TURKEY AS A NEW SECURITY ACTOR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA*

AFRİKA BOYNUZU'NDA YENİ BİR GÜVENLIK AKTÖRÜ OLARAK TÜRKİYE

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Abstract: Due to having unique geographical location, the Horn of Africa is one of the most important strategic regions in the world. Thanks to the geo-political and the geo-economic importance of the region, global and regional actors have continuously maintained their strategic relations with this region throughout history. Despite the existence of structural political, economic, and security crises in the region, significant political and economic transformation has emerged throughout the region after the 2000s. This study argues whether Turkey's increasing security cooperation with the Horn of Africa has contributed to the political, economic and military transformation of the countries in the region. Since 2011, Turkey has implemented a multi-faceted and proactive foreign policy to strengthen its strategic relations with the Horn of Africa. This article found that that Turkey's lack of a history of exploitation and active humanitarian aid policy of Turkey in Africa have paved the way for the emergence of the establishment of strong and long-term strategic partnerships with the countries in the Horn of Africa.

Keywords: Turkey, AK Party, Africa, Horn of Africa, Security, Foreign Policy

Öz: Afrika Boynuzu, eşsiz coğrafi konumu nedeniyle dünyanın en önemli stratejik bölgelerinden biridir. Bölgenin jeo-politik ve jeo-ekonomik öneminden dolayı küresel ve bölgesel aktörler bu bölgeyle stratejik ilişkilerini tarih boyunca sürekli bir şekilde devam ettirmişlerdir. Bölgede yapısal siyasi, ekonomik ve güvenlik krizlerinin varlığına rağmen 2000'li yıllardan sonra bölge genelinde önemli siyasi ve ekonomik dönüşümler ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu çalışma, Türkiye'nin Afrika Boynuzu ile artan güvenlik isbirliğinin, Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki ülkelerin siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri acıdan dönüşümlerine ne ölçüde katkıda bulunup bulunmadığını tartışmaktadır. Türkiye, 2011 yılından bu yana Afrika Boynuzu ile stratejik ilişkileri geliştirmek için çok yönlü ve proaktif bir dış politika gelistirmektedir. Bu makale, Türkiye'nin sömürü gecmisinin olmaması Türkiye'nin Afrika'daki aktif insani yardım politikasının, Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki ülkelerle güçlü ve uzun vadeli stratejik ortaklıkların kurulmasına zemin hazırladığını vurgulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, AK Parti, Afrika, Afrika Boynuzu, Güvenlik, Dış Politika

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1.Introduction

The geopolitical and geoeconomic importance of the African continent in general and the Horn of Africa in particular continues in world politics. The Horn of Africa is one of the most dynamic regions in the world economically and politically. The Horn of Africa is very close to the geo-politically very important points in the world such as Red Sea, Bab Al- Mandeb Strait, and the Arabian Peninsula and also it is located in a region that is very rich in terms of oil and natural gas resources. For these reasons, both global and regional actors keep their strategic relations with this region at the highest level. For example, because of the strategic importance of Djibouti, which is geographically located in the Bab Al- Mandeb Strait, global actors such as the U.S., China, France, Japan, Germany, and Italy established their military bases in this country in order to protect their political and economic interests in the region (Alexandre, 2020: 50).

Since the 2000s, the Horn of Africa has undergone a major political and economic transformation. For example, the countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya have become among the fast growing countries in Africa. The Somali Federal Government was established in 2012 after the elections held for the first times since 1991. As a result of the emergence of a relative political stability in Somalia, it has started to make great strides economically in recent years. Ethiopia and Eritrea ended their historical hostilities in 2018 which paving the way for the emergence of a strategic partnership between the two countries in the region (Kaizhi, 2018). All these examples show us that the political and economic dynamics of the region play a significant role in transforming the region. This study consists of three main parts. The first chapter examines the geopolitical significance of the Horn of Africa. The second part analyzes the relations of global and regional actors with this region. The final section analyzes Turkey's foreign and security policy in the Horn of Africa.

