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**The Southern Separatist Movement and the Civil War Years in Sudan, 1955-1972<sup>1</sup>**

**Sudan'da Güney Ayrılıkçı Hareketi ve İç Savaş Yılları, 1955-1972**

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### Abstract

The diversity regarding the social construct of Sudan, co-ruled under Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, during the former half of 20<sup>th</sup> century led to remarkable crises with the administrative organisations commencing to be instituted during the process of transition into modern governmental structuring. The Southern Sudanese, unable to adapt to the Northern social construction prioritising Islam and Arabic culture regarding language, religion and traditions, claiming equal rights concerning newly organised institutions sparked civil unrest. Upon independence, Southerners struggled against the central government in an organized way to have more say on the future of their country. The dominant, sovereign and center-oriented policies of the Northerner leaders posed as the trigger underlying the Southerners being radicalized with their discourses incorporating initially autonomy, and later total independence. The 1960's, when the independence effort of the nation was carried out via armed organisations systematically, not only eradicated the peaceful atmosphere, but also brought out hostility between the parties formidable to overcome. This study analyzes the representation issue (South-North Rivalry) regarding institutions during pre and post-independence periods and the political processes bringing forth the civil war.

**Keywords:** Sudan, South Sudan, Separatism, Autonomy, Civil War.

### Öz

20. yüzyılın ilk yarısında İngiltere ve Mısır'ın eş idaresinde yönetilen Sudan'ın toplumsal yapısındaki çeşitlilik, idari kurumların tesis edilmeye başlamasıyla modern devlet yapılanmasına geçiş aşamasında önemli krizlerin doğmasına neden olmuştur. Dil, din ve gelenekler bakımından Kuzey'in İslam'ı ve Arap kültürünü önceleyen toplumsal yapısına uyum sağlayamayan Güney Sudanlıların, yeni organize olan kurumlar üzerinde eşit haklar talep etmeleri iç huzursuzluğun çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Bağımsızlık sonrasında Güneyliler, ülkelerinin geleceğinde daha fazla söz sahibi olmak için Merkezi hükümete karşı örgütlü olarak mücadele etmişlerdir. Kuzeyli liderlerin baskın, egemen ve merkeziyetçi yönetim biçimleri, Güneylilerin otonomi ve sonrasında tam bağımsızlık söylemleriyle radikalleşmesinin arkasındaki itici güç olmuştur. Ülkenin egemenlik mücadelesinin silahlı örgütler aracılığıyla organize olarak yürütüldüğü 1960'lı yıllar Sudan'daki toplumsal barışı ortadan kaldırdığı gibi taraflar arasında onarılması güç düşmanlıklar yaratmıştır. Bu çalışmada Sudan'ın bağımsızlık öncesi ve sonrasında kurumlar üzerindeki temsil meselesi (Güney-Kuzey mücadelesi) ve iç savaşa neden olan politik süreçler analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Sudan, Güney Sudan, Ayrılcılık, Otonomi, İç Savaş.

### Extended Abstract

Sudan, which was administered jointly by Britain and Egypt, was one of the regions where demands for independence were strong after the Second World War. While the process of achieving independence was spearheaded by Northern Muslims, Southerners also sought to have a say in determining the future of the country prior to its declaration of independence. The growing demands of the Southerners during the 1953-1956 respecting autonomous administration were manifested in the 1955 Torit Uprising, which led to years of civil war that had a pervasive impact on the country.

Despite the fact that British administrators collaborated with more educated Northern Muslims during the Condominium period, they distinguished between Southerners and Northerners with regard to their awareness of Africa through missionary activities. Furthermore, following Sudan's independence, Egyptian influence was exerted through the use of language, religion and culture, which contributed to the intensification of the North-South division in Sudan. The political approaches of Sudanese politicians, which tended to ignore the South, exhibited a significant impact on the growth of internal turmoil in Sudan despite the influence of external factors. In particular, Sudan being perceived as an Arab and Muslim country by the deviated leaders concern among the significant non-Muslim African population residing in the south. It is important to acknowledge that, due to the relatively limited educational opportunities available to Southerners compared to those in the North; the majority of leaders spearheading internal uprisings were either educated in the West or supported by it. Despite the fact that the Anya-nya organisation was established in the South, it is challenging to assert that the Southern uprisings had constituted a mass movement until the 1980s. Notwithstanding the aforementioned circumstances, the six-year military dictatorship in Sudan had a profound impact on the Southerners. In this context, the notion that Northern political figures would suppress the Southerners' demands through the use of coercive measures has been entirely discredited. In the democratic era that followed 1965, Southerners began to engage in organised resistance against Northerners.

The Sudanisation movement, with the support of Britain, facilitated the appointment of educated Muslim Northerners to all bureaucratic mechanisms of Sudan. The exposure of non-Arab African Southerners to dominant language and cultural elements served to deepen the existing socio-political and cultural divergence. In particular, during the period of military rule between 1958 and 1964, the imposition of Islamic and Arabic culture on the Southerners resulted in their significant exodus from their homeland. Had the Khartoum central administration pursued a more democratic and conciliatory approach seeking to unite all societal groups in Sudan, the country would have been spared the devastation it experienced. During the civil war years in Sudan, the cultural and regional divisions that had already emerged were further exacerbated. The efforts of the military regime to exert pressure were ultimately unsuccessful, resulting in a reaction from the international community and prompting the Khartoum administration to reconsider its approach. The conflicts between 1955 and 1972 resulted in tremendous damage to both parties. Despite Numeysi's consequent period of political détente, a more violent civil war commenced in the 1980s.

## Introduction

The new administrative and economic system Britain had established over Sudan attained a partial success in Sudan, which was striving to progress. The people of Sudan, with their lingual, religious and racial distinctions, almost remained in the same state as they were under 19<sup>th</sup> century Turkish-Egyptian administration. This case was a fractional result of political struggles of Britain in the South, such as the Congo and the limited interest in the South Britain had because Britain was only paying attention to preventing another force from threatening its status in Egypt through accessing the Nile (Gray, 1971, p. 113; Collins and Herzog, 1961, p. 119, 120). The relationship Britain had based with the Arab Muslim society of Egypt was driving them to cooperate with the Muslim tribes in Sudan, which fitted the flow of history. Due to historical reasons, Britain regarded Sudan as an Arabic colony; therefore, South-North distinction had born no practical correspondence to them until the discourses of Sudanese independence (Aguda 1973, p. 185). The Muslim Arabian tribes in North Sudan had, for centuries, been affiliated with Egypt relating to a diversity of realms, chiefly trade. Naturally, Northerners possessed a relatively superior position compared to Southerners. Hence, these affinity British-Egyptian authorities had towards the North limited the Southern effect on the fate of the country during the period of Condominium. Beginning with 1884, modern Sudanese nationalism constituted the Northern nationalistic movement masterminded and supported by the Southerners. The British, before 1960s, had not believed that Sudan would become independent. Little had been done to close the economic, social and cultural gaps between the South and the North by the time Sudan gained its independence (Beshir, 1980, p. 5; Woodward 1981, p. 381).

