

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY FORCES DURING THE OG OG 2004 (ATHENS). CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF THE HELLENIC COAST GUARD

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Abstract: The aim of this concise paper is to present and to examine critically the security policy planning of the Olympic Games 2004 (OG 2004) which took place in Hellas. More specifically will be examined the strategic management of security forces which were involved in them, the crisis management system which was developed in order to combat any event, incident during the Olympic Games and further to ensure the secure conduct of them. Furthermore will be analyzed the role and the contribution of one of the basic Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) in Hellas, the role of the Hellenic Coast Guard in this security policy.

It is noted that Hellas was the smallest country that has ever organized modern Olympic Games. Because of its size, the international interest and the participation of many people of the entire world activated the whole state machine and the total of forces in order to be ensured the secure conduct of them.

Key words: Olympic Games, Hellas, strategic management, crisis management system, security forces, Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG)

Introduction

The Olympic Games is a world event, attracting world attention. One of the most important parameters taken into consideration during the organisation of the Olympic Games is Security. This parameter was also of particular consideration to the Hellenic state, as soon as Athens was designated as the Olympic Games host city of the 28th Olympiad.

On September 05, 1997, the Olympic Games Host City Agreement² was signed between the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Hellenic Olympic Committee, and the City of Athens. In this Agreement, among other issues, was provision for the obligation of the Hellenic state to take all the necessary and indicated measures in order to ensure the safe conduct of the Olympic Games.

Following a decision issued by the head of the Ministry of Public Order, and an order by the Chief of the Hellenic Police (HP), a Task group was formed in April, 2000. Its goals were to define the basic parameters of the Security of the Olympic Games. In other words, to answer the question: «what is meant by Olympic Games Security, and how is this going to be implemented? »

The result of this group was the “Security Policy”, which was adopted by the Hellenic state and the IOC and which described the aims of the security program, its general principles, and the strategies for its implementation (Manual ‘‘Olympic Security’’, 2003:83-84).

Special emphasis had been given on the role of the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG), due to its inherent nature and mission and because of the Hellenic geopolitical reality. It must be noted that HCG exercised command in specific Olympic Venues.

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² There is no access to the original document of agreement. So it is faced as a secondary source.

Specifically concerning maritime area, the most important role for the preservation of the Hellenic but at the same time the European maritime borders in the eastern Mediterranean had been assigned to HCG, which institutionally is responsible to enforce the law at the ports and in territorial waters throughout the Hellenic maritime area (Korontzis “a”, 2011). The mission was challenging, as Hellenic geopolitical reality is characterized by the following:

A.-Extensive Hellenic coastline (around 18.400 kilometres contour and 1.150.000 square kilometres total surface area), while the total length of the external limits of the Hellenic spatial sea is 8.670 kilometres.

B.-Many islands and island rocks, over 9,000, create an area accessible from several directions especially in the sea area.

C.-Dense maritime traffic in the Aegean Sea and in general in the Hellenic maritime area, as sailing vessels connecting areas of the western and Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa and Europe, Black Sea with the Mediterranean. The main policing duties include smuggling, illegal immigration, terrorism, organised crime, search and rescue, monitoring the vessels trafficking etc.

The central idea of this paper is that the administration model in order to support the strategic aim of secure Olympic Games needed more flexible organization and structure with further purpose to respond immediately to any challenges and threats, with real proper respect to the know-how and specialization of bodies and services which were taken part as security forces in the OG 2004.

For the OG 2004, had been created many administration levels, had been developed many institutions which were involved in the various levels of administration, while there was a lack of communication and immediacy between these levels. In addition to the above should be taken into consideration the exaggerated actors' large numbers which were involved in security, something which made difficult the coordination. Finally, the assignment of the OG security to HP created the additional problem that this institution would be possible to have institutional opinion for actions and functions of other bodies and services which were outside of its normal institutional framework, with possible danger the lack of analogue specialization to lead in wrong decisions and choices.

1.-Olympic Security Policy

In order to be achieved the security program goals, the following general principles and strategic directions were accepted:

a. - Olympic Games Security was part of the Hellenic State security, and was not independent of the general policy and security strategy that was planned and implemented by the competent Hellenic authorities.

According to the provision of article 5 of Law 2833/2000 (A' 150), the HP general competence for the OG security, the coordination of the other engagement competent authorities, as well as cooperation with them, in no way would affect the specifications in law of the competent authorities and their right to take decisions according to their legal framework (Document with No 1016/114/108 issued on October 17, 2003 by the Ministry of Public Order/Division of Organization and Legislation/ 2nd Department).

Consequently, the Olympic security was part of the wide security which was institutionally enforced by the competent authorities/institutions according to their competences within the scope of the government policy.

The major issue revealed in this case was how was going to be assigned the Olympic security to an institution such as the HP, while HP would have an institutional point of view for actions and responsibilities for other competent authorities as HCG which were going to act at a parallel security level. Different opinions and points of view and their imposition later in accordance with the notion of coordination for matters outside of HP competence in conjunction with the lack of know-how and skills on these, would not create the possibility of wrong opinions - decisions enforcement? For example, what view could HP have in the draft of sea borders surveillance, in policing the maritime area, in the draft of the Olympic maritime transportation, in the draft for search and rescue items etc.

The wording of the document with No 1016/114/108 issued on October 17, 2003 issued by the Ministry of Public Order / Division of Organization and Legislation/ 2nd Department was moving to the right direction on the basis of the existing legal framework. According to the specific legislation established for OG 2004 security, was likely to happen a wrong because the competence and in the same time the opinion of other competent authorities was not acceptable.

