

## AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ VE RUSYA’NIN SOĞUK SAVAŞ’IN HEMEN ARDINDAN AVRASYA PROJESİNDEKİ KAMU DİPLOMASİLERİNİN ANALİZİ

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### ÖZET

Bu makale, Soğuk Savaş’ın sona ermesinin hemen ardından Rusya ve Avrupa Birliği’nin Avrasya projesi üzerindeki uluslararası büyük oyunda farklılaşan ve yakınlaşan çıkarları üzerine odaklanmaktadır. Avrasya hinterlandında enerji kaynaklarının ve ihracat yollarının kontrolü, Soğuk Savaş sonrası uluslararası siyasetin ve kamu diplomasisininin temel konusu haline gelmişti. Bu bağlamda, Rusya ve AB’nin ilişkileri Sovyet sonrası dönemde kurulan Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu ve özellikle enerji politikaları ekseninde tartışılmıştı. Avrasya hinterlandını kontrol edenin aynı zamanda yeni siyah ipek yolu da denilen enerji koridorunu kontrol edeceği algılamasından hareketle, Rusya bölgenin kendi stratejik önceliği olduğunu açıkça belirtmişti. Her ne kadar başarısı sorgulansa da, Avrupa Birliği’de jeo-stratejik ve ekonomik çıkarları açısından Avrasya’daki petrol ve gaz rezervlerinin kontrolü ve güvenli bir şekilde Batı’ya ulaşmasını sağlama hususunda ısrar etmiş ve bu duruma uygun politikalar üretmiştir. Avrupa Birliği bölgeye yönelik demokrasi temelli kamu diplomasisinde; Sovyetler Birliği’nden kopmuş Bağımsız Devletler için bu rezervlerin kendi egemenlikleri, refah ve ekonomik büyümelerini sağlamada önemli potansiyele sahip olduğu gerçeğinden hareketle politikalar geliştirmişti. Fakat, Rus askeri ve siyasi emperyalizmi bu duruma tepki göstermişti. Küresel güçlerin Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu içindeki yapılanması ve etkinliği karşısında, aynen 20.yüzyılın başındaki Rusya ve İngiltere İmparatorlukları arasındaki Büyük Oyunda olduğu gibi, bölge bugün de Rusya ve Batı dünyası arasındaki egemenlik ve güç mücadelesine sahne olmaktadır. Rus emperyal genişlemesini önlemek ve kendi jeostratejik çıkarlarını güvence altına alabilmek için Avrupa Birliği’nin bölge ülkelerine başta demokratikleşme olmak üzere çeşitli projelerle girmesi, aralarında bir çeşit rekabet ve işbirliği olan Avrupa Birliği ile Amerika’nın da yeni Transatlantik gündem çerçevesinde konuya müdahil olması bu bağlamda ele alınmaktadır. Böylece, Rusya ile aralarında adeta yarı ortak, yarı rakip bir nevi ilişki türü olan Avrupa Birliği’nin demokrasi üzerine inşa edilen kamu diplomasisi, Avrasya kaynakları üzerinde de en azından Rus petrol ve gaz şirketlerinin bölgedeki diğer aktörlerle eşit şartlarda katılmasını sağlamaya yönelik sürdürülmüştür.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Avrupa Birliği, Rusya, Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu, Avrasya, Enerji, Kamu Diplomasisi, Yumuşak Güç.

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## AN ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIA ON EURASIAN PROJECT JUST AFTER THE COLD WAR

### *ABSTRACT*

This article focuses on the diverging and converging interests of the European Union and Russia on Eurasian Project especially concerning the great game on energy politics just after the Cold War. It was discussed the post-Soviet era political relations between the EU and Russia within the axis of the Commonwealth of the Independent States. While the Caucasus had become the new “Black Silk Road” where the transportation routed for oil and gas from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and marketed in Europe, the perception in the region was that whoever control the Caucasus would control the pipelines. Russia had made clear that the Caucasus and Central Asia was one of its top strategic priorities. The oil and gas reserves of the Eurasia was vital to Western geo-strategic and economic interests too. So democracy based public diplomacy of the European Union has insisted that they have the potential to secure prosperity and economic growth bolstered by low oil prices. In addition, these resources were key to ensuring revenues and the sovereignty of the Newly Independent States with them. The wealth brought by oil could fuel both economic and democratic development in Eurasia and fostered the independence and freedom of countries which served in turn as an obstacle to potential Russian imperial expansion. On the other hand, how Russian imperialism in Eurasian Project reacted this situation was also analysed. The Russian military and political establishment was attempting to impose a sphere of influence on the CIS and to secure control of the region’s energy as well as Western and regional countries. Control over the region’s energy resources and export routes out of the Eurasian hinterland was quickly becoming one of the central issues in the post-Cold War politics. Like the “Great Game” of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, in which the geopolitical interests of the British Empire and Russia had clashed over the Caucasus region and Central Asia, today’s struggle between Russia and the West turned on who controls the oil reserves in Eurasia. The public diplomacy of European Union was trying to ensure that Russia was not a dominant, but rather an equal partner in developing the oil resources of the region. EU wanted Russian oil and gas companies should be allowed to participate in the development of Eurasian energy resources on an equitable basis with other countries in the region. There was also a kind of coordination and cooperation between the EU and United States of America, much of their work was done on the basis of the New Transatlantic Agenda.

**Key Words:** European Union, Russia, Commonwealth of Independent States, Eurasia, Energy, Public Diplomacy, Soft Power.

## **Introduction**

At the end of 1991, after the collapse of the USSR<sup>1</sup>, Russia became an independent state, forced to leave its status as the center of a world empire. Three Slavic republics, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, calling themselves Sovereign Republics and High Contracting Parties and they established the Commonwealth of Independent States CIS by concluding a treaty on the Creation of a (CIS).<sup>2</sup> The Slavic nucleus was a few weeks afterwards by eight other former Union Republics in the treaty of Alma-Ata, which took the form of a protocol added to the Minsk Treaty. Thus, the non-Slavic latecomers were qualified as equally founding members of the CIS.<sup>3</sup>

The Newly Independent States were also recognized by the international community as fully fledged members of the United Nations and they became separate members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). During the transitional period European Union used its democracy based public diplomacy in which the former union republics were establishing their own state systems and were gradually becoming aware of their own interests related to their status as New Independent States. Exception should be made for the Baltic States which reaffirmed their independent status before the collapse of the Soviet Union and managed to remain outside the CIS. There was also a special triangle of relations between the European Union (EU), the Baltic States and Russian Federation. The EU's public policy on Baltic States was well on track and the realization of especially the EU memberships. During the first part of the 1990's both Russia and Baltic States have sought to play the "Western Card" against each other.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For the dissolution of the Soviet Union and perestrioka; collapse of the bipolar world; and the role of United States and West in the collapse of the Soviet Union see; Igor Gali, V.I. Groov-G.A.Vasilyev-O.S.Şenin, *Sovyetler Birliđi Neden/Nasil Yıkıldı*, Arif Berberođlu(derleyen ve Ruşçadan çeviren), (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınları, Eylül 2008).

