagen School offers a valuable framework for understanding the discourses used by NATO as a securitising actor to concretise climate change in the competitive region. Overall, the study examines the effect of climate change in the Arctic, which also shapes NATO's behaviour and discursive strategies to concretise the threats of climate change within this context. To investigate NATO's securitisation of climate change, this study has analysed a range of sources, including NATO's strategic concepts, official documents on climate change and the Arctic, statements, Secretariat General reports, and secondary sources on the subject.

This study has three parts. First, the primary premises of the Copenhagen School are presented. The second part explains the security environment of the Arctic, focusing on the impending effects of the changing climate to grasp the political context of the securitisation discourses. The third part explains NATO's discursive strategies to concretise climate change.

1. The Copenhagen School

Arguing that traditional approaches are insufficient to comprehend the security challenges that have emerged after the Cold War, including civil unrest, illegal immigration, environmental pollution, terrorism, and the spread of diseases, the Copenhagen School emerged in the 1980s and differentiated itself from the traditional security studies by defining security in a broader context. Assuming security is socially constructed, the securitisation perspective claims that truth is created by human ideas and discourses.¹² Using an interpretivist epistemology and constructivist ontology, this approach challenges the realist conceptualization of security and assumes that social reality is intersubjectively formed and, hence, can be changed by human agency.¹³ By using speech acts, securitisation theory explores the construction and deconstruction of threats as a social reality.¹⁴

Securitising actors are individuals or groups who use security discourses.¹⁵ Waever argues that political elites, pressure groups, government organizations, and bureaucrats play

9 Barbora Padrtová, *Securitization of the Arctic: U.S. Securitizing Actors and Their Strategies*, Ph.D. Thesis, Masaryk University, Brno, 2017.

10 Erdem Lamazhapov, *The Environmental in Security: Securitization Theory and Russian Environmental Security Policy*, MA Thesis, University of Oslo, Oslo, 2020.

11 Daniel Akikie, *NATO and the Arctic: Theorizing NATO's Twenty First Century Problem*, Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, Massachusetts, 2022.

12 Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization", Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995.

13 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde, *Security A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1998, pp. 24-25.

14 Thierry Balzacq, "A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants", Thierry Balzacq (ed.), *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, Routledge, London, 2011, pp. 12-13.

15 Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, *Security*, p. 36.

an essential role in defining and executing security owing to their positions of authority that legitimise the implementation of extreme measures or actions.¹⁶ The securitisation perspective claims that choosing which topics to categorise as threats is a political decision.¹⁷ Due to the power enjoyed by certain groups, the securitisation perspective argues that the decision to classify certain issues as threats is political.¹⁸

This study analyses NATO's approach to climate change in the framework of its evolving identity amidst a geopolitically competitive environment resulting from climate change. It, therefore, examines how NATO securitises climate change to present it as a concrete threat under the changing structure of the Arctic.

2. Shifts in the Structure of the Arctic and NATO's Organizational Identity

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has raised the question of how NATO would survive in the new era. By developing new capabilities, NATO has begun to address evolving security threats like terrorism, migration, and energy security. NATO's multi-layered and flexible identity has functioned as a key factor in the organization's ability to survive in the post-Cold War era.¹⁹ NATO's flexible identity is composed of three layers. The first layer of NATO's identity, known as the "collective ideology", prioritises protecting liberal political and economic values, such as freedom, democracy, and free trade, for Alliance members. The Strategic Concept of 1991 re-emphasises these objectives and specifies NATO's role as the fundamental institutional embodiment of shared Western values.²⁰ The second layer of NATO's identity, "operational identity", is based on three principles, "deterrence and defence", "crisis prevention and management", and "common security" that NATO follows in its operations. The last layer is the "organizational identity", reflected in Article II (cooperation/collective security) and Article V (collective defence) of the NATO Treaty. Article II aims to promote peaceful relations between states, while Article V outlines that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, the organization will respond by accepting the attack against all members.

During the Cold War, Alliance emphasised the collective defence dimension of its organizational identity. However, with the restructuring of the international system after the Cold War, several NATO member states no longer viewed the Alliance as an organization solely focused on defence planning and secrecy. Prioritizing the concept of enhanced cooperation with other countries,²¹ NATO shifted its focus from Article V to Article II.²² This focus on cooperation also spread to the Arctic in the post-Cold War era. With the reduced Russian military presence in the 1990s and NATO's focus on out-of-area operations like Afghanistan and Iraq, the Arctic became less of a priority on NATO's agenda. Moreover, the need to solve environmental issues strengthened collaboration between the Arctic states: Sweden, Russia, Iceland, Canada, Norway, the U.S., Finland, and Denmark.²³ The launching of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991 and the foundation of the

16 Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization".

17 Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, *Security*, pp. 40-41.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 40.

19 Trine Flockhart, "Understanding NATO through Constructivist Theorizing", Mark Webber & Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Theorising NATO: New Perspectives on the Atlantic Alliance*, Routledge, London, pp. 153-158.

20 NATO, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept", 1991, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm, accessed 15.09.2023.

21 Flockhart, "Understanding NATO through Constructivist Theorizing", p. 144.

22 Akikie, NATO and the Arctic, pp. 61-66.

23 Lev Voronkov, "The Arctic for Eight", 2013, <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/the-arctic-for-eight/>, accessed 11.10.2023.