The leader of HP was going to approve according to article 6 of Presidential Decree (PD) 2/2003 (A' 2) the plans of the Olympic Games Security Division (OGSD) (Korontzis, 2010: 29-34) after the opinion of the Head of the HCG, the Head of the Hellenic Fire Service (HFS), the representative of Armed Forces (AF) and the First Deputy Commander of National Intelligence Service (NIS).

A serious point was with what knowledge the leader of HP would approve plans of other competent authorities which were specialized in institutional activities. If, for example the head of HP had a different option at the plan concerning marine transportation protection which was drawn up by the HCG, according to what know-how would he / she argued against the Head of a specialized institution?

b.- The responsibility of the OG security assigned to the HP, which was going to coordinate all the involved agencies and competent authorities.

As coordination (Korontzis, "b" 2011:63) was meant indirect administration form and was consisting one of the management key dimensions. The number of institutions/competent authorities which were involved in OG Security was a lot (Korontzis, 2010: 67-69), something which became difficult the coordination enforcement by the HP.

But also within the OGSD the coordination was difficult, although the target was common, the secure performance of OG 2004. In OGSD were seconded personnel from different competent authorities and services. It is obvious that the staff of those competent authorities from different services, different jurisdiction and action systems, and different cultures were difficult to attain constructive cooperation and functionality among them. Different was the role of AF as also the role of NIS. Other officials were public officials and other military officers. But it was a nice try and excellent experience because all the shareholders should work together for a common purpose.

Additionally the structure of OGSD did not offer flexibility and creativity in the action to the executives who were coming outside of HP services, including the fact that the administration was enforced by HP within its headquarters. Also all the executives were enrolled into to OGSD divisions and departments. The ministerial decisions which were predicted by article 5

of Law 2833/2000 in accordance with article 14 of PD 63/2001(A' 54) as far as it concerns the HCG did not carried out.

It could be foreseen that the Olympic security extension and implementation of HP functions to the entire country without having the know-how, experience and specialization to manage facts out of its competence obviously contained risks in the preparation, adoption and implementation of plans.

At the same time new institutions beyond the existing at the political level were established, but their authorities were overlapping, making planning difficult, difficult the coordination, difficult the decision-making as also difficult the forwarding of directives and guidelines to the existing levels.

c.- The OG constituted primarily a sporting event, and not a security exercise.

There is no doubt that OG was and still is a major sporting event. The terrorist attacks which occurred during the OG (Munich 1972, Atlanta 1996), the social demonstration against the commitment of 1968 OG in Mexico have led to an incensement of security measures, in order to be safeguarded the OG performance and at the same time to protect the athletes and the spectators.

In particular, following 09/11 the western countries had become targets of Islamism fundamentalist groups a situation which led States to take additional measures. This last issue meant high expenditure with the use of means and resources to large degrees, carrying out specific trainings and exercises and the maintenance of preparedness at high levels.

Hellas high strategy for OG 2004 led to be used all the available means with a view to be maximizing security and to be minimizing the weaknesses in the field of security. This was the one dimension of the high strategy. The other main dimension was the diagnosis of the international environment (risks opportunities) the study and assess of terrorism and asymmetrical threats, during the last years and the upgrading of international cooperation. In this way was created a positive image abroad and legitimacy in the internal running, while the safe performance of the OG 2004 was the main objective of the Hellenic legal order.

d.- The security of the Games was based on the cooperation between Hellenic and International security agencies however – in any case – decisions had to be taken only by the appropriate Hellenic Authorities.

Hellas assessed and institutionalized cooperation in international organizations, States, intelligence services and other law enforcement agencies. In this way, a canopy had been created effectively which would restrict the opportunities of international terrorism and organized criminal groups to pass through Hellas.

This context has intensified cooperation with Interpol, Europol and police forces in foreign countries. Also was used information technology which helped the collection and processing of information. In addition to the cooperation with the United Nation, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) etc request for assistance was submitted to NATO. Finally cooperation in many areas existed with Olympic Advisory Team (OAT).

Hellas was intended to activate an International Supplementary mechanism providing security. In any case the decisions on all matters were taken by the Hellenic authorities as security belongs to state sovereignty hard core.

e.- Human resources that would be used in security duties and measures, would come from the agencies involved in OG security (HP, HCG, HFS, AF, NIS), and each competent authority specifically trained its personnel for that purpose under specific seminars and training courses which had been drafted by the OGSD. In the case of the participation of private agencies or volunteers, their command, training and control would be the responsibility of the main security agency to which they were assigned (Mbrekis, 2008:139-168). For this purpose was issued the Ministerial Decision (MD) number 1016/114/105-ε (B' 1247).

2.-Olympic Security Command Structure. Main Olympic Security Agencies – roles and jurisdiction

2.1- Decision making – legal framework

Concerning Head of HP approved according to article 6 of PD 2/2003 the plans of OGSD after receiving the opinion of the Head of the HCG, the Head of the HFS, the representative of AF and the First Deputy Commander of NIS.

A serious point was with what knowledge the leader of HP would have approved plans of other competent authorities which were specialized in institutional activities. If, for example the Head of HP had a different opinion on a draft concerning the surveillance of sea borders which was drawn up by the HCG, according to what know-how would argue against the Head of a specialized institution?

