# CAN EUROPEAN IDENTITY EXIST ALONGSIDE A NATIONAL IDENTITY? POSSIBLE INGREDIENTS FOR THE RELATIVE POSITIONING OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY BY ITS CITIZENS

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**Abstract**

The European Union has long been considered as the beacon of a deeper economic and legislative integration for establishing and sustaining peace. However, defining European identity cohesive enough to combat the cultural, economic and political troubles of a modern world continues to challenge EU politicians. Taking 'identity'as a dynamic, processual, and contextual phenomenon,this study examines the components of creating a collective identity with a focus on bringing legitimacy for further integrationthrough European Citizenship. While doing that it shows that the European Identity has become more important in a world of cascading crisis. It emphasises that efforts in constructing European Identityso far needs a step change to strengthen a coherent and stably organized community. It underlines the fact that the EU might fail in generating a distinctive supranational identity without a real commitment to the founding liberal principles of the original European project. Itdemonstrates that for the human agents to conform to Kant's conditions for universal hospitality, the EU will need to develop its education and social models further to capture global tolerance and transculturalism. The study therefore offers political democratic citizenship, trans-cultural space and social policy as possible ingredients of situational European Identity.

**Keywords:**European Identity, European Citizenship, Separatist Movements in Europe, Supranational Identity, Multiculturalism

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# AVRUPA KİMLİĞİ ULUSAL KİMLİKLERLE BİRLİKTE VAR OLABİLİR Mİ? AVRUPA KİMLİĞİNİN VATANDAŞLAR TARAFINDAN GÖRELİ KONUMLANDIRILMASININ OLASI BİLEŞENLERİ

## Özet

Avrupa Birliği (AB) uzun zamandır barışı tesis etmek ve sürdürmek için daha derin bir ekonomik ve yasal entegrasyonun yol göstericisi olarak görülmektedir. Bununla birlikte'Avrupa Kimliğini' modern dünyanın kültürel, ekonomik ve siyasi sorunlarıyla mücadele edecek kadar uyumlu bir şekilde tanımlamak, AB politikacılarını zorlamaya devam etmektedir. Kimliği dinamik, süreçsel ve bağlamsal bir olgu olarak ele alan bu çalışma, 'Avrupa Vatandaşlığı' yoluyla entegrasyon için meşruiyet sağlamaya odaklanarak,AB için kolektif bir kimlik yaratmanın bileşenlerini incelemektedir. Bunu yaparken, bir yandan krizlerin artarda yaşandığı bir dünyada Avrupa Kimliğinin AB için dahaönemli hale geldiğini gösterirken, diğer yandan AB sınırları içinde yaşayan bireyleri tutarlı ve istikrarlı bir şekilde organize olmuş bir topluluk olarak güçlendirmek için, ortak kimliği inşa etme konusundaki şu ana kadar gösterilençabalarda bir kademe atlanması gerekliliğini vurgulamaktadır. Çalışma aynı zamanda, AB'nin orijinal Avrupa projesinin kurucu liberal ilkelerine gerçek bir bağlılık olmadan, kendine özgü bir uluslarüstü kimlik oluşturmada başarısız olabileceği gerçeğinin altını çizmektedir. Avrupa'da bireylerin Kant'ın evrensel konukseverlik koşullarına uyması için, AB'nin küresel hoşgörüyü ve tüm insanlığı kültürler-ötesi bir anlayışla kapsayan bir anlayışı yakalamak amacıyla kullandığı eğitim ve sosyal modellerini daha da geliştirmesi gerektiğini göstermektedir. Bu çerçevede, durumsal Avrupa Kimliğinin olası bileşenleri olarak siyasi demokratik vatandaşlık, kültürler-arası alan ve sosyal politikayı önermektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Avrupa Kimliği, Avrupa Vatandaşlığı, Avrupa'da Ayrılıkçı Hareketler, Uluslarüstü Kimlik, Çok Kültürlülük

## Introduction

Based on the Kantian ideals of 'perpetual peace' and of 'a morality-based society', European integration has deepened over the years, becoming a corner stone of a federation of nationstates guided by mutual and voluntary submission to a mechanism of universal code of laws, and a moral commitment to a long-term, sustainable peace (Huang and Throsby, 2011; Haygood, 2015; Gülboy, 2017). The current European Union (EU) often is seen as an evolving political entity established based on an intergovernmental, supranational, republican model built on rights-based citizenships and communitarian values. However, today, the EU is facing an uncertain future as member states debate the importance of political and economic cooperation. There is a growing contemporary scepticism and anxiety about the

EU's future. Problems within the Eurozone, the Schengen area, growing migration issues, the Brexit decision and the war in Ukraine pose major challenges for the future of the integration project (Cohn, 2012; Rosamond, 2016; Jones, Klemenand Meunier, 2021; Biedermann, 2022; Mason, 2022; Ulusoy, 2022).

Indeed, increasingly separatist movements have started to manifest themselves especially in cases where real per capita income inequality between member states does not decrease over time or is re-triggered by economic crises (Levy, 2003; Arnorsson and Zoega, 2016; Jones, KlemenandMeunier, 2021). In particular, the Brexit sets a formidable example for separatist movements in Europe today and is seen as the forerunner of deep existential troubles for the European Project (Nardini andDempsey, 2017;Fabbrini, 2022;WolffandPiquet, 2022).It casts doubts about the successful construction of the 'European Identity' alongside national identities. Similarly, member-states' response to the increasing number of refugees entering their borders however shows that the European liberal political structure falters under the resurgence of divisive national identities.Rosamond (2016) sees the difficulties in dealing with border issues as a manifestation of a more serious identity problem within the Europe.

This position has raised a number of questions in academia: Why and how the EU failed to construct a 'European Identity' based on a deep-rooted hospitality among the member states?How has disintegration become a reality for the EU despite its sticky institutions and strong regulatory framework? Have the enforced austerity measures dictated by the strong at the expense of the weak deepened the emotional divide and put the Kantian Paradise into a

glass house? Although each of these questions have been explored by academic scholars individually, what the EU needs to do more of in order to secure relative positioning of European Identity by its citizens in the face of the new challenges facing the union needs further elaboration.In this context, this paper aims to identifypossible ingredients of situational European Identity in a world of cascading crisis. In particular, it explores the role

'European Citizenship' can play in the construction of 'European Identity' while at the same time questioningwhether citizenship alone sufficient to create an open system in which differences mean a wealth of knowledge and values accessible to everyone.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The first section provides a brief literature review on identity construction through narratives and outlines what these theories tell us about the difficulties in constructing European Identity. The second section focuses on European Identity itself and explores the three main initiatives employed to construct it over since the beginning of the integration project. It shows how the constructed European Identity narrative placed itself in the political marketplace alongside the other national identities. The third section questions to what extent European Citizenship can be answer to the Europe's identity crisis in today's societies defined by cultural and ethnic pluralism. The fourth and final section concludes the paper stating that for the people of Europe to conform to Kant's condition of universal hospitality, the EU needs to develop its education and social models further to capture global tolerance and trans-culturalism alongside political democratic European citizenship.

