

The Self-Determination Process in Sudan Towards the End of the Condominium

Kondominyum'un Sonuna Doğru Sudan'da Self-determinasyon Süreci

Abdullah ÖZDAĞ*

Abstract

Upon the Mahdiyya era having been closed in 1899, a new period in Sudan called Condominium, designating the joint administration of England and Egypt, was entered in Sudan. This period, witnessing the struggle of both parties for influence evolved to a political state where British authorities were effectual. However, this ceaseless struggle for influence between the two countries carried on until the self-determination process of Sudan. Moreover, the contribution made by this contest to the self-determination process of Sudan is well-credited. The Anglo-Egyptian tussle could not avert the submission of the new generation in Sudan to independence in the years to follow. Just like in the whole World, the demand for independence in Sudan has been called out since 1940s. As a response to the irrepressible demand for independence, England gradually initiated the process which would lead to Sudan's autonomy, and ultimately its independence. Sudan gaining an autonomous status in 1953 caused political parties to increase their efficacy. This process also facilitated an electoral system in Sudan based on self-governance for the first time. As a result of the general elections held towards the end of 1953, Ismail al-Azhari became the first Prime Minister of Sudan having won the elections. A short while later, the British and Egyptian bureaucrats serving in Sudan began to be replaced by the Sudanese. Upon constitutional regulations, total independence of Sudan was enacted by the Sudanese Parliament on 1 January 1956. Thus, the Sudanese owned an independent country the future of which they would determine like the countries in the rest of the world.

Key Words: Sudan, The Nile, Condominium, Independence, Egypt

Öz

1899'da Mehdiye Döneminin sona ermesiyle Sudan'da Kondominyum denilen İngiltere ve Mısır'ın ortak idaresiyle yeni bir döneme girilmiştir. Tarafların nüfuz mücadelesine sahne olan bu dönem daha çok İngiliz otoritelerinin etkin olduğu bir politik duruma evrilmiştir. Ancak yine de iki ülke arasındaki nüfuz mücadelesi Sudan'ın bağımsızlık sürecine kadar devam etmiştir. Hatta bu durumun çoğu zaman Sudan'ın self-determinasyon sürecine olumlu katkılarının olduğu bilinmektedir. İngiltere ve Mısır'ın Sudan'a egemen olma mücadelesi, sonraki yıllarda Sudan'da yetişen yeni neslin bağımsızlık taleplerinin önüne geçememiştir. Tüm

Makale Geliş Tarihi: 05.04.2023. Makale Kabul Tarihi: 12.02.2024.

Araştırma Makalesi / Künye: ÖZDAĞ, Abdullah. "The Self-Determination Process in Sudan Towards the End of The Condominium". Gazi Akademik Bakış Dergisi (GABD), 17/34, (Haziran 2024): s. 43-63. DOI: 10.19060/gav.1498697

* Assoc Prof., Nevşehir HBV University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, International Relations Department, E-mail: abduallahozdag1@gmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0002-5775-8264.

Gazi

Akademik
Bakış

43

Cilt 17
Sayı 34
Yaz 2024

dünyada olduğu gibi Sudan'da da özgürlük talepleri 1940'lardan itibaren yüksek sesle dile getirilmiştir. Önü almamaz bağımsızlık taleplerine karşı İngiltere, kademeli olarak Sudan'ın özerkliğine ve nihayetinde bağımsızlığına giden süreci başlatmıştır. 1953'te Sudan'ın özerk bir statü elde etmesi politik partilerin etkinliğini daha da artırmasına neden olmuştur. Bu süreç Sudan'da ilk kez kendi kendini yönetme hakkına dayalı bir seçim sisteminin de önünü açmıştır. 1953'ün sonlarına doğru yapılan genel seçimler sonucunda İsmail El-Azhari seçimleri kazanarak Sudan'ın ilk Sudanlı Başbakanı olmuştur. Kısa süre sonra Sudan'da görev yapan İngiliz ve Mısırlı bürokratların yerini Sudanlılar almaya başlamıştır. Yapılan anayasal çalışmalar sonrası Sudan'ın tam bağımsızlığı 1 Ocak 1956'da Sudan Parlamentosu tarafından kabul edilmiştir. Böylece Sudanlılar tüm dünya ulusları gibi kendi geleceklerine kendilerinin karar verecekleri bağımsız bir ülkeye sahip olmuşlardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sudan, Nil, Kondominyum, Bağımsızlık, Mısır

Introduction

In Sudan, the initial phases of the Condominium, during which an urban, elite community had barely been formed, are remarked as silent periods. The theory of self-determination, put into practice in the case of the Egyptian Revolution initially at the end of World War I and thereafter along the subsequent years in other Arab countries, indicated everything had begun to change in Sudan, and they would evolve irrecoverably. In Sudan, the first uprising against the sovereign power led by England could be acknowledged to be Ali Abdullatif's "White Flag League", acting under the aegis of Egypt¹. The strife Ali Abdulatif embarked on with his limited number of followers against British domination (1924 Crisis) was managed to be submerged before it could pose a real threat against British authorities². Still, his campaign paved the way for the formation of new groups and ideas that would influence the following 30 years of Sudan. The attempt by England to Sudanize government institutions upon their perception of Egypt as a threat led to the emergence of a class with their fresh claims in the periods to follow. Political figures like Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mahdi and İsmail al-Azhari were among those these circumstances brought forth.

The British administration in Sudan was able to manage Sudanese nationalism for some more time taking advantage of the competition between Mahdist groups and the Khatmiyya sect. In the period following, the effect of Egyptian administration upon Sudan remained inactive until the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1836. Yet, pro-Egypt organizations in Sudan never ceased to communicate with the Egyptian administration anyhow. This research

- 1 Peter M. Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1961, p. 128; see also Sudan Memorandum, H.A. Macmichael Kataloğu, Khartoum, 10 September 1932, SAD 403/7/1-66.
- 2 M. W. Daly, "The Development of the Governor-Generalship of the Sudan, 1899-1934", *The Journal of African History*, 24/1, 1983, p. 89, 90; See also for the 1924 Crisis, Elena Vezzadini, "Nationalism by Telegrams: Political Writings and Anti-Colonial Resistance in Sudan, 1920-1924", *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 46/1, 2013, p. 27-59.

focuses on the self-determination process of Sudan, which was under English-Egyptian rule for nearly half a century. How the will of the Sudanese to determine their future was shaped and the nature of the way they were organized were scrutinized. In addition, the steps taken by England and Egypt regarding the autonomy and independence of Sudan were endeavored to be analyzed. Studies on Sudan have mainly focused on the period of autonomy and independence (1953-1956). Articles providing more detailed information do not allow a full understanding of the independence process. Thus, this study will contribute to the comprehension of Sudan's long process of independence in a wholistic perspective.

The Revival of the Spirit of Freedom

Upon the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1836, the Egyptian administration began to pursue a more active policy in Sudan³. However, the spirit of the time had changed so much that educated and experienced Sudanese people were added to the civil services of the sovereign powers, England and Egypt. Therefore, in Sudan, embracing a policy of neutrality during the years of World War II, Egypt's call for union and the expertise of English authorities were not much regarded.

