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*Derleme • Review*

## **Back to the Bildsamkeit or towards the Ability to Dissent; on the Discourse on the Conditions for Enabling and Demanding the Participation of Children and Young People in Politics in Germany**

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**Abstract:** This paper first introduces youth social work as a target group and actor in civic education. The current state of civic education in Germany is discussed by analysing the 16<sup>th</sup> Children and Youth Report, also to subject this state later to a normative evaluation. This is provided in the first part with the discourse on education where a precise clarification of terms and approaches is undertaken. In the evaluation of the approaches themselves, a distinction is made between (a) discourses that seek to hold together the components of the system in their juxtaposition against each other, and (b) ways of proceeding that seek the unity of this system in the communication of the selected categories with each other. The third method (c) first analyses the advantages and disadvantages of the first two approaches in terms of the expectations that are actually effective in the living world. It then proposes a new search for a theory-led re-development of the laws of evaluation based on normative principles. In this way, educational ideals are thematised not only according to their eligibility to be recognised but also according to their worthiness of recognition at all. The second part of this contribution deals with education in its mediation with democracy and law. Democracy is differentiated into participation, representation and deliberation. And the law is considered from the logic of its evolution and its claim to universality. Finally, the assertion is substantiated that civic education is best constituted in the mediating of democracy and law with education. In this mediation, political education appears as a by-product of political culture. In this review article, the method of discourse analysis is used.

**Keywords:** Civic Education, Democracy, Law, Bildsamkeit, Youth Social Work

### ***Bildsamkeit'a Geri Dönüş ya da Fikir Ayrılığı Yeteneğine Yöneliş; Almanya'da Çocukların ve Gençlerin Siyasete Katılımını Mümkün Kılma ve Talep Etme Koşullarına İlişkin Söylem Üzerine***

**Öz:** Bu çalışmada, öncelikle yurttaşlık eğitiminde bir hedef grup ve aktör olarak gençlik sosyal hizmeti tanıtılmakta, ardından buradan türetilen yurttaşlık eğitimini normatif bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutmak için 16. Çocuk ve Gençlik Raporu özelinde Almanya'daki yurttaşlık eğitiminin durumu tartışılmaktadır. Kriterler doğrultusunda yapılacak her değerlendirme eğitimin şu anki durumunun incelenmesini gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu gereklilik bu çalışmanın ilk bölümünde sonulan kavramların ve yaklaşımların birbirleriyle olan ilişkilerinin titizce

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açıklığa kavuşturulduğu eğitim üzerine söylem ile sağlanmaktadır. Yaklaşımların değerlendirmesinde, sistem bütünlüğünün bileşenlerini birbiriyle olan karşılıklarında birarada tumak isteyen söylemlerle (a) bu sistemin bütünlüğünü seçilen kategorilerin birbiriyle olan iletişimde (b) arayan ilerleyiş biçimleri arasında bir ayırım yapılmıştır. Üçüncü yöntem (c), önce ilk iki yaklaşımın avantaj ve dezavantajlarını yaşam dünyasında fiilen etkili olan beklentileriyle ele almaktadır. Sonra bunları normatif ilkelere hareketle, teori öncülüğünde değerlendirme yasalarının yeniden geliştirilmesi için yeni bir arayışı önermektedir. Bu şekilde, eğitim idealleri bir yandan kabul görme kapasiteleriyle öte yandan kabul görmeye değer olup olmadıklarına göre ele alınmaktadır. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümü, eğitimin demokrasi ve hukuk ile olan ilişkisiyle ilgilenmektedir. Demokrasi; direkt katılım, temsiliyet ve müzakere formlarına ayrıştırılmaktadır. Hukuk ise onun evrim mantığı ve evrensellik iddiası açısından ele alınmaktadır. Son olarak, yurttaşlık eğitiminin en iyi şekilde demokrasi ve eğitimin etkisiyle ama siyasi kültürün bir yan ürünü olarak ortaya çıkmakta olduğunun vurgusu yapılmaktadır. Bir derleme olan bu çalışmada da, söylem analizi yöntemi kullanılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Yurttaşlık Eğitimi, Demokrasi, Hukuk, *Bildsamkeit*, Geçlik Sosyal Hizmet

## Introduction

One well known thesis in social science states that everything goes from the simple to the complex. If this thesis is correct, this is a time in which the social phenomena and pre-constituted world order have never been as complex as they are today. With the increase in complexity comes a feeling of powerlessness. It is the feeling that individuals are a grain of sand in the sea, that they cannot achieve anything significant with their actions. The purpose of civic education is to counteract this sense of powerlessness and transfer it away from the human body and into communal, i.e. political actions. This goal requires specific knowledge, skills and values. The following contribution is a discussion of the conditions for demanding and encouraging children and young people to become politically active in Germany.

Since Herbart at the latest, pedagogy has focussed on the development of indigenous concepts and the corresponding goal of self-foundation, for which Herbart himself proposed the *Bildsamkeit des Zöglings* (Herbart, 1964, 69). *Bildsamkeit* (ability to acquire new skills developed through upbringing and education) means that upbringing and education are promising if the goals and values pursued by the educators for the adolescent correspond to the adolescent's own goals, values and abilities, which the adolescent will not only *need to have* in the future but *would also want to have* by envisaging the probable existing complex challenges in that very society. Education as an object of disciplinary lineage and upbringing as an object of (professional) practice should be the goal of the *bildsamkeit* of the adolescent on the basis of the anthropological assumption that a individual is most self-effective when it willingly makes itself the subject of the educational maturity, *bildsamkeit*, into which it is thrown at birth and that runs from chaos to order (Demir, 2024). The special feature of Herbart's concept of *bildsamkeit* is indeed, as Tenorth would put it, that it is neither biologically (given disposition) conditioned nor paternalistically conceived but rather provides for self-determination by means of communicative action with corresponding values and goals which are accessible to deliberate self-reflection in the community (Tenorth, 2024: 257-258). *Bildsamkeit* is the basis of what allows human beings to be identified, not only in relation to other beings, but also to all other fellow human beings.

First of all, such a abstract notion of *bildsamkeit* beyond the perspective and resources of the parents in a certain society creates partly unjustified and impossible expectations on children. *Bildsamkeit* means the educability, even the obedience of the child according to certain ideas. The question also arises as to how the best interests of the child are brought together with the rights of the child in this concept (Ammann, 2020). An one-sided view, determined by the perspective of adults, degenerates the child into an empty shell that would be fulfilled with the traditional, moral-philosophical expectations and assignments of duty without an empirically founded reference to the child itself and thus leads to the cementing of its already partly unjustified heteronomy (Rhein, 2019; Willmann and Bärmig, 2020). A discussion about the state of political education especially in Germany needs therefore to point out that John Dewey, for example, closely linked the German understanding of education with nationalism (Dewey, 2004: 100-104). The famous German philosopher T. Adorno believed that because Germans transitioned directly from the empire to democracy without having learnt to use their freedom

for their autonomy, they ended up under national socialism where they were once again back in the structures of heteronomy to which they were accustomed and for which they had longed (Adorno, 2014: 141). In this respect, German citizens have a special obligation to maintain and cultivate democratic culture. That's why Adorno was searching for ideas on how this historical burden could be transformed into a principle of action. "The demand that Auschwitz should not happen again is the very first educational demand. It precedes all others to such an extent that I don't believe I have to justify it, nor should I." (Adorno, 2014: 135) This is still a leading principle of civic education in Germany. That explains partly why Habermas has felt nowadays strongly to declare his unconditional solidarity with the Jewish life in Germany and with Israel as well (Deitelhoff, et al., 2023).

Secondly, civic education can be approached on the basis of a theory or of a practice of a given community. From the perspective of a community, civic education can be defined as an exploratory involvement in the hand down practices of that community. This is the path of empirism, which starts from an observation and infers the general. The members of such a community are conscious of their historical responsibility and constitute themselves for the purpose of mutual co-operation in a state (Oakeshott, 1962: 112). For Oakeshott political education is an invitation to citizens to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills for this involvement. That kind of knowledge and skills are thought in political ideologies as a floodgate of such practices. He divides political ideologies into two groups; ideologies, which, starting from an abstract and absolute principle such as freedom and human rights, provide the corresponding instructions for action, or ideologies, whose principle corresponds to the traditional practices of a community. This praxis "is a system of ideas abstracted from the manner in which people have been accustomed to go about the business of attending to the arrangement of their society." (Oakeshott, 1962: 118) Oakeshott wants to underpin political education with ideologies that are not derived from principles independent of the community's experience but are generated from experienced practices, customs, traditions and ideals. On the other hand, from a theoretical point of view, civic education starts with the willingness of a community to be organized on the political sphere, different from religion, nation, moral and economics (Schmitt, 1932; Mehring, 2018). In this case, a view of the world and of humankind is constructed on the basis of rationalism, which is then taken as the foundation for the observation and judgement of phenomena in the world of experience. Both ways have their advantages and disadvantages (Peirce, 1887). This contribution focuses from both points of view on youth and school social work, which are specializations within social work as a profession that aims to improve the living conditions of disadvantaged groups.

