

**LEGITIMACY, PARTICIPATION AND RESTRICTED PLURALISM:
the 1987 ELECTIONS IN TURKEY**

Nermin ABADAN-UNAT

The last general election of Turkey of November 29, 1987 were hailed unanimously in the Western world as the culminating point of Turkey's return to "genuine" democracy, the elimination of military tutelage and the reaffirmation of legitimacy as expressed by the popular will.

Yet it seems misleading if not impossible to analyze this particular turning point of Turkey's recent history without placing it in a relatively broader context. Looking from a certain distance, the last elections represent a significant part of an electoral chain covering five phases, which could be qualified as follows:

- 1 — The first general election of '83 after the military intervention: guided election
- 2 — The provincial and communal elections of 1984: Indicative election
- 3 — The by-elections of 1986: Experimental election
- 4 — The referandum concerning the return of former politicians of Sept. 6, 1987: Pre-test of coming election,
- 5 — The early general election of Nov. 29, 1987: The personalized, no-issue, media conditioned election.

Given the fact that Turkey faced since 1960 three time military intervention in order to repair "the social fabric" and permit democracy to continue, a new Constitution has been adopted in 1982. This Constitution can be considered as an anti-thesis of the previous one by placing a premium on the restauration of law and order to the disadvantage of a pluralistic society. The functioning of the new established political party system again can only be properly evaluated by briefly assessing the role and place of the army and a vigorous social force affecting politics, namely the resurgence of traditional Islam.

The role of the army in restructuring Turkey's social structure

As one may recall the first military intervention in 1960 was prepared and executed by officers of lower ranks against the hierarchical leadership as well as the government (Weiker, 1963: 118). Their intervention was oriented toward the recognition of civilian supremacy. Because of their widely differing political orientation they heavily collaborated with academic elites. The product of their reorganizing efforts, namely the 1961 Constitution reflected the aspirations of Turkey's intelligentsia. It diminished the overwhelming power of parliament, installed checks and balances both within and outside the government structure and created "autonomous institutions" such as the universities, broadcasting and television corporation.

After a decade of political instability and growing uneasiness in society, the army taking a lesson of the previous experience consulted the political feelings of its own lower ranks and opted for a move based on the consensus of the armed forces to be done through the existing chain of command. This explains why the indirect intervention of 1971 took the form of an ultimatum by the top commanders.

In this second sequence the army defined its mission as "defending the state" which operationally meant to exercise oversight on civilian politics such that law and order should be preserved and not reach levels to threaten the existence and the survival of the political system. At the same time complementarity between the aims of the military and the desires of the growing community of businessmen and industrialists became evident. This complementarity led in the 1970's the informal military-business linkages. Companies recruited retired generals on their boards of directors and contributed generously to voluntary funds established for the purchase of military equipment.

The third intervention which took place in September 1980, was preceded by a complete breakdown of public authority, rampant terrorism, parliamentary immobilism, amoral partyism, polarization of the political party system, stalemate situation within coalition governments, an economic situation bordering on national bankruptcy. Thus the last intervention which was done directly, openly based on the hierarchical chain of command of the army, adopted long range plans, intending the restructuring of Turkish society (Turan 1986: 18).

The nature of the newly reshaped regime through the Constitution of 1982 has been defined by K.H. Karpat (Karpat, 1985: 4) as a "two tiered regime". The state represented by the president is equipped with

sufficient authority to exercise a mild tutelage over the parliament. The second tier consists of parliament, cabinet, administration and constitutional court. Thus the choice was taken in favour of political stability against a participatory democracy. Although political participation does appear as if discouraged, on the contrary by adopting the principle of compulsory voting, it becomes instrumental. However this participation is restricted in terms of permitting the creation and flourishing of various kinds of interest groups and non-governmental associations. Particularly hard hit is the area of labour representation.

Thus we might say that one of the most relevant and least discussed characteristics of Turkey's present social structure is the peculiar attempt to combine state and societal corporatist elements. As well known among the numerous types of state and societal corporatism that have been identified in recent comparative studies, two particular varieties may be considered as the nearest prototypes for the identification of Turkish corporatism. The first one is an exclusionary bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, the second one is a state coordinated system of multilateral bargaining and crisis management. The two years following the 1980 intervention applied the first alternative, the period opening its door to competitive politics adopted the second choice.

Today Turkey's associational life is heavily dominated by the private sector and their affiliated social organizations, such as the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and the influential Business Research Association TÜSIAD, while the trade unions and various other social associations representing the web of a pluralistic democracy are under heavy state tutelage. (Weiker 1986: 671) According to the new Constitution and Labor Law, private interest groups are forbidden to engage in political activities (which includes supporting or cooperating with political parties, taking part in party meetings, rallies, even expressing organizational views on "political matters").

State corporatism is most enthusiastically endorsed by the commercial-agricultural-import/export groups as a remedy for what they perceive as increasing political disorder and social disintegration. The systematic efforts of the present government to join the Common Market are partly blocked by the reticence of the political leadership to decide when and how the range of Turkey's associational life will be widened. (Kalaycıoğlu, 1988) No need to underline that the overweight of state corporatism not only hinders interest articulation on behalf of the working class, but also prevents social justice oriented political parties to enlarge their rank-file membership.