Although the Graduates General Congress, founded by the graduates of Gordon College in February, 1938, aimed at an intellectual movement in the realm of education and in social domains, it evolved into a place where political rhetoric was put out⁴. The members of the fast-growing organization began to take action during the year the organization was established with its number of members reaching up to 1.200 people. İsmail al-Azhari, later to become the first prime minister of Sudan, sent a letter to the Sudanese administration on behalf of all the people of Sudan. The letter concerned a constitutional regulation regarding the representation of the Sudanese in the administration. However, the claim addressed to the joint British and Egyptian administration was denied⁵. Thereby, this attempt was to form the basis of many correspondences claiming the right to be represented in the administration in the years to follow. This organization, having approximately 2.000 members and making itself heard around a great number of cities after 1940, employed a bold discourse oriented towards independence in contrast to the tribal leaders cooperating with British and Egyptian administrations⁶. Thus, in 1942, theoretical debates regarding the self-determination of Sudan commenced. On 3 April 1942, Congress Chairman İbrahim Ahmad presented a 12-article memorandum to "Sudan General Secretariat"

3 Robert O. Collins, "The Independent Sudan," *Current History, North Africa*, 44/257, (January 1963), p. 14.

4 R. O. Collins, *Ibid*, p. 15.

5 J.S.R. Duncan, *The Sudan's Path to Independence*, William Blackwood and Sons Ltd, London 1957, p. 139.

6 Carole Collins, "Colonialism and Class Struggle in Sudan," *MERIP Reports*, No: 46, (1976), p. 7.

gazi

Akademik
Bakış

45

Cilt 17
Sayı 34
Yaz 2024

on behalf of the Sudanese people. This committee, in sum, demanded that the governments of England and Egypt determine the geographical borders of Sudan upon the war via a joint declaration and announce Sudan to be an independent country⁷.

In about a month, upon their meeting with Governor General Huddleston, Secretary-General Newbold pronounced his resolution. Newbold, in his letter dated 12 May he sent to Abraham Ahmad, stated that, without the consensus of England and Egypt, they would not be justified to make the decision on their own as the demand concerned the constitutional status of Sudan, which was ensured by the treaty of 1899 and Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936⁸. Therefore, the British authorities in Sudan denied this demand turning down the memorandum owing to the nature of the policy of Sudan. As a result, in the meeting between Secretary-General Newbold and the chairman of the congress, Ahmad, some members of the congress were inclined to accept a privately handed guarantee, but others declared they would not acknowledge anything unless their demand was officially accepted and replied to. In the course of events, the congress and those close to it diverged into two main groups “Ashigga” (1944) and “Umma” (1945)⁹. Ashigga (Brothers), led by İsmail al-Azhari and adopting the slogan “Unity of the Nile Valley”, later became National Unionist Party (NUP), and gradually managed to take hold of the congress. The moderate who preferred to act with England towards independence founded Umma (Nation) Movement led by Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mahdi. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman el-Mahdi was previously (1881-1898) the leader of Ansar, a Mahdist group struggling against the British and Egypt during the period¹⁰. Afterwards, this movement evolved more towards the British administration with respect to their discourse under the leadership of Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mahdi, which was partially due to his ambition to take the chair in the administration of Sudan¹¹. In fact, Abd al-Rahman was not an active figure in Sudan until he received the support of the British administration against the Ottoman Sultan’s declaration of jihad in World War I.¹².

7 Sudan Politic Notes, N.R. Udal Catalogue, September 1954, Sudan Archieve Durham (SAD), 403/1/1-6, the demands composed of 12 articles included scopes such as legislation, education, justice, agriculture and industry. For all articles, see Douglas Newbold, *The Making of the Modern Sudan*, Faber and Faber Limited, London, p. 540, 541.

8 Newbold, *Ibid*, p. 542, 543.

9 Sudan Politic Notes, N.R. Udal Catalogue, September 1954, SAD, 403/1/1-6.

10 R. O. Collins, *Ibid*, p. 15.

11 Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, p. 160.

12 Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman, being invited to London after the war in Sudanese committee, presented the sword of his father, Mohammad Ahmad, to King George V. This incident passed into history as the incident of sword, which was interpreted as the passion of Sayyid Abd Al Rahman to rule Sudan. For detailed information on Sayyid Abd al-Rahman, see Fadwa Abdel-Rahman Ali Taha, “Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mahdi: Kingship and its Implications on the History of the Sudanese Nationalist Movement, Sudan: Environment and People”, *Second International Sudan Studies Conference Papers*, Durham, (1991), p. 52-60.

As the arguments with regard to the future of Sudan were in progress with the sounds of educated groups in North Sudan rising higher, South Sudan did not succeed in being integrated into the north due to the poor conditions of its economy and its lack of education; hence, it could serve less during the process of independence. This condition of South Sudan was, in a way, owing to the policies pursued by the British. The English authorities not wishing Islam to penetrate into South Sudan promoted missionary schools; hence, these areas inhabited by people limited to primary education were able to make less progress¹³. Sudan's elite consisted mostly of northern Muslims. These northerners were primarily graduates of Gordon College, which was established to train local personnel for the lower echelons of the movement¹⁴.

Despite the ascending pro-self-determination discourses of the Sudanese in the first years of the 1940s, Douglas Newbold, Secretary-General of Sudan, endorsed that the self-determination process had to be gradual pointing to the slowly growing income of the country¹⁵. Newbold's endorsement somehow indicated the British were not leaning towards the idea of total independence yet. In May 1944, Governor-General Huddleston enacted the constitution of Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan getting aid from Secretary-General Newbold so as to meet the demands of the Sudanese to an extent by taking the Sudanese closer to central administration, and hence to ease the tension having been raging. Under the auspices of Secretary-General Newbold again, provincial consules were established. This administrative organization satisfied the Sudanese at first, though later, could not satisfy even the moderate nationalists due to its advisory-only function¹⁶.

Sudanese nationalists began to put more pressure on the central administration to be entitled to more floor. Upon this, on 26 March 1946, Foreign Secretary Bevin declared that they would not alter the status of Sudan until the Sudanese were asked for advice via institutional channels in his speech at the British Parliament. In April 1946, Governor-General Huddleston once again took a stance favoring status quo restating Bevin's words to the Advisory Council¹⁷. The ideas of the Sudanese Government's Civil Secretary J. Robertson and Ambassador Campbell in Cairo for the recognition of the Sudanese delegation were also rejected by the Sudanese Government (British administration) on the grounds that they represented only a small portion of the society, the elite¹⁸.

13 C. Collins, *Ibid*, p. 7, 9.

14 Gabriel Warburg, "From Mahdism to Neo-Mahdism in the Sudan: The Role of the Sudanese Graduates in Paving the Way to Independence 1881-1956", *Middle Eastern Studie*, 41s/6, 2005, p. 988.

15 Newbold to Cairo, 15 July 1944, Khartoum, PRO. FO, 921/305.

16 Peter M. Holt, "Sudanese Nationalism and Self-Determination," Part II, *Middle East Journal*, 10/4, Autumn (1956), p. 370.