## 1. Identity Construction through Narratives in the Literature

According to essentialists an identity should be conceived as a result of cultural variables because 'each ethnic core produces a political identity in a more and less direct fashion' (Cederman, 2000: 5 in Bee, 2008). The essentialist approach also argues that collective identities are only possible at the highest level in the nation-states (Risse, 2004: 166 in Öner, 2011). In this view, the positive correlation between 'culture' and 'identity' makes it too hard to construct 'supranational identity' because of the lack of common cultural characteristics among the member states. However, as Bee (2008: 433) points out, the emphasis upon European integration as a continuously changingprocess prepares the foundation of considering European Identity as being forged and constructed. Indeed, Frank (1999: 43 in Öner, 2011) describes Europe as "…an old civilisation, a political ideal which is constantly under

construction while others see it as a 'utopia' or a'voyage towards goals', 'hopeful travel'". This approach is in line with the views of social constructivist who see identities as socially constructed and can be shaped by active intervention and planning. In this context, identity becomes a dynamic, processual and contextual phenomenon which can be used to engender a popular sense of belonging.

> "We must never forget that: From war, we have created peace. From hatred, we have created respect. From division, we have created union. From dictatorship and oppression, we have created a vibrant and sturdy democracies. From poverty, we have created prosperity."
>
> Irish Presidency of the EU, Declaration for a Day of Welcome of **1** May 2004 in Larant (2005)

It is clear that the European thought leaders have also adopted this approach and have seen identity conceived as a result of political intervention, reinvention and the selection of certain patterns of values instead of others. Deriving from this perspective, it is assumed that European Identity may be constructed by the will and planning of elites. It is interesting to note that the same perspective also provides the basis for those who are against the idea of European Identity as they see it as a political construct of the EU with an *imagined* European Community. This dualist conundrum is the reason why, the institutionally constructed identity and social constructivism is being chosen as the theoretical basis for studying the formation of European Identity.

If identities by themselves do not exist and they are constructed by identity narratives which attempt at imagining communities to lock up human groups within artificial boundaries in order to mobilize them towards the attainment of particular political goals (Öner, 2011), what does this tell us about the difficulties about constructing European Identity?

### 1.1. Identity as a Narrative

Martin (1995: 11) states that narrative identity, being at the same time fictitious and real, is an exercise in emotive mobilization that endeavours to move people by touching what is strongly ingrained in their affectivity. That is why, to be effective, the production of a narrative organized around one set of feelings has to make other feelings disappear or to render them irrelevant. Indeed, as Martin (1995: 13) presents,

> "…the identity narrative channels political emotions so that they can fuel efforts to modify a balance of power… it changes the organization of human groups and creates new ones; it alters cultures by emphasizing certain traits and skewing their meanings and logic… [It] brings forth a new interpretation of the world in order to modify it".

In his study, Martin (1995: 12) provides three pillars of identity narratives: "…relationship to the past, relationship to space, and relationship to culture". He also underlines that "…there are always several identity narratives available…" and that "…there are always many identifications possible in a situation of competition for power". He explains that an individual can concurrently relate to several narratives and, to a degree, handle the inconsistencies among them. In a world where multipleidentification is the rule, an individual becomes an area where groups overlap. In other words, s/he has the possibility of choosing her/ his political identifications among narratives available in the political marketplace.

Consequently, s/he may pick up the ones s/he wants to participate in more strongly.
In line with this theoretical framework, Laffan (2004: 76 in Bee, 2008) argues that

> "…identity building had been fostered by membership, the external projection of an EU identity, the appropriation by the EU of the concept of Europe, and the cement provided by the founding values and the addition of EU symbols".

This was done initially with the expectation that citizens of the member states will change their identifications in the course of their life and feel more concerned by or more attracted to European Identity.In this context, the open-ended nature of the identity has allowed European Identity to have a place in the market of political power giving meaning to the EU's efforts for further integration ideal.At the same time, it has created an environment where it needs to constantly compete with other identity narratives including the national ones.

### 1.2.The Power of Identity in Generating Change and Politics

In this world where there are always several identity narratives in competition on the same political marketplace and where citizens can choose among them, the question becomes, as Lehning (2001: 244) puts it, "whatdraws a body of citizens together into a coherent and stably organized political community, and keeps that allegiance durable?" Wendt (1999: 358 in Öner, 2011) asserts that "…interdependence, common fate, homogeneity and self-restraint…" are important factors for collective identity formation. For many, the EU has the interdependence

(common market) and common goal (peace in Europe and creating a standing in a bipolar world).But homogeneity is absent in the case of Europe, in contrast, diversity is one of its main characteristics. According to Wendt (2003), heterogeneity increases the potential for conflict. In response to this threat against successful construction of European identity, several scholars and politicians claim that the states of Europe have a common, historical, cultural, and religious heritage.

However, given that European states had many long wars among each other throughout history, the question remains whether homogeneity always guarantees living in piece and construction of collective identity? Indeed, Martin (1995: 7) states that "…the concept of identity has nothing to do with homogeneity and permanence." Similarly, Lehning (2001:

264) states that 'European demos cannot be based on an idea of ethnic homogeneity…On the contrary, the collectivity of citizens that constitute the demos encompasses heterogeneity'.At this point, Wendt (1999: 358 in Öner, 2011) offers another important factor in collective identity formation: "… actors have to trust that their identities and interests will be respected and their individuality will not be completely submerged by the group". According to him, "…collective identity implies giving to the 'other' some responsibility to take care of the 'self'". In this respect, the motto of EU, 'united in diversity', can be considered as the reflection of the need for providing reassurance for the maintenance and protection of diversities within the EU.

In a similar way, Martin (1995:10) claims that "once a community has been imagined, its mobilisation can be best described as a situation of power struggle". In his approach, the importance of cultural specifics leads to a reassessment of the conditions which allow for free processes of cultural cross-fertilization or not. According to him, differences mean a wealth of knowledge and values accessible to everyone in open systems of group inter-action. Whereas closed systems are built on the belief that identities and cultures are exclusive, and that some of them should prevail upon others.In this context, a more appropriate answer to the question of European Identity may be rooted in whether the EU has done enough to generate an open system within its borders to overcome the problem of exclusivity.

Therefore, our next set of questions becomes the followings: Could we really say that the institutional framework of the EU has provided a sufficiently dense interaction atmosphere for the member states and their citizens which then in turn have influence their state identities,

identities of the EU elite and citizens of the EU?[2] Or equally importantly in a world where "…people construct their multi-cultural identities historically and contextually in different fields" (Güney, 2014: 210), how can the EU ensure that more of its citizens choose to relationally position themselves as Europeans in the face of multiple challenges faced by member states?Answering these questions requires us to look at European Identity more closely in the next section.

