

# HYBRID WARFARE, DAESH AND TURKEY'S STANCE\*

Hibrit Savaş, DEAŞ ve Türkiye'nin Duruşu

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## Abstract

*Interstate conflicts are no longer only introduced by conventional means of warfare. Information technology products, social media, socio-psychological concerns and multilayered usage of all sources of defense and attack instruments have changed the warfare agenda. Hybrid threats have joined a developing package of alternative concepts about the evolving character of modern conflict. By giving an account of Hybrid Warfare agenda, this paper aims to explain Turkey's stance vis-à-vis DAESH's hybrid threats. It examines the Middle Eastern regional context with regard to DAESH and hybrid threats. Next, DAESH's hybrid characteristics and basic motivations to threat Turkey are studied. Lastly, Turkey's stance against DAESH's hybrid threat is analyzed. It is argued that DAESH's threat against Turkey contains some set of hybrid characteristics.*

**Keywords:** Hybrid Warfare, DAESH, Middle East, Turkey, Borderline Security, Refugee

## Özet

*Günümüzde devletler arası anlaşmazlıklar yalnızca konvansiyonel araçlarla değil bilgi teknolojileri ürünleri, sosyal medya, sosyo-psikolojik hassasiyetler ve bütün savunma-saldırı araçları kaynaklarının çok katmanlı bir şekilde kullanımıyla ifade edilmektedir. Hibrit tehditler modern çatışma kavramlarının evrimine bir alternatif olarak dahil oldu. Hibrit savaş kavramı yeni savaş türünü tanımlamak için kullanılmaktadır. Bu çalışma Hibrit Savaş terimine değinerek, Türkiye'nin DEAŞ'ın hibrit tehditlerine karşı duruşunu açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmada DEAŞ'ın Türkiye'ye yönelik tehditlerinin bazı hibrit özellikler içerdiği savunulmuştur. Bu tehditler karşısında Türkiye'nin duruşu daha sıkı sınır hattı güvenliğinin ve mülteci gözetleme sisteminin kurularak güçlendirilmesine vurgu yapılmıştır. Ayrıca, çalışmada Türkiye'nin DEAŞ'ı bertaraf etmek için kurulan umut eden koalisyon güçlerine dahil olmasına değinilerek önemi vurgulanmıştır.*

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## 1. Introduction

Changing dynamics and conditions of warfare in recent decades have given a birth to debates on the conceptualization of warfare. Scholars such as Mary Kaldor, John Robbs, and General Rupert Smith have spent efforts on contextualizing the new warfare.<sup>1</sup> Evolution of warfare techniques has further fueled debates over the true definition of warfare. Hybrid warfare has emerged as a new phenomenon, which stands for defining new form of warfare.

In the modern world politics, inter-state conflicts' major peculiarity cannot only be introduced through conventional elements of warfare. Besides, information technology facilities, social media, socio-psychological instruments, and multidimensional usage of all sources of defense and attack tools have dramatically changed the warfare agenda in politics. Hybrid term emerged as a new definition of warfare to explain wars which include multidimensional nature. The discussions continue to describe whether this type of warfare is hybrid or something else, and it tries to explain how.

According to Cambridge dictionary, hybrid means something which is a mixture of two different things. In line with that, hybrid warfare must include at least two different kinds of warfare. However, the question at this level lies in the fact that what constitutes the kinds of warfare to be called as hybrid.

The governments are in need of attaching a definition to the problems at which they are facing because definition matters to formulate policies. In 2005, General James Mattis and Frank Hoffman wrote about the rise of irregular methods like terrorism, insurgency, and narco-crime.<sup>2</sup> What they indicated in their US Naval Institute's Proceedings magazine is "Irregular challengers seek to exploit tactical advantages at a time and place of their own choosing, rather than playing by our rules. They seek to accumulate a series of small tactical

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1 Mehmet Seyfettin Erol-Şafak Oğuz, "Hybrid Warfare Studies and Russia's Example in Crimea", *Gazi Akademik Bakış*, Vol: 9, No: 17, Winter 2015, p. 262.

2 "Countering hybrid threats: challenges for the West", *Strategic Comments*, 2014, 20:8, 10-12, p. 1.

effects, magnify them through the media and by information warfare, to weaken US resolve.”<sup>3</sup> In their analysis, they identify the merge of different modes and means of war as “Hybrid Warfare”. Frank Hoffman, defines hybrid warfare as:

*“Hybrid warfare incorporates a full range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”*<sup>4</sup>

Hoffman also points out that hybrid wars blend the hard state-on-state conflict with obstinate efforts in the context of irregular warfare.<sup>5</sup>

In United States’ Department of Defense’s analysis, it is stated that hybrid warfare blends conventional and irregular warfare.<sup>6</sup> Peter R. Mansoor defines hybrid warfare as “... conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (guerillas, insurgents, and terrorists), which could include both state and non-state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose.”<sup>7</sup>

Hybrid warfare concept is bizarre since it often requires action below and “outside the level of war.”<sup>8</sup> It is a tough issue to determine what “outside the level of war” means because international law does not provide any definition to describe such a situation.<sup>9</sup> However, hybrid warfare, up to now, has been the most preferred concept as it fits to explain new warfare agenda in the world politics. Hybrid warfare

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3 James N. Mattis - Frank Hoffman, “Future Warfare, The Rise of Hybrid Wars”, *Proceedings Magazine*, November 2005, Vol: 132, 11, 1, p. 18.

4 Frank G. Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21th Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” *Potomac Institute for Policy Studies*, December 2007, p. 8, <http://www.potomac institute.org/images/stories/publications/>, (Accessed on 21.08.2016).

5 *Ibid*, p. 29.

6 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Hybrid Warfare*, Washington D.C 2010, p. 15.

7 Peter R. Mansoor, “Introduction: Hybrid Warfare in History”, Williamson Murray-Peter R. Mansoor, ed., *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present*, Cambridge University Press, New York 2012, p. 2.

8 Martti Lehto, “Theoretical Examination of Cyber Warfare Environment”, Dean Tanya Zlateva-Prof. Virginia A. Greiman, ed., *Proceeding of 11<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security*, Boston University, Boston 2016, p. 229-230.

9 *Ibid*, p. 230.

could not be reduced to being a pure term. It is not a doctrine-ready concept. There are continued efforts to add new dimensions to illustrate the “hybrid” concept. In short, as a concept it remains invaluable for now.