In the South, the political steps to facilitate lingual and cultural integration with the North had fallen far behind. Undoubtedly, the struggles among the tribes in the South also had an effect that slowed the change in the South (Collins and Herzog, 1961, p. 122). However, the educational institutions instituted by the British administration like Gordon Collage led to the emergence of a more educated side to claim independence. Likewise, Northern educated youth transformed to be at a position to be the object of British authorities with respect to the future of Sudan as a whole. On the other hand, the Southerners few in number graduated from missionary schools of Britain began to act not only by bearing local patriotic spirit, but also a spirit adopting animosity against the Northerners. Although the fact that Britain overlooked the missionary activities carried out in the South beginning with Condominium had formed an incongruity regarding Northern Muslimism, the distinctions between Arab and African identities, Northern administration's preponderant leadership and political mistakes over South led to the fault lines between North and South to deepen even more (Abd Al-Rahim, 1970, p. 247, 248; Wai, 1979, p.73-75; Warburg, 1881, p. 988.).

The objective of this study is to elucidate the South-North problem by examining the influence of Britain and Egypt, as well as the underlying causes that originate from the internal dynamics of the region in question. It is evident that the racial and cultural elements inherent to Sudan's distinctive internal structure have been the most pivotal factors in shaping Sudan's future trajectory. In order to gain insight into the political and social turbulence that Sudan experienced in the period following its independence, it was deemed necessary to consult the British archives, which contain a wealth of official documents. In particular, the article examined the correspondence of British officials regarding Sudan, where they had been present for a considerable length of time during the post-independence period. Furthermore, the published works of notable British and Sudanese statesmen from that era were also included into this study.

### The Beginning of Resistance in the South

Northern Arabs' discourses of self-determination during 1940 have triggered enlightenment with respect to some fractions in the South making new administrative regulations in their favour. Nevertheless, the beginning of Southern politics dates back to 1947, when the Southern leaders joined Juba Conference (Willis, 2015, p. 285, 286.; Özdağ, 2024, p. 45-47). However, this circumstance did not mean Southerners were deciding for their future. The co-sovereigns and Northern nationalists decided for the future of the South. Moreover, the future status of the South was not even brought to agenda in Juba (Rolandsen and Daly, 2016, p. 66). The fact that Sir James Robertson, the Colonial Civil Secretary, declared south to be a part of the North from then on interpreted as the congregation of Northern Arabs and Southern Black Africans around the same table. The British authorities were aware of the backwardness of the Southerners and expressed in their reports the difficulties of the representation of the Southern provinces (PRO. FO, 141/1192, 31 Mart 1947, Khartoum). The following year, the educated Southern representatives chosen by the Englishman, Robertson, in Juba bore the opportunity to be able to get into the parliament in Khartoum (Malwal, 2015, p. 17, 18; Collins, 1963, p. 19). Thuswise, the Southern representatives happened to wake up to the dawn of a new period.

The status quo instituted in Sudan via Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1899, also recognized the Condominium (Sudan Archive Durham (SAD), 700/10/1-13, 1899). ceased to have effect upon the resolution of autonomous government made on 12 February 1953. During the period of autonomous administration that was to last 3 years, the power of the Governor General of Sudan was placed on an international committee upon having been confined (Holt 1961, p. 162). The elections taking place in December, 1953 resulted in the victory of National Unity Party (NUP) led by Azhari (SAD, 403/10/14, 15 December 1953; Henderson 1965, p. 104). On the path to the independence process, the attention of the public was fixed on the rivalry between these two groups in the North rather than the South-Sudan issue. Although Ismail Al-Azhari was moderate to federal demands to gain the support of prominent Southern leaders, he did not disaffirm Egyptian administrators' being assigned to Southern provinces, leading to the rebellion of 1955 (A.B.H. 1955, p. 429). In actual fact, the impacts this rebellion would pose on the future of Sudan could not be utterly comprehended by the political figures in the North. Besides, the main foundation of the strong objections made by the South was based on Azhari giving less floor to Southerners regarding Sudanization policies to increase his power. Northern interpretation of public prioritizing Muslim and Arab construct concretized through Sudanization movement, and this circumstance did not escape the attention of the South (McClintock, 1970, p. 467). In pre-independence Sudan, top positions in the central government (only 14% British) were left to Sudanese. There was also an increasing number of Sudanese in the Northern provinces, with the exception of the South (SAD, 586/2/1-99, Undated, Macmichael Catalogue). In a way, the Arabism intertwining with religion and culture as well as surrounding Sudanese political elites was not allowing the floor to other agents owing to its conservative structure. Broadly, the will of the Sudanese Arabs to dominate the nation was not only based on their fear of losing the privilege of holding political power but also their faith in that they were naturally embroidered with the power to rule as they were superior to other fractions (Aguda, 1973, p. 186; Young, 2019, p. 3; Bob, 1990, p. 202).

The resolution proposals having been offered by the South since 1953 autonomy were disregarded by the Northern political figures who had been directly communicating with British and Egyptian authorities. Yet, the loose political alliance of the South politically increased its effectiveness through the support they attained from NUP. During the elections of 1953, the president of NUP, Ismail Al-Azhari, had managed to

receive the support of the Southern representatives in the parliament declaring he would especially attend to the demands of the South. Between 1954 and 1958, 8 out of 19 Southern representatives in the parliament were appointed as ministers (Howell, 1973, p. 165; Rolandsen and Daly, 2016, p. 70, 71). When Ismail Al-Azhari was elected the prime-minister, Southern politicians in their parties like Mr. Bullen Alier, later to be appointed as the minister of animal resources, offered a proposal with respect to the appointment of Southerners during the implementation of Sudanization policy. Since Azhari and other Northern politicians opposing to this proposal, the Southern parliament members Mr. Bullen Alier and Mr. Dak, Dei decided to abdicate the cabinet (SAD. 985/5/7, 1965, M.W. Daly Catalogue). Northern political leaders holding central government somehow always cooperated with some Southerners furnishing them with minor authorities inside the parliament or cabinet. Southern politicians always questioned the North. Besides, the president of Liberal Party, Benjamin Lwoki wrote to the prime minister of Britain claiming to be voicing the whole South that he demanded the South to transition to a federation or that it be separated (Willis, 2015, p. 288).