In Law 2690/1999 (A' 45) and particular in article 20 is defined what happens in the case in which a previous opinion (simple or positive) is necessary in order a regulatory action to be published. The specific article in any case did not ensure that if the head of HP did not agree with a proposed draft issued by a competent authority would be obliged to publish it. That because the PD 2/2003 mentioned after the previous opinion without specified the character of this.

The nature secure legal way for the OG security would be the competent authority to draw up the plans and the final signature/approval of the plan should be responsibility of the natural or political leadership something which did not happen in OG 2004.

For example, is mentioned that in exercises under the name ''ASPIS IRAKLEOUS 2004'', had been requested that the entities contingency plans for various operations (as far as concerns the HCG many of the plans had been signed by its Head) should be submitted to Olympic Security Center (OSC) in order after the approval of its commander, the plans should be submitted for final approval by the Head of HP. Automatically revealed the question what know-how had the commander of OSC in order to approve plans of other competent authorities and would the approval by the Head of HP be required while they had been signed by a leader of another competent authority?

According to article 14 of PD 63/2001 titled «Relations between OGSD with other engagement services and operators» the involvement of all the competent authorities in the planning and the measures taking before and during the OG 2004 is taking place with as predicted in paragraph 2 of article 5 of Law 2833/2000, based on their local competences and for a given circle of items and accordingly to the analysis and risks assessments which threatened the OG 2004. The level of involvement of each service and institution was determined by the OGSD Director after approval issued by the political and service overview body.

The interpretation of the word coordination by the HP was another serious point. This was stipulated in accordance with the concept which had been developed in the draft of administration, coordination, control, communications and integration of Olympic Security (C4I), and was determined as the power which was assigned to a security commander to harmonize the functions or activities of two or more services of the same or another competency authority.

In that case, the commander was authorized to coordinate and consult the involved commander of different competent authorities at the proper administration corresponding level, or to their representatives and had the right to impose his/her view, when there was no consensus among them or to submit, during his/her opinion the matter to a higher administration level. Therefore, coordination was an indirect form of administration. For example OSC, when was dealing in order to face different incidents, exercised full operational management of existing police security administration, in Olympic installations and in the urban area, in Attica prefecture and if there was a reason to do so, in the administration of Olympics cities security (Thessaloniki, Volos, Patra, Iraklion). Also could coordinate the responsible authorities which were involved in the incident according to the concept of the term «coordination».

During the operational command enforcement of the facts and the coordination of services action, OSC confirmed that its role was fulfilled and the functions of each institution dealing with other service or body was in accordance with the planning of Olympic security and its institutional authority was acting appropriately according to the existing Olympic security administration at urban areas or at the Olympic cities and via their representatives officers toward the responsible bodies to remove any derogation.

From the combination of OSC Commander tasks with the tasks of the Specialized Commander Incident (Korontzis, 2011, 63, 69) arises clearly that HP had opinion in the administration of other competent authorities' forces which were allocated to the OG 2004. This policy included risk and danger, as well as the officials of HP provided guidelines and instructions for actions to other operators' forces without having the appropriate know-how and experience.

On the other hand the competences of each competent authority which took part in the security of the OG 2004 were described clearly on existing provisions. The provision in article 5 of Law 2833/2000 concerning the general competence of HP for the OG security, the coordination of the other engagement authorities, as well as the cooperation with them, did not affect in any way their competences predicted in the law and their right to take decisions according to their legal framework and to cooperate for issues which were regulated by issuing of Joint Ministerial Decision (JMD) (Document with No 1016/114/108 issued on June 17,-2003 issued by the Ministry Of Public Order/Division of Organization and Legislation/2nd Department 2). It was obvious that the system HP was trying to establish was in confusion.

A crucial role in the design of the Olympic security as well as in the implementation of plans during the OG 2004 and Paralympics Games had OGSD, with the responsibility to coordinate actions of different competent authorities and services with different institutional frameworks, culture, establishment and responsibilities. This inevitably imposed the coexistence of all in order to draw up all the necessary projects and actions with further purpose to achieve an objective which was the security performance of OG 2004.

Under HP united administration with the implementation of a new model of inter-sectoral cooperation with separate roles and responsibilities at all levels, according to a declaration of the HP Head in a speech on the October 16, 2003 at the Union of Foreign Correspondents Press, could be observed by those who had the right know – how during the OG 2004 shortcomings, impairment and overlaps of which a typical example was the incident on September 11, 2004. On that day the Helicopter make SINOUK fell in the area of ATHO (region in North Hellas). As a result of the fall, Patriarch Alexandros and another 17 members of the accompanying escort were killed. In the middle of the performance of the Olympic security with the highest possible readiness in all areas, the area of helicopter fall was located with a delay of three hours because the services and the competent authorities could not coordinate and cooperate among them.

2.2-Command, Control, Communication and Integration Systems (C4I Systems)

The Olympic industry, reflecting international and interconnected political-economic governmental, corporating interests, exploited real and perceived terrorist threats to prescribe extremely high security requirements. The Athens 2004 Olympics were used as a testing ground for the latest antiterrorist super panoptic technology, which crucially failed to work. The central surveillance integration security system (C4I), planned by Science Applications International Corporation, could not be implemented in time for the games. Hence the security of the Athens Olympics was dependent on conventional means (Samatas, 2007: 220-238).

Samatas explains how the system C4I failed to work. Specifically OG 2004 was the first international event after the terrorist attack of 09/11. After the Gulf War Gulf the Islamic fundamentalism was increased (Korontzis, 2010: 6-10). The main targets were the states of the west and their citizens. Consequently in the OG 2004 citizens and athletes from various targets – states were grouped together and that created the need for a system which could help to avoid any terrorist threats.