Out of these outlined frame the *first part* of this contribution is about the current state of civic education in Germany discussed from a sociological point of view with the 16<sup>th</sup> Children and Youth Report (CYR). Three explanatory approaches are then presented that deal with the emerging issues of upbringing and education in a systematic way. Upbringing and education are presented within a society that cultivates and imposes different expectations on the individual depending on its constitution. According to the *first* approach, existing expectations and challenges can be generated from the viewpoint of juxtaposition by comparing the phenomena temporally, spatially and socially. This juxtaposition approach is traced back to ancient Greek philosophy. A *second* approach is seen in the idea of communication which entities right conditions for good contributions to the state of knowledge and ability of the corresponding actors analysed. With that approach questions of following kind could be put forward: Should it be in teaching about creating an inspiring learning atmosphere or performance promotion? Should it be about material or formal education? Can the selection function of education be supplemented by its function of a qualification? The difference to the first method is that any answers to these questions were not seen as disqualified or corrupt. The *third* approach takes certain logics from preceding approaches and brings them together at the next level. This approach seeks the mutually reinforcing components of the preceding approaches based on predetermined principles. This action-theoretical approach of deliberation is particularly good in the search for consensus. Since consensus in comparison to compromise requires not only passive agreement but active consent, the question arises as to what kind of norms exist that are both indispensable and good in political education. The answer is sought in term of worthiness as well as in mediation of democracy and law with education.

The *second part* is a reflexion about the relationship between democracy, law and (civic) education. There is no unity between them but an instructive coexistence. Civic education is about educating individuals for the political, initially within an already pre-constituted community based on certain preconstituted tradition and principles. That doesn't mean that this community has to be organised in a modern state based on law- but they are typically. However, a mediation between society and individuals is needed. Informal institution like family and customs and formal law as well as organizations like school, churches and social work are developing ideas of a mediation between community and individuals. Modern law can be seen as the formal name for the mediation between lifeworld values like customs and universal principles develop through the corset of formal logic. From the point of civic education, there is also no need for an unity between them but a communicative action. Lifeworld values and ideals driven out of logic are communicated in democracy, which is put by politically educated citizens to an independent relationship with law and the corresponding culture. Democracy consists not only of direct participation and indirect representation in certain consultative bodies but also of consultative deliberation in discourses on the political conditions of growing up in a liberal culture with the corresponding institutional expectations (Habermas, 1998: 349-398). A contribution of children and youth work to civic education has insofar to discuss democracy, law and education in connection with political culture of that community.

The question of the cultural conditions of civic education is particularly virulent today. In a time of rise of right-wing extremist movements, it is part of the culture of every person in modern societies to develop appropriate approach of dealing with dissent, no matter how tense it may be in certain cases. It is apparently not uncommon to see fundamental principles politicised in the name of solidarity. These principles are indeed of a discursive nature but therefore neither belong to politics nor should they be prejudiced in the name of one type of culture. A clear understanding of the terms used in these discourses helps to separate the wheat from the chaff. These include not only the terms like deliberation, participation, but also *Bildsamkeit*. Education in general and education in social work in specific is about a self reflection on certain principle and (anthropological) assumptions, like an ability of every human of learning, of talents for development through upbringing and education. None of them can be completely verified. *Bildsamkeit* is a good example of both, the impossibility of empirical support for certain assumptions and the susceptibility to misuse of certain terms, which may have an animating effect on the profession but often gain validity at the expense of disciplinary respectability. In line with that tension, in the last part conclusions are drawn from the two previous parts.

## Method

Basically, there are three types of methods. Firstly the genesis, which reflects a development, the upgrowth of phenomena. Second the normative evaluation, which subjects existing facts, circumstances, phenomena to criticism under a general, or generally accepted and acceptable principle. Lastly the comparison, which relates at least two comparable phenomena under their similarity and/or difference. All of these three methods were applied in this paper. In all these methods, a world of facts is ontologically presupposed, which can be *interpreted* constructivistically, systematically and phenomenologically. And *Interpretation* itself can be defined as a method of trying to understand the phenomena. On the one hand, phenomena (facts, texts, traditions, statements etc.) are categorised in their historical context in their emergence (genesis), and on the other hand, they are made accessible to new actors with other facts (literature) for further interpretation. This is provided in the present work, on the one hand by reconstructing and embedding the history of civic education in the context and, on the other hand by analysing the terms (such as education, deliberation, law etc.) from the viewpoint of abstract norms like democracy. All results are current fixed points that are presented as facts for further interpretation. Hermeneutics, i.e. the interpretation of observations has indeed been a common method in social pedagogy since Friedrich Schleiermacher. Hermeneutics as a general method was developed by phenomenologists such as Martin Heidegger, Wilhelm Dilthey and Hans-George Gadamer und Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Demir, 2023a). On this basis, the existing literature about civic education was structured along two fundamental distinctions; the first distinction between philosophy and sociology is

about keeping normative statements with their theoretical tautological propositions separate from empirical propositions with correspondingly falsifiable observations. This distinction allows both a discourse on the (realistic) expectations from tradition, religion and philosophy as well as their reflection in practical everyday life, without ignoring their overlapping. An example of this can be found in that paper in the discourse on *eligibility* and *worthiness for recognition* of certain values. The second distinction is about keeping practice, profession and discipline apart in the sense of complementarity based on comparison. On the basis of this comparative distinction, three conceptions of civic education could be discussed; (a), democracy, law and education could be separated from each other without ignoring their overlapping and, a differentiated treatment of the practice of professionals, their reflection in the discipline, in the theory could be undertaken (b), so that the recourse in the actions of children and young people in social pedagogy (c) could be analysed.

### **Civic Education in Germany Based on 16<sup>th</sup> Children and Youth Report**

The current state of civic education in Germany shall be illustrated with the 16<sup>th</sup> Children and Youth Report (DE: *16. Kinder- und Jugendbericht*). Since 1965, the Federal Government of Germany has undertaken the effort to submit a report about young people in every legislative period. In the 16<sup>th</sup> Children and Youth Report (CYR) attention was focussed on civic education from the perspective of children and youth education and youth social work from kindergarten to university (CYR: 45-85). CYR can be regarded as official documents in the sense that they are published on behalf of the Federal Government and the Federal Government officially comments on the publication. Insofar, the articulated ideas in CYR may be used as legitimate, recognized demands of the public (Hradil, 1987: 144-153).

CYR sees civic, political education as an ongoing task, that is re-emphasised and redefined by the actors at every stage and in every life situation. The report emphasises the ability of young people and their empowerment by society to compromise, to consent to democratic decisions while at the same time safeguarding the interests of (political) minorities as the essence of civic education (CYR: 8). Civic education is understood as a non-neutral, active, critical and controversial deliberation of all children and young people in decision-making. Their right to civic education is derived both from UN children's rights and from section 1 of *Code of Social Law* (DE: *Sozialgesetzbuch*) VIII (CYR: 11, 80, 159, 361). In particular, the participation of disadvantaged children and young people is emphasised, especially those with migration background. However, the report aims to analyse the conditions and opportunities for political participation of all adolescents and in all relevant areas. This in-depth analysis is justified by the current challenge of democratic participation, which on the one hand "all too often leads to anti-democratic orientations and activities" and on the other hand points to the "credibility and justification deficits of the existing political system." (CYR: 45)

Politics is seen in the report as a decision-making process capable of winning a majority with an "inescapable core" of the principles of the rule of law, such as legal equality, separation of powers and protection of minorities (CYR: 109). Politics is defined as the "establishment, enforcement and questioning of generally binding and publicly relevant regulations within and between groups." (CYR: 47) According to this definition, politics concerns always everyone who has (un)consciously and/or (un)willingly subjected to this regulation. It is rightly emphasised that politics is not a private but a public matter. The state is not presented as a neutral, passively observing and arbitrating authority but it is disenchanted as a representative of certain interest groups. Indeed, as Foucault has already outlined, its actions are a form of a particularised representation of interests - the state is one actor among others (Foucault, 2003). Anyone who lives within this framework (such as Germany) can ignore the whole but can never escape it even if this person wants to shatter this framework. The above mentioned definition takes hardly up the perspective of the public as the sphere where relevant issues are addressed and thus also the realm of communication with other actors of different interests and ideas. Also, the international level is missing. Especially today, (youth) politics takes place with reference to inter-, trans- and supranational levels. Significantly is the lack of function. From a systems theory perspective, politics

has the function of communication with which the respective decisions can be moved in one direction or another (0-1) - either from the decision to questioning or in opposite direction (Luhmann, 1997: 336).

