MAKARIOS' ACHIEVEMENT AND THE FAILURE OF NATO: THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS PARTNERSHIP

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to explore the period after the collapse of the Republic of Cyprus partnership. The Turkish Cypriot leadership on the island was not fully satisfied with Ankara's policy towards the island during this period. And Turkey was not fully satisfied with its policy towards the island either. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot leadership on the island was dissatisfied with the constant leadership by Athens. Likewise, Athens was dissatisfied with Makarios, who moved away from Enosis. While the Greek Cypriot leadership were willing to pave the way for Enosis during this period by making the Turkish minority on the island an ineffective minority, depriving it of its constitutional rights, Turkey prepared some strategies to develop the Taksim policy. As a result, Makarios neutralised the influence of the NATO quartet (the United States, Britain, Turkey and Greece) on the island with his Moscow and Non-Aligned card for a while.

Keywords: Cyprus, Enosis, Akritas Plan, Non-Aligned Movement, Cyprus Problem

MAKARIOS'UN BAŞARISI VE NATO'NUN BAŞARISIZLIĞI: KIBRIS CUMHURİYETİ ORTAKLIĞININ ÇÖKÜŞÜ

ÖZ

Bu çalışma, Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti ortaklığının çöküşünden sonraki dönemi incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Adadaki Kıbrıs Türk liderliği bu dönemde Ankara'nın adaya yönelik politikasından tam olarak memnun değildi. Türkiye de adaya yönelik politikasından tam olarak memnun değildi. Öte yandan, adadaki Kıbrıs Rum liderliği de Atina'nın sürekli liderliğinden memnun değildi. Aynı şekilde Atina da Enosis'ten uzaklaşan Makarios'tan memnun değildi. Kıbrıs Rum liderliği adadaki Türk azınlığı etkisiz bir azınlık haline getirerek ve anayasal haklarından mahrum bırakarak Enosis'in önünü açmak isterken, Türkiye de Taksim politikasını geliştirmek için bazı stratejiler hazırladı. Sonuç olarak Makarios, Moskova ve Bağlantısızlar kartıyla NATO dörtlüsünün (ABD, İngiltere, Türkiye ve Yunanistan) ada üzerindeki etkisini bir süreliğine etkisiz hale getirmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs, Enosis, Akritas Planı, Bağlantısızlar Hareketi, Kıbrıs Sorunu

Introduction

This article attempts to shed light on the phases of the collapse of the partnership of the Republic of Cyprus and the events that followed, and to understand the end of an era with the armed conflict in Erenköy. In this context, the mutual policies and manoeuvres of foreign and local actors in Cyprus are considered in the context of changing international politics. It also attempts to understand the interactions between international organisations such as the North

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Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the political rivalries of superpowers such as the USSR and the mutual interactions in Turkish-Greek relations that took place within the framework of the policies of nationalism pursued by local actors. In this sense, this article will analyse the division of the Republic of Cyprus, which began with the end of the period of partnership, in terms of the country's internal and external relations and the reconstruction of these relations.

In addition to the local actors and the policies they pursued during the collapse of the Republic of Cyprus' partnership, this article also assesses the significant contribution of various state and international organisations to the downfall of the republic. These are Turkey and Greece, the international powers USA, UK and USSR as well as the international organisations NATO and NAM (Kıralp, 2019). This paper analyses the political priorities that focused on Cyprus in the climate of the Cold War and in the context of a renewal of relations in the region. The study analyses how the unmediated articulation of international actors on the front formed by the divided political actors of Cyprus creates an atmosphere. UNSC Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 (S.C. Res. 186, 1964), which apparently determined the future of Cyprus, is a result of this web of relations. As the Republic of Cyprus' partnership comes to an end in its renewed form, it defines not only a process of separation, but also a process of redefining new attitudes and behaviours towards other actors. At the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, *"it confirms that Cypriot political actors played an important role in involving their motherlands in the problem, but that international actors (NATO) rather than local actors contributed to ending the problem"* (Yorgancıoğlu, 2023, p. 4016). At the moment of collapse, however, the opposite happened. At the end of 1964, Makarios not only brought Athens to its knees, but also managed to neutralise NATO forces for a time with the help of important actors such as the USSR and the NAM and to gain independence.

Pre-Détente Era, Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement

The Cuban Missile Crisis was escalating towards the coldest days of the Cold War. While the crisis left a phase of Cold War behind it, the days of détente loomed on the horizon. In the run-up to this period of détente, not only did the question of superpower supremacy arise, but the post-Stalinist policy of de-Stalinisation prompted Moscow to increase its support for the NAM, as the NAM's anti-Western stance tacitly supported Moscow's policies on a global scale. Moreover, Washington's self-serving attitude in foreign policy during the Cuban Missile Crisis led the world to conclude that the superpowers were not bold enough and ultimately could not afford a direct confrontation (Baker, 1978).