Especially the project for C4I systems had the objective to cover the operational necessities of Olympic security predicted in every administration level. The Operational Centre would have specific technical and operational opportunities, equipment and abilities, in order to facilitate and take the appropriate decisions concerning the administration, coordination and the control of forces, equipment and the management of incidents (Staurakakis, 2009: 39).

In order all the above to become a reality, the project had determined three autonomous but interdependent setting up component – systems:

- a.-the system of administration support and making decision (CDSS),
- b.-the information and security system (CIS) and
- c. - the system of command centre – operational centre (CCS) [Document with No 2004-1/17/1-ρλστ issued on August 7 2002 issued by OGSD/Command and Control Center].

The above system was not delivered and was not operational during OG 2004 (Argirakis, 2005). It was acquired by Hellas on March 29, 2007 (Mbrekis, 2008:145) and presented numerous operational problems. Consequently as it can be seen diagrammatically in table 1 the coordination, ramification and the urgency in the administration and the decision system, in the system of communications and information technology and in the system of command centers – operational centers between services and operators did not work.

The 2004 Athens OG was the testing ground for the existing technology to prove that leading technological means are available to secure major international events. Unfortunately, technology so far cannot be used effectively in all cases without violating the legal framework, which was created to make the people feel that their personal data is protected. We have the example of the Greek Cell Phone Caper, which became a major case in the July 2007 issue of the spectrum magazine of The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineering (IEEE). This has been coded as ‘the Athens affair’ and shows how extremely hackers smart with apparent inside information pulled off the most audacious cell-network infiltration ever. It was found that the cell phone of the Prime Minister of Greece was bugged, along with 100 other high-ranking officials and dignitaries of the government, including an employee of the US Embassy (Stavroulakis, P. and Stavroulakis, S., 2008: 68–82).

A basic security presumption is security communications. As mentioned earlier the system C4I which was going to support the OG security did not work. At the same time it does not reveal from somewhere that the agencies, bodies and competent authorities involved in OG security had made upgrading of means in order to secure the communications because obviously based on C4I system.

Police Colonel G. Galiatsos had stated that «we will never perhaps learn, if it was the planning which prevented us from a potential planned attack. But the result justifies our efforts. Nothing was coincidence, because nothing was left to chance. Eventually only those who dislike us believe in our luck, because only in this way can our success be explained, which is given and universally recognized» (Galiatsos, 2005: 69).

It is known that any performance can be divided in two levels: one level is the communication policy according to appropriate policies should convince citizens that all are progressing satisfactorily and secure. The second level is the operational which includes all the necessary planning actions in order to prevent or to curb any unlawful energy. The fact that during the OG 2004 a terrorist attack did not take place does not necessarily mean that the planning was so good that operated dissuasively. Furthermore it should be noted that the most recent crisis which had been confronted by Hellas was the crisis of IMIA on January 1996. That incident had proved that crises system management was at least insufficient with non-separate roles between civil and military leadership and with full discrepancy in strategic and operational level to deal with the crisis.

The cooperation between AF and other responsible security agencies concerning Olympic and Paralympics Games organization was excellent. This cooperation helped, beyond the positive effects, to be identified any weaknesses in the general organization and functioning of State services for handling of other similar situations in the future. In other words the knowledge and experience which was acquired is now a driver for handling any similar crisis in the future (Mbrekis, 2008:19-20).

The cooperation between AF and OGSD might be described as excellent. This because AF institutional role was clear and specific, aiming in any case on State protection from external threat as also aimed to the borders inviolability. The Ministry of National Defense/AF as mentioned before had managed unsuccessfully in a political and in a military level IMIA crisis. This case gave a unique opportunity for cooperation with security services and bodies in order to plan new projects and test the old ones. At the same time were developed new partnerships with international organizations such as NATO in order to be offered assistance in case Hellas asked so (Mbrekis, 2008:169-188). Institutionally it was one of the few cases in

which a MD was published [No 1016/114/136-α' (B 486)] according to were determined the tasks of AF staff who were available for security meters and order during the OG.

3.-Administrative Security Model

It is known that the management concept is consisted by the following functions: programming, organization, staffing, leadership, coordination, reporting, financial and control.

The political level was represented by the Cabinet of Foreign and Defense Matters (CFDM) and the Olympic Security Coordinating Council (OSCC). Also at this level was incorporated the Olympic Preparation Coordination Committee, the Olympic Security Coordination, the Strategy Committee and the Civil Overview body. At the Strategic level were the Olympic Centre, the Service Overview Body and the Council of Crisis Management (Korontzis, "b" 2011:39-49).

It is obvious that these were different levels of administration and it was difficult to be coordinated. In addition as clearly reveals from table 1 the administration levels including different councils, committees, Strategic and Operational Centers given the fact that C4I systems did not work can be perceived the situation and the difficulty of the administrative model to work.

In the case of the OG planning a serious point carried out was that the planning was misdirected by the beginning, as the legislative framework which was drafted defined that a specific security agency (HP) would have a holistic option concerning staff and operational activities of other competent authorities. This institutional responsibility which was entrusted for that period was in contrary to the competences enforced by the competent authorities before the OG 2004.