17 Sudan Politic Notes, N.R. Udal Catalogue, September 1954, SAD, 403/1/1-6.

18 Fadwa Abdel-Rahman Ali Taha, "The Sudanese Factor in the 1952-53 Anglo-Egyptian

görs

Akademik
Bakış

47

Cilt 17
Sayı 34
Yaz 2024

The outcome of the negotiations carried out between Egypt and England since February 1946 to revise the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was completed in October 1946 by the Sudan Protocol. It was stated that there was no change regarding the status of Sudan in terms of self-determination. Thus, despite embracing distinctive policies regarding Sudan, the two countries took a stance opting for prolonging the status quo in Sudan¹⁹. Meanwhile, the administration of Egypt carried on with their traditional discourse. To them, even if the Sudanese were to decide upon their future on their own resolution, this would depend on acting with Egypt. The prime minister of Egypt pointed to the unity of Sudan and Egypt via his statement “The whole Nile Valley is in a unity of language, religion and race”. During this period, the publicly produced discourses in Egypt were based on “the unity of Sudan and Egypt” and “Sudan and Egypt under the Egyptian Crown”²⁰. The basis of Egypt’s approach to unity originally came from intricate, traditional social and administrative structuring that originated in Turkish administration. The children of the elite tribes in Sudan worked in Sudan with the Egyptians once they had completed their education in Egypt. Naturally, the ulama and elite administrative and military post-holders were under the influence of Egypt²¹.

The prime minister, Ismail Sidky Pasha, embarked on exertions to come to terms with the British Government in London through organized negotiations. The moderate discourse employed by Sidky Pasha regarding Sudanese sovereignty raised the ire of the opponent politicians who believed a more rigid policy had to be pursued. Due to his comprehension signifying he would not be able to continue under the existing circumstances, Sidky Pasha resigned and was replaced by Nokrashi Pasha on 13 July 1947. Nokrashi Pasha, the moment he came into power, denied the prospects of ultimate independence and ceased negotiations with the British. In his letter to “The Times” dated 25 October, he stated the Egyptians wanted to maintain their unity with the Sudanese as long as the Sudanese wished²². Upon this, British Foreign Minister Bevin, in his meeting with Amr Pasha, the Egyptian Ambassador in London, on January 22, 1947, declared that Nokrashi Pasha’s statements caused concerns in the British authorities. Amr Pasha stated that the Sudanese Protocole was clear, and that when the time came, they would be respectful of the determination of the Sudanese²³.

Prime Minister Nokrashi, despite the absolute disagreement with the British during his first months of duty by changing his attitude, attributed

Negotiations,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 44/4, (July 2008), p. 604.

19 Sudan Politic Notes, N.R. Udal Catalogue, September 1954, SAD, 403/1/1-6.

20 Report of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, H.A. Macmichael Catalogue, Undated, SAD, 586/2/1-99.

21 Gabriel Warburg, “The Wingate Literature Revisited: The Sudan as Seen by Members of the Sudan Political Service during the Condominium: 1899-1956,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 41/3, (2005), p. 383.

22 Report of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, H.A. Macmichael Catalogue, Undated, SAD, 586/2/1-99.

23 Bevin to R. Campbell, M. V. Daly Catalogue, 23 January 1947, SAD, 988/6/1-30.

the breakdown regarding the negotiations to the dissatisfaction of Egypt on the basis of two main issues. The former one of these is the evacuation of English troops from Egypt. The latter is the protection of the unity of Sudan and the full restitution of Egypt in terms of its rights regarding the administration of Sudan to make Sudan eligible for autonomy²⁴. Upon this, British Foreign Affairs stated that Britain and Egypt were vested with equal rights on the legislation of Sudan; therefore, Sudanese government could not embark on activities of legislation without first consulting both sides of the Condominium²⁵. British authorities were not inclined to leave the sovereignty over Sudan in a unilateral fashion; hence, they began to appoint the Sudanese to more operative posts beginning in 1946. The will to mitigate the raging ire of the Sudanese nationalists against British authorities had a part in the constitution of this ideology. Accordingly, the governor-general held the Sudan Administration Conference to work more closely with the Sudanese in 1946. As a result of this conference, a few subunits bringing the central government and regional governments closer were established, and appointments were made to the new posts. In this constitution draft regarding the central government, the establishment of a legislative Assembly and an executive council of 12 people were the points in question²⁶.

The Institution of Constitutional Councils

The reports obtained from the Sudan Administrative Conference were submitted for the approval of the governor-general and British government upon being effectuated during the first months of 1947²⁷. With the newly implemented reforms, the executive council of the governor-general, which was comprised of 12 British people all of whom were from England, was to be formed of 6 English and 6 Sudanese people²⁸. Later, in 1949, with the appointment of one Sudanese person to the council, the Sudanese happened to outnumber the British in the council²⁹. With the inclusion of 14 people who were natural members due to their positions as officers in the legislative assembly and the English members, the total number increased to 95, 89 of whom were the the Sudanese³⁰. The prerequisite to council membership began to be conditional on having been a resident in the constituency at least for two years and being above at least 30 years of age. In addition, the right of the voters to vote depended on whether they were at minimum 25 years of age and paying a particular amount of tax³¹.

24 Report of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, H.A. Macmichael Catalogue, Undated, SAD, 586/2/1-99.

25 Beckett to A. McDougal, 17 March 1947, Cairo, PRO. FO, 141/1189.

26 Sudan Administration Report, 11 March 1947, Cairo, PRO. FO, 141/1192.

27 Sudanese Genel Governor-General to Cairo Embassy, No: 35, 24 April 1947, Khartoum, PRO. FO, 141/1192,

28 Report of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, H.A. Macmichael Catalogue, Undated, SAD, 586/2/1-99.

29 Henderson, *Ibid*, p. 98.

30 Duncan, *Ibid*, p. 136.

31 Harold Macmichael, *The Sudan*, Ernest Benn Limited, London 1954, p. 112.

gors

Akademik
Bakış

49

Cilt 17
Sayı 34
Yaz 2024

Although the legislative Assembly undertook the administration all around the country, there were significant obstacles regarding South Sudan being represented. At the Juba Conference in July 1947, the South's right to decide their own future was ignored by British and Sudanese representatives³². However, The governor-general had suggested that this territory be ensured to be integrated through the number of schools the medium of education of which was Arabic, and that the economic welfare level of the territory equal that of the South. Thus, during the initial phase of the declaration of autonomy, South Sudan bore a passive status³³. These constitutional preparations were delayed for some time by the administration of Egypt, claiming that they were being neglected. However, as Egypt was one of the sovereign nations over Sudan, the negotiations regarding Sudan would not carry on without the approval of Egypt. The fact that some politicians in Egypt turned these constitutional endeavors and the policy of "Sudanization" into a "no to English Intervention" campaign caused the endeavor to be suspended temporarily. Yet, the Nokrashi Cabinet in Egypt emphasized they did not approve of the misinterpretations and that they would maintain the policies regarding the autonomy of Sudan with Britain³⁴. Egypt proposed a number of regulations like a full-fledged parliament and there being more Sudanese representation in the executive council, which would enable Sudan to transition more swiftly to democratic institutions, and hence an autonomous administration; nevertheless, due to the lack of parliament experience of the Sudanese, ultimate autonomy would be expanded over a period of time³⁵.

