ON THE NOTION OF MEANING:

PROPOSITIONALIST AND COUNTER-PROPOSITIONALIST VIEWS

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Abstract: This study aims at examining propositionalism in contrast to its opposing perspectives, assessing whether it offers a sufficient framework to explain relationships between propositions solely in terms of propositions themselves. The first section introduces essential concepts such as *truth*, *meaning*, *sentence*, *object*, and *proposition*. To underscore the breadth of current debates, it explores conditional sentences through illustrative examples and provides a concise overview of the motivations behind propositionalism, outlining its key arguments. Subsequently, the study analyzes two prominent strands of propositionalism—referred to as Propositionalism A and Propositionalism B—both widely discussed in academic discourse. The second section delves into the limitations of these approaches, focusing on key issues such as intentionality, propositional attitudes, and non-propositional objects, while also highlighting the semantic distinctions between metaphorical and literal meanings. The conclusion, drawing on examples that emphasize relationships involving non-propositional objects rather than mere propositions, argues that propositionalism fails to offer a comprehensive framework for sentence meaning, as it overlooks significant aspects of language use.

Keywords: Propositionalism, Meaning, Non-propositional Objects, Intentional Attitudes, Objectuality

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ANLAM NOSYONU ÜZERİNE:

ÖNERMECİ VE ÖNERMECİLİK KARŞITI GÖRÜŞLER

Öz: Bu çalışmanın amacı, önermecilik görüşünü, onun karşıtı ile değerlendirmek ve önermeciliğin önermeler arasındaki ilişkileri önerme temelinde açıklayan bir çerçeve sunup sunmadığını soruşturmaktır. İlk bölüm, *doğruluk, anlam,* cümle, nesne ve önerme gibi temel kavramlarla birlikte tanıtmaktadır. Devam etmekte olan tartışmaların geniş kapsamını vurgulamak amacıyla koşullu cümleleri örnekler üzerinden tartışan bu bölüm, önermeciliğin motivasyonlarına kısa bir genel bakış sunmakta ve temel argümanlarını açıklamaktadır. Ardından, akademik tartışmalarda yoğun bir şekilde incelenen önermecilik A ve önermecilik B olarak adlandırılan iki temel önermecilik yaklaşımı incelenmektedir. İkinci bölüm ise önermeciliğin her iki türündeki kısıtlamaların analizini sunmakta ve *niyetlilik, tutum* ve *önermeye dayalı olmayan nesneler* gibi önemli kavramlara odaklanmakta, mecazi anlam ve gerçek anlam arasındaki semantik nüansları açıklamaktadır. Sonuç bölümü, önermecilik argümanının temelini oluşturan ve önermeler yerine, özne ile önermeye dayalı olmayan nesneler arasındaki ilişkileri vurgulayan örnekler üzerinden, önermeciliğin önermeler arasındaki ilişkilere dayalı olarak cümle anlamının kapsamlı bir çerçevesini sunamadığı ve birçok örneği göz ardı etmekte olduğu sonucuna varılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Önermecilik, Anlam, Önermeye dayalı olmayan nesneler, Niyetsel tutumlar, Nesnelik

1. Introduction

The relationship among the three key terms in logic—sentence, proposition, and meaning—has long been a subject of contention within the realms of philosophy of language and philosophical logic. Two predominant schools of thought emerge: the propositionalist and counter-propositionalist camps. Propositionalist proponents assert that the meaning of a sentence lies in its proposition. To quote Rothschild (2015), this perspective aligns with the notion that "the truth-conditional content of a sentence" equates to "the proposition it expresses" (p. 781). This stance entails a transformation wherein the proposition inherent in a sentence, typically expressed as a that-clause, becomes synonymous with the sentence's meaning. For instance, 'Snow is white' is understood to mean 'the proposition that Snow is white'. Central to this debate is the semantic function of verbs like 'means', defended by propositionalists and contested by their counter-propositionalist counterparts. Thomson (1969), for instance, challenges this stance, questioning the transition from the formulation '*S means P*' to the assertion 'P = *the meaning that S has*' (see p. 741). The crux of the disagreement lies in discerning what constitutes the meaning: is it merely the proposition conveyed by the sentence, or is it something more nuanced and complex?