This apprehension leaves the aftertaste of an antagonistic understanding of politics based on conflict, although politics is also about cooperation, the creation of common values, institutions and shared goals. That why in that understanding political action shrinks to regulations referring mainly to the legal system. Overall, the definition concentrates on decision-making but neglects the process of public will-formation. An attempt is made to compensate for these disadvantages by considering the formal, substantive and procedural dimensions of democracies but in fact that made it worse. In the substantive dimension of democracy, for example, a reference is made to “ineluctable principles” although the formal dimension reports on the areas in which “rules are developed and enforced but may also be questioned and replaced by others.” (CYR: 47) It is neither explained why they are necessary dimensions of democracy at all nor how these two dimensions can coexist side by side. It should be explained much more precisely and deepened why not the regulations but conditions and procedures are absolute (Habermas, 1996: 277-292; Luhmann, 1997: 373; Pettit, 2013).

This lack of clarity is then reflected in the idea of non-formal education programmes, according to which they should *not* (be) “directly directed and controlled” without providing a reason for this abstinence (CYR: 48). Why can or should professionals in youth centres not offer “didactically prepared” activities? I mean, it is possible to lead without misleading. Without any recognisable reference to Habermas, discourse conditions such as inclusion, i.e. public access to discourse, equal participation, truthfulness of the participants, informality of opinion are mentioned not as dimensions of procedural democracy but as central quality criteria of civic education (CYR: 48; Habermas, 1991: 132, 162). One consequence of this can be found in the following quote: “Civic education and political participation are interrelated. On the one hand, participation in political activities motivates civic education. On the other hand, civic education expands the repertoire of possible political action.” (CYR: 71) The first sentence is just a truism. And since Sokrates killing it has been clear that the relationship between civic education and political participation is of the accumulation type. Also a glance at Dewey would be enough (2004, §VII, 24). Even a brief look at the *fridaysforfuture* movement would demonstrate the positive connection between participation and education. From different logics, it can be stated that political participation promotes civic education (Butler, 1990; Tolbert and Smith, 2005; Heckman, 2013; Putnam, 2015; Linder and Mueller, 2021: 143-155). The more the participation, the greater the need for knowledge and skills. The reverse is empirically not verified. Rather, people with a significant identity and low economic capital have a lower participation rate also with high educational capital (Bourdieu, 2009). One crucial factor is the perception of impact; the more weight is given to one’s own ballot paper and/or actions in general for the output of the upcoming decision the higher the motivation for political participation (Downs, 1957; Scholtz, 2021).

### Three Conceptions of Civic Education

To explain this understanding of politics in CYR, it is necessary to clarify the terms used; civic education in German consists of the concepts, politics and education (*politische Bildung*). Politics can be contemplated from the point of view of the state (*polis*) and the people (*demos*) of that state (Habermas, 1996: 293-308; Sartori, 1997; Pettit, 2013). And education has the respective references to the state, the people of the state, and thus also to culture, society and the individual. The relationships and connections can be found in the ancient Greek word *paideia*. It means the civic education of the individuals in relation to society. “It is, after all, the creation of the work of art of the person or of personal formation, the essence that gives birth to the culture of an age and makes possible all its individual achievements.” (Dilthey, 1986: 21) In this respect, *paideia* means the striving for perfection, for excellence (*arête*) in all aspect of life. Taken together *paideia* and *arête* mean a perfect unity of the individual, society and morality in the sense of binding norms. This all-encompassing understanding is responsible not only for the emergence of science, art and philosophy but also for the murder of Socrates. Socrates was murdered because he deviated from this predetermined path by teaching the youngster

logos instead of poetry. “Socrates does injustice and is meddling, by investigating the things under the earth and the heavenly things, and by making the weaker speech the stronger, and by teaching others these same things.” (Plato, 2024, 19c)

Socrates admits of being guilty if it means spreading the knowledge across the youngsters - where there is no smoke there is no fire (20d), but he emphasizes his noble intentions (Plato, 2024, 20e). Given the expected punishment, he tries to convince the court not by means of valid arguments but by pointing out to the beginning of the end; Pythia had told Chaerephon, Socrates’ student and friend, that there is no wiser man than Socrates (Plato, 2024, 21). To verify this, Socrates began to ask people questions and then realised that Pythia’s statement was correct. His intention was therefore not to question the art, the legends, the tradition, the customs, the insights, in short the existing orders. Socrates’ accusers were hardly impressed by his defence. They were convinced that Socrates teaches the youth logic, biology and philosophy instead of arts, poetry, deeds and wisdom from the Gods. They were certain that he was a threat to the unity of people based on hand down insight. This idea of unity was insofar already by its birth a double-edged sword. That is why at the latest with Aristotle, this totality was transformed in duality. According to this, perfection has its origin in nature, which can be understood genealogically and logically according to the goal (Demir, 2023b: 43-58). The flip side of this perfect, light-filled unity is its corrupt shadow side (cf. table 3).

### **The Longing for a Perfect Unity through Juxtaposition**

A good start for a discussion about the longing for that perfect unity with a link of today is an article by Tenorth under the title *Education - between Ideal and Reality. An Essay* (2013). To evaluate social reality from the point of view of an ideal is a method of philosophy. Such an assessment requires principles that draw a line between science, religion, ideology and everyday understanding. For a direct comparison of education of today’s practice with an ideal in the sense of a concept of perfection rationally designed for a predetermined goal makes the state of existing education look “solidary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”, as Hobbes would put it (Hobbes, 1976, §XIII). On the other hand, a comparison of today’s education with the state of education in the past, e.g. with the lifetime of Hobbes, would present the current social reality hopeful, beautiful, good and just. The question is not from which of this reality should education be considered but rather how an adequate evaluation of today’s education can be provided. What type of catalogue of criteria and values is necessary for evaluating the civic education?

The longing for an unambiguous, perfect unity expresses in the title of Tenorth’s contribution is as old as the history of humanity itself. But it is also a specific German dream. In terms of content, it is about a comparison, albeit based on a value that is not up for debate. Example; Muslims in Germany are lazy. Laziness is attributed here to every person with an Islamic identity, which would also apply if the attribution were empirically wrong (Solveig, et al., 2024; Hambauer, 2025). The core of this approach is the idealisation or condemnation of a group identity (Peirce, 1887: &V; Benner, 2023). In an article, Wilhelm von Humboldt idealised *the character of the Greeks* by pointing out the complementary unity of their ancient culture, society and the age in the individual (1807). Greeks would be characterised by their friends as people in balance. They would orientate themselves towards the noblest or most sublime, integrating these qualities in their personality when it harmonises with the whole. In such a civilisation, man would feel committed to the production of the absolute but knowing that the abstract absolute reveals itself in the universality of observable phenomena. “The classical lives in the light of observation, links the individual to the genus, the genus to the universe, seeks the absolute in the totality of the world, and levels the conflict in which the individual stands with it in the idea of destiny through general equilibrium.” (Humboldt, 1807: 71)

Humboldt assumes that to lead a flourishing life, a person needs a certain type of ability, knowledge, which they gain from various areas and experiences and then put together according to their constitution and own sense (Humboldt, 1793: 234). This person would then lead a well-directed life but remains

open to surprises, to forms of discontinuity. The intellect of such a person must be trained. At the centre of this training should be the person who initially has no intentions but wants to give meaning to life. To be meaningful in life, “man also needs a world outside himself.” (Humboldt, 1793: 235) In addition, that type of individual would seek the widest possible world to realise his inner urge for improvement and ennoblement, to grasp his thinking as an attempt of it’s spirit and his actions as an attempt of his will. In doing so he would need to connect himself as closely as possible with the external world. Man wants so Humboldt to endure humanity in his person both during his age, and after his physical existence for which he learns to engage with the general and the concrete at the same time.