HP had not the knowhow to guide properly the actions of other agencies and services and it was possible to be committed an error. High strategy would have provided incorrect instructions to the middle and to the lower echelons of security forces. These echelons which would have enforced all the public policies that were adopted in specific items would have faced increasing confusion, overlapping responsibilities, problems in administration and coordination. The most important was that security staff should operate in different institutional basis from the one that had been trained since the orders which were coming from the higher levels would be incorrect. For instance if a terrorist incident would take place in a port or at the sea (jurisdiction of HCG) and commander of the scene was officer of HCG, incident commander was the OSC (HP) and the approval of the operational plans issued by the Head of HCG, after approval of the Commander of OSC (HP officer without experience in HCG items and out of HP competence) was provided by the Head of HP, the last two officials how would decide - based on what expertise on plans of different LEA?

In the mean while how the Commander of OSC would coordinate operations not only because the C4I did not work but with what experience what would act in a territory unknown to him/her (out of HP competence) and with different means of action than these used by HP (for instance floating patrol boat, Special Forces of HCG acting in vessels e.g.). In any case must be mentioned the meaning given to the term coordination as has been analyzed above.


Table 1: Olympic Security Command Structure

A **LEGEND** for the main points follows:

HELLENIC TEXT	ENGLISH
A.T.	Police Station
ΑΡΧΗΓΟΣ ΓΕΕΘΑ	Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
ΑΡΧΗΓΟΣ Λ.Σ.	Head of the Hellenic Coast Guard
ΑΡΧΗΓΟΣ ΠΣ	Head of the Hellenic Fire Service
ΑΣΤΥΝ. Δ/ΣΕΙΣ	Police Divisions
ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΚΕΣ ΥΠΟΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΣΕΙΣ	Police Sub Divisions
ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΚΕΣ ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΕΣ (ΑΥ)	Police Services
Γ.Α.Δ.Θ. – Α.Δ. ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑΚΩΝ ΟΛΥΜΠΙΑΚΩΝ ΠΟΛΕΩΝ	Police Directorates of Olympic Cities
ΓΑΔΑ	General Police Directorate of Attica
ΓΕΝΙΚΗ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΕΙΑ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ (ΓΓΠΠ)	General Secretary of Civil Planning
ΔΑΟΑ	Olympic Games Security Division
ΔΙΑΚΛΑΔΙΚΑ ΚΕΝΤΡΑ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΕΩΝ	Joint Operations Centres
ΔΙΟΙΚΗΣΗ ΟΕΟΑ	Athens 2004 Olympic Games Organising Committee Command
ΕΘΚΕΠΙΧ	National Operations Centre
ΕΚΑΒ	National Ambulance Centre
ΕΚΣΕΔ	Joint Search and Rescue Center
ΕΛ.ΑΣ.	Hellenic Police
ΕΠΙΤ. ΔΙΟΙΚ. ΟΚΑ, ΣΥΝΔΕΣΜΟΙ ΦΟΡΕΩΝ, ΚΛΠ	Olympic Security Centre Commanders, Agencies Liaisons, etc.
ΕΥΠ / ΚΕΠΟΑ	National Intelligence Service / Olympic Games Operations Centre
Κ.Ε.	Operations Centre
Κ.Ε. ΛΟΙΠΩΝ ΦΟΡΕΩΝ	Other Agencies Operations Centres
ΚΕΝΤΡΙΚΟ ΛΙΜΕΝΑΡΧ. ΠΕΙΡΑΙΑ	Piraeus Central Port Police Authority/Coast Guard
ΚΕΝΤΡΑ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΕΩΝ (ΚΕ) ΛΟΙΠΩΝ ΦΟΡΕΩΝ	Command Centers of Different Services
ΚΕΝΤΡΟ ΔΙΟΙΚΗΣΗΣ ΑΓΩΝΩΝ	Olympic Games Command Centre

HELLENIC TEXT	ENGLISH
Λ.Σ.	Hellenic Coast Guard
ΛΙΜ. ΤΜΗΜΑΤΑ	Coast Guard Port Police Departments
ΛΙΜΕΝΙΚΕΣ ΑΡΧΕΣ	Coast Guard Port Police Authorities
ΟΕΟΑ	Athens 2004 Olympic Games Organising Committee
ΟΚΑ	Olympic Security Centre
ΟΚΑΕ	Olympic Venue Security Centre
ΟΚΑΕ ΕΛΛΑΣ	Hellenic Police Olympic Venue Security Centre
ΟΚΑΕ ΠΛΩΤΩΝ ΞΕΝΟΔΟΧ.	Floating Hotels Olympic Venue Security Centre
ΟΚΕΛΣ	Hellenic Coast Guard Olympic Operations Centre
ΟΚΕΠ	Olympic Intelligence Centre
ΟΚΕΠΣ	Hellenic Fire Service Olympic Operations Centre
ΟΠΚΑ ΕΛ.ΑΣ.	Hellenic Police Olympic Regional Security Centre
ΠΑ	Hellenic Air Force
ΠΝ	Hellenic Navy
ΠΥ	Hellenic Fire Service
ΣΥ.Σ.Ο.Α.	Olympic Security Coordinating Council
ΥΕΝ/ΑΓΚ	Ministry of Mercantile Marine/Officer of General Duties
ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΟ / ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟ ΕΠΙΠΕΔΟ	STRATEGIC / POLITICAL LEVEL
ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΙΑΚΟ ΕΠΙΠΕΔΟ	OPERATIONAL LEVEL
ΤΑΚΤΙΚΟ ΕΠΙΠΕΔΟ	TACTICAL LEVEL

Source: Olympic Games Security Division, 2004




4.- Crisis Management System

The system for the management of events and crisis was a system for managing the facts which were going to affect the OG security (July 1, - October 10, 2004). The system was based on the standard administration Olympic security system and the principle of unified administration (Konstantinidis, 2005:111-115) which meant the competent authorities coordination under the unified command of HP.

