

THE QUALITY OF '20-YEAR-OLD' DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA: FROM AUTHORITARIAN TO DEMOCRATIC HYBRIDITY? ¹

NİJERYA'DA '20 YILLIK' DEMOKRASİNİN NİTELİĞİ: OTORİTERLİKTE DEMOKRATİK MELEZLİĞE DOĞRU MU?

Victoria Satu Jatau
PhD Candidate
Near East University
Faculty of Economics and
Administrative Sciences
Department of Political Science and
International Relations
nanchindalang@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0001-7530-0153

Prof. Dr. Nur Köprülü
Near East University
Faculty of Economics and
Administrative Sciences
Department of Political Science and
International Relations
nur.koprulu@neu.edu.tr
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6978-1891>

Gönderim 16 Ocak 2024 – Kabul 18 Şubat 2024
Received 16 January 2024 – Accepted 18 February 2024

Abstract: *The regime-type in Nigeria has been a controversial in scholarly discussions. This article draws its meaning from the earlier classifications of the case of the Nigerian Republic as 'ambiguous'. The path towards democratization in the Fourth Republic of Nigeria is an ongoing process, and it is worth scrutinizing its regime hybridity. This article, thus, problematizes the quality of democracy in Nigeria and illustrates the permeable nexus between democratic and authoritarian forms of governance, emphasizing that these processes are not stagnant, but rather intertwined. In this regard, this article argues that the regime-type in Nigeria is a hybrid of authoritarian and liberal principles. However, the degree of hybridity varied during the Fourth Republic. In light of this, this article focuses on the reasons for the improvement of democracy in Nigeria from the authoritarian to the liberal end of the democratic spectrum between 2011 and 2015. The study employs qualitative methods in the form of comparative and descriptive analysis. Data is drawn from Freedom House and Afrobarometer, as well as the growing literature on Nigerian democratization and hybrid regimes. With the aim of placing the Fourth Republic of Nigeria in the context of current regime typologies, this article utilizes the democratic indicators of Linz and Stepan regarding civil and political societies to demonstrate the hybrid nature of Nigerian democracy, and its location within competitive authoritarianism. This contradicts the earlier theory of the Nigerian case proposed by Diamond and Carothers'. This paper argues that multiparty electoral competition in Nigeria, especially in the 2015 elections, was real and led to power alternation as Nigerian democracy is mostly the result of inefficiency and a lack of the proper utilisation of political society. Hence, hybrid regimes cannot be simply described as semi- or pseudo-democracies; rather, each has a unique character and trajectory of regime hybridity, which calls for an in-depth analysis.*

Keywords: *Nigeria, hybrid regimes, democracy, elections, parties and opposition, competitive authoritarianism, ethno-religious cleavages.*

¹ This article is a study produced from the PhD Thesis entitled "Consolidation of Democracy in Deeply Divided Societies in Africa: The Enabling and Hindering Factors in Nigeria's Fourth Republic" written by Victoria Satu Jatau, Department of Political Science and International Relations, which was submitted to the Institute of Graduate Studies, Near East University, Fall, 2023-2024 Academic Year.

Öz: Nijerya'daki rejim türü çoğu zaman literatürde tartışmalı bir konu olmuştur. Nijerya Cumhuriyetinin daha önce 'belirsiz' olarak sınıflandırılmış olması bu makalenin çıkış noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Nijerya, Dördüncü Cumhuriyet döneminde demokratikleşme sürecine dahil olmuş ve rejim türünün melezliği incelemeye değer bir konu olagelmıştır. Dolayısıyla bu makale, Nijerya'daki demokrasinin kalitesini sorunsallaştırarak demokratik ve otoriter yönetim biçimleri arasındaki geçirgen bağı göstermeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu minvalde çalışma, söz konusu süreçlerin durağan değil, daha ziyade iç içe geçmiş olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Bu makale Nijerya'daki rejim tipinin otoriter ve liberal ilkelerin bir melezi olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Ancak Dördüncü Cumhuriyet döneminde melezliğin derecesi değişiklik göstermiştir. Bu gelişmeler ışığında, bu makale Nijerya'da demokrasinin 2011-2015 yılları arasında demokratik spektrumun otoriter ucundan liberal ucuna kadar gelişiminin nedenlerine odaklanmaktadır. Çalışma, karşılaştırmalı ve betimleyici analiz biçiminde nitel yöntemler kullanmaktadır. Veriler, Freedom House ve Afrobarometer'in yanı sıra Nijerya'nın demokratikleşmesi ve melez (hibrit) rejimleri hakkında gelişmekte olan literatürden alınmıştır. Dördüncü Nijerya Cumhuriyeti'ni mevcut rejim tipolojileri bağlamına yerleştirmeyi amaçlayan bu makale, Nijerya demokrasisinin melez doğasını ve rekabetçi otoriterlik içindeki konumunu göstermek için Linz ve Stepan'ın sivil ve siyasi toplumlara ilişkin demokratik göstergelerinden yararlanmaktadır. Bu makale, Diamond ve Carothers'ın Nijerya örneğine ilişkin daha önceki teorisinin ötesine geçmeyi amaçlamıştır. Ülkede özellikle 2015 seçimlerinde çok partili seçim rekabetinin gerçek bir olgu olduğunu ve Nijerya demokrasisinin çoğunlukla verimsizliğin ve siyasal toplumun uygun şekilde kullanılmamasının sonucu olması nedeniyle iktidar değişimine yol açtığını ileri sürmektedir. Dolayısıyla melez rejimler, kabaca yarı demokrasi veya demokrasi dışı olarak tanımlanamaz. Zira melez rejimlerin derinlemesine inceleme gerektiren kendine özgü özellik ve hibrit yörüngeleri vardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nijerya, melez rejimler, demokrasi, seçimler, partiler ve muhalefet, rekabetçi otoriterlik, etnik-dinsel ayrışmalar.

INTRODUCTION

It has been 20 years since Nigeria began its transition from military rule towards democracy. However, its democratic quality remains unclear as authoritarian and democratic reflexes continue to be intertwined, suggesting hybrid democracy. The Nigerian regime typology has been extensively discussed in literature, and many academics still find it to be an important topic. On one hand, Larry Diamond describes Nigeria as the epitome of an 'ambiguous case' (Diamond, 2002: 22);² meanwhile other scholars suggest that Nigeria is in the category of 'patronage democracies', "where wealth is primarily distributed according to political ties rooted in ethnic clientelist networks, solving problems of cross-ethnic cooperation at the level of party formation" (Kendhammer, 2010: 67–68). In this regard, Andreas Schedler argues that countries holding multiparty elections and a mid-range Freedom House political rights score (between 4 and 6 out of 7) can be classified as 'electoral authoritarian' regimes (Bogaards, 2009: 407). Furthermore, the Freedom House portrays Nigeria as a 'partly free' country, classifying it an 'electoral democracy'. For Carothers, the political trajectory of transitional countries which have shifted away from authoritarian rule – like Nigeria, Indonesia, Serbia, and Croatia – "is as yet unclear" (Carothers, 2002: 14).