“What does one demand of a nation, of an age, of the whole of mankind, if one is to give it one’s respect and admiration? One demands that education, wisdom and virtue should reign among it as powerfully and generally as possible, that it should raise its intrinsic value so high that the concept of humanity, if it had to be deducted from it as the only example, would gain a great and worthy content. One is not even content with this. It is also demanded that man should visibly imprint his value on the constitutions, which he forms, even on the inanimate nature, which surrounds him, even that he should breathe his virtue and his strength (so mightily and so omnipotently should they radiate through his whole being) into the offspring which he produces.” (Humboldt, 1793: 236)

Humboldt is referring on social laws and the principles derived from them as elements of unity achieved just for the purpose of theory. According to Humboldt, there is a universality in objective reality. That’s why man longs for regularities, for patterns, for order. That’s why he need cognition. Throughout education, this longing should neither lead to distraction, for example by explaining everything according to the principle of chance, nor to a social reality far from objective reality, for example by confusing theory with reality itself (238). “Every business recognises a spiritual mood peculiar to it, and only in it lies the true spirit of its perfection. There are always several external means of expressing it, but the choice among them can only determine whether it finds lesser or fuller satisfaction.” (Humboldt, 1793: 239) Education is the attempt to teach everything according to the peculiarity of that insights. The theoretically assumed unity of the elements of the (social) world is an illusion of human intelligence sharpened by upbringing and education.

A specific pedagogical concept of unity, which is comptabile with paideia and still frequently thrown into the discussion today, is the *Bildsamkeit* develop by Herbart (Anhalt,1999; Rucker, 2014; Anhalt, et al., 2018; Tenorth, 2024)

“The basic concept of pedagogy is the ‘Bildsamkeit’.

Note. The notion of *Bildsamkeit* has a much broader scope. It even extends to the elements of matter. In terms of experience it can be traced back as far as those elements that enter into the metabolism of organic bodies. Traces of the *Bildsamkeit* (plasticity) of the will can be seen in the souls of the nobler animals. But we only know of the *Bildsamkeit* of the will to morality in man.” (Herbart, 1835: &1)

In that famous quote Herbart not only distinguishes humans from other animals, but also from other humans incapable of being receptive of *bildsamkeit*. Only people with the will to morality are susceptible to this sensitivity (*bildsamkeit*). This belief was apparently tested by Victor of Aveyron, giving evidence of the existence of ‘feral’ children who were found running wild without upbringing or education (Tenorth, 2024). These children were regarded as the raw material both for the ultimate proof of the *bildsamkeit* as well as for its refutation. For with these children both could be demonstrated; the human being apparently loses the ability to think abstractly, for example, despite his disposition but at the same time can not only compensate for certain deficits, but also develop abilities again, although he had lost them in the meantime. Pedagogy as the endeavour of established institutions to describe and explain actions aimed at developing the (given) abilities of an adolescent was at odds with a view of elitism according to which only a privileged group of people are capable of education. Thus, deaf people were denied the ability to be sensitive to truth, not only by church-organised religion, but also by science and philosophy. This denial resulted in a moral lowering to the level of an animal and thus also social exclusion from religious services and educational institutions (Tenorth, 2024: 261). From the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, this image of man was apparently increasingly questioned by the notion of

‘developmental ability’. Pedagogy means both education, cultivation of certain human affections for participation in the common as well as the education, development and provision of various (communication) means in order to enable the actors to participate in a direction, manner and according to their own abilities, which vary depending on the type of person.

With Tenorth, two phases of understanding of *bildsamkeit* can be identified. In the first phase, a general assumption was made about the developmental capacity of human beings. On closer inspection, people who have fundamental deficits from birth and/or due to environmental conditions were implicitly and practically excluded. In addition to people with cognitive impairments, these are above all deaf and speechless people as well as feral children. Society should not only encourage healthy, capable, able-bodied children to work and become morally sensitive in educational institutions, but also take care of alleviating the suffering of people with deficiencies in sanatoriums (Tenorth, 2024: 265). In the case of the deaf, for example, the work of Abbé Charles-Michel de l'Épée (1712-1789), Roch-Ambroise Sicard (1742-1822) in France and Samuel Heinicke (1727-1790) in Germany suggested that healing was indeed possible under certain conditions. For pedagogy, this is an identity-creating achievement because that reasoning, rationality and idea of the ability to learn were hence actually attributed to all people.

In the next phase, the humanistic-pedagogical concept of *bildsamkeit* was moulded into an instrument of intervention for totalitarian ideologies. Tenorth titled it this the ‘deformation of *bildsamkeit*’, which was particularly promoted by Wilhelm Flitner and Herman Nohl (Tenorth, 2024: 267). Flitner associates the phonomonological concept of worlds on the one hand with the abnormal, with ‘degeneration, prematurity, delay, maldevelopment, disorder’ and on the other hand with the ‘anatomy of the spiritual human being’ (Flitner, 1983: 83). Nohl links the degeneration diagnosed by Flitner with pathological national conditions, from which he then also postulated a symbiosis of biological, individual, historical and social like-mindedness in national unity. *Paideia* would be realised in Nohl's idea of the ‘Führer’, specifically in Adol Hitler (Nohl, 1988: 166, 226). This discourse is still being reproduced today (Assmann, 2020; Voigt, 2024).

This longing for a state of unity defined by the absence of any ambiguity goes back to Plato's unitary state upon which Hobbes sketches in his *Leviathan*. Part of this longing was established in nation states with a notion of pure unity understood as the absence of ambiguity in terms of ethnicity and ethics and the corresponding institutionalised law (Demir, 2023c). “If I knew something that was useful to me and harmful to my family, I would banish it from my mind. If I knew something useful to my family but not my County, I would seek to forget it. If I knew something useful to my Country and harmful to Europa, or else useful to Europa and harmful to the human race, I would regard it as a crime.” (Montesquieu, 2012: 221) Plurality of life itself was transfer in the unity of moral consideration. This one-sided idea with contrast juxtapositions is then adopted by economics, biology, history, sociology and education alike (Sumner, 1883; Spencer, 1898; Parsons, 1951; Schelsky, 1970). Of course, as the social times progressed the concept of unity also evolved. Part of these developments is the transformation of Greek tradition of *paideia*, which was brought in the course of this time from the morality of the Gods back to man on earth by translating it in Latin as *humanitas*. With this specification, *paideia* receives a stronger connection to existing society. Thus, pedagogy was less about higher values but more about upbringing and education of the next generation of e.g. craftsmen, soldiers and teachers for the concrete society (Tenorth, 2020: 91-96). In this context, the concept of society refers to the validity of the norms of a civil society that has been constituted based on property, ownership (Habermas, 1962: 155). From the very beginning, this concept of society has a negative connotation to e.g. feudal, religious, socialist or feminist communities (Habermas, 1998: 443; Luhmann, 1991b; Arendt, 1992: 43; Agamben, 1993: 69). Based on these understandings, Karl Popper was able to divide all types of communities into closed and open societies (Popper, 1992). The actors in each society must deal with a different type of decision, individual, values, education and model of relation in the sense of Mouffe (2000: 80-107).

**Table 1.** Differences of Societies in their Juxtapositions

Type of society	Closed society (rigid hierarchy with low mobility)	Open society (vertical and horizontal mobility)
<b>Differences</b>		
<b>Individual</b>	socialized for the society of diversity	socialized in the society of differences and inequalities
<b>Values</b>	concrete customs, habits	abstract, moral principles
<b>Education</b>	linked (only) to political goals	linked (also) to individual goals
<b>Relation</b>	antagonistic (war of friends against enemies), politics of conflict	agonic (cooperation with different and un-equal), polity, policy, politics

### Towards a Society of Communication

Beginning with J. Locke, J.-J. Rousseau and I. Kant, these longing for a perfect unity through juxtaposition was increasingly placed in an autonomous side-line, in a communication with each other. In terms of content, it is no longer about opposing phenomena with extreme characteristics (good/evil, corrupt), but about emphasising the nature of reality, which is neither objectively nor interpersonally considered to be the same for every person but rather a construct that is different for or differently conceived by every subject. J. Locke treated in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* the child in the sense of *tabula rasa* -empty of any content. Locke thus opposes Plato, Rene Descartes and hence rationalism. According to Locke, humankind does not come with divine or innate ideas thanks to which the world is recognised. Rather, human beings have experiences with the objects around them from which they form a picture of the world and acquire it ever better over time. Und Rousseau treats childhood in *Emile* as a distinct phase of diversity with an absolute right to exist. The child does not have to be given knowledge that is independent of experience, nor does it have to be given knowledge that the adults feel is good for the child. Learning from both, I. Kant poses the question of how autonomy is possible under heteronomy (Kant, 1803: 27). Once the band was broken with that question it follows other equally interesting thoughts. How could the future perspective of the pupils be expanded by the present perspective of the educators (Herbart, 1887: 29). What are the unconditional values of a good upbringing and education (Natorp, 1904: 5)? How is education possible at all (Hillgruber, 1927)? Is the “*Führer*” the pedagogical reference as an ideal type for a relationship between educator and educated (Nohl, 1935: 165). Instead of two contrasting societies with corresponding personalities, two types of norms are designed with corresponding expectations of society, culture and personality (Habermas, 1981: 270f, 408-419). Instead of a juxtaposition of either-or-logic, in this discourse the antinomies are once again considered as a unit with two sides. Thus, the task of the educators was no longer seen in the ontological deep structure of being but in the respective justifications for one side or the other. Not only moralizing but also the reasoning for the respective decision were rationalized. The content of this discourse is no longer the juxtaposition of perfection and corruption but search for the answer to the question of (the empirically observable) conditions for the development of abilities and skills. In this context, dialectics replaces the method of ontology enabling the actors to compare social phenomenon not only from a normative point of view but also in their genesis and corresponding institutions as well as in comparison to others. A series of discourses can be traced back to this background. One of these is the discourse in German-speaking countries on the concept of *coping with life* (DE: *Lebensbewältigung*). It is proposed in social pedagogy based on the assumption that individuals not only perceive social reality differently, but also act differently depending on their (awareness of) their (own) resources (Böhnisch, 2012).