Arctic Council in 1996 were examples of increasing cooperation to address sustainable development and environmental concerns.²⁴

Throughout the 2000s, the Arctic nations achieved noteworthy progress in regional collaborations. In 2008, the Ilulissat Declaration effectively addressed the contentious territorial disputes between the Arctic's five coastal states. The maritime border dispute between Norway and Russia continued for about 40 years and was resolved in 2010. In the same year, the first formal dialogue between Russia and NATO was launched on "Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean", which was later enlarged to include seventeen states, as well as indigenous communities' representatives and an interdisciplinary group of scientists.²⁵ In 2011, the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue was adopted, followed by the formation of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable. The Arctic Defence Chiefs Conference was held in 2012, and the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response was introduced in 2013.²⁶ Under all these cooperation initiatives, Russia assumed the "partner" role in the area, while the West did not need NATO's military deployment in the area. Canada, for instance, expressed opposition to the Alliance's military build-ups in the area, claiming that NATO's involvement may undermine the progress made by Arctic states in terms of regional cooperation.²⁷ NATO began to reduce its military posture and deployment and transfer its activities to member states. For example, after closing the AFNORTH regional command, NATO transferred the mandate to functional structures in Brunssum, the Netherlands (Joint Force Command) and Northwood, Britain (Maritime Command).²⁸

Despite ongoing cooperative efforts, perceptions of the Arctic have dramatically changed due to the increasing geopolitical significance of the Arctic area, thanks to the opportunities triggered by climate change. The structure of the region has been reshaped by ocean acidification, the loss of sea ice and rising sea levels, which are increasingly affecting the Arctic ecosystem, commercial activities, and geopolitical stability. Initially, all Arctic and many non-Arctic states have acknowledged how the melting of the Arctic's ice cover has allowed for more accessibility to the international community.²⁹ The richness of the Arctic Ocean in terms of resources has been highlighted by the U.S. Geological Survey (2008),³⁰ which reported that 6% of global oil and 24.3% of natural gas reserves lie in the area. In addition to oil and gas, many other commodities have become more accessible, including fish stocks and expanded aquaculture opportunities, strategic minerals, and forest products.

Global warming in the area has not only facilitated the exploitation of numerous oil and gas reserves, together with other commodities but also enabled new sea routes, including

24 Michael Byers, "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study", *International Relations*, 31:4, 2017, pp. 381-382; Daniel Lambach, "Cooperation in the Cold-The Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement", Joachim Weber (ed.), *Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: The High North between Cooperation and Confrontation*, Springer, Cham, 2020, pp. 254-255.

25 Paul Arthur Berkman, "Stability and Peace in the Arctic Ocean through Science Diplomacy," *Science & Diplomacy*, 3:2, 2014, https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/sites/default/files/stability_and_peace_in_the_arctic_ocean_through_science_diplomacy_science_diplomacy.pdf, accessed 28.02.2024.

26 Lambach, "Cooperation in the Cold-The Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement", p. 258.

27 Rob Huebert, "NATO, NORAD and the Arctic", John Higginbotham and Jennifer Spence (eds.), *North of 60: Toward a Renewed Canadian Arctic Agenda*, *Centre for International Governance Innovation*, 2016, https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/north_of_60_special_report_lowres.pdf, accessed 24.10. 2023.

28 Voronkov, "The Arctic for Eight".

29 Huebert, Exner-Pirot, Lajeunesse and Jay, "Climate Change and International Security".

30 U.S. Geological Survey, "Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle", 2008, <https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf>, accessed 12.10. 2023.

the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and Northwest Passage, which possess greater advantages over the existing routes between Asia and Europe, especially in terms of commerce. Some states, notably Russia, China and the U.S., have published comprehensive plans and constructed research institutes to produce icebreaker ships and develop new technologies to ensure their position in the Arctic.³¹ Although the Soviet leader Gorbachev called for the Arctic to be a zone of peace in 1987,³² contacts between Russia and the West have decreased significantly and the spirit of Arctic exceptionalism was damaged following Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014. Therefore, climate change has been a key factor in changing the meaning of the Arctic from "a front of cooperation" to "an area for competition" by highlighting the region's commodities and commerce potential. The competition between Arctic countries in commodities, tourism, commerce, and technology carries the potential risk of increased military capacity in the region escalating into conflict.³³

Russia was one of the countries that showed significant interest in this structural shift in the Arctic. By taking various initiatives, such as ratifying the Maritime Doctrine in 2001, applying to the UN to extend its exclusive economic zone, placing its flag in the Arctic in 2007, approving the "Russian Federation's Policy for the Arctic to 2020" in 2008, Russia has highlighted the value of the area for Russian interests.³⁴ Furthermore, Russia has intensified its military initiatives in the region after 2014. Creating the Joint Strategy Command "Northern Navy/Fleet" in 2014, increasing military spending to modernise its operational capabilities, re-opening Soviet-era military bases, having large investments for the Russian air force, creating a flexible inspection system network that would connect unmanned aerial systems, space and underwater satellites, monitoring the developments in the Arctic on land, above and below the ocean, and in the air, and announcing 2035 Arctic Strategy in 2020, Russia has undertaken to protect and maintain its position as a dominant force.³⁵

Despite the significant growth of Russia's military stance in the Arctic, cooperation and dialogue were maintained until the breakdown of NATO-Russia relations in 2014.³⁶ In 2009, NATO stated that its missions in the region aimed to maintain soft security.³⁷ Secretary General Scheffer reiterated this strategic stance in April 2009 when he insisted that NATO

31 Huebert, Exner-Pirot, Lajeunesse and Jay, "Climate Change and International Security".

32 Mikhail Gorbachev, "The Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Occasion of the Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the City of Murmansk", 1 October 1987, https://www.barentsinfo.fi/docs/Gorbachev_speech.pdf, accessed 01.03. 2024.