Political party system in post '83 Turkey

Given these conditions it seems more meaningful to analyze 1987 elections under the light of the political setting elaborated since 1980 - the year zero for political parties. Indeed with the military intervention all political parties were first forbidden to engage in any kind of activity, later were all abolished by a decision of the National Security Council-NSC. The NSC after having taken this decision pledged publicly the temporary nature of its rule and promised restoration of competitive politics as soon as law and order were restored.

Characteristics of Turkish political parties prior to 1980

Turkish political parties were organized along the line of the administrative division. Local party organizations were loose structures, membership records not well kept. Powers of local party organizations tended to destabilize local party politics. Intra-party politics carried similarities with local party politics. Elements not satisfied formed factions, upon failure left their party. Parties in government or oppositions functioned as clientelistic networks. (Abadan-Unat, 1981: 86-88) Due to significant processes of rapid urbanization, commercialization and industrialization, cleavages both functional and non-functional, multiplied. The impact of this process on the party system was a strategy of polarization. Forming coalition was hard, each party tried to retain its separate identity.

The rightist National Salvation Party and the National Action Party adopted respectively extreme pro-religious and chauvinistic views, which led to the erosion of the center and hindered any kind of coalition formation.

The restructured party system of today

The major tools are legal ones embedded in the Constitution and the Political Parties Law. Accordingly no political party may be in conflict with the principles of national unity, territorial integrity of the state, human rights, national sovereignty and the democratic and secular character of the Republic. Communist parties, parties oriented to ethnic separatism, religious distinctions and racial differences are not allowed to exist. The most effective but not verbalized principle of the NSC policy was "depoliticization" on a broad scale. To this end the Constitution bans political parties to establish auxiliary branches for youth, women (Art. 68) Similarly the founding of extra-party organizations such as clubs, associations, labor unions, cooperatives, foundations, occupational and pro-

fessional associations are forbidden. Parties are also forbidden from receiving any donations (Art. 69) except state allocations. Under these conditions it goes without saying that to entrust political parties with the task of articulating and aggregating all interests, assumes a certain level of organizational capability, which currently is not existing in the Turkish political party system.

Furthermore provisions of the Electoral Law attempt to increase political stability by barring small parties of entering parliament. Art. 33 allows parliamentary representation only to those parties which have obtained 10% of the national vote. A further cut-off is introduced by the same Law in stipulating that a candidate may not get elected unless his party has received the number of votes which exceed the number obtained by dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of deputies to be elected from that district. (Art. 34)

At the level of parliamentary parties, the Constitution has attempted to deal with another source of instability. Art. 84 makes it possible to terminate membership of a deputy who changed party of accepted ministerial appointment in a cabinet not supported by his party.

Finally the Political Parties Law made intra-party democracy more operational. Party leaders have to be elected in bi-annual elections under judiciary control. The length of service of leaders has been limited. Art. 15 foresees no longer service term as six consecutive terms for two years each.

The emergence of new parties

Immediately after the ban concerning political activities was lifted on May 16, 1983 by the NSC, several new parties made their appearances. Actually 22 political parties have been founded since zero point, out of which 9 are still in existence and six have participated at the last elections, but only 3 have been able to enter parliament. (Milliyet, 1986, 27:12)

The first party to enter the political arena was the Nationalist Democracy Party, founded under the leadership of the retired general Turgut Sunalp. This party enjoyed the unofficial backing of the army. It was conceived to become the party sustaining the state. Next came the Populist Party under the leadership of İsmet İnönü's former secretary Necdet Calp. It was looked upon of becoming the tolerated opposition party. Third came the Motherland Party, founded by Turgut Özal, former defeated candidate of the National Salvation Party in 1977, later undersecretary of primeminister Demirel, deputy primeminister of the interim Uluşu

government, considered as an able economic expert. His party was looked upon at this date, as an eventual coalition partner.

Following the first three endorsed political parties, a second set of objected parties made their public appearance. These were the Great Turkey Party under the leadership of Ali Fethi Esener, a retired general. The Social Democracy Party under the leadership of Erdal İnönü, a former professor of physics, the Welfare Party, a continuation of N. Erbakan's party.

The Great Turkey Party being identified with the dissolved Justice Party by the NSC, was equally dissolved 15 days after the lifting of the ban. The two other parties were not dissolved but on the eve of the '83 elections the majority of their candidates were vetoed, among them Erdal İnönü too. Because of the very high number of vetoed candidates belonged to the second group of the above cited parties, they were confronted with the impossibility of completing their candidate list and thus were not permitted to run. The number of vetoed candidates of the approved parties was also very high.

Their total breakdown is as follows:

- 392 from the Motherland Party
- 398 from the Nationalist Democracy Party
- 389 from the Populist Party

Actually the discussion about the legitimacy of the first post-1980 elected parliament lies in the above cited harsh control and the determination to select the future political class according the wishes of the NSC. Nevertheless the rebirth of parliamentary life in 1983 brought an end to the direct intervention of the armed forces.