Hybrid threats against a target state stands for formation of precautionary steps and strategies. Hybrid warfare includes multi-modal kinds of threats, which have little in common with past examples of interstate aggression.<sup>10</sup> Future threats evolve by combining new ideas, means and capabilities while removing conventional means and capabilities through atrophy.<sup>11</sup> Supporters of the hybrid warfare phenomenon are critical on the idea that this new type of threat we have is just a simple mixture of conventional and non-conventional capabilities (which are driven by the employment of 21<sup>st</sup> century technologies and communication network), which are distinct from traditional irregular warfare methods.<sup>12</sup> Besides, Frank Hoffman states that hybrid threats incorporate full scale of different warfare modes including; conventional measures, irregular tactics, terrorist attacks with disproportionate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.<sup>13</sup> According to Hoffman’s view, the characteristics of hybrid threats<sup>14</sup>, can be categorized as follows<sup>15</sup>:

- Blended Modalities, which indicates that hybrid threats make use of all sources of conventional and non-conventional means combined with terrorism and criminal activities.
- Simultaneity, hybrid enemies can apply different modes of conflict simultaneously that work in a coherent way.

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10 Sacha Dominik Bachman-Hakan Gunneriusson, “Hybrid Wars: The 21<sup>st</sup> Century’s New Threats to Global Peace and Security”, *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, Vol: 43, No: 1, 2015, p. 78.

11 Daniel Ștefănescu, “Nato Strategy to defeat enemy forces in the Hybrid War”, *International Conference of Scientific Paper Afases 2015 Brasov*, 28-30 May 2015. p. 2.

12 Scott Moreland, “The Islamic State is a Hybrid Threat: Why does that matter?”, *Fortuna’s Corner*, 2 December 2014.

13 Hoffman, *Ibid*, p. 8.

14 Ahmed S. Hashim, “Hybrid War: ISIS and Russia in Action, a Comparative Study of Non-State and State Forms of Non-Linear Warfare”, *ISMS Conference*, Singapore 2015, <https://goo.gl/ASOSjd>, (Accessed on 07.07.2016).

15 Scott Moreland, “The Islamic State is a Hybrid Threat: Why Does That Matter?”, *Fortuna’s Corner*, 2 December 2014, <https://fortunascorner.com/2014/12/02/the-islamic-state-is-a-hybrid-threat-why-does-that-matter/> (Accessed on 09.07.2016).

- Decentralized structure, hybrid threats' ultimate goal could be achieved through decentralized cell structures that serve for the sake of the ultimate goal.
- Fusion, opponents use professional soldiers, terrorists, guerilla fighters, and criminal thugs.
- Criminality, which implies the use of criminal activities to sustain operations. It could be deliberate mode of conflict.

In hybrid warfare agenda, in general, the incorporation of all the warfare measures is made in order to succeed the synergy that is required to produce considerable damages to the target state or states, with a strategy that promotes abstinence of predictability and the exploitation of the identified vulnerabilities.<sup>16</sup> Sample cases particularly in unstable regions and failed states contribute to updates for hybrid warfare agenda.

## 2. How Hybrid Wars Look Like

The most striking development that fueled the hybrid warfare discussion recently was the Ukraine crisis with Russian aggressiveness. What this crisis brought new about hybrid warfare was that a state uses its all components it has in order to reach a nation and create instability by using plenty of tools.<sup>17</sup> As Ischinger puts it, the Ukrainian conflict appears to send a terrible message that policies and acts of aggression, violence and annexation can turn out to be successful.<sup>18</sup> What Russians did in East Ukraine and Crimea led to harsh accusations in the EU and the USA circles that the Russia used regular and irregular forms of warfare to chasten Ukraine in line with its exact national interests.

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16 Lavinu Bajor-Grigore Motofelea, "Aspects of Local Communities Security in Hybrid Warfare", *Military Art and Science*, Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre No: 3, 63, 2011, p. 239.

17 Erol-Oguz, *Ibid*, p. 267; Janis Berzins, "Russian New Generation Warfare Is Not Hybrid Warfare", Artis Pabriks-Andis Kudors, ed., *The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe*, Konrad Adanauer Shiftung, The Centre For East European Policy Studies University of Latvia Press, Riga 2015, p. 45

18 Wolfgang Ischinger, "Why Ukraine Matters - Especially for Asia", *Munich Security Conference*, 2014, <https://www.securityconference.de/en/discussion/monthly-mind/single-view/article/monthly-mind-october-2014-why-ukraine-matters-especially-for-asia/> (Accessed on 01.06.2016).

Russia's moves in Ukraine and Crimea crisis added important definitive instruments to the hybrid warfare debates as shown in the info-graphic blow. Russia combined multiple conventional and unconventional tools of warfare against both Ukraine and Crimea.

What does hybrid warfare entail?



Source: MSC

Another significant example that gave rise to the hybrid warfare context was the second Lebanon war of 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah. Latter's distributed and decentralized cells were able to repel high-professional Israeli army forces with the help of using a mixture of guerilla tactics and the modern weaponry.<sup>19</sup> The war between Hezbollah and Israel showed that the conventional military capacity is not satisfactory itself to rebuff the threats. For Israel, it was difficult to develop defense methods against the cell structures, which

<sup>19</sup> Douglas C. Lovelace, *Terrorism, Commentary on Security Documents*, Oxford University Press, New York 2016, p. 88.

can act non-centrally in the direction of a common political aim. In addition to this, highly qualified fighters who had very good knowledge of the geographical area had plugged the defense channels of Israel by using state-of-art weapons. Israel acknowledged the superiority of Hezbollah in land defense strategy despite its wide intelligence and military power. Lieutenant Hanoach Daub, an Israeli military officer, asserted that “Hezbollah has guerrilla fighters who are trained by a regular army”.<sup>20</sup>

In connection with the hybrid warfare issue, thanks to the snowballing effects of the globalization processes on information technology, warfare evolved into something new. It could be argued that the technological developments wiped out the issue of definable fronts as far as the inter-state conflicts concerned. For instance, by cyberspace tools, states' electronic bases could be downed. In 2007, Estonia was exposed to a cyber-attack called as DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attack that swamped websites of Estonian organizations, including Estonian parliament, banks, ministries, newspapers and broadcasters.<sup>21</sup> All the EU and the NATO officials were careful at their accusations against Russia because it was very hard to define and detect the attacker. Russia denied all the allegations about Estonia cyber-attack. Another example is Stuxnet virus cyber-attack against Iran's nuclear base at Natanz. Although Iran accused Israel and the USA, it could not find the real attacker.

Diversified means of warfare raised the question of what sort of the warfare states should project to defend themselves. In other words, it is not clear what necessary means and processes required to deter and respond effectively to hybrid warfare are.<sup>22</sup>

In terms of the organizational hierarchical structure of the hybrid warfare, it has decentralized appearance that hides the real hierarchical structure. Namely, separate cells independently act, and try to accomplish their mission in accordance with the proposed general

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20 Greg Myre, “Israel's Wounded Describe Surprisingly Fierce, Well-Organized and Elusive Enemy”, *New York Times*, 12 August 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/12/world/middleeast/12soldiers.html>, (Accessed on 12.08.2016).

