

Administrative Processes and Principles of the Public in Siyasatnamas¹

Siyasetnamelerde Kamunun Yönetim Süreçleri ve İlkeleri

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ÖZET

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Siyasetname,
Karar Verme,
Görevlendirme,
Denetleme,
Cezalandırma.

Siyasetnameler, hükümdarlara ve devlet görevlilerine yönetim hakkında tavsiyeler sunan eserlerdir. Bu tür metinler, yöneticilerin sahip olması gereken nitelikleri, yöneten ile yönetilen arasındaki ilişkiyi, yönetimin kavramlarını, temel unsurlarını ve süreçlerini detaylı bir şekilde ele almaktadır. Siyasetnameler, kamunun yönetiminin esaslarını açıklarken, aynı zamanda ideal bir yöneticinin nasıl davranması gerektiği konusunda rehberlik etmektedir. 10-14. yüzyıllar arasında, Endülüsten Maverünnehir'e kadar uzanan geniş coğrafyada hüküm süren Samaniler, Gazneliler, Karahanlılar, Abbasiler, Selçuklular, Eyyübiler, Memlükler, İlhanlılar ve Timurular gibi çeşitli devletlerin varlığında kaleme alınmış siyasetnameleri inceleyecek olan bu çalışma, eserlerin yönetim süreçlerine dair ortaya koyduğu ortak ilkeleri ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Siyasetnamelerde karar verme, görevlendirme, denetleme ve cezalandırma olmak üzere dört temel süreçten söz etmek mümkündür. Bu çalışma, karar verme sürecini kanuniyet (yasallık), meşveret (danışma) ve müsavat (eşitlik); görevlendirme sürecini emanet (sorumluluk), liyakat (yeterlilik) ve menfaat (yararlılık); denetleme sürecini memuriyet (devlet görevlisi), raiyet (halk) ve adavet (düşman); cezalandırma sürecini ise kanuniyet (yasallık), tedbirat (caydırcılık) ve muvazenet (eşdeğerlilik) kavramları çerçevesinde belirlenen ilkeler doğrultusunda değerlendirmektedir.

ABSTRACT

Keywords:

Siyasetnamas,
Decision-Making,
Assignment,
Supervision,
Punishment.

Siyasetnamas are works that offer advice on administration to rulers and state officials. These types of texts thoroughly address the qualities that administrators should possess, the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, the concepts, fundamental elements, and processes of administration. Siyasetnamas explain the principles of public administration and at the same time provide guidance on how an ideal administrator should behave. This study, which examines the siyasetnamas written during the existence of various states such as the Samanids, Ghaznavids, Karakhanids, Abbasids, Seljuks, Ayyubids, Mamluks, Ilkhanids, and Timurids, which ruled in a wide geographical area ranging from Andalusia to Transoxiana between the 10th and 14th centuries, aims to explain the common principles these works present regarding administrative processes. Four basic processes can be identified in the siyasetnamas: decision-making, assignment, supervision, and punishment. In this study, the decision-making process is addressed in accordance with the principles determined within the framework of the concepts of legality, consultation, and equality; the assignment process is examined within the framework of the concepts of entrustment, merit, and interest; the supervision process is discussed within the framework of the concepts of officialdom, subordination, and enmity; and the punishment process is addressed within the framework of the concepts of legality, deterrence, and proportionality.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Siyasatnamas are didactic works written in prose and verse that provides advice to rulers and state officials on the principles of administration (Devellioğlu, 1986:101). The term is derived from the combination of two words: "*siyasat*", denoting the path to be followed in administration, and "*nama*", signifying a written work in Persian. The subject matter of siyasatnamas encompasses the characteristics of the ruler, the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, the concepts, elements, and processes of administration. The objective of these works is to provide rulers with practical and theoretical information, thereby enabling them to demonstrate more effective and fair administration. The majority of research on the history of administration is concentrated on the period of the Ottoman Empire, with a particular emphasis on the analysis of its organizational structures. This study will adopt an alternative approach to the existing literature on the subject. It examines siyasatnamas written between the 10th and 14th centuries in the region extending from Andalusia to Transoxiana in the presence of states such as the Samanids, Ghaznavids, Karakhanids, Abbasids, Seljuks, Ayyubids, Mamluks, Ilkhanids, and Timurids. It discusses the processes and principles of administration through these works.

Given that the selection of the siyasatnamas is defined as occurring prior to the advent of the Ottoman Empire, the research period is thus limited to the 14th century. The chronological starting point is the 10th century. The 10th century marks a pivotal turning point and the advent of a new era in the geographical regions encompassed by the selected works. From 945 onward, Baghdad lost its status as a state center due to the intensifying pressure on the Abbasids from the Buwayhid dynasty. Over the following five centuries, the former caliphate society was replaced by a society with more than one understanding of administration, which continued its existence under independent rulers. During this period, no city, including Baghdad, could serve as a cultural hub. The Berber dynasties in the Maghrib region were unified in Spain and the Maghrib, while those in Egypt and Syria were unified in Cairo, along with other Arab lands. Iranian countries developed and spread their language, Persian, which became the most important carrier of culture. Muslims in Eurasia built a civilization of their own, as did the trade-oriented states of Muslims on the shores of the Indian Ocean (Hodgson, 1995:3,9). Since the siyasatnamas analyzed in this study were selected from these regions, the research period is defined as spanning the 10th to the 14th centuries².

In the classical understanding of management, as exemplified by Henri Fayol, there are five fundamental management functions: planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating, and controlling. Similarly, four fundamental processes can be identified in siyasatnamas: decision-making, assignment, supervision, and

2 The works "*El-Medinetü'l-Fazıla*" and "*Es-Siyasetü'l-Medeniyye*" were authored by Farabi, a prominent figure within the Meshşai school of thought. The "*Pendname*" was authored by Sebüktegin, the inaugural ruler of the Ghaznavid State. "*El-Ahkâmü's Sultaniye*" was authored by Maverdi (974-1058), a Shafi'i jurist. "*Nehcü'l Belağa*" was written by the Mu'tazila author Sharif al-Radi. "*Âdâbü'l-Mülûk*", authored by Ebû Mansur es-Sealibi (961-1038), encompasses works on comparative philology, poetry criticism, and politics within Arabic literature. It was dedicated to the Turkish emir of Khwarazm, Ebu'l-Abbas Mamun b. Mamun Khwarazmshah. Written by the Great Seljuk vizier Nizam al-Mulk (1018-1092), "*Siyeru'l-Müluk*" was dedicated to the Great Seljuk ruler Melikshah. The "*Kutadgu Bilig*" was authored by the celebrated poet and statesman Yusuf Khass Hajib (1021-1070), who was nurtured within the Karakhanid State. Amir Keikavus wrote "*Kabusname*" for his son Gilan Shah. "*Nasiha-tu'l-Muluk*", a text written by Ghazali (1058-1111), an Ashari theologian, Shafi'i jurist, and mystic, was likely presented to the Great Seljuk Sultan Muhammad Tapar or Melik Sancer. "*Nahju's-Suluk fi Siyase-ti'l-Muluk*" was authored by Abu Najib Suhrawardi (1097-1168), a sufi, jurist. "*Siracü'l-Muluk*", written by Maliki jurist Muhammad b. Turtushi (1059-1126), was dedicated to Ma'mun al-Bataihi, the vizier of the Fatimid Caliph Amir-Biahkamillah. "*Telhisu's-Siyase*" was authored by Ibn Rushd, a philosopher, jurist, and physician who represented the Andalusian Meshsha'i school (1126-1198). The "*Yasa*" is attributed to Genghis Khan (1155-1227), the founder and inaugural ruler of the Mongol Empire. "*Mirsadü'l-İbad*" was authored by Najmeddin Daye (1177-1256), a Kübrevi sheikh and commentator. "*Tezkiretü'l-Hareviyye fi Hiyeli'l-Harbiyye*", a text written by Ali bin Abu Bekr al-Kharawi (1147/1148-1215), a traveler, poet, ambassador, and counselor, was dedicated to al-Malik al-Zâhir Ghâzi, the son of Salâhaddin-i Ayyûbî. "*Ahlâk-ı Nasirî*" was authored by the Iranian scholar and philosopher Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (1207-1274), a representative of the Bâtinî school, in the 13th century. "*Nasihât al-Muluk*" was authored by Sadi Shirazi (1218-1291), a prominent figure in Persian literature. "*Siyasetü's-Şeriyye*," a treatise written by Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328), a Hanbali jurist and Salafi scholar, was dedicated to Muhammad b. Qalawun, the seventh ruler of the Mamluk State of the Bahri Dynasty of Turkish origin, who reigned in Egypt between 1279 and 1290. "*Al-Fahri*" a text written by the Shiite historian Ibn Tıqtaqa (1262-1309), was dedicated to Fahreddin İsa, the administrator of Mosul under the rule of the Ilkhanate ruler Gazan Khan. "*Tahrirü'l-ahkam fi tedbîriehli'l-İslâm*" was authored by Badraddin ibn Jamaa (1241-1333), a jurist of the Mamluk period. The "*Timur Tüzükati*" was authored by the founder and inaugural ruler of the Timurid State, Amir Timur (1336-1405). The "*Mukaddime (Third Part)*" was penned by the historian, social scientist, philosopher, politician, and statesman Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406).

punishment. This study focuses on the decision-making process, examining it through the lens of the principles of legality, consultation, and equality. Similarly, the assignment process is discussed in terms of entrustment, merit, and interest, while the supervision process is analyzed in light of the principles of officialdom, subordination, and enmity. The punishment process is discussed on the basis of the principles determined within the framework of the concepts of legality, deterrence, and proportionality.

The decision-making process is informed by a set of rules that are based on a legal framework. In the context of decision-making, where consultation is a fundamental aspect, the law applies to all individuals involved. In the context of appointments, the prevailing view is that public duties should be regarded as entrusted, that civil servants should be appointed on the basis of merit, and that the public interest should be taken into account in appointments and dismissals. In terms of supervision, the priorities are subject to change based on the oversight of state officials, the public, and those considered enemies. The texts posit the necessity of being aware of the situation of the ruled and of maintaining control over them. They also discuss the methods of supervision and the consequences of supervision and lack of supervision. Regarding the control of enemies, the authors emphasized the vital role of spies, the necessity of employing military force only as a last resort, the importance of not underestimating the capabilities of one's adversaries, the value of maintaining positive moral standards and benevolent intentions in one's approach towards enemies, and the necessity of responding to each enemy with an equivalent force. In the context of punishment, they proposed that penalties for criminal offenses should be determined in accordance with the relevant legislation, that they should be sufficiently deterrent to prevent reoffending, and that they should be commensurate with the gravity of the crime in question.

A recurring theme in *siyasatnamas* is the notion of a form of administration that is inherently reliant on maintaining a delicate equilibrium. The authors place significant emphasis on the establishment of administrative balance in the processes of decision-making, assignment, supervision, punishment, and in the relations between the ruler and the ruled. The term "*administrative ... of the public*" is used in the study's title in reference to the concept of "*public*" as "*people, community*", whereas "*public administration*" is understood as a systematic field of study in the modern era. Accordingly, the term "*administrative ... of the public*" is preferred over "*public administration*".

2. DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND PRINCIPLES IN SIYASATNAMAS

The decision-making processes in *siyasatnamas* are predicated on the assumption that laws constitute the foundation of the state. It is incumbent upon the ruler to be knowledgeable about, safeguard, and enforce the laws. The ruler, who is expected to take a definitive stance, is advised to seek consultation when making judgments. The significance of consultation is underscored in works that encompass a comprehensive range of details, from the procedures of consultation to the qualifications of the individual to be consulted. They advanced the position that all individuals, including those in positions of authority, should be treated equally under the law.

2.1. Grounding Decisions in Laws: The Principle of Legality

One of the most fundamental tenets of decision-making processes in *siyasatnamas* is the assumption that all decisions are ultimately justified by reference to a law. The fundamental principles that underpin the establishment and functioning of administrations collectively constitute the *raison d'être* of states. These laws, which the rulers are obliged to obey, serve as the primary determinant of the relations between the ruler and the ruled. The concept of legality implies that decision-making processes should be grounded in the rule of law, and that discretionary decisions should be avoided.

The authors argue that the state will lose its inherent charm and majesty if it is not bound by any law. They equate the necessity of a ruler with the necessity of laws, suggesting that the two are inextricably linked. If the ruler enforces the laws in accordance with the requisite standards, thereby strengthens his sovereignty (Timur, 2010; Tusi, 2013). Yusuf Khass Hajib posits that the proper organization of laws is essential to preventing oppression, the assurance of justice, and the promotion of the people's prosperity. In his view, tyranny represents a destructive force that engulfs those who are exposed to it, whereas law serves as a source of beneficial growth (Yusuf Khass Hajib, 2010:166). Sebuktegin asserts that the ruler must recognize the source of their authority as contingent upon the establishment of laws and therefore must be diligent in their implementation (Sebuktegin, 1975:229). In establishing the laws, it is essential to consider the welfare of the ruled and the financial stability of the state.

The development of administrations is contingent upon the establishment of laws, which serve to maintain order and facilitate the attainment of competence. The observance of the law results in the transformation of social evil (nikmat) into social good (nimet) (Tusi, 2013:300). The continued existence of administrations is contingent upon the dissemination of knowledge regarding the laws in question, the safeguarding of these laws, and the implementation of said laws. The implementation of laws by rulers who are aware of the ruled is the primary requirement for maintaining order (Tusi, 2013; Yusuf Khass Hajib, 2010). The power that Ibn Taymiyyah listed among the elements of the *wilayah*, along with entrust is directly correlated with his knowledge and enforcement of the laws (Ibn Taymiyya, 1999:39). Similarly, Suhrawardi argued that the capacity to enforce legal provisions is indispensable for the resolution of administrative issues (Suhrawardi, 2013:41-42).

Genghis Khan, who asserted that administrations would be destabilized if khans and beys did not adhere to the established laws, also established the foundations of his authority on the rule of law (Genghis Khan, 1947:177). The virtue of wisdom, as identified by Ibn Rushd as a quality inherent to administrations, pertains to the possession of average qualities in understanding and applying laws (Ibn Rushd, 2013:87). The ruler, who is defined as a legislator, is first and foremost obliged to comply with the laws that they themselves have established. Furthermore, they are not permitted to make any demands of their officials that are contrary to the law (Al-Ghazali, 2016:71). The fact that even the ruler does not take any action contrary to the laws demonstrates that the rules should possess a sufficient degree of imperative qualities. The imperative and validity of the laws preclude any possibility of their violation (Nizam al-Mulk, 2015:83). If the laws are valid for all members of society, they will regulate the relationship between the ruler and the ruled by binding the ruler to them.

One of the crucial factors in the enactment of legislation is the capacity to persevere in decision-making. Ibn Rushd asserts that the ruler should act with decisive action in the implementation of laws and should not abandon their views, even in times of necessity (Ibn Rushd, 2013; Suhrawardi, 2013). The importance of ensuring the accuracy and stability of judgments as a result of determination cannot be overstated, as it is a crucial element in both the establishment of power and the maintenance of social order (Jamaa, 2010; Tıqtaqa, 2016). Tusi, in addition to considering the role of the ruler in determining competence, also emphasized the significance of the collective perseverance of both the people and state officials in achieving this goal (Tusi, 2013:293). The determination of the ruler and state officials to continue the implementation of the laws by observing the rights of the ruled will facilitate the administration.

2.2. Ensuring Consultation: The Principle of Consultation

Another crucial element of the decision-making process in siyasatnamas is the principle of consultation. Consultation signifies the act of soliciting the opinion of another individual on a particular matter, or the act of consulting. Additionally, consultation is one of the fundamental principles that a ruler must adhere to when making decisions. The act of consultation itself is a crucial element in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, the qualifications of the individual to be consulted and the procedures of consultation also influence the accuracy of the decision.

It is imperative that the ruler engage in continuous consultation with his advisors in order to ensure effective administration (Radi, 2016; Al-Kharawi, 2016). It is incumbent upon the ruler, whose administration is commended for its reliance on consultation, to recognize that consultation serves as the foundation of administration. An individual who acts independently without assuming responsibility is unsuited for a position of authority and cannot guarantee the longevity of their tenure (Jamaa, 2010; Shirazi, 2016). Sealibi cautioned the ruler against the assumption that seeking counsel would make him appear dependent on others. Sealibi likened the opinion of one person to a thread, the exchange of ideas between two people to a string, and the consultation of three people to a rope, emphasizing the accuracy of the decisions made as a result of consultation (Sealibi, 1997:97-98). Both the ruler and the ruled are in need of consultation. It is imperative that the ruler be receptive to consultation, given his role as the head of the administration and the significant influence he wields over its operations (Taymiyya, 1999; Turtushi, 2011).

In the view of Al-Ghazali, the ruler is duty-bound to seek the counsel of their advisors on matters of administration. It is imperative that they do not act unilaterally in order to ensure that they remain on the path of rectitude in their administration (Al-Ghazali, 2016:127). Suhrawardi identified consultation as a crucial means of resolving complex issues and asserted its significance in fostering harmonious administration (Suhrawardi, 2013:141). While the ruler is the ultimate decision-maker, it is nevertheless recommended that they consult with

individuals whose opinions they trust (Daye, 2017; Nizam al-Mulk, 2016; Sebuktegin, 1975). Amir Timur, who stated that he solved one-tenth of administrative problems with the sword and nine-tenths with consultation, also emphasized the importance of consultation (Timur, 2010:24). The ruler's consultation with those who are competent in decision-making will not only result in the implementation of beneficial policies but also contribute to the ruler's sense of responsibility towards those under his rule.

The significance of consultation in decision-making depends on the qualifications and expertise of the individual being consulted. This person should possess knowledge, intelligence, foresight, analytical ability, comprehension, and experience (Al-Kharawi, 2016; Yusuf Khass Hajib, 2010). The individual to be consulted, who is also expected to be free of egocentric sentiments, can be selected from among the elders who have no worldly aspirations (Al-Ghazali, 2016; Nizam al-Mulk, 2016). In his writings, Sharif al-Radi posits that individuals who should be excluded from the consultation process include those who are miserly, who may dissuade the ruler from generosity and instill fear of poverty; those who are cowardly, who may weaken the ruler in business matters; and those who are ambitious, who may drive the ruler toward greed and oppression (Radi, 2016:318). Ibn Tıqtaqa suggests that the sovereign should not consult the hungry until they are full, the captive until they are freed, the one who asks for something until they get what they want, the thirsty until they quench their thirst, and the one who has lost their way until they find their way (Tıqtaqa, 2016:60). Additionally, Turtushi suggests that the ruler should refrain from requesting licenses and friend at court from the people he consults during the consultation period. He also asserts that the individual being consulted and his family should not experience food scarcity (Turtushi, 2011:237-239). The authors of the *siyasatnamas* asserted individuals being consulted must possess the requisite qualifications to make an informed decision and that their needs must be met to ensure that their decisions are not unduly influenced.

A further crucial element of the consultation process is the manner in which it is conducted. The ruler must engage in consultation with the individual in private, as this safeguards confidentiality, ensures the discretion of opinions, and prevents suspicion from arising among others (Al-Ghazali, 2016; Tıqtaqa, 2016; Turtushi, 2011). Genghis Khan prescribed that during the consultation, the inferior should refrain from speaking unless the superior posed a question (Genghis Khan, 1947:176). In the event that the consultation occurs within the context of a consultative assembly, with multiple advisors present, the procedural norms undergo a corresponding adjustment. In a consultative assembly, Abu Bakr al-Kharawi asserts that an advisor should voice their objection and offer a correction if they perceive an inaccuracy in the other's statements. The consultation process should continue until a consensus is reached and a unified opinion is formed by the assembly. In the event that a consensus cannot be reached, it is not appropriate to proceed with a decision despite the presence of differing opinions (Al-Kharawi, 2016:81). It is recommended that a clerk and a scribe from a designated caste be present during the consultation council (Timur, 2010:107). In addition to one-on-one consultations with advisors, the consultation process allows for the input of multiple advisors simultaneously. While the majority of writers of *siyasatnamas* agree that matters of administration should be decided through consultation, some have proposed that it should be abolished in certain circumstances (Turtushi, 2011:579).

2.3. Guaranteeing Equality Before the Law: The Principle of Equality

An additional fundamental tenet of the decision-making process is that of equality. The concept of equality implies a state of parity and equivalence. The principle of equality in decision-making requires that laws apply uniformly to all individuals, and that the rules of law are applied in a non-discriminatory manner. The binding rules of law, which regulate the rights and responsibilities of those in positions of authority as well as those who are subject to their authority, also prevent the unaccounted disposition of property.

The tenets of public law apply equally to all individuals, regardless of their relative strength or weakness. It is unjust for the laws to be circumvented through mediation and gifts (Maverdi, 2017; Taymiyya, 1999). Maverdi suggests that impartiality in decision-making processes is contingent upon the judge's ability to refrain from ruling against his mother, father, or son; from presiding over cases involving them as parties; from considering witnesses who may be biased in favor of or against his family; and from being heard as a witness. The impartiality of the decision-making process is also ensured by the judge's refusal to rule in favor of or against an adversary (Maverdi, 2017:155).

Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that it is not within the purview of those in authority to mete out punishment selectively, i.e. to punish those they desire and to refrain from punishing those they do not desire (Taymiyya, 1999:81). Nizam al-Mulk posited that state officials who are reluctant to appear before a court where they may be punished should be subjected to trial by force (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:55). Genghis Khan emphasized that office

holders who are to be punished must obey the orders of the sovereign, even if they are above the officials who will punish them, and must not impede the enforcement of the law, even if the penalty is execution (Genghis Khan, 1947:72). Additionally, Sadi Shirazi argued that it is manifestly unjust for a ruler to overlook the crimes of societal elites while imposing severe penalties on those in lower social strata (Shirazi, 2016:60).

In a case between a commoner and a person in authority, it is the responsibility of the sovereign to treat both parties equally and to pass judgment accordingly. Al-Ghazali posited that the ruler should refrain from conferring privileges upon any individual when administering the law (Al-Ghazali, 2016:119). It is unethical for a ruler to bestow wealth and authority upon individuals with whom they have familial or personal ties, even if they are undeserving (Taymiyya, 1999:65). Additionally, Shirazi regarded the ruler's failure to address the transgressions of those in his proximity and the imposition of harsh penalties on the general populace as a form of cruelty (Shirazi, 2016:82). In accordance with Suhrawardi's doctrine, the ruler is duty-bound to appoint and dismiss state officials solely on the basis of merit, without allowing personal sentiments to influence the decision-making process (Suhrawardi, 2013:150).