Command Structure

Table 2: Command Functions / Command Levels



Source: Olympic Games Security Division (Δ.A.O.A.), 2004

Level A'	→	Political Level
Level B'	→	Strategic Level
Level C'	→	Operation Level
Level D'	→	Tactical Level

According to the Olympic Security Command Model, the levels of Events ³ and Crisis Management and their responsibilities were structured as follows:

Political Level

The Political Level was represented by the Cabinet of Foreign and Defence Matters as mentioned before, and for handling of very serious security events and crises, Command at

³ As «event or incident of security», were considered any illegal action or situation that took place the period of conduct of O.G. 2004 and concerned, influenced or there was a possibility to influence immediately or indirectly, the infrastructures, the operations of games and the persons that participated in that event.

the Political Level was according to Cabinet Legislative Act No 3 issued on February 5, 2004 (A' 26) the Olympic Security Coordinating Council (OSCC) (Korontzis, 2010:51-52).

From the comparison of responsibilities between the CFDM and OSSC can be confirmed that specifically for the operational phase of OG Hellas established a council which was authorized to manage issues related to the Olympic security. On the other hand CFDM was going to manage issues which were related on foreign and defense policy issues or issues on public order only in case if they were related to the defense and foreign policy.

The existence of two Councils in political level did not help the immediacy of OG security structure and in particular could not help in the immediate solve of several different events and incidents, since the establishment of OSCC added another level of administration in the Olympic security. In comparison it must be noted that in the Hellenic legal order did not exist Council like OSCC for handling similar affairs and issues of public order and security if necessary were managed by the CFDM.

CFDM should be the only one Council to deal with matters of defense and foreign policy, avoiding the creation of another Council and the addition of another level in the administration structure. In that way if the levels of administration were lowered, should be avoided confusion and malfunction, since a body which did not have experience on handling high importance items such as the Olympic security was set up.

Finally, the province in order to organize the management system of events and incidents in serious criminal acts, threats or incidents that could be influenced the Olympic security, the intervention of special forces, the evacuation or the block of Olympic venues came as overlapping with the provinces which were carried out by the Council for crisis management which was established according to article 13 of PD 63/2001. This overlapping created confusion of provinces implementation, problem in hierarchical structure of the Olympic security, difficulties on contact of upper administration level with the lower, because it was not clear who was providing orders in case of crisis.

Notable is the fact that representative of Ministry of Mercantile Marine/HCG did not participate in CFDM but in OSSC.

Strategic Level

The Strategic Command – as an overall surveillance on the Olympic Security – was exercised – following the relevant legislation – by the Head of the HP, who also was the Head in the Olympic Strategic Security Centre.

For handling of very serious events and crises, within the whole theatre of Olympic Security Operations, Strategic Command was exercised by the Crisis Management Council (article 13 of PD 63/2001) in which Head was also the head of the HP.

In case the Crisis Management Council had to manage one or more very serious events or crises, was exercised command by the OSC, which had the necessary infrastructure and organisation (Crisis Management Room, Joint Intelligence Team etc.) that allowed the fullest possible support to functions and information.

Strategic Command was also responsible for the command of events management within the whole of the Hellenic domain.

At the strategic level were OSCC and the Crisis Management Council. At the first one the Commander as mentioned before was the Head of the HP who was responsible for Olympic Security in the entire Hellenic domain. The Crisis Management Council was assembled for specific incidents if something like that was decided by the Head of HP. So there was an overlapping of competences between Crisis Management Council with the institutional role of OSCC.

In addition as has already been analyzed the assigning of the OG security to the HP and in the mean time the creation of the strategic level which was represented by the head of HP which had the administration Authority of the Olympic security, created a problem, and more specific in case in which a decision should be taken in order to be faced incidents or events which did not fall in HP competences because in that level HP had competence throughout the Hellenic territory.

The convergence of Crisis Management Council (which is integrated at the strategic level but differs from the role of the HP Head), was carried out regularly or exceptionally and the responsible person for its function was the head of the HP if specifically extremely serious criminal acts, incidents or incidents which were likely to affect the Olympic security were taking place. Constitutionally if the convergence of the Council was called by another Member, it was not necessary that the Head of HP should agree.

For everything that was not included in extremely serious criminal actions the Head of HP could decide alone as he/she represented the strategy administration.

Operation Level

The Command of one or more serious or very serious incidents which could take place within Olympic Venues or in the urban area of Olympic Cities, as an overall Olympic Security approach, was exercised mainly by the OSC (Korontzis, 2010:56-58). During the management of incidents, OSC implemented complete operational administration on Olympic Forces, Venues and in urban region in Attica Prefecture and in aiding case, at the Olympic Cities.

Also as has been mentioned before implemented the meaning of co-ordination, according to the significance that was pointed out in the drawing of Administration, Co-ordination, Control, Communications and Integration Systems (C4 I).

At the same level was the Olympic Regional Security Center (ORSC) which constituted by regional administrations as well as the security administrations with level equivalent to HP division. To ORSC reported all the Olympic venues. ORSC and Olympic Venue Security Center (OVSC) reported to OSC A basic condition for the Administration functioning, coordination and control system of operations was C4I systems which did not received and did not work.