Thus, the positioning of the Nigerian case as 'ambiguous' and 'unclear' by Diamond and Carothers, raises an interest for this article. This paper seeks to examine if the case of Nigeria still remains *ambiguous or not*. This will enable us to analyze the

² As stated by Diamond; "At best, Ukraine, Nigeria, and Venezuela are ambiguous cases. We may not have enough information now to know whether the electoral administration will be sufficiently autonomous and professional, and whether contending parties and candidates will be sufficiently free to campaign, so as to give the political opposition a fair chance to defeat the government in the next elections" (2002: 22).

quality of the Nigerian democracy over the 20 years of its trend towards democratization since 1999– which dates back to the collapse of the military rule and the inauguration of the Fourth Republic– and also to locate it within regime typology and categories. The indicators that will help us with this analysis will be derived from the seminal work of Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996), Robert Dahl (1989, 2008), and Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky (2002).

Indicators for measuring democratic consolidation were proposed by Linz and Stepan (1996). These included the following: Civil Society, Political Society (e.g. elections, political parties, electoral boards, etc.), Economic Society, Rule of Law, and Bureaucratic Environment. Dahl (1989: 221) argues that the establishment of democracies requires a high degree of competition and participation free and fair elections, elected officials, the inclusive right to vote, the capacity to run for public office, freedom of speech, access to alternative information, and associational autonomy (Dahl, 1989: 221). Way and Levitsky (2002: 5) assert that regular elections must be free, fair and competitive; they should include full adult suffrage; to provide comprehensive protection of civil liberties including the freedom of, assembly press and expression. Moreover, democracies can be fully constructed by non-elected 'tutelary' authorities, such as militaries that would jeopardize the power of the elected officials to rule (Dahl, 1989; Schmitter and Karl, 1991).

When looked at critically, all the indicators suggested by Dahl and Way and Levitsky fall within Linz and Stepan's conceptualization of political society. Thus, the civil and the political society – that is, the electoral management body (the Independent National Electoral Commission- the INEC in the case of Nigeria), elections, political parties (both with opposition) and candidates, inclusive suffrage/participation (the right to vote and be voted for), and freedom of speech, *inter alia*, will be used as the indicators to examine and analyse the quality of Nigeria's democracy, and to locate it among regime typologies.

The question to ask at this juncture is: How is the civil and political society performing in the Nigerian democratization process? The extent to which the electoral administration (precisely the role of the INEC), is autonomous; the question of whether the elections are meaningful; whether opposing parties and candidates are granted the adequate ground to campaign without restrictions; the extent to which opposition parties have a fair opportunity of defeating the incumbents through elections; and whether the civil society and the media are free, are all major indicators that will be used to measure the quality of democracy in Nigeria in this research paper.

In identifying the scholarly discussions on *regime categorization* and the kind of *hybridity* represented in Nigeria, postulates that there is *no* coherence in its regime classification, which is closely intertwined with the quality of its democratic institutions and practices. In light of this, we restate that the original set of indicators would be employed to investigate the nature of Nigerian democracy and, as a natural extension of this goal, to determine the exact "hybridity" category that Nigerian democracy belongs to.

1. METHODOLOGY

The study employed qualitative methods in the form of both comparative and descriptive analysis. Therefore, through these comparative and descriptive methods, we seek insight into the regimes of the Fourth Republic of Nigeria and look for how they differ. Hence, these methods provide us with the opportunity to find out why some of the republic's regimes were *authoritarian* in character while others tilted towards *liberal* democracy.

Therefore, this study is primarily based on from the conclusions drawn from the existing literature and the data provided by both Freedom House and Afrobarometer. Based on the literature and discussion, this article has summarized the strengths and weaknesses of the selected democracy indicators. The article also compared and described the different democratic regimes in the Fourth Republic in order to improve our understanding of the different regimes and their positioning in the regime typology and categorization. The examination of regime typology and hybridity will serve as the central analytical framework for this study.

2. STUDYING REGIME TYPES AND HYBRIDITY: THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

As coined by Huntington (1991), with the rise of the *Third Wave* of democratization most of the *new* democracies oscillate between one type of regime and another. Some do so because they lack the needed or basic democratic institutions that define democracy, while others have them, but lack the ability to optimally utilize them for a meaningful democracy. In Schumpeter's classical understanding of democracy, "[A] democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" which stresses the minimal prerequisite of elections (Schumpeter 1956: 269). The concept of democracy is a highly contested area in political science, the definition of authoritarian regimes was also attributed to the key elements of democracy *per se*. Thus, the most significant characteristics in the conceptualization of authoritarian regime types revolved around the presence or absence of free and fair elections. However, it is imperative to indicate that even elections in and of themselves do not fully guarantee democratic regimes (Schedler, 1998; Carothers, 2002). The conceptual distinction between democratic and *non*-democratic regimes is traditionally limited to the notion of authoritarianism, with only limited analysis of the varieties of these 'gray zones'. Scholarship on regime typologies (as coined by Diamond) has grown, resulting in a range of democratization and authoritarianism types, from electoral authoritarianism to what Levitsky and Way describe as the "proliferation of hybrid political regimes" in the post-Cold War era, which has been symbolized by the emergence of the "competitive authoritarianism" regime type (2002: 51). Carothers, for instance, described this new stage as "the end of the transition paradigm", saying that "many countries said to be engaged in a democratic transition were, in fact, "stuck in the 'gray zone' from which there was no certainty that they would soon – or indeed, ever – emerge as liberal democracies" (Carothers, 2002: 10).

As stated by Bogaards and Elischer "Although 14 of Levitsky and Way's 35 cases of competitive authoritarianism are located in Africa ... scholarship on Africa has failed to engage in the concept and theory" (2015: 6). In other words, it is imperative to state

that; Africa is a home for many competitive authoritarian regimes and thus has “much to offer” to the existing literature on the hybrid regimes in African continent. Meanwhile, Fasakin (2015) posits that most African countries have the veneer of democracy, yet are without democracy. One reason behind this phenomenon is intertwined with the idea that “competitive politics is an imported luxury neither needed nor affordable in developing countries”, as the corollary of this understanding multiplicity of political parties or “multipartyism” which echoes the politicization of existing social cleavages in the form of ethnic or religious affiliations was rather opted by some countries in Africa (Decalo, 1992: 9-10).

In this context, an empirical analysis of the functioning of some democratic political forms of politics, institutions and techniques used by incumbents in these hybrid regime types is of greater importance. In the light of these theoretical debates, this article aims to suggest that the transition paradigm according to which transitology proceeds in three stages –opening, transition and democratic consolidation– is *no* more valid worldwide, and that those cases that are hybrid in character, and whose transition has stalled, such as some in Africa, deserve deeper exploration. In this context, the notion of competitive authoritarianism in the seminal work by Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky (2002 and 2010) is a good example of ‘hybridity’, a concept that has dominated the scholarship on regime theory (Diamond, 2002; Bogaards, 2009, 2010). Having said that, Levitsky and Way define competitive authoritarianism as one hybrid form of governance where “formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy” (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 52). It follows that a hybrid regime is a combination of authoritarianism and liberalism. This type of government represents a mixed system with both democratic and authoritarian attributes.