The nuclear threat that the two superpowers had experienced indirectly during the Suez War in 1956 was a global stress test that they faced directly and without mediators in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The Cuban missile crisis, which occupies a very special place in the history of the Cold War, was also the high point of the period. After the crisis had reached its diplomatic and military climax, it paved the way for the policy of détente. It is of great importance to understand how the crisis created meanings and gaps in the process. The crisis had a very different impact on the European side. The European wing of NATO was very uncomfortable with its American allies being sidelined in the face of such a threat or danger, because it went against the spirit of the alliance. Nikhita Khrushchev's political adventure, characterised by failure, came to an end in 1964 and he was removed from office by the party. On the other hand, serious difficulties arose in the East on the Soviet-Chinese line and the conflicts led China to

accept the United States as a balancing factor. France, a member of the Security Council, launched a European nuclear bomb programme despite the testing laws. To summarise, the period after the Cuban Missile Crisis was a time that challenged the hegemony of the superpowers and tested their ability to control (Stevenson, 1985).

Another important change in world politics during this period that cannot be ignored was the process of decolonisation, in which almost 50 states in Africa and Asia gained their independence in the modern era. The process, which began after the First World War, stalled and only had a chance of success after the Second World War. It is obvious that the search for labour, raw materials and markets, which was accelerated by the Industrial Revolution, turned the European powers into colonisers and the defenders into the exploited in these countries. The process of colonisation was not limited to the exploitation of natural resources, but was also used as a military resource for war. During colonial rule, existing identities, ethnicities, languages, religions or borders were not taken into account and all kinds of self-interested policies were pursued without foreseeing the dangers. When the people were decolonised, they carried these problems with them ("Decolonization of Asia and Africa, 1945-1960," FRUS).

When the rivalry between the blocs reached its peak, Washington favoured foreign aid for the countries of the Third World during the period of Cold War. Similarly, Moscow offered incentives against the Western bloc, because the West was the address of the exploiters and the ideology to be fought. When these new states realised that all these investments were not for their benefit but for their inclusion in their own bloc, they emerged on the world stage at a conference in Bandung, Indonesia, as the NAM. "The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was the Third World's response to the Cold War. Without the Cold War, the concept of a Third World would not have emerged" (Arnold, 2010, p. 1). The basic principles of the NAM were political independence, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggressive foreign policy, non-interference by great powers in the internal affairs of small states and equality.

The nationalist wave that emerged outside Europe quickly circled the world. Although the interwar period was not the scene of these independence movements, more than a hundred states joined in the post-war period. These newcomers did not join the Third World voluntarily, but became members of the Third World spontaneously and almost automatically. The members of the NAM had in common that they were not very different politically and economically and that they were still open to exploitation. The new states were expected to make an economic breakthrough after decolonisation, but this change failed to materialise and was replaced by political instability and the atmosphere of the Cold War. As a result, they have become dependent on Washington and Moscow, even on the members of the aid club. It should be noted that this situation was an artefact of the related time period. In this sense, the NAM members had to fight in two areas: firstly, for political independence and secondly for economic independence. The second point is very important because it symbolises the end of dependency (Sylvester, 2014). While the climate of the Cold War created a bipolar world order, the NAM countries that remained outside this order had to adapt their policies accordingly.

The Suez War of 1956 was both a crisis and an opportunity. The West's hostile attitude towards Egyptian arms sales under the Baghdad Pact further alienated Egypt from the West and prompted it to turn to other sources, leading to the signing of an arms sale's agreement with Czechoslovakia. Indeed, this arms deal was greeted with great joy by Arab countries and was seen as a symbolic message to Western countries (Dawisha, 2016). With the end of the

promised American funding for the construction of the dam and Nasser's quick decision to nationalise the canal, the balance in the eastern Mediterranean shifted rapidly. However, the invasion, which was carried out in partnership with the British-French-Israeli side, ended in a balance between Washington and Moscow. The transfer of Western financial resources to Eastern financial resources paved the way for a new international policy that will be used many times in the future. This strategy of manipulation, skilfully executed by the leaders of the Third World, matured the atmosphere of the NAM, which did not want to ally itself with any bloc.

Nehru's neutrality response to the Korean War, which goes back to the idea of the NAM, was a manifestation of the "Third Way" approach. Bringing the concept of neutrality without taking sides under the umbrella of the UN and enforcing the principle that war would affect everyone was a step that profoundly changed the system. This movement, which aimed to avoid the two poles of the Cold War and was also known as the Five Initiative, was differentiated in 1954 when China and India demonstrated the ability of different ideologies to compromise and not give a visa to the superpowers. Above all, Washington's uncompromising stance brought the NAM members closer together and they were recognised at the Belgrade Conference in 1961. Although the policy of non-alignment was internalised by most of the states involved in the movement, there were also conflicts and disagreements between these states, whose policies and interests diverged in practise (Strydom, 2007). However, the main driving force that brought together these countries, whose views on international politics were based on their own socio-economic conditions, was participation and co-operation on the international stage as free nations with their own policies.

The nationalist movements of the détente period and the confrontation period are not completely different from each other, and the decolonisation processes and ethnic conflicts continue. However, the dominant ethnic groups in the NAM member states of this period showed considerable solidarity not only against territorial integrity but also against groups seeking their rights. In the period of decolonisation, many states emerged and became members of the NAM very soon after. Just as it was no coincidence that they became NAM members, it is also no coincidence that the minorities in these states worked towards the disintegration of these states at the hands of Western states.

NATO, USSR and the Non-Aligned Movement

There has always been a special policy of consultation between the United Kingdom and the United States. Prime Minister Macmillan's visit to Washington and Ottawa in June 1958 was a reminder of such a situation. "*President Eisenhower had re-affirmed the principle of private Anglo-American consultation on matters of common concern and had agreed that this principle, which had been applied successfully in the political field, should now be extended progressively to economic and military matters*" (CAP 128/32/48/1, p. 3). On the road to the Republic of Cyprus, the period 1959-1964 in particular is discussed on the basis of the three actors in the title.