The insurrection, recognized as the Torrit mutiny as it broke out around Torrit, Southern oppositions precipitated in the state of Equatoria in 1955 in Sudan, which was on the verge of independence, stood out as a reaction to Southern leaders not having been taken seriously. (Özdağ, 2024, p. 57, 58) It began as Plan Zande was in progress as a result of Northern officers shooting at crowds during the demonstrations resulting from 300 workers having been fired. Upon the suppression of this rebellion huge masses joined (450 northerners died), 122 southerners were executed upon proceedings (PRO. FO, 371/113626, Khartoum, 20 December 1955; Rolandsen and Daly, 2016, p. 71-72). The investigatory committee formed upon this rebellion detected that some of the leaders in the riots were Muslim (Gray, 1971, p. 118) indicating that various religions and groups gathered under Southern identity. Despite this, it is not possible to consider the reaction of the South as a civil war until the 1960s, due to the lack of regular military training and support from the wider society, and inadequacies in armament (Rolandsen, 2011, p. 212). The insurrection breaking out in Equatoria built up to a degree that it could inhibit Azhari's policies. Within this 3-year transition period during which Sudan was fragile, Khartoum central government quenching the Southern rebellion by force resulted in a major crisis to begin (PRO. FO, 371/113626, Khartoum, 20 December 1955).

Liberal Party, standing as the sole spokesperson in this period, initiated a campaign for federal status. In response to a Southern conference announcement by the Southerners, Azhari stated "*We are a transitional government. We are here to exercise Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, and we have an autonomous status. The treaty declares Sudan a whole...*" (SAD. 985/5/7, 1965, Daly Catalogue)". Later on, to expand his base, he gave the green light to Southerners' demand of federation. Likewise, Southern support was to be obtained for Sudan, which was on the verge of independence (Malwal, 2015, p. 66). In November, 1955, the parliament unanimously determined that the issue of federation be definitely discussed the following year by the constituent assembly. This condition constituted a phase where the Southerners made the North accept them. When Al-Azhari formed the government in January, 1956 right after independence, he granted the eminent Southern leaders Paysama, Lwoke and Buth Dio ministries (Howell, 1973, p. 166). Later, the constituent assembly rejected the federation demands. Thus, national consensus could not be achieved in the state-building process and new management crises emerged (Fluehr-Lobban, 1990, p. 617; Kok, 1996, p. 556).

Upon independence, the manifesto, the party programme, put forth by Al-Azhari prioritised the improvement of relations with Arab countries. Moreover, Azhari, the Prime Minister, had obtrusively stated they cared for instituting a defensive alliance with Egypt. Azhari's tendency towards Arabian territory, especially

Egypt, regarding foreign politics showed not only that he had strengthened his authority through acquiring the support of Khatmiyyas, who were Pro-Egypt in their domestic policy, but also that despite its ethnic diversity, he regarded Sudan as an Islamic Arab country (PRO. FO. 371/113592, FR. No: 31, Khartoum, 5 January 1957). Such policies pursued by Azhari both to acquire support from the Arab world and to unite diverse Northern fractions around himself led him to be distanced from the issue of South Sudan. Despite the policies embraced by several fractions that Sudan must be an utterly Islamic nation, Al Azhari rejected a constitution based on Qur'an, which the South advocated as well; nevertheless, he could proceed his communication with the political figures from South Sudan, which was an exemplary show of courage that cannot be overlooked (PRO. FO. 371/113592, FR. No: 34, Khartoum, 14 February 1957). The fact that religion had become the focus of controversy resulted in Christian population in South Sudan, which had been 8% (approximately 230.000 in 1955), to rise even more around 1960's (Willis, 1970, p. 292). But it is not correct to consider the Sudanese civil war as a conflict between the Muslim North and the non-Muslim South. Beyond religion and culture, South Sudanese aspirations for an equal share in Sudan's political life form the core of the struggle (Bob, 1990, p. 203).

Prime Minister Al-Azhari began negotiations with the United States of America with respect to the acknowledgement of Eisenhower Plan on 9 January (PRO. FO. 371/113592, FR. No: 32, Khartoum, 17 January 1957); however, upon the firm objections by pro-Egypt Khatmiyyas, he officially terminated these negotiations in August, 1957 (PRO. FO. 371/113592, FR. No: 46, Khartoum, 16 August 1957). Yet, as he had declared before, Azhari was not involved in any blocs. Sudan declaring impartiality opened up a broader path to Azhari regarding the sovereignty of the North in Sudan domestic politics before the USA and the countries of Western Bloc. Despite all, the voices of South Sudanese people were lost during this period in the competitive environment of the international conjuncture and among the political controversies in the North.

Meanwhile, the internal controversies within NUP caused the party to be split. Al-Azhari Government was replaced by a coalition government led by Abdallah Khalil in July. This political condition also gave way to controversies among Southerners. With the South congregating in Khartoum for the parliament, the separation between the proponents of Stanislaus Paysama and Benjamin Lwoki got more severe in Southern Liberal Party (PRO. FO. 371/113592, FR. No: 41, Khartoum, 6 June 1957). The rivalry among Southern leaders against one another was always to postpone the resolution to the South issue. For instance, the fact that Stanislaus Paysama was blamed for not being a Southerner for having been born in Darfur, a Northern province, showcased that political rivalry rose up to the level where there was regional discrimination (Willis, 1970, p. 289). The intemperate speeches by Northern leaders despising Southerners inconvenienced the Southern politicians collaborating with the North (Gray, 1971, p. 116). Moreover, the fact that central government had suspended development projects like Zande Industrial Plan in Zande and Jabbal Marrah plans in Darfur due to financial handicaps seriously elevated regional tension in the South. The economic troubles in Sudan not only obstructed the establishment of a coalition, but also brought pressure on decision-making mechanisms and inhibited the onsets of development oriented towards the South (Mihatsch, 2021, p. 246).