In June 1948, the legislative assembly and administrative council were instructed by the advisory council to work actively within the jurisdiction of the Governor-General. Despite the official protest of the Egyptian Government on 15 December, the legislative assembly chosen under the Secretary-General of Umma, Abdullah Halil, and the members of other independent parties gathered. Meanwhile, Umma seized the parliamentary majority because pro-Egypt parties, particularly Ashigga, had been protesting against the elections³⁶. Despite all, the parliament gathered and appointed Abdullah Halil Bey as the president. Thereupon, besides Abdullah Halil Bey and the ministers of health and education, appointments of 10 under-secretaries were made. This way, the council of Governor-General, composed mostly of the Sudanese, was replaced by Executive Council³⁷. In 1949, the executive council worked for the first year with the executive council. Owing to several delays, the first season of the parliament opened on 20 December 1949. The

32 Sam L. Laki, "Self-Determination: A Solution to the Sudan Problem", *Northeast African Studies*, 3/2, 1996, p. 10.

33 Report of The Sudan Administration Conference, Chairman J. W. Robertson, 31 March 1947, Khartoum, PRO. FO, 141/1192.

34 Sudan Governor-General to Cairo Embassy, 27 October 1947, Khartoum, PRO. FO, 141/1192.

35 Report of Sudan Administration, 27 November 1947, Khartoum, PRO. FO, 141/1192.

36 Sudan Politic Notes, N.R. Udal Catalogue, September 1954, SAD, 403/1/1-6.

37 Henderson, *Ibid*, p. 98.

gost

first season of the parliament in which all members participated attracted substantial attention of the public as well³⁸. Sudanese nationalists and Ashigga proponents regarded the legislative council more as a British device inhibiting, or at least postponing the independence of Sudan than an institution³⁹. Ashigga's persistent opposition to the English administration did not contribute to the resolution of the issues; moreover, it fed the environment of crisis in which Egypt was involved.

The election to be carried out in Sudan was to contribute to the establishment of the democratic institutions that would facilitate independence. There existed an incongruity among the parties in Sudan regarding the issues of autonomy and total independence. Egypt was accusing English administration of turning Sudan into their own colony through the unilateral resolutions they took. Hence, The Government of Egypt declared they unilaterally terminated the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and 1899 Condominium Agreement and demanded the full evacuation of the British acknowledging the Valley of Nile under the the Kingdom of Egypt had to be United. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bevin, declared the treaty of 1936 approved by the parliaments of both countries could not be altered without the common consent of both sides⁴⁰.

Despite the escalating political tension between Britain and Egypt, the steps towards the autonomy of Sudan were progressing. British administrators organized meetings with independent tribal leaders and several apolitical groups in Sudan. They were convinced the shortest route towards national causes was constitutional progress, thanks to which foreign intervention was to be ensured to be minimized or to cease⁴¹. Afterwards, a constitutional amendment committee was established in Khartoum to specify the principles regarding the autonomous administration in 1951⁴². The Foreign Affairs Minister of Egypt clearly stated his parliament declined to compromise in any way to the Ambassador of Cairo during the meeting on 6 July. Further meetings were organized between the sides on 13 and 26 July that did not proceed well. Meanwhile, Anglo-Egyptian relations were in tension due to English ships anchoring in the Gulf of Aqaba and Israel's policies upon the canal. On 30 July, Eden, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his speech at the parliament, stated the Foreign Affairs of Egypt shut their door for negotiations. By 6 August, the negotiations between England and Egypt had completely ceased⁴³.

Except for Ashigga supported by Egypt, the representators of all political groups in Sudan joined Constitutional Amendment Committee. Yet,

38 Report on The Administration of The Sudan in 1949, Khartoum, PRO. FO, 371/96845.

39 Peter M. Holt, "Sudanese Nationalis...", p. 371.

40 Sudan Politic Notes, N.R. Udal Catalogue, September 1954, SAD, 403/1/1-6.

41 Political Situation, N.R. Udal Catalogue, 18 February 1952, SAD, 779/11/1-113.

42 Sudan Politic Notes, N.R. Udal Catalogue, September 1954, SAD, 403/1/1-6.

43 Creswell to Eden, Egypt: Annual Review for 1951, Alexandria, 3 July 1952, PRO. FO, 371/96845.

gazi

Akademik
Bakış

51

Cilt 17
Sayı 34
Yaz 2024

due to the political attitude Egypt bore, there were several resignations from the committee. Thereupon, following the proposition of the president, the committee was dispersed in 1951 although it had almost reached its aim. However, the endeavors constituted a significant map for the Sudanese Government⁴⁴.

As new political perspectives were emerging in Sudanese political life via new political parties, Egyptian politicians were demonstrating their will for a Sudanese Administration structured under Egyptian sovereignty and the Egyptian crown; and the implementation of the Egyptian constitution upon Sudan. The English Authorities had already been declaring that they would not accept this since 1946. The Foreign Affairs Minister, Eden, sent a telegram to Stevenson, the Ambassador of Cairo, stating that the British Government would fulfill their promise to the Sudanese, and informing that they would support Howe, the Governor-General, so as to effectuate a constitution that would lead Sudan to autonomy. Eden stated that they would be respectful of the Sudanese determination to be governed under the crown of Egypt once they had gained their independence⁴⁵. Within 2 days following Eden's telegram, on 21 January 1952, Robert Howe, the Governor-General of Sudan, sent an assertive telegram to Eden stating that on the basis of the promise the British Government had made to the Sudanese, the demand of the Egyptians was impossible to be met; that Sudan's status would not be altered unless the Sudanese were consulted first; and that the Sudanese would determine their own future. In addition, Governor-General Howe mentioned in his telegram that all political parties except for Ashigga rejected the constitution of Egypt and that the policy of Egypt towards Sudan caused great disturbance in some quarters⁴⁶. On the other hand, Foreign Minister Eden informed Ambassador Stevenson in Cairo that there would be no bargaining on Sudan against the Suez Crisis with Egypt⁴⁷.

As the political dispute between Britain and Egypt was holding, the constitutional endeavour was being pursued in an unabated way. The objection of Egypt at that point was the fact that Sudan already had its own constitution. Ambassador Stevenson in Cairo demanded British Government to ask the Government of Egypt to accept the constitutional draft in which there was substantial progress immediately⁴⁸. Thenceafter, upon the meeting in the official room of Churchill, the Prime Minister of England, the previous resolution that had before been mentioned by English diplomats were re-handled and declared to Egypt. In line with this, it was resolved that King Farouk's title as the king of Sudan would never be recognised, Sudan would be free to determine its own status, and there would be no alteration regarding

44 Sudan Politic Notes, N.R. Udal Catalogue, September 1954, SAD, 403/1/1-6.

45 Eden to Stevenson, M.W. Daly Catalogue, 19 January 1952, Cairo, SAD, 989/2/1-90.

46 Howe to Eden, M.W. Daly Catalogue, 21 January 1952, Khartoum, SAD, 989/2/1-90.

47 Eden to Stevenson, M.W. Daly Catalogue, 20 February 1952, Cairo, SAD, 989/2/1-90.

48 Stevenson to Eden, M.W. Daly Catalogue, 9 April 1952, Cairo, SAD, 989/2/1-90.

gost

the status of Sudan without the Sudanese having being asked in advance⁴⁹. Thus, it was comprehended that Britain was not to permit Egypt to make any political attempt upon Sudan.