<sup>2</sup> The three original member states of the 1922 Soviet federal construction declared that they considered the Soviet Federation to be dissolved and formed a new Slavic nucleus. This was formulated in the preamble of the short document of the so called Treaty of Minsk 8 December 1991. See also details of the rise and fall of the Soviet Empire; Mesut Hakkı Caşın, *Novgorod Knezliđi'nden XXI.Yüzyıla RUS İMPARATORLUK STRATEJİSİ*, (İstanbul: Okumuş Adam Yayınları, Nisan 2006), pp.129-241.

<sup>3</sup> Ten republics claimed immediate membership, the Baltics declined to join, as did Georgia and Azerbaijan became conditional members. See also; B.Martha Olcott, "Russia's Place in the CIS", *Current History*, vol:92, no:576, October, 1993, p.28.

<sup>4</sup> Mathias Jopp and Barbara Lippert, "Towards a Solution of the Baltic Issue: the EU's Role", in: Mathias Jopp&Sven Arnsward (eds), *The European Union and the Baltic States*

It should be stressed that Russia never stood alone in the post-Soviet space. EU discussed that the CIS was not conceived to replace the USSR, but to fill in a gap during an exceptional and unpredictable historical period. It was like a new theatre prepared to welcome new actors and new stage.

As the plan of Russian public diplomacy, CIS project initially concerned the 12 neighbours who until 1991 belonged to a common political, economic and social space. In this sense, a comparison was made with relations between Turkey and its neighbours after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire or, in a different manner, the situation of Austria, Hungary and other Central European states after the break up of the Habsburg Empire.<sup>5</sup> As earlier examples of Britain and France<sup>6</sup>, the loss of Soviet Empire was accompanied by the search for a new role in Russia who was forced to define a new form of relationship with the members of the former Soviet Union according to new international parameters. Reference was made to EFTA, NAFTA or the Asia-Pacific Council, each contemporary association opts for a policy of economic cooperation. From the beginning a vague blueprint of CIS-construction was made for future interstate cooperation. Although the Newly independent States were just leaving their former life as Union Republics, the Treaty of Minsk, were already formulated their relations between each other as an independent states. From the very beginning of the CIS, the heads of states and governments went in search for ways to establish cooperation on a new basis, to bring the reform programs closer together and to co-ordinate activities along the new lines of market transformation with Western world. The Minsk Treaty already mentioned the target of creating all-European and Eurasian markets.<sup>7</sup>

The member states also promised each other to cooperate in the field of foreign and defense policies. Charter of the CIS explain the areas of mem-

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Visions, Interests and Strategies for the Baltic Sea Region, Program on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, vol:2, (Helsinki&Bonn:Ulkoopoliittinen Instituutti&Institut für Europäische Politik,1998), p.9-18.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid*,p.34.

<sup>6</sup> Britain and France could simultaneously pursue decolonization in Africa and Asia, and integration in Europe, Russia had little alternative but to pursue decolonization in Eurasia even as it sought regional integration with the countries in the region. See; Karen Dawisha, "Russian Foreign Policy in the Near Abroad and Beyond", *Current History*, vol:95, no:603,October 1992, p.322.

<sup>7</sup> For the Minsk Treaty and Almaata Protocol see ; Fırat Purtaş, *Rusya Federasyonu Ekskinde Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu*, (Ankara: Platin Yayınları, 2005), s.64-71.

ber states joint activities such as protecting people rights and freedoms, coordinating foreign policy, guarding borders, cooperation in the formation of a common economic space. Besides this, there would be cooperation in transport, communication systems, environmental protection, healthcare, social issues, migration policy and struggled against organized crime. Moreover, the new cooperation should be developed according to the principles of European cooperation and currently accepted good neighborhood principles as tools of EU's public diplomacy. Reference was made to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and to the aim of establishing an economic and legal space.<sup>8</sup>

From the start, security was an important issue in the framework of CIS cooperation. The situation in this field was relatively different from the European Union, where security was primarily guaranteed by the transatlantic cooperation and defence structure of NATO. In this CIS framework Russia who was the security guarantor, situated itself not outside but within the cooperation framework. This could be considered as a reason why security was important issue from the beginning. The member states would preserve and support a common military strategic space under a joint command, including unified control over nuclear weapons.<sup>9</sup>

The CIS was not likely to develop in the direction of the restoration of the former Soviet state, nor towards a European-like system of supranational powers in the first years of the its existence. Restoration of the Soviet Union was not practical option, despite the calls of communist and nationalist groups for the revival of the fallen giant. This idea was formulated with the great authority by a leading Soviet international lawyer G.I. Tunkin: *"It is impossible to turn back the wheel of history. Under present conditions the movement for the restoration of the Union, although in principle enkindled by honest intent, is fraught with danger. An attempt to reach this goal by resorting to force would lead to immense bloodshed, and there is evidently no other means but force. Today, the only course is to align our steps with*

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<sup>8</sup> Katlijn Malfliet, "The Commonwealth of Independent States: Russian Ambitions Disguised in a European (Eurasian) Project?", in: Tom Casier & Katlijn Malfliet (eds), *Is Russia A European Power? The Position Of Russia in a New Europe*, (Belgium: Leuven University Press, 1998), p.94.

<sup>9</sup> Together with the Treaty of Minsk and the Protocol of Alma-Ata, the Declaration of Alma-Ata and the Charter (Ustav) of the CIS, accepted on 22 January 1993 are qualified as the "Founding Documents of CIS". Mesut Hakkı Çaşın, *Rus İmparatorluk Stratejisi*,...p.240.