21 Col Sanjeev Relia, *Cyber Warfare: Its Implications on National Security*, Vij Books, India 2015.

22 NATO, *Wales Summit Declaration*, 2014.

political goals. Thus, this lacks target states' defense strategies because centers of threats vary. States are unable to determine where the front line should be settled and what sort of tools should be used to escape the danger. The difficulty to detect the connections between hybrid means (Cyber-attacks, social media instruments, economic warfare, information warfare and propaganda, support of local unrest, irregular forces, and etc.) and their organizational hierarchical structure makes hybrid warfare totally different from other warfare types.

Hybrid warfare tools could be used both in a state of war and peace. This is something that paves the way for great maneuvering ability towards the target state. It does not matter how much target state has conventional warfare capacity, it is very difficult for a state to defend against a hybrid threat. Besides, by using hybrid warfare means, the source of threat could want to provoke target states to enforce them to act as it wishes. With regard to that, the former Defense Minister of the USA, Chuck Hagel, stated in an interview that in the war, "things can get out of control, and drift and wander"<sup>23</sup> in ways that can cause a military to fall into a more "accelerated" use of force than it was initially anticipated.

Thomas L. Friedman emphasizes an important aspect of the hybrid warfare by drawing attention to the relationship between individual and the nation-state in the globalized system, in his book "The Lexus and The Olive Tree". Since globalization lifts the obstacles between humans so that they can reach each other and connects the people of the world to each other via the Internet, it bears the opportunity to affect the market and nation-states. Hence, today's world has "Super Empowered Individuals". Super Empowered Individuals has the ability to reflect their anger and extremes directly.<sup>24</sup>

In brief, hybrid warfare agenda seems to continue to evolve with the help of the changing dynamics of global and regional conflicts on the one hand, technological improvements on the other. The point is how and in what form states get ready to defend themselves against hybrid

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23 Joseph Nye, "The Future of Force", *Project Syndicate*, 5 February 2015.

24 Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and The Olive Tree*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 2000, p. 14.



warfare instruments. Politically and economically unstable regions are much more fertile for the applications of hybrid warfare tools.

### 3.Regional Context

Political, ethnic and religious strife in Iraq and Syria has put renewed emphasis on 'hybrid warfare', in which combatants employ a mix of the conventional and unconventional tactics to achieve their objectives.<sup>25</sup> DAESH's experience in Iraq and Syria has left the western and neighbor countries of the relevant regions uncertain, as how best to respond.

The borderlines which were previously drawn on the basis of ignoring the ethnic, cultural, religious and social forms, revealed the differences between these forms as a cause of conflict.<sup>26</sup> Disintegrations based on sects and ethnics maintained the causes of conflict within the region. Instead of coming directly face to face with the enemy targets, the powers that want to create dominance on the region, used their strategies towards terror groups which are supposed to be the result of the social forms which are already wonkily sorted, and may show a tendency for conflict. Radical groups which emerged as a result of the disintegrations on sect and ethnic origin, challenge the borderlines that were drawn in the past. This structure of the Middle East causes non-state tools to come into prominence as an efficient instrument, by letting multi-dimensional implementation of hybrid factors.

Terror organizations such as DAESH, PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat), PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) and Al-Qaeda gained mobility during the authority gap. Having these organizations expanded their domains in Iraq and Syria where borders become meaningless, obliges hybrid wars to have multi-dimensional and multi-layered defense systems for the target state. DAESH has emerged as one of the most ferocious terrorist organization, which poses remarkable hybrid instruments to threaten enemies and bring further its political strategies.

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<sup>25</sup> "Countering hybrid threats: challenges for the West", *Strategic Comments*, Vol: 2014, No: 40, 2014, p. 10-12.

<sup>26</sup> Barry Rubin, *The Tragedy of the Middle East*, Cambridge University Press, New York 2002, p. 64.

Hybrid warfare is simply a mixture of terrorism, criminal activities, and guerilla fighting, conventional and non-conventional instruments. In addition to this, hybrid warfare simultaneously<sup>27</sup> dares to apply all these components, and has fusion with the crisis region.<sup>28</sup> Acting in the Middle Eastern region, DAESH carries the major characteristics of hybrid warfare. Methods and techniques that it used in its previous attacks prove DAESH's hybrid strategies towards its enemies.<sup>29</sup>

Changing dynamics of the Middle Eastern region after the United States' intervention in Iraq in 2003 have left the country divided on sect and ethnic origins. Power struggle among ethnic and religious groups have left the whole country politically, economically and militarily unstable. U.S.'s retreat from Iraq in 2011 accelerated the tension among warring parties in Iraq. Warring parties in the country has tried to make use of the power vacuum after the U.S.'s leave. At its immediate borders, Turkey faced many non-state adversaries like al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham and PYD that pose vital security threats while it has already been struggling with the PKK terrorism.

Turkey's 35 years fight with the PKK terrorism has provided important experience for fighting cross-border threats from a transnational non-state threat. It is apparent that Turkey had gained geostrategic lessons learned from low intensity conflict experience with the PKK. However, terrorist organizations, particularly the DAESH, have the potential to produce hybrid threats against Turkey. Although the DAESH has distributed sovereignty over both Syrian and Iraqi lands, it acts like a state rather than a terrorist organization. It earns huge amounts of money from oil revenues, collects tax from its "citizens".<sup>30</sup> Therefore, it has sustainable income sources in which

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27 Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Threats: Neither Omnipotent nor Unbeatable", *Orbis*, Vol: 54, Issue: 3, 2010, p. 443.

28 Munczer Eid Alzamalkani, "ISIS' Grand Strategy", *International Policy Digest*, 21 July 2015, <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2015/07/21/isis-grand-strategy>, (Accessed on 08.08.2016).

29 Aaron Y. Zelin, "The Islamic State's Territorial Methodology", *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, Research Notes, No: 29, (January 2016), <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote29-Zelin.pdf>, (Accessed on 01.08.2016).

30 Audrey Kurth Cronin, "ISIS is more than a terrorist group", *Foreign Affairs*, 23 March 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-03-23/isis-more-terrorist-group>, (Accessed on 07.04.2016)

it organize various mode of attacks towards its enemies. For Turkey, the DAESH poses remarkable hybrid threat characteristics. DAESH's advancement in the Middle East and its ability to attract international players' attention makes it an important threat for Turkey's security.