Thus, narrowing this framework to the Nigerian case, the power of incumbency, as abused by the ruling parties across the national and state levels, exposes Nigeria’s authoritarian/hybrid democracy. Nigeria is selected as the case under investigation for this article is twofold: First and the foremost reason for selecting the case of Nigeria is profoundly stemming from the contested regime-type of the country which is usually seen as ‘ambiguous’ or ‘unclear’ by the key scholars in this field by the early 2000s. The second motivation for this work is related Nigeria’s endeavor towards democratization since 1999. On the one hand, Nigeria is embarked on a democratic transition process such as the breakdown of the authoritarian rule and moving towards holding elections, the country’s democratization efforts is not without significant challenges, on the other.

For instance, the elections have been regularly conducted in Nigerian Fourth Republic since 1999; state manipulation of government machineries for electoral gains subverts the principles of fairness and equity, undermining the minimum democratic standard of freedom, fairness, inclusiveness, and meaningful elections for a liberal democracy. Most elections in Nigeria fail Norris, Frank and Coma’s (2013) examination of integrity and credibility which stresses the quality of elections –with the aim of detaching electoral authoritarian systems from democratic ones. Within this framework, this article examines the factors that led to fluctuations (either progress or regression) in the propensity of the Nigerian regime type towards democratic hybridity before

assessing Nigerian regime hybridity, an overview of the role and centrality of civil and political society as key indicators for measuring the quality of democracy in Nigeria is necessary to situate the case in regime categorization in the following sections.

3. SELECTED DEMOCRACY INDICATORS: CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL SOCIETY

3.1. The Civil Society

For Linz and Stepan, a viable civil society is indispensable, given the important role it plays in strengthening and consolidating democracy. Civil society has the competence to stimulate political vistas, supervise the operation of the government and state, and push democratic transitions to completion, as well as to ensure quality of the regime (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Therefore, the place of civil society in a democratic society cannot be underestimated and must be emphasized.

3.2. The Arena of Political Society

As indicated by Linz and Stepan (1996) political society is also essential for the flourishing and consolidation of democracies. Political society includes the electoral body, elections, political parties and oppositions, universal suffrage/participation, freedom of expression, etc. Without these components of the political arena, a key ingredient would be missed in a democratic regime. Political parties are necessary for elections to take place, because it is through the parties that candidates' manifestos and programs are articulated and presented to the electorate. People can only vote and be elected through the political party structure.

In addition, election management among other duties are another vital component of a political society. This is basically an exercise delegated to a recognized body or commission in a democratic regime to ensure free and credible elections. Such an assertion clarifies the basic understanding of electioneering administration as the responsibility of a constitutionally recognized organ to conduct and supervise the electoral process. This conforms to the perspective of Ijim-Agbor (2007) who conceptualizes election management as the mechanism through which an election is administered to enhance the actualization of the electorate's consent towards the transformation of authoritative and legitimate government. Similarly, the report by Ajayi (2007) of the Election Administration Centre considers election management to be synonymous with election activities anchored by the electoral body, which includes running the polls on Election Day, procuring the necessary equipment, recruiting and training poll workers etc. to facilitate the electoral process. Sakariyau and Aliu (2014) constructively criticized this direction in the case of Nigeria, by speculating that the political class and more importantly by in the conduct of the 'highest bidder' control Nigeria's electoral management, which goes beyond the procedural requirements involved in the conduct of elections. In essence, the process indicates 'what is', as opposed to 'what ought to be'.

As stated by Levitsky and Way, in competitive authoritarian regimes, the first and most critical ground that reinforces competition is, no doubt, the electoral arena *per se*. In such cases, even if elections are conducted, their meaning is open to skepticism due to a lack of real contestation and unfair election campaigns. In competitive authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, “elections are often bitterly fought. Although the electoral process may be characterized by large-scale abuses of state power, biased media coverage, (often violent) harassment of candidates in opposition and activists, and an overall lack of transparency, elections are regularly held, competitive (in that major opposition parties and candidates usually participate), and generally free of massive fraud” (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 55). Levitsky and Way also indicated that the inclusion of parallel vote-counting procedures and the participation of international monitoring schemes severely limit the ability of incumbents’ capacity to commit widespread fraud (2002: 55). So, under competitive authoritarian rule, “elections may generate considerable uncertainty, and autocratic incumbents must therefore take them seriously” (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 55).

Given the critical importance of the aforementioned indicators of political and civil societies for the health of democracy, the quality of Nigeria’s 20-year-old democracy will be evaluated in light of these indicators, in the following section.

4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE *QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA THROUGH THE LENSES OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL SOCIETY*

Linz and Stepan (1996) suggested in their seminal book entitled *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* that, the characteristics of consolidated democracies which are civil society, political society, economic society, rule of law and finally bureaucratic structure. In light of this, the following indicators will be used to measure and analyse the quality of democracy in Nigeria: Civil society and the political society (electoral body – INEC, elections, political parties and opposition, inclusive suffrage –the right to vote and be voted for –and freedom of expression).

4.1. Civil Society

The civil society is, for the most part, regarded as a vibrant institution in the Fourth Republic of Nigeria. Its role in democratic governance as highlighted by several other studies revolves primarily around advocacy, civic engagement, education, election monitoring, media monitoring, budget monitoring, and related other functions (Baryart, 1986; Osaghae, 1997; Diamond 1999; Odeh, 2012). Civil society organizations (CSOs) in Nigeria have been trying to advocate for the provision of some basic democratic dividends since 1999. Via public protests, workshops and media analysis, CSOs track elected representatives’ output, and request that they respond to some national or local development issues (Odeh, 2012). The Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) for example, has played a huge role in civic engagement, research, and documentation since 1999. It has also arranged conferences and symposiums for elected officials, parties and the citizens on the issues primarily related to democracy. In the fuel-subsidy demonstrations in Nigeria in December 2012, for example, CDD workers joined other civil society organizations. Established in Nigeria in 1999 with offices in the capital cities Lagos and Abuja, it promoted transparency, accountability and fairness in

Nigeria's democratic governance. However, because of Nigeria's large and dynamic population of over 180 million citizens with approximately 250 ethnic groups speaking almost 400 different languages, it has been challenging for these organizations to enter rural areas for social mobilization. Furthermore, the Save Nigeria Group (SNG) has been instrumental in monitoring the adherence to the constitutional order in the country. The SNG also organized a public protest in 2012 criticizing the removal of fuel subsidies in the country. The protest initially led by the SNG later unite with the other groups such as Occupy Nigeria Group (ONG), Citizens for Good Governance (CGG), Arise for Change (AFC), and Women Arise for Change Initiatives (WACI) and exemplified the largest public rally organized in Lagos since 1993. They did not protest against the decision of the government concerning fuel subsidies, but also ask for ending corruption, particularly in the oil sector (Perouse de Montclos, 2018).