The return to competitive politics began with the general elections of November 6, 1983, which granted as stated above only three parties the right to participate. Contrary to expectations and calculations, it was not the Nationalist Democracy Party whose dictum was "the State first, then democracy, then the party" neither a pale replica of a Social Democrat Party but Özal's Motherland Party (ANAP) which received the largest popular support. The electoral returns are as follows:

- ANAP 45.1 % votes - 211 seat
- HP 30.5 % votes - 117 seat
- MDP 23.3 % votes - 71 seat (Table I)

Table I — Results of General Elections 1983

Registered voters	19,767,366		
Casted votes	18,238,362		
Electoral Participation*	%92.3		
Valid votes	17,351,510		
Motherland Party (ANAP)	7,833,147	%45.1	211 seats
Populist Party (HP)	5,285,804	%30.5	117 seats
Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP)	4,036,970	%23.3	71 seats
Independent	1,195,588	% 1.1	—

* Art. 63 of the Electoral Law imposes obligatory voting, foresees financial fines for voters abstinence.

Source: Resmî Gazete, November 14, 1983, No. 18 221, P. 13.

It should be added that on the last day of the electoral campaign, a TV appeal by President Evren against the choice of the Motherland Party and in favour of the Nationalist Democracy Party gave a counterproductive result. Özal's party being publicly criticized conveyed to the voters the image of being the most civilian one, a major reason for the preference of the Turkish electorate.

This election represents the first stage of transition to democracy and can be qualified as a "Guided Election".

The second phase was followed six months later on March 25, 1984 with the provincial and communal elections in which all the parties which met the requirements of the Political Parties Law were admitted to run, namely the first three which participated in 1983 elections and the second three ones namely the True Path Party (DYP), the Social Democracy Party (SODEP) and the Welfare Party (RP). At this election the Motherland Party ANAP) proved to be the most credible political organization. The party received 41.5 % et the provincial elections, the Social Democrats (SODEP) received 23.4%, the True Path Party (DYP) 13.2%, the Populist Party (HP) 8.8% and the Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP) 7.1% votes. (Table 2).

Table II — Municipal Elections of March 25, 1984

Registered voters	12,341,328	
Casted votes	10,559,948	
Valid votes	9,952,848	
Motherland Party (ANAP)	4,296,399	%43.2
True Path Party (DYP)	1,179,082	%11.8
Populist Party (HP)	775,123	% 7.8
Nationalist Democracy P. (MDP)	542,091	% 5.4
Welfare Party (RP)	372,948	% 3.8
Social Democrat Party (SODEP)	2,469,334	%24.8
Independent	317,871	% 3.2

This election which we can label as "Indicative", served to expose a paradoxical peculiarity of the politics of transition: an electorally credible government party and the parliamentary opposition parties without significant electoral bases in society, leaving the stronger opposition parties outside of parliament since the results of the provincial and communal elections could not be used to correct the preferences of the electorate.

Following these two elections further development on the electoral scene were registered in 1986. In August the Social Democrat Party under the leadership of E. İnönü anxious to get a stronghold in parliament and the Populist Party under the leadership of Aydın Güven Gürkan, whose electoral basis was dwindling, merged. On the left another new political formation made its appearance. Bülent Ecevit's wife, circumventing the ban on former political leaders to engage themselves in active politics, founded the Democratic Left Party (DSP), thus creating a legal platform for the public reappearance of Bülent Ecevit. The founder of the new Democratic Left Party claimed that in order to preserve the purity of the party, they excluded doctrinaire Marxists and rely only on the rank and file. The number of their founders was about 20.000.

On the right front, Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP) dissolved itself. About twenty of the former NDP deputies joined the Motherland Party (ANAP), and a similar number formed a new party named the Free Democratic Party (Newspot 9 and 23 May 1986). Thus the role of the major right-wing opposition was assumed by the True Path Party (DYP) under the leadership of Demirel's loyal supporter, Hüsametdin Cindoruk, a lawyer who defended Menderes and served six months prison.

Table III — Municipal Elections in Metropolitan Areas (Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir) March, 25, 1984

Registered voters	3,995,970	
Casted votes	3,410,903	
Valid votes	3,209,989	
Motherland Party (ANAP)	1,610,621	% 50.2
True Path Party (DYP)	144,396	% 4.5
Populist Party (HP)	254,419	% 7.9
Nationalist Democracy P. (MDP)	138,254	% 4.3
Welfare Party (RP)	119,511	% 3.7
Social Democrat Party (SODEP)	930,646	% 29.0
Independent	12,142	% 0.4

Source (Table II and III): **Mahalli İdareler Seçimi Sonuçları DİE** (State Statistic Institute) December 1984.

The by-elections of 1986, September 28, represent the third stage in the chain of transitory democracy. These by-elections gave three seats to the Motherland Party, seven to the True Path Party and one to the Social Democrat Populist Party (Table 3). They can be defined as "Experimental" elections. The laxity in regard of lifting the legal pre-conditions for party foundation and organizational built-up, together with the prolongation of the electoral campaign period, created in Turkey due to daily broadcasted and televised party propaganda an intensive political climate. Twelve parties - ten on the right, two on the left - participated at these by-elections. A content analysis of the messages conveyed by the media indicates that the ten parties on the right carried massive religious and nationalistic themes, while the Motherland Party concentrated itself on optimistic predictions of a rosy future (Table 4).