## 2. European Identity

Öner (2011: 21) states that European Identity has been simultaneously under construction as 'Europe' has always been. Therefore, it has been defined on a different basis throughout history. The idea of 'united Europe' developed a political dynamism after the 1st World War in the framework of the League of Nations on the basis of the renewed European Consciousness. After the 2nd World War, the integration of Europe started to be perceived as the best way to improve the position of Europe in a bipolar world (Levy, 2005; Larant, 2005;

Huang and Throsby, 2011; Morelli and Sonno, 2017). The Treaty of Rome referred this

integration as 'union among the peoples of Europe' indicating that all previous ideas on unification influenced the construction of European Economic Community (EEC).

Bee (2008: 437) provides 4 periods during which the Commission produced new discourses on European Identity: the 1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s and 2001–2005. His analysis shows that how on the European identity question, the Commission rejected a formulation based on essentialist principles, proposing a formulation based on constructivist ones. He further argues that along these four phases the Commission actively acted as an 'identity builder'. Today, European Identity refers to collective identity of citizens of the EU. The construction of European Identity refers to the attempts to deepen EU citizens' sense of belonging to the EU.

[2] According to the social constructivism, boundaries of 'self' may change in interaction and cooperating states can form a collective identity.

### 2.1. Formation of 'European Identity'

It is important at this point why the EU is interested in European Identity. It is safe to say that the EU has linked the questions of legitimacy and democratic deficit[3], hence the lack of public support, to lack of a common collective identity. This in turn meant that the EU has needed to strengthen the popular base of support for integration. That is why, the EU has been trying to encourage the formation of collective European Identity and fostering of sense of belonging through a number of initiatives According to Laffan (1996: 80 in Öner, 2011), the EU has mainly 3 types of top-down initiatives to construct European identity:

#### 2.1.1. Development of Rights and Citizenship

As the forefront of the collective identity formation, it has taken the shape of 'a Citizen's Europe', 'a People's Europe', and of 'a European Citizenship'. It has been considered as the main route to creating a larger presence in the hearts and minds of the citizens of member states.

a) Rights and Values: Kant's vision called for a mechanism promoting the lawful coexistence of individual political communities comprising a judicial world community (Kant, 1992). The EU created this community through economic, political and social federation of European free states committed to universal principles of republican democracy, a universal declaration of human rights, tolerance and the adherence to both moral and legal codes of conduct under the supranational institutions[4] . These universal concepts have become the basis of modern European Identity.

b) European Passport: In 1985, the EC adopted a standardized European passport. The passport union has positively influenced construction of European identity in civic

[3] The challenge of democratic deficit has to do with how to create and secure democracy in a non-state entity.

[4] In accordance with Kant's ideal, 28-member states surrendered at least a portion of its national sovereignty in order to achieve 'a universal state of all peoples'. European leaders hence resorted to liberal convictions that treaties and agreements would serve as foundations for a peaceful Europe.

terms. The shift from the used of wording 'workers' to 'citizens' has been an integral part of increasing the level of support of the citizens to the integration process.

c) Governance Principles: An expanding emphasis on the need to discover the democratic bases of the project, through the adoption of principles such as those of openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence (European Commission, 2021).

d) European Institutions: As in all democratic systems, EU institutions have been acting as identity producers. They aim to make citizens become more aware of their belonging to a political entity (Larant, 2005; Huang and Throsby, 2011).

i. *The EU Parliament:* As the only institution of the EU, it is directly elected by the citizens of the EU since 1979. It provides an opportunity for participation of the citizens to the politics of the EU despite the steadily declining turnout rate for its elections. It is composed of multinational party groups and it has references to both cultural and civic understanding of European identity. ii. *The EU law and the decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ):* As the reflection of 'what Europe is and what it spires to be', they play important role in construction of substantive aspect of a European identity. Through the case law, the ECJ has reflected daily lives of the citizens of the EU, constructing the European identity on a utilitarian basis. It has become the best defender of the European citizenships; it interprets law in such a way that right actually mean something.

### 2.1.2. The Politics of Belonging and Symbols

The EU has in some ways selected particular symbols in order to develop a common identity. The creation of a common symbolism together with the diffusion of European dimension in areas such as for example those of culture and education, could be considered as aimed at

constructing the EU's identity. The political and cultural symbols, launched by the Constitutional Treaty (2004), as the flag, the anthem, the motto, the currency and Europe Day may therefore help, by creating emotive images and rites to make the European Union more legitimate in the eyes of its citizens and help them to accept the plan for a common destiny.

a) The European Motto 'United in Diversity': While most European citizens may not feel they share a common European culture there is a possibility that as more people become aware of the significance of the EU policy, the EU will become more of a focus for their concerns and aspirations. There are also those who think that European countries share a relative degree of cultural commonality which is characterised by diversity. As a multinational and multicultural organization, the EU is understandably careful not to offend elements of their membership by creating a European identity that is not sufficiently all embracing. That is why, the EU aims to define European identity in the context of cultural diversity among the members state in order to increase the feeling of belonging to the EU without eliminating national and regional identities. However, it is hard to reconcile unification and diversity.

b) EU Currency (the Euro, Our Money): Lunched in 2001, EURO has become another significant symbol of unification with its coverage well known as 'Euro Zone'. Togetherness was the basis under which the message about Europe would have to be built. This message promoted the following elements: (1) Progress, which meant improvement of the social and economic conditions for the realisation of a better tomorrow. (2) Prosperity, related to economic expansion, development, high standards of living etc. (3) Protection of the quality of life.

c) The European Union Flag: In 1985, the Community adopted its official flag. Positioned all over the EU, the flag has now become one of the symbols most readily associated with the EU.

d) European Union Anthem:'Ode to Joy' from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony assumed the role of unofficial anthem of the Community.

e) Europe Day (9 May- Schuman Celebration): Celebrated every year in member states, it is intended to play an important role in forming European Identity.

### 2.1.3. The Development of Cross-national Networks and Cooperation

In this area, the EU has used consciousness-raising initiatives and started to employ cultural references.

a) Single Market and Free Movement of People: One of the main initiatives for

making Europe a social reality by enforcing citizens' rights and perceptions of the existence of the supranational entity. 'Europe without Frontiers' became the first slogan to be used on a wide scale through Europe, as it had the aim of creating a perception of the European Community as a common public space, one in which citizens could freely act and behave.

b) Education and Training Programmes: With the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the EU secured the power of developing European dimension in education and of bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore in EU policy (Article 126). Erasmus,

Leonardo, Socrates, Tempus, Jean Monnet, European City of Culture programmes were all introduced by exercising this power. There are also improved social security covers for intra-community immigrants.

Bee (2008: 436) states that the EU's recent definition of European Identity is based on civic features and strictly linked to a wider concept of democracy, compared to the concept of identity based on imagined elements, as it emerged in the 1980s. He also points out that

> "The EU is self-representing itself and its own identity by referring explicitly to concepts such as the public sphere and European Citizenship, as well as to a broad set of policies in areas such as information and communication, culture and education".