The UN Political Committee's green light for the self-determination proposal was made possible by the support of a large number of countries. Athens' defeat in the UN General Assembly at the end of 1958 had discouraged the country after all these years and pushed it towards a peaceful solution. In the days between 1958 and 1959, Athens revised its strategy and announced a partial withdrawal from the idea of fighting under the umbrella of the UN (Crawshaw, 1978). This precious moment was invaluable to NATO, as the motherlands of the two ethnic groups on the island of Cyprus were indispensable to NATO but a serious source of

trouble. A secession from the organisation, as had happened before in NATO's history, posed a serious threat. In this sense, a negotiated solution within NATO was expected by all. The *'reluctant republic'*, as Xydis (1973) described it, was thus born in Zurich.

NATO forces designed the Republic of Cyprus without the consent of the partners. The absence of communism in a federation decided within the NATO framework significantly reduced the threat perception. The situation was relatively calm until the last day of November 1963, when Makarios called for a constitutional amendment (Bilge, 1987, p. 376). This was the invitation for the fatal blow to the island's unity. In his search for a singular position, Makarios explained why he was not a member of NATO and instrumentalised an insurmountable problem on NATO's southern flank. For the sake of the integrity of Western unity, Washington handled the matter more cautiously, realising that the fragility of the new state was nothing other than the existence of NATO itself (Holland, 1995). It was only days later that the fierce fighting that had begun in the final days of 1963 was halted and NATO temporarily assumed the role of peacekeeper in Cyprus, once its colony and now with its own armed forces. NATO again acted early and intervened directly. NATO's fear was obvious: Would the island of Cyprus become the *"Cuba of the Mediterranean"* (Windsor, 1964, p. 4).

In international relations, disputes with keywords such as colonial past, ethnic conflict and ethnic confusion often become an international problem. In this context, Republic of Cyprus is no different and 1964 was a painful year for NATO forces. Moscow initially preferred to stay out of the problem and also favoured non-intervention. Aziz (1969b, p. 201) summarised Moscow's stance on this issue under four main points: *"The existence of an organised legal communist party such as AKEL; the existence of a left-wing Papandreou government in Athens; the existence of British bases in Cyprus and the coldness of Turkish-Soviet relations"*. The conference, which took place in the first month of 1964, ended without a result (Kohen 1964a, pp. 1, 7). In London, the government realised that it would not receive the support it had hoped for from NATO. *"The situation in the Island remained tense and there was some reason to think that illicit supplies of arms were reaching both communities from abroad"* (CAB 128/38/9/2, p. 2). The first meeting of the British Cabinet was convened on a single subject and dealt with Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home's Memorandum CP. (64) 2. Makarios, the president of the Republic of Cyprus, unilaterally announced the cancellation of the *"Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance"* in violation of the treaty. Although the Cabinet did not want to take too much responsibility, it decided to organise an urgent conference in London for the benefit of the bases on the island (CAB 128/38/1). The Cabinet is briefed by Commonwealth Secretary Sandys as follows:

> *"the situation in Cyprus remained precarious and that there was a considerable risk of a renewal of communal fighting. It was therefore increasingly urgent to find a political solution to the problem of the Island's future; but, although he was doing all he could, in his personal discussions with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, to promote a common understanding which might form the basis of formal negotiations, both parties were showing considerable reluctance to co-operate"* (CAB/128/38/6, p. 3).

Furthermore, Commonwealth Secretary Sandys drew attention to the Turkish navy's military activities in the Mediterranean; on the other, he pointed out that they could not deal with the matter alone and that Washington would need the support of the Sixth Fleet in the event of a possible Turkish military operation (Kohen, 1964b, pp. 1, 7). Seeking a solution to the problem

outside NATO meant bringing the matter under the UN umbrella, but to neutralise the possible Moscow card, Washington and London might have to step aside. In that case, it would be the Afro-Asian grouping and only the Afro-Asian grouping that would manage the conflict. As a result, the HM Cabinet decided to authorise the issuing of a directive authorising the Commander of the British Armed Forces to take control of Nicosia airport if he deemed it necessary and to insist on the NATO framework (CAB 128/38/7, pp. 3-4). While Moscow intervened in the matter by issuing a diplomatic note to Ankara on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, just as Makarios had requested.

Moscow judged the matter from its own perspective, but did not differ from the western side. A possible new position in the eastern Mediterranean was an advantage and a trump card for communism. Moscow assessed its actions in this context and emphasised the international peace and security context by targeting the London Conference (Aziz, 1969a). As the conference drew to a close, Washington and London agreed on a joint force (Allied Force). The United Kingdom would provide the greatest support, but the government in Washington agreed for a limited period (3 months) (Kohen, 1964c, pp. 1, 7; Kohen, 1964d, pp. 1, 7; CAB 128/38/8, pp. 3-4). With Khrushchev's diplomatic note of 7 February, Moscow made an official statement on the island policy and there was a rapprochement with Makarios (Milliyet, 24.02.1964; Coşar, 29.02.1964). Due to the dispute between the NATO powers, the island policy left NATO and went under the unwanted UN umbrella, as it was calculated. This was the undisputed success of Makarios and UNSCR 186 of 4 March 1964 became the date on which the Turks continued to be stateless on the international stage and the Greeks state-capable (UNSCR 186, 1964).