#### 4. DAESH's Hybrid Characteristics

With regard to Hoffman's visualization of hybrid threats, it can be argued that the DAESH corresponds many characteristics of hybrid threat as far as its activities towards Turkey concerned. As it was previously told above, characteristics of hybrid threats consist of blended modalities, simultaneity, decentralized structure, fusion and criminality.

The DAESH should not be taken as just like a non-state terrorist organization. It acts much more like a state. As Cronin puts it, the DAESH is not like al-Qaeda. He further states, "... the DAESH threat is more akin to the state-sponsored terrorism emanating from Iran, Iraq, Libya, the Soviet Union, and Syria during the 1970s and 1980s. Groups with the known backing of states (such as Hezbollah and many of the Palestinian groups) had access to greater resources, more logistical support, better intelligence, better weapons, and wider networks than those that operated on their own (such as the Weathermen or the French group Action Directe). State-backed groups were always more dangerous."<sup>31</sup>

State-like structure provides huge income through oil and tax revenue, therefore; paves the way for proposing blended modalities in the attacks against its opponents.<sup>32</sup> For instance, when the coalition forces started to launch air strikes over DAESH's strategic points in the summer of 2014, its militants melt down in the urban landscape. Thereafter, in order to avoid air strike damage, small tactical units were created and performed their operations at night, as they also limited phone calls and radio communications.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Grame Wood, "What ISIS Really Want", *The Atlantic*, Issue: March 2015.

<sup>33</sup> Nour Malas, "US-led Airstrikes Disrupt Islamic State, But Extremists Hold Territory", *The Wall Street Journal*, 5 October 2014.

DAESH is able to use unmanned aerial drones. It has well-educated militants who are able to use captured weapon systems like the US Humvees and some artilleries.<sup>34</sup> DAESH's diverse military capabilities and its income derived from oil and tax revenues provides it to compose more sophisticated tactics. Brannen in her article published in Foreign Policy journal quoted from the former U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, he describes the DAESH "as sophisticated and well-funded as any group we have seen."<sup>35</sup>

DAESH adopts different modes of conflicts. It does not only target military facilities, but it also aims to ignite social and political neural ends of the target country. It aims to exploit weaknesses of the target states. At the same time, with the help of a deep understanding of political, ethnic and economic crises in Turkey, it also targets political nerve ends to stir up political environment.<sup>36</sup>

Reyhanlı, Suruç, Turkish Mosul Head Consulate, Ankara Tran Station, Istanbul Blue Mosque (Sultanahmet), and Istanbul Atatürk Airport attacks (not claimed by DAESH yet, but majority of the Turkish officials agree that it was DAESH) have been done by DAESH. Beyond executing terrorist attacks, DAESH aimed to stir up the political atmosphere in Turkey. Particularly, after Suruç and Ankara Train Station suicide bomb attacks, while the HDP officials blamed the government, the AK Party members blamed the HDP and PKK. DAESH's strategy towards Turkey does not only target military facilities, but it apparently makes use of Turkey's tense political atmosphere.

Decentralized nature of the DAESH network structure both in the Middle East and Turkey provides maneuvering capability for its activities. There are two advantages for DAESH to have networks in Turkey. First, Turkey shares expansive border with DAESH-dominated lands. Second, Turkey has almost 3 million refugees both from Iraq and Syria most of which are ill documented. These two provided

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34 Ghassan Adnan-Tamer El-Ghobashy, "Iraqi Officials Say Islamic Militants Used Chlorine Gas North of Baghdad", *The Wall Street Journal*, 24 October 2014.

35 Kate Brannen, "Hagel: ISIS is more dangerous than al Qaeda", *Foreign Policy*, 21 August 2014.

36 Burak Kadercan, "How ISIS is Ripping Turkey Apart", *National Interest*, 30 June 2016.

DAESH to have various operatives in Turkey. As a matter of fact, DAESH's news agency Amak published an info-graphic showing its covert units in some countries. According to that info-graphic, DAESH claimed that it has covert units in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Algeria, France, Tunisia, Lebanon and Bangladesh. Rukmini Callimachi, who is a correspondent for the New York Times, focusing on al-Qaeda and DAESH, shared this info-graphic on her twitter account. DAESH terror attacks in Turkey are much more decentralized and autonomous than being managed by a center.<sup>37</sup> DAESH can independently use its covert units from its center for ultimate purposes.

Inside the DAESH militant groups, there are specialized guerilla fighters, professional soldiers and criminal toughs. One of the most significant motivation for mercenaries and criminals to be used in terror attacks is its financial sources. To finance criminal activities beyond its borders requires constant cash flows. In 2014, DAESH earned almost 20 million USD in ransoms, and 1 million USD per day from oil sales.<sup>38</sup> DAESH's income model makes it possible to recruit more fighters and criminals, which have professional skills. DAESH's strategy for recruiting new fighters poses great threat for Turkey. The report, prepared by the Police Intelligence Department of Turkey, stated that since April 2011, 2,750 Turkish Salafists have moved between Turkey, Syria and Iraq. The report indicated that there are 1,222 Turkish Salafists in Syria, 749 of them with DAESH and 136 with Jabhat al-Nusra. It added that 457 Turkish Salafists have been killed in the region.<sup>39</sup>

Increase in transnational organized crime and transnational ethnic and sect fund-raising networks have given rise to the resources available for practitioners of hybrid warfare.<sup>40</sup> Terrorist groups like DAESH, as being part of hybrid warfare are mostly based on ethnic, sectarian, tribal or some other traditional group membership, which

37 Murat Yeşiltaş et al., "Sınırdaki Düşman Türkiye'nin DAİŞ ile Mücadelesi", *SETA*, 2016, p. 33.

38 Russel Berman, "The World's Wealthiest Terrorists", *The Atlantic*, Issue: October 2014.

39 İsmail Saymaz, "İşte Emniyet'in Selefi Raporu: Türkiye tabanları 20 bine ulaştı, bu bir tehdit." *Hürriyet*, 25 April 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/iste-emniyetin-selefi-raporu-turkiye-tabanlari-20-bine-ulasti-bu-bir-tehdit-40094417>, (Accessed on 08.07.2016).

40 Joseph Scroefl-Stuart J. Kaufman, "Hybrid Actors, Tactical Variety: Rethinking Asymmetric and Hybrid War", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol: 37, No: 37, p. 876.

often bypass political and religious lines.<sup>41</sup> Already constructed social and relative ties that includes transnational linkages with overseas sympathizers are sustained by evolving social media instruments.