The legislative assembly acknowledged this draft in April 1952 to make constitutional changes in the parliament. In May 1952, the constitutional draft presented to the governments of England and Egypt did not satisfy the government of Egypt. Meanwhile, Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mahdi, who had been negotiating with the British Government, was invited to Cairo for negotiations by the government of Egypt. In the negotiations, the government of Egypt declared that the issue of the Nile and the enactments regarding Sudan approved by the parliament in 1951 were to be reviewed if the sovereignty of King Farouk on Sudan was acknowledged. Thereupon, the government of Egypt fell and the negotiations were interrupted⁵⁰. After the cabinet of Nahhas Pasha was overthrown, many governments wanted to pursue the negotiations; however, they were not successful owing to government reshuffles. As a matter of fact, the constitutional draft was managed to be acknowledged after the coup of July at the end of 1952. Hence, the executive council composed of 7 Sudanese and 3 English members administered the country during 1953⁵¹.

Sudan's New Path from Self-Governance to Self-Determination

King Farouk having been overthrown, Egypt's sovereignty claim on Sudan drew to a close. Egypt launched negotiations with some Sudanese political figures in order Sudan to acquire an autonomous state. Egypt declared to the UN that they would not oppose to the independence of Sudan. The leader of Umma Party was invited to Cairo by the prime minister in June 1952. The popularity of the new Egyptian politics was represented by the half-Sudanese, apparent leader of the junta, General Muhammed Nagib. General Nagib was half-Sudanese and his education in Sudan entitled him to the trust of the Sudanese people⁵². English propositions of autonomy were presented to Nagib on 24 September 1952 by the Ambassador in Cairo, Stevenson. Thereupon, Nagib invited Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mahdi and other political figures to Cairo to negotiate the issue of autonomy. General Nagib's positive discourse regarding the Sudanese people's determination on their own led to the emanation of sympathy towards him by various groups in Sudan⁵³.

In October 1952, the English Government accepted the autonomous status of Sudan. Upon this, on 2 November, Egypt did not only accept the autonomous status, but also declared that regulations might be made on a

49 Eden to Stevenson, M.W. Daly Catalogue, 22 April 1952, London, SAD, 989/2/1-90.

50 Duncan, *Ibid*, p. 151, 152.

51 Henderson, *Ibid*, p. 103.

52 Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, p. 159, 160.

53 Taha, "The Sudanese Factor in the 1952-53 Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations", p. 607.

gazi

Akademik
Bakış

53

Cilt 17
Sayı 34
Yaz 2024

constitutional basis to make Sudan independent⁵⁴. In April 1952, the constitutional arrangements regarding the status of autonomy had nearly been completed. This status set forth a complete Sudanese council of ministers (with two ministers from the South) and a bicameral parliament. The Senate was to be composed of fifty members thirty of whom were to be elected to election boards and twenty of whom were to be nominated by the Governor-General. The House of Representatives was to include 95 members 35 of whom were to be elected directly and 57 of whom were to be elected indirectly. As a gesture to the educated Sudanese, Graduates' Constituency was established. The position of the Governor-General was to be close to an undisputed country leader's with constitutionally empowered rights⁵⁵.

The new government formed in Egypt cracked the door open for Sudanese autonomy and self-determination compared to the previous regime of King Farouk by engaging Egypt in a more passive status. The government of Egypt came to terms with all the political parties in Sudan regarding autonomy on 10 January 1953 via Salah Salim, whom the government had sent to make negotiations on their behalf. Therefore, all the parties in Sudan except for those in the South signed a text involving all foreign powers evacuating their troops from Sudan within 3 years, the Sudanization of all the police and defense force of Sudan, the limitation to Governor-General's authority to assign people to commissions, and the conduct of direct elections in Sudan⁵⁶. The Agreement of 10 January invalidated the agreement draft of the British that they were expected to deliver to Egypt on 12 January. British authorities held several negotiations with Sudanese political parties. All political groups in Sudan were all of one mind regarding Sudanization through the establishment of autonomous units, and the requirement that the obscurity related to the future of Sudan be eliminated⁵⁷.

By common consent of Egypt and Britain, the agreement regarding Sudan's autonomy was signed on 12 February 1953. Upon 12 February, the efficacy of the Sudanese political parties gradually rose. The power of the Government-General was limited and handed over to an international committee due to the activities of Sudanese and Egyptian political figures to reduce the influence of Britain. This committee was to be comprised of two Sudanese, one English and one Pakistani member. This modified status was turned into an equal and fair administration for all communities around Sudan. This agreement also addressed the unitary structure of Sudan⁵⁸. The Agreement of 12 February set a 3-year prerequisite to autonomy prior to self-determination. In the Agreement took place the regulations regarding the cessation of the transition period and the process of self-determination. The

54 Sudan Politic Notes, N.R. Udal Catalogue, September 1954, SAD, 403/1/1-6.

55 Peter M. Holt, "Sudanese Nationalism...", p. 370.

56 Sudan Politic Notes, N.R. Udal Catalogue, September 1954, SAD, 403/1/1-6.

57 Taha, "The Sudanese Factor in the 1952-53 Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations", p. 620.

58 Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, p. 162.

prior institution of autonomy put into practice became the parliament. The agreement established a committee of three Sudanese, one Egyptian, one English and one American member to organize and prepare for the general elections.

This committee made arrangements over direct and indirect constituencies by working on the electoral law. Despite the draft of the English authorities including 35 direct and 57 indirect constituencies, the committee determined that 68 direct and 24 indirect constituencies be effectuated. Besides, the number of members in the Graduates Committee which was originally 3 was elevated to 5. Meanwhile, Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mahdi declared that he had no intent on becoming the King in Sudan through his official historical speech in August⁵⁹. Hence, his passion for monarchy since World War I lost its effect due to the well-implemented and organized opposition practiced by Khatmiyya and its followers including the NUP of Azhari⁶⁰.

The elections finally held in December 1953 imposed a shocking effect on the English authorities. Azhari's NUP had won the election overwhelmingly. Azhari claimed 51 out of 97 chairs in the House of Representatives, and; 22 chairs out of 30 in the Senate. Umma Party, on the other hand, became the strongest opposition party with 22 chairs in the House of Representatives and 3 in the Senate. The Socialist Republican party could get only 3 chairs in the Parliament, and no chair in the Senate⁶¹. The fact that the administration of Egypt supported the National Unionist Party financially for the election posed an effect on the results. Azhari, the leader of NUP, took advantage of Egypt's experience in the election whereas the Umma Party and the others were unable to be organized well due to their lack of experience and financial support⁶². Hence, when the results of the election were announced, Gawain Bell, the Chairman of the Sudanese Political Service, and other English authorities claimed that bribery and Egypt Propaganda had an influence on the vote. When it had been obvious that NUP had won the election, Bell pursued a policy to be in agreement with the new party⁶³.

59 Duncan, *Ibid*, p. 161, p. 162.

60 Taha, "Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mahdi: Kingship and its Implications on the History of the Sudanese Nationalist Movement", p. 57.