The EU seems to consider all these as fundamental for developing a form of European belonging based on political participation and related to the multi-level governance system (Lehning, 2001). This demonstrates that during the construction process of European Identity, sometimes cultural references, sometimes civic instruments have been used. This position could explain, at least partially, why even among the EU elites, there is not a common understanding of European identity (Öner, 2011: 63).

Bruter (2005: xv in Öner, 2011) underlines that 'Civic European Identity' has a positive impact on citizens' support on further European integration, but it is not the case for 'Cultural European Identity'. It is true that there are those who support the idea of European Identity and believe that it exists within the EU. By those, the EU is seen to make its own mark on the construction of European Identity by bringing people closer to each other and helping people to understand each other better. There are also those who are against the idea of European Identity as they see it as a political construct of the EU with an *imagined* European Community. They say that

nobody defines themselves as Europeans when answering the question of who you are i.e. they do not see it as the main characteristics of themselves. For them, the EU will always be an institution which includes different identities (Öner, 2011: 57).

However, Güney (2014: 206) shows that people are able to combine their multiple belongings at different levels and they can cope with that. Martin (1995: 14)'s analysis also demonstrates that a constructed identity narrative can place itself in the political marketplace, where there are many narratives exist, to be chosen by individuals at any given time. Given this position, just because European Identity is politically constructed and the EU is a place where there are, and will always be, different identities, it does not mean that one day it cannot become one of the main characteristics with which citizens of member states define themselves. Indeed, Fligstein*etal.* (2012: 110) states that only 12.7% of the people in Europe tend to see themselves as Europeans; an additional 43.3% of people view themselves as having a national identity and sometimes a European Identity. This 43.3% represents situational Europeans who under the right conditions will place a European Identity over a national identity.

This means that it is possible for European Identity to exist alongside national identities if effectively constructed. Indeed, Risse (2004: 166 in Öner, 2011) highlights that the construction process of European Identity within the EU has been ongoing without replacing national identities. Although the processes influenced national identities, it has not replaced them. Similarly, Öner (2011) points out that European Identity has been in the process of interaction with national identities and does not replace them; rather it *Europeanizes* them to various extents. Hermann *et al.* (2004: 2 in Bee, 2008) confirms this position by stating that

"…the EU directly affects people's life, shaping behaviours and drawing EU institutions ever deeper into the national social contexts". Martin (1995: 14) also supports it by presenting that a series of concentric circles to represent different levels of identifications starting from the neighbourhood or the village and ending with Europe could be drawn. Fligstein*etal.* (2012:

122) similarly concludes that

> "…strong national and European identities are *not incompatible* because they refer to different communities that are nested in relationship to one another and activated under different social conditions".

This brings us to the question of why it has been so difficult to make European Identity one of the defining characteristics of the citizens of member states despite the ongoing efforts.

Could it be that, as Wendt (1999: 364 in Öner, 2011) points out, individuals are resisting the forming of a 'European Community' based on a collective identity, because they feel that it threatens the fulfilment of their personal needs? Similarly, do the nation-states resist the forming of the supranational identity because they feel that it threatens the fulfilment of national needs? Or could it be that, as Güney (2014: 205) puts it, citizens do not participate because "they do *not* feel at home i.e. accepted and welcomed"?

### 2.2. The Question of European Identity Today

When Hayek (1939 in Scharpf, 2009) foresaw the European Integration, he assumed that the political integration would come first, and that a strong federal government would then create a common market and centralize the policies. Indeed, the long-term goal of the founding fathers was to unite the peoples of Europe, rather than only uniting the nation-states (Levy, 2003; Larant, 2005; Huang and Throsby, 2011; Jones, Kelemen and Meunier, 2021). But after the Empty Chair Crisis in the mid-1960s, it was not easy to replace national identities (Öner, 2011: 79). However, the unification was a lot easier to achieve at the economic level. Why was that and why did mean for how European Identity have been perceived by public since then? This section looks at these questions under 6 different headings:

a) Europe as an 'Elite-driven' Project: The Paneuropean Movements showed that construction of European Identity among the masses was difficult from the beginning. This is why the project of unification of Europe was based on a 'leaders' movement' and has been an elite driven project since then. Indeed, Öner (2011: 7) states that at the beginning of the 20$^{th}$ century European Identity was only a cultural fact as the political idea of Europe was only in the minds of a few people. Bee (2008: 434) points out that this elite-driven nature of the project meant that European Identity have not really reached the other spheres of civil society. Shore (1994: 288 in Öner, 2011) demonstrates this position:

> "Although on some levels it appears that a common European consciousness is developing amongst those working in the institutions it is difficult to see how it relates to the population in general."

This means that the integration concept has been based far more on the will of the statesmen than on the will of the people. As a result, there is little feeling of belonging to Europe and European identity has not yet been engrained in people's minds.

b) Europe as a 'Christian Exclusive' Project: The more ethnic sense of what it means to be European exist (Fligstein*etal.*, 2012: 113). This ethnic identity excludes certain groups from becoming Europeans. As a result of this position, non-European immigrants have been increasingly perceived as 'more foreign'. Contemporary boundaries between 'us' and 'them' are usually drawn between natives and immigrants from outside Europe. Since September 2011, there has been an increased attacks against the Muslim migrants (Öner, 2011: 28). The promotion of exclusive European Identity has been strengthening the nationalistic and xenophobic movements

(Larant, 2005; Jacobs and Maier, 2005: 20 in Öner, 2011; Jones, Kelemen and Meunier, 2021).

c) European Identity defined based on a 'Strong Other': European identity has also been defined against the 'others.'The construction of Europe has been achieved through demarcation of the 'other' which has also changed throughout the history. European identity seems to become important for people only when you compare it with 'other'. Thus, people usually feel themselves more European when they face with a nonEuropean culture. Although many may view that the EU is a unique project and does not need an'other', Orluc (2000: 154 in Öner, 2011) argues that one of the main weaknesses of the European idea is that "it remained strong only as long as the threat against Europe was also strong". Frank also (1999: 45-56 in Öner, 2011) asserts that

> '[at the time] there was a national consciousness and European identity, but no European consciousness…[which] gradually emerge with the effects of exogenous factors, such as rejection of war, fascism, communism…among the political elites…[and] led to the construction of the EC'

Following the post-Cold War era, there has not been a clear 'other' of Europe. To find a common position among member states has become much more difficult, because of the absence of a common 'other' (Castano, 2004: 54 in Öner, 2011; Morelli and Sonno, 2017; Cornellissen, 2022). However, it seems like institutional integration, geographical

expansion and immigration have increasingly defined Europeanness in relation to a new other: non-white immigrant Muslims (Fligstein*etal.*, 2012: 114).