Moscow's de-Stalinisation policy opened up new possibilities and even opportunities for the Soviets and fostered closer relations with the NAM member states (Allison, 1988). In this sense, the strong international support Makarios sought came from Moscow and he was recognised as a potential ally. On the other hand, NATO unity was seriously challenged and was unable to show unity. June 1964 was shaken by President Johnson's message, known as the *"Johnson Letter"*, in which he spoke out against a possible Turkish intervention on the island. This letter shook relations between Ankara and Washington to the core and changed their direction. However, the information provided to the Cabinet by Commonwealth Secretary Sandys went in the opposite direction: *"the United States Under- Secretary of State, Mr Ball, had made no reference in his recent discussions in London to the possibility that the United States Sixth Fleet should intervene in order to prevent a Turkish invasion of Cyprus"* (CAB 128/38/31, p. 3).

By June 1964, Greek military power on the island had visibly increased, and yet Lord Carrington informed the Cabinet that *"at the recent meeting of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation the increase of Greek forces in Cyprus had been universally condemned"* (CAB 128/38/38, p. 4). There was also a ray of hope at the talks in Washington, which took place in the last ten days of June, but they were merely preparations for another meeting in Geneva (Milliyet, 24.07.1964). At this point, the information that Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home gave in the Cabinet cannot be ignored:

> *"it had emerged from the discussions which he and the Foreign Secretary had just concluded with the Prime Minister of Greece, M. Papandreou, that the Greek Government favoured a solution of the problem of Cyprus by means of enosis, coupled with an arrangement whereby the settlement would be in some sense guaranteed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In return they would be prepared to cede to Turkey a small island off the Turkish coast. The Turkish Government, on the other hand, were showing increasing interest in a solution based on a partition of Cyprus, whereby they would exercise sovereignty over an area in the north-east of the Island" (CAB 128/38/41, p. 5).*

Makarios, who once again managed to open the window of opportunity created by the crisis, endeavoured to bring the conflict under the umbrella of the UN and once again won the battle for independence against the Western side. The proposal of the plan is very clear. The plan provides for partition, even if it is only a small part. This partition will take place between the three guarantor powers. Although Athens had a different opinion about the Acheson plan, it took a step back after the negotiations with Makarios. They left the Enosis they had longed for decades to another time (Milliyet, 30.07.1964; 31.07.1964). While the first signs of a new phase emerged on the Ankara-Moscow line (Kışlalı, 05.08.1964), Washington opened a new front in the Far East. American warplanes began bombing the north of Vietnam (Milliyet, 06.08.1964). On the other hand, Ankara carried out its first serious military operation on the island, while an attack was organised in Erenköy (Kokkina), a fishing village in the North-West of Cyprus, was attacked under the supervision of General Grivas (Milliyet, 10.08.1964).

After the armed clashes in Erenköy, Moscow openly backed Makarios. The disagreement within NATO offered Moscow the opportunity it had been waiting for and *'declared that the Soviet Union would not stand idly by in the event of armed intervention in Cyprus'* (Milliyet, 16.08.1964, p. 1). During the talks in Geneva, Makarios finally put Moscow's backing on the table. His aim was to neutralise Athens and keep it on his side without alienating it too much from the idea of Enosis (Kohen, 1964e, pp. 1, 7; Kohen, 1964f, pp. 1, 7). The ideal of national unity (Pan-Hellenism) captured Athens and it rejected the Second Acheson Plan, although it accepted it (Ekmekçi, 26.08.1964). Here it becomes clear that the Greek zeal for Enosis was now threatening the existence of the Republic of Cyprus of 1960. As August 1964 drew to a close, Makarios raised his hand even higher. Makarios knew how to take risks and first flirted with Moscow, then Athens capitulated to him and finally travelled to Cairo to ask Nasser for arms aid. In this sense, Egypt is not only Nasser, but also able to mobilise the power of the NAM. There is nothing more for Washington to do. It was dealing with a new international problem like Vietnam, but Makarios, who was openly supported by Nasser, felt safer (The Straits Times, 30.08.1964, p. 4). In October 1964, the NAM conference in Cairo concluded with the following declaration. The NAM, which in the following very clearly and understandably stands behind Makarios and thus the Republic of Cyprus of 1960, has made its position in international relations clear with the title *"respect for the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity: problems of divided nations"*.

> *"Concerned by the situation existing with regard to Cyprus, the Conference calls upon all states in conformity with their obligations under this Charter of the United Nations, and in particular under Article 2, paragraph 4, to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and to refrain from any threat or use of force or intervention directed against Cyprus and from any efforts to impose upon Cyprus unjust solutions unacceptable to the people of Cyprus. Cyprus, as an equal member of the United Nations, is entitled to and should enjoy unrestricted and unfettered sovereignty and independence, and allowing its people to determine freely, and without any foreign intervention or interference, the political future of the country, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations"* (NAC-II/HEADS/5, 1964, p. 18).