The civil society associations offer elected members with soft loans and agricultural benefits, job opportunities and basic social facilities such as hospitals, clinics, clean water and other necessary services in Nigeria (Odeh, 2012). What is more, civil society has been helping to encourage and support free and fair democratic elections in Nigeria since 1999, though most of the elections end up lacking credibility for other reasons. According to Okechukwu Ibeanu, 'Situation Room' was comprised of a group of 60 local civil society associations that have engaged in monitoring and tracking of the 2015 presidential elections (Ibeanu, 2015). Amid the problems that plagued the INEC in some parts of Nigeria during the presidential election, Situation Room noted that;

It is unreasonable that INEC was unable to deploy its officials and election materials on time to allow the timely start of polls. Officials and materials did not reach a significant number of polling openings. This delayed accreditation and voting, and contributed to the continuation of the vote on the following day in many places. Situation Room draws urgent attention to three crucial problem areas: (1) the late start of elections; (2) accreditation challenges; (3) the competence of security agencies and the use of social media (Ibeanu, 2015: 9).

Civil society seeks to strengthen the democratization processes through this phase of constructive criticism and recognition. One of the major flaws in Nigeria's democracy and civil society, however, is the perception of it being an elitist project. The reason behind this is intertwined with the fact that; many civil society groups asking for in democratic governance and are primarily located in the urban areas, however only few ones centred in rural areas deprived of financial and administrative resources necessary to integrate and promote good governance. Thus, the lack of national cooperation/ unification of the civil society constitutes a challenge for a broader impact.

Thus, the civil society in Nigeria is active, meaning that the mass media, labour and professional unions, human rights organizations, student unions have the capacity to function as pressure groups on the public policies of the state (Ibrahim, 2011: 29). The fight to extend Nigeria's political space and promote the welfare of ordinary Nigerians reveals "a wide range of actors" – labour unions, in particular the Nigeria Trade Congress (NLC), the National Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers Union (NUPENG), the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), and Campaign for Democracy (CD) (see Bradley, 2005; Kew, 2004: 101–131; Olayode, 2018: 136). In the history and political growth of Nigeria, they were an influential mobilizing and agitating force (Ikelegbe, 2001a; Ikelegbe, 2005: 241).

As rightly put by Egbefo (2015), authoritarian rule by an institutionalised oligarchy forms one of the major challenges to enhancing the quality of democracy in Nigeria. He oligarchs, he posits are made up of political fixers-godfathers, composed of self-serving politicians, business partners, former military officers and bureaucrats. Though these oligarchs claim to represent democratic bases professional, regional, and ethical constituencies, their pedigree falls short of their claim by far. Secondly, the sit-tight mentality of some incumbent rulers is a testament to the authoritarian tendency of the rulers in Nigeria. Some have manipulated transition process in an effort to perpetuate themselves in power. For example, we have General Yakubu Gowon, and General Sani Abacha under the military who attempted that, and former president Olusugun Obasanjo and Muhammadu Buhari, within the Fourth Republic (Egbefo, 2015).

The Nigerian civil society has been active since the return to civil rule in 1999. In fact, it has fought rigorously to ensure the collapse of the authoritarian rule, and since then has been working hard to enhance the quality of the Nigerian democracy. However, both the rural and urban civil society in the country need national cohesion to make a broader impact.

4.2. Political Society

4.2.1. The Electoral Body – The INEC and Elections

Nigeria has held elections on a regular basis since 1999, and are mostly seen to be free from large-scale electoral fraud. However, in this rentier state, incumbents are still used to manipulate the state's resources. Frequently, the ruling party frequently prevents the opposition to receive enough information from the media, and may even jeopardize the capability of the opposition candidates and their supporters to function, which in turn leads to tampering of election outcomes (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 53–54). For instance, the PDP from 1999 to 2015 is an important example of how the ruling party has used surveillance over the different constituencies across the country with the help of “the recruitment of ‘godfathers’ and other ethnically-minded political entrepreneurs” (Figueroa and Sives, 2002; Omotola, 2009). Thus far in 2015 till date this has been the APC. This reveals the “gray” zone in the Nigerian endeavour towards democracy, where democratic institutions exist, but are primarily *destabilized* by the dominant party's control of “the voting process and the purse strings of political resources” (Kendhammer, 2010: 67). During the 2003 general elections, even though a quite number of both domestic and international observers participated, the organizational weakness of the INEC and its restricted autonomy from the incumbents all hindered its effectiveness. For example, the eligible electorate was not registered they were silenced and sale of votes were detected (Omotola, 2010a). Both domestic and foreign electoral observers unanimously condemned the 2003 elections as it was seriously flawed. It was argued that in some states, “the minimum standards for democratic election that are fairness, equity and justice were not met” (Fadal, 2011: 204). In the end, the PDP emerged as the winner at all levels by a wide margin. President Obasanjo was reelected and acted as the president for a second term with a total of 24,109,157 votes (61.80% of total votes cast), while General Mohammed Buhari – Obasanjo's opponent and leader of

the then All Nigeria People Party (ANPP), emerged as runner up, with 12,495,326 (32.3%). This also reveals the influential place of retired military officers in the Nigeria's political pace.

Moreover, in the National Assembly elections of 2003, the PDP won a landslide victory with 75 of the 109 senatorial seats, leaving 28 and 6 seats for the ANPP and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) respectively. The main driving force behind the electoral victory of the PDP was closely intertwined with the power of the incumbency, which provided the ruling party to have access to state institutions, precisely the institutions such as INEC, treasury, mass media, as well as security forces (Omotola, 2010b). The 2003 elections resulted in a sharp decline and decay of opposition politics across the country. Meanwhile, the defeat of the AD in the south-west demonstrated the very fact that, it did not extend its political influence to be considered as an alternative to replace the PDP. As argued by Omotola and Aremu, (2007), the PDP's dominance was such that it became 'the only game in town' –portraying itself a single party state (Omotola, 2010b).

More so, during the 2007 elections, unparalleled rigging, voter intimidation, ballot stuffing, falsification of results was reported. For instance, in Enugu State, which is located in the south-east region, the, then-Senate President Ken Nnamani, like many others, could not vote in the presidential election for lack of availability of voting materials (Omotola and Aremu, 2007). During 2007 elections, it was also recorded that, a day before the elections the INEC disqualified the candidacy of the members of the opposition parties, i.e. the ANPP and Action Congress (AC) Adamawa, Kogi, and Anambra states, despite the court's decision against this. This and many more cases caused local as well as international observers to be unanimous in their criticism of the elections (Omotola and Aremu, 2007).

The 2011 elections, however, saw a relative improvement over the 1999, 2003, and 2007 elections. The key driving force was related to the relative increase in the roles of NGOs and international observers in monitoring the government to ensure transparency, accountability, and good governance. For instance, under the leadership of Justice Ephraim Akpata in 1999, Sir Abel Guobadia in 2003, and Professor Maurice Iwu in 2007, the INEC was widely perceived to be deprived of administrative competence. Under the leadership of the above-mentioned Chairmen, Commission was reputed with irregularities (Omotola and Aremu, 2007; Obah-Akpowoghaha, 2013; Ebirim, 2014). The elections were undermined by transparency deficiencies, poor organization, electoral violence, procedural irregularities and strong evidence of fraud– especially during the results collation process, as described above with respect to the first three transitions of the Fourth Republic. The ICG alleged that the postponement of the 2011 parliamentary elections was an effort by then-President Jonathan and the PDP to curb the growing power of the opposition groups (ICG, 2015).