The intensity of these debates escalates significantly when we factor in the inherent ambiguity and intentional nuances present within propositions. This dimension of the discourse intricately intersects with the natural evolution of spoken languages. Evidently, the propositionalist perspective struggles to furnish a framework wherein the meaning of any given sentence can be unequivocally equated with its proposition, irrespective of the temporal and contextual variations that sentences inherently possess.

Consider a revised version of Kripke's disquotation technique (see 1979) in the analysis of intentional sentences through an examination of an illustrative example that sets the stage for the ongoing debate, inspired by the seminal work of Frege, namely *Sinn und Bedeutung*. Nelson, for the sake of argument, treats the narratives of Superman as factual events and contends that Lois Lane is a colleague of Clark Kent whom she is definitely familiar with, yet although she admires Superman, she does not know that 'Clark Kent' is identical with the hero known as 'Superman'. Consequently, while assertions (a) and (b) can be confidently made, a conundrum emerges with regard to assertion (c):

(a) Lois believes that Superman is strong.

(b) Lois does not believe that Clark Kent is strong.

As 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' are co-referential terms, one might anticipate their interchangeable usage to yield no semantic discrepancy, in which case (c) would be false despite the co-reference of the terms:

(c) Lois does not believe that Superman is strong.[1]

The crux of the matter lies in the nuanced semantic differences between these co-referential terms in the sentences they inhabit. While Frege's seminal work introduces a framework based on the distinction between sense and reference to tackle this issue, a revised iteration of Kripke's disquotation technique seems to be elucidating the problem through specifications concerning the propositional reports of intentional assertions: "If an agent *A* sincerely, reflectively, and competently accepts a sentence *s* (under circumstances properly related to a context *c*), then *A* believes, at the time of *c*, what *s* expresses in *c*".[2] However, the relativization of context and time through the specifications introduced by the disquotation technique, Nelson (2023) contends that there is no need for that because

> Suppose an agent accepts 'I am hungry' at t. It should not follow from this that she believes what is expressed by 'I am hungry' as uttered by you–unless you happen to be the agent in question. It also shouldn't follow that she always persists in believing what she believes; she is free to change her mind on the matter.

Drawing attention to the intricacies of ambiguity and its correlation with intentionality, Thomson introduces a thought experiment, which puts the emphasis on the Grice's intention-based semantics[3] rather than co-reference, or reference in general. Thomson's thought experiment involves two distinct languages: English and Other. In both linguistic contexts, a sentence σ, when assertively uttered, assumes divergent meanings. He elucidates this relationship as follows:

> It does not help that σ was English; it was and is, whatever was then said. English was spoken then; but so apparently was Other. The suggestion that σ was uttered *with* this meaning rather than that one is unhelpful in a different way, because

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[1] For a more detailed analysis of the case, see Nelson, (2023).

[2] See Nelson, (2023).

[3] See Grice, (1957).

> obscure. It is not that one cannot utter a sentence with a meaning. ... But equally
> you utter it, you utter a sentence with two meanings, just as if you hit a bigamous
> man you hit a man with two wives. Evidently the notion appealed to here is
> different. It is more nearly that of intention. If someone utters the sentence 'Jack
> is fair' he will usually have one of two intentions, that of saying that Jack is blond
> or that of saying that Jack is just (Thomson, 1969, pp. 743-744).

The primary challenge confronting a propositionalist lies in the inherent limitations of
their theoretical framework. While propositionalism purports to offer a methodological
approach that ostensibly sidesteps the complexities of temporal and contextual
variations in sentences by recasting them into that-clause propositions, there exist
scenarios that defy resolution without accounting for the speaker's intention. Despite the
purported comprehensiveness of dictionaries, the pervasive influence of time and
context introduces an element of uncertainty, wherein a sentence may convey meanings
divergent from those reconstructed by the propositionalist. This ambiguity is
particularly pronounced in cases where the speaker remains unaware of any potential
misuses or inaccuracies in their choice of words. In other words, the propositionalist
stance encounters significant hurdles when confronted with the nuanced intricacies of
language usage and the subjective intentions of speakers.