In addition to peaceful coexistence, international solidarity against imperialism and neo-colonialism was also one of the basic ideas of the NAM (Mortimer, 1984). Makarios, who received more than he had expected in Cairo, also received a favourable response from Yugoslav President Tito. After the conference, Tito visited Nicosia and organised a public meeting with Greek Cypriots, as if to show his stance to the world public once again, and then issued a joint statement with Makarios (Kıralp, 2019). By supporting the NAM's policy towards Makarios, they also contributed to their own policy, as many of these newly established states had the same problems. On the last day of the conference, Makarios attended the Sunday service in the Greek church in Cairo and assessed the outcome as *"a great spiritual victory for the people of Cyprus"* (Milliyet, 12.10.1964, pp. 1, 7).

Discussion and Findings

The Cold War of the 1960s entered a new phase with the Cuban Missile Crisis and sailed into uncharted waters. The crisis was, if you will, *"the peak of the Cold War"* and led the two blocs down different trajectories or political debates. During the missile crisis, the US State Department opted for isolation and avoided seeking the opinion of its European allies, resulting in a disappointing foreign policy in the eyes of allies. The result was that US foreign policy, pre-occupied only with itself, produced a new idea for NATO's European allies. Since Moscow has nuclear weapons and Washington may not come to Europe's aid in the event of a Soviet attack, or at least they are no longer sure of it in such a situation, European allies would be even more averse to the idea of using American nuclear weapons in Europe. France, a member of NATO, would be the first European state to break with the Washington axis.

Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet split of the Eastern Bloc wrote a different history and caused serious damage. In contrast to the belief in an inevitable war between the blocs, after Stalin, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev put forward a new thesis as an alternative: *"peaceful coexistence"*. With the policy of de-Stalinization (Britannica, 2014), Moscow not only changed its economic perspectives, but also turned against the *"fatalistic inevitability"* of an expected war between the two blocs and made the founding leader Lenin's *"principle of coexistence of states with different social systems"* into Moscow's new foreign policy. This new policy paved the way for Moscow's decision to support all anti-Western movements on all continents. At the same time, the world, which was on the brink of nuclear catastrophe with the missile crisis, better understood the gravity of the situation, because there was now no turning back. *"If we cannot end our differences now, we can at least help make the world safe for diversity,"* President Ken-

nedy warned Moscow in a speech at the American University in Washington in June 1963 (Kennedy, 1964, pp. 459-464). Although the phase of detente had not yet begun, the two super-powers had shown the first signs of easing tensions. However, all of this had driven a wedge between them and their allies and eroded their influence (see Blanton & Kegley, 2016).

In the 1960s, world politics was once again in upheaval. The NAM, composed of newly decolonised countries between the Eastern and Western blocs, heralded another change. The Belgrade Conference of 1961 was the expression of many international criticisms. A movement that opposed colonialism, imperialism and racism and remained true to the principle of equality. It denounced the unequal development of the Third World and called on the Security Council UN to expand. In this sense, it was a movement that profoundly influenced international politics. The movement's political priorities included opposition to neo-colonialism, the promotion of a world free of nuclear weapons, the closure of military bases abroad and respect for domestic affairs (Arnold, 2010).

The shaping of world politics described above inevitably influenced the nationalist politics of the two communities. In this sense, while different arenas were opened to the political actors of Cyprus, it has been shown that President Makarios made the most of the opportunity to play in these political arenas. While the Anglo-American side supported the collapse of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960s, Makarios managed to secure himself by utilising external supports. Enosis no longer had a place in this game plan and Makarios had to move towards full independence. This approach allowed him to reveal a different understanding (than expected): *"a series of constitutional amendments that would pave the way for Greek Cypriot rule on the island and abrogate the right of foreign powers to interfere in Cyprus"* (Yorgancıoğlu, 2020, pp. 299-300). The year 1961 symbolised the emergence of Makarios and Nicosia on the world stage as a member of the NAM. After the Belgrade Conference of 1961, he would soon become one of the symbolic leaders of the alliance.

On the other hand, the presence of the communist AKEL party gave it an anti-NATO stance and the support of Moscow. At the beginning of the 1963 events, Moscow openly supported Nicosia and warned against any intervention. Later, it openly criticised Athens' willingness to agree to the *"double Enosis"* plan (the Acheson Plan) and declared that Nicosia would only go along if politics allowed it. This was the idea of de-Atinization in Nicosia's politics (Drușotis, 2008). It was only when Makarios excluded Greek Prime Minister Papandreou from this policy that he overcame Athens' inclination towards NATO plans. To summarise, this turned from a domestic NATO issue into a national one. Nevertheless, Athens used Grivas and Greek officers to control Makarios (Kıralp, 2023).

In 1964 Makarios dissuaded Athens from the idea of double Enosis, at least for a while. He succeeded in blocking such NATO solution models. For the Turkish Cypriots, however, this period did not quite fulfil their expectations of Ankara. In a message to Ankara, the Turkish Cypriots declared that they wanted to settle in their motherland and tacitly expressed that they did not receive enough support. Denktaş and Küçük expected Ankara to take military action as soon as possible. They were not at all satisfied with Ankara's delay in this regard, as the Turks living on the island were trying to survive under very difficult conditions. Washington offered a NATO peacekeeping force to prevent further unrest, but Makarios managed to prevent the deployment. Greek troops and UN peacekeepers were deployed instead. However, when Washington prevented the Turkish military from intervening militarily, this led to an improvement

in relations between Ankara and Moscow. At this point, Moscow switched from the non-intervention thesis to the pro-Turkish federation thesis (Gürel 1984; Bilge 1996).