2. The Geopolitical Importance of the Horn of Africa

During the Cold War, world politics consisted of a bipolar international system. The countries in the world generally took their place in the international system by falling under the influence of either the USA or the Soviet Union at that time. Therefore, it was not possible for the countries to develop independent foreign policies under the umbrella of the bipolar international system represented by the USA or the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Even though the African countries gained their independence in the aftermath of the World War II, they could not achieve true political and economic independence. With the collapse of the Cold War, significant challenges to the unipolar international system emerged in the nature of the international system. Particularly African countries have begun to take strategic steps to get rid of the old system and to truly achieve their political and economic independence (Nhlapo, 2012).

Since 2000, African countries have sought to diversify their foreign policies and

move away from the neo-colonial policies to become truly independent actors in world politics. In this respect, the African countries see the rising powers as a great opportunity to diversify their foreign and security policies. The African countries have taken strategic steps to develop the bilateral relations with the rising powers, especially China and Russia. The increasing strategic involvement of new actors in African politics has also posed a number of threats to traditional African actors. The first and most important threat is that African countries gaining strategic autonomy is a situation that will radically change the relations between the former European colonial countries and the African countries. The second threat is that the former colonial powers will not be able to continue exploiting African countries for their economic interests with their neo-colonial policies. The third threat is that countries that the West sees as rivals, such as China and Russia, are gaining significant power in the African continent, which is an undesirable situation for Western countries.

For instance, China has become the largest economic power in the African continent as well as in the region of the Horn of Africa. In particular, China uses its political and economic power to gain strategic control over the energy, gas and precious metals of the African countries. China has built a military base in Djibouti to protect its strategic investments especially in Africa. China is also developing very special strategic relations with Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa. Under the Road and Belt Initiative, China is carrying out the work of more than 400 projects in areas such as roads, infrastructure and railways by lending four billion dollars to this country. China also supplied unmanned aerial vehicles to Ethiopia during the 2022 Tigray war. In this sense, China, plays a very important role in limiting the strategic power of the USA with its extensive economic and military relations on the African continent in general and in the Horn of Africa in particular (Abdulrahman, 2022).

The core countries in the Horn of Africa include Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Ethiopia but this list has geographically expanded over time and contained new countries including Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda (Oumar, 2020: 59). The Horn has massive economic potential due to having its strategic location and rich oil and gas. The total population of the region is 282 million which corresponds to 33 percent of the continent's population. The gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020 was \$281.49 billion. This region is also a gateway to enter to the central African markets (Abebe, 2021: 362).

There are three important reasons and dynamics affecting the geopolitical structure of the Horn of Africa in world politics (Oumar, 2020: 59). The first is that since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, passing through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait has been strategically important because of the passage of commercial and oil vessels. Between 10 and 20 percent of global trade takes place in this region (Lanfranchi, 2022). This has changed the geo-strategic significance of the Horn of Africa in the world as well as in the region. It is important to highlight that the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is one of the most important geo-strategic points in the world connecting Asia and Europe. More than 40 percent of oil vessels in the world pass through the Bab el Mandeb Strait (Abebe, 2021: 362).

6 million barrels of oil per day have been transferred to the West through the Red Sea and the Bab el Mandeb (Lanfranchi, 2022). The second reason is the proximity of the Horn of Africa to the rich oil region in the Gulf. The oil of the Gulf region has been transferred to the West through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea. Besides, the discovery of oil in South Sudan, and Uganda has made the region more strategic region on the international arena. The third reason is that there are strategic points and locations in the region. These include ports, islands and military bases. For instance, the Doraleh port of Djibouti, the Assab port of Eritrea, the Berbera port of Somaliland, and the Suavin island of Sudan have been strategic points for regional and global powers to expand their influence of power in Africa (Oumar, 2020: 60).