In the elections of 2 February 1958, the orthodox wing of Liberal Party led by Benjamin Lwoki supported Umma Party, and Lwoki became one of the senators of the Higher House of the Parliament<sup>2</sup> (SAD. 985/5/25, October 1965, Daly Catalogue; Gosnell, 1958, p. 409-417). An oppositional wing led by Stanislaus Paysama, on the other hand, was in a tendency to endorse NUP, and they were not hesitant to utter their regional

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<sup>2</sup> In 1958, there were 1,5 million electors to vote for general elections in Sudan, which was with a population of 10 millions. For comprehensive information on 1958 elections.

separatist demands under a federal constitution. Abdallah Khalil's coalition government led by religious community appointed 3 Southern cabinet ministers as usual disregarding Liberal Party. Upon this practice drawing reaction, on 19 March, Paysama formed a federal bloc with 39 members of the parliament out of 46 parliament chairs allocated to the South. Saturnino Lohure, who was a parliament member and a Catholic priest, was elected the president of the bloc. The parliamentary government preserved its existence until 17 November 1958, when the Sudanese army came into power via a military coup with no blood shed. The new prime minister, General Ibrahim Abboud took over all legislative prerogative and executive powers through the High Council of Armed Forces and its Armed Forces Council (McClintock, 1970, p. 467, 468). Legislative, administrative and judiciary powers were granted to the council of ministers, a team of 13 people 5 of whom were civilians. Prime Minister Abboud promised that he would fulfil his international obligations and maintain the relations with African and Arab countries (Holt and Daly, 1979, p. 171.).

From 1953, when Sudan gained its independence, to the military coup in 1958, the Southern Sudanese people changed dramatically. The political circumstance that villagers had little consciousness was finally slightly brought to the agenda of the side who was able to access education. This way, the freedom furnished by democratic life facilitated the Southern representatives in the parliament to be able to get the support of significant masses (Rolandsen and Daly, 2016, p. 67).

### **Southern Organization upon Military Rule**

The fact that the policy of Sudanization during autonomous administration had pushed the South to second class in terms of the nation's administration left the Southerner youth to get "*militantised*". In 1955, Anya-Nya organization established in 1955 by William Deng was a result of this circumstance. These militant youngsters rapidly organising began to generate a gradually advancing pressure upon the Southern politicians based in Khartoum (Howell, 1973, p. 170; Woodward, 1981, p. 381). The deep divergence regarding the most fundamental aspects of the nation like its language and religion, and the hardships like destructive competition among political parties during the 1956-58 period turned into a political deadlock, doing the groundwork for the army to seize power. The military regime considered this circumstance as a security threat needing solving. Hence, a total pressure was begun to be built up on the Southerners who had become militants by being mobilized (SAD. 985/5/8-9, 1965, Daly Catalogue). General Abboud's military coup overlapping the period when Southern voices were the loudest reflecting their rights caused suspicions that the religious government had been cooperating with the military. The close ties between Abdallah Khalil and General Abboud who had served together as senior officers enforced this suspicion even more (Wakoson, 1990, p. 49). This period constituted a breaking point regarding Sudanese political history as these initial restrictions brought upon constitutional order and democratic life by military conducted to military authorities taking advantage of their authorities as an opportunity to interfere with civil administration.

The regime of General Abboud stopped parties' political activities and acknowledged the law of "*defending Sudan*", which allowed unlimited detention without trial. Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation (SWTUF) was banned and authorities were imprisoned. After all, business organizations were banned alongside with unions being impoverished (Collins, 1976, p. 11). Abboud regime began to pursue an uncompromising policy towards the South, yet little resolution did they make against their problems concerning any realms involving economy. The government contracts in the South were monopolised, and fertile lands were nationalised (Gray, 1971, p. 119). Khartoum Government removed the Christian missionaries whom they accused of supporting the rebellions in the south out of the country; nevertheless, no definitive policy was

pursued with respect to transitioning South Sudan into Islam. The tribal leaders in the South began to resort to bearing Islamic names to ease up the pressure upon them under most occasions. Education was reunited and medium of instruction was turned to be Arabic instead of British. The outcome to this change became the deepening of Southerners' hatred against the Arabs in the North and armed resistance in place of political conflicts (Malwal, 2015, p. 40; Bob, 1990, p. 202; Fluehr-Lobban, 1990, p. 618; Warburg, 2013, p. 107). Justifiably, Southern politicians and effective leaders of the South had to flee abroad. Likewise, Southern issue fell into disfavour until the parliamentary life of 1965. However, this case did not prevent Southern political figures from being organised in various countries (Howell, 1973, p. 171). The South policy of the central government gave birth to serious social intricacies. The number of the Southerners taking refuge in Uganda by fleeing from South Sudan had reached 6 thousand 6 years after the coup (Holt and Daly, 1979, p. 179). The policies of Abboud regime kicked up a fuss in the North as well as the South. The policies of the military regime brought with it the opinions to support the South. For instance, Sudan Communist Party called for an autonomous territory in the South (Beshir, 1980, p. 6; Woodward, 1981, p. 383).

The policies followed by the central administration in Khartoum which had passivized Southerners posed an effect on the swift transformation of Saturnino Lohure's statement in 1958 that "*The South has no intention to be separated from the North, if it had, nothing on the World could hinder the demand to be separated.*" into discourses of independence (Wakoson, 1990, p. 51). From then on, the politicians on exile foregrounded their black-African identity even more, requesting support from international communities based on this racial difference. As a matter of fact, Joseph Oduho and Saturnino Lohure founded Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) in 1961, which was to be renamed "*Sudan African National Union*" (SANU) later on. While President Joseph Oduho mentored Father Saturnino, the Secretary-General became William Deng, returning from Europe (Kyle, 1966, p. 514; Rolandsen, 2011, p. 215). Clearly, SANU was shaped in the same pattern as were contemporary anti-imperialist movements in other African countries like Kenya African National Union and Tanganyika African National Union (Rolandsen and Daly, 2016, p. 80). Father Saturnino had become popular thanks to his strong stance in the parliament and thus was elected the president of Liberal Party then. Father Saturnino had been financially supporting this movement and Oduho from the beginning (SAD. 986/8/6, Daly Catalogue). The leaders of SANU were efficient announcing the existence of Anya Nya, which depended on a local armed rebellion movement without any consistent commanding structure. Anya Nya was expected to be a guerilla force supporting the rights of the South. In August 1963, Anya Nya declared absolute independence (Rolandsen, 2011, p. 215, 223). Shortly, Anya-Nya instituted close relationships with educated decision-makers of the South by ensuring their support. Moreover, the South Sudanese contributed for Anya-Nya to sustain their existence through paying a certain sum of money monthly (Malwal, 2015, p. 32, 33).