ORSC constituted an «intermediary» level between OVSC and OSC which did not offer anything as was “blocked” the immediacy between OSC and OVSC. The direct communication of OVSC with the component operational center was necessary for the smooth functioning of the security system without the interposition of other administration levels, by the time that the pylon of this system, C4I systems did not work. The OG as far the security and the communications based on the means and the methods which the responsible authorities had before the performance of OG 2004.

Tactical Level

The management and command of an incident on a tactical Level, was split as follows:

1. Incidents which took place within an Olympic Venue.
2. Incidents which took place within the urban and sub-urban area.

5.- Hellenic Coast Guard Command Model

The approach of the HCG Forces Command Model was aimed on assuring that during the period of the Olympic and Paralympics Games the HCG could combat all the events and crises effectively (in the areas of HCG competence) and to achieve the high level of cooperation with all the other services and Agencies involved (Documents of Ministry Mercantile Marine with No 1418.11/26/03 issued on December 11, 2003 and 1418.29/24/03 issued on April 08, 2003).

Basic Concepts

Maritime Security: term “Maritime Security”, within the framework of the specific command model, was used in a broad sense and was referred to the preventive measures for public order, traffic, and security, to the suppressive measures as also to the interventions implemented by the MMM via HCG.


Maritime Security Olympic Command: as Maritime Security Olympic Command was determined the organisation of a number of people, measures and operations of the MMM via HCG, legal entities under the supervision of MMM, which had as a goal the prevention and suppression of crime, and the protection of people, infrastructure and property. The administration, cooperation, coordination and the management of the operations which were related to the Olympic security and were within the competence of HCG realized via Hellenic Coast Guard Olympic Operations Center (CGOOC).

The mission of the CGOOC was the command, coordination, and control of HCG forces for the management of events and incidents in areas of HCG jurisdiction within Hellenic Domain, except for those of Search and Rescue – for which the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) remained responsible in Athina FIR. It belonged to the operational level and was directly under the HCG Head command (Document of MMM with No 1418.29/72/2004 issued on 28-05-2004).

Maritime Security Olympic Command with exclusively Olympic duties: this was referred to these which mission was the handling of Services concerning public order, traffic, security, as well as Search and Rescue Services exclusively in specific venues and installations, functions, and activities for the Olympic Games.

Maritime Security Olympic Command with mixed duties: this was referred to a Maritime Command which duties were, on the one hand the handling of Services concerning public order, traffic, security, as well as Search and Rescue Services for specific Olympic activities, and on the other hand the handling of Services concerning public order, traffic, security, as well as Search and Rescue Services to the community for its daily operations. (Delimichalis, 2004: 4-5)

Table 3 : Hellenic Coast Guard Forces Command Organisation



Source: Ministry of Mercantile Marine, 2004

Analyzing the administration model of HCG forces which were involved on the Olympic security during the OG 2004 and taking into consideration the levels of administration which can be seen on table 3 are remarked the following:

1. At political level and in particular in OSSC, HCG was represented by the Minister of Mercantile Marine something which did not happen in CFDM.
2. The strategic level contained to OSSC was represented by the HCG Head via the participation in Crisis Management Council. Except the participation of the Head of the HCG in the aforementioned Council which was convened regularly or extraordinarily by the HP Head did not foresee any other duty for the HCG Head, whose opinion in each case was under the judgment of the HP Head for acceptance or not. This was also happened during the planning of HCG drafts. The opinion HCG Head did not commit the HP Head.
3. The operational level has the responsibility of command, control and cooperation of HCG Olympic forces which were managed by the CGOOC and JRCC, participated also with liaison officers in OSC, in ORSC at Olympic cities and at ORSC Falirou. Under its authority were

the OVSC Marinas Flisvou, and Floating Hotels where the administration exercised only by HCG. At the same level belonged the administrative regions of HCG.

4. At tactical level was contained the OVSV in which the HCG exercise administration in specific venues like Agios Kosmas or joint with HP like at Friendship and Piece Stadium, Bits Volley at Faliro, Sxinia Rowing, Villages of Press in Agios Andreas, Triathlon at Vouliagmeni and at the Port Police Authorities of the country.

In order to achieve direct and interoperability administration of its services and given the fact that the C4I systems were not received, there was not a need to be involved HCG officers at ORSC as also there was not necessary the involvement of regional administrations of HCG, because institutionally they had not any operational experience. The involvement in the administrative model of these services because these services were predicted at the organization of the MMM did not add any value and instead of solving problems, created more.

The immediate subordination of all HCG forces in CGOOC would have created effectiveness and direct administration. The HCG based on their executives know-how, the training of its personnel which had in conjunction with the enormous operational experience acquired via JRCC in number of issues in areas under its jurisdiction could have afford a lot.

The signature of HCG drafts by Head of HP in competence which were not under the HP competence created a lot of problems. For example in matters of search and rescue in the Aegean Sea or on items concerning the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) what kind of opinion could make the leader of HP? It could not be guaranteed by the Olympic planning that the administration of serious or very serious incidents or events on matters within the competence of HCG would be managed by the leader of HCG or by an appropriate officer. The exercise of the OG security administration by limiting the institutional role of operators with determining specialized duties and the establishment of Specialized Event Commander created additional problems between the two institutions in case that was a different option for an incident considering the meaning of coordination as has been analyzed before.

The MMM did not sign the relevant legislation law 2833/2000 and PD 63/2001 and 2/2003. It was invited later to participate with its staff to take part in a procedure on the basis of the institutional framework which had been established by the HP, which in any case did not guarantee the distinct institutional role of the operators. Finally had not been issued any MD predicted by Article 5 paragraph 2 of law 2833/2000 which would have determined the subject and the way in which OGSD and HCG would cooperate, but also had not been fixed the level of HCG engagement according to the paragraph 2 of PD 63/2001 as had not been approval issued by the political and service overview body.