3. External Actors' Security Involvement in the Horn of Africa

Global and regional actors have been actively involved in security and politics in the Horn of Africa due to the increasing geo-strategic and geo-economic importance of the region. After the 2010s, the geopolitical competition in the Horn among the actors increased more significantly. The actors have competing interests in the region. The U.S. has developed a much more security-oriented foreign policy in the region after the 9/11 attacks. Combating terrorist organizations including Al-Shabab in Somalia, and Al-Qaeda in Yemen have been among the strategic objectives of the U.S. in the region because protecting the security of oil of the Gulf region and the security of Israel are among the most important priorities of the U.S. foreign and security policy (Tüysüzoğlu, 2019: 336-38). In addition, Iran's active involvement in Yemen through Houthi has been seen as a growing threat by the U.S. in the region. Importantly, the U.S. established a military base in Djibouti in 2003 just after the 9/11 attacks in order to protect its security and strategic interests in the region more actively. The U.S. also actively joined NATO operations between 2009 and 2016 to stop maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (Ibid.). In addition, Japan, Italy, Germany, and France also have military bases in Djibouti.

The rise of China and Russia in the region is also a significant concern for the U.S. in the region. China established a logistical base in Djibouti in 2017. China is the largest economic partner in the region and has made huge strategic investments in this region. For instance, it completed a railway project between Ethiopia and Djibouti in 2018. Expanding its strategic influence in important points including in the Horn of Africa, in the Red Sea, and in the West Indian Ocean has been among the most important priorities of China because of its commercial interests. China also conducted a military operation in 2009 to halt maritime piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa. China has redefined the Horn after the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. As a result of the initiative of the BRI, China has been more actively

involved in its commercial activities in the region. The Horn is particularly defined by Chinese policymakers as a strategic gateway to be able to expand its economic and political influence in the rest of the African continent (Alexandre, 2020: 53-4). Furthermore, Russia has been increasing its involvement on the continent in recent years. For example, the Wagner group has been involved in security and politics in different countries in Africa including Central African Republics (CAR) (Cohen, 2022), Sudan, Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, and Libya. Likewise, Russia endeavors to establish military bases in Somaliland and Eritrea to gain strategic power in the region (Africa Defense Forum, 2023).

There is a tense rivalry among the regional powers of the Middle East to expand influence in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia is one of the actors playing an active role in politics and security in the region. For instance, Saudi Arabia signed a military agreement with Djibouti to establish a military base in 2017. Iran has become a part of the struggle for power in Yemen after the Arab Spring. Houthis' activities in Yemen are seen as a big threat by Saudi Arabia. Iran pays attention to increasing strategic relations with the countries in the region to break its international isolation and strengthen its international legitimacy as a regional actor (Tüysüzoğlu, 2019: 345-6). From the perspective of Saudi Arabia, Iran endeavors to expand its sphere of influence in the regions including the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden through Houthis in Yemen and seeks to attack the Saudi regime. To counterattack against Iran in the Horn, Saudi has conducted military operations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) against the Houthis in Yemen since 2015 Alexandre, 2020: 56). Israel supports the Saudi-led military operations in Yemen against the Houthis in Yemen and perceives the expansion of the power of Iran in the region as a security threat to Israel (Ibid., 59).

Saudi Arabia's policy towards the region changed after 2017 and decided to get more actively involved in politics and security in the region. In particular, Turkey's proactive policy in Somalia and Sudan has changed the foreign policy behavior of the Saudi regime. Besides, Turkey's growing strategic relations with Qatar in the Horn have significantly motivated the Saudi regime to get more actively involved in the region. To paralyze the growing strategic partnership between Turkey and Qatar, Saudi Arabia put political and economic isolation against Qatar in 2017 along with the U.A.E., Egypt, Bahrain, and some countries in the Horn of Africa.

Since Turkey established a military base in Mogadishu in 2017 and signed political, economic and security agreements with Sudan in 2017, Saudi Arabia has decided to become a more actor player in the region. To do so, Saudi Arabia established the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in Riyadh on 6 January 2020 (Bagnetto, 2022) to confront the growing powers of Turkey, Iran, and Qatar in the Horn of Africa and in the Red Sea. At the same time, the U.A.E. has established military bases in Somaliland and Eritrea and constructed commercial ports including in Somaliland, Puntland, and Barawe to expand its sphere of influence

in the region (Alexandre, 2020: 58-9).