It is imperative that the ruler refrain from excluding himself from the process of establishing and enforcing the rules of administration. Even if the ruler's actions result in positive outcomes for his interests when he disobeys the laws, he should be aware that the rules also establish an area of responsibility for him (Taymiyya, 1999:147). Amir Timur posited that the laws should be observed primarily by the ruler, thereby deterring state officials and the general public from acting arbitrarily outside the confines of the established regulations (Timur, 2010:72). In the view of Al-Ghazali, if any member of the populace has a dispute or lawsuit with the ruler, the latter should conduct himself in accordance with the norms applicable to a citizen (Al-Ghazali, 2016:119). In contrast, Shirazi asserted that the laws are also applicable to the sovereign and discussed the capacity of the sovereign to impose penalties upon himself for an offence he has committed (Shirazi, 2016:85).

3. APPOINTMENT PROCESS AND PRINCIPLES IN SIYASATNAMAS

The appointment processes described in the siyasatnamas are grounded in the principle of meritocracy. The works underscore the notion that state duties are entrusted, and highlight the fact that property is not the exclusive domain of rulers and officials. They argue for a meritocratic approach to appointments, eschewing nepotism and conferring positions on those who merit them, rather than those who merely desire them. Furthermore, they underscored the significance of social acceptance in appointments and dismissals made with the public interest in mind. They assert that civil servants should be obligated to fulfill their duties if such appointments serve the greater good of society.

3.1. Creating Awareness of Responsibility: The Principle of Entrustment

The principle of entrustment in appointments posits that an office is not the personal property of state officials, that they are merely granted temporary authorization, and that they are not at liberty to rule in their positions as they see fit. Those who have been entrusted with an office are duty-bound to refrain from betraying the very positions that they themselves are not at liberty to dispose of. Furthermore, the awareness of accountability to the original trustee has also resulted in a concomitant sense of responsibility for administration.

The offices to which state officials will be appointed are, in fact, a trust (Turtushi, 2011:145). A trust is not a gift bestowed upon those in authority, nor is it a property that they may utilize at their discretion (Radi, 2016; Turtushi, 2011). In a letter to his administrator, Ali b. Abu Talib stated that he had made him a partner in his trust and emphasized that the trust was not the property of the ruler (Radi, 2016:304). In contrast, Ibn Taymiyya posits that one of the two elements of wilayah is entrustment, which corresponds to the fulfillment of the duty with merit, free from human fear (Ibn Taymiyya, 1999:39). When selecting state officials, the ruler should consider their ability to abide by the trust, as well as their competence and religious adherence (Daye, 2017:170).

The authors of the siyasatnamas suggest that those who occupy positions of authority and fulfill their duties and powers in an appropriate manner can be considered to have fulfilled the trust placed in them. While Sharif al-Radi asserts the necessity of fulfilling the trust and that those who are unfit for the trust will be disappointed, Bedreddin Ibn Jemaa underscores the significance of the viziers' fidelity to the trusts (Radi, 2016; Jamaa, 2010). Yusuf Khass Hajib is another author who posits that viziers should approach their office with a sense of trust while fulfilling their duties. Hajib asserts that a vizier should approach their role with integrity and a sense of

responsibility towards the trust placed in them (Yusuf Khass Hajib, 2010:180). Additionally, Al-Ghazali interpreted the vizier's refusal to allow the ruler to appoint an unqualified individual to a state office as a demonstration of respect for the trust (Al-Ghazali, 2016:130). In contrast, Maverdi defined the soldiers' surrender of the spoils they had acquired as an act of respect for the trust (Maverdi, 2017:108).

The designation of state offices as trusts directly engenders a sense of responsibility for the individual occupying that office. The individual occupying the position is aware that they are answerable to the proprietor of the trust in the fulfillment of their duties and that they are not at liberty to dispose of their position at their discretion. The concept of property as a trust serves to prohibit arbitrary practices with regard to public property and offices. The authors of the *siyasatnamas* advanced the argument that these positions, which were not at the individual's disposal, including that of the sovereign, should be based on merit, not nepotism.

3.2. Entrusting Tasks to Qualified Individuals: The Principle of Merit

In its most basic form, the principle of merit in appointments can be defined as the practice of selecting the most qualified individual for a position. The decision should not be based on the individual's desire for the position, but rather on their suitability for the task at hand. The implementation of a merit-based system for the appointment of state officials would result in a decline in the significance of factors such as nepotism and bribery in the selection process. The principle of entrustment in appointments dictates that the office is not the property of the authority holder, thereby preventing them from acting at their discretion. In contrast, the principle of merit guarantees that state responsibilities, which are not the exclusive property of any individual but rather belong to the collective society, are entrusted to capable individuals.

Individuals possess a range of characteristics, shaped by their creation, educational background, and inherent qualities. The ruler is responsible for organizing individuals and communities in accordance with their inherent characteristics (Al-Farabi, 2012:89). The determination of positions should be based on an assessment of individuals' abilities. It is the responsibility of the ruler to evaluate the merit of officials, select them for positions commensurate with their qualifications, and ensure that they perform their duties in accordance with their abilities (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016; Sebuktegin, 1975).

Farabi suggests that individuals who possess a proclivity for assuming an official role and those who have received a superior education among their peers are among those most suited to the position. In the event of equality in education, he deems the individual who exhibits superior ingenuity to be more meritorious (Farabi 2012:82-83). Sealibi posits that, given the necessity of quality leadership, it is incumbent upon the ruler to bestow authority and positions upon those who have demonstrated their capacity for excellence (Sealibi 1997:214). It is the responsibility of the ruler to appoint individuals who demonstrate competence in their respective roles (Taymiyya, 1999; Tıqtaqa, 2016). For each position, the ruler should select and appoint individuals who are trustworthy, skilled, worthy, and knowledgeable about the intricacies of the task at hand (Suhrawardi, 2013; Daye, 2017).

In the selection of state officials, merit entails not only the appointment of a candidate who is suitable for the given position, but also consideration of their experience. Sadi Shirazi posited that the sovereign should refrain from delegating significant responsibilities to those lacking the requisite experience and expertise (Shirazi, 2016:83). In addition to Suhrawardi, who cautions against appointing inexperienced individuals to state positions, Genghis Khan also emphasizes the importance of selecting leaders with military experience (Genghis Khan, 1947; Suhrawardi, 2013).

In the context of appointments, experience is regarded as a merit criterion, and it is also assumed that those in positions of authority possess an understanding of the circumstances of those they administrate. The authors of the *siyasatnamas* directly linked advancement in office to experience, operating under the assumption that an individual who had previously been among the ruled would eventually attain the position of ruler and thereby gain an understanding of the condition of the ruled. Genghis Khan asserted that commanders must ensure their soldiers are not subjected to hunger and thirst. He further stipulated that they should be seasoned individuals who have experienced such privation (Genghis Khan, 1947:176). Both Yusuf Khass Hajib, who asserts that a servant who serves can become a bey, and Nizam al-Mulk, who suggests that the measure of the service of slaves increases over time in proportion to their merit, illustrate that advancement in appointments is feasible according to experience and competence (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016; Yusuf Khass Hajib, 2010). The possibility of advancement contingent on one's tenure thus underscores the significance of merit. Furthermore, the

consideration of merit will prevent the determination of nepotism, bribery, and other factors that may be effective in appointments.

The practice of favoritism in appointments has the potential to diminish the influence of the sovereign in the administration. This, according to Abu Mansur al-Sealibi, could ultimately lead to the demise of sovereignty, which he considers to be the most significant challenge facing politics. He posits that the practice of purchasing and selling ranks, offices, and administratorships for financial gain represents the initial stage of political collapse (Sealibi, 1997:227). In contrast, Ibn Taymiyah asserts that it constitutes treason for a ruler to fail to appoint a meritorious and deserving individual on the basis of kinship, status as a slave or master, marital status, nationality, sect, cult, gender, race, wealth, personal welfare, enmity, or bribery (Taymiyya, 1999:35). Suhrawardi maintains that the ruler should make decisions regarding appointments and dismissals based on objective criteria, taking into account the prevailing sentiment and the prevailing opinion of the state (Suhrawardi, 2013:150).

The fundamental objective of electing state officials is to select the individual who is best suited to fulfill the responsibilities of the position. If the candidates are meritorious, the selection is based on who is most closely aligned with the purpose and nature of the task at hand. If the servant is intelligent and consistent, he should be appointed to the role of supply officer; if he is a bow and arrow maker, he should be assigned to that position; if his attitude is appropriate, he should be designated as a sealer; if he has a clean face, he should be appointed as a saki; if he is proficient in mathematics, he should be selected as a treasurer; and if he is intelligent and perceptive, he should be appointed as a scribe (Yusuf Khass Hajib, 2010:305).

In the appointment of administrators, if one of the two candidates possesses greater power and the other exhibits a greater sense of trustworthiness, the individual who is most beneficial for the province is selected. In the context of judicial appointments, the selection of the most suitable candidate hinges on the specific demands of the task at hand. If the role entails a degree of subtlety in judgment, the individual with a deeper understanding of the subject matter is likely to be appointed. Conversely, if the role is primarily about upholding moral standards, the candidate with a strong moral compass may be preferred. This is a concept espoused by Ibn Taymiyya (Ibn Taymiyya, 1999:39-40). If the state official is to serve as an army commander, he should exemplify generosity and vigilance. If he is to serve as a vizier, he should demonstrate the capacity to enforce the laws. If he is to serve as a “*hajib*”, he should refrain from accepting bribes. If he is to serve as a scribe or a secret scribe, he should possess the ability to maintain confidentiality. If he is to serve as a “*subaşı*” or “*ilbaşı*”, he should exhibit proficiency in hearing and seeing (Yusuf Khass Hajib, 2010:213). In the event that one candidate possesses greater knowledge and the other displays greater courage, the individual who is best suited to the prevailing circumstances should be appointed to a position of authority (Jamaa, 2010:36).

In addition to the qualifications previously mentioned, the ruler must also possess merit. Sharif al-Radi posits that unqualified rulers provide superfluous justifications when faced with a challenge, adhere to their personal beliefs exclusively, and amass superfluous treasures. He compares their administration to quenching thirst with bitter water (Radi, 2016:49). In the view of al-Farabi, the ruler must evince a proclivity for administration and a set of attitudes aligned with the responsibilities of administration (Al-Farabi, 2017:103). Nasir al-Din Tusi, who attributed the equilibrium of administration to the ruler's capacity to administrate, also censured the unqualified state officials (Tusi, 2013:243).

The authors of the siyasatnamas also underscored the significance of merit in appointments by elucidating the ramifications of entrusting the role to an unqualified individual. Keikavus asserted that an unqualified person to a role would lead to the mismanagement and waste of state resources (Keikavus, 1970:112). Al-Ghazali draws a parallel between bestowing a state position upon an unqualified individual and entrusting a body to a practitioner lacking medical expertise (Al-Ghazali, 2016:127). In contrast, Sharif al-Radi posits that state officials should be selected from among the superior members of society, those who are not indifferent to state affairs, those who do not engage in disputes with adversaries, those who do not persist in erroneous actions, those who investigate when making judgments, and those who do not arrogate praise (Radi, 2016:321).