## 5. DAESH's Online Capacity

Many of the journalists and scholars are of the view that DAESH is waging the most effective worldwide recruiting strategy. Its attacks in European cities has shown that DAESH militants could execute orders commanded by miles away where s/he organizes the attack. Its ideological discourse paves the way for having extended and diversified alternatives to serve the terrorist organization's mission. DAESH's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi regards that being loyal to his group ideology does not necessarily mean that supporters must fight on the frontline. Besides, for DAESH leaders, way of serving for caliphate might be just like that he or she can wage his/her "amel" at home. Amel in organization's vocabulary means committing an attack. Thus, Online facilities are one of the most important means to spread its ideological influence all over the world. For instance, when we look at the DAESH's attacks in European cities, plenty of the perpetrators were not trained formally in DAESH's camps in Syria and Iraq, but online.<sup>42</sup>

DAESH is able use social media and news outlets for propaganda and information warfare. DAESH has proven that it professionally uses YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and blog posts for plotting, recruitment, fundraising, and marketing.<sup>43</sup> Through social media tools, DAESH makes efficient use of professional propaganda videos to illustrate their fighters like heroes. DAESH also uses nuanced messaging to market its professionalism and discipline.<sup>44</sup> The use of mobile technology, along with the exploitation of the mainstream media means that these messages have reached audiences around the

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41 *Ibid.*, p. 868.

42 Michael S. Smith, "Containing ISIS' Online Campaigns After Manchester", *Foreign Affairs*, 27 May 2017.

43 J.M. Berger-Jonathon Morgan, "The ISIS Twitter Census", *Center for Middle East Policy*, Brookings Institute, No: 20, 2015, p. 2.

44 Scott Jasper-Scott Moreland, "The Islamic State is a Hybrid Threat: Why Does that Matter?", *Fortuna's Corner*, 2 December 2014.

world.<sup>45</sup> Clint Watts reports that DAESH's social media posts provide a look for outsiders to follow and track what is really going on in Syria and Iraq, as they are places where there can be very little news coverage by journalists. DAESH militants consider this as a chance to manipulate it in their favor.<sup>46</sup> Watts further adds that DAESH "wants to communicate back to their communities that they're participating." As a part of recruiting strategy, prospective recruits use social media platforms to communicate with foreign fighters previously engaged in battles to learn how was their experience, and to get in contact with those who can explain how to join the fight in Iraq and Syria. Through social media tools, DAESH can organize all activities including terror attacks. J.M. Berger claims that social media for DAESH is more like an oxygen tube and opens an invaluable area for its propaganda all over the world.<sup>47</sup>

In addition to social media tools, DAESH uses online and print media tools to propagate its ideology. Particularly after the capture of Mosul and declaration of caliphate in 2014, DAESH had intensified its propaganda capacity.<sup>48</sup> DAESH has an English language media platform called Dabiq. It regularly puts out a glossy propaganda magazine aimed at recruiting jihadists from the West. Dabiq magazine has published 12 issues so far. When issues' content reviewed, it is seen that DAESH's Turkey perception has changed after Turkey's engagement with the coalition forces. Dar al-Islam (French language) and Konstantiniyye (Turkish language) are other publications that DAESH uses for its propaganda. Dabiq and Konstantiniyye publications have been targeting Turkey in their recent issues.<sup>49</sup>

45 James P. Farwell, "How ISIS Uses Social Media", *IISS The Survival's Editor Blog*, 2 October 2014, <https://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2014-d2de/october-931b/isis-media-9d28>, (Accessed on 08.07.2016).

46 Scott Simon's Interview with Clint Watts of Foreign Policy Institute, "ISIS Runs A Dark Media Campaign On Social Media", 6 September 2014, [http://www.npr.org/2014/09/06/346299142/isis-runs-a-dark-media-campaign-on-social-media?utm\\_medium=RSS&utm\\_campaign=news](http://www.npr.org/2014/09/06/346299142/isis-runs-a-dark-media-campaign-on-social-media?utm_medium=RSS&utm_campaign=news), (Accessed on 08.07.2016).

47 Berger-Morgan, *Ibid*, p.3

48 Steve Rose, "The ISIS Propaganda War: A Hi-Tech Media Jihad", *The Guardian*, 7 October 2014.

49 Yeşiltaş et al., *Ibid*, p. 20.

## 6. DAESH's Motivations to threat Turkey

There are three main reasons to explain why DAESH targets Turkey. The first one is that Turkey not only shares a long borderline with DAESH-dominated areas, but it also hosts 3 million refugees from both Iraq and Syria. The second is that Turkey's ongoing ethnic and political tension inside the country provides DAESH to exploit it. The third factor is that DAESH wants to deter Turkey from getting involved with the coalition forces that fight against the group.

Turkey's geographical proximity to Iraq and Syria makes it vulnerable to the negative developments at its immediate borders. DAESH exploits this huge and barely documented Turkish borders.<sup>50</sup> While this proximity leads to refugee flows, it also poses uncontrolled retaliation from the terrorist groups if Turkey would intensify its fight over it. In other words, Turkey is in such a position that its attacks on DAESH produce much more cost when it is regarded from DAESH's responses through unknown and unchecked terrorist attacks. Ömer Taşpınar, a senior fellow and Turkey expert at the Brookings Institution, a research center in Washington, DC, in connection with Turkey's borderline with DAESH, says "The more you fight DAESH, the higher the risk of retaliation, because Turkey is right at the border. When Turkey's position vis-à-vis DAESH compared to other states, threats targeting Turkey is much more complicated". As Taşpınar points out "Turkey is not Belgium, it's not France. It doesn't have a huge buffer with Syria."

Refugee flow towards Turkey from both Iraq and Syria has made it very difficult to impose strict documentation procedures for Syrian and Iraqi people while they were crossing the border. Slackly controlled borders attract DAESH militants to use Turkish borders for their operations. Turkey was shown among the centers which DAESH has many covert units by latter's magazine called Amak. DAESH makes use of the light guarded borders to get in contact with these covert units. This makes Turkey vulnerable to DAESH threats. For instance, DAESH, for the first time, targeted foreigners in Turkey at

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50 Kadercan, *Ibid.*



the Sultanahmet (Blue Mosque) bomb attack on 12 January 2016.<sup>51</sup> According to the intelligence and security forces' report, the perpetrator of the Sultanahmet bomb attack was Syrian, who crossed the Turkish border as a refugee.<sup>52</sup>

Ethnic and political tensions in Turkey emerged as leverage for DAESH to exploit. DAESH considers this fracture as a chance to push Turkey somewhere rocky in order to prevent it to fight against the group. When DAESH's attacks in Turkey are examined, there are two important points. First, DAESH performs its attacks in places where mass casualties could be achieved. Second, it prefers to target sensitive political, religious or ethnic groups to stir up unrest inside the country. By doing this, DAESH, on the one hand, wishes to cause many people to lose their lives at brutal suicide bomb attacks, and on the other hand, to create chaos which emanates from political, religious and ethnic fracture.