33 Mike Sfraga and Jack Durkee (eds.), "Navigating the Arctic's 7Cs", *Wilson Center*, 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Polar%207Cs%206x9%20BOOK-FINAL_WEB%20%281%29.pdf, accessed 20.10. 2023.

Connectivity and communities are also factors that may affect the Arctic's structure in addition to climate change, commodities, commerce, cooperation, and conflict. In terms of connectivity, an interconnected landscape, an integrated marine system, shared infrastructure (roads, ports, and rail), binding cultural and social ties, and equitable access to essential community services are essential to creating a sustainable workforce or health system and enabling economic development. In the region hosting different communities, it is important to reduce inequalities and support the development of indigenous expertise and communities in the Arctic. Sfraga and Durkee (eds.), "Navigating the Arctic's 7Cs".

34 Liv Karin Parnemo, "Russia's Naval Development-Grand Ambitions and Tactical Pragmatism", *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 32:1, 2019, pp. 58-59; Arctic Portal, "Russian Federation's Policy for the Arctic to 2020", 2010, https://icr.arcticportal.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1791%3, accessed 20.09.2023.

35 Gail Fondahl, Aileen A. Espiritu and Aytalina Ivanova, "Russia's Arctic Regions and Policies", Ken S. Coates (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2020, pp. 204-212.

36 Duncan Depledge, "NATO and the Arctic", *The RUSI Journal*, 165:5-6, 2020a, p. 83; Duncan Depledge, "Train Where You Expect to Fight: Why Military Exercises have Increased in the High North", *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies*, 3:1, 2020b, p. 297.

37 Voronkov, "The Arctic for Eight".

should prioritise political and preventive action over military operations, particularly in the Arctic.³⁸ However, this stance has changed after Russia's military involvement in Ukraine in 2014.³⁹ The U.S. expressed concern that the spirit of peace in the Arctic could be undermined. Criticizing the growing number of Russian military forces in the region, the U.S.'s former Secretary of State Clinton expressed that Russia's expansionist policies could spread to the Arctic and made a call to Western powers to unite against the Russian threat.⁴⁰ Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, cooperation between Russia and the Arctic states broke down and pressure mounted on NATO to reconsider its regional strategy. These events have led to Russia's loss of participation in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and the cancellation of the Arctic Chiefs of Defence Conference.⁴¹

NATO has accelerated its engagement in the Arctic in response to Russian rearmament. A new Joint Force Command (JFC) for North Atlantic and High North operations has been deployed and the North Atlantic Council has more closely monitored Russia's actions in the region.⁴² NATO has also developed its large-scale military exercises in the Arctic.⁴³ To demonstrate its commitment to preventing the region from becoming a hotspot for international conflict, NATO established a new command, NATO's Arctic Command (ARCCOM), to use deterrence and counter Russian aggression in the High North.⁴⁴ This enables NATO to maintain the security of its northern borders and prevent future conflicts from spilling over into the Arctic. Emphasizing how a great power game has replaced the absence of strategic competition in the Arctic, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Investment Grand stated that Arctic governments are now "more in favour of seeing NATO in the region".⁴⁵ This aligns with the NATO 2030 report, which highlights how developments in the region can impact NATO's interests.

Although Russia's ultimate ambition in the Arctic is to protect its nuclear arsenal, the second-strike capabilities of its powerful Northern Fleet, and Russia's strategic territory, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies,⁴⁶ this increased presence has revived the region's Cold War legacy and mobilised the West's Northern Flank spirit. The lack of dialogue between Russia and the West after Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014

38 NATO, "Q&A Session with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the NATO Youth Forum", 2 April 2009, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_52741.htm, accessed 02.04.2009.

39 Despite this negative situation, initiatives have been taken to maintain the cooperation between 2014 and 2018. Sfraga and Durkee (eds.), "Navigating the Arctic's 7Cs". In 2015 and 2016, representatives from Russia, the United States, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Canada, Iceland, Greenland, the United Kingdom, Germany, China, and France participated in ambassadorial panels to establish a balance between mutual interests and national interests regarding the Arctic High Seas. Ambassadorial Panel, "Building Common Interests in the Arctic Ocean", University of Reykjavik, 2015, <https://en.ru.is/news/arctic-high-seas-oct15>, accessed 29.02.2024; Ambassadorial Panel, "Building Common Interests in the Arctic Ocean", University of Reykjavik, 2016, <https://en.ru.is/news/building-common-interests-in-the-arctic-ocean-1>, accessed 29.02.2024.

40 The Globe and Mail, "Hillary Clinton Warns Montreal Crowd of Russia's Increased Activity in Arctic", 2014, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/clinton-warns-montreal-crowd-of-russias-increased-activity-in-arctic/article17560676/>, accessed 12.10.2023.