*history, which means to support and cultivate the Commonwealth of Independent States.*"<sup>10</sup>

The Newly Independent States in Eurasia also developed nationalist ambitions to make themselves, economically and politically independent from Moscow. They allied with non-CIS countries other than Russia to achieve this goal. Distribution of power and global outreach of these nations changed radically.<sup>11</sup> But on the other hand, Russian patriotic consensus, which emerged since 1992 as a unity among the major capital camps with regard to the most important issues, have been discussing that Russia has a civilization in its own right that, despite of its connections with the Europe, cannot and would not thrive in the West.<sup>12</sup>

Russia cannot adopt either the structure of western political institutions or all the principles of the market economy, because different historical traditions force it to follow its own unique path. Russia was not really seeking integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures, because the patriotic consensus saw a danger therein of the country being absorbed by the "single, Western World". Instead, Russia saw itself as the heart of its own Eurasian zone of integration. Discussion on NATO's enlargement has acted a catalyst for the new patriotism and has thus assured greater significance than it otherwise would have warranted.<sup>13</sup>

### **The European Union & the CIS in Terms of Integration**

The very succes of the European Union public diplomacy, the advances in integration and economic development which made it so attractive to the East. The CIS could develop along ideas, values and patterns which might show some similarity with European integration. Can CIS and EU integration be compared as a process? Unfortunately, the historical and geopolitical

<sup>10</sup> V. Pechota, "The Commonwealth of Independent States: A Legal Profile", Parker Scholl Journal of East European Law, vol:2, no:4-5, 1995, p.585.

<sup>11</sup> For the details of Caspian energy resources and power politics in this region see; Sedat Laçiner, "Hazar Enerji Kaynakları ve Enerji-Siyaset İlişkisi ", Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies vol: 1 no:1, 2006, ss.36-66. See also Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu USAK resmi web sitesi: <http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/vR-PhzIqgAaUzEbsqIgyiYdXFvT60sp.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> Katlijn Malfliet, p.127.

<sup>13</sup> Aleksandr Dugin, Rus Jeopolitiği Avrasyacı Yaklaşım, Vügar İmanov(çev.), ( İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, Temmuz 2003), p. XVII.

differences was striking and speak against any direct comparison of the EU and the CIS. The CIS leaders and pro-integration bureaucrats did not hide that they drew inspiration from the European model.

There were crucial differences between the European integration process and CIS project as follows: The European experience demonstrates that fruitful cooperation between smaller and bigger states presupposes restraint of the bigger partners and corresponding institutional framework. The largest states in the EU have made the positive experience that exercising such restraint can serve their interests as well. On the other hand, the European Community has also declared its role to be one of building peace and reconciliation through the development of closer relations between European states since its foundation.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the European Community had begun to look a peace-building role with its soft power in this time on a larger scale. Work through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and through bilateral channels, to defuse ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The EU endeavoured to settle the conflicts in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. They tried to strengthen secular Muslim societies, notably Turkey and Azerbaijan, Islamic militant groups. Western world was believed that both Russian geo-strategic ambitions and Iranian-style religious militancy pose long-term threats to the Muslim societies of the region.<sup>14</sup> These threats could be countered by helping to create free market economies, respect for the rule of law, and a civil society that respects democracy and political pluralism for the EU and also United States of America as their soft power of public diplomacies.<sup>15</sup>

The ideologized democratic internationalism, traditional Russian chau-

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<sup>14</sup> The situation of the region after the Cold War, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia's foreign policy with the regional powers, Turkey, Russia and Iran's Caucasus policy should be taken into account. The U.S. policy in the Caucasus in terms of regional and global repercussions, and also in August 2008 Russia-Georgia War II with the current situation must be analyzed by the effects of war in the Caucasus. Regional countries and regions of the Caucasus policy, as well as external actors as an effective force in U.S. policy towards the region from the perspective of international relations have been examined in a comparative study look; Kamer Kasım, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Kafkasya, (İstanbul: USAK Yayınları, 2009).

<sup>15</sup> For the details see; Belkıs Ulusoy, & Okan Yeşilot, "Avrasya Coğrafyasında Rusya-ABD Nüfuz Mücadelesi", Turuncu Devrimler SOROS'un Yeni Dünya Düzeni: İkinci El Demokrasi ve Neconlar, Sinan Ogan(der), (İstanbul: Birharf Yayınları, 2006), ss.178-195.

vinism, enlightened self-interest were the examples of different foreign policy schools that emerged in post-Soviet Russia. In Asia and the Middle East, Russia was clearly starting to carry out policies that reflected statist thinking. The complex oil, money and transport politics were characterized as classical geopolitics which was a revival of the Great Game that marked Central Asia and the Caucasus in the nineteenth century. The Old Great Game was focused on the dynamics of Russia absorbing the Caucasus and Central Asia as parts of its expanding empire. Enlightened interest implies first of all that Russia should strike a balance on an East-West axis and on a South-North axis. In its post-imperial re-integrationist course, atlanticism should be rejected as not sufficient and too extremist. Because Russia still too far separated from Europe and behind the West in economics. Conversely, Russia could not afford to become a solely Eurasian and Asian power.<sup>16</sup>

Both insiders and outsiders initially assumed that the CIS nations would primarily look to their neighbours, the former Union Republics, and to the West for economic alliance formation. However, Newly Independent States on the territory of the former Soviet Union saw more strategic sense in looking at the same time West and Eastwards. The extension of closer relations with China was a typical example of this development. *"Indeed, at one side Russia emphasized the broad alliance with China and that was materialized in April 1996 by establishment of Shanghai Five Group which included Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This group aimed in related to two bigs intention at large, to create strategic bridgehead against the US ascendancy, at specific, to maintain common border security."*<sup>17</sup> Therefore, the crucial question was not whether the CIS countries would develop towards EU integration and would participate in a pan-European economic and security structure. But rather whether the CIS finally ends up in a similar structure, that would hinder pan-European integration in the future and draw a new dividing line in Europe? The future politics and economics of Russia and its newly independent neighbours affect global and regional security issues such as proliferation, terrorist networks and resources, transnational crime and drugs, the global spread of AIDS, international markets for energy and natural resources.

With the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the European Union

<sup>16</sup> Katlijn Malffliet, p.122.