The principle of merit in appointments is the process of identifying and appointing the most suitable individual for a position based on their qualifications and abilities. The aforementioned competence is equivalent to the selection of the most suitable individual to occupy a position within the administrative hierarchy. The qualifications of the individual to be appointed to an office are determined by the observation of public interest and social acceptance with regard to the appointment and dismissal of state officials.

3.3. Safeguarding the Public Interest: The Principle of Interest

The principle of self-interest in appointments is defined as the determination of appointments and dismissals based on considerations of social acceptance and benefit. The principle of self-interest, which also corresponds to the preservation of order and the prevention of possible disorder, indicates that appointments and dismissals should be made in favor of the ruled, with minimal consideration given to the interests of the officials. The primary objective of the principle of self-welfare in appointments is to ensure the preservation of social order.

The social welfare in the appointment of state officials is contingent upon the acceptance of the individual to be appointed by the populace. In the view of Ibn Tıqtaqa, the ruler should initially disseminate information regarding the individual to be appointed and the position to be held among the populace, and subsequently make a decision based on the response of the people. Those who are aware of the appointment process will engage in discourse regarding the candidate, resulting in a division of opinion. Those who align with the ruler's perspective will highlight the candidate's merits, whereas those who hold opposing views will emphasize his shortcomings. Ultimately, the ruler, who is cognizant of the prevailing sentiments, will make a determination in accordance with the prevailing social consensus (Ibn Tıqtaqa, 2016:42). In contrast, Nizam al-Mulk proposed that if individuals of merit, whose service could benefit the populace, refused to serve, the ruler should have the authority to compel them by force (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:60). The extent to which the ruler may exert pressure on state officials in the welfare of the ruled is a matter of contention.

In addition to the cases of appointments previously discussed, there are also instances where the office in question is obtained through the use of force. The authors of the *siyasatnamas* argue that in order to guarantee social cohesion, the individual who was compelled to assume the position of authority should be vested with authority by the sovereign. The sovereign should issue an invitation to the malik who has seized control of certain towns by force, requesting that he submit to his authority and assume responsibility for administering these territories. According to Badraddin ibn Jamaa, the sovereign's approach toward an individual who has seized control of a region by force should be such that it ensures the unity of the ruled (Jamaa, 2010:40). Nevertheless, it is imperative that the sovereign refrain from allowing the individual who has assumed a position through force to act unilaterally in matters of administration. It is the responsibility of the sovereign to appoint another meritorious official to serve alongside the individual who has assumed the position through invasion. Maverdi considers this appointment, made to address the deficiencies of the dominant figure, indispensable for preventing the conflation of public and private interests and safeguarding the social welfare (Maverdi, 2017:87).

In the context of appointments, it is recommended that priority be given to individuals who demonstrate strength and courage, regardless of their moral standing, over those who exhibit weakness and incapacity. In the view of Ibn Taymiyya, the strength of a sinner who has committed wrongdoing is a burden for the people, whereas the consequences of his actions are for himself alone. Nevertheless, the virtuous but vulnerable individual's virtuous actions will be attributed to themselves, while their vulnerability will be perceived by others (Ibn Taymiyya, 1999:40). The authors suggest that property may persist in the absence of belief, but not in the presence of oppression (Suhrawardi, 2013; Timur, 2010). A nonbeliever who exercises just authority is preferred over a Muslim who is cruel. The rule of an infidel ruler is contingent upon the absence of oppression; otherwise, his rule is subject to termination (Al-Ghazali, 2016; Tıqtaqa, 2016; Turtushi, 2011). The continuity of administration can be ensured by guaranteeing justice, even in the event that the ruler is an unbeliever. However, the absence of justice renders the administration untenable. In the context of appointments, it is imperative that the appointments be made in a manner that is beneficial to the ruled and that the qualifications for the respective offices be determined in accordance with social acceptance.

The authors of the *siyasatnamas* posited that the appointment and dismissal of state officials should be conducted in accordance with the principle of self-welfare. Another issue pertaining to the appointment and dismissal of officials is that if the appointment is made on behalf of the public, it is challenging to dismiss, whereas if the appointment is made on behalf of the appointee's personal interests, it is relatively straightforward to dismiss. In the event that the administrator of a province is appointed by the caliph, the death of the caliph does not result in the dismissal of the administrator. Conversely, if the vizier is responsible for appointing the administrator, the vizier's death will lead to the dismissal of the administrator. This is due to the fact that the appointment of the administrator by the caliph is made on behalf of the public, whereas the appointment of the administrator by the vizier is made for the personal benefit of the vizier. A vizier appointed by the caliph is dismissed upon the caliph's death. Although this may appear to be a contradiction, it is based on a rationale that is analogous to the concept of the public interest. The sovereign appoints the vizier for his own benefit, on behalf of the sovereign's office. In contrast, the appointment of an administrator is a procedure carried out on behalf of the public (Maverdi, 2017:82).

While it is relatively straightforward to revoke an appointment made on behalf of the appointee, it is considerably more challenging to do so in the case of appointments made for the benefit of the public. The ruler is unable to dismiss the successor whom he appointed on the grounds of the people's right unless his condition changes (Maverdi, 2017:42). The pivotal point in appointments and dismissals is not the identity of the appointing or dismissing authority, but rather the extent to which the appointment or dismissal is made on behalf of the public. In the event that an appointment is made on behalf of the public, it becomes challenging to dismiss the appointee.

4. SUPERVISION PROCESS AND PRINCIPLES IN SIYASATNAMAS

The concept of supervision in *siyasatnamas* can be broadly classified into three categories: the supervision of state officials, the supervision of the public, and the supervision of enemies. The fundamental objective of supervision of state officials and the public is to maintain awareness of their activities and to ensure their compliance with established regulations and norms. In addition to the methods of control, they also discuss the consequences of control and the lack of control. In the context of supervising enemies who are not part of the ruled population, the authors underscore the importance of not underestimating the enemy, the necessity of employing military action only as a last resort, the role of moral rectitude and benevolence in achieving victories, and the necessity of responding to the enemy with equivalent forces.

4.1. Supervision of State Officials: The Principle of Officialdom

Effective supervision of civil servants necessitates that the sovereign possess a comprehensive understanding of the individuals in their employ. It is incumbent upon the sovereign to be cognizant of the individuals occupying the offices of state and to be apprised of the status of the officials with whom he works (Al-Ghazali, 2016; Nizam al-Mulk, 2016). Nizam al-Mulk, who proposes the establishment of intelligence centers along major transportation routes, asserts that officials should be subjected to scrutiny and with concerns regarding administrative matters conveyed either discreetly or publicly (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:100). Sebüktegin asserts that the ruler must be aware of those under his administration and make the necessary inquiries. State officials under the administration must not take the people's property unfairly. In the event of any goods being stolen from merchants in the desert, it is reasonable to assume that they originated from the sovereign's treasury. Consequently, control measures should be reinforced (Sebüktegin, 1975:229-230). In addition, Amir Timur's charter stipulated the appointment of clerks in all border cities. Their role was to inform judges, the public, sipahis, soldiers, the treasury, caravans, and rulers in neighboring countries of all pertinent information, including the movement of goods and the activities of caravans (Timur, 2010:117).

It is recommended that the ruler dispatch individuals of integrity and loyalty as spies to conduct supervisions of state officials (Radi, 2016:322). The writers of the *siyasatnamas* advocate for the appointment of dependable spies and supervisors to oversee administrators, judges, and officers across the country (Al-Kharawi, 2016; Al-Ghazali, 2016). Sadi Shirazi, on the other hand, cautioned against the potential influence of spies from other states. He proposed that to mitigate any potential damage, it was essential to ascertain the identities and backgrounds of state officials and to appoint individuals with investigative expertise to monitor their activities (Shirazi, 2016:53). It is imperative that the ruler exercise control over the administrators of provinces situated at a considerable distance from the capital, with the objective of safeguarding the rights of the people (Suhrawardi, 2013:54). In the event of observing an individual of foreign origin among the ranks of the palace guards, sentinels, or guards, it is imperative to launch an investigation (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:143). While the supervision of state officials is regarded as a necessity from an administrative standpoint, the manner in which such supervision is conducted is also of significant importance.

It is recommended that the supervision of state officials be conducted in a secretive manner, rather than in an overtly public setting (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016; Keikavus, 1970). The supervisor charged with the responsibility of conducting an supervision of a state official must do so without the knowledge or awareness of the individual under supervision (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:46). Ali b. Abu Bakr al-Kharawi posits that in the event of an supervision pertaining to a matter of significant administrative consequence, the appointment of an additional official to oversee the supervisor's status is prudent. The individual responsible for overseeing the supervisor's activities should not harbor any negative sentiments towards him. The practice of sending the same envoy to a place on a consistent basis may foster an amicable relationship between the supervisor and the individual under supervision, which could compromise the impartiality of the supervision process. Nevertheless, even if the

sovereign desires to examine the state official directly, it is imperative that he be alone with him in his council and allow him to behave freely. In the event of deception by the sovereign's initiative, Kharawi asserts that the official in question should be removed from office. Conversely, if the official exercises restraint and comprehends the situation, he or she should be reinstated to their position (Al-Kharawi, 2016:80-83).

The information obtained by supervisors should be known only to the sovereign, as they are known to no one but the sovereign (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:77). Al-Ghazali suggests that the ruler's vigilance and wisdom in matters of administration will also affect the officials under his rule (Al-Ghazali, 2016:157). Similarly, Abu Mansur al-Sealibi posited that state officials mirror the actions of their ruler. In this regard, he asserts that the sovereign should exercise particular vigilance in the supervision of scribes, chamberlains, and counsellors, who collectively represent the administrative apparatus and the ruler (Sealibi, 1997:72).

Additionally, the writers of the *siyasatnamas* addressed the potential adverse consequences of inadequate supervision on the administration. According to Keikavus, the ruler's lack of awareness regarding the activities of his vizier can be considered tantamount to a disregard for his own life and property (Keikavus, 1970:131). Ibn Rushd posits that state officials possess the potential to inflict harm upon the people, given their superior strength and fearlessness (Ibn Rushd, 2013:69). The failure to supervise officials, who are granted authority contingent upon the nature of their duties, results in a lack of oversight and accountability in administration. Sebuktegin, who asserts that all instances of corruption in administration originate from heedlessness and negligence, advocates for the ruler's authority over income and expenditures, his awareness of clerks and viziers, and proposes that if the clerks are traitors, they may collaborate with tax officials and misappropriate the state's assets (Sebuktegin, 1975:232).

Similarly, Najmeddin Daye suggests that a lack of supervision facilitated the ascendance of officials who abused their authority and caused detriment to the state (Daye, 2017:170). Muhammad b. Turtushi, in recounting the tale of the sovereign who was unable to safeguard his possessions, posits that the absence of accountability among the administrative personnel precipitated the demise of the state. The lack of awareness on the part of the ruler of the activities of state officials results in the guards acting in accordance with their own interests, tax officials oppressing the people, the people seeking to remove the rulers, a reduction in income, and the disobedience of soldiers who are unable to receive their salaries (Turtushi, 2011:159-160). The formation of certain groupings within the state can be prevented through the supervision of state officials (Suhrawardi, 2013:54).