With this logic of communication, the school as a public institution was now in addition to the family being upgraded to a place for the realization of ideals (Nohl, 1960: 26-29, Ladenthin, 2022: 249-262). That has two different aspects. First of all, upbringing and education were understood as an unity in the communication with the family, school, workplaces, universities, the akademie and society as a whole (Natorp, 1904). The demystification of religious images of the man and world during the Enlightenment also contributed to this expansion, whereby not only social ideals but also individual educational ideals such as personality development were hence available as legitimate values. Education

was the new literary, cultural, pedagogical-professional practice in a society of ‘*res publica litteraria*’ in which authorship become a characteristic of personality. J. J. Rousseau’s autobiographical confessions are still today considered as key texts of modern individualism (1903). W. Dilthey used the example of Goethe und Schleiermacher to show what exactly (auto-) biography means. However, “authorship will soon be expanded, on the one hand in its claim - ‘originally we are all geniuses’ - and on the other in its products. Then not only poems, other texts or musical compositions but the lives of the educated themselves are seen as the result of their own authorship and defined as the product of education. Here, the subject becomes the author of itself and is celebrated in its historical new ‘individuality’ and its uniqueness...” (Tenorth, 2020: 105)

Secondly, because it was no longer just the aristocrat but also the son of the wealthy, who could afford an education, a lifelong learning could be considered as the ideal of every responsible and enlightened person. Every human as a self-determining subject and born into a pre-constituted society considered to acquire knowledge, abilities and skills through upbringing and education in a world that he himself helps to shape (Luhmann, 1997:618-634, 880-883). The pedagogy of society not only “discovers” the child as an independent phase of being human but also paves the way for seeking the goal and the consequences of education in the personality (Ariès, 1975; Luhmann, 1991a; Agamben, 1993). Education is seen not only as a characteristic of the individual but also be used as a medium of social steering. Ideologies and science increasingly replace religion for the regulation of social order (Habermas, 1996: 159f; Bellmann et al., 2020). With the logic of the communication, not only the ideal of social reality could be presented to the individual but also, depending on type of society, the acquisition of knowledge for example could be compared, upgraded and devalued with the immediate, meritocratic and utilitarian requirements of religion, the king, the nation, the labour market and now also the company (Terhart, 2006: 16-25). The concept of socialisation could now be assumed to mean a new kind of communication between the individual and society (Ertuğrul and Bauer, 2024).

Taken those developments into account, the old Greek duality of perfection and corruption was contrasted in the system theory in a endless communication. Something was in the juxtapositions approach either good or evil, either normal or abnormal, either king or subject, either sick or healthy etc.. But N. Luhmann generalised that logic in another perspective; good is the other side of evil, normal and abnormal are two side of an assessment, king and his subject are part of one political system, being sick is part of being healthy. Luhmann was able to distinguish everything in 0-1 (right/wrong, power/no power, communication/decision, etc.) but also subordinate everything to society (Luhmann, 1997: 60-78). It is no more just a being member of a community or not but it also about being an individual in a self-chosen society. It is about becoming an part of society through upbringing in one case and being (at same time) an distinct individual in a functionally differentiated society in the other case. That adding of the equality in the idea of diversity made possible to differentiate between *education in closed community* and *education in open society*, and to compare them according to the same parameters. The table below is driven out of that logic.

**Table 2.** Education for the Community and Education in Society

	<b>Education in a concrete community</b>	<b>Education in abstract world society</b>
<b>Prerequisite</b>	for equal rights and obligations for everyone, including <i>little Johnny</i> .	for a self-determining, self-thinking and self-learning person (responsible autodidact).
<b>School</b>	as a selection institution to produce the same abilities and skills, competencies through the same learning opportunities, learning content and levels of teaching in view of the monotony in the world of work.	as institution of diversity of learning opportunities and development of individual skills and inclinations in view of the variety of situations in life.
<b>Success as function of education</b>	is made possible already in the institutions (family as fate) in the sense of predictability and civilized acting of member who is willing to learn to behave according to given tasks and expectations.	is achieved through self-effort in the institutions (family as starting capital, but also day-care, kindergarten, schools) in the sense of creativity, authenticity and ability to communicate.
<b>Skills</b>	discipline as a remedy for laziness because of original sin transferred to work through insight.	intelligence as a divine gift is consolidated in cognition by using rational-scientific methods.

In retrospect, with the start of modernity and shift from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language lead by G. Grege, L. Wittgenstein, J. Austin, C. Peirce and finally Richard M. Rorty's *Linguistic Turn*, the old structure of understanding was forced into the tight corset of the formal logic of thoughts (Bauman, 1992; Habermas, 1998: 24-32). It was no longer about a single society that was considered perfect but about two different stages of a social development. The old idea of society of ancient Greek perfection required the negation of other types of society as corrupt. Social relations were defined in pre-structured kin-non-kin and then in their moralisation. On the other hand, the communication society was about a socialization process in community and society, about at least two different stages of a single social development with the idea of communication. Consequently, there was no longer a need for negation based on moral as a corrupt side but a levelling from one social time to the next based on the function. This made it possible to strive for a transformation in society, culture and individual, which doesn't exclude social, traditional relationships but certainly required beside kin-non-kin more abstract media of communication like money, power and right, which also allows the logic of both social inclusion and exclusion at the same time without being out of communication.

### **Deliberation as the New Unity**

The juxtaposition approach (either/or) was based on conflict. It consciously looks for tensions, disagreements, problems and abnormal. The decisive advantage of the juxtaposition approach is that this approach allows the respective units to be examined from one point of view in detail, which contributes to the emergence of specialisations. But it completely separates the units from each other. Consequently, it ends up either in the categories of glorious victory and sober defeat: Either humanity ends up in eudaimonia, paradise, utopia, or in dystopia and degrading fascism. On the other hand, communication approach (as-well-as) is seeking everywhere for cooperation. It is a world of communication and construction, nothing else. Firstly, it is not possible in that world to not communicate. Also a not-communication is communication. If or because everything is reduced to communication, there doesn't seem to be anything worth knowing. Every sentence is either a contradiction or tautology. Not new insight, cognition, understanding. Everything is a repetition of the old in its current version. The second difficulty lies in the fact that the logic of communication assumes an individualised construction of reality instead of a social, shared world that is also accessible to scientific investigation, which, as Walter Benjamin would put it, opens the door to speculation for Platonic realism in the age of technical reproducibility. It doesn't have a realistic epistemology. Another disadvantage lies in the fact that social phenomena are presented here in the name of reducing complexity in one social space, even though a sharpening of the differences is decisive for the quality of the respective decisions. Finally, the communication approach relies in the creation of unity on

programs that promote the stability and/or fragility of society, depending not (existing) on the circumstances, but rather on (existing) perceptions. Because stability is constructed as the other side of society's temporality, education relies not only on science, knowledge (insight and cognition) and morality but also on ideologies, which have the quality of corruption for sure.