Going further, the next elections were held in 2015, during which it was reported that the INEC had adequate capacity and power to make electoral outcomes open-ended. There is no doubt that there were significant efforts by the INEC to create an accurate and inclusive registry through its continuous registration of voters. Elections were credible, the audit of the public register and the issuance of voting cards were a testament to the level of preparedness of the election management body. Moreover, civil society assisted in monitoring the elections, and also mobilized participation during the

elections (Lewis and Kew, 2015: 95). Thus, as observed by Egbefo (2015), authoritarian rule by 'an *institutionalized oligarchy*' forms the major structural challenge to deepening democratic regime in Nigeria.

The Freedom House records that, both local and international observers assessed the 2015 presidential election³ as "competitive and generally well conducted, with improvements in voter identification and reductions in election-related violence compared with 2011" (Freedom House Report, 2019). Afrobarometer records that the 2015 presidential elections "marked a zenith in the quality of electoral administration in that country (up to 35 points between 2005 and 2017)" (Afrobarometer 2019b: 12). The Nigerian Parliament is bicameral and the Senate is composed of 109 seats and the House of Representatives is composed of 360 seats. The members of both branches of the legislature are elected for four-year terms. In the House of Representatives, the All Progressives Congress (APC) won 212 seats, while the PDP captured 140, and smaller parties were granted only the remaining 8 seats, which marked a historic victory for the country's opposition entirely. By the 2015 elections, the APC acquired 60 and the PDP won 49 seats in the Senate (Freedom House Report, 2019). The country's multiparty system also empowered the opposition parties through elections. One clear manifestation of this was the APC's electoral victory in the 2015 elections, represents the first democratic transfer of power in Nigerian young democratic history between the two-key rival political parties. In a survey conducted by the Afrobarometer in 2017; 67% of the respondents in Nigeria stated that 2015 parliamentary elections were "completely free and fair" or "free and fair with minor problems" while 31% of them thought it was "not free and fair" or "free and fair with major problems" (Afrobarometer 2019: 4).

Additionally, one of the reasons for the success of the 2015 elections was attributed to the Accord Agreement, which the then incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan signed with the intention of preventing any unnecessary tension from arising during the elections, was cited as one of the reasons for the success of the 2015 elections. The idea behind the Accord Agreement was to allow the elections to be 'won' and not 'captured' (Araba and Braimah, 2015). The incumbent conceded defeat and did not use the power of the incumbency to consolidate his power and perpetuate himself in office unconstitutionally. He rather allowed the process to run its rightful course and the people's choice prevailed. This behaviour is a demonstration of political maturity and a step in the right direction in the country's democratization process. For Orji, regarding the 2015 national elections, "improvements in election administration offered all parties a more level playing ground and increased the prospects of genuine elections being carried out. In this way, the PDP's opportunities to frustrate the opposition or co-opt their mandate were greatly reduced" (2015: 81). President Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP was defeated by Muhammadu Buhari, the candidate of the APC, who won 45% and 54% of the votes respectively.

Nevertheless, during the elections, some problems were observed and identified, such as long queues and a lengthy procedure that made registration and PVC collection a daunting experience for the electorate. In addition, the election results highlighted the

³ Under the Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Nigeria, "to become president a candidate must win both a plurality of the national vote and at least a quarter of the vote in two-thirds (24) of the states".

salience of ethnic and religious cleavages in the country, a northern Muslim – Muhammadu Buhari– winning largely in the northern parts of the country, and a Christian from the southern Niger Delta region –Goodluck Jonathan– winning a crushing majority in the south. Despite the electoral contestation, hundreds of thousands of Nigerians could not vote in the 2015 elections largely due to the inability of the electoral umpire to provide them, their permanent voter cards in time, because the process would be over-militarized, or as a result of their displacement due to Boko Haram insurgency. However, the election was a huge success in terms of credibility.

Conversely, despite the relative success of the 2015 general elections, the 2019 general elections revealed serious shortcomings which challenged the exercise's legitimacy, and the conduct and outcomes fell below the expected thresholds for credible elections (NCSSR, 2019). Operations at INEC fell short of their intended position and responsibilities as set out for credible elections. This shows that irrespective of the improvement in other democratic components in Nigeria, democratic election outcomes are never synonymous with full democratization, neither are they a guarantee of a lasting democratic consolidation. The 2019 general elections witnessed a retrogression from what had been built in the 2015 elections, as it was marred by heavy rigging, destruction of ballot boxes and violence. Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, the candidate of the PDP described the election as a “shame”, and was not free and fair (Kunle, 2019).

One of the critical moments during this episode was the cancellation of the elections just five hours before polling was to begin. This was publicly announced by the INEC due to lack of sufficient hold elections countrywide. The failure to distribute materials to polling units on time, including ballot papers and results sheets, was one of the main reasons behind the postponement (EU Observer Mission Report, 2019). Even the political parties and civil society organizations in the country strongly criticized this short-notice postponement. The Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room (2019) asserted that the sudden postponement showed how unprepared the INEC was, thereby dampening the national excitement built up for the elections. It stopped those who had travelled earlier from voting in their constituencies from making a second trip, exacerbating voter apathy, which had been progressively increasing with each electoral cycle since 2003. Besides the fact that the election was illogically postponed, another major weakness of the 2019 Nigerian elections was the collection of results. Virtually all the national and international observers reported obvious interference with the process and often with the active involvement of INEC officials.

Some of the reasons adduced for the failure of the INEC in most of the elections is the non-financial autonomous nature of the Commission (Ajayi, 2015). The INEC funding comes entirely from the executive branch (Hanson, 2007). This is in all likelihood another reason why the commission can be easily manipulated by the presidency. The old saying goes that ‘he who pays the viper dictates its tune’. The timely release of funds is critical to the success and independence of the INEC. This can only be possible when the Commission is financially independent. As it stands, the current constitution does not allow for total financial autonomy for the INEC; if possible, there should be a clause in the constitution that gives a certain percentage of the national budget to the INEC directly. This would not only guarantee the organization’s autonomy but would also reduce its over-dependence on the government; it would thereby achieve the capacity and the autonomy to operate independently. This

will not only guarantee the credible conduct of elections, but promote a shift towards an ideal liberal democracy.

It is worthy of note that, most of the 73 political parties that contested the presidential general elections failed to maintain internal democracy. However, the EU Observer Mission stated that Situation Room coordinated an extensive network of observing organizations. According to a statement made by the EU Observer Mission in the 2019 elections, both the Presidential and National Assembly elections were competitive, and candidates were able to campaign freely. The EU reported that:

The INEC worked in a very difficult environment and made various improvements. However, its serious operational shortcomings reduced confidence in the process and put undue burden on voters. The controversial suspension of the Chief Justice by the President was also divisive and raised questions about process, timing and jurisdiction. During this period, needless to say that, the CSOs and the media contributed positively to the accountability through scrutiny of the elections. In nearly 90% of 190 EU observations, agents of the two main political parties were both present. However, important polling procedures were insufficiently followed, and in 14 per cent some essential materials were missing (EU Election Observer Mission, 2019).

In addition, the EU also recorded that between approximately 20 and 35 people were killed on polling day. Concerns over the spates of violence recorded during the presidential and parliamentary elections held on 23 March 2019 were also expressed by the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA).