Certainly, the matter at hand pertains to the truth-value of sentences and consequently
extends to other scenarios, including conditionals. Rothschild (2015), positing that the
proposition conveyed by a conditional, if one exists, diverges from the material
conditional, asserts that there is no plausible method of reconciling the disparity
between natural language conditionals and material conditionals (see p. 783). As is
known, natural language conditionals, as observed in natural languages like English,
serve to express the relationship of implication between propositions within the given
language. For instance, consider the statement 'If it's foggy, then the visual range is
short', where the truth value of the consequent ('the visual range is short') hinges on the
truth of the antecedent ('it is foggy'). In contrast, the material conditional finds its place
within formal systems such as propositional logic or first-order logic. In such systems,
any statement in the form $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ is deemed true unless φ is true and ψ is false. Despite
the structural resemblance between the two types of conditionals, significant disparities
exist. While natural language conditionals are subject to influence from the speaker's
intentions or contextual factors, material conditionals operate within a purely formal
realm and adhere strictly to truth-functional semantics. Consequently, challenges often
arise in the translation of natural language into formal languages, particularly when
considering the speaker's intentions or contextual nuances. Moreover, vacuously true
propositions present a further complication, exemplified by statements like 'If unicorns
are purple, then the laws of thermodynamics are true'. Pointing out the disparities
between natural language and material conditionals, Rothschild (2015) provides an
analysis of the following four cases concerning *(A→C)* and *(¬A ∨ C)*:

> First, consider a case in which A is false: 'either not A or C' seems to be clearly
> true in this case, but it is much less clear that 'if A then C' is true. Second, consider
> evidence that A is false. This is clearly evidence for the disjunction 'either not A
> or C', but it is not evidence for 'if A then C'. Third, the probability of 'either not
> A or C' cannot be lower than the probability that A is false. On the other hand, it

seems that the probability that 'if A then C' can be arbitrarily low even when the probability that A is false is high–consider for instance the probability of statement 'if the world ends tomorrow, it will end at precisely 3:03pm'. All these differences suggest that the proposition expressed by a conditional, if any, is not the material conditional (p. 783).

The issues inherent to propositionalism originate from the disparity between symbolic language and natural languages. It is not as straightforward as propositionalists presume to semantically model natural language by equating the meaning of a sentence with its proposition. Nevertheless, there exist other comprehensible motivations behind propositionalism, which, naturally, have sparked additional debates.

2. Propositionalism A and Propositionalism B

The concept of propositionalism encompasses five main types, each offering a distinct perspective on what constitutes a proposition.[4] In general propositionalism, all informational content is regarded as propositional.[5] However, the other types are more specific in their criteria for what qualifies as propositional content. For instance, attitudinal propositionalism focuses on emotional or mental attitudes, considering content such as love for someone as propositional.[6] Pictorial propositionalism, on the other hand, extends this notion to visual descriptions, encompassing various forms of images as propositional.[7] Linguistic propositionalism, influenced by Frege, broadens the scope to include all linguistic content, such as modes of presentation or senses, as propositional.[8] Denotational propositionalism and sententialism, meanwhile, represent reductive approaches. Denotational propositionalism advocates for reducing linguistic references to propositional content,[9] while sententialism aims to reduce intensionality to embeddings within that-clauses.[10]

The taxonomy of propositionalism expands when one ventures beyond the confines of logic into realms such as metaphysics and epistemology. Indeed, discussions surrounding propositionalism inevitably intersect with debates about truth and meaning, firmly rooted in the domains of epistemology and metaphysics. These discussions grapple with how to reconcile the ambiguous and intentional nature of propositions without succumbing to paradoxes or inconsistencies. From an epistemological standpoint, propositionalists advocate for grounding the justification of propositions in the relations between them. According to Kvanvig (2007), this perspective persists because it "allows a strong relationship between the theory of justification and more standard confirmation theory where claims are confirmed and disconfirmed by information gleaned from experiments and other source" (p. 176).

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[4] See Liefke, (2024).

[5] See Grzankowski & Montague, (2018).

[6] See, Montague, (2007).

[7] See Zimmermann, (2016) and Bücking, (2018).

[8] See Frege, (1892).

[9] See Quine, (1956).

[10] See, Larson, (2002).

Beyond justification, propositionalism is driven by various other motivations. A brief examination of these motivations may provide further insight into the essence of propositionalism.