Negative stereotyping of immigrants seems to lead a process of negative identification or 'active othering' (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 238 in Öner, 2011; Haygood, 2015).

d) The 'Two-Tier' EU (core members and new member states): Big and small member states and enlargement process in the EU make it hard to find a common position among the member states which have negatively influenced construction of European Identity. Nardini and Dempsey (2017) underline that although the EU was founded on liberal principles, national discourses based on realist strategies have become more prevalent, spurred by debates on borders and identity issues.In the time of crisis, the political fragility of the Union tends to give way to a political discourse focusing on national identity, immigration, sovereignty, workers' rights, and political-economic needs. While this may seem second nature to contemporary Europeans coming of age with no historical memory outside of a unified and borderless Europe; it is becoming a bitter pill for the pre-EU generation to swallow (Nardini and Dempsey, 2017; Jones, Kelemen and Meunier, 2021).

e) The lack of 'Legal Personality' of the EU: The legal personality was in the project of constitution, but it was not realised. Because the EU has a complex institutional structure and the member states have different perception of the future structure of the EU, it is a lot more difficult to construct European identity. Priban (2009: 55) points out that "the nation-state democratic legitimation dilemma grows with the further integration and constitutionalisation of the EU." He further argues that the EU's progressive political integration without adequate public accountability even contributed to the resurgence of the ethno-nationalist identity politics in the member states. Patomaki (2017: 172) concurs that the current policies, principles, and institutions of the EU both generate counterproductive politico-economic effects and suffer from problems of legitimation. Cohn (2012) also points out that many European leaders believed that the EU enlargement (as per point d)necessitated major institutional reforms to overcome these issues instead of a less ambitious Lisbon Treaty signed in

2009. Indeed, Brexit is an indication that modest policy proposals and tentative steps within the existing EU Treaty framework may be too little too late.

f) Europe as a "Future-oriented" Project: European Identity has always been constructed on a shared vision or a common goal and as a future-orientated project. Delanty (2007 in Öner, 2011: 80) argues that currently, it is harder to reach compromise among the political elites of on the future of the EU. Despite the decrease in the level of importance of the elites' role, they are still crucial for the maintenance of the integration process and construction of the European Identity. According to him, what currentlylacking is elites and leaders with a daring vision. It is not understood that the elites alone cannot alone carry on themselves without the support of public opinion (such as what happened with the Constitutional Treaty).The importance of the public opinion and gaining their support for the European integration has become more important to establish legitimacy of the EU. Bottom-up initiatives of the civil society and providing channels of participation for the EU citizens are necessary.

The picture presented above shows that the increased economic interdependency and coordination among member states have not been matched by the public support for the EU. As Fligstein*etal.* (2012: 112) describes, 'there seems to be little in the way of shared European Identity or politics…the sense of Europeanness… has seemed to lessen'. Immigration, the socalled war on terror, slow economic growth and finally the financial crisis and war in Europe have caused citizens across Europe to view their national governments as the main focus of their identities and political activity (Checkeland Katzenstein, 2009 in Fligstein*etal.*, 2012).

This picture indicates that the EU cannot proceed to a greater degree of political integration without the underlying structure of a unifying European identity, which in turn cannot be constructed only by top-down initiatives of the EU elites and institutions. It is necessary to have bottom-up initiatives alongside the top-down initiatives to have a chance in effectively constructing European Identity (Weber, 2006 in Öner, 2011: 83). As Fligstein*etal.* (2012: 109) points out, if there is going to be European Identity, it is going to arise from people who associated with each other across national boundaries. The picture also demonstrates that Europeans' belief in the values of inclusiveness and development seems to fade in times of crisis – both within EU borders, and beyond (Rosamond, 2016; Wolff and Piquet, 2022; Jones,

Kelemen and Meunier, 2022; Ulusoy, 2022). In such times, immigrant groups and others seem to have been deemed as 'outsiders' who are seen as a cultural and economic threat (Fligstein*et al.*, 2012: 114). This makes the EU more vulnerable populist right-wing national politics.

Indeed, if Europe has achieved its unity and self-definition generally in response to the 'others' including its own violent past, what does this tells us about how to construct

European Identity in today's context? This question brings us back to the legitimacy of the EU and whether 'institutionalization of conception of European citizenship' could provide a stronger motivation and reasoning for the people of Europe to relationally position themselves as Europeans in the face of new integration challenges.

## 3. Can 'European Citizenship' be an Answer?

There is a wide-spread belief that the EU's very ability to survive, grow, act, andsucceed in its endeavours rests with weather or not EU citizens actively espouse the spirit of the Union. This follows the maxim that "citizens should not only be able to demand a greater and more direct voice and vote in the governance of their increasingly common affairs, but they are also entitled to it" (Bee: 2008: 437). In this context, it makes sense to use the concept of 'citizenship' beyond the borders of a nation state (Lehning, 2001: 241). Therefore, there is a need to provide a clear definition for it before we take this line of thinking further.

### 3.1. Citizenship and Identity

Marshall (1964: 72) defined citizenship as 'full membership of a national community' which means that each individual considered a citizen could expect certain rights of entitlement from the state and in return would be expected to uphold certain standards or duties within the community to be considered a 'citizen'. Marshall's focus was to find an acceptable balance between the forces for inequality and those for equality. That is why his membership entails participation by individuals in the determination of the conditions of their own association. He therefore strongly argued that "the welfare state would limit the negative impact of class differences on individual life-chances and would also ultimately enhance the individual's commitment to the system."

Therefore, in Marshall's model, citizenship or the equality of rights it generates becomes an integrative process counteracting the tendencies towards social division and conflict generated by the economic system. That is why, Marshall put the relationship between the citizen, the state and the social welfare at the centre of his analysis by comprising citizenship into three interlinking aspects: civil, political and social rights[5]. By guaranteeing these rights to all, a welfare state ensures that every member of society can feel like a full member of society. This brings us to the point that citizenship is also an identity[6], an expression of one's membership in a political community (Lehning, 2001, 242). Citizenship is not only limited to a legal status; it is also important for individuals' relationship with the social and political environment.

This means that the concept of citizenship has two constitutive elements: rights and identity (or belonging). Each of these elements must be experienced in a geographical context, regardless of the fact how this geographical context is defined. The function of citizen can be discharged at a multitude of levels, from local government and functional interest groups, on to the region, nation, and eventually on to the cosmopolis (Heater, 1990: 318-319 in Lehning, 2001: 242). This is the reason why European Citizenship has become one of the key concepts in the construction of European Identity in order to overcome the democratic deficit[7] of the EU by generating a common expression of solidarity and common destiny.

As more powers are transferred to the EU, so this notion of deficit has been subject to increasing debate. Indeed, Fligstein*etal.* (2012:110) states that "…46% of Europeans view themselves as having strictly national identity". According to Habermas (2011 in Haygood, 2015), the process of European integration, which has always taken place over the heads of the population, has now reached a dead end, because it cannot go any further without switching from its usual administrative mode to one of greater political involvement. As Habermas (1996) puts it,

[5] Rights to public education, health care, unemployment insurance, and old-age pension. These rights are the traditional components of a welfare state - confronting the risks of sickness, old age, invalidity, unemployment, and poverty.