The cancellation of ballots and turnout ratios, is one out of the problems. According to Kunle (2019), the percentage of cancelled ballots announced by the INEC in the 2019 general elections was 3.3 millions of all registered voters. This, he said, is four times higher than the rate from 2015, when registered voters in cancelled polling units represented less than 1% of all registered voters. The turnout in 2015 was 44% (Reuters, 2019), which rapidly declined to 35% in the 2019 elections (The Guardian, 2019). The turnout in the 2011 elections, however, had been 54%, which shows a linear decline that endangers the legitimacy of the elections, as well as elected incumbents.

By and large, elections have been conducted on a regular basis since 1999, and are run in a 'competitive' manner, but the quality of elections is still not immune to irregularities and the other factors detailed in this study. This supports Fasakin's position that most African countries have the veneer of democracy, yet their democracies can be better understood as "competitive authoritarianism" (2015). In this context, Nigeria represents one of the two countries (with Zambia) among the African countries surveyed, where the people perceived that the "quality of elections" (covering the period between 2005 and 2018) in the country is improving (Afrobarometer, 2019b: 12).

The political parties and the opposition will be the next pillars under the political society indicator.

4.2.2. Political Parties and the Opposition

The number of political parties in the Fourth Republic of Nigeria has risen from 3 in 1999 to 91 in 2019 (Daily Post, 2019). In fact, the total number of political parties is around 286, but only 91 are registered with the INEC. Nigeria has been ruled by a quasi-single party system in which constitutionally the country had a multiparty system, but the PDP acts like a *de facto* ruling party. This political equilibrium was smashed with the 2015 elections, when the PDP was defeated and the ruling elites were replaced by the APC. More importantly, Obasanjo –a Yoruba Christian from the south-west region– was, in fact, representative of “the ‘power shift’ away from the Muslim-majority northern states, which had been closely identified with national political power since the coming of independence in 1960” (Lewis and Kew, 2015: 96), only to see power return to a Muslim leader of the APC, Muhammadu Buhari from the northern geopolitical zone. Thus, Nigeria’s political landscape since the 2015 elections has become more ‘competitive’ and also ‘polarized’ (Lewis and Kew, 2015: 106). This also illustrates that Nigeria’s is not a single-party system; with the rise of the APC, a two-party competition has arisen. Accordingly, in a survey conducted in Nigeria, 69% of respondents stated that they “believe in having many political parties to ensure that voters have a real choice”, which marks an increase since 2012 records (Afrobarometer 2019a: 2).

Having seen political parties and opposition in Nigeria, inclusive suffrage/participation will be the next in analyzing democratic quality under the political society indicator.

4.2.3. Inclusive Suffrage/Participation

Inclusive suffrage entails that all adults have the ‘right to vote’ in the election of officials in democratic forms of governance as well as political stability. The inclusive suffrage has, however, been infringed upon in some parts of Nigeria due to the Boko Haram insurgency. The insurgence of Boko Haram has caused an insecurity that threatens the willingness of eligible citizens or electorates to go to polling centres, as most of these are marred by electoral violence by the end of the day. For instance, towards the 2015 general elections, some of the Igbo people who were resident in the north had registered in the north, but on the eve of the elections, the majority of them abruptly moved to the east out of concern about the possibility of a spiral outbreak of violence marring the electoral process. Disenfranchised by security concerns, the voting rights of these citizens was hampered. Besides, the over-militarization of Nigerian elections contributes to voter apathy. The police are the security agents who have to monitor the elections, but the military is also deployed during the elections. This undermines one of the indicators of democracy cited by Way and Levitsky, that is the absence of non-elected “tutelary” authorities that hinder the elected officials’ effective power to rule.

Furthermore, the ‘right to run for office’, is also undermined by the presence of political elites and/or godfathers in the Nigerian political landscape. Godfathers usually determine who will run and win office before an election. Although godfathers do not run for office themselves, many Nigerians believe that they are the ones who decide who wins, and who loses (BBC News, 2019). For instance, tensions existed nationwide prior to the 2003 elections, mostly in areas such as Anambra in the south-east, Kwara in

the north-west, and Borno in the north-east, where battle lines were drawn between well-known godfathers and their godsons. This reduced the voter turnout and gave the INEC the justification to rig the election results in the ruling party's favour (Ajayi, 2006).

4.2.4. Freedom of Expression – Citizens and the Press

The last, important indicator for the political arena in measuring the quality of democratic regimes is freedom of expression. It gives people and opposition parties in particular the opportunity to criticize the ruling party. During President Olusegun Obasanjo's two terms in office, –from 1999 until he handed over power in 2007– Nigerians were denied this right, as anyone who tried to express an honest opinion on political events or the government faced blatant intimidation and the wrath of the regime. For Diamond, “electoral authoritarian regimes range from 4.0 to 6.0 on the combined seven-point scale” (Diamond, 2002: 32) in accordance with Freedom House ratings of political rights and civil liberties. According to this rating system, Nigeria's overall score is 4.0 out of 7.0, which classifies it as a “partly free” country, receiving 3.0 for political rights, but a lower rate – 5.0 – for civil liberties (Freedom House Report, 2019).

Although freedom of speech and the press are constitutionally guaranteed in Nigeria, these fundamental rights are restricted by several laws pertaining to sedition, criminal defamation, and the dissemination of false information (Freedom House Report, 2019). In Nigeria, intimidation and detention of journalists covering security issues and politically sensitive matters. For instance, Samuel Ogundipe, a journalist of *Premium Times*, was charged in August 2018 “with stealing a police document after publishing an article that provided details on the investigation of the security personnel who denied lawmakers access to the National Assembly in July” (Freedom House Report, 2019). In addition, some journalists were also attacked by the Boko Haram insurgency in 2019. Finally, at the request of the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), internet service providers blocked those websites supporting Biafran independence.

With reference to the discussion of selected democracy indicators, the quality of democracy in Nigeria speaks about its regime type too. In other words, Nigerian democracy possesses both strengths and weaknesses –which can be seen in the table below– and has a propensity from authoritarian towards democratic hybridity.