The president of the party, Joseph Oduho and those around him determined that they had surpassed the point where a type of relationship was possible conceivable with neither the federation nor the North. From then on, they were to maintain that they would be to assert the utter independence of the South in the name of the ex-African Kingdom of the Republic of Azania (Kyle, 1966, p. 514). On 12 October 1964, the military regime collapsed, and democratic life was restored. With the revolution of October, new and ex-politicians, southern villagers, intellectuals and Southern government authorities brought into open a popular organization by the name of "*Southern Front*". In the declaration made in October, 1964 called "*National Charter*", the South did not take place within the body that instituted the declaration. Hence, the phase where the fall of military regime transitioned into parliamentary regime was constituted. In the elections of April, 1965, the South attained

3 out of 15 ministries, acquiring 1 of the 5 Supreme Council members. The representatives were surely the members of the Southern Front (SAD. 985/5/25, October 1965, Daly Catalogue).

### Round-Table Conference

The transition team declared using force would not resolve the issue of South Sudan. The idea by the transition team to implement a new initiative regarding South policy was a first in the history of Sudan. The government, as an outcome of the dissimilarities between the people in the North and South, not only acknowledged the Southern issue, but also signalled unprecedented political initiatives in the South (SAD. 985/5/4, 1965, Daly Catalogue). Northern and Southern political leaders envisaged a well-attended negotiation table could be the only instrument to satisfy the rightful passions of the South. Besides, these negotiations could constitute the sole mechanism to ease the fears of the North in the case of prospective Southern separation (Beshir, 1980, p. 6). In fact, through contact having been established with SANU, still on exile in Eastern Africa, they were requested to join the “*Round-Table Conference*” so that a peaceful negotiation could take place between the two sides. To the suggestions of the government declaring peaceful solution policies, the Southern front responded positively with Agrey Jaden convinced later; hence, SANU was persuaded to join the negotiations (Malwal, 2015, p. 36, 37). This constituted a significant opportunity for the South to attain a federal government. Actually, most of these groups were separatists; nevertheless, a federal government could be a noteworthy phase to lead to conclusive independence (Howell, 1973, p. 173; Leriche and Arnold, 2013, p. 24). The general amnesty demand by some Southern leaders regarding the Southerners on exile in other countries was approved. As a consequence, the government of Khartoum declared general amnesty to be effective upon 1955, January covering the Sudanese in these countries having conducted several negotiations with government of Uganda. Thereupon, the leader of SANU refused to return until the status of the South was determined. Nevertheless, within several months, Southern leaders including SANU made a decision to participate in the conference, which they regarded as an opportunity (Holt and Daly, 1979, p. 1785). The plebiscite proposition made by SANU and Southern Front with respect to the Southerners being able to determine their own future was put on the agenda of March, 1965 Round-Table Conference (SAD. 985/5/26, 1965, Daly Catalogue).

The meeting was realized with the participation of the equal number of 18 delegates from each side, an observant committee coming from 15 African countries including the bordering countries. The 7 African countries which participated in the conference and exerted to become an effective part of the resolution were Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, the United Arab Republic and Algeria (SAD. 985/5/7, 1965, Daly Catalogue; Billy Agwanda and Başak Özora, 2020, p. 62). Agrey Jaden left the conference upon his short declaration having expressed the demands of the South definitively; he stated “*There is nothing in common between the North and the South. If you want peace between us as neighbours, leave the South, so that we can have our independence*” (Malwal, 2015, p. 36, 38). However, negotiations were proceeded by the other leaders of the South. The parties made resolutions during the negotiation regarding the normalization of the situation in the South, and the South being given new rights considering every realm. A 12-people committee was appointed for constitutional and administrative reforms (Leriche and Arnold, 2013, p. 24, 25).

The initial steps to be taken for the South to be normalized were bringing back the refugees in neighbouring countries inside the country, supporting the Southerners, whose houses and properties were effaced during conflicts, alleviating the conditions like famine experienced within the South and making research to ensure this. In addition, the cases the upon which the South gained new rights were appointing appropriate, qualified people to administrative posts to Sudanese the administration, ensuring equal

opportunities regarding job and pay, ceasing discriminations based on language, religion and race, being granted the authority to open up private schools, the freedom of manoeuvre, establishing a university in the South, opening up new schools to be run by qualified Southerners (SAD. 985/5/6, 1965, Daly Catalogue).

The resolutions made at the conference indicated that the transitional government took the issue seriously and pointed to genuine exertions of normalization. Besides, these resolutions were to reinstitute the trust of the Southerners towards the Northerners and the government. Yet, the resolutions made during negotiations could not even be put into the phase of implementation. The central government in Khartoum depended the implementation of these resolutions on the Anya-Nya gangs in the South to give in to the army. Essentially, this was not anything likely to be conceded by the South. The Southerners stated that the implementation of the resolution and an agreement on the political and constitutional status of the South was the only way to farewell to arms. This was denied, and policies of peace were reversed by the central government that had been in search of solutions. In fact, the central government could not get the response they were expecting in return for their proposition of territorial dominion, and realized that the Southerners had been evolving to complete separation policies. Although innumerable issues had been discussed and settled during the negotiations, “*the issue of South’s status*” related with the integrity of Sudan was the most critical issue. Consequently, the central government had depended the ensuring of Sudan’s integrity on the total eradication of the organization Anya-Nya, which ran separatist activities (SAD. 985/5/6, 1965, Daly Catalogue).

#### **Transition into Democratic Life and Effective Southern Organization**

Following a 6-year military regime, the political life in Sudan began to revive. The cease-fire agreement between Southern fighters and the central government was violated and Northern soldiers embarked on invading Southern territories again. Northern political figures had developed a fear that the South was to be separated by resorting to force. Besides, they contemplated Western countries supported the separatist activities in the South (SAD. 985/5/13, Bona Malwal, 1965, Daly Catalogue). In addition, the relations with bordering countries had been going through a crisis in a way to expand the Southern crisis. Especially Khartoum’s mediating the delivery of the arms, which were for the rebels in Congo, from Egypt and Algeria drew the reaction of Congo’s administrators. Things went so badly that Congolese rebels withdrew, and the arms dispatched from Khartoum were seized by Anya-Nya, which was in South Sudan. Consequently, the actions committed by Anya-Nya in the first half of 1965 were observed to rise. The chief reason behind the new acceleration of Anya-Nya was probably due to the financial aid and spiritual support Congolese Government provided them with (Howell and Hamid, 1969, p. 302).