Table IV — By-Elections September 28, 1986

Elections were held in 10 provinces: Ankara, Bingöl, Burdur, Gaziantep, İstanbul İzmir, Manisa, Niğde, Samsun, Zonguldak			
Registered voters	2,950,154		
Casted votes	2,592,752		
Valid votes	2,507,212		
Electoral Participation	%87,8		
Motherland Party (ANAP)	805,267	%32.1	6 seats
Flag Party (BP)	9,058	% 0.3	—
Great Anatolia Party (BAP)	13,497	% 0.5	—
Great Fatherland Party (BVP)	32,303	% 1.2	—
Democratic Left Party (DSP)	213,168	% 8.5	—
True Path Party (DYP)	590,069	%23.5	4 seats
Liberal Democracy Party (HDP)	34,317	% 1.3	—
Reformist Democracy Party (IDP)	15,729	% 0.6	—
Nationalist Work Party (MÇP)	55,144	% 2.2	—
Welfare Party (RP)	137,485	% 5.4	—
Social Democrat Populist P. (SHP)	570,055	%22.7	1 seat
Citizen Party (VP)	25,814	% 0.2	—
Independent	5,306	% 0.2	—
			11 seat

Source: Resmi Gazete, October 10, 1986, No. 19 247, P. 20-21.

Intensive political mobilization around blurred issues: the constitutional amendment referendum of September 6, 1987

An important sequence in the transitional process toward democracy is represented by the series of elections carried out in 1987. These elections preoccupied intensively public opinion and forced the voters to go twice, in certain areas three time to the polls. Since each of these electoral acti-

vities are accompanied with lavish spending on behalf of the national and local government, it is not erroneous to state that Turkey's escalating inflation has been partly increased by the large scale electoral expenses particularly those undertaken by the major municipalities.

The first of these electoral exercises were the local elections in approximately 100 newly established municipalities, Spring 1987, which reinforced the Motherland Party's position. This was followed by an intensive parliamentary debate around the restitution of the political rights of the former politicians, who were subject of a five and ten years long ban. In spite of the constitutional provisions this issue became increasingly important since the True Path Party, which had earned 23.6% of the votes and ranged second behind the government party at the by-elections of 1986, built up all its political discussions on this very point and finally succeeded to introduce this item on the agenda of the parliamentary assembly. Demirel's frequent travels in the countryside and the enthusiastic support of the masses contributed in tackling this delicate issue. Thus a constitutional amendment became imperative, because the majority of the reborn parties, namely the True Path Party, the Democratic Left Party, the National Work Party and the Welfare Party were essentially controlled by party organizations outside of parliament. The ability of their official and semi-official leaders resulted in the creation of parliamentary groups through the mechanism of party shifting. Although the new Constitution was elaborated in view of stability, through Art. 84, the instability of the parliamentary cadres became obvious as more members changed within one legislative term their party affiliation than during the totality of the history of the Turkish Republic.

At this point two factors played a decisive role: the insistence of the True Path Party of early elections and Özal's desire to comply with the demands of the European states to restore full democracy as a precondition for Turkey's access to full membership in the EC.

The amendment of the Constitution was adopted on May 18, 1987. Its major aim was to repeal the provisional Art. 4, banning political leaders and politicians from engaging into political activities. However this amendment was conceived to enter into force only if the popular will expressed through a referendum, would fall out positive.

Özal and his party launched their referendum related campaign in favour of "No" by asking the voters two questions: "Does Turkey need old politicians or new ones?", "Should we return to the situation prior to September 12?" The four former political leaders, who actively directed their reproduced parties, engaged themselves in a ferocious electoral

campaign. Their major argument was centered on the protection of fundamental rights in a democratic society and the thesis that the inalienable political rights of man cannot be eliminated through discretionary power of a small group. However the reluctance of TV to explain the electorate the two alternative options - in Turkey the existing two TV channels are subject to governmental monopoly - resulted in a blurred perception of the voters which continue until the very end. Within this unclear situation, it was the clear position of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) which contributed to a clarification. Although some of its rank and file was not in favour of a comeback of Ecevit, Erdal İnönü actively engaged himself in the restauration of all political rights. The result was thin as a knife's edge: 50.16% Yes versus 49.8% "No"s. As the "Yes" votes were considered as the outcome of a joint move of all opposition parties, Özal cleverly managed to interpret the 49.8% as a vote of confidence for his own party. He turned over a defeat in a significant victory.

At the referandum the highest proportion of "No"s were casted in Tunceli (78.7%), the lowest in Malatya (28.6). In twenty provinces the "Yes", 47 the "No"s were in majority. (Table 5) The "Yes" vote was more noticeable in highly urbanized provinces, integrated in market economy as well as the Southeast; the "No"s were casted substantially more in Central Anatolia.

Table V — Electoral Returns of Constitutional Amendment Referandum
September 6, 1987

Registered voters	26,095,630
Casted votes	24,436,821
Valid votes	23,347,856
Electoral Participation	%93.6
Voters approving with "Yes" constitutional amendment :	11.711.461
Voters not approving with "No" constitutional amendment :	11.638.395
"Yes" votes	%50.16
"No" votes	%49.84

Source: Resmi Gazete, September 12, 1987, No. 19 572.

The early general elections of 1987

On referandum day, five minutes after the closing down of the voting stations, Özal in a TV adress made his decisions to ask for early general elections public. Several factors played a role in this decision: to benefit from the relative high proportion of "No"s the party was expecting, to relieve the heavy pressure upon the economy due to the pre-election atmosphere, to benefit from the amendments passed in regard of the electoral

law by which the electoral districts were reapportioned and a new form of calculation was to function on favour of the strongest party, to leave as short time as possible to the return of the former political leaders.