<sup>17</sup> See for more details; Gürkan Şen, "Şanghai Beşlisi", *Stratejik Analiz*, cilt:1, sayı: 1, Mayıs 2000, s.15-18.



public diplomacy decided to support the transition process towards market economies and democratic societies in countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Thus, since the beginning of the nineties, the EU has developed a much more formal and political relationship with the CIS countries. Building strong trading links was a major objective, but the overall aim was to foster enduring political, economic and cultural links, so as to ensure peace and security. European Union's role as a soft power was ensured to integrate the countries of the former Soviet bloc into the international system via public diplomacy. On the other hand, an assessment and advisory project on the development of GUUAM which was a security association comprised of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, as a mechanism for regional security and political cooperation and development of the "Shanghai Six" regional grouping was for coping with problems of Eurasian security and stability.<sup>18</sup>

Likewise Russian public diplomacy has been trying to integrate in all kinds of European institutions which were the Council of Europe, OSCE. She was accepted by G7. Russia expressed its interests for World Trade Organization. Also in March 1997, Yeltsin proclaimed that Russia aimed at full integration in the European Union<sup>19</sup> as a rhetoric of Russian public diplomacy at his time. However two strange events followed each other about a legal framework for the protection of minority groups. Firstly, the "Convention on Safeguarding the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities" concluded within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States on 21 October 1994. Secondly, the "Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities" adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 10 November 1994.<sup>20</sup> Without doubt,

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<sup>18</sup> See for general information, official documents, conferences, media, press releases and newsletter details of GUUAM official web site: <http://www.guam.org/>

<sup>19</sup> Yeltsin expressed this thought after the American-Russian Summit during a short visit to Finland. The decision of the Central and Eastern European associated countries adopt the obligatory harmonization objective of the EU was on the one hand and the ambitions of Russia in the framework of the CIS on the other hand. This might create a new post-socialist bipolarity in Europe. Asem Nausabayeva, "Yeltsin'den Sonra Putin'le Yeni Rusya", *Stratejik Analiz*, cilt:1, sayı:1, Mayıs 2000, s.9.

<sup>20</sup> M. Elst, "The Protection of National Minorities in the Council of Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. A Comparison in Standard Setting" in: K. Malffiet and R. Laenen (eds), *Minority Policy in Central and Eastern Europe- The Link between Domestic Policy, Foreign Policy and European Integration*, (Leuven: Institute for European Policy, 1998), p.149-189.

their political role was the most important. For the CIS it is an attempt to

For Russia, these conventions are an instrument to justify its irredentist concern for the legitimize itself as a regional organization on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Russians living in the Near Abroad and implicitly for supporting its claim to Eurasian space as its exclusive sphere of influence. The human rights record of Russia is not very convincing. The Commission on Human Rights, established by Yeltsin in 1993, was disbanded after its declaration that human rights were violated in Russia who was far from a real democracy.

According to foreign policy rhetoric of Russia would remain Europe's largest and one of the most influential country. The regional design of Russia differed from the West. The Russian nation was being reborn with a statist foreign policy which aimed at putting its own imprint not only on Eurasia, but also on East Central Europe and Europe as a whole.<sup>21</sup> However, the political and historical assumptions of this integrated CIS space was fundamentally different from the West European. Utilitarianism and freedom, equality and fraternity, individualism were important West European's dogmas which were difficult to digest for CIS.

On the other hand, the alliance between China and the CIS stems from political and economic motives as well as from a mutual desire to ensure regional stability in Central Asia. China could provide Russia with hard currency and investment, while the CIS could provide China with access to the resources necessary for attaining military superiority. Two strategically important treaty were signed with China. The first was a treaty between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tadzhikistan which set out to demilitarise their 5000 mile border. The second was a joint declaration in which Russia and China expressed their view of how to form the new international relations of the twenty first century. China, Russia and the five Central Asian countries signed an agreement to improve the effectiveness of the railroad known as the Second Eurasian Continental Bridge, spanning two continents between Rotterdam and China's port Lianyungang on the Yellow Sea.<sup>22</sup> This was one component of a larger transportation and energy corridor made up of interlocking railroads, pipelines and communication systems.

<sup>21</sup> See for details; Mesut Hakkı Caşın, *Rus İmparatorluk Stratejisi*,...p.414-430.

<sup>22</sup> These agreements were signed during Jiang Zemin's April 1994 visit to Moscow. See for details; Alfred Voskressenski, *Russia, China, USA Redefining the Triangle*, (New York: Nova Science Publishers), 1996.

All of them were in various stages of modernization and coordination. The Eurasian “transport corridor” covered a major part of the legendary Silk Road and directly involves the three Trans-Caucasian countries (Armenia, Azerbaidzhan and Georgia)<sup>23</sup> and five Central Asian countries. Russia wants a European section of the transport corridor, running from the Baltic states through Central Russia to the Black Sea, to be established by the joint efforts of the Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus under Russian /CIS control for Russian public diplomacy.

The CIS in its first years was nothing more than an anarchical mass without political and legal shape. In that new environment, with most countries spinning away from organized relationship with Russia who had to develop its own foreign policy. The CIS today has several multilateral high level bodies that meet regularly: the Heads of State Council, the Heads of Government Council, Ministerial Councils and Inter-parliamentarian Assembly.<sup>24</sup> What it lacks was its own multilateral or supranational bureaucracy: ministers and agencies similar to those of the European Union. But the bureaucracy was Russian and based on Moscow. This makes the CIS a forum for debate, but denies it the capacity to develop and carry out a policy of its own as written by programmatic documents of CIS charter. The CIS would develop as a Russian policy preference, because the process was directed by Russia and the bureaucracy was Russian.

### **Diverging Interest of Russia and the EU in the Caucasus&Central Asia**

The Caucasus is one of the world’s most ethnically complex regions<sup>25</sup> along with the Central Asian called group of five countries which are intermixed artificially states. There are number of objective factors helping to explain us why the Caucasus and Central Asia have been so unstable.

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<sup>23</sup> See the importance of these countries; Aleksandr Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği Avrasyacı Yaklaşım...*pp.369-370.

<sup>24</sup> For more details of CIS structures see: <http://www.cis.minsk.by/main.aspx?uid=74>

<sup>25</sup> It is the fault-line between the Caucasus mountains and the Asiatic steppes, the meeting point between Persian, Turkic and Slavic civilizations. A long history of invasions, incursions and waves of settlement, along with the isolation of mountain valleys have produced an extraordinarily complex mosaic of peoples. This helps us explain why the **overwhelming majority of violent conflicts in the former Soviet Union have occurred in the Caucasus.** See; Aleksandr Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği Avrasyacı Yaklaşım...*p.370