The practice of state officials accepting bribes and collecting goods in return for carrying out their duties also underscores the necessity of rigorous supervision. It is essential that the ruler abstain from accepting monetary compensation for assuming office and that they refrain from misappropriating state property for the sake of familial ties (Sebuktegin, 1975:230-231). Both Al-Ghazali, who counsels that the vizier should refrain from accepting any gifts from the populace, and Yusuf Khass Hajib, who asserts that the hajib should perform his duties without the inducement of bribes, highlight the vital necessity for state officials to occupy their posts in an appropriate manner (Al-Ghazali, 2016; Yusuf Khass Hajib, 2010).

Similarly, Najmeddin Daye espoused the view that the vizier should refrain from soliciting bribes in exchange for his services and should not amass wealth on behalf of the ruler (Daye, 2017:189-190). Ali b. Abu Talib also composed a missive to the administrator, who distributed public property to the Bedouins of his tribe. In this letter, he asserted that the administrator had betrayed the trust placed in him and rebelled against the administration, and he demanded accountability for these actions. Muhammad b. Turtushi suggests that the acceptance of a bribe renders the recipient blind and deaf, thereby negating the significance of the office in question, which is held in trust (Turtushi, 2011:424).

Furthermore, the authors of these *siyasatnamas* emphasize the drawbacks of wealth accumulation by state officials. Ibn Taymiyah posits that it is impermissible for an imam to bestow property upon an individual who is not entitled to it and who is related to him (Taymiyya, 1999:65). Yusuf Khass Hajib asserts that civil servants should refrain from amassing personal property, even for the benefit of their families. He further argues that bribery should not be viewed as a form of compensation for the performance of official duties (Yusuf Khass Hajib, 2010:183). Ibn Rushd, who considers all forms of property to be detrimental for state officials, asserts that the unjust acquisition of property by officials will inevitably result in the oppression of the people (Ibn Rushd, 2013:70). As Abu Mansur al-Sealibi observed, the practice of selling ranks and offices for financial gain undermines the integrity and competence of those who hold them. This ultimately contributes to the deterioration of the state apparatus and the potential for its collapse (Sealibi, 1997:227).

4.2. Supervision of the People: The Principle of Subordination

The ruler's responsibility for supervising the people requires that he be well-informed about them. It is incumbent upon the ruler to possess knowledge about those under his rule, to be aware of the habits of each tribe, and to make the necessary inquiries (Sebuktegin, 1975:230). Najmeddin Daye attributes the absence of oppression in the administration to the ruler's comprehensive oversight of all individuals and a keen awareness of the intricacies of their affairs and the perpetrators thereof (Daye, 2017:177). Similarly, Nizam al-Mülümük asserts that a just administration is contingent upon the sultan's supervision of those under his authority (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:76).

The protection of justice, which is regarded as the fundamental order of the state, is inextricably linked to a comprehensive understanding of the population (Tusi, 2013:295). It is the ruler's responsibility to gather information about his people, administrators, judges, advisors, and soldiers with the assistance of trusted state officials (Suhrawardi, 2013:172). Both Yusuf Khass Hajib, who advised that sages and scholars should inform the sultan about the people, and Genghis Khan, who ordered the establishment of a permanent postal organization in order to be informed about all kinds of developments in the administration, considered the control of the people among the basic elements of the administration (Yusuf Khass Hajib, 2010; Genghis Khan, 1947).

Similar to the permanent postal organization, which was designed to disseminate information about the circumstances of the ruled, the *hisbe* organization serves a dual purpose: it disseminates information about the ruled and meets their needs through the municipal services it provides. Maverdi asserted that the "*hisbe*" organization was established with the purpose of supervising the people (Maverdi, 2017:452). Ibn Rushd, however, posited that in addition to establishing an institution for supervision, rulers should occupy a dominant position in the city, thereby facilitating the control of the populace (Ibn Rushd, 2013:68).

The efficacy of administration hinges on the efficacy of the methods employed to control the ruled. The existence of numerous social groups and their interconnections informs the approach to be taken in supervision. Muhammad b. Turtusi posited that the ruler should approach every ethnic group in society with an equal degree of proximity. The author suggests that racism and favoritism constitute social sedition. If the ruler is partial to one group and indifferent to the other, he will be deprived of the support of the neglected group and his authority will be undermined (Turtushi, 2011:160). In contrast, Amir Timur proposed that rulers should act in accordance with the temperament of the people in each province and place (Timur, 2010:114).

The authors of the *siyasatnamas* make reference not only to the inhabitants of the state in question, but also to the citizens of other states that have been incorporated into the territory of the country. Ali b. Abu Bakr al-Kharawi counseled the sovereign to demonstrate benevolence towards those who had accumulated wealth and renown prior to the state's collapse and subsequently experienced a decline in fortune (Al-Kharawi, 2016:97). Nevertheless, the sultan must exercise caution when administering individuals from a different nationality. Sebuktegin further suggests that the sultan should maintain control over those who have inherited the state, ensuring their obedience and vigilance against them (Sebuktegin, 1975:232). The sultan's supervision of populations in other states may facilitate the implementation of a potential war. In his account of the capture of the capital city of Hirat during his campaign in Khorasan, Amir Timur asserts that his awareness of the circumstances of those wronged by state officials was instrumental in securing victory. He posits that the war to the state of the people whose rights had been usurped by state officials resulted in victory (Timur, 2010:114).

4.3. Supervision of Enemies: The Principle of Enmity

Beyond overseeing state officials and the general population, the ruler's ability to influence and direct the actions of enemies and rivals represents a crucial aspect of maintaining order and stability within the administrative structure. It is incumbent upon the sultan to be cognizant of the circumstances surrounding all beys and kings, regardless of their proximity (Keikavus, 1970; Sealibi, 1997). The authors of the *siyasatnamas* posit that the sultan must be vigilant in order to recognize his friends and enemies and obtain information about them (Sebuktegin, 1975; Suhrawardi, 2013).

Abu Mansur al-Sealibi suggests that the sultan should maintain vigilance at all times, whether during the darkness of night or the light of day, and remain fully informed about the circumstances of his enemies (Sealibi, 1997:173). Similarly, Maverdi posited the necessity of maintaining intelligence regarding the enemy's situation, a viewpoint shared by Sealibi (Maverdi, 2017:102). Nasir al-Din Tusi, who advised that messengers and spies should be tasked with investigating enemies and that the ruler should determine his policies based on the news

from his officials, asserted that the most effective way to combat enemies is to control them and to be aware of their plans (Tusi, 2013:301).

One method of supervision enemies is for officials at the borders to assign a reliable individual as a guide until the city is reached. This allows for the identification of the number of horsemen and pedestrians in the entourage of foreigners entering the country, the size of their clothing, and the reason for their arrival (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:110). Additionally, Emir Timur directed the appointment of clerks in each border city, tasked with the gathering information about the populace regarding the populace, administration officials, and adversaries (Timur, 2010:117).

It is imperative that the ruler be prepared to face an adversary at any moment, given the possibility of an unexpected confrontation. Sadi Shirazi counsels the ruler to remain vigilant against potential ambushes and to exercise caution to avoid being wronged and poisoned (Shirazi, 2016:83). Similarly, Genghis Khan decreed that foodstuffs should not be consumed unless the individual offering them had tasted them first. This edict was to be observed even if the offerer was a prisoner (Genghis Khan, 1947:171).

The authors assert that a friend can become an enemy, and an enemy can turn into a friend. They therefore advise that the ruler should love his friend with fear and hate his enemy with fear (Turtushi, 2011:535). Amir Timur suggests that an enemy soldier who has lost hope in his own cause and seeks to engage in combat alongside Timur's troops after participating in his own forces during the conflict should be welcomed. Nevertheless, if a soldier wishes to defect during the conflict and not after its conclusion, he should be rejected. Timur's perspective is that a soldier who renounces his state during wartime will be of no benefit to his own army. Timur cautioned that enemies could potentially become friends, and vice versa. He believed that if viziers and soldiers improved relations with the enemy for the benefit of their own state, this could result in betrayal. He considered it crucial to control both friends and enemies (Timur, 2010:110).

Additionally, the authors of the *siyasatnamas* delineated the courses of action that the ruler should pursue, contingent on the circumstances of the enemy. It is essential to gain an understanding of the internal structure of the enemy army and to respond with an equivalent level of organization (Suhrawardi, 2013:217). Muhammad b. Turtushi counsels the ruler to form his own ranks with the same groups as those in the enemy's ranks, thereby enabling him to respond effectively to the enemy's stratagems. Turtushi compares the individuals belonging to disparate clans within the enemy ranks to the water within the ear and asserts that the sole method for removing this water is to clean the ear with an alternative therapeutic water of the same kind (Turtushi, 2011:550). The authors, who advised maintaining constant vigilance against the enemy, also sought to elucidate the nature of control in the event that the enemy was perceived to be vulnerable. Ibn Tıqtaqa posits that state officials should not underestimate the enemy, even if he is weak, when informing the sovereign about the enemy. If the officials underestimate the enemy, the ruler will be weakened when he is defeated and will not be considered important even if he is defeated (Tıqtaqa, 2016:60).

Sadi Shirazi likens the potential for a ruler to underestimate the power of an enemy to replace them as a pawn in chess (Shirazi, 2016:74). In contrast to Ibn Tattaka, Abu Bakr al-Kharawi suggests that rulers must refrain from engaging with the weak using the analogy of a lion closing its eyes to avoid confrontation with a rabbit. In the context of the metaphor, al-Kharawi posits two potential explanations for the lion's closing its eyes. The first is that the lion despises the rabbit due to its awareness of the latter's inherent vulnerability in the face of the lion's own strength. The second is that the lion closes its eyes out of a sense of maturity and compassion, allowing the rabbit to pass unimpeded (Al-Kharawi, 2016:97). In both instances, the lion permits the rabbit, which is inferior in strength, to traverse its path. Nevertheless, this metaphor does not imply that the ruler is devoid of caution or control. Nasir al-Din Tusi assessed that the ruler's failure to accurately assess the enemy and take the requisite precautions, even when the enemy is relatively weak, represents a significant departure from the principles of prudence (Tusi, 2013:303).

The authors of *siyasatnamas*, who also provide tactical guidance on the conduct of warfare and the subjugation of adversaries, offer insights into the measures that ought to be taken by rulers before and after the commencement and conclusion of hostilities. In his treatise, Sharif al-Radi counsels that one should engage with those who engage in combat, but avoid confronting a group that has initiated hostilities unless an order is received from the caliph. Furthermore, he advises that one should not adopt a stance that suggests fear of war (Radi, 2016:274).

In contrast, Muhammad b. Turtushi argued that it was inappropriate for the ruler to dictate the specific timing of battles with the enemy on a daily basis. Turtushi posits that it would be advantageous for the enemy to determine the measures taken regarding the war with definite provisions and to make them explicit. He

compares the lack of flexibility in the provisions regarding the war to the lamb tied tightly to the stake being more easily eaten by the wolf (Turtushi, 2011:551). In the event that the sovereign is confident of victory, it would be prudent to engage in warfare. However, once the enemy has been vanquished, it would be unwise to engage in further violence, as the enemy is to be regarded as having the same status as the subjects (Tusi, 2013:304). In the event of a rebellion, it is incumbent upon the ruler to join forces with his subjects in order to confront the rebels. According to Sharif al-Radi, the absence of the unwilling participant is preferable to his presence, and his refusal to engage in combat is more advantageous than initiating an attack (Radi, 2016:269).