4. Turkey's Foreign and Security Policy in the Horn of Africa

Analyzing the historical dynamics of Turkish foreign policy is essential to grasp the factors driving Turkey-Africa relations. After Turkey was established in 1923, it adopted a Western-oriented foreign and security policy. While Turkey's traditional foreign policy maintained its relations with the West at the highest level, it kept it at the lowest level with the non-Western regions. The West became the most important ally for Turkey for a long time. After joining NATO in 1952, Turkey began to deepen its strategic security partnership with the West. Particularly, the Soviet threat against Turkey was a significant motivation to join the Western security umbrella. Turkey also aimed to modernize the Turkish army through a security partnership with the West. Furthermore, Turkey received financial assistance from the West to recover its economy and adopted a Western identity to transform the Turkish identity. For these reasons, Turkey prioritized developing its relations with the West. Turkey's longstanding unilateral relations with the West have resulted in significant repercussions for Turkey's security and economy. The primarily result was that it increased a high level of dependency on the West. The second result was that Turkey followed a unilateral foreign policy, and therefore ignored its relations with the non-Western regions for a long time (Sıradağ, 2022: 394-5).

With the emergence of the Cyprus issue after the 1960s, Turkey began to question the impacts of its traditional foreign policy (Tepeciklioğlu, 2012: 73). The Cyprus issue was the most important development to change the static structure of Turkey's traditional foreign policy. When the Greek militants increased attacks against the Turkish Cypriots on the island after the 1960s, Turkey planned to militarily get involved in the island and protect the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey expected support from the West and the international community to solve the security crisis on the island but the West disappointed Turkey by supporting the Greek side. With the escalation of violence on the island, Turkey carried out a military operation in 1974 to stop attacks on Turkish Cypriots. The U.S. put a military and economic embargo on Turkey in 1975 and the international community supported Greece (Koca, 2022: 106-8).

As a result of the experience Turkey got with the Cyprus issue, it decided to diversify Turkish foreign policy and strengthen Turkey's defense industry to decrease the high level of dependency on the West. As a part of changing Turkish foreign policy after the 1960s, Turkey sent a group of people consisting of Turkish diplomats, businessmen, and academicians to different African countries to develop bilateral relations in 1965 (Turhan, 2021: 468-70) and 1979 but these initiatives did not bring success to Turkey to increase bilateral relations with the African countries because Turkey's policy in Africa during the Cold War was not materialized in a strategic plan. Also, Turkey continued to be a part of the Western bloc during the Cold War era. After the collapse of the Cold War era in the 1990s, Turkey's efforts on diversification of Turkish foreign policy

under the administration of Turgut Özal (1983-1993) increased significantly. Özal endeavored to strengthen bilateral relations with the non-Western regions including the Middle East, Asia, and North Africa but his efforts included the countries in North Africa. In addition, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan paid official visits to Libya and Nigeria in 1997 to develop strategic relations but Erbakan's coalition government could not deepen strategic relations with the African countries because his government was forced to resign by the military administration (Küçükboz, 2016: 467-473).

Turkey the first time prepared an Africa Action Plan in 1998 to boost bilateral relations with African countries in a strategic way. Importantly, the different stakeholders including diplomats, businesspeople, civil society organizations, and bureaucrats contributed to the preparation of the Africa Action Plan. The Plan was a sort of strategic document which was providing details about how to develop political, economic, social, and security relations with African countries (Hazar, 2012: 5-8). However, the Action Plan was not carried out successfully by the government of the time because of the constant economic and political crises in the country at that time.

With the coming to power of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in 2002, Turkey has been under a significant political, economic, and social transformation. The ruling party government announced 2005 as a year of Africa. Turkey's active engagement with Africa began after 2005 in systematic planning. The ruling party governments have implemented the Africa Action Plan of 1998 successfully. The African Union (AfU) accepted Turkey as a strategic partner of the continent in 2008. Turkey the first time organized the first Turkey-Africa Summit in Istanbul in August 2008 with the participation of 49 African countries (Ibid., 9-12). The third one was also held in Istanbul in December 2021. The Turkey-Africa Summits particularly facilitate developing relations with African countries.