[6] Marshall, as well, saw citizenship as a shared identity that would integrate previously excluded groups and provide a source of national unity in British society.

[7] Decision-making in the EU is not accountable to EU citizens.

"…wishy-washy coordination, the legality of which is intentionally vague, is not sufficient for rules that require the EU to work as a unit". He therefore argues for a 'democratic constitutional identity' based on an awareness of shared belonging to a political community that extends across the national boundaries.

Today, the term 'European citizenship' is perceived as a condition by which people from different nations should have similar rights to be asserted vis-a-vis the European public courts and public officials (Perez-Diaz, 1998: 235 in Lehning, 2001). This means that European identity is inextricably linked to a new type of citizenship based on multiple forms of alliance

ranging from local town to the union. Citizens are considered necessary to create a political Union and to overcome the democratic deficit (Bee, 2008: 444). Public space, citizenship, public opinion, values and belonging are the tools that the EU is seeking to define in order to

seek the democratic bases of the project and to build European identity.The next question to ask is whether this formula is the best one to pursue for constructing European Identity?

Rawls (1996: 36 in Lehning, 2001) states that

> "The diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern democratic societies is not a mere historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy'.

İçduygu (2002: 288 in Tuna and Özbek, 2014) points out that when considered in the context of international migration, "the institution of citizenship is neither egalitarian, nor sacred, nation-based, democratic or important". Tuna and Özbek (2014: 217) underline that following the increased volume of migration across the globe, citizens of modern nation-states and their borders cannot be determined as clear-cut as they were in the past. In this new era, as they put it,

> "…individuals are not homogeneous like envisaged by the nation-state; they are not tied to a geographical area as their trans-national and inter-border mobility is considerably high. The connection between 'nation' and 'citizen' is untied, and that nation-states

themselves need a new definition for citizenship to bring solidarity and unity in their borders'.

So, what does this mean for the model of European Citizenship and for activation and relative positioning of European Identity by the people of Europe? According to Lehning (2001: 247) "we are in need of a conception of citizenship that can cope with the fact of cultural and ethnic pluralism of modern societies..."

From the Habermasian (2011 in Haygood, 2015) perspective, only solidification and strengthening of a collective European identity can help the EU to overcome difficulties posed by pluralistic and multi-cultural nation-states and perceived democratic deficit. With his concept of "constitutional patriotism", he offers a citizenship concept based on a shared political culture and allegiance. In his model, 'a sense of community' should develop from that common denominator in which the constitutional principles are rooted, in a federal context.

Similarly, Lehning (2001: 247) argues for a 'liberal democratic conception of citizenship', based on the political theory of John Rawls[8]. His idea focuses on finding an overlapping

consensus around a political conception of justice. He also argues for European citizenship that entails accountability, not to the separate peoples of Europe, but accountability to the people of Europe as a whole.

### 3.2.The Use of a Concept that is Identified with Nation-state in an Attempt to Construct a Supranational Identity

Lehning (2001: 240) points out that nation-states and nationalism are relevant to European integration for two reasons: a) they are seen as key obstacles to the EU and b) the formation of European nation-states provides useful parallels, even a model, for understanding some of the processes involved in European political integration and state-formation. Indeed, the debate so far demonstrated that the EU makes use of similar means to achieve the citizen's support (European icons, emblems, flags, mass celebrations and rituals, European anthem, European

[8] The institutions of constitutional democracies should satisfy four conditions: respect for the rule of law; the protection of fundamental freedoms (which includes the right to form independent associations); secure, though

common culture and history). However, if the traditional citizenship approach entered into a crisis of legitimacy and of representation in the late-modern era (Tuna and

Özbek, 2014: 216), what kind of challenges does using the concept of 'citizenship' present in constructing European Identity?

It has now been widely acknowledged that, in spite of many predictions, ethnic identity has not disappeared in modern society. It can be argued that Marshall's view runs into difficulties once the idea of a national unity is challenged by the emergence of increasing social and cultural pluralism. In the face of pluralism, theorists offer civic citizenship based upon principles of right, rather that the common identity (Feyman, 2014). Civic citizenship refers to a set of institutional frameworks which define individual's values, rights and obligations. Beiner's(in Lehning, 2001) definition of republicanism is "the requirement that all citizens conform to a larger culture, but this culture is national-civic, not national-ethnic. It refers to political, not social allegiance".

This version of citizenship applies even more strongly at the level of the European political order. There has always been strong case for European Identity to be constructed on a civic basis as it was considered to be more compatible with national identities (Öner, 2011). However, as Tuna and Özbek (2014) point out republicanism tries to generate citizens through education by adopting policies above differences, rather than making reference to

not constitutionally entrenched, property rights; and: conformity to the principle of majority rule in the making of public policy (Rawls 1971: 221-243 in Lehning, 2001: 251).

them. The experience shows that despite the possession of common rights of citizenship, some citizens may feel excluded (Güney, 2014). Therefore, the literature increasingly focuses on the need of healthy democratisation of citizenship to cope with implications of pluralism (Kadıoğlu, 2014).

Bee (2008) states that citizenship should be re-established through a better consideration of what democracy is. This requires that demands for difference are politicised and moved onto the public domain through participation in the public debate, dialogue and belonging to a

political community. As a political project the EU is built upon common values with the understanding that it covers a mixed geographical area with a lot of people from different nationalities. For a long time, it has been considered as a living example of multicultural and diverse community. If the European Identity is 'cultural diversity' and it needs to exist alongside national identities, it needs to be ready to cope with challenges that nation-states face in the context of demands of difference being brought to the public domain. Like any nation-state, the EU's legitimacy requires to consider the demands of difference as well as to respond to them (Tuna and Özbek, 2014). In other words, if these demands should be accepted as ontological phenomena and inherently carry the possibility of articulated with radicalism, the design of European Citizenship becomes critical if it is ever going to achieve the expected result in the construction of European Identity.

Indeed, Leibfried (1993: 150-151 in Lehning, 2001) states that "…steps taken towards European citizenship at Maastricht in 1991 have not allowed for the metamorphosis of the 'market citizen' (1957-1991) into the 'full-fledged' EU citizen". Jacobs and Maier (1998:20) also states that the creation of the "…'Citizenship of the Union' in the Maastricht Treaty has created a new division between 'Eurocitizens' and 'Euroforeigners' with evident exclusionary consequences for particular groups of immigrants". This brings us the question posed by Lehning (2001: 244):

> "How to revise current definitions of citizenship to accommodate increasing pluralism of modem societies, and how to ensure that citizenship can indeed provide a common experience, identity and allegiance for the members of those societies?"