The use of military force has historically been regarded as a measure of last resort by those who have written on the subject of administration. This is particularly true in the context of relations between rulers and their enemies. Najmeddin Daye counseled the sovereign to exercise patience and pursue peaceful relations with enemies, suggesting that war should only be considered when absolutely necessary (Daye, 2017:187). Nasir al-Din Tusi, who advised against resorting to war if it were possible to disperse the enemy with the implementation of specific plans, asserted that the deployment of spies and scouts constituted the most crucial tactic in the control of the enemy (Tusi, 2013:303). According to Sharif al-Radi, a peace offer presented by the enemy should not be rejected (Radi, 2016:327).

It is incumbent upon the ruler to seek avenues for reaching an accord with adversaries and to act in a manner that precludes the necessity for war to the greatest extent feasible (Tusi, 2013:302). Some writers of *siyasatnamas* who portray war as a last resort maintain that intractable issues can be resolved through diplomatic means and moral persuasion, even if the adversary lacks such qualities. Ibn Tiktaka counsels the ruler to assuage the animosity of his enemies and foster amicable relations through benevolent conduct (Tıqtaqa, 2016:50). Al-Ghazali posits that a ruler who is unable to vanquish his adversary through material means may nonetheless prevail if he exhibits a superior moral virtue that is absent in his opponent (Al-Ghazali, 2016:150). Similarly, Muhammad bin Turtushi counseled the ruler who sought to exert a greater influence than an unannounced nocturnal incursion to cultivate a benevolent disposition that would not be found in their adversary (Turtushi, 2011:169).

5. PUNISHMENT PROCESS AND PRINCIPLES IN SIYASATNAMAS

In the *siyasatnamas*, it is stated that punishments should be administered in accordance with the laws, that criminal acts should be proven before punishments are handed down, and that bribes should not be accepted to reduce the severity of punishment. The authors underscored the necessity for penalties to be sufficiently deterrent to deter future criminal acts, the implementation of measures to prevent criminal acts prior to the imposition of punishment, and the absolute adherence to the prescribed penalties without compromise. The appropriate response to criminal behavior is a punishment that is commensurate with the crime committed. It is imperative that the punishment be neither more nor less than necessary, and that it be administered at a pace that is gradual in comparison to the speed at which rewards are granted.

5.1. Regulation of Punishments by Laws: The Principle of Legality

The principle of legality in punishment, as articulated in various *siyasatnamas*, stipulates that criminal acts and their corresponding penalties should be defined and enforced in accordance with established legal norms. The authors, who considered proof of the crime a prerequisite for punishment, asserted that all individuals should be treated equally before the law and that no bribes or gifts should be accepted to reduce the penalties.

Punishments must be carried out in accordance with the stipulations set forth in the relevant legislation. It is the responsibility of the sovereign to administer punishment to those under his rule who have been harmed by state officials or by each other, in accordance with the stipulations set forth in the law. The primary objective of punishment is the rehabilitation of criminals, not the protection of personal interests (Al-Ghazali, 2016:147). Nizam al-Mulk, who argued that sultans should be aware of the measures to be taken against state officials in the event of harm to the public, also asserted that the punishments to be applied to officials should be determined (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:70). Nasir al-Din Tusi posits that there are three methods for eradicating social ills and meting out justice: incarceration, restraint, and exile. Imprisonment is a form of punishment that prevents criminals from interacting with the general public. Restraint is a method of preventing criminals from engaging in any physical actions. Exile is a form of punishment that removes criminals from civilized life (Tusi, 2013:297). Ibn Taymiyya also enumerates the penalties for obstruction, larceny, adultery, and the regulations

pertaining to public affairs and public property as forms of public punishment and rights. He does not, however, mandate the investigation of these matters by the plaintiff (Taymiyya, 1999:75).

Maverdi distinguishes between two categories of punishments: principal punishments and tazir punishments. Principal punishments are those that arise from the violation of Allah's rights (i.e., public rights) and the violation of people's rights. Maverdi categorizes the penalties associated with the infringement of God's rights (public rights) into two distinct categories: those imposed for the neglect of obligatory duties (prayer, fasting, zakat) and the commission of prohibited acts (*adultery, theft, consumption of alcohol, road cutting*), and those pertaining to the violation of individuals' rights, which are limited to manslaughter and wounding. Tazir punishments, conversely, are those meted out with the objective of deterring the perpetrator in cases where the act in question is not punishable by any other means. It is not feasible to excuse the primary punishments; however, amnesty is a viable option in the case of tazir punishments. In the implementation of principal punishments, the offender should be compensated for the damage caused to them in tazir punishments. However, compensation is not required for damage caused to the offender that is not prescribed (Maverdi, 2017:416-442). In contrast, Amir Timur decreed that individuals who had taken possession of another's property by force should be subjected to legal punishment and that the property in question should be returned to its rightful owner (Timur, 2010:94).

The authors of the *siyasatnamas* suggest that proof of the crime is a prerequisite for punishment. Sadi Shirazi counseled the ruler to refrain from authorizing punishment until the crime is proven (Shirazi, 2016:82). Maverdi, who asserts the necessity of proof for the implementation of punishments, additionally posits that proof can be obtained through testimony and evidence (Maverdi, 2017:415). Similarly, Ibn Taymiyah also stipulated that the criminal must confess his guilt in order to receive punishment (Taymiyya, 1999:106). Amir Timur, an advocate of the principle that the ruler should not act on the word of anyone in punishment, proposed that if someone's guilt is proven by witnesses, the punishment should be determined in proportion to the crime committed (Timur, 2010:117). Punishment cannot be imposed unless the accusation of a crime is proven by the guilty party or proven by various forms of evidence.

Another crucial aspect of punishment is that it is not feasible to mitigate the prescribed penalty through the use of bribes. Ibn Taymiyah suggests that public punishments are to be applied universally, irrespective of the individual's strength or weakness. He further asserts that the administrative inconvenience of not applying them through mediation and gifts is outweighed by the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the legal system. In his view, it is not permissible to accept goods in return for not enforcing penalties for public violations (Taymiyya, 1999:75). Suhrawardi similarly asserted that the ruler should punish enemies and corruptors after apprehending them, rejecting any requests or bribes (Suhrawardi, 2013:173).

5.2. Prevention of Crime: The Principle of Deterrence

The principle of deterrence in punishment is defined as the regulation of punishments in a manner that is designed to prevent the recurrence of criminal acts. The authors of the *siyasatnamas* posited that the regulations on punishments should be sufficiently deterrent to prevent the commission of crimes. In the case of crimes for which punishment is certain, the ruler should refrain from making concessions and should take measures to prevent the crime before it is committed, thereby eliminating the necessity for punishment. The deterrent effect of punishment should be structured in a manner that effectively prevents the commission of crimes. Ibn Taymiyya suggested that punishments should be determined with a view to fulfilling the necessary conditions for the maintenance of social order and to prevent what is forbidden. The application of punishment for a crime that has already been committed also serves to maintain its deterrent effect, preventing the commission of similar crimes in the future (Taymiyya, 1999:129).

Muhammad b. Turtushi posits that an individual who is aware that retaliation will be carried out as a consequence of criminal acts such as murder, theft, rape, and property destruction will refrain from attempting such crimes. He asserts that the perpetrator will thereby safeguard both his own life and the life of the individual whose life he attempted to take (Turtushi, 2011:463). In contrast, Nizam al-Mulk recommended that the sultan attend to the grievances of the populace on two days of the week to forestall criminality (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:30). Genghis Khan also mandated that soldiers and their weaponry be supervised prior to embarking on war, thereby attempting to circumvent any potential negligence that could result in disciplinary action (Genghis Khan, 1947:172). Muhammad b. Turtushi, who argued that the ruler should be aware of the work of the officials and supervise them, stated that a possible crime would be recognized through intelligence (Turtushi, 2011:157).

To guarantee the efficacy of punishment as a deterrent, the authors of the siyasatnamas also delineated the boundaries of the provisions and addressed the issue of property usurpation, which was a significant challenge due to the lack of control. In the view of Keikavus, any crime that causes harm to the public should not be forgiven (Keikavus, 1970:122). In accordance with Nizam al-Mulk's assertion that all positions should be filled according to merit he also proposed that administrative affairs should be conducted with justice and that punishment should be carried out with the sword (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:194). Amir Timur decreed that in the event of laziness or rebellion on the part of state officials, their salaries should be reduced, their posts should be changed, they should be assigned to another duty, or they should be dismissed (Timur, 2010:92). Ibn Taymiyya, who argued that the caliph should seize the property of an official who had unjustly taken the people's property and return it to its rightful owner, also ruled that if the property was not returned, the official should be imprisoned or beaten (Taymiyya, 1999:93).

Similarly, Nizam al-Mulk asserted that in instances where tax officials have collected more taxes than legally permitted from the populace, the excess funds should be returned and the official in question should be dismissed and exiled (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:38). Sebuktegin asserts that the sovereign should not sleep for the night without administering punishment to those who have attempted to destroy the people's property (Sebuktegin, 1975:230). In contrast, Sadi Shirazi asserts that a ruler who fails to punish thieves is himself complicit in the act of robbery (Shirazi, 2016:50). Additionally, Sharif-er Radi threatens to impoverish and discredit any officials who take, whether in small or large amounts, the people's property (Radi, 2016:279). In contrast, Genghis Khan advocated for the conviction of a gentleman who was unable to administrate even ten people, including his family. He ruled that officials who neglected their duties should be punished with beatings and, in some cases, death. Those who were sentenced to death could be released from the death penalty by paying a diet (Genghis Khan, 1947:173). In regard to the death penalty, Ibn Taymiyya posited that an individual who has unintentionally caused the death of another person should be required to pay a diet, provided that the family of the victim grants forgiveness (Taymiyya, 1999:132).

The authors suggest that deterrence through punishment will prevent the commission of crimes. They argue that the specific provisions of punishment should vary according to the nature of the criminality, although they do set forth provisions on a number of crimes and punishments. Abu Mansur al-Sealibi categorizes criminals into three distinct groups and presents his views on appropriate punishments based on the nature of the crimes committed. Those whose offenses are deemed pardonable may acknowledge their misdeeds and express remorse. Those who are certain that they will not betray are not subject to punishment. Those who perpetrate criminal acts for which no justification exists, yet are orphans, may be exempt from punishment if they acknowledge their misdeeds and pledge to refrain from similar offenses. In the case of repeat offenders, even if they confess their crimes and express remorse, they should be subject to immediate punishment. In the opinion of Abu Mansur al-Salibi, it is the recidivist criminals who are deserving of punishment (Sealibi, 1997:215-216).

Similarly, Nizam al-Mulk classified criminals and identified those who should not be pardoned by the sultan as individuals who attempted to destabilize the state, engaged in illicit activities, failed to safeguard state secrets, flattered the sultan with their words, and made agreements with his adversaries (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:46). Sebuktegin, in contrast, asserted that those who appropriated the property of the populace and those who sought to disincite the sultan from the exercise of his authority should not be granted clemency (Sebuktegin, 1975:231).