Through the decision to held on November 1 early elections the requirement of the Electoral Law for all parties to designate their candidates by holding nationwide primaries was abolished, based on the argument that the legally foreseen time periods were not sufficient to meet the target date of November 1. This proposal was strongly criticized by the opposition, particularly by Ecevit's party who proposed to boycott the elections. However the three opposition parties in parliament could not agree on a joint preventive action, the amendment was passed as drafted by the Motherland Party. Thereupon the Social Democrat Populist Party applied to the Constitutional Court. The Court indeed found the amendment 5:6 contradictory to the Constitution. This time Özal's government presented a second bill to parliament asking for general elections to be held on November 29, so that those parties wishing to hold primaries could realize them.

Table VI — General Elections of November 29, 1987

Motherland Party (ANAP)	8.704.335	%36.3	292 seats
Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP)	5.931.000	%24.8	99 seats
True Path Party (DYP)	4.587.062	%19.1	59 seats
Welfare Party (RP)	1.717.425	% 7.2	—
Democratic Left Party (DSP)	2.044.576	% 8.5	—
Reformist Democracy Party (IDP)	196.272	% 0.8	—
Nationalist Work Party (MÇP)	701.538	% 2.9	—
Independent	89.421	% 0.4	—
Share of valid votes at custom entrees:	47.942		
Electoral participation: 93.3%			

Source: Results of General Election of Representatives, 29.11.1987
State Institute of Statistics, No. 1273, P. 2-3.

The Social Democrat Populist Party and the True Path party, both decided to hold primaries in order to enforce intra-party democracy. Consequently the Social Democrat Populist Party applied primaries in 97, the Truth Path Party in 72 out of 104 electoral districts. The four other parties the Motherland, Democratic Left, Welfare and Reformist Democracy Party designated all their candidates at the party headquarter. The outcome of the candidates lists indicated that overall strong preference was given to aspirants with local, regional or religious affiliation.

While the primary period created a tense climate, the shortened electoral campaign of 15 days passed relatively quietly. The polls showed

a 50% preference of the voters for the Motherland Party, as second the True Path Party, as third the Social Democrat Populist Party.

Electoral returns and the electoral system

The amendment of the electoral law contributed to the fact that while the Motherland Party received in 1983 with 45.1% votes 52% of the seats; in 1987 the same party which only received 36.3% of the votes, gained 13% more seats. This fact stems from the particularity of the electoral law which introduced so-called contingent seats, which are allocated to the strongest party. Thus the Motherland Party was able to win 42 out of the 46 contingent seats. This modification actually converted the proportional system into a kind of pseudo-majority system and assured the Motherland Party a 3/5 majority in parliament, sufficient for any constitutional amendment.

The major areas where the Motherland Party regressed are the metropolitan centers of Istanbul, Ankara and İzmir as well as provinces in

Table VII — Place of origin, term or election, educational level of members of parliament, legislature 1987

Electoral district	ANAP	%	SHP	%	DYP	%	Total	%
Place of birth	232	79.5	70	70.3	50	84.7	352	78.7
Other than place of birth in Turkey	56	19.2	29	29.3	8	13.6	93	20.7
Born abroad	4	1.4	—	—	1	1.7	5	1.1
Terms of Election								
First time	136	46.5	79	79.8	37	62.7	252	56.0
Second time	141	48.3	11	11.1	14	23.7	166	36.9
Third time	8	2.7	8	8.0	3	5.0	19	4.2
Four and more	7	2.4	1	1.0	5	8.5	13	3.0
Educational level								
Primary school	16	5.5	3	3.0	2	3.0	21	4.7
Secondary school	29	10.0	7	7.1	10	11.0	46	10.2
University	221	75.6	85	85.9	43	73.0	349	77.5
Second University	5	1.7	—	—	2	3.4	7	1.5
Foreign University	21	7.2	4	4.0	2	3.4	27	6.0
Marital Status								
Bachelor	8	2.7	3	3.0	1	1.7	12	2.7
Married	282	96.6	93	94.0	58	98.3	433	96.2
Divorced	2	0.7	3	3.0	—	—	5	1.1

Source: Milliyet, December 15, 1987.

Thrace, the Marmara, Aegean regions, centers exposed to a fast growth of capitalism.

The Social Democrat Populist Party obtained 24.7% of the vote but only 99 seats. The schism on the left among the Social Democrat Populist Party and the Democratic Left Party produced a major loss of potential left of the center votes. Thus the Motherland Party was able to secure itself 64 additional seats. In case of a merger or electoral alliance 47 seats would have gone to the Social Democrat Populist Party, 17 to the True Path Party. The total sum of the social democrat vote in 1987 being 33.2%, there is a slight increase in comparison to the overall return of 1984 which was 32.2% (Table 6).