Southerners had been objecting to the elections being held in the South from the beginning as elections would not be able to be carried out fairly until the state of emergency was over and they refused to nominate candidates to the elections committee newly constituted in November, 1964. Southern villagers declined to be registered, and attendants refused to go to the polls directly or indirectly. High Council postponed all electoral procedures as they did not have the required freedom in the South. Thus, until April, 1965, the elections were only held in the North. The results did not gain the required majority to UMMA Party to govern on their own. A coalition was to be instituted to designate the new government. Just as NUP was about to draw the parliamentary majority towards themselves, they did not forget that they had handed the government over to the military. Despite each doubt NUP bore, they accepted UMMA’s proposition to coalition (SAD. 985/5/15, Bona Malwal, 1965, Daly Catalogue). Mohammad Mahgoup became the Prime Minister. This coalition owned three fourths of the chairs, and would be able to govern the country without indorsement from smaller

parties. As soon as Prime Minister Mahgoup took his office, he declared he would meliorate the relations with the neighbouring countries and implement a rigid policy towards the South (SAD. 986/8/62, Daly Catalogue).

**Table 1:** General Elections of April, 1965

| Parties               | Chairs | Parties       | Chairs |
|-----------------------|--------|---------------|--------|
| Umma                  | 74     | NUP           | 53     |
| Beja Congress         | 10     | Nuba Congress | 9      |
| Islamic Charter Front | 5      | Darfur Front  | 6      |
| P.D.P                 | 3      | Communists    | 11     |

Reference: SAD. 986/8/62, Daly Catalogue

Mahgoup Government declared that Anya-Nya (Southern Freedom Fighters) had to disarm to restore the law and order on 26 June 1965. The rebellion in the South was endeavoured to be dispersed with the army being entrusted with full authority. Hence, it was stated that the resolutions made at the Round-Table Conference could not be put to implementation until law and order were restored. Consequently, Northerners waged a substantial war against Anya-Nya by characterising them as a terrorist, rebellious and outlaw gang. A significant part of the army was deployed over to the South to exercise control around the territory. As a consequence, the people in the South had to flee to bordering countries. Besides, African Cooperation warned the North regarding their actions. As a result of the mailed fist of the army, lots of people lost their lives in many regions including Juba and Wau (SAD. 985/5/17, Bona Malwal, Daly Catalogue).

With the government of Maghoup coming into power in 1965, especially the pressure he employed over the southerners in Wau and Juba led SANU to take action more actively. SANU, which publicly went live with the participation of 2000 southerners in Omdurman on 11 April 1965, sustained its existence led by William Deng until it was split from within. In addition to SANU and Southern Front, the other small parties were Liberal Party led by Stanislaus Paysama and But Dio and Sudan Unity Party, which was founded by Santino Deng in January, 1965 (SAD. 986/8/109, Daly Catalogue). SANU was more overtly associated with Anya-Nya. After Deng had defected, Agrey Jaden decided to sustain their activities in the interior parts of Sudan by reorganising the organization (SAD. 986/8/72, Daly Catalogue). The supreme commander of Anya-Nya was to become the president of SANU, hence he was to obtrusively relate the party with the army of independence for the first time. However, it was dismembered during Udohu's leadership struggle in Equatoria, and Deng's in Bahr el Ghazal. Equatoria people did not want political leadership to belong to another region. This quotation by Bona Malwal showcases how disjointed South Sudan was: "*The political disputes in South Sudan never end up in unanimity, they tend to end up in more separation*". Thus, South's disability to institute unity led to new formations (Malwal, 2015, p. 33).

During the final week of June, Joseph Udohu and George Kwanai founded Azania Liberation Front (ALF) movement, which was committed to the principle to be utterly separated from the rest of Sudan. Other supporters of ALF were Father Saturnino, Pancrasio Ochieng, Marko Rume and Alexis Mbali. South becoming an independent sovereign power was also SANU's aim, and a short time after ALF was founded, an announcement in compliance with this was made. These two organizations splitting up due to political reasons had the same characteristics regarding their foundations and works, and in the end, ALF favoured the leadership

of Joseph Oduho to Agrey Jaden's. At the end of August, 1965, an attempt was made to unite ALF and SANU under the name of "*Sudan African Liberation Front*" (SALF). The merger of ALF and SANU was realized on 19 December, and owing to the endeavours by a conciliation committee led by Dr. Justo Muludiang, the title of the organization, ALF, was preserved and Oduho became the president while Jaden became the vice-president. Once it was founded, ALF announced its own doctrine (SAD. 986/8/74, Daly Catalogue).

ALF, the supreme authority of which was comprised of 11 members, began its activities in South Sudan. It held its first official meeting in Father Saturnino's headquarters in Sudan with at least 7 members participating on 8-12 July 1966. Incidentally, upon July, 1966, the political competition between Oduho and Father Saturnino caused the administrative council to fall apart (SAD. 986/8/76, Daly Catalogue). ALF, maintaining the utter independence of the South, was able to succeed in neither gaining the support of Anya-Nya nor bringing the leaders on exile together (Holt and Daly, 1979, p. 188). Oduho had to go to Kampala as his authority was disputed.

The rivalry among the leaders in South Sudan had been weakening the Southerners. Naturally, the government of Khartoum was inhibiting the South from reaching wider masses taking advantage of these separations. Despite this, upon a short while, all the groups led by Jaden came together and declared that "*the Interim Government of Sudan*" was established with a major treaty in Angudri in August 1967. On 19 August, when Angudri Congress was held, Jaden explained the history and goals of the struggle. His fundamental goal was not to constitute a party or a front, but a government which could bring together all the elements of Southern leadership. By the utterly civil delegates except for Anya-Nya, the name "*South Sudan Negro Interim Government*" was accepted by 30 favouring votes to 2 opposing votes (The word "*negro*" was dropped in January, 1968). Jaden was elected the president while Camillo Dhol the vice-president. On the days following, Jaden formed a new cabinet. A draft constitution and a flag were prepared. He wanted to determine to combine all types of guerilla camps under a national army called ANAF (Anya-Nya National Armed Forces). An extensional congress was held in South Sudan for the first time. Political figures tried to be successful by congregating over hardships so firmly for the first time. The circumstances like the conventional politician Father Saturnino's death, Oduho being in the East due to his weakening with regard to decision-making and Mondiri's apprehension paved the way for more educated, professional Southern political figures like Gordon Mortat and Joseph Lagu to emerge. Finally, strict compliance with the principle that all fractions were to equally represent the South was a significant factor regarding the establishment of the cabinet (Leriche and Arnold, 2013, p. 25; SAD. 986/8/87, 88, 89, Daly Catalogue). The first cabinet meeting took place in Bangu in January, 1968. Southern Sudanese Gazette began to publish on 1 March 1968 (SAD. 986/8/90, 91, Daly Catalogue).