The 1950s and 1960s were a different time for the island of Cyprus. It is worth noting that world politics strongly influenced the nationalist policies of the two communities during these two periods. In the 1950s, the NAM was not yet active enough. On the other hand, Moscow had not formulated a direct policy towards Cyprus, so the issue remained with NATO. In this context, the Taksim and Enosis policies were guided by the assumption that the island was a NATO island. Nicosia, which became independent after 1960 (albeit on a partnership basis), also recognised the benefits of the political arena provided by Moscow and the NAM. For this reason, Makarios ignored the double Enosis formula, which had to be eliminated, and received the full support of Moscow and the NAM for his independence policy. This new form of politics required the reconstruction of the state. Moreover, some constitutional amendments that brought more prosperity to the Greek Cypriots were healthier than the idea of double Enosis (Kızılyürek, 2016).

With the outbreak of conflict in Cyprus after independence, the Republic of Cyprus passed unilaterally into the hands of the Greek Cypriot leadership, forcing the Turkish Cypriot leadership to withdraw from its institutions. While the leaders of both communities were able to become players in the 1950s, Makarios became an influential player in the 1960s thanks to the NAM and Moscow. Having two such effective cards at his disposal, Makarios utilised them to the full (against NATO). The declaration published after the Cairo conference explicitly mentioned "the right to self-determination in Cyprus" and received the full support of the NAM. As a sign of this influence, he did not shy away from clashing with the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Ankara. On the other hand, he came into conflict with Athens when the balance within NATO was disturbed. His lonely walk on this thin ice worried many circles (Dodd, 2010). *"[London] and [Washington] were concerned not only about Greco-Turkish tensions but also about Makarios's relations with AKEL, USSR, and the NAM. These developments made the Cyprus conflict in the 1960s an inter-bloc rather than an intra-bloc conflict"* (Yorgancıoğlu, 2020, p. 301).

Unfortunately, the Turkish side was not able to make its case at the international level as effectively as the Greek Cypriots. Makarios, on the other hand, was supported several times in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. For example, A/RES/2077 (XX) called on states "*to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus*", and A/RES/3212 (XXIX) called for "*the withdrawal of foreign armed forces and foreign military presence*". The Turkish Cypriots only found some support in late 1964 and early 1965 when Moscow accepted their demand for a federation (a bi-communal federal arrangement). Moscow's concession to this demand was the result of improved relations between Ankara and Moscow. On the other hand, Makarios also received the support of Moscow and NAM, to prevent foreign interference, especially when Turkish jets attacked Erenköy (Kokkina). After the attack by the Turkish jets, Moscow declared that it would not hesitate to take action for the integrity of Cyprus. This was a blank cheque for Nicosia and a warning against occupation. Similarly, Makarios not only rejected the NATO plan, which included Athens' demand for a double Enosis but also began building a national identity centred on Nicosia. The measures Makarios took in Cyprus in 1964 are largely in line with constructivist theory, which focuses on interstate behaviour, identity and norms. Efforts to unite Cyprus identity and sovereignty, the dynamics in relations with the Cyprus community and international support can be significantly supported by a constructivist perspective. In this sense, it can be said that Makarios' policy was

probably aimed at strengthening the national identity and international recognition of Cyprus, but it was also necessary to take into account the internal social dynamics and the uncertainties that these dynamics could generate. This was a very serious axis shift from a position in which the will of the Greek Cypriots awaited Athens' help to one in which the will of Nicosia came first. This policy was aimed at pushing Athens out of the game and favouring Moscow and NAM. This encouragement of independence was nothing less than Makarios' skilful synthesis of Cold War power relations and Greek Cypriot nationalism (O'Malley & Craig, 2001). In this context, the shift of the axis in Makarios' imagination (Anderson's term) can be illustrated as follows: from the pro-NATO *"imagined"* Western Cyprus in the 1950s to the anti-NATO *"imagined"* non-aligned and independent Cyprus in the 1960s.

Although the Republic of Cyprus was created at the London Conference, it is an indisputable fact that it was established without the consent of the two communities. At London's insistence, the Zurich and London Agreements were a fait accompli, but this was the result of an inevitable process. Unfortunately, under the watchful eyes of all the guarantor states, Turkish and Greek Cypriots shattered up the common tone of the island with their own hands in just three years. This shows that despite the aspirations of international actors, nationalisms can frustrate these plans or lead to contradictory outcomes (Xydis, 1973). While the two communities had centred their nationalist policies on the island of NATO in the 1950s, things changed quickly for President Makarios in the 1960s. Faced with Moscow's and NAM's support for the independence of Third World countries, the Greek Cypriot leadership sublimated Greek Cypriot nationalism on the island and was no longer willing to follow Athens. As Andreas Papandreou emphasised, *"Makarios always spoke of Enosis, but in practise he always sought independence"* (Kıralp, 2015).