41 Depledge, "NATO and the Arctic", p. 84.

42 Ibid., pp. 87-88.

43 Depledge, "Train Where You Expect to Fight", pp. 291-294.

44 The Arctic Institute, "NATO's Arctic Command: A Case for the Expansion of NATO's Mission in the High North", 2023, <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/nato-arctic-command-case-expansion-nato-mission-high-north/>, accessed 28.02.2024.

45 Sebastian Sprenger, "NATO's Camille Grand on the Alliance's Arctic Tack", 2020, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/05/11/natos-camille-grand-on-the-alliances-arctic-tack/>, accessed 15.09.2023.

46 Heather A. Conley, Matthew Melino and Jon B. Alterman, "The Ice Curtain: Russia's Arctic Military Presence", Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence>, accessed 28.02.2024.

makes militarization in the region critical.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the fragile relations between Russia and Western governments have been undermined by serious disagreements over the Syrian conflict, Russia's support for anti-government forces in Ukraine in 2014, interference in the 2016 U.S. election and the recent Russian-Ukrainian War, all of which have revived historical rivalries.⁴⁸ Due to distrust, fear, deft diplomacy, and lack of dialogue, security dilemmas have arisen in the Arctic.⁴⁹

Overall, the emergence of climate-based geopolitical rivalry has changed the "structure" of the region. The structural shift in the Arctic has triggered a change in NATO's interests, behaviour, and overall identity. As noted by Akikie, with the pressure of increasing geopolitical competition, NATO would emphasise the "collective defence" dimension of its identity, but since climate change is not a concrete threat, the use of "collective defence" had to be justified.⁵⁰ The next part demonstrates that NATO has attempted to develop and justify a comprehensive policy towards the Arctic by securitising the changing climate as a concrete threat.

3. NATO's Securitisation of Climate Change

Climate change and the geopolitical competition resulting from it in the Arctic have restructured the region. According to Akikie, although NATO emphasises the "collective defence" dimension of its organizational identity in response to Russia's growing presence under changing conditions, this identity is not well-suited to address climate change due to its intangible nature.⁵¹ NATO has thus engaged in transforming climate change into a tangible threat by securitising it as a crisis multiplier and a threat multiplier.

One of the discursive strategies NATO has used to securitise climate change has been treating climate change and security as interchangeable and two sides of the same coin⁵² rather than distinguishing security threats "tangible and intangible" NATO has addressed many global security issues together, such as Russia's conflict in Ukraine, North Korea's missile tests, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and climate change.⁵³ Emphasizing the importance of changing climate for the Alliance due to its connection with security issues,⁵⁴ NATO has often used the expressions "crisis multiplier" and "threat multiplier" to underscore the severity of the threat.⁵⁵ Using these expressions, NATO has stated that climate change exacerbates

47 Miloš Tomić, "Strategic Control of the Arctic and Possible Armed Conflict of the Great Powers", *Politika Nacionalne Bezbednosti*, 24:1, 2023, p. 146.

48 Sfraga and Durkee (eds.), "Navigating the Arctic's 7Cs".

49 James Kenneth Wither, "An Arctic Security Dilemma: Assessing and Mitigating the Risk of Unintended Armed Conflict in the High North", *European Security*, 30:4, 2021, p. 650.

50 Akikie, NATO and the Arctic, p. 74.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 74.

52 NATO, "The Geopolitical Implications of COVID-19", 30 June 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_176983.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 26.10.2023; NATO, "Opening Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the NATO Youth Summit", 28 April 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_194916.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 5.11.2023; NATO, "High-Level Discussion on Climate Security with the NATO Secretary General at COP27", 8 November 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_208773.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 11.10.2023; NATO, "Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg", 2 November 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_188262.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 2.11.2021.

53 NATO, "Speech by NATO Secretary at Keio University", 1 February 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_211398.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 12.10.2023.

54 NATO, "High-Level Discussion on Climate Security with the NATO Secretary General at COP27".

55 NATO, "Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg", 31 May 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_184341.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 15.10.2023; NATO, "Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg", 7 June 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_184735.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 17.10.2023; NATO, "Opening Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens

existing threats as a “threat catalyst” rather than creating new ones.⁵⁶ By giving the example of the Arctic, NATO has addressed the growing security problems through the lens of Arctic security, emphasizing the consequences of changing climate both in the civilian sector and military operations.⁵⁷

The focal points of NATO’s securitisation speech acts are related to the military and political security sectors. Regarding the political security sector, the securitisation discourses are centred on conflicts and violence within states. Specifically, NATO states that climate change intensifies the struggle for scarce resources like water, food, and land, which can lead to conflicts⁵⁸ and even wars⁵⁹ or exacerbate existing tensions.⁶⁰ By emphasizing the worsening interconnected security problems in vulnerable areas of the Middle East, the Sahel region, and North Africa, NATO explains the effect of climate change in providing a fertile environment for violent non-state actors, including terrorist organizations.⁶¹ Regarding the Arctic region, NATO has re-emphasised the effect of the rapidly changing climate on shifting the low-tension areas towards increasing global competition. Recalling climate change as a “conflict multiplier”,⁶² NATO notes that authoritarian regimes often use military intimidation or aggression to gain an advantage in the region.⁶³

However, NATO’s discourse on military security centres on its military operations.⁶⁴ Within this framework, NATO highlights that extreme weathers, like those in Iraq and the Arctic, have a detrimental impact on Alliance bases, military operations, and supply routes.⁶⁵ NATO notes that the impact of rising sea levels, specifically in the Arctic region, will have consequences for all naval bases. Referring to the role of traditional security structures and the military in building security, former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen stated that the

Stoltenberg at the High-Level Dialogue on Climate and Security”, 28 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_197168.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 26.10.2023; NATO, “High-Level Discussion on Climate Security with the NATO Secretary General at COP27”; NATO, “Vilnius Summit Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government”, 11 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 15.11.2023.