DAESH wants to punish Turkey because of its cooperation with the western powers fighting against itself.<sup>53</sup> DAESH's last two attacks in Turkey targeted foreign tourists. It is argued that the basic motivation behind these attacks is to isolate Turkey from its Western allies. At the DAESH's agenda, Turkey was not a prior target that must be threatened. At the beginning of its propaganda tools like online and print media, DAESH did not directly referred Turkey as an enemy. However, when Turkey started to engage with western coalition to fight against DAESH, the terrorist group reacted against Turkey. From the onset of Syrian crisis, Turkey's primary concern was the removal of Bashar Assad from the power.<sup>54</sup> However, despite Turkey's insistent diplomatic efforts to oust Assad, he still remains firmly in power and

51 "Sultanahmet Meydanı'nda patlama", *Hurriyet*, 12 January 2016.

52 "Davutoğlu: Saldırının faili yabancı uyruklu DEAS üyesi", *NTV*, 12 January 2016, [http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/davutoglu-saldirinin-faili-yabanci-uyruklu-deas-uyesi,zcbEuBxA\\_k2xcxov9dXXg?\\_ref=infinite](http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/davutoglu-saldirinin-faili-yabanci-uyruklu-deas-uyesi,zcbEuBxA_k2xcxov9dXXg?_ref=infinite), (Accessed on 07.07.2016).

53 "According to the CATO Institute Defense and Foreign Policy Department expert Trevor Thrall, ISIS attacks Turkey due to latter's partnership with coalition forces using Incirlik base", <http://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/isisid-turkiyeyi-cezalandirmaya-calisiyor/3409732.html>, (Accessed on 08.07.2016).

54 Murat Yetkin, "Erdoğan'ın Suriye-Esad Çizgisinde Önemli Değişim", *Radikal*, 25 September 2015, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/murat-yetkin/erdoganin-suriye-esad-cizgisinde-onemli-degisim-1439820/>, (Accessed on 08.08.2016).

Turkey wants to adjust to this reality.<sup>55</sup> Verda Özer asserts that Turkey's possible rapprochement with Syria is a product of revision of foreign policy, particularly after the government change in the AK Party.<sup>56</sup> Turkey's shift towards coalition forces' strategies put Turkey on the DAESH's target.

## 7. Turkey's Stance

Turkey's stance towards the DAESH threat has three dimensions. In the first place, almost 3 million Syrian and Iraqi refugees inside the country constitute a major threat for Turkey in a sense that DAESH could exploit it. Second, Turkey's 911 km Syrian border has been faded after the civil war broke out. Third, political, religious and ethnic complexities in Turkey provides to make inroads for terrorist organizations to exploit.

The increasing number of refugees is a source of threat for Turkey's security. Turkey's immediate borders witnessed bloody skirmishes and struggle. Syrian regime's attacks on its people and bloody fights among terrorist organizations led locals to flee their homes.<sup>57</sup> According to the data from the United Nations Refugee Agency; approximately 52% of Syrians who have left their country because of the civil war live in Turkey. As of June 2016, the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey is 2,733,044.<sup>58</sup>

With regard to DAESH's hybrid tactics in its operations, being a Syrian refugee constitute a perfect cover for a perpetrator of a terrorist attack. For instance, complexities over identification of the perpetrator of the suicide car bomb attack targeted military personnel shuttle at Merasim Street in Ankara have raised questions about the border security issue. After the bomb attack, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu

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55 Sinan Ülgen, "The Calculus in Ankara Has Shifted" in interview with Aron Lund, "Will Turkey Change Its Syria Policy?" *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace*, 21 June 2016, <http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/63865>, (Accessed on 08.07.2016).

56 Verda Özer, "Strong Incentives For Turkey To Stop Opposing Assad" in interview with Aron Lund, "Will Turkey Change Its Syria Policy?" *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace*, 21 June 2016, <http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/63865>, (Accessed on 08.07.2016).

57 Elizabeth Ferris-Kemal Kirişçi, "The Consequences of Chaos", *The Marshall Papers*, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C 2016, p. 15, 35.

58 *Syria Regional Refugee Response*, UNHCR, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224>, (Accessed on 08.07.2016).

made a statement at Chief of Staff's Headquarters saying that the attack was organized by a YPG militant whose name was Saleh Neccar who was from Syria's Haseke district and passed to Turkey as a refugee.<sup>59</sup> Thereafter, TAK (Kürdistan Özgürlük Şahinleri / TeyrêBazên Azadiya Kurdistan) claimed the Ankara car bomb attack three days after Davutoğlu's statement.<sup>60</sup> According to Davutoğlu's statement the name of the perpetrator was Saleh Neccar, but TAK announced that the bomb organizer was Abdalbaki Sönmez born in Van. However, one week later from the car bomb attack, it was officially declared that suicide bomber was Abdalbaki Sömer with the help of a DNA test with his father, Musa Sömer. News agencies reported that Abdalbaki Sömer and Saleh Neccar was the same person. The former was the one who left his home for ten years and joined the PKK. The latter was the one who acted in PKK's some branches and joined YPG in 2014. He crossed the Turkish-Syrian border on July 2015 as a Syrian refugee.<sup>61</sup> He cleared his identity history by masking himself as a Syrian refugee. Sömer could achieve to proclaim himself as Saleh Neccar, and succeeded to cross the border. If all the procedures were managed in Syria, how he could succeed to pass the Turkish border with fingerprint test. An effective surveillance system for refugees both at borderline points and their journey inside the country seems urgent to establish.

Borderline security issue has become a hot political concern in all over the Europe, particularly after the Syrian crisis. Because of its proximity to the crisis region, Turkey also has border security problems. There are some technical issues that Turkey lacks regarding the border security. The first is that Turkey needs to empower interagency coordination. There is no an umbrella authority patrolling Turkey's border security. National Intelligence Agency (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı-MİT), Turkish National Police (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü), Ministry of Customs (Gümrük Bakanlığı), Ministry of Agriculture (Tarım

59 "Davutoğlu: Ankara saldırısının faili YPG mensubu Salih Neccar", *T24*, 18 February 2016, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/basbakan-ahmet-davutoglu-genelkurmay-ziyaretinin-ardindan-aciklamayapiyor,328645>, (Accessed on 08.08.2016).

60 "Ankara'daki saldırıyı TAK üstlendi", *Deutsche Welle Türkçe*, 19 February 2016, <http://www.dw.com/tr/ankara-sald%C4%B1r%C4%B1s%C4%B1n%C4%B1-tak-%C3%BCstlendi/a-19061738>, (Accessed on 08.08.2016).