Table Showing the Summary of the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Indicators, Regime by Regime, within the Fourth Republic of Nigeria

Regime after each election	Civil Society	Political Society	INEC	Elections	Pol. Parties	Opposition Parties	Inclusive Suffrage	Freedom of Expression
1999	Viable		Viable	Fairly credible	Fairly viable	Not viable	Good	Poor
2003	viable		Not viable	Not credible	Viable	Viable	Fair	Poor
2007	viable		Not viable	Not credible	Viable	Viable	Fair	Poor
2011	viable		Viable	Fairly credible	Viable	Viable	Fair	Good
2015	Viable		Viable	Credible	Viable	Viable	Fair	Good
2019	Viable		Not viable	Not credible	Viable	Viable	Poor	Poor

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research paper is to examine the quality of democracy and the obstacles in the democratic transition since the Fourth Republic. Since its first free and multiparty elections conducted in 1999, Nigeria has demonstrated that it possesses democratic institutions and indicators that can improve the quality of its democracy, but it is not without challenges, and these institutions are, mostly subverted by authoritarian practices. As a result, these institutions are not being used to their full potential for the benefit of democracy. The quality of democracy in Nigeria is examined by referring to selected democracy metrics. One of the key indicators that has been used is the civil society which has remained viable since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999. Under the political society, the INEC has faltered in many respects with the exception of the demonstration of its administrative professionalism and institutional empowerment in the 2015 general elections. Elections have always taken place on a periodic basis, but the majority of them are tainted by violence, excessive militarization, ballot box snatching, disfranchisement, and other irregularities in the country. Having said that, one very positive event from the six general elections held so far was the 2015 transfer of power to an opposition party from the ruling party, which had ruled the country for sixteen years. It is also imperative to indicate that the number of political parties has consistently grown from 3 in 1999 to 91 in 2019, and elections have been highly competitive, particularly in 2015 and 2019. But then, most of these political

parties lack a national outlook, and most are personality driven instead of being driven by ideology. Opposition parties do not always have a fair chance of defeating the ruling party, due to their disadvantaged position relative to the state machineries, which may be manipulated by the ruling power for political gains during elections. With the exception of the 2015 general elections, the ruling party has consistently weakened opposition parties. Under the political arena, inclusive suffrage is guaranteed, but most eligible voters become disenfranchised for lack of access to their PVC, and other times because of violence. Furthermore, as our analysis has shown there are other variables that limit the freedom of speech, even if it is protected by the constitution. One such element is the media, which is not entirely free.

One potential indicator of an impediment to democratic governance is voter apathy and de-politicization, which have been clearly detected in lower turnouts. Moreover, the turnout has been dropping at an alarming rate since the 2003 elections; it was 54% in 2011 and 44% in 2015. In the 2019 elections, turnout was only 35% countrywide. In fact, the key indicator of regime hybridity in Nigeria is the inefficiency of the system to allow for the rightful utilization of most of the indicators in our analysis of the Nigerian case. For instance, the overall system lacks the necessary checks and balances to prevent massive electoral fraud, corruption, and electoral violence, as was once again experienced in the most recent 2019 elections. Nearly every element of the political society/indicator is rendered absurd by the regime's authoritarian tendencies. In other words, though sufficient democratic institutions/ indicators exist, the system does not allow for their optimal utilization for the good of democracy. As so, the quality of elections can be a matter of contention which can impair the fairness, inclusivity and the meaning of elections. This forces us to define the regime type of Nigeria as hybrid. In addition, the use of the state apparatus to rig elections, and other authoritarian tendencies among the country's leaders propels us to categorize the Nigerian hybrid democracy as being competitively authoritarian.

Based on this research, it can be argued that Nigerian hybridity has shifted from an authoritarian towards a democratic one. Nigeria is rated as a "partly free" countries (60 points out of 100) falling between the democratic and authoritarian regime types, according to data from Freedom House (2023). This article, thus, goes beyond the previous theoretical explanations and contestations over Nigeria, and attempts to categorise the gray area that Nigeria has been in since 1999. In saying so, this work illustrates that the existence of democratic institutions such as multiparty elections and arenas for competition were real at the time of the 2011 elections, when an opposition electoral victory was possible. Furthermore, as a result of the effects of authoritarian diffusion throughout the world, the 'blurry' boundary between electoral and competitive authoritarian regime types – which Diamond refers to in relation to 'ambiguous' cases (2002) – is *no longer* hidden in the case of Nigeria, which may draw analysts interested in examining the regime-typologies in Africa as a whole. In this regard, this article aims to contribute to the growing literature on hybrid-regimes in Africa by addressing the theoretical underpinnings of regime hybridity and referring to an empirical case from the field of study.

On the one hand, as Afrobarometer indicates Nigerians are in favour multiparty competition and elections and multiparty competition and elections, but the people do not trust the INEC, on the other (2019a: 8). Moreover, during the 1999–2007 period, the new administration has restricted the media and opposition since 2015. One could argue that the regime type is *hybrid*. Still, its hybridity has oscillated across the spectrum, with the years 2011–2015 being a more liberal democracy period in the Fourth Republic.

With increased financial independence, the country's democracy transitions from a hybrid one that can be described as competitive authoritarianism to a full-fledged liberal democracy and the INEC could function better to maintain the transparency, integrity, and overall quality of Nigerian democracy making it visible. In light of the discussion of democracy indicators, this study attempted to demonstrate that Nigeria's regime type is a *hybrid* one with major obstacles to achieve a high level of democracy. This does not, however, carry Nigeria's ongoing attempts entirely back to achieve democratization.

REFERENCES

- Afrobarometer (2019a). "Nigerians Support Elections and Multiparty Competition but Mistrust Electoral Commission", *Afrobarometer Dispatch* No. 275 – by Thomas Isbell and Oluwole Ojewale. https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/D%C3%A9p%C3%A4ches/ab_r7_dispatchno275_nigerian_views_on_elections.pdf
- Afrobarometer (2019b). "Africans Want Open Elections – Especially if They Bring Change", *Afrobarometer Policy Paper* No. 58, https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r7_policypaper58_africans_want_elections_especially_if_they_bring_change.pdf
- Ajayi, K. (2007). "Election Administration in Nigeria and the Challenges of the 2007 Elections". *The Social Sciences*, 2(2), 142–151.
- Ajayi, K. (2006). "Security Forces, Electoral Conduct and The 2003 General Elections In Nigeria." *Journal of Social Sciences* 13(1), 57–66.
- APA News (2019). <https://apanews.net/en/pays/nigeria/news/institute-raises-concern-over-election-violence-in-nigeria>
- Araba, A. and J.O. Braimah (2015). "Comparative Study of 2011 and 2015 Presidential Elections in Nigeria". *Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research*, 15(7).
- Bayart, J. F. (1986). "Civil Society in Africa", in Chabal, P. (ed.) *Political Dominion in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- BBC News, 4 Feb 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47089372>
- Bogaards, M. (2009). "How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism". *Democratization* 16(2), 399–423.
- Bogaards, M. Elischer, (2016). "Competitive Authoritarianism in Africa Revisited", *Z Vgl Polit Wiss* 10, 5-18.
- Bradley, M. T. (2005). "Civil Society and Democratic Progression In Postcolonial Nigeria: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations". *Journal of Civil Society* 1(1), 61–74.
- Carothers, T. (2007). "A Quarter-Century Of Promoting Democracy", *Journal of Democracy*, 18, 112–126.
- Cleen Foundation (2019). "Post-Election Statement on the 2019 Presidential and National Assembly Elections", 24 February. Available at: <https://cleen.org/2019/02/24/cleen-foundations-post-election-statement-on-the-2019-presidential-and-national-assembly-elections/> (accessed on 24 March, 2020)
- Dahl, R. A. (2008). *On Democracy*. Yale University Press.
- Dahl, R. A. (1989). *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.
- Daily Post (2019). "2019 Elections: INEC Discloses Number Of Political Parties to Contest", February 2, <https://dailypost.ng/2019/02/02/2019-election-inec-discloses-number-political-parties-contest/>