56 NATO, “Speech by Prof. Dr. Rob de Wijk on NATO’s New Strategic Concept”, 19 September 2009, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_58107.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 10.11.2023.

57 NATO, “Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau”, 26 August 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_206908.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 11.10.2023.

58 NATO, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Emerging Security Risks”, 1 October 2009, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_57785.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 17.11.2023; NATO, “Opening Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the High-Level Dialogue on Climate and Security”; NATO, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the College of Europe in Bruges”, 4 March 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_181919.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 15 October 2023; NATO, “Keynote Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Sciences PO Youth & Leaders Summit”, 18 January 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_180709.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 15.09.2023.

59 NATO, “Opening Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the NATO Youth Summit”.

60 NATO, “High-Level Discussion on Climate Security with the NATO Secretary General at COP27”.

61 NATO, “Vilnius Summit Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government”.

62 NATO, “The Geopolitical Implications of COVID-19”.

63 NATO, “NATO is Stepping Up in the High North to Keep Our People Safe”, 24 August 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_206894.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 15.11.2023.

64 NATO, “The Geopolitical Implications of COVID-19”; NATO, “Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau”; NATO, “High-Level Discussion on Climate Security with the NATO Secretary General at COP27”.

65 NATO, “Keynote Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Sciences PO Youth & Leaders Summit”; NATO, “Opening Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the High-Level Dialogue on Climate and Security”.

Alliance should improve its efforts to tackle the insecurity consequences of changing climate with the following statements:⁶⁶

“I believe, for example, that the security implications of climate change need to be better integrated into national security and defence strategies— as the US has done with its Quadrennial Defence Review. That means asking our intelligence agencies to look at this as one of their main tasks. It means military planners should assess potential impacts, update their plans accordingly and consider the capabilities they might need in future... What about also including cooperation that helps build capacity in the armed forces of our Partners to better manage big storms, floods, or sudden movements of populations?”

NATO also securitises climate change in terms of its effects on human security, which is primarily linked to migration.⁶⁷ NATO reports mainly indicate that rising sea levels and temperatures will impact the lives of individuals and force people to migrate.⁶⁸ Underlining that threats to socio-economic development, food and water security and health may cause climate migration and social instability, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report predicts that by 2070, extreme temperatures will force billions of people to migrate from regions including South America, Africa, Southeast Asia, India, and the Middle East. More importantly, the report warns that Alliance members may face political, economic, and humanitarian difficulties as these migratory flows shift towards European countries.⁶⁹

Noting the varying effects of climate change on different states regarding this humanitarian crisis, NATO states that food production will decrease by 10% with every 1.8-degree increase in temperature and this insecurity will have a greater impact on individuals and governments who cannot afford the financial burden of this situation.⁷⁰ Apart from migration, NATO recognises the adverse outcomes of the changing climate on gender equality. According to the Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment Report, factors such as gender, socio-economic structure, and social expectations will influence how individuals are exposed to the harmful outcomes of changing climate.⁷¹ The report indicates that climate change will not affect every individual equally and particularly women and girls will be the most vulnerable group.

In connection with human security, another area of NATO's focus is economic security. By stressing economic disparities among states caused by climate change, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly report observed that the economies of hot and disaster-prone countries decreased by over 25% between 1961 and 2010.⁷² The report revealed that developing countries, where agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sectors are concentrated, will be the most vulnerable to the negative outcomes of climate change. The NATO Parliamentary

66 NATO, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Emerging Security Risks”.

67 NATO, “NATO and the Security Implications of Climate Change”, 28 September 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_178355.htm, accessed 26.10.2023; NATO, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg”; NATO, “High-Level Discussion on Climate Security with the NATO Secretary General at COP27”.

68 NATO, “Keynote Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Sciences PO Youth & Leaders Summit”; NATO, “Speech by Prof. Dr. Rob de Wijk on NATO's New Strategic Concept”.

69 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Understanding, Adapting to, and Limiting the Impact of Climate Change on Allied Civil Security. Special Report”, 2022, <https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2022-climate-change-report-sanchez-012-cds>, accessed 12.12.2023.

70 NATO, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Emerging Security Risks”.

71 NATO, “Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment”, 2023, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2023/7/pdf/230711-climate-security-impact.pdf, accessed 12.10.2023.

72 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Understanding, Adapting to, and Limiting the Impact of Climate Change on Allied Civil Security. Special Report”.