There are four primary motives underlying propositionalism. The first of these can be articulated as follows: "Propositions, which stand in logical relations, allow us to properly index the mental states and their relations to one another" (Grzankowski, 2015, p. 377). This motive closely aligns with Kvanvig's perspective, albeit with significant implications for the philosophy of mind. It raises questions about whether propositions can exhaustively account for all mental states, or if there exist non-propositional mental states. This motive is particularly foundational to debates surrounding the intentionality of attitudes and the truth-value of propositions. Grzankowski (2015) further elaborates on the second motive, positing that "without propositional *relata* practical syllogisms will be impossible to construct and a theory of motivation will flounder" (p. 377). While discussions within propositionalism occasionally incorporate discourse on possible worlds, the prevailing metaphysical framework tends to be realist and empiricist. From a propositionalist perspective, constructing practical syllogisms necessitates viewing propositional *relata* not as mere fictions, but as inherently integrated with the fabric of reality. Thirdly, concerning strictly non-conceptual content and the manner in which individuals engage with reality, proponents argue that "if the attitudes are related in certain interesting epistemic ways ... then the contents of those attitudes must be both conceptual and propositional" (Grzankowski, 2015, p. 377). Although the notion of conceptual and non-conceptual content being simultaneously conceptualized and propositional seems paradoxical, propositionalists adopt a reductive stance, subsuming both types of content under propositions and propositional *relata*. The fourth motive revolves around the objectuality of propositional constituents, echoing Russellian arguments. Russell famously contended that quantified phrases such as 'the F' do not independently contribute to propositions as constituents due to their inherent incompleteness. Building upon this notion, Grzankowski suggests that propositionalism presupposes propositions to be existentially quantifiable.[11] Despite their individual controversies, these motives collectively yield the following commitments or implications for propositionalism:

(i) Propositions are the objects of the attitudes.

(ii) Propositions are the bearers of alethic properties such truth and falsity.

(iii) Propositions are the bearers of modal properties.

(iv) Propositions are the semantic values (in context) of uttered declarative sentences.

(v) Propositions are the compositional semantic values of that-clauses (Hodgson, 2012, pp. 339-340).

The most contentious commitment among propositionalists is arguably the first one outlined above, which can be considered foundational to the others. In fact, some

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[11] See Grzankowski, (2015).

scholars define propositionalism primarily through this commitment. [12] Montague (2007), for example, asserts that "propositionalism is the view that for any intentional attitude φ, to be intentionally related to something, say Roger, is ipso facto to φ *that Roger is F*, for some property *F*" (p. 503). However, propositionalists diverge along two paths concerning the relationships between the three terms: *the subject*, *the non-propositional object*, and *propositional attitudes*. One strain of propositionalism argues that "there is a propositional attitude or attitudes (of that subject's) in terms of which it can be analysed" (Grzankowski, 2015, p. 380). In contrast, the other strain contends that "there are propositional attitudes (of that subject's) upon which it supervenes" (Grzankowski, 2015, p. 380). As these two types of propositionalism are arguably too specific to fall under the categories listed above, I follow Grzankowski and refer to the former as *Propositionalism A* (PA) and the latter as *Propositionalism B* (PB) for the purposes of our subsequent discussions. To illustrate their main commitment, we can assert that propositionalists maintain that many psychological states are propositional attitudes. Crawford (2014) aptly encapsulates the controversial position with regard to the three terms—subject, non-propositional object, and propositional attitudes—as follows:

> [Propositionalist allege that the] inference from 'Maggie believes that Philip is reading' and 'Tom believes that Philip is reading' to 'There is something which Maggie and Tom both believe' is formally valid and that its formal validity implies that the second sentence quantifies over a proposition. The propositionalist gives the argument the following simple and clearly valid first-order quantificational form: *Fab, Fcb*, therefore $\exists x(Fax \& Fcx)$ (pp. 179-180).

3. Counter-propositionalist Arguments

PA and PB encounter challenges, as highlighted by Grzankowski. Let me first examine the problems PA faces. Analyzing attitudes and their meanings from a propositionalist perspective proves to be difficult and lacks guarantees under PA. In essence, there is no necessary condition that safeguards against counterexamples. Were such an analysis to provide such a necessary condition, PA would represent a method of accessing meaning that is both modellable and free from the ambiguity arising from the time and context dependence inherent in natural language. Grzankowski contests PA using the case of Tom and Sally, where Tom likes Sally. The properties attributed to objects are inherently time and context-dependent, meaning that they are subject to change. This flux undermines any stability in the meaning of predicates with which an object is associated. In the case of Tom and Sally, Grzankowski (2015) remarks:

> If we demand some particular property, we will face immediate worries. For example, consider the following: S likes Sally iff S likes that Sally is nice. But suppose that Tom is a masochist and doesn't like that Sally is nice. In fact, he takes that trait of Sally's to be a hurdle in their relationship. He may, nevertheless, like Sally. ... A person like Tom might like y even if he fails to like that y is nice (pp. 381-382).