61 Holt, *A modern History of the Sudan*, p. 163.

62 Sudan Politic Notes, N.R. Udal Catalogue, September 1954, SAD, 403/1/1-6.

63 Gawain, as the under-secretary of the Minister of the Interior, described Ismael el-Azhari through the following sentences: "His comfortable figure, benevolent appearance and gold-rimmed glasses masked a character of single-minded ambition, political astuteness and shrewd opportunism. However much I disliked and distrusted his policies, however often he seemed to me and to many others unscrupulous and irresponsible, my only course was to try and win his confidence and if possible a measure of his friendship, and in so doing attempt to exercise some influence." Gabriel Warburg, "The Wingate Literature Revisited...", p. 377.

gosi

Akademik
Bakış

55

Cilt 17

Sayı 34

Yaz 2024

1953 Sudan General Elections (House of Representatives)⁶⁴

	Direct	Indirect	Graduates Constituency	Total
National Union Party (NUP)	36	11	3	50
Umma	21	1	1	23
Independents/Non-Party	3	8	1	12
Socialist Republican Party (SRP)	3	0		3
Southern Party(SP)	5	4		9
Total	68	24	5	97

1953 Sudan General Elections (Senate)

	Khartoum	Blue Nile	Kurdufan	Darfur	North	Kassala	Bahrel Gazel	Equatoria	Upper Nile	Total
NUP	2	4	4	2	3	3	1	1	2	23
Umma	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	3
Southern Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	3
Independent	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	2
Total	2	5	5	4	3	3	3	2	3	30

It was not surprising for the Sudanese to vote for Azhari's NUP. Azhari had established good communication with the educated class in towns and cities. The fact that he acted in an organized manner in many parts of Sudan

64 For the elections of 1953, H.A. Macmichael Catalogue, 15 December 1953, SAD, 403/10/14; also see K.D.D. Henderson, *Sudan Republic*, p. 104.

affected the results. The principal propaganda of Azhari was his claim that Umma's triumph would mean a Mahdi monarchy, and those who did not follow his ideology would be persecuted. Meanwhile, the anti-imperialist feelings formed as a result of nationalistic discourses were another reason for Azhari's victory⁶⁵. Shortly after the elections, on 1 January 1954, the Governor-General of Sudan inaugurated the first Sudanese Parliament. However, this was not an official inauguration. Only the prime minister and the spokesman of the parliament were to be chosen. Thus, Sayyid İsmail el-Azhari, the person to send the first Congress letter to the Sudanese administration 16 years ago, became the Prime Minister of Sudan on 6 January 1954⁶⁶, and on 9 January, the cabinet was constituted, and oath speeches were made. The council of ministers was constituted of 11 members all of whom belonged to NUP. In addition to this, besides prime minister, Azhari also held the ministry of the interior. Upon these accretions, Howe, the Governor-General, announced 9 January, when the institutions of autonomous Sudan, The Council of Ministers and The House of Representatives, were constituted, as "The Appointed Day"⁶⁷.

Upon beginning his work as the Prime Minister, Azhari encountered two substantial problems. The former was the issue of agreeing with Britain possessing executive positions within state organs, and the sharing of these positions. The latter was his relations with Umma Party. Although there was occasional tension between the Sudanese ministers and British authorities, these relations never reached the breakaway point. Public life continued in its own peculiar way⁶⁸. The Sudanization movement beginning with the evacuation of the Egyptians from public administration in 1924 gained speed with the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953. A gradual 'Sudanization' process quickly eroded Egyptian influence. However, it should be noted that the main reason for expelling the Egyptians from Sudan was political, as the slogan 'Unity of the Nile Valley' was fearful not only for the nationalist Sudanese but also for the British⁶⁹. Until the Agreement of 1953, Sudan Political Ser-

65 P. B. Broadbent, "Sudanese Self-Government", *International Affairs*, 30/3, (1954), p. 322.

66 Seyid İsmail el-Azhari, born in Omdurman in 1902, became the first prime minister of Sudan elected as a candidate from Omdurman in the Northern constituency. Having been graduated from the College Gordon, he finished American University of Beirut. Before embarking on politics, he worked in the education department of the Sudanese Government (1921-1946) in 1939, he was elected the first secretary of Graduates' Congress, and the following year, he became the prime minister there. See. H.A. Macmichael Catalogue, 29 January 1954, SAD, 403/10/67-76; also see. Duncan, *Ibid*, p. 178.

67 H.A. Macmichael Catalogue, 29 January 1954, SAD, 403/10/67-76.

68 Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, p. 165, 166; For a list of senior officials serving in Sudan, see M. W. Daly, "Principal Office-Holders in the Sudan Government 1895-1955", *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 17/2, 1984, p. 309-316.

69 Gabriel Warburg, "From Mahdism to Neo-Mahdism in the Sudan: The Role of the Sudanese Graduates in Paving the Way to Independence 1881-1956", *Middle Eastern Studie*, 41s/6, 2005, p. 987, 988.

Azhar

Akademik
Bakış

57

Cilt 17
Sayı 34
Yaz 2024

vice (SPS)⁷⁰ fell beyond regarding the issue of Sudanization intentionally due to the Southern issue and their concern regarding efficiency. It was a fact that the number of well-educated Sudanese people was low, and the majority of the Sudanese replaced by the British was not as well-educated as the English. Disregarding the prospective drawbacks, it was determined to evacuate all the English personnel from public life as soon as possible⁷¹. Within the scope of the Sudanization policy, the number of the Sudanese working for the government increased day by day. At the beginning of 1954, there were 9351 covert officials working for the government 7996 of whom were Sudanese and 1156 of whom were English. The rest of them were constituted of people from other countries, mainly Egyptians⁷².

The policy of Sudanization diminished the interest in English officials in every sphere. As a matter of fact, on 15 August, the last English official left the Sudanese Defence Force; and on 9 October, the last English official left the Police Force. Thereafter, on 14 December, G. W. Bell, the President of the Sudanese Political Service, which had lost its efficacy, left Sudan⁷³.

In 1955, the issue of South Sudan, which was to torment Sudan for a long time as a huge problem in the years to come, was waiting to be dealt with by Sudanese Government. In 1955, the South Sudanese people rebelled in the province of Ekuatoria to create an autonomous structure for themselves. The rebellions against the central government grew to the extent of interrupting the policies of Azhari⁷⁴. This comprehensive and complicated issue of Sudan was, in a way, related to "Sudanese Nationalism". The educated North Sudanese Muslim people, particularly the Mahdists and Khatmiyya sectarians, focussed on the discourse of Arab Nationalism under the influence of Egypt. However, such a discourse did not correspond to anything to the Christians who were not Arabs and to the pagan Southerners. The sout-

70 The graduates of Oxford and Cambridge were more often admitted into Sudan Political Service. For more detailed information on Sudan Political Service (SPS), see Robert Collins, "The Sudan Political Service: A Portrait of the 'Imperialists'", *African Affairs*, 71/284, 1972, p. 293-303; besides, see A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, "The Sudan Political Service: A Profile in the Sociology of Imperialism," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 15/1, 1982, p. 21-48.

71 David Sconyers, "Hurrying Home: Sudanization and National Integration 1953-1956," *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies*, 15/1-2, (1988), p. 64-66.

72 P. B. Broadbent, "Sudanese Self-Government," 327; Macmichael announced the number of people working for Civil Services as 8.412 Sudanese and 998 English citizens in 1951. See Macmichael, *Ibid*, p. 113.