### **The Southern Policy of the New Period (1965-1969)**

Four different governments served in Khartoum from the elections of 1965 to 1969. Contrary to commonly perceived, these governments embedded politicians with a tendency to compromise and realistic political ideas. Despite the governance of traditional parties, the central governments of Khartoum were not numb towards the regional reactions in the South. In addition, the Southerners in the North were searching for ways to express African political awareness and their own conceptions and reflections. Thus, in March, 1965, "*Southern Front*", which emerged from the Round-Table Conference, and William Deng's SANU founded themselves as the only Khartoum-based Southern political parties. Southern Front, under the presidency of Clement Mboro, was officially registered as a political party in June (SAD. 986/8/108, Daly Catalogue). Despite every impediment, Southern politics completed its organization in cities and their sub-units to a great

extent during the period of 1965-1969. More significantly, the headquarters of both parties served as social clubs where Southerners, even including illiterate immigrant workers, could gather and be accepted (Howell, 1973, p. 174). Southern Front published a daily newspaper called "*The Vigilant*". The Vigilant appealed to a literate mass with its brave discourses promoting the unity of the South. Still, they published a tight rope regarding their discourse of total separation in order not to draw reaction from the central government (Willis, 1970, p. 295).

Meanwhile, Mahgoup Cabinet resigned due to the complications regarding internal affairs, succeeded by the coalition of UMMA-NUP led by Sadiq Al-Mahdi, the grandson of Muhammad Ahmad. Sadiq, coming into power so young, was promising regarding new policies that could resolve the Southern issue. The committee comprising of 12 people constituted as a result of Round-Table Conference presented their report on 26 September 1966, offering a series of constitutional propositions that covered a distance to meet the demands of the South even if it fell behind federalism. The proposed system was a territorial one with the key features specified below (SAD. 986/8/111, Daly Catalogue).

Each region was to hold a constitutional parliament and administration. Administrative power was to be shared between central and regional government. Security forces were to be under the control of the central government. There existed a disagreement regarding the geographical borders of the regions, so the Southern members of the committee stated the South needed to be a whole region. The circumstance where the South was a whole region might yield to a confrontation between two parties, hence the chairman of the 12-person committee, Tousif Mohammad, published a notice as a result of the negotiations (SAD. 986/8/112, Daly Catalogue). The report of this committee was to set the bases of Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 (Wakoson, 1990, p. 23; Leriche and Arnold, 2013, p. 24, 25). Upon the report having been presented, the government of Sadiq did not ask to gather the Round-Table Conference, where the committee would have to report again. Prime Minister Sadiq externalised such an action effectively stating Round-Table Conference constituted a political gap at first. This gap was subsequently filled by the constituent assembly and political parties who had a duty to discuss and resolve national issues. Therefore, instead of revocating Round-Table Conference, Prime Minister Sadiq first held a political parties conference, and subsequently a constitution draft committee. These groups having discussed the report of the 12-person committee rejected the suggestions provided by this committee when much progress had been made. Instead, they put forward a unitary, Islamic constitution draft, which disappointed the southerners. As a matter of fact, this meant everything had to be rewound (SAD. 986/8/113, Daly Catalogue).

Sadiq visited South Sudan a few times in October and November 1966, and made statements with respect to the resolution of the "*South issue*". Meanwhile, at the conference at Addis Ababa during his tour, he declared relating to the South (SAD. 986/8/114, Daly Catalogue): "*there are major tribal groups as well as small ones; if we grant them the right to self-determination, nothing would be left to us.*" The visits paid by Prime-Minister Sadiq to the South were well-received by the people in the region. The flexibility of Sadiq, who had a well-educated and effective personality, regarding his political approaches, encouraged the Southerners.

Prime Minister Sadiq, in every region he visited, stated rebellions taking place around all districts needed ceasing, and elections needed relying upon. As a matter of fact, only Northerners had participated in the elections of 1965 (SAD. 986/8/115, Daly Catalogue). Prime-Minister Sadiq demanded completely new elections be carried out in the South by relieving the 21 parliament members representing the South. Despite the desire for a more democratic parliament to utterly represent the South, elections were able to be carried out in 39 out of 60 parliamentary constituencies. Even under neutral circumstances, it was not a policy calculated

to assure the Southerners of the fact that their democratic rights were pursued (SAD. 986/8/116, Daly Catalogue). The political figures witnessing the policies pursued over the South believed the elections would not have an outcome. Yet, the news regarding the elections yielded to another breakup in the South. While Hilary Logali mentioned they would not participate in the elections again by referring to racial differences regarding African identity, William Deng determined to take part in the elections through the indorsement of SANU stating the only party to represent the South was indeed SANU (Willis, 1970, p. 297).

As a result of the elections held in the South on 8 March 1967, UMMA sent forth 15, SANU 10, NUP 5, Sudan Unity Party 2 and Liberal Party 1 Member of Parliament (SAD. 986/8/121, Daly Catalogue). Unexpectedly, SANU was endorsed by the Southerners, and Clement Mboro attained a superior position compared to Southern Front. It was then contemplated that the determination made by Southern Front to boycott the elections was a mistake. Later on, the rising popularity of Deng inspired Mboro and Logali to campaign more in Southern regions. Deng had trusted Prime Minister Al-Sadiq indeed with respect to the federation; however, the official prime minister, Siddik el Mahdi did not specifically make him an official promise regarding a federation (Malwal, 2015, p. 46). William Teng's discourse "*We demand a federal government system. We advocate the unity of our people.*" posed a wide extent of effect within Sudan. However, SANU's success was devastated by the assassination of William Deng. Both South and North blamed someone for the assassination (SAD. 985/5/33, Aggrey Jaden's declaration, Daly Catalogue). In 1968 the constituent assembly, dominated by the Umma and the NUP, violated article 99 of the 1964 Constitution and passed the constitutional amendment banning communist activities. The Umma Party then insisted on Sudan's transition to an Islamic rule, ignoring the traditions and beliefs of the South (An-Na'im, 1989, p. 16; Bob, 1990, p. 203, 204).