First of all the region has extreme ethnic diversity that has been exploited by Russia who adopted a strategy of “divide and rule” just as it did in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. She divided potentially powerful groups like the Circassians into smaller, artificial ethnic groups and emphasized cultural and linguistic differences between them. The Russian public policy also elevated Christians such as Armenians, Georgians and Ossetians above the Muslim peoples of the regions, and settled Cossacks on the traditional territory of all ethnic groups. Many of these same public policies had continued in the Soviet period. Second is the cleavage between Orthodoxy and Islam in the region given the long history of clashes between Islam and Christendom in Asia Minor. Third is high rural birth rate and high population density throughout the region. The result has been chronic unemployment, especially in the countryside where ethnic groups are particularly intermingled. In the Soviet period, surplus labour in the region was exported, but this safety valve has been turned off. Large numbers of unemployed have led to growing pressures on scarce land and housing. A fourth factor is the economic distress in the region. Economic problems have compounded the traditional weakness of the local economies which have been heavily dependent on Moscow for subsidies. So, economic problems have in turn been aggravated by ethnic tensions in the region. Fifth, the administrative legacy of the USSR created the basic conditions for ethno-political conflicts in the region. Dividing the regions into ethnically-defined administrative units served to politicize ethnicity, created the impression that territory which was settled by number of groups actually belonged to only one group and scattered individual groups across frequently changing administrative borders. Sixth factor is the lack of experience of the new national and regional leaders of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Soviet nationality policy gave the administrative units of the region all the trapping of sovereignty and autonomy but none of the substance. It thus deprived the leaders of the region of experience in self government and it promoted a “brain drain” from the region. As a result, local elites lacked the skills needed to contain intensifying interethnic tensions when they arose. A final objective factor has been the refugee crisis which was initially an effect of conflict but is now helping to prevent stabilization. The refugee problem has further strained local housing and infrastructure, and it has placed an additional burden on local governments and the welfare system. Along with these objective factors there were specific triggers for individual cases. These consisted of an unwillingness of local political

leaders to compromise and a failure to follow through on key political directives. Finally, although the Russia has not always been a primary instigator of the conflicts in the region, she has certainly played an important role, particularly after tensions emerged or erupted into violence. Although Russia was hardly a unitary actor, many in Moscow clearly believed that Russia's national interest was served by conflict in the region.<sup>26</sup> As a result, for example Russia has engaged in a limited covert operation in support of the Abkhaz secessionists, played a role in a coup in Azerbaijan that brought down President Abulfaz Elchibey, manipulated Armenia and Azerbaijan to keep them at loggerheads over Karabakh, assisted the North Ossetians in their conflict with the Ingush in order to ensure that North Ossetia would remain a key ally of Moscow in the region.<sup>27</sup>

At the same time, Russia has made some efforts to resolve some of the conflicts of the region. For example, Moscow brokered a peace agreement between Georgia and South Ossetia; it is sponsoring negotiations over Karabakh and she has insisted that the international community grant it a special status as the principal guarantor of peace and stability in the Caucasus. However, she is doing so in order to increase its influence in the region, as suggested by the fact that it has on many occasions obstructed the peacemaking efforts of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nation. As a result, the involvement of international organizations has become little more than window dressing. This is also critical time for the Caucasus and Central Asian states because a number of negative trends could converge to bring about a crisis.<sup>28</sup>

Russia has made clear that the Caucasus is one of its top strategic priorities. It has appealed to fellow signatories of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) to lift the treaty's limitations on Russian tanks and heavy weapons in the region. Russia has intended to maintain a large military presence in the region. The Caucasus has also become the new "Black Silk Road" where the transportation routed for oil and gas from the Caspian

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<sup>26</sup> Maxim Shashenkov, "Russian Peacekeeping in the Near Abroad", *Survival*, vol: 36, no:3, Autumn 1994, p.51-55.

<sup>27</sup> Abulfaz Elchibey who rejected to join CIS, acting against imperial policy of Russian near abroad and shaped his foreign policy to strenghten independence of Azerbaijan. Okan Yeşilot, *Ateş Çemberinde Azerbaycan*, (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2010), s.30-33,173-174.

<sup>28</sup> See the details; Fiona Hill, *The Caucasus and Central Asia: How the United States and Its Allies Can Stave off a Crisis* [http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2001/05asia\\_hill.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2001/05asia_hill.aspx)

Sea to Black Sea and marketed in Europe. The perception in the region was that whoever controls the Caucasus would control the pipelines. Before the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, only two independent states, the USSR and Iran, bordered the Caspian Sea, now, five states that are Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan, adjoin the sea, the repository of an estimated 200 billion barrels of oil and comparable reserves of natural gas.<sup>29</sup>

Over the past few years, major Western oil companies have concluded a series of multi billion dollar contracts with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia to explore and develop Caspian oil and gas deposits. But the implementation of these deals still depends to a large extent on the construction of a network of pipelines to export hydrocarbon riches to Western markets. At present, the only functioning pipelines ran across Russia, giving it leverage over its newly independent neighbours. And at least one such agreement was threatened by a dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over the ownership of specific deposits because the international legal status of the Caspian Sea and the precise delimitation between the national sectors of the states that border it are unresolved.<sup>30</sup>

Russia has repeatedly presented the Great Silk Road as less economical and longer than the Baikal-Amour link between East and West. Russia's leaders were particularly fearful of the possible negative impact on CIS integration if the Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus, instead of following Russia's plan, should seek to join the transcontinental system without Russian involvement, thereby retreating further from Russian influence. As all of the larger states in the neighbourhood, including Turkey and Iran, have large diasporas of Caucasian peoples. Irrespective of the real revenues likely to result from control of the pipelines, all contenders want a piece of the action. The possibility that other major powers will establish their own "sphere of influence" in the Caucasus is therefore of great concern to Moscow. In particular, Moscow was committed to resisting efforts of Turkey and Iran to increase their presence in the region. Moscow also wanted to prevent the unravelling of its own federation; maintained the security of strategic international borders with Iran and Turkey; ensured access to key former Soviet industrial and military facilities; and developed a market for

<sup>29</sup> Michael Croissant, "Transkafkasya'da Petrol ve Rus Emperyalizmi", *Avrasya Etüdüleri*, cilt:1, İlbahar, 1996, p.23.

<sup>30</sup> Stephen Blank, "Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey*, vol:14, no:3, 1995, p. 42.

Russian products.

The oil and gas reserves of the Caucasus and Central Asia are vital to Western geo-strategic and economic interests in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, too. They have the potential to secure prosperity and economic growth bolstered by low oil prices. In addition, these resources are key to ensuring revenues and the sovereignty of the Newly Independent States with them. The wealth brought by oil can fuel both economic and democratic development in the Caucasus and Central Asia, fostering the independence and freedom of countries which serve in turn as an obstacle to potential Russian imperial expansion. So, Russian military and political establishment was attempting to impose a sphere of influence on the CIS and to secure control of the region's oil. The vast expanses of the former Soviet Union harbour oil and gas riches which would be crucial in fuelling the global economy.<sup>31</sup> Control over the region's energy resources and export routes out of the Eurasian hinterland was quickly become one of the central issues in post-Cold War politics. Like the "Great Game" of the early, 20<sup>th</sup> century, in which the geopolitical interests of the British Empire and Russia had clashed over the Caucasus region and Central Asia, today's struggle between Russia and the West turned on who controls the oil reserves in Eurasia.<sup>32</sup>

The world faced a choice between the cooperative exploitation by the East and West of natural resources or a wasteful straggle that could cost a fortune in blood and treasure. Regional conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia threaten to deny Western access to the vital oil and gas reserves. The wars in Chechnya, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in Georgia were started or exacerbated by the Russian military.<sup>33</sup>

Moscow hoped that the only route for exporting the energy resources of

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<sup>31</sup> The huge oil reserves, estimated at over 25 billion barrels, under the Caspian Sea and in the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are similar to those in Kuwait and larger than those in Alaska's Northern Slope and the North Sea combined. See for more details; Alaeddin Yalçınkaya, *Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Petrol Boru Hatları*, (Istanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1998).