5.3. Punishment Proportional to the Crime: The Principle of Proportionality

Proportionality in punishment denotes the imposition of penalties commensurate with the gravity of the offense and the equilibrium between the offense and the penalty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, which stipulates that punishment should be commensurate with the crime committed, retaliation is an acceptable course of action, and compensation for damages caused by the criminal should be sought from the perpetrator in a similar manner. The implementation of administration actions has the potential to elicit a response in the form of either punishment or reward. It is therefore essential that the application of punishment is carried out in a measured and considered manner, whereas the implementation of reward should be executed in a timely and expedient fashion.

In the field of siyasatnamas, the equilibrium of administration is predicated on the concept of rewarding public goods and punishing public evils. Muhammad b. Turtushi, who proposes the implementation of a reward system for state officials based on the difficulties they face, also asserts that punishments should be moderate (Turtushi, 2011:358). Abu Bakr al-Kharawi, who advocates the constant supervision of state officials such as

administrators responsible for social order, also believes that those who act justly should be rewarded and advanced in rank, while those who commit atrocities should be punished and demoted, and in some cases dismissed from their posts (Al-Kharawi, 2016:76-77). Ibn Tıqtaqa identifies the capacity to reward good actions and punish bad ones as a defining characteristic of an effective ruler (Tıqtaqa, 2016:32).

The most pivotal aspect of the principle of proportionality in punishment is that punishments are meted out in accordance with the nature of the crimes committed. The ruler is duty-bound to impose a punishment commensurate with the crime committed and to refrain from exceeding the prescribed limits (Suhrawardi, 2013:88). Al-Ghazali, who advocates for the implementation of criminal punishment in accordance with the gravity of the crime committed, asserts that such penalties should be administered in a manner that is devoid of personal bias and prejudice (Al-Ghazali, 2016:58). Similarly, Nizam al-Mulk, who proposes the implementation of disciplinary measures for servants in accordance with their transgressions, asserts that the imposition of penalties commensurate with the gravity of the offense will reinforce the authority of the sovereign and deter potential opposition from state officials (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:46).

Amir Timur, on the other hand, put forth the argument that the equilibrium between criminality and retribution would maintain a state of hope and fear among the populace, thereby fostering the emergence of a balanced administration (Timur, 2010:119). The Sultan should refrain from using the whip when a sword is more appropriate and vice versa. Furthermore, the death penalty should not be imposed as a punishment for crimes that can be adequately addressed through imprisonment (Sebuktegin, 1975:232). In the view of Muhammad b. Turtushi, imprisonment should be employed in cases where a warning is sufficient, the whip should not be used in crimes where imprisonment is required, and the sword should not be used in lieu of the whip (Turtushi, 2011:186). Maverdi posits that the death penalty should not be sought for crimes that do not necessitate such a punishment (Maverdi, 2017:414). Sadi Shirazi also cautions that the ruler should not hastily impose the death penalty in a state of anger, noting that while it is relatively simple to kill the living, it is not possible to resurrect the dead (Shirazi, 2016:69).

The principle of proportionality is concerned with the determination of punishment in a way that ensures that the offender suffers the same degree of victimization that he has caused. Additionally, Nizam al-Mulk proposed that state officials should be punished in accordance with the gravity of their offenses, arguing that proportionality in punishment would serve to safeguard the sultan's authority (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:46). Ibn Taymiyya's assertion that torture is strictly prohibited and that the method of killing employed by the murderer should be replicated in the same manner represents a pivotal point of equilibrium in the domain of punishment (Taymiyya, 1999:88). In accordance with the principle of equality, an individual who amputates his own right hand at the elbow will have his hand amputated at that point, an individual who breaks a tooth will have their tooth broken, and in instances where it is not feasible to achieve equality, a "*wounding diet*" is a necessary measure. Furthermore, the infliction of excessive physical harm upon an individual is also prohibited. In the event of an individual uttering a curse against another, the latter is entitled to reciprocate in kind (Taymiyya, 1999:138-139).

In addition to advocating the determination of punishments with a concern for balance, the authors of the *siyasatnamas* proffer suggestions to encourage behaviors that are rewarded in return and to avoid actions that are likely to result in punishment. It is recommended that the ruler refrain from hasty punishment and instead adopt a policy of swift reward for those who perform their duties in an exemplary manner (Suhrawardi, 2013:86). Sebüktegin posited that refraining from dismissing state officials for their first offense would encourage greater caution (Sebuktegin, 1975:230). Muhammad b. Turtushi similarly deems it inappropriate to punish an individual of merit for a single misstep (Turtushi, 2011:247). In the view of Abu Mansur al-Sealibi, if the sovereign discerns that a dependable and diligent state official is unable to fulfil the requirements of their role, it would be more beneficial to offer praise than criticism. Such conduct on the part of the sovereign would serve to dissuade other officials from exhibiting trepidation in the discharge of their duties, thereby fostering a sense of accountability (Sealibi, 1997:216).

Nizam al-Mulk also suggested that individuals who have been promoted to higher positions and subsequently punished publicly would suffer a loss of reputation and the efforts made on their behalf would be rendered futile. Consequently, he advocated for the implementation of secretive warnings for individuals demonstrating competence, as opposed to public punishment (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:140). The nature of the crime and the character of the offender are both significant factors in determining an appropriate punishment. According to the authors of the *siyasatnamas*, a meritorious and hardworking civil servant who commits a first offense should be forgiven on the assumption that he would not repeat the offense. In such cases, a secret warning is an effective and proportionate response.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE BALANCE IN SIYASATNAMAS

Balance is a fundamental aspect of siyasatnamas. Muhammad b. Turtushi posits that administration can be achieved through a flexible approach that avoids the pitfalls of weakness and a robust stance that prevents the eruption of anger (Turtushi, 2011:188). The authors place significant emphasis on the establishment of administrative equilibrium in the processes of decision-making, assignment, supervision, punishment, and in the relations between the ruler and the ruled.

6.1. Balance in the Decision Making Process

The initial stage of administrative processes is the decision-making phase. The foundation of decision-making in siyasatnamas is based on the principles of legality, consultation, and equality before the law. The authors suggest that decisions should be made in accordance with the law, that the ruler should engage in consultation when making decisions, and that equality before the law should be ensured. Ensuring balance in decision-making would not only result in more sound judgments but also prevent the victimization caused by wrong decisions.

In their attempts to elucidate the decision-making processes, the authors of the siyasatnamas placed the greatest emphasis on the importance of consultation. Indeed, it was almost ubiquitous in their discussions. In his treatise, Abu Mansur al-Sealibi posited that consultation would yield either a prudent decision that would result in victory or an erroneous decision that would be suffered by those consulted (Sealibi, 1997:98). If the ruler makes a decision through consultation and achieves a victory, this is beneficial in itself. However, if he is unsuccessful, at least he will not have to bear the consequences alone. Sebuktegin recommends that the ruler should give importance to the opinions of people he trusts in administrative affairs, yet ultimately advises him to act on his own decisions (Sebuktegin, 1975:231). In contrast, Badraddin ibn Jamaa attempted to establish a balance between the subjects to be consulted and the individuals to be consulted. He proposed that experienced individuals should be consulted in matters where it is challenging to ascertain the truth, and individuals of knowledge should be consulted in complex matters (Jamaa, 2010:101).

The ruler should neither act with undue haste nor undue delay in making decisions. Nizam al-Mulk counseled that when news of an unanticipated occurrence is received, the sultan should refrain from hasty decision-making and instead await the revelation of the truth (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:151). Additionally, Keikavus posited that the sultan should not be unduly slow in his consultations but should not display a need for the opinions of those consulted. The ruler should refrain from hastily implementing the decision resulting from the consultation until the appropriate time comes. However, when the time comes, the ruler should not be impatient (Keikavus, 1970:122). Similarly, Suhrawardi counseled against hastiness in meting out punishment and advocated for swift rewards. He also advised a measured approach to everyday matters. However, he also deemed it inappropriate to act soberly in all circumstances, emphasizing that such behavior could potentially have adverse social consequences (Suhrawardi, 2013:86).

Furthermore, it is indicative of a balanced approach when all individuals are treated equitably before the law in decision-making processes. Al-Ghazali posits that when an individual presents a case to a ruler, the latter should adopt an equal stance with the former (Al-Ghazali, 2016:119). Amir Timur also asserted that he was the foremost law-abider and that state officials and rulers were similarly obliged to obey the law (Timur, 2010:72). In the view of Ibn Taymiyah, the application of the law should be impartial, irrespective of the status of the perpetrator, whether a respected figure or an ordinary person (Taymiyya, 1999:75). Maverdi's perspective on the role of the judge in his decisions also provides sufficient evidence to indicate that a balance is present. A judge is prohibited from presiding over cases involving their parents. He is precluded from acting as a witness for or against his family, as well as from hearing witnesses. Maverdi asserts that only testimony favorable to the adversary can be heard and a decision made (Maverdi, 2017:155).

It is incumbent upon the ruler to exercise discernment in regard to the extent of his actions, to ensure that his administration is sufficiently robust to preclude the possibility of abuse, and to make donations in a manner that does not result in undue financial strain. It is incumbent upon the ruler to ensure that the state treasury is sufficiently replenished to enable the administration of the military forces. Furthermore, he should maintain a sense of justifiable anger to the extent that the people will not hate him (Shirazi, 2016:86). Both Yusuf Khaas Hajib, who counsels the ruler to maintain equilibrium in his financial affairs, and Sebüktegin, who urges the ruler to be magnanimous without squandering the treasury, underscore the significance of a balanced approach

in decision-making (Yusuf Khass Hajib, 2010; Sebuktegin, 1975). In contrast, Sadi Shirazi suggests that the ruler should be sufficiently generous to avoid undermining the state order and that the treasury should be sufficiently robust to prevent state officials from facing difficulties (Shirazi, 2016:46). Additionally, Najmeddin Daye posits that the ruler should refrain from excesses in both stinginess and generosity (Daye, 2017:172).

6.2. Balance in the Appointment Process

The appointment processes described in *siyasatnamas* are based on the principles of allocating offices to officials on the basis of trust, considering merit as a key factor, and taking public interests into account. Maintaining equilibrium in the appointment processes will guarantee that the powers are exercised by those who are adequately qualified, and social benefits will be taken into consideration rather than ensuring individual interests. The authors of the *siyasatnamas* posited that appointments should be made in accordance with the nature of the office in question. Ibn Taymiyah, who suggested that the most meritorious individual should be selected for an office, proposed that the decision-making process should be guided by the specific purpose of the appointment. He advocated for the appointment of the most qualified individual, in accordance with the nature of the position to be held (Taymiyya, 1999:39-40).

Similarly, Bedreddin ibn Jamaa advocated for the appointment of the most suitable individual to the caliphate, aligning with the perspective of Ibn Taymiyah (Jamaa, 2010:36). In contrast, Keikavus argued that the appointment of an individual who is bankrupt, hungry, and a tyrant would be detrimental to the country. He argued that appointing an individual with a proclivity for greed to an office would inevitably lead to financial challenges. Such an individual, he asserted, would prioritize meeting their own needs before utilizing their authority for the benefit of the public. He further drew an analogy between this scenario and an arrow, which, after feeding itself with water, would then be capable of carrying water for irrigation purposes (Keikavus, 1970:112-113).