The political crisis breaking out upon the elections reached its peak with the government of Sadiq not obtaining a vote of confidence. Moreover, the competition among the Mahdi family caused deep wounds in UMMA, and they were split into two wings. In place of Sadiq, who was overthrown, Mahgoup became the prime minister. The power hunger of the Sudanese politicians once more deadlock all the mechanisms that could produce solutions to economic and social conflicts in the country. Thus, in 1969, an American diplomat stated (Willis, 1970, p. 297): "*The political parties in the North are almost utterly busy with their efforts to come to power or to retain it; hence, they have little time to allocate to the urgent problems of the country.*" These political crises in Sudan led to a new coup attempt of young officers. Nimeiri was put into power by Free Officers Movement, which was based on the organization within Egyptian army bringing Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser to power (Wai, 1979, p. 76).

When Nimeiri militarily took over the government on 25 May 1969, serious attempts to resolve the South issue had not been taken yet. Nimeiri desired to reinforce his potency via resolving the Southern issue, which had not been able to be resolved although numerous negotiations had been made with that consideration. In fact, Nimeiri compromising with the Southerners was a requirement of the period, because Anya-Nya, organized under the leadership of Joseph Lagu, had barely turned into the only substantial power in South Sudan. Besides, his substantial pressure on the opposition caused his authority to be disputed. Nimeiri's Revolutionary Council pronounced during the historical political memorandum on 9 June 1969 that the Southern region was different from the North historically and culturally, and the unity of Sudan had to be constructed on these objective facts, and that the people of the South bore the right to embrace and enhance their

own cultures and traditions in a socialist Sudan. Diversity was, for the first time, given a legitimate basis given the process of state-construction (Beshir, 1980, p. 6,7; Bob, 1990, p. 204; Young, 2019, p. 3).

Upon 1971, Nimeiri had to have more faith in the army to be able to retain his power. Another reason why Nimeiri approached the South was that his relations with Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were on the verge of breaking up due to the allegation that he had supported communist coup (Wakoson, 1990, p. 23, 24). Nimeiri, who lost his military furnishing source, decided to take more concrete steps that former leaders could not by prioritising the Southern policy. Finally, Egypt's interest in peaceful resolutions between the South and North for more water set the basis of Addis Ababa Agreement of 1973 between Nimeiri and the South. Nimeiri regime negotiating with the South more resulted from the pressure the period imposed than legal or constitutional requirements. Therefore, an agreement to be made with the South was unfeasible to be permanent.

As an outcome of the bilateral negotiations, Addis Ababa Agreement, involving the independence demand of the South, was acknowledged on 27 March 1973. Thusly, the civil war period lasting 17 years ended, and a significant opportunity was taken to reconstruct South Sudan, which had been melting down socially and economically. A part of the civilian society that had to take refuge in neighbouring countries like Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire and the Central African Republic during the civil war was able to return to their land again. Nevertheless, the social and economic life in South Sudan was never restored to its pre-civil war levels (Awad, 1974, p. 88).

### **Conclusion**

The discrepancies the South bore compared to the North with regard to religion, language and race did not play a significant role in Sudanese political life during centuries. During the condominium period of joint Britain-Egypt administration, with Britain as the more effective power (1899-1956), the South Sudanese people are observed to have delved into their identity. The underlying reasons to this may be divided into two, as natural and political. Natural reasons may be classified as the lingual, religious and racial distinctions the Southerners bore compared to the Northerners. The phenomenon of religion imposed more impact on the conservative social construction of the North beyond expectations. While Northern political elites explained on every circumstance that they regarded themselves as a part of Arab world, they disregarded the pagan and Christian values the Southerners embedded. The fact that the Southerners could not be integrated to the Northerners in terms of language prevented the cooperation with Northern political elites who were working with British authorities closely. Doubtlessly, it still remains to be discussed that Sudanese (British) authorities neglected educational activities to facilitate the lingual unity of the South.

It can be stated that the most fundamental factor emerging Southern separatist movements are political developments. The fact that the youth having been graduated from Western educational institutions like Gordon College puzzled their brains on Sudan's status during 1940's and that they organized naturally transformed them into British authorities' interlocutors. This circumstance essentially gave the Northerners the upper hand in terms of determining the future of Sudan, including the South. During these years, Southerners could not exhibit any spontaneous action regarding the future of Sudan. The first sight of the South in Sudan's future can be dated back to the Governor-General of Sudan inviting Southerners to Juba Conference in 1974. Yet, this circumstance does not correspond to the fact that a separatist movement in the South began. Few educated Southerners attending these debates constituted the bases of them developing political consciousness. Even though it is little known to what extent the British supported the Southerners, it is well known that

Southern political elites visited Western countries asking for support. After all, both parties pointed to the imperialist countries as the responsible parties for the crises arising on their side of the field.

The rebellion breaking out in Equatoria after Sudan had gained autonomy in 1955 was the most outstanding emergence to point to with respect to the noteworthiness of the Southern issue. However, the Southern political elites of this period developed inconclusive political manoeuvres which postponed the Southern issue until after the utter independence. Upon independence, Khartoum government considering themselves a part of Arab world and devising discourses accordingly constituted a contradiction of South's African identity which was not Muslim. This case was parallel to the Arabicization and Islamization policies of all institutions within the context of Sudanization. During these years, Southerners founded several political parties and non-governmental organizations to act in an organized way. These organizations grew to support their rights influentially as well. Despite this, Southerners could not have Khartoum central government come to terms with their demands due to their internal conflicts. In addition to this, the military coup of 1958 prevented Southerners from becoming actively organised in Sudan until 1965. In consequence of the heavy pressure imposed on the South, a great number of Southern political figures began to conduct their activities in neighbouring countries. Likewise, Southern issue happened to reach another dimension. Despite all these developments, the civilian governments upon the coup always negotiated with Southerners like before. The fact that Southerners were represented in the North was not a case to be undermined. Already, it had been a tradition that southerners were given 3 of their political figures' ministries in the cabinet. However, these were not enough to resolve the issue of South's status. The first instance that indicated Northern politicians took Southern issue seriously and wanted to find a solution to it became the Round-Table Conference of 1965. The Conference could not transform into a prospect to ensure peace between the parties as the Northern Sudanese politicians did not wish to share their habit of administering Sudan with the Southerners who were not Muslim. In addition, the separatist discourses of the South were considered unacceptable. As a matter of fact, in 1960's, the active strife of the South developed such a fright at Northern politicians that this was the basis of applying excessive force. This internal drift in Sudan deepened the efficacy of the North, thus Southerners evolved from an autonomous status to total independence for whatever the reason was.

Undoubtedly, this civil war in Sudan battered both sides and did not provide either side with the prospects to develop modern institutions following independence. Because the confrontations in Sudan disturbed safety and peace, the governments acceding to power had to pursue more authoritarian and militarist policies.

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