<sup>32</sup> Ariel Cohen, "Yeni Büyük Oyun Avrasya'da Boru Hattı Siyaseti", *Avrasya Etüdüleri*, cilt:1, İlkbahar 1996, s.2-15.

<sup>33</sup> The Russian strategy especially concentrated upon Georgia and Azerbaijan who had rejected the CIS membership, faced severe problems, such as Georgia slipped into civil war, Azerbaijan cede some portion of its own land to its neighbour, Armenia. See the article of Michael Croissant "Transkafkasya'da Petrol ve Rus Emperyalizmi" *Avrasya Etüdüleri*, cilt:1, 1996, ss.16-26.

Eurasia would pass through Russia.<sup>34</sup> The European Union and also United States of America were need to ensure free and fair access for all interested parties to the oil fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia. These resources are crucial to ensuring prosperity in the first half of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and beyond. Access to Eurasian energy reserves could reduce the West's dependence on Middle East oil and ensure lower oil and gas prices. Moreover, oil revenues can boost the independence and prosperity of such Newly Independent States as Azerbaijan and Georgia. With these new-found oil riches, non-Russian republics in the region would depend less on Russia, both economically and militarily. So the European Union supported the independences of the region's countries. Independent and self-sufficient former Soviet states, bolstered by their oil revenues, would deny Russia the option of establishing a de facto sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Two important pipeline routes in Central Asia were under consideration. The first would allow oil to flow from the Azerbaijani Caspian Sea shelf to the Black Sea coast. The second would transport oil from giant Tengiz oil field, developed by the U.S., based Chevron corporation in Kazakhstan, in a westerly direction towards Europe and the Mediterranean.

Western governments and oil companies participating in the Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani pipeline projects faced a choice: Would a neo-imperialist Russia, aided and abetted by Iran, dominated the development of Eurasian oil its exports, or would Russia be an equal and fair player in the region with Turkey, the three Caucasian states Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and possibly Iran? The U.S. should respect the right of Russian companies to bid for the exploration and transport of oil and gas in the region.<sup>35</sup> However, the EU has a paramount interest in assuring that the Caucasian and Central Asian states maintain their independence and remain open to the West. Otherwise, Moscow would capture almost monopolistic control over this vital energy resources, thus increasing Western dependence upon Russian-dominated oil reserves and export routes. In order to ensure free and fair access to the oil reserves in Central Asia, the EU should strive to preserve the indepen-

<sup>34</sup> Musa Gasimov, "Rusya'nın Azerbaycan Politikası" *Avrasya Dosyası*, cilt:7, sayı:4, Kış 2001-2002, s.269.

<sup>35</sup> Bill Gertz, "Russian Agents Teach Iranian Spies," *The Washington Times*, November 9, 1995, p.1. Also vice President Al Gore, at the urging of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, agreed to keep secret from Congress details of Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran beginning in late 1995. See for details; Bill Gertz, "Gore's Russian Deals" <http://www.williamtheimpeached.com/russiadeal.htm>



dence and economic viability of the Newly Independent States in Central Asia. The public diplomacy of EU tried to prevent the reconstitution of Russia's sphere of influence in the southern parts of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). To achieve that end, it should endeavour to ensure that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and other Newly Independent States received a fair portion of the oil revenues from the region.

Moreover, the EU tried to strengthen bilateral and multilateral political and economic cooperation with these states. So the EU was developed TRACE-CA<sup>36</sup> program that stand for Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia. It was agreed to develop a transport corridor on an West-East axis from Europe, across the Baltic Sea, through the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to Central Asia. The European Union offered this program as an additional route that would complement all traditional routes.

The project corresponded to the global European Union strategy towards these countries and was based on the following objectives: to support the political and economic independence of the republics by enhancing their capacity to access European and world markets through alternative transport routes; to encourage further regional co-operation among the republics; to increasingly use TACIS and TRACECA as a catalyst to attract the support of international financial institutions and private investors; and to link the TRACECA route with the Trans-European Networks. (TENs). Thus providing an important link to the EU and its accession candidate countries. Thus, TRACECA was a part of the broader technical assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States.<sup>37</sup> TRACECA has been dialogue driven from its inception in 1998 whereas TACIS used to be demand-driven.

The leaders of the participating Republics considered that the TRACE-CA route was of strategic importance to establish an alternative transport outlet to Europe which will complement the traditional and often heavily overloaded route via Moscow. The public diplomacy of European Union was trying to ensure that Russia was not a dominant, but rather an equal

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<sup>36</sup> TRACECA Program was launched at a conference in Brussels in May 1993 which brought together the trade and transport ministers from eight of the TRACECA countries including five Central Asian republics and three Trans-Caucasian republics.

<sup>37</sup> Under TACIS finance was provided for the transfer of know-how to twelve countries of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia. It fostered the development of market economies and democratic societies. It was the largest program of its kind public operating in the region and had launched a lot of civil projects since its inception in 1991.

partner in developing the oil resources of the Eurasia. Russian oil and gas companies should be allowed to participate in the development of Eurasian energy resources on an equitable basis with other countries in the region and that was considered their right. Forming partnerships with Western oil-companies could turn the Russian business sector into an ally of the West. The technical assistance provided through TRACECA has helped to attract larger investments from the international financial institutions, that included the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development who have made a number of commitments for capital projects on ports, railways and roads along the TRACECA route and the World Bank who had made commitments for new capital projects on roads in Armenia and Georgia. In addition, European Union private investors were engaging in joint ventures with Caucasian and Central Asian transport companies. The EU was supporting the program with other projects to further enhance regional cooperation and economic sustainability in the region such as the Southern Ring Air routes project and Gas Pipeline projects (INOGATE).<sup>38</sup> The EU strongly supported the growing independence, sovereignty and prosperity of the New Independent States of the Eurasian region. There was also a kind of coordination and cooperation between the EU and United States of America. Much of their work was done on the basis of the New Transatlantic Agenda.<sup>39</sup>

A series of activities in public diplomacy of EU were foreseen in four broad areas: diplomatic cooperation, global issues, trade and people to people. It focused on actions vital to transatlantic and global peace, prosperity, security and stability. The EU along with US and Russian Federation were both partners and competitors in the region. The EU and US also agreed on the principle of multiple routes and on furthering regional cooperation. While they did not always agree with their respective policies to Iran, there was growing convergence between their positions and there was US opposition to the transit of Caspian energy through Iran. U.S. supported a pipeline route through the territory of Georgia and Turkey that brought oil from Eurasia to a Mediterranean port such as Ceyhan in Turkey.