According to Lehning (2001: 272) "…if a Marshallian conception of citizenship is to be envisioned on a European level, one necessary requirement is positive integration". And positive integration implies solidarity, or 'social rights' on the European-level.' Streeck (1995: 402-403 in Lehning, 2001) also points out that the accomplishments of economic citizenship are certainly not enough to embody an idea of social justice.

### 3.3.The Functionality of Multiculturalist Policies in a Multicultural Environment

Multiculturalism is accepted as an approached emerged by cultural, philosophical and political choices (Tuna and Özbek, 2014: 218). This ideology aims to provide areas where public freely

express themselves culturally. The multicultural process adds the concepts of 'difference' and 'other' to 'individual liberty' and contributes to the development of the connection between the identity and citizenship. In multicultural states the implementation of a three-dimensional (legal, psychologic and political) citizenship policy helps to establish societal unity and stability. However, as Tuna and Özbek (2014: 219) points out, one of the main reasons for unpopularity of multicultural policies (even their moderate versions) by the nation-states is that "they have not been able to provide satisfying solutions to the problems at which they are pointing in the historical process".

Indeed, multicultural policies enable ethnic and minority groups to demand of 'autonomy' which is seen as a genuine threat for the unity and stability of the existing political organisation by nation-states. This means that, in the context of nation-states, multicultural policies are only helpful for the existing political organisation if they are implemented on a limited basis; otherwise they lead to major separatist movements (Kadıoğlu, 2014; Tuna and Özbek, 2014; Rosamond, 2016). What does this mean for the effectiveness of multicultural policies in the establishment of European Identity and Citizenship? Could they really support unification of the society as a whole? This position then leads us to the question of the extent to which multicultural policies are effective in touching the hearts and mind of the EU citizens.

A clearly significant expression, the label 'Unity in diversity' describes the EU's strategy about the European Identity and Citizenship. It is significant because national identity can be a serious concern for the effort to foster a European Identity, as long as people do not understand that this supranational identity is not intended to replace the national one. That is why European Citizenship is conferred on the basis of the nationality principle with the expectation that such definition will make the process of integration more relevant to the individual citizens by increasing their participation, strengthening the protection of their rights and promoting the idea of 'European identity' (Bee, 2008). In this perspective, European identity is the disposition of different nationals to consider themselves, their compatriots and their foreign fellowEuropeans as equal members of the European community: it refers to equal concern and respect. This approach is based on the aspiration that the differences among nation-states do not necessarily have to be transformed into a conflict. However, experience shows that they are if at least one of the groups in a given social system perceives its situation as inferior and its interests as endangered.

For the formation of European Identity and deepening of the EU, political leaders have taken a number of innovative steps: the direct elections to the European Parliament introduced in 1979, the 'Citizenship of the European Union' established by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the Charter of Fundamental Rights adopted by the first European Convention (2000), the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon signed in 2004 and 2007 respectively, both aimed at making the EU more effective and democratic, that is 'bringing it closer' to the 500 million citizens.Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate has brought a set of initiatives and specific programmes in order to gain visibility with the public opinion.

At the same time, a new and broader conception of citizenship has been proposed, with the implementation of programmes aimed at enhancing an 'Active European Citizenship'. The participatory components of this new form of citizenship have been considered the solution to create processes of identification within the multi-level form of governance of the EU.However, for the first time since the EU's birth, it seems that there is more support to leave the union rather than to fight to preserve it (Haygood, 2015; Arnorsson and Zoega, 2016; Cornelissen, 2022). Although most European Countries have active policies towards integration and multiculturalism, European political elites seem to have created new boundaries between different ethnic groups (Jacobs and Maier, 1998: 20).

The Brexit Process is often referred as the manifestation of 'Identity Crisis in Europe' which represents one of the critical challenges for the continuation of the Project Europe. Brandishing the slogan 'Vote leave, take control', the Leave campaign secured 51.9% of the referendum vote (Dorling, 2016: 3697). What prompted the UK Referendum and reverse the UK's integration into the EU? As Arnorssonand Zoega (2016) put it "why a country known forthe strength of its institutions, the tolerance of its population and an outward looking and measured foreign policy…" unilaterally decided to withdraw from the EU? Why reciprocally advantageous economic integrations between the UK and EU have been unable to propel the UK to play its part in the integration process?

Brexit as the forerunner of the disunity movement shows that insisting on a transnational political organisation based on laws, rights and duties lacks certain concreteness necessary for people to rally behind (Taylor, 2017; Wolff and Piquet, 2022). It is clear that the UK public did not want to abandon its nation-state in pursuit of the perpetual peace for Europe (or beyond).

In contrast, they have drawn attention to the EU's greatest crisis of faith: shaping national sovereignties to co-exist with a supranational European identity. It is also clear that for critics of the EU, its efforts to forge a European identity have been portrayed as a threat to national cultures and identities (Rosamond, 2016; Jones, Kelemen and Meunier; Cornelissen, 2022).Using the Brexit as an example, Arnorssonand Zoega (2016) also show that the leave camp was strongest in the UK regions that prospered during the industrial revolution in manufacturing and declined due to globalisation at both the end of the 19th and the end of the 20th centuries. Morgan (2017) supports this view by stating that the UK public's disaffections concern the quality and pressure on public services, wages and income levels, population growth and cultural change.

At this point, Cohn (2012) points out the cross-border immigration[9] as another aspect of the deepening of the European integration and how it has created problems initially in the Schengen Area and later on for the EU in general. Barigazzi (2017 in Morgan 2017) also underlines that heavy internal and external migration and the willingness of members to secede caused further divisiveness among member states. The voter motivations for Brexit conform to these

statements: Arnorssonand Zoega (2016) find that one objective of the leave camp appears to be to reduce the flow of immigrants coming mostly from Eastern Europe. Therefore, according to Rosamond (2016), Europeans do not actually seem to believe in the values of inclusiveness and development in times of crisis – both within EU borders, and beyond.

Tibi (2013: 48) argues that multiculturalism is not "cultural relativism that argues 'anything goes'". He instead offers cultural pluralism which approves diversity but also requires that "…pluralism has to be combined with the consent to universal cross-cultural core values". He further argues that the EU needs to focus on 'cross-civilizational bridging' to establish shared values uniting different cultures. This may be the only way to deal with the current cultural tensions and re-constructEuropean Identity while preserving its inclusivity in the age of

[9] The Arab Spring uprising began to create problems in the Schengen Areas when France shut its borders to trains carrying African migrants from Italy in April 2011. The problems increased with the large movement migrants from Syria, Iraq and elsewhere to Europe in 2015. Germany and other EU countries rejected Italy's proposal to open more European ports to rescue operations carrying migrants.

globalisation. Bee (2008) and Soysal (2002 in Bee, 2008)'s response to this challenge to consider the EU as a multi-level governance system, being characterised by different levels (supranational, national, regional, local) and with different patterns of identification across those different levels. Indeed, the results of Euro Barometer show that a) identification with the EU among EU citizens lags considerably behind attachments to their respective national states, and b) it seems unlikely that European Identity, with the EU as its political foundation, will generate the sorts of passions and loyalty that people feel towards their nations (European Commission, 2021).