73 Duncan, *Ibid*, p. 183, 184.

74 Sudan Report, 20 December 1955, Khartoum, PRO. FO, 371/113626; Azhari made the following statements against the campaign launched by the Liberal Party, the only voice of South Sudan, for federal status: We are transitional Government and we have self-government statute and the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement to execute, and we shall be very careful not to contravene their provisions. The agreement provides that the Sudan is one integral whole. The Egyptian and British Governments would not have signed the Agreement unless they had been satisfied that the feeling of the Sudanese was that the Sudan should be one unit on the basis of the decision arrived at, at the Juba Conference in June 1947... see, SAD. 985/5/7, 1965, Statements by Bona Malwal

gost

herner-educated class of the period feeling humiliated under the rule of the British administration led to the reality that they began to relieve themselves by referring to their glorious periods. Through this perspective, it was possible to comprehend how they could regard themselves as a part of the Arab World. Nevertheless, the Southerners neglected by the Southern leaders, especially the ones studying at missionary schools and converting to Christianity, held a grudge against the effective leadership of the Northerners⁷⁵. When al-Azhari formed his National Government soon after independence in January 1956, to temper Southern reactions and strengthen his own hand, he gave ministry to the South's key leaders Paysama, Lwoke, and Buth Diu⁷⁶.

As the South issue was carrying on, Azhari focussed his energy on declaring the total independence of Sudan. On 16 August 1955, the Sudan Parliament passed a motion regarding the forces of Egypt and Britain evacuating the country having conferred the resolution on the condominium. The evacuation processes were managed to be completed in the middle of November. Therefore, all the parties and leaders in Sudan agreed upon a plebiscite, and on 29 August, the parliament unanimously conferred the resolution that "a direct popular vote would be the best option for the Sudanese to specify their genuine desire regarding their own destiny" ⁷⁷. The edition regarding the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was signed on 3 December in Cairo to hold the plebiscite. On the same day, a subsidiary agreement was reached to supervise self-determination and establish an international committee. The principal aim of this committee was to be to declare independence in a free and neutral environment⁷⁸. Then, there happened to exist no obstacle on the path to independence. What had to be done was to terminate the condominium in line with the schedule specified within the framework of the constitutional rules.

The policy of the Egyptian Government towards Sudan firmly pertained to the Sudanese determining their own future independently from any kind of influence. After all, the administration of Egypt was making arrangements to uphold the independence of Sudan either through plebiscite or parliament. English Government had also begun their preparations to uphold Sudan's independence and to terminate the Governor-General's mission⁷⁹. The action having been taken, on 19 December 1955, the Sudanese Government put the declaration of independence through unanimously⁸⁰. The governments of Britain and Egypt acknowledged this resolution. The next step

75 Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, "Arabism, Africanism, and Self-Identification in the Sudan," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 8/2, (1970), p. 233-249.

76 John Howell, "Politics in the Southern Sudan", *African Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 287, 1973, p. 166.

77 A.B.H, *Ibid*, p. 422.

78 Sudan Report, 20 December 1955, Khartoum PRO. FO, 371/113626.

79 Chancery to Foreign Affairs, Tel. 342, 14 December 1955, Cairo, PRO. FO, 371/113626.

80 Mr. Adams to Foreign Affairs, Tel. 333, 20 December 1955, Khartoum, PRO. FO, 371/113626.

gors

Akademik
Bakış

59

Cilt 17
Sayı 34
Yaz 2024

was to be the advice of the condominium and the responsibilities of the Governor-General were to be undertaken⁸¹. Governor General A. Knox Helm, in the meeting with Azhari, apprehended that his post was to be terminated permanently in a few weeks although he thought that this would happen on 15 February⁸². English Foreign Affairs, in their telegram dated 23 December, noted that the procedure to be pursued upon the declaration of independence would be⁸³: the termination of the post of the Governor-General and the recognition of the independence by terminating the condominium, the existence of an appropriate president, the existence of a constitution and government, handover, the termination of the international committee, the constitution of diplomatic relations with Sudanese Parliament, the termination of the Office of Governor-General under these conditions.

Upon the resignation of Governor-General A. Knox Helm, Prime Minister Azhari ensured that the five members of the council of the state transferred from the Governor-General due to the resolution of independence be appointed by the parliament. Thereupon, on 1 January 1956, the council of the state was planned to take an oath. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Parliament gathered on 31 December for the required legal arrangements to effectuate the status of independence⁸⁴.

On 1 January 1956, the representatives of the British and Egyptian governments officially passed the torch to Sudan in the Parliament of Sudan. The members of the High Commission were to carry on the task of the president until the presidential elections based on the law enacted on 21 December. These members came into office having taken their oaths. The flags of the condominium were taken down, and the Sudanese flag was raised⁸⁵. Upon the independence, each country sent Khartoum congratulatory telegrams. Immediately after the independence, on 4 January, the government of Egypt appointed an ambassador to Khartoum. Thereupon, Britain, as well, established their embassy building in Khartoum, thereby deciding on continuing diplomatic negotiations with Sudan⁸⁶. Upon the negotiations carried out, on 3 February, the National Government was formed by Azhari. National Unionist Party (NUP) and the united opposition received 8 ministry each⁸⁷. Despite everything, a new, independent government was formed in Sudan. Sudan, from then on, carried on their exertion to make independent policies just like other countries.

81 Mr. Adams to Foreign Affairs, Tel. 342, 20 December 1955, Khartoum, PRO. FO, 371/113626.

82 Private Secretary Kirkpatrick to Cairo, Tel. 436, 21 December 1955, Khartoum, PRO. FO, 371/113626.

83 Foreign Affairs to Khartoum, Tel. 598, 23 December 1955, London, PRO. FO, 371/113626.

84 P.G.D. Adams's Report, Fortnightly Report (FR) No: 5, 30 December 1955, Khartoum, PRO. FO, 371/119601.

85 P.G.D. Adams's Report, FR No: 5, 30 December 1955, Khartoum, PRO. FO, 371/119601.

86 P.G.D. Adams's Report, FR, No: 6, 13 January 1956, Khartoum PRO. FO, 371/119601.

87 P.G.D. Adams's Report, FR, No: 8, 10 February 1956, Khartoum, PRO. FO, 371/119601.

Conclusion

Although Ali Abdullatif's discourse in 1920s is attributed to as the first reaction to the English sovereignty in Sudan, it is understood that the educated generation that could discuss the Notion of self-determination had not been raised. The desire of the Sudanese community to be involved in the mechanisms where they could devise resolutions for their own country was to truly begin about twenty years following the date when the first reaction emerged.

Without any doubt, the political attitude of Britain and Egypt posed a substantial effect on the self-determination process turning out a success; though, it should priorly be acknowledged that an urban and educated Sudanese generation had been raised. Although the Sudanese, except for those from the South, whether they had graduated from western educational institutions or traditional local educational institutions, embraced distinctive world views, they were influenced by the independence of the Arab countries around them, Egypt in particular, and developed an awareness regarding self-determination. As a matter of fact, what put flesh on the bone of the spirit of freedom was the written text Graduates' General Congress sent to Sudan's general secretary. The fact that the Sudanese had reached the wisdom, ability and courage to determine their own future facilitated them to put pressure on the administration of Britain to act in an organized way, which caused the emergence of the external factors regarding the self-determination process.