<sup>38</sup> INOGATE means Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe.

<sup>39</sup> The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) was signed in December 1995 by president Clinton, Felipe Gonzales and Jacques Santer, president of the European Commission. The NTA was an important instrument of partnership between the EU and USA which covered a very broad range of activity both regionally and globally. See for more information Delegation of the European Commission to the United States's of America website: <http://www.eurunion.org/eu/>

## Russian Imperialism in Eurasian Project

According to the famous theory of McKinder, Central Asia is the historical and geographical center of the world. It is a giant power closed to the attacks coming from the sea and having rich natural resources. With these characteristics it is the focus of political and trading actors of the world. Central Asia has viewed as a chess table where global power struggle is shown. The Russian military and political establishment is attempting to impose a sphere of influence on the CIS and secure control of the region's oil. The main threat to the equitable development of Eurasian oil for the West has been the Russian attempt to dominate the region in a de facto alliance with the radical Islamic regime in Tehran. *"The control of the Caucasus and Central Asia would allow Russia's geographical proximity to, and closer cooperation with, the anti-Western regimes in Tehran and Baghdad."*<sup>40</sup> It was argued that an anti-Western Russia, Iran and Iraq, if they desired, could pursue a common interest in driving up the price of oil.<sup>41</sup>

Russia benefits from instability in the Caucasus, where wars and conflicts undermine independence and economic development while hindering the export of oil from the region's states. Moscow has gone beyond words to establish its power in the Caucasus. The Russians has been setting up military bases in the region in order to gain exclusive control over all future pipelines. Georgia had four Russian bases and Armenia had three, while Azerbaijan was holding out under severe pressure from Moscow. In addition, members of the CIS were required to police their borders jointly with Russian border guards, and thus were denied effective control over their own territory.<sup>42</sup>

There has been an attempts to reintegrate the South. The struggle to re-establish a Russian sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia started in early 1992. While not a full-scale war, this struggle employs a broad spectrum of military, covert, diplomatic and economic measures. The southern tier of the former Soviet Union was a zone of feverish Russian public diplomatic activity aimed at tightening Moscow's grip in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. "The entire southern rim of Russia was a turbulent

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<sup>40</sup> Karen Dawisha, "Russian Foreign Policy in the Near Abroad and Beyond", Current History, vol: 95, no:603, October 1996, p.332.

<sup>41</sup> Russian was supplying nuclear reactors to Tehran, and its intelligence services are training Iranian secret agents. See Bill Gertz, "Russian Agents Teach Iranian Spies", The Washington Times, 9 November 1995, p.1.

<sup>42</sup> Ariel Cohen, p.3-4.

frontier, a highly unstable environment in which metropolitan civilian and military elites, local players, and mid-level officers and bureaucrats drive the process of reintegration.<sup>43</sup>

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin called for a re-examination of Russia's borders to the detriment of her neighbours, especially Ukraine and Kazakhstan. For example, upon his return from a state visit to the U.S. in September 1994, Yeltsin reiterated Russia's right to conduct peacemaking in the "near abroad" to protect Russian speakers and to exercise freedom of action in its sphere of influence.<sup>44</sup> The aim of such an arrangement would be to ensure Russia's control of the oil and gas reserves in Eurasia. Competing political interests inside Russia's neighbours often prompt local elites to challenge the faction in power and to seek Moscow's support. For example, Russian oil chieftains in Kazakhstan and military commanders who were still in place in Moldova and Georgia naturally maintain close links with Moscow. Where it lacked troops on the ground, Moscow supported the most pro-Russian, faction in the conflict, such as Trans-Dniestrian ethnic Russians in Moldova, the separatist Abkhazs in Georgia, warlords and former communist leaders in Azerbaijan, and pro-communist clans in Tajikistan. This was a classic scenario for imperial expansion. What was common to these conflicts was that without Russian support, the pro-Moscow factions, regardless of their ethnicity, could not have dominated their respective regions, and would be forced to seek negotiated and peaceful solutions. In each case, appealed by the legitimate governments of the Newly Independent States to restore their territorial integrity were ignored by Moscow. Russian political elites have not overcome the imperialist ideology that inspired both pre-1917 and Soviet expansionism.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Russian Federation Presidential Edict, On Approval of the Strategic Policy of the Russian Federation Towards CIS Member States, (FBIS-SOV-95-188, no.940), 28 September 1995, p.19.

<sup>44</sup> These statements were echoed on numerous occasions by former Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and other key policy makers in Moscow. In his September 1995 Decree "On Approval of the Strategic-. Policy of the Russian Federation Toward CIS Member States," Yeltsin outlined to create a CIS military and economic union. Some observers have termed this design an informal empire "on the cheap", a "sustainable empire" which is less centralized than the old Soviet Union. See; Ian Breenmer and Antony Ricters, "The Perils of Sustainable Empire", *Transition*, March 15, 1994, p.14 .

<sup>45</sup> *ibid*, p.15. See also; " Kafkas Cephesi'nde Yeni Bir Şey Yok!", *Diplomatik Gözlem*, [http://www.diplomatikgozlem.com/haber\\_oku.asp?id=3857](http://www.diplomatikgozlem.com/haber_oku.asp?id=3857)

For today's Moscow bureaucrats and generals, as for their predecessors in St. Petersburg prior to 1917, "*the turbulent southern periphery is a potential source of political fortunes, promotions and careers. For Russian politicians in search of a grand cause, re-establishing the empire and paying for it with Eurasian oil revenues is a winning proposition, especially in the murky environment in the aftermath of imperial collapse.*"<sup>46</sup>

The Russian army and security services sought to deny foreign companies the right to export oil without their control. Russian military activities over the post cold war period indicated an attempt to consolidate strategic control of oil sources and export routes in Eurasia. For example, the war in Chechnya blocked an important pipeline from Azerbaijan through Grozny, and the victory of the Abkhaz separatists, supported by the Russian military, further secured the Russian oil terminals in the ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse. In order to obtain an oil route in the region, Western exporters might be pressured to reach accommodations with the Russian generals.