Just as Athens did not approve of Makarios' 13-point proposal to amend the constitution, the Turkish ambassador to Cyprus, Emin Dirvana, conveyed Ankara's commitment to the London-Zurich agreements to the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Rauf Denktaş. On the other hand, the governments of the two motherlands, while defending the continuity of the constitutional order, did not abandon their Enosis and Taksim policies and prepared secret plans (Reddaway, 1986). Meanwhile, the two communities that shared the island were not idle. While the Greek Cypriot leadership were willing to pave the way for Enosis by turning the island's Turkish Cypriots into an ineffective minority, depriving them of all constitutional rights and marginalised them [Akritas Planı]. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot leadership was preparing the Provisional Phase/Interim Plan [Geçici Merhale Planı] or, as Purcell (1969) called it, "Contingency Plans" to pave the way for Taksim. It should be noted that these plans were issued only two days before making the final decisions for the island. The aim was to show the Turks as a minority whose main purpose was overthrowing the Republic of Cyprus.

> *"There can be no doubt that both sides had contingency plans ready in the event of a deterioration in relations. They would have been foolish not to. On 2 March 1964, the Greeks published in the Cyprus Bulletin a document dated 14 September 1963, and allegedly bearing the signatures of both Küçük and Denktaş, which had been 'found in the office of a Turkish Minister'. It provides for partition in the event of a unilateral Greek abrogation of the constitution, on the principle that 'when the obstacle is removed one reverts to the forbidden'"* (Purcell, 1969, p. 321).

However, in March 1964, UN Security Council Resolution 186 made Makarios the rightful president of Cyprus. Following the resolution the Greek Cypriots took control of the republic government, while the Turkish Cypriots lost their constitutional rights. Having seized power in Cyprus, Makarios did not permit the Athens to negotiate with the members of NATO without his consent. In this context, he temporarily succeeded in incentivising Athens to follow him by introduced more effective policies (Druşotis, 2008).

When the island spiralled into violence and initial diplomatic initiatives failed to produce results, Ankara pressed the button for military action. However, Washington cancelled out this military action by responding with the Johnson letter. Although NATO forces aimed to send a military force (in the name of a peacekeeping force) to Cyprus, Makarios managed to eliminate this threat through political manoeuvring and the invocation of his legitimate authority. The result of this policy was that UN troops were stationed on the island, while NATO troops were not deployed on the island of Cyprus for some time (see FRUS archive). In this situation, *"the National Guard, the Cypriot army established in mid-1964, was predominantly officered by Athens-controlled mainland Greeks disloyal to Makarios"* (Kıralp, 2019, p. 372). Makarios, however, survived the ordeal with the support of the NAM and Moscow, while the NATO plan of double Enosis and the Turkish-Greek dialogue were neutralised. It is clear that the NATO Quartet could not eliminate or destroy the Republic of Cyprus. In principle, Athens accepted the Acheson Plan (supported by Washington), while Makarios prevented the "others" from making this decision (see FRUS Archives; Druşotis, 2008).

Although Ankara remained aloof from separatist and Taksim politics until 1964, the Turkish Cypriot leadership believed that the status quo of Zurich and London posed a great risk to Turkish Cypriot identity and in this sense was perceived as the greatest threat to Turkish identity. Although Ankara resisted this belief for a long time, the Zurich-London framework did not bring long-term happiness to the Turkish Cypriots from this perspective. After the collapse of the Republic of Cyprus' partnership, Ankara could not prevent the Turks from living in segregated enclaves, but it could provide financial and humanitarian aid and supply some arms. Similarly, despite repeated warnings from Turkish Cypriot leaders, Ankara refrained from supporting plans for Taksim or a federation until their Greek Cypriot counterparts overthrew the constitutional order and delivered a threatening message to Ankara (see Denktaş, 2000). As soon as the Greek Cypriot leadership acted, the Turkish Cypriot leaders began to influence Ankara's foreign policy and expected military intervention; however, Ankara could not give the expected response to this demand as the conditions were not yet ripe.

Conclusion

The island of Cyprus experienced a significant shift in its political landscape during the 1950s and 1960s, as world politics strongly influenced the nationalist policies of the two communities. In the 1950s, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was not yet a significant player on the international stage, and Moscow had not yet formulated a direct policy towards Cyprus. As a result, the issue of Cyprus remained within the domain of NATO, and the policies of Taksim and Enosis were guided by the assumption that the island was a NATO territory. After gaining independence in 1960, however, Nicosia recognised the benefits of the political arena provided by Moscow and the Non-Aligned Movement. In this context, the policies of Taksim (partition) and Enosis (unification with Greece) were guided by the assumption that Cyprus was a NATO island. Consequently, Makarios abandoned the idea of double Enosis, which had to be eliminated, and received the full support of Moscow and the Non-Aligned Movement for his policy of independence.

Makarios secured and neutralised the influence of Greece and NATO on Makarios with the Moscow and Non-Aligned card. Since NATO could not risk a plan without Ankara, Enosis in these circumstances meant double Enosis, so Makarios, to put it bluntly, had to change the course of his policy towards independence whether he wanted to or not. Once the road to Enosis was blocked, Makarios had no choice but independence. This was nothing less than the discovery of virtue on the road to independence. Therefore, the Turkish Cypriots could not exert as much influence on the international stage as Makarios. The Greek Cypriot leader managed to balance the power of NATO by using the NAM and de-Stalinisation. In this sense, it would be misleading to consider this as a success of Makarios alone, because the changed development of world politics also neutralised the expected influence on Cyprus. This policy of independence was in line with the conditions of the time, the independent, sovereign and non-aligned politics of the Eastern bloc and NAM, and such a form of nationalism (Kıralp, 2015, 2019). This was in line with Machiavelli's admonition to pursue in politics what is and not what should be. Makarios refined this philosophy in his politics and abandoned Plato in order to survive.