In other words, a third approach is needed that not only places realism in communication with empiricism, but also assumes a knowledge that is fallible, but not impossible to have. Accordingly, a consensus can in principle be reached between different schools of thought, including epistemological ones, according to certain criteria that are considered reasonable by those concerned (Habermas, 1991; Hoyningen-Huene, 2016). In short, there is a reality and a truth, even if it is difficult to grasp. To explain and embed this assumption in the context, it should at *first* be pointed out that the question of Kant must be specified under new conditions: What educational ideals are out there from which the necessary resources can be uncovered to master the current challenges for the next generation as well? In this question, education is interrelated with upbringing in which the achievements of education are stabilised in the socially binding values, like modern law. The examination of the good conditions of upbringing and education asks at least implicitly about the values and norms, about educational ideals that can be ideally sorted according to their *eligibility* and *worthiness for recognition*. The educational ideals that are eligible of recognition within a particular society must be distinguished from educational ideals that are considered *worthy of recognition* by all those who may be affected by them, as Habermas would put it. What is involved in being worthy of recognition is the search for principles that can claim the power of universal validity. Examples of such principles are developed in moral philosophy. Aristotle and Immanuel Kant as representatives of deontology, the ethics of duty, and Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill as representatives of utilitarianism can be mentioned. These norms include Kant's *Categorical Imperative*, John Rawls' *principle of difference*, principle of favouring those who are disadvantaged in society and Jürgen Habermas' *principle of possibly affected* (Kant, 1997b: 140; Habermas, 1991: 134, 157; Habermas, 1996: 59-60; Habermas, 1998: 383-385; Rawls, 2005, &12, p. 65).

The worthiness of recognition as a quality criterion poses the practical question of which values and standards should be consulted in the search for a consensus on a way of working productively. Values are about the self-image, like the ethics of a profession, which serve as orientation for practical action. In essence, it is about leading a conscious life in accordance with one's own self-evidence of the good life. Such norms are the medium of reaching consensus. Logically, consensus is preceded by conflict, not only in terms of facts and social issues but especially in terms of time. And how the parties move from conflict to consensus depends not only on values, goals but also on the method chosen. One example is Frankfurter Erklärung from 2015 which a reflexion of the *Beutelsbach Consensus* defining the principles of civic education according to three criteria (Wehling, 1977: 178-180). According to that commitment, firstly, there is a ban on overpowering, which prevents indoctrination on the part of instructors. Secondly, the principle of controversy applies, according to which the educator must present controversial positions from the perspective of an observer in the sense of a neutral party - from the view of neuter. Thirdly, the aim is to enable learners to understand given political issues not only from their own position but also from the perspective of the actors themselves, in order to develop the arguments and didactic skills to reproduce them and to represent their own ideas and interests appropriately.

Secondly, taken the first ethical point of view in the consideration a further and more abstract way of thinking is required to see the need for deliberation. And to this end, reference should first be made to Talcott Parsons' term of *double contingency* and Jürgen Habermas' *principle of all those possibly affected*. Parsons dealt with the question of how social stability is guaranteed despite uncertainties, changes under the concept of double contingency in the sense of a pattern of expectations based on reciprocity (Parsons, 1962: 13-29). Parsons' answer is that individuals are brought up to conform to norms within a culture in which they internalise the corresponding norms through socialisation and education (Parsons, 1959). Parsons regards norms both as sources of social innovation and as reasons for communicative stability containing the two options of conflict and cooperation. For Habermas,

Parsons' idea of double contingency explains the factually existing agreement. Parsons is indeed concerned with the *eligibility* of norms. As a sociologist, he cannot deal with the question of the normative conditions of stability. However, for Habermas, as a philosopher, the factual correspondence between the expectations of ego and agency is not sufficient to explain the stability of a *just* social order. For the factual agreement of expectations to also be able to lay claim the legitimacy, to be *worthy of recognition* as just, the stability of the agreement of these expectations among the actors must be harmonious with the *perspective of all those possibly affected*. In that case, it is not only solid but legitimately robust. Only this test according to abstract principles gives the stability the power of a universally valid commitment (Habermas 1981: 392; Habermas, 1998: 38-45).

Thirdly, by moving from the level of norms to individual in the sense of system of personality, one may continue in two extreme ways; concrete personalities can be seen either as the possible realization/failure of ideal norm or as a case for evaluating the social reality (Nohl, 1988; Dilthey, 1986). In both cases three questions arise: First, what exactly is meant with personality? Second, what ideal types of personality are relevant in the educational system. Finally, whether insights can be derived from these ideal expectations for civic education. To start with, personality can be understood with Parsons as the bundle of roles and with Habermas as the ideal-typical representative of an argument (Parsons, 1951: 138-169; Parsons and Shils, 1962: 110-158; Habermas, 1998: 458-464). Personality can be constructed from both point of view as a basis of participation for creation of binding norms in a given society. Through a set of expectation, the person can acquire a social identity that makes it identifiable by others as the person it is claiming to be (Parsons, et al., 1962: 7, 19-24). In line with that understanding, personality can first be captured with G.H. Mead in the triangle of *I*, *Me* and the *generalised other* (Mead, 1968, §XX, 35). And in addition, the view of the generalised other can be translated with Habermas as the perspective of the *neuter* - the current uninvolved person representing the abstract principle of general validity (Habermas, 1991: 143).

In this view, personality is the process of individuation through socialisation in communication with culture, society and normative principles (Parsons, 1951: 30). Cicero's motto *non nobis solum* (not entirely for ourselves) is the first step to recognise that individuals are part of a given society. After a person has acquired an ego-identity by assuming a role in the community, that person then wants to be a very specific *I*, by distinguishing itself from others. The question is not *whether*, but *what kind of ego do I want to be*. With that question, the actor subjects his identity to general principles, in the light of which his own personality is specified (Habermas, 1994). In that respect, socialization refers to the deliberation on the existing rules, expectation, customs and norms, while individualization refers to the process from a dependent child to the self-chosen type of not confusable personality with unmistakable individual goals and life plans (Habermas, 1994). The point is, upbringing and education enable individuals in that approach to the types of action with other people, and towards those self-determined goals.

A possible answer to the second question about *types* of personality is that the gentleman, the educated and the scholar may be considered as ideal types (Plato, 2018, II 360-362; Weber, 1985, p.192-205). The English word *gentleman* refers to a given status (Mingay, 1976; Keen, 2002). It can probably trace back to the aristocratic form of alt Greek word *kalokagathia* as the tern in which the beautiful and good are mediated with each other. On the other hand, the German word *educated* (*Gebildeter*) refers to a position that has been acquired through special, personal achievements like certain skills and knowledge. It is not an issue of charisma (wise man), rites (chief), or rationalized relations of positions (boss, supervisor, commander, manager). Educated is the ideal of humanism, the ideal of Humboldt discussed above. The educated is distinguished from the scholars by its social positioning. The scholar owes his status in society to his qualifications in the academy with corresponding formal certificates and relationships (Stichweh, 1987: 278-336). But, a person can also be considered educated without formal training. In addition, the educated person not only has to demonstrate certain skills and knowledge but must be able to embody certain professional, ethical and moral positions in public. Not the educated, but the scholar buys his freedom with loneliness (Schelsky, 1963). Like wise man, *kalokagathia* / barbarian and gentleman / uncultivated, the scholar also establishes a moral distance to the other, but

not the educated. The educated is seeking for public attention (Parsons and Platt, 1973: 1-8; Bourdieu, 1982, p.113; Luhmann, 1997: 734; Tenorth, 2020: 97-115).

To put in another way, the gentlemen is *ascribed*, while the educated and the scholar corresponds to the dimension of *achieved* through personal skills (Parsons, 1951: 284). Just as the *barbarian* in ancient Greek aristocratic society meant the uncultivated observer, who spoke a different language and *kalokagathia* is the positive twist of the same logic, the *gentleman* as a category of feudal society marks the boundary to the other. In both cases, it is a concept of diversity existing already in archaic societies, and not of difference, which was especially developed in by the functional differentiated societies based on capital. While the barbarian and the gentleman are the two (negative / positive) sides of a single type of hierarchy of two different communities, the educated and the scholar correspond to the differentiation of personality within a single society. In this respect, educated and scholar are the *variances* of a personality system within a modern society based on differences. In contrast, *kalokagathia* / barbarian are the characteristics of the personality of an aristocratic community and gentleman / uncultivated are the characteristics of the personality of a feudal community, both of which are not based on difference but on diversity. Arguing from the logic of social research; difference can only be measured with a nominal scale, whereas ordinal and interval scales can be used for the difference principle (Diekmann, 2007: 291). In short, the gentlemen is based on status marking a distance to above and below. The scholar lives in the seventh light tower of *cognition* and uses his knowledge to develop sophisticated models in special areas. Whereas the educated deliberates through a communicative action with other actors in public and for public. He is not a specialist with a special jargon but a public intellectual with lifeworld language dedicated also to insight (Habermas, 1996: 417, 429, 447).

The final question, namely *what insights can be generated from that discussion above for civic education* can now be answered with a statement; the gentlemen, the scholar and the educated can be considered as the complementary components of an ideal personality in the system of upbringing, education and training. What does that discussion mean for the civic education is the subject of next section. But it is clear, that the discourse on perfection and its negations (juxtaposition) or communication between two part of a system is now transformed into a dialogue, into the art of conversation with equal partners by giving argument and counterargument, reasoning on the ground of common norms and goals (Gadamer, 1960; Habermas, 1991; Habermas, 1998: 349-398). The content of this discourse lies in the search for an answer to the question of *the ideal conditions* of communications. Social work poses the question, for example, of how it can enable the next generation to engage in deliberation even under today's heteronomous social conditions. How can the interests of the next generation be legitimised with the ideas that are already partly established today? And an answer can be seen in the deliberation about a mediation of democracy and law with the education.