In order to identify a suitable compromise in the selection of officials, consideration was given to the importance of ensuring that the selected candidates possessed the requisite qualities to provide a balanced and effective leadership team. Ibn Taymiyyah postulated that if the superior ruler's temperament was mild, his deputy should be hard, otherwise the deputy should be chosen from mild-tempered candidates (Taymiyya, 1999:41). In contrast, Amir Timur, who advocated that the sovereign should appoint mature individuals with justice as viziers, held the view that a just vizier would be capable of overcoming the oppression of the sultan. Timur, who also advocated for a balanced approach to the treatment of officials, asserted that he did not elevate the ranks of the officials excessively or unexpectedly, nor did he demote them or diminish their motivation to fulfill their duties (Timur, 2010:84).

6.3. Balance in the Supervision Process

The processes of supervision can be discussed in three ways: the control of the state officials, the control of the people, and the control of enemies. In the context of state officials, the general public, and adversaries, the authors initially emphasized the importance of recognizing the circumstances of these groups and implementing effective control measures. Furthermore, the works in question addressed the ramifications of control and the consequences of its absence. An effort to maintain equilibrium in supervision facilitates the ruler's discernment of both allies and adversaries, thereby enabling the formulation of policies informed by this discernment.

In his treatment of those he considers to be friends and those he deems to be enemies, the ruler must be aware that the nature of these relationships is not static and that individuals may shift from one category to the other. Muhammad b. Turtusi advised the ruler to love with fear, contemplating the possibility that his friend might one day become an enemy, and to hate with fear, considering that his enemy might one day become a friend (Turtushi, 2011:535). Nizam al-Mulk proposes that the sultan should cultivate intimacy with his friends in a manner that facilitates their estrangement and, subsequently, their re-establishment of ties (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:262).

Similarly, Sadi Shirazi posited that friends may one day become enemies and cautioned the sultan against divulging all information to his friends. He highlighted the potential for enemies to become friends in the future and advised against persecution (Shirazi, 2016:84). In contrast, Ibn Tıqtaqa suggested that there are two distinct categories of adversaries: the oppressor and the oppressed. It is recommended that the ruler refrain from placing trust in and avoiding the oppressed, and that they not be fearful of the oppressor (Tıqtaqa, 2016:50). Amir Timur

asserted that he treated his friends with kindness and his enemies with tolerance, and that he preferred to seek compromise in his relations with both friends and enemies (Timur, 2010:72).

Furthermore, it is essential to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy for administrating and regulating the ruled. Ibn Tıqtaqa posits that there exists a distinct understanding of politics for each social class. The ruler should provide guidance to those who adhere to virtuous moral standards, offer both encouragement and threats to those who are of an intermediate moral standing, and utilize compulsion to ensure that the populace acts in accordance with the established moral code (Tıqtaqa, 2016:43). Amir Timur, who placed great emphasis on maintaining equilibrium in his relations with state officials and the people, asserted that he kept them in a state of ambivalence, oscillating between fear and hope, through his policies (Timur, 2010:81). In contrast, Al-Ghazali argued that appointments and dismissals should be made on the basis of balance. He likened the dismissal of a state official with experience and merit due to a minor incident to the transformation of the state administration into a school for children (Al-Ghazali, 2016:126).

6.4. Balance in the Punishment Process

The implementation of deterrence-based balance is a fundamental aspect of the criminal justice system, as evidenced in siyasatnamas on punishment processes. These processes are shaped in accordance with the laws and regulations that administrate them, with the aim of preventing crimes from being committed. In order for punishment to be justified, it is necessary to prove that a crime has been committed. The limits of punishments are regulated in accordance with the law, and the specific punishment is determined according to the nature of the crime. Ensuring a balance in the punishment process would serve to deter criminal activity and prevent injustice. This is because punishments are determined according to the proof and nature of the crime, thus ensuring that those who commit crimes are held to account for their actions.

The equilibrium achieved by the ruler in his administration of those under his rule also influences the behavior of the ruled towards him. Abu Mansur al-Sealibi posited that an excessively lenient ruler, one who forgives all, will damage his reputation. Conversely, a harsh ruler, one who is known as a tyrant, will alienate the people and become vulnerable to conspiracies (Sealibi, 1997:101). Similarly, Suhrawardi suggests that if the ruler attempts to compel others to adhere to his desires, the ruler will be vanquished. Furthermore, if the ruler exceeds the boundaries of forgiveness, he will forfeit his reputation (Suhrawardi, 2013:33). Ibn Tıqtaqa also cautioned that excessive generosity towards military personnel could potentially lead to their detachment from the ruler, whereas a stingier approach could cause them distress (Tıqtaqa, 2016:53).

The administration of just and proportionate punishment, commensurate with the gravity of the offense, is a fundamental tenet of balanced justice. Maverdi posited that punishments should be administered by those with the requisite competence, applied to those who have committed the requisite offense, and that there should be no undue pressure for the death penalty for offenses that are not necessary (Maverdi, 2017:415). Abu Najib Suhrawardi counseled the ruler to mete out punishment commensurate with the gravity of the crime and to refrain from excessive penalties (Suhrawardi, 2013:88).

Muhammad b. Turtushi also suggested that imprisonment should not be imposed for crimes where threats are sufficient, that whip punishment should be reserved for crimes where imprisonment is sufficient, and that sword punishment should be reserved for crimes where whip punishment is sufficient (Turtushi, 2011:186). Sebuktegin posited that the ruler should not resort to the whip where the sword is necessary and the sword where the whip is necessary (Sebuktegin, 1975:229). In contrast, Ibn Tıqtaqa counseled the ruler to refrain from punishing those who are indifferent with threats, those who are threatened with imprisonment, those who are imprisoned with beatings, and those who are beaten with death (Tıqtaqa, 2016:43).

Amir Timur, who asserted that he ruled by maintaining a balance of hope and fear among the populace, also mandated penalties commensurate with the gravity of the offenses (Timur, 2010:119). Similarly, Nizam al-Mulk espoused the view that officials who perpetrate offenses should be subjected to penalties commensurate with the gravity of their misdeeds (Nizam al-Mulk, 2016:144).

It is not the role of the sovereign to mete out punishment for personal gain; rather, it is their responsibility to ensure that those who have committed crimes are duly punished. Al-Ghazali counsels the sovereign to mete out punishment for the reform of criminals, cautioning against the pursuit of personal gratification and the satisfaction of resentments (Al-Ghazali, 2016:147). In contrast, Sadi Shirazi argued that it is cruel for a ruler to refrain from punishing their relatives while punishing ordinary people (Shirazi, 2016:82).

7. CONCLUSION

The period between the 10th and 14th centuries, during which the artifacts analyzed in this research are dated, corresponds to a period in which numerous states underwent significant changes. This included the establishment and collapse of states ruled by the Ghaznavids, Qarakhanids, Abbasids, Seljuks, Ayyubids, Mamluks, Ilkhanids, and Timurids. The period in question represents a time when the dynamics of rulership and administration underwent significant transformation as a result of shifts in political power. A multitude of political, social, scientific, religious, and artistic formations that continue to exert influence in the present day emerged during this period. Siyasatnamas were also shaped around this richness and diversity and defined the concepts of administration in a manner compatible with the conditions and geography of the period.

The decision-making process is informed by the rules set forth by the law, and consultation is of significant consequence in this process. The tenet of consultative decision-making is that the law is a valid and binding force for all. This approach calls to mind the principle of the rule of law, which holds that all individuals and institutions are equal before the law and must act in accordance with it.

Siyasatnamas underscore the significance of public service and the necessity for officials to conduct themselves with accountability, emphasizing that public duties should be regarded as entrusted. Appointments are based on merit, and it is also argued that the public interest should be considered in appointments and dismissals. It is of the utmost importance that decisions are taken in an impartial manner, with the general benefit of society in mind and without consideration of personal interests.

The authors of the siyasatnamas posit that the priorities of the supervisory process are contingent upon the identity of the individual being supervised. The texts contain detailed discussions of the processes and methods of supervision of state officials, as well as of the people and enemies. They provide detailed accounts of the optimal methods for conducting control, the establishment of effective control mechanisms, and the adverse consequences of inadequate control. The role of espionage in the monitoring of adversaries is underscored, and it is asserted that armed conflict should be regarded as a last resort. It is strategically crucial to refrain from underestimating adversaries and to respond to each with an equivalent force. Additionally, it is asserted that engaging with adversaries through benevolent and conciliatory means may yield strategic advantages.

In the context of legal proceedings, the argument is made that punishments should be fair and in accordance with the law. The implementation of legal penalties for criminal offenses serves to reinforce the authority of the law and to guarantee the administration of justice. It is crucial that the penalties imposed serve as a deterrent, thereby preventing future criminal acts. The stipulation that punishments should be commensurate with the gravity of the crimes in question calls to mind the principle of a fair trial, which dictates that the punishment should be proportionate to the crime's severity. In this manner, the objective of the punishment process is to safeguard social order and contribute to the prevention of criminal activity.

The analysis of siyasatnamas allows us to gain insight into the understanding of administration in a given period and geographical area, as well as the qualifications of their authors. In addition to elucidating the existing administrative processes, these treatises also highlight the ideal administrative processes. In this context, key concepts such as justice, merit, conformity to the law, consultation, and public interest assume particular prominence within the framework of recommendations and rules administrating decision-making, assignment, supervision, and punishment. It may be posited that the administrative ideals were achieved under the leadership of these concepts during the periods in which siyasatnamas were written. However, if we recall that the necessity of a concept can be conveyed even in its absence, the significance of the principles discussed in this study for the authors and their respective eras will become more apparent. It is important to note that throughout the processes of administration, not only are the principles that are ultimately reached mentioned, but also the principles that are attempted to be reached.

The administrative codes contained within siyasatnamas demonstrate that these works offer social, economic, and political guidance based on their historical context and a depth of insight that will enrich ongoing discussions on administrative thought. An attempt to construct administrative principles based on the data provided by the works will reveal the current administrative accumulation of the ideas that will form the backbone of the administration. This will enable us to consider the ideas of the past and present together and determine the conditions of the future.

YAZAR BEYANI / AUTHORS' DECLARATION:

Bu makale Araştırma ve Yayın Etiğine uygundur. Beyan edilecek herhangi bir çıkar çatışması yoktur. Araştırmanın ortaya konulmasında herhangi bir mali destek alınmamıştır. Makale yazım ve intihal/benzerlik açısından kontrol edilmiştir. Makale, “*en az iki dış hakem*” ve “*çift taraflı körleme*” yöntemi ile değerlendirilmiştir. Yazar, dergiye imzalı “*Telif Devir Formu*” belgesi göndermişlerdir. Mevcut çalışma için mevzuat gereği etik izni alınmaya ihtiyaç yoktur. Bu konuda yazarlar tarafından dergiye “*Etik İznine Gerek Olmadığına Dair Beyan Formu*” gönderilmiştir. Yazar, çalışmanın tüm bölümlerine ve aşamalarına tek başına katkıda bulunmuştur. / *This paper complies with Research and Publication Ethics, has no conflict of interest to declare, and has received no financial support. The article has been checked for spelling and plagiarism/similarity. The article was evaluated by "at least two external referees" and "double blinding" method. The author sent a signed "Copyright Transfer Form" to the journal. There is no need to obtain ethical permission for the current study as per the legislation. The "Declaration Form Regarding No Ethics Permission Required" was sent to the journal by the authors on this subject. The author contributed to all sections and stages of the study alone.*

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