The states of the CIS's southern tier were coerced by Russia even before they declared their independence from the USSR. "Moscow incited local pro-Russian factions, such as Abkhazians in Georgia, Armenians in Karabakh, and hard-line communist pro-Russian-clans in Tajikistan, to challenge the independence and territorial integrity of these-nascent states."<sup>47</sup> The Russian military provided advisers, hardware, training, planning and coordination for the military activities in these areas. As a result, lots of people have been left dead, wounded, or homeless. In addition, these violent conflicts blocked the transit routes to the West for Caspian and Central Asian oil.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> The Russian military and security services are by far the most resolute driving force behind the restoration of a Russian-dominated CIS. They are playing a key role in ensuring Moscow's control over the pipeline routes. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall terminated, at least temporarily, confrontation with the West, leaving the Red Army's General Staff, the Russian military intelligence (GRU), and the former KGB desperately seeking new missions. The biggest of these new missions is to establish control over Caucasus and Central Asian oil, establishing a Russian sphere of influence in the process. See also; Armağan Kuloğlu, "Rusya Federasyonunun Yeni Kafkasya Politikası" Stratejik Analiz, cilt:1, sayı:3, Mayıs 2000.

<sup>47</sup> Ariel Cohen, *Russian Imperialism: Development and Decline*, ( New York: Praeger Publications, 1996 ), p.10.

<sup>48</sup> For the current developments in the region see the details; Berk Aslanhan, "Rusya'nın Yeni Kuzey Kafkasya Projesi", *Politika ve Kültür Araştırmaları Grubu*, <http://www.politikkultur.org/?&Bid=336618>

Former Soviet geography was influenced by the color revolutions of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in the Russian pro-regime, by demolishing the pro-Western and/or the West and balanced policies that would execute the leaders to power introduction in particular Russia. While its regional allies alarmed and the United States in the region improved the efficiency of a scale effect, Russia's influence by creating a narrow space, causing the expansion of the foresight. CIS in the geography of a hand-colored revolutions while the other hand, the U.S. supported Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Then the efficiency of GUAM also lost instead of the Baltic from the Black Sea and Caspian Sea would extend a geography to cover a new alliance of the establishment have been noted. Union with the name of democratic countries in the shaping of this new alliance with the emergence of the CIS that have emerged virtually lost its function.

After September 11, the U.S. came in to the region and started to establish military bases as well as Moldova and Georgia. The country's Russian military bases at once be removed in the direction of efforts in the region to continue the competition in military area or continue an indicator has been. On the other hand, Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia were became as increasing the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO's Eastward expansion to continue, the interest of the EU's in the the former Soviet region in different formulations under the continuation.<sup>49</sup> The color revolutions of the regions were also worked accident in spite of the geographical area in Russia and the region was gradually activated a button to take the power that leads China's new measures. Shanghai Cooperation Organization to this end has increased activity in the region. The sinking of the CIS in Russia's Kremlin to take the new policy directs. "This new policy of first reflections of each view and its effects were opened to the CIS instead to Moscow more loyal to the country would create a new union to be understood. Russia against the U.S. with moving some of the countries of CIS that the opportunity to benefit from the Russian by now was not desirable. The next process in the CIS of the elimination of customs facilities and visa-free passage facilities of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, as Russia against the U.S. with moving some of the countries deprived of these countries economically difficult situation into might. New geography of competition in the former Soviet Union in the process would escalate even further understood. Instead of

<sup>49</sup> Firat Purtaş, Rusya Federasyonu Ekseninde Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu, (Ankara: Platin Yayınları,2005), s.183.

eliminating the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Single Economic Space and the new shining star of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization might be.”<sup>50</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The European Union along with the US need to convince the Russians to approach the oil question in Eurasia rather as an economic, not geopolitical, opportunity. The West reassure Russia that its companies will be included in future economic ventures in the region. Russian companies alone do not have the technological and financial resources to develop the hydrocarbon reserves of Eurasia. They will need Western oil companies to do that. To become richer, Russia also needs Western help. On the other hand, to foster peace and stability in Eurasia, Europe needs Russian help. A modus vivendi can be reached only if Russia accepts that the principles of free markets, democracy and state sovereignty take precedence over the outdated geopolitical practices of the past century. Russia’s top foreign policy priority was to make the reintegration of the Soviet successor states. Integrationists in Moscow fell into two camps: those who wanted to see full political and military reintegration; and those who wanted to see economic integration only. However, there was a consensus that some form of reintegration was necessary and inevitable. The continuing conflict in Caucasus might no longer be in Russia’s best interests. Major investors would not get involved in the development of the oil in the region if pipelines cross zones of chronic instability. Moreover, there was a growing concern over terrorism. In order to secure funding and to reduce the threat of terrorism, Russia might decide to encourage the resolution, or at least the management of the Caucasus’s myriad disputes. But this was not an easy task as their deep political and economic roots. The fact that Russia has either ignored or deliberately exacerbated them. Russia should continue to cooperate with the West in areas where Russia remained dependent on Western assistance. In other areas, however, Russia might seek a special role for itself and also confront the West. More frictions between Russia and EU has emerged concerning the Russian policy within the CIS. But, the CIS was likely to fall apart, the new GUUAM alliance seems to have more potential for growth than the CIS today.

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<sup>50</sup> Sinan Ogan, “Sovyetler Birliđi’nin Mirası Dađılıyor...”, Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Stratejik Arařtırmalar Merkezi TURKSAM, <http://www.turksam.org.tr/a697.html>

Russia played the CIS game very carefully and in a balanced and often contradictory way, but with a decided aim which was the CIS integration process was directed by Russia and she was de facto the core of the CIS. The geographic situation, Russia encompasses two thirds of the CIS territory and half of the population of the former Soviet Union, was pointing at Russia as a gravitational center within the CIS. Russia still remains a world power due to economic and military power with nuclear arms. The structure of CIS economy and the historical tradition would drive the states that just acquired their sovereignty to new cooperation in a Eurasian space. They would encourage each other to evolve towards a common market. They should coordinate their economic policy and foreign trade. All this make under the enormous weight of the Big Slavic Brother. It was precisely the new principles of cooperation that would strengthen the position of Russia. Russia will no longer the sponsor the brother republics because of ideological reasons. The valorization of world prices will also strengthen the dominant position of Russia.

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