Assembly has specifically stated that 30 million people may need humanitarian assistance in the Sahel region, where climate risks overlap with poor socio-economic conditions.⁷³

Energy security is the last key sector in NATO's climate change discourse. Stating that Russia uses energy as a tool of pressure, NATO argues that alternative ways must be found to reduce dependence on fossil fuels and Russian oil and natural gas.⁷⁴ NATO has demonstrated its commitment to investing in green energy technologies by arguing that reducing dependence on other countries is not the solution.⁷⁵ Regarding the Arctic's importance for energy security, NATO acknowledges Norway's crucial contribution to enhancing the Alliance's comprehension and response to the challenges in the High North, thus strengthening common security, including energy security. Attributing its increased military deployment in the Arctic to deter and respond to threats to critical infrastructure,⁷⁶ NATO stated that the gas platform in the North Sea is essential in ensuring energy supply to Norway, the Nordic Regions, and Europe.⁷⁷

The securitisation in different sectors also enables NATO to take two extraordinary measures in the field of climate issues. Firstly, by incorporating climate change into the three main areas of "Strategic Environment", "Crisis Prevention and Management", and "Collaborative Security" in the 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO aims to achieve its vision of becoming the leading international organization through adaptation. While reminding military units to remain strong against the adverse results of climate change, NATO presents the need for adjusting its operations, equipment, and uniforms to better cope with severe weather conditions.⁷⁸ Secondly, in the face of the worsening security problems in the Arctic due to climate change,⁷⁹ NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg re-affirmed NATO's commitment to addressing issues like climate change and melting glaciers with the use of Article V. Stating that NATO's primary role is a military alliance, Stoltenberg emphasised that NATO does not have a direct responsibility to combat climate change and reduce emissions, unlike many other various institutions and organizations that undertake this role. Instead, by emphasizing the relations between Article 5 and climate change, together with the various security threats it poses, Stoltenberg stated that NATO will focus on the security aspects of climate change.⁸⁰ NATO Deputy Secretary General Gottemoeller conveyed this understanding with the following statement:⁸¹

"First of all, I do want to say that this area is of extraordinary importance, and NATO recognises extraordinary importance in a strategic sense and the climate changes that have been developing speed there have only heightened that sense

73 Ibid.

74 NATO, "High-Level Discussion on Climate Security with the NATO Secretary General at COP27".

75 NATO, "Opening Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the High-Level Dialogue on Climate and Security".

76 NATO, "Joint Press Point", 24 March 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_213193.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 12.10.2023.

77 NATO, "Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on the Release of His Annual Report 2022", 21 March 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_212998.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 12.10.2023.

78 NATO, "High-Level Discussion on Climate Security with the NATO Secretary General at COP27".

79 NATO, "Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau".

80 NATO, "Lecture by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Leiden University College", 18 April 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_153756.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 22.09.2023.

81 NATO, "Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Session", 29 May 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_144090.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 12.10.2023.

of strategic importance of the region. So, NATO is both concerned in a historical sense about the Arctic region but also, very I would say, seized on the matter that there is this environmental issue, and a rapid climate change is going on there. So, both aspects are something that NATO has been fully embracing.”

To summarise, NATO primarily addresses the securitisation of climate change through the military, political, and energy security sectors in the Arctic region while presenting human and economic security sectors out of the Arctic context. By drawing attention to its various concrete impacts in these sectors, NATO securitises climate change.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the post-Cold War, the Arctic region provided a platform for international actors to pursue cooperative initiatives, leading to the foundation of regional initiatives such as the Arctic Council aimed at resolving regional problems. However, the intense effects of the changing climate in the region have not only resulted in environmental problems but have also eroded cooperation and increased geopolitical competition by opening access to previously inaccessible commodities and facilitating commerce through reduced transportation costs. The transformation of the region's structure from a cooperative front to a competitive area has manifested itself with the conflicting interests of various actors, including Russia, China, and NATO in the region.

As the change in structure leads to shifts in the identities, interests, and behaviours of the actors, NATO has adjusted itself to the changing Arctic environment by using the collective defence dimension of its flexible identity, despite its post-Cold War emphasis on collaborative efforts defined by Article II. Mutual criticisms between Russia and NATO in the region have resulted in an increasing military presence. However, Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the Ukraine War launched in 2022 have led to NATO's preparation to escalate the crisis and prevent Russia's aggressive stance in the international system from being reflected in the Arctic. This has led to the emergence of the idea of the Arctic security dilemma.

Based on the premise that collective defence requires a tangible threat, this study has discussed how NATO has attempted to construct climate change as a concrete threat by securitising it as a threat and crisis multiplier. The study on NATO's securitisation of climate change has three main findings. Firstly, NATO prioritises Arctic security through the political, military, and energy security sectors. Military security discourse focuses on the challenges in the conduct of military operations, such as extreme precipitation effect on holding air operations and the supply of military equipment or extreme heat impact on the conduct of NATO personnel in their operations. Regarding the political security sector, NATO highlights the potential conflicts and crises of climate change. Moreover, NATO's discourse on energy security is in line with reducing dependence on Russia and fossil fuels.

The second finding is that climate change is securitised in the human and economic security sectors without relevance to the widespread Arctic context. These securitisation discourses are shaped around the issues of climate-induced migration, socio-economic inequality, the disproportionate impact on women and girls, and the greater vulnerability of Sahel, North Africa and the Middle East. The study concludes as a last finding that securitisation enhances NATO's adaptive capacity, thus strengthening collective defence in the Arctic. By concretizing the threat through securitisation discourses, NATO justifies its actions taken in the area within its collective defence identity framework.