Assessing the spatial distribution of the social democrat vote the electoral districts of the leaders are playing a decisive role. The Democratic Left Party registered its highest return in Ecevit's electoral district Zonguldak with 26.9%, the Social Democratic Populist Party in Erdal İnönü's electoral district İzmir with 35.6%. Next to the leaders electoral districts the strength of the Social democratic Populist Party are metropolitan cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, some provinces in Thrace, as well as West and East Anatolia. Particularly relevant are traditionally left inclined provinces of Artvin, Kars, Tunceli, Diyarbakır, Siirt, Mardin and Van.

Table VIII — Professional background of members of parliament, 1987

Lawyer	ANAP	%	SHP	%	DYP	%	Total	%
(Barrister-Judge)	61	20.9	35	35.4	13	22.0	109	24.2
Engineer-Architect	58	19.9	11	11.1	11	18.7	80	17.8
Bureaucrat	33	11.3	15	15.1	12	20.3	60	13.3
Liberal profession	74	25.3	17	17.2	16	27.1	107	23.8
Physician, dentist pharmatist	25	8.6	4	4.0	4	6.8	33	7.3
Military	4	1.4	—	—	—	—	4	0.9
University teacher	9	2.7	5	5.0	1	1.7	14	3.1
Teacher	11	3.8	1	1.0	—	—	12	2.7
Farmer	16	5.5	1	1.0	2	3.4	19	4.2
Worker, tradeunionist	1	0.3	5	5.0	—	—	6	1.3
Journalist, writer	1	0.3	5	5.0	—	—	6	1.3
Other	—	—	1	1.0	—	—	1	0.2
Total	292	100	99	100	59	100	450	100

Source: Milliyet, December 15, 1987

The strength of the Democratic Left is rather concentrated on the north of the country, the Black Sea coast line. In spite of all the efforts of the Social Democrat Populist Party to unite the electorate around the

larger opposition party by using full page newspaper ads, personal appeals of wellknown artists and writers, it has not been possible to rally the total social democrat vote behind the Social Democrat Populist Party. It would be wrong to attribute the 8.5% of the Democratic Left Party solely to the charismatic personality of B. Ecevit, it might also reflect a certain degree of dissatisfaction of the voters in regard of the parliamentary and intra-party performance of the Social Democrat Populist Party.

The third party, namely Demirel's True Path Party has improved its record in comparison to 1984, but has lost votes in comparison to the 1986 by-elections. Demirel was able to surpass the government party in his electoral district Isparta with 60.2% and obtain almost equal votes with the Motherland Party in Antalya, Zonguldak, Samsun, Elazığ, Bingöl. However the party's electoral return in Central Anatolia and the three metropolitan cities of İstanbul, İzmir, Ankara was very low. A comparison with the electoral record of Justice Party in 1977 and the returns of the Aegean, Marmara region and North East Anatolia A similar picture emerged in 1987 as well. This clearly shows that Demirel's party is firmly entrenched in Turkey's political life and possesses a lasting electoral basis.

The Welfare Party which received 7.2% of the votes is a direct successor of the previous National Order and National Salvation Party. This party shows a strong concentration in four distinct regions: 1. East and East South Anatolia (Erzurum, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Siirt), 2. Central Anatolia (Kayseri, Konya, Sivas), 3. Black Sea (Trabzon, Rize), 4. Marmara, Kocaeli, Sakarya. The most important electoral concentration can be observed in East and South East Anatolia. These districts represent areas where organized religious movements (sects) are particularly strong.

The radical right party, the National Work Party, registered a significant defeat. It only obtained 2.9% of votes. In certain districts such as Çankırı the 17% vote of 1977 regressed to 5.5%; in Yozgat it fall from 22% to 10%. This situation shows that the National Work Party has not been able to attract new members of its strongly propagated Turkish-Islamic ideology; one may assume that a significant part of their clientele shifted side and merged into the Motherland Party.

Social stratification and political parties

Although the electoral statistics are not yielding any information about the demographic distribution of the votes, some electoral research carried out during the campaign are yielding some reliable estimates. Accordingly the Social Democrat Populist Party was supported mainly

by the civil servants, the wage earners in public enterprises, the members of the liberal professions and the pension holders. The True Path Party obtained their support from middle scale businessmen, petit bourgeois and peasants; the Democratic Left is backed by a part of wage earners in public enterprises notably miners, liberal professions and small merchants. The Motherland Party enjoyed the support of all stratas and classes. The business world linked to the international finance and banking world as well as the managers of the multinational corporations were the most enthusiastic supporters.

As far as rural/urban voting return is concerned, the True Path Party is receiving predominantly support from the rural electorate, while the Social Democrat Populist Party is a predominantly urban supported party. The Motherland Party receives support both in the cities and in the countryside. However its most noticeable electoral losses occurred in the metropolitan areas. Looking in the electoral return according to sex and education, one may say that the female electorate is favourably inclined toward the Motherland Party, whereas the Social Democrat Populist Party is backed by voters with high educational level.

The professional breakdown in parliament indicates that the new parliament registers a decline of politicians with bureaucratic and military background. Adversely there is a noticeable increase of engineers, entrepreneurs and lawyers. The turnover in parliament is also very high in 1987: the Motherland Party was able to return only 151 of its former 249, the Social Democrat Populist Party 6 of its 53 and the True Path Party 8 of its 43 members. Thus the reelection rate has been 60% for the Motherland Party, 18% for the True Path Party 11% for the Social Democrat Populist Party. This shows that a) the impact of primaries on the selection of new cadres has been very significant, b) that a substantial part of the non-vetoed members of the Motherland Party in 1983 were re-elected in the new parliament and thus represent a link between the cadres approved by the military leadership of 1980 and the present legislation.