The ruling party governments redefined traditional foreign policy believing that the geographical and historical dynamics of Turkey necessitate Turkey to develop multilateral and proactive foreign policy. Geographical dynamics means that Turkey is not only a neighbor to Europe, but also close to Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Therefore, the ruling party governments accepted an Afro-Eurasian foreign policy identity. Historical dynamics means that Turkey has a significant historical legacy in Africa dating back to the 16th century. Most of the countries in North Africa and in East Africa were a part of the Ottoman State. These dynamics provide several significant opportunities for both Turkey and Africa to increase relations.

At the diplomatic level, Turkey increased the number of its diplomatic missions from 12 to 44 across the African continent. Moreover, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has visited over 33 African countries. Erdoğan's efforts to develop relations with Africa have played a significant role in strengthening relations between Turkey and Africa. At the economic level, Turkey's total trade with Africa has jumped from 5,4 billion dollars to 40 billion dollars (TRT Haber, 2023). Turkey has established Turkey-Africa Business

Forums with African countries to boost economic relations. At the social and cultural level, Turkey has opened Yunus Emre Cultural Centers in eight African countries and Maarif Schools in more than 25 African countries (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı).

Turkey's active involvement in Somalia since 2011 has been a significant example to understand Turkey's African policy. Erdoğan has become the first leader to visit the conflict-hit country since the 1990s. Turkey has developed a new pattern of humanitarian aid and foreign policy in Africa. Turkish state agencies, NGOs, and businessmen began to work together intensively to decrease the severe impact of the humanitarian crisis that was at its highest level in 2011 (Sıradağ, 2016: 89-90). After 2011, Turkish NGOs actively began to provide humanitarian assistance to the needy people in Somalia and directly talked to Somalis in the streets of Mogadishu without feeling any danger. Turkey has also renovated roads, schools, and public buildings. Moreover, Turkey has provided scholarships to hundreds of Somali students to study in Turkey. Turkey's unique experience and success in Somalia have motivated it to develop its relations with the rest of the African countries (Sıradağ, 2022, 7-8).

Importantly, Turkey signed a Defense and Economic Agreement with Somalia in February 2024 (Hamit, 2024). According to this agreement, Turkey will ensure Somalia's maritime security and support the establishment of the Somali Naval Navy. Additionally, the Oil and Natural Gas Agreement was signed with Somalia in March 2024 (Maruf, 2024). According to this agreement, Turkey will search for oil and natural gas in Somalia's land and sea blocks and will produce them. With these agreements, Turkey has strengthened its strategic presence not only in Somalia but also in the Horn of Africa. With the TURKSOM Military Training Base opened by Turkey in Somalia in 2017, both the military and police forces of Somalia are being established. With the Defense and Economic Agreement, Turkey will ensure the establishment of Somalia's navy. With the formation of Somalia's land and naval armies, Somalia's strategic power both as a federal state and in the Horn of Africa will increase further. It is also very significant that these agreements took place after the controversial agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland in January 2024 (Zane, 2024). With these agreements with Turkey, Somalia is trying to establish a strategic balance both in the Horn of Africa and against the Ethiopian Federal Government. Turkey's success and development, especially in the defense industry in recent years, has caused Turkey to take a more strategic role in African geopolitics.

Turkey carries out its strategic relations with the region of the Horn of Africa in a strategic balance. For example, while Turkey signed a security cooperation agreement with Somalia, it also maintains very strong political and security relations with Ethiopia. Likewise, Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles sold to Somalia were also sold to Ethiopia. Turkey, which started a very strong and comprehensive humanitarian aid effort in Somalia in 2011 with the historic visit of the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, started to take important steps to increase its strategic power in the military

and defense fields after 2016. Turkey's active humanitarian aid diplomacy both in the Horn of Africa and in other African countries has paved the way for the emergence of cooperation in the different areas such as energy and military and defense. In this sense, we can state that the basis of Turkey's deepening security relations in Somalia lies in Turkey's active humanitarian aid diplomacy. Turkey's military and training base in Somalia is also to enable Somalia to establish its own military navy and thus protect Somalia's independence and territorial integrity. In this sense, security support provided to Somalia makes significant contributions to both solving Somalia's internal problems such as terrorism and achieving political and economic stability in the Horn of Africa region.