Conclusions

The aim of this concise paper is to present and to examine critically the security policy planning of the Olympic Games 2004 (OG 2004) which took place in Hellas. More specifically was examined the strategic management of security forces which were involved in them, the crisis management system which was developed in order to combat any event, incident during the Olympic Games and further to ensure the secure conduct of them. Furthermore was analyzed the role and the contribution of one of the basic Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) in Hellas, the role of the Hellenic Coast Guard in this security policy.

Based on the analysis can be summarized the following key findings:

The Ministry of Mercantile Marine/HCG had not signed the Law 2833/2000, PD 63/2001 and the PD 2/2003.

Furthermore, as far as concerned the MMM/HCG, had not issued any Joint Ministerial Decision as was provided in article 5 of Law 2833/2000, via which would have defined the object and that manner of cooperation as well as would have regulated associated matters.

Also according to article 14 of PD 63/2001 titled «Relations of the OGSD with involved operators and services» can be shown that the involvement of all the competent authorities and services in the planning of the measures before and during the OG 2004 was HP responsibility and was based on the competences of other operators as those were identified by the analysis and the risk assessment which threatened the OG 2004. The analysis and the risk assessment was fixed by the OGSD Director and then followed approval by the political and services overview body. As regards the MMM/HCG had not issued any procedure concerning the degree of involvement.

Although it was a Primary Security Authority, HCG was called after the legislation establishment to participate with its officers in the planning of all kinds of measures and plans under the leadership of the HP. It worth's to be mentioned that the MMM/HCG did not be represented in CFDM.

According to article 6 of PD 2/2003, «The plans of the Olympic Games Security Directorate are approved by the Head of the Hellenic Police, after the opinion of the Head of the Coast Guard ...». This created an issue, concerning through which knowledge or expertise the Head of the HP would approve plans of other competent authorities, as obviously the Head of the HP was not in a position to have the appropriate know how for specialised activities that each competent authority or agency would develop. If, for example, the Head of HP did not agree on a specific draft on which specialised knowledge should have supported his/her argument? Additionally, the fact that the HP had an opinion via OGSD on matters which were not institutionally or regionally part of its regular competence, created the real possibility of unforeseen situations developing.

Within the OGSD the coordination was difficult, although the aim was common the secure performance of OG 2004. That was because all competent authorities and services were constituted by different executives (military or/and civilian staff), different labor status, different culture, philosophy and working conditions.

In addition to the above, OGSD structured did not offer flexibility and creativity in executives action who were coming from different services except HP, as the administration was enforced by the HP within its headquarters and the executives were enrollment at different departments of this Division.

The existence of multiple command levels coupled with the lack of C4I systems functionality (which was supposed to ensure the information immediate dissemination) undoubtedly created difficulties in the flow of information to the hierarchically higher levels.

From the combination of the tasks of the Commander of Olympic Security Center (OSC) with the tasks of the Specialized Commander Incident (individual Commander Incident), arises clearly that HP had opinion in the administration of other competent authorities forces and services which were allocated to the OG 2004. This policy concluded risk and dangerous, as HP officials were given guidelines and instructions for actions to forces of other operators without having the appropriate know-how and experience.

OG 2004 security planning based on C4I systems with objective to cover the operational necessities of Olympic security predicted that in every administration level – operational centre should have specific technical and operational opportunities, equipment and abilities, in order to facility information and decisions, the administration, forces coordination and control and the incidents management. But these systems were not received by Hellas with obviously consequences for functioning of control, administration and cooperation systems.

At the political level were contained CFDM, OSCC, the Olympic Preparation Coordination Committee, the Olympic Security Coordination and Strategy Committee and the Civil Overview Body. In strategic level was contained the Head of the HP, the OSCC and the Service Overview Body.

It is obvious that these are different levels of administration and it is difficult to be coordinated. In addition if taken into consideration that the centers which were shown above in table1 constituted the operational level and the Olympic venues constituted the tactical level, immediately can be understood the difficulty of working of the administrative model and the accumulation of operators at the top of level whose tasks were overlapping. Overlapping created confusion to the administration, with obviously affected the immediacy in decision-making, in the vertical and horizontal reciprocal exchange of information and in coordination. The institutions for Olympic security control were too many while also the OSCC was not necessary by the time which CFDM existed.

Also it can be observed an over concentration to HP authorities throughout the Hellenic area which leads to the conclusion that the Olympic security was not part of the state security but covered all the country. This power was clearly something beyond of the institutional role performed by HP. Using as an occasion the Olympic security, extended and implemented functions to the entire country without having the proper know-how, experience and specialization to manage incidents far away of its cycle competence. Obviously this in conjunction with what has been mentioned entailed risks in the plans preparation, adoption and implementation.

At the same time were established new institutions beyond the existing at the political level which was the main level but their competences were overlapping, and made the planning difficult, difficult the coordination, difficult the decision-making, the donation of directives and guidelines to the existing levels.

Through the analysis revealed the malfunction of the specific administrative model which had been developed in order to cover the necessities of OG security, were created many administration levels, had been developed many institutions which were involved in the various levels of administration, while there was a lack of direct communication direct between these levels and C4I systems which its main target was the communication between all the levels among all competent authorities and agencies as has been mentioned did not work.

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