61 Metin Gürcan, "Identification of Ankara bomber muddled by faulty communication", *Al-Monitor*, 25 February 2016, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2016/02/turkey-ankara-blast-right-bomber-with-wrong-identification.html>, (Accessed on 07.07.2016).

Bakanlığı), and Turkish Land Forces (Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı) have their own institutional responsibility area at the borders. Ministry of Interior Affairs takes the coordination with governors and district governors. When the number lower authorities involved in border security is considered, it becomes pretty hard to carry out effective patrolling mechanisms. Because each of these institutions has their own area of concentration, putting enough emphasis on security matters might be hard. At Turkey's long 911 km border with Syria, there are many provinces that have borders with Syria. Each province's local administrative might have different approach to the border security.<sup>62</sup> For instance, Turkish government's effort to construct a wall at the Nusaybin border was protested by the district mayor, Ayşe Gökkan.<sup>63</sup>

European Union's 2013 progress report about external borders and Schengen states, "Turkey has not yet adopted a border security law to establish a specialized professional border security organization and regulate tools for integrated border management". The report criticized Turkey for its problems in interagency coordination and complexities in assigned responsibilities.<sup>64</sup> As a remedy this, Turkey's security forces established the Center for Risk Analysis via Turkish National Police's Intelligence, Combating Terrorism and Smuggling departments. These centers are established to deter and prevent foreign fighters from entering Turkey via airports, seaports, and at the borders.<sup>65</sup> However, for years, Syrian and Iraqi borders of Turkey have been used for smuggling activities. Smuggling even had become a source of income for families living at the border provinces. In addition, ethnic and sectarian conflict in Syria and Iraq complicates border security control mechanism to be effective.

DAESH's covert units in target countries act independently from each other, even from DAESH central. Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert and professor at Georgetown University, states that DAESH has

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62 Murat Yeşiltaş, "İç savaşa komşu olmak, Türkiye'nin sınır güvenliği siyaseti", *SETA*, 2015, No: 136, p. 20-21

63 "Nusaybin'de duvara karşı ölüm orucu", *BBC Turkish*, 1 November 2013, [http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2013/11/131101\\_nusaybin\\_duvar](http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2013/11/131101_nusaybin_duvar), (Accessed on 08.08.2016).

64 *2013 Progress Report for Turkey*, European Commission, October 2013, p. 66.

65 "The State of Affairs in Foreign Terrorist Fighters Research", *ORSAM Workshop*, 23 January 2015, Ankara, p. 8.

been working for years to plant the seeds for the kind of small-scale attacks in Europe. With the help of individuals in Europe, DAESH orchestrates its operations in across the Europe and other countries. Hoffman indicates that “They put in place an infrastructure across Europe to facilitate the movement of people to and from Iraq and Syria, but also to provide a bedrock of both inspirational and operational support for terror attacks.”<sup>66</sup>

DAESH released a map showing its covert units in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Algeria, France, Tunisia, Lebanon and Bangladesh.<sup>67</sup> In its terror attacks, DAESH uses its covert units. Moreover, DAESH militants outside its borders recruited mostly according to their immediate circles. In other words, family and friendship ties are important for recruiting fighters. Smaller and more family based covert units provide an intense loop for radicalization and reinforcement<sup>68</sup>, which state authorities hardly have inroads to gain intelligence.

As John Horgan puts it, “the reason given for involvement in terrorism may be a direct reflection of an ideological learning process that comes from being part of the group.”<sup>69</sup> For instance, Charlie Hebdo, attackers Said and Chérif Kouachi were born, raised and radicalized in Paris.<sup>70</sup> DAESH, through its social media and communication tools propaganda, tries to attract foreign fighters across the Middle East and Europe. Without having physical contact with the DAESH’s central, terrorists have the ability to carry out terror attacks in any country. Covert units provide DAESH to get in touch with some radical people to perform a terror attack.

66 Julian E. Barnes-Benoit Faucon, “Islamic State Threat in Europe Shifts”, *Wall Street Journal*, 28 July 2016.

67 Patrick Maguire, “ISIS releases chilling map of its ‘covert units’ across the world... and EUROPE is included”, *Express*, 3 July 2016, <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/684730/isis-covert-units-map-france-turkey-lebanon-nigeria-tunisia-sousse-boko-haram>, (Accessed on 08.07.2016).

68 “The Family Ties of Terror”, *TSG Intel-Brief*, 20 November 2015, <http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-family-ties-of-terror/>, (Accessed on 08.07.2016).

69 Todd C. Helmus, “Why and How Some People Become Terrorists”, Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin, ed., “Social Science in Countering Terrorism”, *RAND National Defense Research Institute*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 2009, p. 73.

70 Angelique Chrisafis, “Charlie Hebdo attackers: born, raised and radicalized in Paris”, *The Guardian*, 12 January 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/12/sp-charlie-hebdo-attackers-kids-france-radicalised-paris>, (Accessed on 08.07.2016).

Suruç suicide bomb attack in Şanlıurfa province of Turkey on 20 July 2015 revealed that DAESH is capable of using its covert units to carry out a bomb attack. It is declared that suicide bomber in Suruç was Sheikh Abdurrahman Alagöz. He was the brother of Yunus Emre Alagöz, who was the suicide bomber attack in Ulus. Another brother of them Yusuf Alagöz told that he knew brother of Orhan Gönder, who was the perpetrator of the Diyarbakır bomb attack at HDP's pre-election meeting.<sup>71</sup> According to agency news, Alagöz brothers and Orhan Gönder were members of the Dokumacılar unit of DAESH.<sup>72</sup> This unit is located in Adıyaman province. It is set to recruit fighters for DAESH.<sup>73</sup> What is striking here is that DAESH opts for using family and friendship ties to wipe out the communication tracks. Having numerous times and even days with a relative does not constitute a skeptical movement.

With respect to having almost 3 million refugees both from Syria and Iraq, Turkey's stance towards DAESH hybrid threat needs to focus more on effective surveillance mechanisms. DAESH militants exploit faded Syrian borders for crossing and Syrian refugees to mask their recruits. A surveillance system, which follows newcomers during their activities in Turkey, should be established. The most important issue is the documentation of people crossing the Turkish borders.

Turkish Police Forces carried out almost 150 operations, and took 1173 DAESH militants in custody during these operations against covert units of DAESH in Turkey from June 2015 to March 2016.<sup>74</sup> What is striking about these operations is that the Police Forces intensified its operations in different areas of the country where DAESH is active.<sup>75</sup>

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71 "Polis Alagöz Kardeşleri Dinlemiş: Belki Son Görüşmem!", *Radikal*, 17 October 2015, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/polis-alagoz-kardesleri-dinlemis-belki-son-gorustumem-1453598/>, (Accessed on 07.07.2016).