Parliamentary turnover was also magnified by the constitutional amendment which has increased the total number of parliamentary seats from 400 to 450. Thus in the legislative assembly of 1987 56% of the deputies have been elected for the first time, 36,9% for the second, 4.1% for the third and 3.0% for the fourth time. The lack of parliamentary experience in regard of half of the legislative assembly will no doubt affect the degree of compliance which the deputies will no doubt affect the degree of compliance which the deputies will indicate in regard of the decisions taken by their respective party groups.

The new parliament of 1987 registered also a regression of female representation. While the number of women had reached 12 (3.0%) in 1983, at the 1987 elections only 6 women - 4 within the Motherland Party and 2 within the Social Democrat Populist Party - were able to enter the new legislative assembly. This weak female representation is mostly due to the disadvantaged position of female candidates in parties which opted in favour of primaries.

In terms of labour representation, the return is similarly dismal. Only 1.1% of the new parliament has a trade-union background inspite the fact that Turkey's largest federation of trade-union, Türk İş, disregarding the legal restrictions, has made its political choice publicly known and pronounced itself in favour of backing the Social Democrat Populist Party.

The role of mass media in the election

No doubt that the conversion of rational thinking into politics as show business has been the dominant feature of Turkey's political life in 1987. The massive emotional appeals diffused during the by-elections of 1986 served a kind of infrastructure on which the government party based its electoral campaign in 1987; it also helped to bridge the lack of time which occurred because of the shortened period of electoral campaign. During the 14 days of official electoral campaigning the totality of free time on TV for the seven parties which entered the political scene was 100 minutes. This time was apportioned as follows: 30 minutes for the government party, 20 for the major opposition party, 15 for the other opposition parties with parliamentary group (meaning 20 members) and 10 for those not represented in parliament. In addition political parties were permitted for the first time to use TV on a commercial basis. The two largest parties took advantage of this possibility. There was no debate between the party leaders - a regression in comparison to 1983 when Özal was able to demonstrate his superior rhetoric abilities and easily won the contest in the eyes of public opinion. In 1987 Özal refrained of engaging himself in a verbal debate with İnönü, Demirel, Ecevit, Erbakan and the two other party leaders. Thus the most widely diffused political messages of the leaders remained each one an uncontested monologue, their evaluation was left to the spectators. Taken one by one here are the major themes:

The leader of the Motherland Party Turgut Özal adorned his speeches with eye-filling vistas of newly constructed bridges, highways, factories, an assortment of a blooming economy and a rapidly industrializing country. The primeminister repeatedly underlined the fact that Turkey is on

an irreversible path of modernization, westernization and development - shortly Turkey has "jumped into a new age of its history". His target was the young cohort of the year 2000 eager to establish ties with the market economy those who are desirous to "turn around the corner". His arguments were focussed to prove that Turkey has become during the past five years of his government a totally different country, almost comparable to a European one. He stressed the increased rate of consumption, the convergence of urban/rural living styles and the social peace. His messages were geared to heighten the self-esteem of the electorate.

Unlike Özal, the leader of the Social Democrat Populist Party choose to focus his appeals on the low income, working population. His model of social democracy relies on a distributive system which protects the individual from economic exploitation, assists various groups in overcoming the deprivations of an unequal economic growth and secures protection in regard of all democratic rights. The electoral campaign of the party was well planned, made use of full page ads in the press as well as supportive statements of various types of citizens on TV. The question "Do you want to be squeezed like a lemon for the next five years?" created a large scale echo and strong disapproval on behalf on the government party. İnönü in his adresses stressed the fact that depolitization and fear cannot guarantee social peace. The solution of democracy can not be a "silent" but a "talking, discussing, truth seeking" Turkey.

Bülent Ecevit tried to establish through his own personality a link with the past. Contrary to the expectations of his followers, he gave little importance to economic issues. His major aims were twofold: to discredit the image of the Social Democrat Populist Party, which he accused to collaborate with the government party and thus contributing to the continuation of a non-pluralistic system; to stress a populist ideology in which there is little if no place for intellectuals and bureaucrats. Thus the Democratic Left Party's campaign was basically oriented to implement wedgedriving on the left front and shunned to present an alternative model of democracy.

Among the three rehabilitated political leaders who participated in the electoral campaign, Demirel was the one who used the greatest amount of emotional appeals. His ideological orientation remained that of traditional conservatism. This point of view differs both from the social democrat pluralistic concept as well as the individualistic democracy understanding of the Motherland Party. Demirel also exceeded in unrealistic promises in regard of combatting inflation and gave an open priority to peasant oriented policies.

Necmettin Erbakan, mostly renowned for his demagogical political style presented a distinctly different appeal to the electorate. Instead of insisting on the revitalization of a purely national industrialization program - his favorite theme in the past - he used all his arguments for the reinstallation of a new moral based uniquely on Islamic values. He projected a society/state model embracing Islamic ideology and accorded special emphasis on a new educational model solely inspired by Islamic sources.

The National Work Party focussed its speeches on present mismanagement, scandals. The speakers of the party tried to attribute the image of a pluralistic society to a plan of the extreme left. The essence of the messages were in favour of an anti-communist, nationalist, Islamic Turkey.