- Decalo, S. “The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa”, *African Studies* 91(362), 7-35.
- Diamond, Larry (1999). *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Diamond, Larry (2002). “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”, *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2).
- Ebirim, S. I. (2014). “Effects of Electoral Malpractices on Nigerian Democratic Consolidation”, *Public Policy and Administration Research* 4(2).
- Egbefo, Dawood (2015). “Leadership and Ethno-Religious Crises: Implications for National Integration in Nigeria”, *African Research Review* 9(4), 92–109.
- EU Election Observer Mission, 15 June 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/election-observation-missions/eom-nigeria-2019/64167/press-release-eu-election-observation-mission-nigeria-publishes-final-report-2019-general_en
- Fadal, Mohamed (2011). “Opening the Political Space: A Boost For Somaliland’s Democratic Process.” *Reflections and Lessons of Somaliland’s Two Decades of Sustained Peace, Statebuilding and Democratization*, 44–52.
- Fasakin, A. (2015). “State and Democratization in Nigeria”. *Democracy and Security* 11(3), 298–317.
- Figueroa, M. and A. Sives (2002). “Homogenous Voting, Electoral Manipulation and the ‘Garrison’ Process in Post-Independence Jamaica”, *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 40(1), 81–108.
- Freedom House Report (2019). <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2019>
- Freedom House Report (2020). <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2020>
- Guardian(2019). <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/01/democracy-failed-nigeria-turnout-presidential-election>
- Huntington, S (Spring, 1991). “Democracy’s Third Wave”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol: 2, No. 2.
- Ibeanu, Okechukwu. (2000). “Ethnicity and Transition to Democracy in Nigeria: Explaining the Passing of Authoritarian Rule in a Multi-ethnic Society”, *African Journal of Political Science / Revue Africaine de Science Politique* (Special Issue: Nigerian Politics in Transition) 5(2), 45–65. Published by: African Association of Political Science Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23495080>
- Ibeanu, Okechukwu, and Samuel G. Egwu (2007). *Popular Perceptions of Democracy and Political Governance in Nigeria*. Centre for Democracy and Development.
- Ibrahim, J. (2011). *A Study of the Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria*, Codesria: Dakar.

- ICG (2015). "Nigeria's Elections: A Perilous Postponement", *International Crisis Group Report*, 12 February 2015. <http://blog.crisisgroup.org/africa/2015/02/12/nigerias-elections-a-perilous-postponement/>.
- ICG (2019). (International Crisis Group), Report No: 275, 21 May 2019. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/275-returning-land-jihad-fate-women-associated-boko-haram>
- Ijim-Agbor, U. (2007). "The Independent National Electoral Commission as an (IM) Partial Umpire in the Conduct of the 2007 Elections". *Journal of African Elections* 6(2), 79–94.
- Ikelegbe, Augustine (2001a). "The Perverse Manifestation of Civil Society: Evidence From Nigeria", *Journal of Modern African Studies* 39(1), 1–24.
- Ikelegbe, A. (2005). "Engendering Civil Society: Oil, Women Groups and Resource Conflicts in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria". *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43(2), 241–270.
- Kendhammer, B. (2010). "Talking Ethnic but Hearing Multi-Ethnic: The Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria And Durable Multi-Ethnic Parties in The Midst of Violence". *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 48(1), 48–71.
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way (2002). "Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 13(2), 51–65.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way (2010). *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewis, P. and D. Kew (2015). "Nigeria's Hopeful Election", *Journal of Democracy* 26(3), 94–109.
- Lewis, Peter and Bratton, Michael (2000). *Afrobarometer Paper No: 3: Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria*. https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Working%20paper/AfropaperNo3_0.pdf
- Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan (1996). "Towards Consolidated Democracies", *Journal of Democracy* 7(2).
- Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room - NCSSR (2019). Report of Nigeria's 2019 General Elections, retrieved from http://www.placng.org/situation_room/sr/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Report-on-Nigerias-2019-General-Elections.pdf (accessed on 22 March, 2020).
- Norris, P., Frank, fR. and Coma, F. M. (2013). "Assessing the Quality of Elections", *Journal of Democracy* 24(4), 124-135.
- Obah-Akpowoghaha and Nelson Goldpin (2013). "Party Politics and the Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria", *Party Politics* 3, no. 16: <https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/RHSS/article/view/8372>
- Obi, C. (2011). "Taking Back our Democracy? The Trials and Travails of Nigerian Elections Since 1999", *Democratization* 18(2), 366–387.
- Odeh, A. M. (2012). "Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria". *Journal of Emerging Trends in Educational Research and Policy Studies* 3(1), 61–67.

- Olayode, K. O. (2018). “Chapter Nine: Civil Society, Democracy and Development”, *Contemporary Issues in Africa’s Development: Whither the African Renaissance?*
- Omotola, J. S. (2009). “‘Garrison’ Democracy in Nigeria: The 2007 General Elections and the Prospects of Democratic Consolidation”, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 47(2), 195–221.
- Omotola, J. S. (2009). “Electoral Administration and Democratic Consolidation in Africa: Ghana and Nigeria in Comparative Perspective”, Global South Workshop 2009, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Institut De Hautes Études Internationales Et Du Développement) in Geneva, 19 to 23 October.
- Omotola, J. S. (2010a). “Explaining Electoral Violence in Africa’s ‘New’ Democracies”, *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 10(3).
- Omotola, J. S. (2010b). “Elections and Democratic Transition in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic”, *African Affairs* 109.
- Omotola, J. S. and F. A. Aremu (2007). “Violence as Threats to Democracy in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic, 1999–2005”, *African and Asian Studies* 6(1/2), 53–79.
- Orji, N. (2015). “The 2015 Nigerian General Elections”, *Africa Spectrum* 50(2), 73–85.
- Orji, Nkwachukwu (2014). "Nigeria's 2015 Election in Perspective." *Africa Spectrum* 49(3), 121–133.
- Osaghae, E. (1997). “The Role of Civil Society in Consolidating Democracy: An African Comparative Perspective”, *African Insight* 27(1).
- Persouse de Montclos, M. (2018). “Oil Rent and Corruption: The Case of Nigeria”. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/perouse-demontclos_oil_rent_corruption_nigeria_2019.pdf
- Reuters (2019). <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-election-factbox/factbox-nigerias-2019-presidential-election-in-numbers-idUSKCN1Q21CX>
- Sakariyau, R. And A. Aliu (2014). A Comparative Analysis of the 2007 and 2011 General Elections in Nigeria *Political Science Review* 6(1), 149–165.
- Sani, I. (2013). Political Parties and Governance in Nigeria: Explaining the Misfortune of the Fourth Republic. *Mambayya House Journal of Democratic Studies*, 5(2), 23–46.
- Sanni, K. (2019). “Local Observers Speak on Nigeria’s Presidential Election”, <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/317007-local-observers-speak-on-nigerias-presidential-election.html>
- Schedler, Andreas (2002) “Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation.” *Journal of Democracy* 13(2), 36–50.
- Schedler, Andreas (2009) “Electoral authoritarianism”, *The SAGE Handbook Of Comparative Politics*, eds. Todd Landman and Neil Robinson. London: Sage Publications, 381–393.
- Schumpeter, Joseph (1956). *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.