72 "Kim bu dokumacılar", *Hürriyet*, 12 October 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kim-bu-dokumacilar-30290471>, (Accessed on 07.07.2016).

73 Mahmut Bozarlam, "Unraveling Islamic State's Turkish recruitment scheme", *Al-Monitor*, 23 October 2015, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2015/10/turkey-syria-isis-adiyaman-suicide-bomber-arsenal.html>, (Accessed on 07.07.2016).

74 Yeşiltaş et al., *Ibid*, p. 57.

75 "İŞİD Operasyonu: 7 İilde 68 Gözaltı", *Al Jazeera Turk*, 13 January 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/isis-operasyonu-7-ilde-68-gozalti>, (Accessed on 08.07.2016).

Political, ethnic and sectarian based conflicts at domestic level have opened an area for DAESH to exploit for its activities in Turkey. DAESH did not prefer to claim terror activities in Turkey. Experts are of the view that DAESH does not want to claim the bombings because it is willing to make use of political environment in Turkey. By using PKK techniques, DAESH misdirects security officials about the source of perpetrator.<sup>76</sup> Besides, both PKK and DAESH exploit the political environment created immediate borders of Turkey. They both employ similar tactics to maintain their presence in the region by carrying out terrorist attacks.<sup>77</sup>

Internal security of a country is important due to its role on the intensity of the terror attacks. According to 2015 Global Terrorism Index report, eighty-eight per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries that were experiencing or involved in violent conflicts.<sup>78</sup> Terrorist organizations are mainly inclined to make use of ongoing conflicts inside the target country.<sup>79</sup> Terrorism emerges as the most prior issue as far as hybrid warfare agenda concerned. Terrorism is complementary to many contemporary conflicts and should be dealt with in a broader context.<sup>80</sup>

DAESH's advancement in the Middle East region had accelerated the Kurdish Nationalism. DAESH's bloody attacks towards Turkey coincided with exhaustion of Turkey's peace process with its Kurds. Particularly the Kobane fight of Syrian Kurds and PYD forces has given them a historic victory against the DAESH. On the international scale, Kurds enjoys an unprecedented degree of military and political support from the outside world, particularly from the Western World.<sup>81</sup> Although DAESH caused many Kurdish casualties in fighting areas of

76 Metin Gürçan, "PKK, İŞİD'in mücadele tekniklerini kullanmaya başladı", *T24*, 24 February 2016. <http://t24.com.tr/haber/guvenlik-analisti-metin-gurcan-pkk-isidin-mucadele-tekniklerini-kullanmaya-basladi,329387>, (Accessed on 08.07.2016).

77 İbrahim Kalın, "ISIS, PKK and the uses of terrorism", *Daily Sabah*, 24 July 2015.

78 *Global Terrorism Index*, 2015, p. 71.

79 Brynjar Lia, *Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism*, Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, London & New York 2005, p. 66.

80 Ekaterina Stepanova, *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Research Report No: 23, Oxford University Press 2008, p. 1.

81 Namo Abdulla, "How ISIL Advanced Kurdish Nationalism", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 2016, p. 90.



Iraq and Syria, the success of Kurds over DAESH made their brand invaluable for western powers as far as fight with DAESH concerned. On the one hand, DAESH attacks Kurdish populated areas in Syria and Iraq to enlarge its area of influence. On the other hand, it pushes Kurds to advance their nationalist ideals. Kobane fight was a historic event that endowed Kurds a historical story which Syrian Kurds never had in their past. This story, which DAESH provided, underpinned and encouraged the Kurdish nationalism in Syria and Turkey. DAESH's advancement towards Kurds in Kobane stirred up the Turkish Kurds and hundreds of PKK members moved to Kobane to fight with DAESH.<sup>82</sup> DAESH's advancement against the Syrian Kurds has benefitted both its cause on enlarging its area of influence, and to exploit Kurdish issue in Turkey.

## 8. Conclusion

Hybrid warfare is becoming more common while unconventional components of warfare diversify. Combination of multiple conventional and unconventional tools of warfare such as regular military forces, special forces, irregular forces, support of local unrest, economic warfare, cyber-attacks, diplomacy, information warfare and propaganda are used in accordance with practitioner's ultimate goal.

Hybrid threats' blurred and murky structure further complicates states' response strategies, and raises questions as follow: how to introduce and compose sufficient speed into detection and calculation of a hybrid campaign, and into confirmed and decide on a certain executive act? How to react attacker's propaganda and mixture usage of unconventional warfare tools while keep staying within international rules and regulations? What sort of military capabilities should be ordered to counter threat?

Political, ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the Middle Eastern region caused long lasting instability. At the regional context, imbalanced power struggle among ethnic and sect groups caused to struggle to fill the power vacuum. DAESH emerged as the most powerful state-like terrorist organization to fill that vacuum. Power vacuum both in

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82 Aaron Stein, "Turkey's New Foreign Policy, Davutoğlu, the AKP the Pursuit of Regional Order", *Whitehall Papers*, Abingdon 2014, p. 84.



Iraq and Syria paved the way for DAESH to exploit oil reserves to gain income to sponsor its terrorist campaign. Huge income derives from oil and tax revenues provided remarkable facilities to sponsor beyond borders terror attacks. Analysis of the hybrid characteristics of DAESH's hybrid threat provides tacit suggestions to be explored, expanded and employed in a wide range of government and security institutions' approach.

DAESH is a terrorist organization, which has state-like facilities. It collects taxes and sells oil. Economic power accompanying with skillful military facilities provides DAESH significant leverage to execute hybrid warfare tools. Through social media and other propaganda tools, organization is able have influence over its decentralized cells across the Europe. The organization tends to exploit social, political and economic situation in target countries. Its attacks in Turkey revealed that DAESH aimed to scratch ethnic and political conflict, and also to damage economy through targeting tourism points.

Turkey is under DAESH targets. Turkey's border with DAESH dominated areas makes Turkey vulnerable to DAESH threat. Besides, Syrian refugees living in Turkey helps DAESH militants to mask themselves as one of Syrian refugees. Political and ethnic debate in Turkey opens a fertile atmosphere for DAESH to take advantage of. Turkey's jump into the coalition forces which is created to fight with DAESH led it to advance its strategies towards Turkey in a sense that it deters Turkey from getting involved the coalition forces.

Turkey is necessarily in need of taking precautionary steps against DAESH's hybrid threats. A stricter borderline security system should be established. The system should be allowed to track each of refugees while their life inside the country. An umbrella institution, which is responsible for patrolling the borderline security, seems as a must due to the fact that separate branches of state institutions for borders concentrates on their own specific area and might skip security matters. DAESH's propaganda tools might be damaged provided that border security is tightened.

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