In conclusion, this study has analysed NATO's securitisation of climate change; future research can provide a broader comprehension of the issue by focusing on Russia and its securitisation of climate change in the region.

Çatışma Beyanı:

Araştırmanın yazarları olarak herhangi bir çıkar çatışma beyanımız bulunmamaktadır.

Araştırmacıların Katkı Oranı Beyanı:

Yazarlar araştırmaya eşit oranda katkıda bulunmuştur.

References

Published Works

- AKIKIE Daniel (2022). NATO and the Arctic: Theorizing NATO's Twenty First Century Problem, *Ph.D. Thesis*, Harvard University, Massachusetts.
- BALZACQ Thierry (2011). "A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants", Thierry Balzacq (ed.), *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, Routledge, London, 1-30.
- BUZAN Barry WAEVER Ole and DE WILDE Jaap (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado.
- BYERS Michael (2017). "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study", *International Relations*, 31:4, 375-402.
- DEPLEGGE Duncan (2020a). "NATO and the Arctic", *The RUSI Journal*, 165:5-6, 80-90.
- DEPLEGGE Duncan (2020b). "Train Where You Expect to Fight: Why Military Exercises have Increased in the High North", *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies*, 3:1, 288-301.
- FLOCKHART Trine (2016). "Understanding NATO through Constructivist Theorizing", Mark Webber & Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Theorising NATO: New Perspectives on the Atlantic Alliance*, Routledge, London, 140-160.
- FONDAHL Gail ESPIRITU Aileen A. and IVANOVA Aytalina (2020). "Russia's Arctic Regions and Policies", Ken S. Coates (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 195-216.
- KEIL Kathrin (2014). "The Arctic: A New Region of Conflict? The Case of Oil and Gas", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 49:2, 162-190.
- KONYSHEV Valery and SERGUNIN Alexander (2014). "Russia's Policies on the Territorial Disputes in the Arctic", *Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy*, 2:1, 55-83.
- LAMAZHAPOV Erdem (2020). The Environmental in Security: Securitization Theory and Russian Environmental Security Policy, *MA Thesis*, University of Oslo, Oslo.
- LAMBACH Daniel (2020). "Cooperation in the Cold-The Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement", Joachim Weber (ed.), *Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: The High North between Cooperation and Confrontation*, Springer, Cham, 273-289.
- MARDIKIAN Lisa and GALANI Sofia (2023). "Protecting the Arctic Indigenous Peoples' Livelihoods in the Face of Climate Change: The Potential of Regional Human Rights Law and the Law of the Sea", *Human Rights Law Review*, 23:3, 1-24.
- TOMIĆ Miloš (2023). "Strategic Control of the Arctic and Possible Armed Conflict of the Great Powers", *Politika Nacionalne Bezbednosti*, 24:1, 133-152.
- PADRTOVÁ Barbora (2017). Securitization of the Arctic: U.S. Securitizing Actors and Their Strategies, *Ph.D. Thesis*, Masaryk University, Brno.
- PARNEMO Liv Karin (2019). "Russia's Naval Development-Grand Ambitions and Tactical Pragmatism", *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 32:1, 41-69.

- SUVANTO Veera Pauliina (2016). *Geopolitics of the Arctic: Challenges and Prospects*, MA Thesis, University of Barcelona, Barcelona.
- WAEVER Ole (1995). "Securitization and Desecuritization", Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*, Columbia University Press, New York, 46-87.
- WITHER James Kenneth (2021). "An Arctic Security Dilemma: Assessing and Mitigating the Risk of Unintended Armed Conflict in the High North", *European Security*, 30:4, 649-666.