### **Deliberation for a Mediation of Democracy and Law with (Civic) Education**

Not only in politics and in the legal system but also in education, binding rules are developed out of public discourses, established with the help of civil society and legitimised with norms, which are also subject of public discourses (Gamble, 1997; Fruhstorfer and Hudson, 2022; Chehata, et al., 2024). Politics fulfils this function with recourse to voting and elections. With the participation of citizens, politics adapts to new technical-technological developments, requirements and principals. Depending on the perspective, the quality of decision-making in democracies is measured in terms of input (the process of decision-making) and / or output (Cheneval, 2015). In both cases, long-term goals, values, norms and interests are used to judge about the quality of decisions made. On the other hand, recourse to the values in the *legal system* takes place with an abstraction of existing traditions, orientations, ties and principles. The values found in society are then consulted for decision-making when they are guided by principles that can safeguard the interests of all those potentially affected. Education as a system assumes a hinge function between these two systems. Education contributes not only to existing knowledge (insight and cognition) and the renewal of values, but also provides the actors with the

necessary arguments for decision making, the creation of norms and for their legitimisation. In order to explain what is meant I like to look first of all at democracy and law spereratyl before mediating both of them with education.

### Democracy

Democracy goes back to the ancient Greek tradition of governing a state according to shared values. Already there, the form, the constitution (legislative) of state have been distinguished from the forms of government (executive). Governing means the decision-making power of a (traditionally established or periodically elected) body for the management of a politically constituted community. In accordance with the paideia tradition of unity between society, culture and individuals, governing meant by Plato the unity of state, community and individuals (Plato, 2018, VIII, 547-533). Based on that tradition, Aristotle distinguishes between three types of pure state constitutions and the three deformations, abnormal forms. For the distinction itself, Aristotle consults the criteria of (social) quality and (objective) quantity (Aristotle, 1909: 183-186; cf; Aristotle, 1959, III, §11, IV, §11).

**Table 3.** Three Forms of Government and their Corrupted Forms According to Aristotle

	Quality	Purity	Deviation
<b>Quantity</b>			
<b>One</b>		Monarchy	tyranny
<b>Few</b>		aristocracy	oligarchy
<b>Many</b>		timocracy	democracy

Aristotle views the *pure* forms as a possible way of flourishing (*eudaimonia*), which in line of juxtaposition approach has an individual and a social component. According to the individual component, human as political animal can achieve *eudaimonia* only living within a state community. According to the social component, a flourishing life can only be achieved in a community whose government is not pursued by private but by common interests (Aristotle, 1909: 127-129; Aristotle, 1959, 1253a). In monarchy / tyranny as well as in aristocracy / oligarchy, the private interests of the rulers are put above the interests of the governed people. What is listed in the table above under purity and deviation is discussed by Aristotle in the context of power and wealth. Only in democracies do rule the many, and in the interests of the many, themselves. Only in democracies does equality goes hand in hand with the good disicion making. "If the people are not completely degraded, although individually they may be worse judges than those who have special knowledge, as a body they are as good or better." (Aristotle, 1959, III) Aristocracy as the ruling few but wise is in term of quality of dicision made not better then democracy as the ruling of the many, by the many and for the many.

Secondly, we do no longer live in a small community of Plato or Aristotle, which was characterized by a common history, language, territorial small, precisely definable border and from similar ethics. Rather, our society is characterized by pluralism and divergence of interest why the *organisation* of good governance becoming more complex (Dahl, 1971). Where these commonalities cannot be assumed, the question of the quality of the majoritarien decision arises; What is the situation of minorities in a majoritarian democracy? Experience teaches us to be careful (Hug, 2002; Danaci, 2012; Hackbarth et al., 2025). Allready Alexis de Tocqueville warned uns against the tyranny of the majority (2004, §XV). If it can be assumed that forms of government should correspond to the characteristics of people not only capable of failure, but prone to constant fallibility, prejudice, short-sightedness and self-glorification, and if this also means that no political system is perfect in itself, then the question arises as how governments can be controlled by the citizens, just to mitigate the damage. J.J. Rousseau proposed that the general-will would never fail. People ruling all together cannot fail to deliver. Tocqueville adopts the idea of small-scale spatiality (township) (§. V.), the civil associations and the transformation role of religion (§. XVI) as the prerequisite for democracy from Rousseau, but he was hardly convinced with the proposal of general will. On the contrary, it is precisely in the experience of the new democracies in the United State of Amerika (USA) that Tocqueville observes the tyranny of the majority. Tocqueville states that in new democracies general will is on the power. The

question is now no more how to control king but how could people control the *general will*? People cannot control themselves in a just way. How can people combine popular rule with a wise, good type of governing, with political, or politically enlightened wisdom? Should we go back to the aristocracy?

Indeed, Tocqueville belongs to an aristocratic family in France. His family members were arrested during the French Revolution almost a year. The fall of Robespierre (1794) saved them from execution. In 1830, he and Gustave de Beaumont received a commission from the new government of King Louis Philippe, to go to the USA to study the prison system. *Democracy in America* is the product of that time. From his own experience, Tocqueville notes that the revolution in France not only unleashed great hopes but also gave rise to terror and despotism. In America, however, he sees a mild, gentle transformation of established actors of aristocratic heir into democrats. “I confess that in America I saw more than America; I sought the image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character, its prejudices, and its passions, in order to learn what we have to fear or to hope from its progress.” (Tocqueville, 1935, Introductory Chapter: 34).

What is different in the USA compared to Europe? How did this political transformation from old to new regime took place in America and what can the people of Europa learn about that experience. He starts with the sentence: “Amongst the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of conditions.” (Tocqueville, 1935: 20) With the *general equality of conditions*, he does not mean the conditions of government but he is referring to the social equality in the society, which precedes a democratically constituted government. A democratic government cannot be built in a society among unequal citizens. The general equality of conditions is the cause of the emergence of a democratically constituted government. Other ways around, equality does not occur out of democratically constituted government, out of law. The idea of equality was planted in the germs of society long before the democratically constituted government arose. The idea of democratic *government* was born in the France and American Revolution. But the idea of an general equality of conditions as a precondition of a peaceful society is around long before the France and American Revolution took place. So, the demand and promise for establishing condition of equality are part of human being. That gradual development towards general equality of conditions is universal, and cannot be stopped by brute force, it will escape this kind of power, sheer will of human control. Therefore, Tocqueville urged the Europeans to follow the spirit of American Revolution based on equality adapted from the civic education in townships, and later on then put in law.

Thirdly, the logic of democracy also includes John Stuart Mill who as a utilitarian was concerned with the question of the welfare of the majority in a democratically organised society. Democracy produces the best conditions for moral action according to utilitarian principles, because democracy serves most people in comparison to all other forms of government. As Aristotle puts it: “For it is possible that the many, though not individually good men, yet when they come together may be better, not individually but collectively, than those who are so, just as public dinners to which many contribute are better than those supplied at one man’s cost; for where there are many, each individual, it may be argued, has some portion of virtue and wisdom, and when they have come together, just as the multitude becomes a single man with many feet and many hands and many senses, so also it becomes one personality as regards the moral and intellectual faculties.” (Aristotle, 1959, III. 7.12781b, 4-6). But contrary to Aristotle, Mill was convinced that especially since democracy was *then* also practised in large areas that went beyond the boundaries of the small communities of Aristotle and J.-J. Rousseau, citizens could only participate out of for practical reasons in government in minor forms. Therefore, the form of government should be a *representative* democracy, so that wise, virtuous and long-term good decisions (=aristocratic) orientated towards the common good could continue to be reproduced (Mill, 2013, §3).

The question for Mill is how the dangers of a *tyranny of the majority* already pointed out by Tocqueville can be prevented. How a democracy should generate competent elites in the greater area that not only excel the spiritual independence and intellectuality of the citizens but also promote this by fostering certain institutions (Mill, 2013, §.17). In chapter (=§) eight, Mill argues against the

*participation* of illiterate, in favour of women's voting rights and for the introduction of dual representation. Mill categorically states that it is not permissible to prevent anyone from voting and governing just based on ascribed qualities, like the nationality, religion and sex. The right of participation arises from the fact of the general demand for unconditional obedience to jointly agreed rules, which requires also the general consent of all competent citizens.