Turkey's increasing strategic interaction in the Horn of Africa in particular and in the African continent in general, Turkey has now developed its foreign policy interests within the framework of its own historical and geopolitical dynamics, rather than within the framework of a Western-oriented foreign policy. In addition, we can say that Turkey's status as a rising actor in the security fields offers a very important opportunity for African countries to diversify their foreign policies, because African countries have faced serious challenges in transforming the independence they gained after World War II into real political and economic independence. In this sense, we can emphasize that Turkey, with its unique political and historical experience, has begun to play an important role in strengthening the political independence of African countries by training the armed and police forces of the African countries and strengthening the armies of the African countries.

Turkey has developed its security relations with African countries by signing security cooperation agreements with more than 30 African countries. Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Ethiopia, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Togo and Rwanda are among the countries purchasing Turkish drones. Turkey has also trained Somali soldiers at the Turkish military training camp. In 2021, Kenya bought 118 military vehicles from Turkey (Wasike, 2023). Djibouti invited Turkey to establish a military base in the country. In addition, the Suakin island was leased to Turkey for 99 years. Even though the military coup toppled the government of Omar Al-Basher in Sudan in 2019, the military government of the time did not cancel the agreement made between Turkey and Sudan in 2017.

Turkey's active security relations with the countries in the Horn of Africa show that Turkey's involvement in Africa is not temporary. Turkey particularly considers the Horn as one of the most strategic regions in the world. Turkey has also aimed to be an important player in African politics to deliver the products of the defense industry to the African market. Through a growing strategic partnership with African countries, Turkey has increased the number of its allies in Africa to support its international cases. Turkey's new pattern of aid has significantly helped Turkey to increase political and security relations with African countries.

African countries have aimed to diversify their political, economic, and security relations with Turkey. Importantly, Turkey's defense industry products are cheaper but quality ones. Turkey has not put any conditions to sell its military products to African countries. Turkey shares its technology experience with African countries without any conditions. Moreover, Turkey's experience in countering terrorism is also an important motivation for African countries to gain Turkey's security experience in this regard. African countries have endeavored to diminish the high level of dependency on the West through cooperation with the new rising powers on the African continent (Sıradağ, 2022: 399-400).

5.Conclusion

The Horn of Africa has geo-political and geo-economic importance in the world especially due to its proximity to the Red Sea, Bab Al-Mandeb, and close to the oil and gas fields. Thanks to its strategic importance, both global and regional actors maintain their political, economic, and security relations at the highest level with this region. Because of the history of exploitation and security problems, this region has been far from political and economic stability for many years. The new political and economic developments that emerged in the region after the 2010s brought hope for the stability of the region. However, the region continues to have a very fragile political and economic structure. Turkey started to be active in the Horn of Africa after 2011. At the point reached today, Turkey has a multifaceted and proactive foreign policy in the region. Turkey has started to export its defense industry products to the Horn of Africa countries. Establishing strong relations with the region, especially in the field of the defense industry, is an important development that shows that Turkey is more likely to be a long-term strategic partner in the region and in Africa. In addition, the military base established by Turkey in Somalia plays a vital role in the establishment of Somalia's national army and in Somalia's more active fight against terrorist organizations. Finally, Turkey's lack of a history of exploitation in the continent and the win-win model are important dynamics that pave the way for African countries to get closer to Turkey.

Turkey developed its security policy and foreign policy within a Western-oriented foreign policy after the establishment of the young Turkey in 1923. During the Cold War, Turkey continued to develop a Western-oriented foreign policy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkish foreign policy found itself in new challenges and needed to redefine and question itself. With the end of the Cold War, Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy began to change. Especially depending on Turkey's historical and geostrategic depths, Turkish foreign policy has begun to take significant steps to develop a multi-dimensional foreign policy. With the AK Party coming to power in 2002, the concept of security began to enter a process of profound change. Especially because of Turkey's economic and social change, it has begun to pursue an

active foreign policy in its region. AK Party governments have begun to consider the concept of security within Turkey's strategic interests and historical dynamics.

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