This article analyses the historical events of the first half of the 1960s (up to the aftermath of the Battle of Erenköy) and concludes that there was a reciprocal interaction between Cypriot political leaderships and the nationalist policies of foreign actors. Similarly, motherland nationalist political figures in Cyprus were instrumental in bringing the partnership to an end. In particular, the shift from the Greek goal of Enosis to a kind of double Enosis goal of NATO, of which Greece was a member, contributed to Makarios steering the island towards independence and adopting a Cyprus-based form of nationalism. Moreover, the USSR and NAM's support for Makarios prevented NATO countries from taming the Cypriot state. Unlike in the 1960s, when the NAM and Moscow became part of the problem, the Cyprus conflict in the 1950s was merely an internal NATO struggle. As a result, the political interests of the Greek Cypriots under Makarios shifted from Greek nationalism in favour of Enosis to Cypriot nationalism. One of the conclusions of this article is that, as Suzman (1999) states, any nationalist movement needs international support. Another possible conclusion is that the measures taken by Makarios in Cyprus in 1964 are largely consistent with constructivist theory of IR, which focuses on interstate behaviour, identity and norms. In this sense, it can be argued that Makarios' policies were probably aimed at strengthening Cyprus' national identity and international recognition. At the same time, however, one must also consider the internal social dynamics and the uncertainties that these dynamics could create.

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EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In 1950, Archbishop Makarios took over the political leadership of the Greek Cypriot community and the leadership of the Enosis struggle. in 1954, Greece applied to the United Nations for the realisation of Enosis by granting Cyprus the right to self-determination, but without success. In April 1955, the EOKA organisation, led by Grivas, began an armed struggle against the British colonial administration for Enosis. Britain organised the London Conference in September 1995 to use Turkey's power against the Greek side. Makarios demanded the right to self-determination in order to annex the island to Greece, while the Turkish Government supported the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots defended Taksim, i.e. the division of the island by Turkey and Greece, against the Greek side's demand for Enosis. The violence that had started between the Greeks and the British spilled over to the Turks in the following years and turned into ethnic violence between the island's two communities. In 1958, Washington expressed its dissatisfaction with the tensions between Ankara and Athens in a louder tone. The parties distanced themselves from the Enosis and Taksim theses and reconciled according to the model of an "independent Cyprus" proposed by the USA.

The agreements did not fully satisfy Ankara, which renounced Taksim, nor the Turkish Cypriot leadership, nor Athens, which renounced Enosis. Both nationalisms in Cyprus were dissatisfied with the agreements, but Makarios had the most negative attitude among these political actors, as he signed the texts under strong pressure from Athens. In the presidential elections that took place in Cyprus in 1959, Makarios became president and Dr Fazıl Küçük, the political leader of the Turkish Cypriots, became vice president. The Republic of Cyprus was officially established when its constitution came into force on 16 August 1960. This also marked the entry into force of the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance. The establishment of the state did not lead to the development of a state consciousness based on the "Cypriot" consciousness. The national consciousness of the Turkish community was centred on Turkey, while the national consciousness of the Greek Cypriot community was centred on Greece. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot leadership soon began to look for ways to resume the Enosis struggle.

The Republic of Cyprus was a partnership based on the political equality of the two communities. The President and Vice-President had the right to veto decisions of the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives on issues such as defence, security and foreign policy. On the other hand, Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership defended the Constitution

of the Republic of Cyprus and its implementation in the period 1960-1963. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot leadership, especially Makarios, did not welcome the Republic of Cyprus' partnership as it prevented Enosis and gave the Turkish Cypriots, whom they considered a "minority", an equal political status with the Greeks and they were uncomfortable sharing political power with the Turkish community, whom they considered a "minority". Makarios' most strategic foreign policy move was to join the Non-Aligned Movement. The Greek leader was aware that Turkey was a geostrategically important NATO member and that NATO could not fulfil the Greek side's demands on the Cyprus issue without Turkey's consent. In this context, Makarios saw the Non-Aligned Movement as a critical centre of power on the international stage where he could rally support against the Constitution and the Zurich and London Treaties. Therefore, the constitutional change demanded by Makarios was not a domestic issue, but an international one that directly affected the guarantor states Turkey, Greece and Great Britain.

This article analyses the historical events of the first half of the 1960s (up to the aftermath of the Battle of Erenköy) and concludes that there was a reciprocal interaction between Cypriot political leaderships and the nationalist policies of foreign actors. Similarly, motherland nationalist political figures in Cyprus were instrumental in bringing the partnership to an end. In particular, the shift from the Greek goal of Enosis to a kind of double Enosis goal of NATO, of which Greece was a member, contributed to Makarios steering the island towards independence and adopting a Cyprus-based form of nationalism. Moreover, the USSR and NAM's support for Makarios prevented NATO countries from taming the Cypriot state. Unlike in the 1960s, when the NAM and Moscow became part of the problem, the Cyprus conflict in the 1950s was merely an internal NATO struggle. As a result, the political interests of the Greek Cypriots under Makarios shifted from Greek nationalism in favour of Enosis to Cypriot nationalism. One of the conclusions of this article is that, as Suzman (1999) states, any nationalist movement needs international support.