The consideration for independence in 1940's gave way to the institution of two mainstream political units in Sudan, Ashigga (1944) and Umma (1945). These political unities that positioned themselves depending on the policies of Britain underlined the foundation of many political parties in Sudan in the period to follow. From this aspect, the first half of the 1950's in Sudan, the period during which the idea of self-determination was discussed and actualized, may be regarded as a period when democratic life blossomed. The negative stance of Britain towards the idea of independence, as in the case of Ibrahim Ahmad's 12-clause memorandum, was later replaced by new administrative regulations that facilitated the involvement of the Sudanese, especially in the North of Sudan. Within the framework of the ideology of English authorities based on remaining in Sudan longer through the prevention of anti-Britain movement and Sudanese nationalism, the administrative institution of the "Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan" turned into the focus of criticism later due to its nature as a solely advisory council. This indicated that the Sudanese had crossed the tipping point on their way to independence. It is comprehensible that England, by moving in the direction of the dramatically strengthening wind of independence, wanted to hold the reins of the process of self-determination. This policy of Britain had two bases. The former was, as stated above, to restrain the hostiles against England, and the latter was to embank the policy of Egypt to be united with Sudan.

One of the points attracting the most attention regarding Sudan's sel-

gazi

Akademik
Bakış

61

Cilt 17
Sayı 34
Yaz 2024

f-determination is the Egyptian administrators' declarations employing the discourse of "Sudan and Egypt under Egyptian Crown" to sustain their sovereignty rights on Sudan referring to the historical background based on their military expedition to Sudan in 1821. The Egyptian administration, first opposed to the process of self-determination advocating status-quo, then began to be the defender of the movement of independence once they realized the impreventable independence wave and the fact that England's policy in Sudan was against them. However, it should be remembered that the fundamental source of the administration of Egypt supporting Sudan's fight for independence was their belief that Sudan would become more dependent on Egypt upon gaining independence.

Egypt's sovereignty claim over Sudan is significant, as it signifies that Egypt's habit of managing Sudan still continued. Therefore, Egypt did not differ from Britain in terms of its policy to administer Sudan. The fact that Egyptian authorities considered Sudan as an extension of their geography with respect to their unity of religion and race meant that they undermined the capacity of the Sudanese people, including those in South Sudan, to build a future for themselves. However, even the groups closest to Egypt located in North Sudan put substantial effort into instituting an independent Sudan. The first concrete step taken in Sudan with regard to the process of self-determination was the Legislative Assembly coming into operation in 1948 and the Executive Council. These councils mostly comprised of the Sudanese played a substantial role in the soft and smooth transition to independence in the following years. Via these councils, not only did the Sudanese gain the capacity to be represented, but they also gained time for the new democratic institutions to be established. There is not the slightest doubt about the role of Egypt's experience of independence and Britain's experience of democracy regarding the devising and implementation of this process. The fact that the Sudanese were able to transition to an autonomous administration with many political parties in such a short time and hold the general elections with no problems occurring should be attributed to the outcome of such policies.

The political figure having his mark on the self-determination process of Sudan was indubiously the first Prime Minister of independent Sudan, İsmail al-Azhari. It must not be left unmentioned that his struggle during 1940s, and subsequently his successful election propaganda in 1953 gave way to substantial changes in Sudan. His political intelligence observed the balance between England and Egypt and his energy formed a wholeness with his charismatic leadership in internal control. A great number of fractions in Sudan regarded him as the leader to take Sudan to independence despite the difficulties of every kind. In addition, another efficient political figure in Sudan, although criticized by many fractions of the period, was Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mahdi for his efforts in the struggle for independence.

gpr

References

1. Official Sources

The National Archive (PRO. FO)

Sudan Archive Durham (SAD)

2. Secondary Sources

A.B.H., "The Sudan for the Sudanese: The Threshold of Self-Determination", *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 11/10, (1955), 421-430.

BROADBENT, P. B., "Sudanese Self-Government", *International Affairs*, 30/3, (1954), 320-330.

COLLINS, Carole, "Colonialism and Class Struggle in Sudan", *MERIP Reports*, No: 46, (1976), 3-20.

COLLINS, Robert O., "The Independent Sudan", University of California Press, Current History, *North Africa*, 44/257, (January 1963), 13-21.

COLLINS, Robert O., "The Sudan Political Service: A Portrait of the 'Imperialists'", *African Affairs*, 71/284, (1972), 293-303.

DALY, M. W., Principal Office-Holders in the Sudan Government, 1895-1955, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 17/2, 1984, p. 309-316.

DALY, M. W., The Development of the Governor-Generalship of the Sudan, 1899-1934, *The Journal of African History*, 24/1, 1983, p. 77-96.

SCONYERS David, "Hurrying Home: Sudanization and National Integration 1953-1956", *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies*, 15/1-2, (1988), 64-66.

DUNCAN, J.S.R., *The Sudan's Path to Independence*, William Blackwood and sons Ltd, London 1957.

HENDERSON, K.D.D., *Sudan Republic*, Ernest Benn Limited, London 1965.

HOLT, Peter M, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1961.

HOLT, Peter M., "Sudanese Nationalism and Self-Determination", Part II, *Middle East Journal*, 10/4, (Autumn 1956), 368-378.

HOWELL, John, Politics in the Southern Sudan, *African Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 287, 1973.

KIRK-GREENE, A. H. M., "The Sudan Political Service: A Profile in the Sociology of Imperialism", *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 15/1, (1982), 21-48.

LAKI, Sam L, Self-Determination: A Solution to the Sudan Problem, *Northeast African Studies*, 3/2, 1996, p. 7-20.

MACMICHAEAL, Harold, *The Sudan*, Ernest Benn Limited, London 1954.

MUDDATHIR Abd Al-Rahim, "Arabism, Africanism, and Self-Identification in the Sudan", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 8/2, (1970), 233-249.

NEWBOLD, Douglas, *The Making of the Modern Sudan*, Faber and Faber Limited, London.

TAHA, Fadwa A. A., "Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mahdi: Kingship and its Implications on the History of the Sudanese Nationalist Movement, Sudan: Environment and People", *Second International Sudan Studies Conference Papers*, Durham, (1991), 52-60.

TAHA, Fadwa A. A., "The Sudanese Factor in the 1952-53 Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 44/4, (July 2008), 603-631.

WARBURG, Gabriel, "The Wingate Literature Revisited: The Sudan as Seen by Members of the Sudan Political Service during the Condominium: 1899-1956", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 41/3, (2005), 373-389.

gazi

Akademik
Bakış

63

Cilt 17
Sayı 34
Yaz 2024

WARBURG, Gabriel, "From Mahdism to Neo-Mahdism in the Sudan: The Role of the Sudanese Graduates in Paving the Way to Independence 1881-1956", *Middle Eastern Studie*, 41s/6, 2005, p. 975-995.

VEZZADİNİ, Elena, Nationalism by Telegrams: Political Writings and Anti-Colonial Resistance in Sudan, 1920–1924, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 46/1, 2013, p. 27-59.

YOUNG, Alden, *Transforming Sudan Decolonization, Economic Development, and State Formation*, Cambridge University Press, London, 2018.

gost

Akademik
Bakış

64

Cilt 17
Sayı 34
Yaz 2024