As Bee (2008) points out the EU citizenship is much more legal than political reality. Despite well-established supranational political institutions, citizens have little in the way of a European political consciousness and are not given much encouragement nor facility to engage in a consistent political dialogue with these institutions. The Union's institutions do not have a relationship with the general public that remotely compares with that of national institutions. This position indicates that European Identity needs to fit within the multi-level structure of the EU, in which different publics with different sources of power interact and develop practices, as well as "…being broad enough to accommodate a diverse range of cultural experiences" (Bee, 2008). In this context, the task is now to bring European issues and debates in the local arenas, in order to raise up concerns and to spread the feeling that 'Europe' can be easily accessed.

Both Habermas and Lehning state that those who are affected by political decisions should be able to participate in legitimating activities of their common affairs. They further argue that what is necessary for the development of shared European identity is the implementation of liberal democratic European citizenship and that only this shared citizenship identity will supersede rival identities based on, for instance, ethnicity. That is why, Lehning (2001:264) states that 'liberal democratic citizenship is, in fact, a plea for solidarity and tolerance among the citizens of the European Union'.At the same time, Martin (1995: 17) states that we are all cultural hybrids. This universal cultural hybridation points to the fact that beside cultural specificities, there are many features common to several or all cultures, even if they are expressed in various ways. Connections and linkages allow for the circulation of cultural traits, those which are specific as well as those which are common, under their many shapes. It is

because of this circulation that cultures change, and that cultural and social innovation is possible.

Klein (2013: 63) also points out that identity is worked from bottom-up (cultural) and topdown (political) and the most important thing is their interplay. His view is that attaching core-values to the EU and its constitution will not level the democratic deficit. He further argues that not fixing identity means accepting diversity and acknowledging different experiences and conclusions from them. According to him the basis for European politics should be the mere willingness to cooperate out of choice and necessity at times. Therefore, he puts "…openness on the margins, the ability to think of and practice borders in a non-linear way, to understand them as places crossover…" at the centre of his analysis for generating an open debate about Europe.

In this context, Bee (2008: 432) draws attention to the structure of the Public Sphere and the form assumed by Europe as a communicative space beyond the nation state. He states that creating a trans-national public 'space' for debate and interaction between institutions and citizens is essential in order to generate public support and a sense of belonging. According to him, only such an approach could enable policy makers to stay in touch with European public opinion, and could guide them in identifying European projects which mobilize public support.

This emphasis is quite important, as it shows how the importance of the way in which communication is represented. It also highlights the growing need for establishing strong lines of communication with the citizens of the EU by the EU. The leaders have to be real leaders to convince people about what is necessary for the union. There is also the role of national politicians in informing their citizens about the EU. Currently they general blame the EU for problems in their member states. Construction of the European identity demands a political vision, but not from the EU officials. The public opinion confused about the expansion of the EU and about what the EU means to them. That is why the political attitude of the national government towards Europe and the involvement of national leaders in the European construction are the most important and effective things in the construction of a European identity (Öner, 2011: 95).

In addition, Streeck (1995: 402-403 in Lehning, 2001)'s emphasis on social policy draws attention to the need for central re-distributive measures to generate the required public support.

Indeed, Leibfried (1993: 150-151 in Lehning, 2001) highlights the importance of the battle for the European Social Policy. Lehning (2001: 267) also points out that although

> "shared citizenship identity may be fostered by participation in a common set of political institutions on a European level, but the question remains if this does generate a sense of solidarity that is strong enough to secure Marshallian (social) rights and duties."

## 3. Conclusion: Possible Ingredients of Situational European Identity

The core values of European integration have been based on three guiding principles: preserving peace and stability, protecting democracy, human rights and freedom, overcoming divisions and solidarity. This is done with the expectation that they work as a point of reference for political action.This studyhowever demonstrates thatthe EU might fail in generating a distinctive supranational identity without a real commitment to the founding liberal principles of the original European projectgiven the current world of cascading crisis.

Using the Brexit and member states' response to migration as examples, it underlines the fact that economic integration, political integration and societal integration moves at different speed and in a non-linear fashion. This temporality creates unstable grounds for unification in the EU and leads to important tensions with regard to the acceptance of integration on the part of the citizens, particularly when these have profound consequences on their way of life.

Indeed, defining European identity cohesive enough to combat the cultural, economic and political troubles of a modern world continues to challenge EU politicians. It appears that despite the decades of work to institutionalise a common European identity, as a means of making citizens of the EU feel a transnational belonging, there is currently no real consciousness to belong together and the self-celebration of a political community and no great capacity in terms of social mobilisation. Indeed, the long-established structure of citizenship is being questioned by the transnational processes in a world of cascading crisis.

In this new world, the EU currently seems to be abandoning its liberal roots in favour of a search for new, divisive identities. More importantly, the people of Europe do not seem to believe in the values of inclusiveness in times of crisis both within the EU borders or beyond. In such periods, the political fragility of the Union tends to give way to a political discourse focusing on national identity, immigration, sovereignty, workers' rights, and politicaleconomic

needs.While this may seem understandable for contemporary Europeans with no memories outside of a unified and borderless Europe; it is a hard to accept phenomenon for the pre-EU generation.

Taking the 'European Citizenship' as a fundamental component of constructing 'European Identity', this study demonstrates that despite its shaky grounds a collective European Identity is key to overcome the difficulties posed by pluralistic and multi-cultural nation-states and perceived democratic deficit in this new world marked by multiple crisis.To be effective in this mission, 'European Citizenship' should enable people of Europe who are affected by political decisions to participate in legitimating activities of their common affairs. Only a liberal democratic take on the shared citizenship will be able supersede rival identities based on, for instance, ethnicity and will createa plea for solidarity and tolerance among the citizens of the EU.

Focusing also on how identity works from bottom-up (cultural) and top-down (political) and on their interplay, it shows that connections and linkages that allow for the circulation of cultural traits will enable social innovation in this European public-sphere. It therefore identifies creating a trans-national public 'space' for debate and interaction between institutions and citizens as another essential component of the situational European identity due to its ability to generate public support and a sense of belonging. This space is also needed for EU policy makers to stay in touch with European public opinion which is critical for identifying projects which mobilize public support.

Finally, the study further emphasises the European Project can no longer only rely on the deepening and widening of economic integration (increased interdependence) and law-making institutions (upholding institutions) for its success. If member-states are sufficiently mature, these issues can be addressed in a democratic fashion with the view of the safety of world citizens. This also means that a stronger emphasis on social policy and re-distributive measures required for gaining public trust. In other words, for the human agents to conform to

Kant's conditions for universal hospitality, the EU will need to develop its education and social models further to capture global tolerance and trans-culturalism.

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