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[12] Since we think of this commitment to be the major one that underlies others, this paper will be concerned with this commitment, including the other commitments into the debates when relevant.

In this scenario, it becomes evident that the analysis of the meaning of the verb encounters difficulties due to the multitude of ways people can interpret concepts like 'liking', each corresponding to different analyses. This variability necessitates a narrowing of context. However, narrowing the context of the verb does not inherently constrain the predicates attributed to the object of the verb, or those supposed to be attributed by the agent of the verb. Consider the following case: "S likes y iff ∃F, S likes that y is F. But once again counterexamples are forthcoming: Obama likes that Osama is dead but Obama doesn't (and didn't) like Osama. Clearly, we have failed to offer a sufficient condition" (Grzankowski, 2015, pp. 381-382). Analysis alone fails to account for predicates themselves, requiring an analysis that incorporates non-propositional elements such as the epistemological concerns surrounding the formation process of predicates. This highlights a domain where the expression and analysis through that-clauses prove inadequate. Here are the two counter-examples that Montague maintains: "Following the 'that'-clause lead, then, it seems that we may analyze *Jonah loves Jane into Jonah loves **that Jane is F** or Jonah loves **Jane's being F**, and* analyze *Jonah worships God into Jonah worships **that God is F** or Jonah worships **God's being F**. But what is the F?"* (Montague, 2007, pp. 510-511). The propositionalist cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the question of the quiddity of 'F' through analysis alone, as these inquiries venture into the realms of epistemology and metaphysics, alongside logic. Thus, regardless of the specificity or generality of the context of meaning, the propositionalists' attempts fall short. Montague (2007) acknowledges this, asserting that "Presumably it is either going to be something relatively specific like 'is beautiful' *(Jonah loves that Jane is beautiful, Jane's being beautiful?)* or 'is benevolent' *(Jonah worships that God is benevolent, God's being benevolent*?), or something essentially more general" (p. 511). However, even this analysis fails to furnish a necessary condition. Let's consider the scope of the verb 'love' in the following scenario, where both the meaning and justification cannot be adequately provided through a propositionalist analysis:

> (8) *X loves Y if and only if (∃F)[X loves that Y has F]*, and (9) *Solomon loves John if and only if (∃F)[Solomon loves that John has F]* is just an instance of (8). But ... (10) *Solomon loves John*. Solomon may love that Rosamond is beautiful. By existentially generalizing on the property of beauty the wide scope analysis of 'loves' is entailed: (∃F)[Solomon loves that Rosamond has *F*]. But Solomon may not love Rosamond; although her beauty enchants him, he is in love with someone else. I believe this strategy will work for all properties (Montague, 2007, pp. 512-513).

Indeed, this approach appears to be a logically sound strategy targeting the bold claim of propositionalism that all intentional attitudes are relations of propositions. However, as demonstrated by the following counterexample: "Whatever property Solomon loves about Rosamond, her beauty, kindness, humor, intelligence, or some combination of these, it does not follow that Solomon loves Rosamond" (Montague, 2007, p. 513). This counterexample challenges the notion that all intentional attitudes necessarily correspond to propositions. Another counterexample, provided by Grzankowski (2016), involves objectual attitudes, exemplified by the scenario of fear and dislike: "The reason I want to be far away from Jones is that I fear him. Sam wants to be far away from Jones as well, but it is because he dislikes Jones. We both want the same thing–to be away from Jones–but the reason I want what I want is different from Sam's reason" (pp. 829-830).

Once again, attempting to paraphrase the sentences into propositions fails to elucidate the distinction between the two different meanings underlying the shared proposition 'to be away from Jones'. These examples highlight the limitations of propositionalist analysis in capturing the complexities inherent in intentional attitudes, particularly when it comes to objectual attitudes.