As underlined previously the relevance of the TV speeches on behalf of the competing parties lies in the fact, that due to the very short time period allocated for electoral campaign, the declining importance of mass meetings, the limited impact of press coverage, the strict control of opinion forging centers in society - universities included - the only large scale exposure to a depoliticized nationwide electorate was carried out through TV. One may contend to state that there has been not television coverage of an election: there has been a television election. Since Özal as prime minister was able to use this media much more frequently than the opposition and structured discussions on particular issues concerning foreign policy, economics while being sparsely realized on late hours are hard if not impossible to be followed by the average viewer, in the end effect the physical particularities of the leaders, their ability to use an easy understood language, even their way of dressing, using certain gestures played a decisive role in forging their popularity and credibility. The cool, detached, confidence inspiring language of Özal which uses technocratic terms reduced to its minimum essence combined with the image of a pious, loyal head of family contributed substantially to the sympathy the Motherland Party was able to generate. The pictures in the heads of the voters dominated over the fact they were presented.

Summing up

The results of the early elections of 1987 are bringing a number of questions on the agenda, which are closely related to the inner dynamics of the political system and the indirect impact of international relations.

The experiences of Southern Europe and Latin America have shown that in cases where a democratic system has been suspended in favour of an authoritarian system, the return to democracy incorporates two diffe-

rent phases: a transitional one and a consolidating one. Transitional phases are usually fashioned according imposed decisions from the top, consolidating one emerges from the bottom.

The question to be answered is as follows: will it be possible with the present Constitution, Political Parties Law and revised electoral system to facilitate this passage? At present one fifth of the political movements in Turkish society are left outside of parliament, the share of those parties not in power but represented has been mathematically reduced. This reapportioning has created on the outlook the basis for political stability, but in reality creates a constant element of instability, which might increase with the growing awareness of economic and financial bottlenecks and crises.

A revision of the electoral system will not only permit to reestablish an equilibrium in terms of adequate representation, but eventually bring along a redressing of the party system. Looking back we see that during the period of majority system (1950-60) Turkey possessed a two party system (Özbudun, 1981: 259). After adopting proportional representation Turkey experienced various forms of party systems: moderate pluralism (1961-65), dominant party (1965-73), moderate pluralism (1973-77), limited pluralism (1977-80). After the return to competitive Turkey lived again a dominant party system from 1983-1987.

These fluctuations are showing that in Turkey there is no single causal relationship between the electoral system and the prevailing party system. Neither social cleavages nor ideological polarization seems to affect directly this evolution. (Ergüder, 1986: 355) Thus one may conclude that the Turkish party system is more effectively shaped by intro-elitists conflicts. This trend has been strengthened by the abolition in 1980 of the existing parties. The frantic efforts of new and old political cadres to create functioning organizations which due to legal constraints are not able to serve real interest articulation and interest aggregation, have among others led to the resignation of both opposition leaders, namely B. Ecevit and E. İnönü. These resignations were taken back.

The second vitally important problem in Turkey's political life are the chances of the opposition parties to become real alternatives. This question gains even greater importance for the left due to its fragmentation and eclectic composition. The left suffers from a triple schizophrenic personality: the necessity to graft on the body of the former RPP (Republican People Party) two different political organizations: the dissolved Social Democrat Party and the Democratic Left Party. Thus it seems not exaggerated to say, that in terms of political crises the opposition is much

deeper affected than the party in power, which also is confronted with an ideological polarization of liberal vs. nationalist traditionalists. At present the fragmentation and atomization of the opposition parties creates a kind of vacuum. While the government party represents a mass party without a clearcut political program both parties on the left have no firm, lasting sociological bases.

Looking back the growth of the left parties in Turkey indicates that the largest support (42%) was given when the party tried in the 70s to discard its bureaucratic state supporting identity and opted for a populist orientation. This trend however did not yield a similar response in the 80s after the transition to competitive politics. At the last election the Social-Democratic Party overlooked the change in the value system of the average citizen which has deeply affected Turkish society in recent years and which replaced the bureaucratic-elitist values with those of the "production oriented, corporation type society" Turkey aspires to become.

The Democratic Left Party unlike its counterparts in the West, refused to recognize any significant differentiation within the social structure and projected a kind of plebiscitarian populism. This explains in part the electoral support which was given predominantly in regard of Ecevit's personality.

Both parties were unable to present a clear position toward market economy, the rising expectations of new consumers and civil society. To the voters they gave the impression of being either a fragmented, faction governed organization in disagreement, or a loose, one-man organization without societal roots. Thus the major problem for Turkish oppositional parties remains in their abilities to elaborate detailed, realistic programs and combine the demands of adequate distribution and increased production in the personality of strong, committed leaders.

The future of Turkey's fragile democracy is closely linked to consensus based action for a pluralistic oriented constitutional amendment changes in the electoral system and the revitalization of political parties as institutions. To the degree that it will be possible to widen the field of associational activities of trade unions, of permitting religious activities without threatening and destroying the existing secular order, democracy will become an inseparable functional element of Turkey's political culture. No doubt that the wisdom and commitment of the political leadership to the ideals of freedom and tolerance will hereby play a decisive role.

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