Internet Sources

- Ambassadorial Panel (2015). "Building Common Interests in the Arctic Ocean", University of Reykjavik, <https://en.ru.is/news/arctic-high-seas-oct15>, accessed 29.02.2024.
- Ambassadorial Panel. (2016). "Building Common Interests in the Arctic Ocean", University of Reykjavik, <https://en.ru.is/news/building-common-interests-in-the-arctic-ocean-1>, accessed 29.02.2024.
- Arctic Portal (2010). "Russian Federation's Policy for the Arctic to 2020", https://icr.arcticportal.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1791%3, accessed 20.09.2023.
- BERKMAN Paul Arthur (2014). "Stability and Peace in the Arctic Ocean through Science Diplomacy", *Science & Diplomacy*, 3:2, https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/sites/default/files/stability_and_peace_in_the_arctic_ocean_through_science_diplomacy_science_diplomacy.pdf, accessed 28.01.2024.
- CONLEY Heather A. MELINO Matthew and ALTERMAN Jon (2020). "The Ice Curtain: Russia's Arctic Military Presence", Center for Strategic and International Studies, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence>, accessed 28.02.2024.
- GORBACHEV Mikhail. (1 October 1987). "The Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Occasion of the Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the City of Murmansk", https://www.barentsinfo.fi/docs/Gorbachev_speech.pdf, accessed 01.03. 2024.
- HUEBERT Rob EXNER-PIROT Heather LAJEUNESSE Adam and JAY Gullede. "Climate Change and International Security: the Arctic as a Bellwether", *Center for Climate and Energy Solutions*, May 2012, <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/arctic-security-report.pdf>, accessed 24.10.2023.
- HUEBERT Rob. "NATO, NORAD and the Arctic", John Higginbotham & Jennifer Spence (eds.), *North of 60: Toward a Renewed Canadian Arctic Agenda*, *Centre for International Governance Innovation*, 2016, https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/north_of_60_special_report_lowres.pdf, accessed 24.10.2023.
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2023). "Climate Change 2023 Synthesis Report", https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf, accessed 10.11.2023.
- NATO Parliamentary Assembly (2022). "Understanding, Adapting to, and Limiting the Impact of Climate Change on Allied Civil Security, Special Report", <https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2022-climate-change-report-sanchez-012-cds>, accessed 12.12.2023.
- NATO (1991). "The Alliance's Strategic Concept", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm, accessed 15.09.2023.
- NATO (2 April 2009). "Q&A Session with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the NATO Youth Forum", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_52741.htm, accessed 25.09.2023.
- NATO. (19 September 2009). "Speech by Prof. Dr. Rob de Wijk on NATO's New Strategic Concept", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_58107.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 10.11.2023.
- NATO (1 October 2009). "Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Emerging Security Risks", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_57785.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 17.11.2023.
- NATO (29 May 2017). "Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Session", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_144090.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 12.10.2023.
- NATO (18 April 2018). "Lecture by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Leiden University College", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_153756.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 22.09.2023.
- NATO (30 June 2020). "Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_176983.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 26.10.2023.
- NATO (2020, September 28). "NATO and the Security Implications of Climate Change", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_178355.htm, accessed 26.10.2023.

- NATO (18 January 2021). “Keynote Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Sciences PO Youth & Leaders Summit”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_180709.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 15.09.2023.
- NATO (4 March 2021). “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the College of Europe in Bruges”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_181919.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 15.10.2023.
- NATO (31 May 2021). “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_184341.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 15.10.2023.
- NATO (7 June 2021). “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_184735.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 17.10.2023.
- NATO (2 November 2021). “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg”. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_188262.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 25.09.2023.
- NATO (2022). “Strategic Concept”, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf, accessed 27.09.2023.
- NATO (28 April 2022). “Opening Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the NATO Youth Summit”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_194916.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 5.11.2023.
- NATO (28 June 2022). “Opening Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the High-Level Dialogue on Climate and Security”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_197168.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 26.10.2023.
- NATO (4 August 2022). “NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s Speech”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_198141.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 15.10.2023.
- NATO (24 August 2022). “NATO is Stepping Up in the High North to Keep Our People Safe”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_206894.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 15.11.2023.
- NATO (26 August 2022). “Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_206908.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 11.10.2023.
- NATO (8 November 2022). “High-Level Discussion on Climate Security with the NATO Secretary General at COP27”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_208773.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 11.10.2023.
- NATO. (2023). “Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment”, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2023/7/pdf/230711-climate-security-impact.pdf, accessed 12.10.2023.
- NATO (1 February 2023). “Speech by NATO Secretary at Keio University”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_211398.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 12.10.2023.
- NATO (21 March 2023). “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on the Release of His Annual Report 2022”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_212998.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 12.10.2023.
- NATO (24 March 2023). “Joint Press Point”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_213193.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 12.10.2023.
- NATO (11 July 2023). “Vilnius Summit Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 15.11.2023.
- PEIMANI Hooman. “Melting of the Arctic Sea Ice”, *Asia-Pacific Energy Research Centre*, November 2015, https://www.apec.org/docs/default-source/Publications/2015/12/Melting-of-the-Arctic-Sea-Ice---Significance-for-the-APEC-Economies-Energy-Security/Melting_of_the_Arctic_Sea_Ice_-_Significance_for_the_APEC_Economies_Energy_Security.pdf, accessed 20.10.2023.
- SFRAGA Mike and DURKEE Jack (eds.). “Navigating the Arctic’s 7Cs”, *Wilson Center*, 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Polar%207Cs%206x9%20BOOK-FINAL_WEB%20%28%29.pdf, accessed 20.10.2023.
- SPRENGER Sebastian (2020). “NATO’s Camille Grand on the Alliance’s Arctic Tack”, *Defense News*, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/05/11/natos-camille-grand-on-the-alliances-arctic-tack/>, accessed 15.09.2023.

- The Arctic Institute (2023). "NATO's Arctic Command: A Case for the Expansion of NATO's Mission in the High North", <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/nato-arctic-command-case-expansion-nato-mission-high-north/>, accessed 28.02.2024.
- The Globe and Mail (2014). "Hillary Clinton warns Montreal Crowd of Russia's Increased Activity in Arctic", <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/clinton-warns-montreal-crowd-of-russias-increased-activity-in-arctic/article17560676/>, accessed 12.10. 2023.
- U.S. Geological Survey (2008). "Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle", <https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf>, accessed 12.10. 2023.
- VORONKOV Lev (2013). "The Arctic for Eight", <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/the-arctic-for-eight/>, accessed 11.10.2023.
- ZANDEE Dick KIMBERLEY Kruijver and STOETMAN Adája. "The Future of Arctic Security", *Clingendael Report*, April 2020, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/Report_The_future_of_Arctic_security_April2020.pdf, accessed 20.10. 2023.