The problem of PA can be traced back to the distinction between the *literal* and *figurative* uses of language. In the literal use, sentences in a language *L* convey precisely what is explicitly stated. For example, 'It is rainy right now' signifies that the weather is indeed rainy at the time of speaking. Conversely, in figurative usage, sentences extend beyond the literal meanings of the words, employed to convey a meaning divergent from the literal interpretation. Take for instance the sentence, 'I have no social life at all, I am literally dead', where the latter half employs a metaphor to rephrase the former, even utilizing the word 'literally' in a figurative context. The question arises: are the figurative uses inherently embedded within the literal, thus accessible through the analysis that PA offers? Meyer delves into the relationship between figurative and literal uses concerning meaning. His analysis culminates in the concept of intentionality, suggesting that solely relying on the purely literal interpretation is insufficient for fully grasping meaning. He states:

> If by the sentence 1) "It's cold", I mean 2) "I should wear a warm coat", we can say that 2) is the figurative meaning of 1), one among other possible readings of 1). We can also say that, by uttering 1), I raise some question that 2) answers. But if by 1), I only intended its literal reading, there would not be any question raised, because 1) would already be the answer. The meaning process would be closed by 1), while, if some other meaning is intended, 1) is merely problematological and the question of *what* 1) means would be raised by uttering 1) (Meyer, 1998, p. 364).

The conclusion he arrives at is the invalidity of assuming that the figurative meaning is inherently concealed within the literal interpretation. Embracing this notion in PA would lead to overinvestment in analysis. Meyer (1998) deduces that "From this, one cannot conclude that this latter answer is already *there*, as a hidden *presence*, to use Derrida's term. One has to *find* the answer, and what is literal not anteriorly given" (p. 365).

Grzankowski responds to PB by pursuing two lines of thought. We'll focus on the first one, as the second involves assumptions about the philosophy of biology that we neither endorse nor aim to substantiate. In his reply, Grzankowski employs a *reductio ad absurdum* strategy, leading to the conclusion that one would need to possess knowledge of all the proposed propositional attitudes to avoid a fear of snakes, a proposition he deems absurd. In this context, fear is conceptualized as an objectual attitude that eludes explanation through PB. Grzankowski (2015) elucidates:

> Jones believes that snakes are scary to him, Jones wants to be far away from all snakes, and Jones fears that snakes will bite him. But all of this may be true and Jones might still fail to fear snakes. Jones might want to be away from them because he thinks they tend to explode (it's explosions that make him nervous, not snakes as such), the prospect of being bitten may sound bad to him on the grounds that he

doesn't want fang marks on his skin before the big swimsuit competition, and, again, his belief may be explained by bad therapy (p. 383).

The set encapsulated by the proposition of desiring to be far away from all snakes does not encompass the underlying reasons or motivations behind this desire. This distinct set, replete with considerations of 'why woulds' and 'why shoulds', constitutes the realm of meaning that propositions may inadequately capture through analysis. Merricks (2009) concurs with this notion contending that "fear and desire are never propositional attitudes, not even when the content of the relevant fear or desire can be fully expressed by using a that-clause" (p. 210).

The majority of counter-propositionalists contend that intentional attitudes establish a connection or link between subjects and non-propositional objects, thereby excluding the possibility of establishing a relationship between the subject and a set of propositions. Montague (2007), among these theorists, asserts that, as of now, there is no compelling reason to think otherwise, stating, "The burden of argument is plainly on the propositionalists" (p. 507).

Desire serves as an exemplar of an attitude wherein non-propositional objects maintain a connection with the subject, a phenomenon that PB fails to elucidate. Montague argues that PB's inadequacy in accounting for this exemplary verb lies in its omission of explanations rooted in the relationship between the subject and non-propositional objects, rather than propositional ones. For instance, he illustrates that one could desire chocolate without liking it, perhaps with the aim of gaining weight, or one could desire to gain weight as a means of resembling one's partner more closely.[13] Thus, Montague contends that PB's deficiency stems from its failure to address these relational aspects inherent in intentional attitudes.

4. Conclusion

As previously discussed, numerous examples illustrate the relationships between subjects and non-propositional objects, rather than propositions. Verbs such as 'desire', 'fear', and 'love' exemplify an objectual nature, featuring non-propositional objects. This characteristic of these verbs suggests that the meaning of sentences cannot be solely reduced to propositions. Both PA and PB encounter their respective challenges: PA struggles to reconcile the gap between context-dependent cases and the propositionalist account of meaning, while PB fails to address counterexamples involving verbs that cannot be adequately explained by propositions. In conclusion, propositionalism falls short in providing a comprehensive account of sentence meaning solely through relations among propositions. Numerous instances remain unaccounted for, indicating that the burden of proof rests on the propositionalists to justify their approach.

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[13] See Montague, (2007), p. 509.

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