“In the preceding argument for universal but graduated suffrage, I have taken no account of difference of sex. I consider it to be as entirely irrelevant to political rights as difference in height or in the color of the hair. All human beings have the same interest in good government; the welfare of all is alike affected by it, and they have equal need of a voice in it to secure their share of its benefits. If there be any difference, women require it more than men, since, being physically weaker, they are more dependent on law and society for protection. (...). Either the whole tendency of modern social improvements has been wrong, or it ought to be carried out to the total abolition of all exclusions and disabilities which close any honest employment to a human being. (...). Men, as well as women, do not need political rights in order that they may govern, but in order that they may not be misgoverned. (...). It is a benefit to human beings to take off their fetters, even if they do not desire to walk.” (Mill, 2013, §8)

Mill treats the right to vote as an equivalent currency of the economy in a democracy. Also in democracy there have to be a material relationship between demands and support. Just as shopping is not possible without money, participation in the future of social institutions should not be possible without knowledge and expertise. Only competent citizens can act in the interests of the common good. Only those who pay taxes can indeed and therefore should have a say in the provisions of taxation. Conversely, those who do not even pay direct taxes, i.e. those who cannot even go shopping, or who live permanently on state aid for no sound reason, are showing their disinterest why they are legitimately excluded. If there is no common interest in an object, there should be no equal right to use the same object. Consequently, the people who knows more should have more to say (plural voting) than those who know less. For Mill, plural voting is the necessary evil on the way to educating illiterate people to become competent citizens. From the viewpoint of Mill, the plural, double voting of wealthy and educated persons as well as the exclusion of the illiterate is temporal, factual and legitimized with the rational management of common interests. To ensure that only people with “mental superiority”, “superiority of influence” and “superior education” govern, representative democracy should be understood as the best form of reflecting the common interests of virtuous and competent citizens (Mill, 2013, §7).

An essential part of his discussion is the legal, structural and formal conditions for the fair participation of all citizens of a modern society. In the chapter 7, Mill aims to increase the welfare of the majority from this formal-legal and philosophical-content perspective by developing solutions to two dangers. According to Mill, the first danger lies in the deep intelligence and simplicity of the opinions of the leading elites. The second danger lies in the law-making of the majority of a social class according to their own interests, alone. Mill wants to prevent these dangers by following the utilitarian principle of maximising utility through the organisational form of *representative democracy* (Mill, 2013, §7). In a *pure democracy*, all citizens are equal - they have the same opportunity to influence the output of the government. Mill describes such a democracy as the form of government of the whole people by the whole people. This form of government defuses the tension between good decisions and decisions made according to the majority of the leading majority (of multitude). In a democracy of the *simple majority*, this tension is intensified by making its decisions dependent on a simple majority.

Mill points out that democracies in their cultural dimension are founded on the ideas and interests of a leading social class. By the founding of democracies within the borders of a nation the ideas and interests of a possibly numerical majority were formed. The ideas and interests of those who did not belong to this founding majority were outvoted. Consequently, there can be in fact no question of complete equality of all citizens in the founding act. And a complete equality of all citizens cannot be guaranteed today by a complete equality of all citizens according to a simple majority. On the contrary, such complete equality based on a simple majority would deepen the system of inequalities that currently

exist in favour of the leading social class which were historically already privileged. This would not be the government of the whole people, but “is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people exclusively represented.” (Mill, 2013, §7) It is a form of government of the privileged majority that does not attribute its assertiveness to the quality of its idea or the generalisability of its interests, but merely to quantity based on sheer power through control of vital resources. In such a democracy, minorities are disenfranchised.

The difference between simple majority democracy (of full participation) and pure democracy (of representation) can be better grasped by starting from with the suggestion that the decision of the majority (=large number) outweighs the decision of the minority (=small number). In a toss-up, the large number wins against the small number. Now, *outweighing* and *winning* are normative connotations that do not exist in numbers themselves. In maths, 2025 is not better than 1996 or 38, whereas in a capitalist society it is better to have 2025 than 38 dollars. This normative preference for 2025 over 38 is the result of socialisation within a culturally tightly interwoven community whose members now want to constitute themselves according to the idea of merit. But in the society of democracy, it is not logical to assume that the small number should be treated badly, excluded from decision-making or not represented in government at all. Rather, governing means finding a medium of *representation, deliberation and participation* that, in John Rawls’ sense, improves the situation of the disadvantaged in society without worsening the situation of anyone else. This Rawlsian principle of difference is not derived from mathematics but from shared social norms.

Fourthly, based on the discussion a distinction can be made on the *organizational* level between absolute, constitutional, parliamentary forms of governing (monarch, tyrant, party and demos). And today’s democracies can be differentiated in their organisational form into representative-parliamentary and (semi-)direct democracy. All existing democracies are organized either in central (Finland, Israel, Iceland) or in federal (Switzerland, Russia, England) forms of government. Saudi Arabia, the Vatican and other small kingdoms are among the surviving absolutist states with correspondingly strong centralism. In any case, their number is decreasing in favour of states with decentralised structures. In contrast, not only is the number of republics with federal structures increasing but their forms of government are also becoming more differentiated. At the same time, although a distinction can be made between presidential (Chile), semi-presidential (France), parliamentary republics (Germany), parliamentary executive (Brazil), directorial (Switzerland) and council republics, at the end of the day these can be classified as either parliamentary (England) or presidential systems of government (USA).

Fifthly, forms of involvement can take the form of representation, deliberation and participation. Representation does not precede participation qualitatively but historically. It is no coincidence that *no taxation without representation* was one of the most important demands of the American independence movement. Pure representation would lead to monarchies and pure and full participation in every decision would lead to high costs -also democracy is built on costly bureaucracy. Every citizen would have to always participate in every decision with the same intensity, which is not possible for logistical reasons alone. Full participation always and in every decision is only possible in small spaces, as Rousseau himself already suggested (Rousseau, 1984). While participation places a high value on the involvement of all those affected, even despite different intensities, representation claims a higher quality of utilisation in its output (Sartori, 1997: 212-242). This is one of the reasons why, with few exceptions today’s states are governed in the form of representative democracies.

However, deliberation derived from the Latin *deliberare* means rational consideration, weighing up between contradicting but equally preferable option. Habermas uses the term in the sense of decision making using public argumentation according to value-rational criteria. It is not the quantity (number) of those deliberating individuals but the quality of their arguments that is of the greatest value for deliberative democracy - a form of will formation and decision-making based on shared values, goals and norms (Habermas, 1996: 277-293). From the logic of a deliberative democracy, the number of participants is indeed irrelevant. It does not matter whether one Petra or four hundred Petras have taken part in a discourse, in an election. It is much more important that Petras’ point of view is deliberated

satisfactorily. On the same token, it is not important whether one young person or four million of them say *no* to a proposal. Much more important is the reason for the rejection. From this point of view, democracy is not a matter of concrete participation of the majority of a people in all decisions, but the concrete reflexion of wise, high-quality, reflective and enlightened deliberation. Of course, no deliberation is ever better for those who are affected than the participation. But from the point of deliberative democracy what is needed is action according to public interests and ideas. The participants in the discourse act counterfactually by adhering to certain principles - they act as if they know exactly what all those potentially affected needs are. They act as if the principle of their actions coincides with the principle of categorical imperative, as Kant would put it (Kant, 1997b, §7, 140).

### Law

This principle is formulated by Immanuel Kant in his work *Critique of Practical Reason* in §7 under the title *Basic Law of Pure Practical Reason*. In other words, developing just principles is not a matter of democracy but of law in its mediation with philosophy. That's also why Habermas explains the principles of law and democracy as having the same origin; historically, law was developed from custom, practice and religious promises. The power of charismatic kings and prophets was in that time sufficient for their validity. The more time has passed, the more regulations and rationalised legislative procedures have been developed, which in turn remain legally enforceable in the courts. As a rule, the constitutions of today's states were not enacted solely according to the logic of democracy but in best case in their cooperation with law driven from rights – from the idea *the general equality of conditions*. In contrast to earlier societies, today these constitutions are not legitimised with the religious sources of natural law, with insights but with reference to moral principles based on cognition. Since Kant at the latest, a relationship between morality and law has been sought. Habermas draws on these considerations and identifies a communicative relation between democracy as a decision-making principle based on the public use of reasoning and morality as a universally binding principle of validity put in practice in the form of binding rules of law (Habermas, 1998: 111).

Especially today, rules are made inside a specific society and for a certain period of the time. The development of rules has a logical and a societal component. Both sources can be seen as a type of discourses. Accordingly, the norms developed in these discourses contain both the rules of coexistence, that can be found in society as well as rationally arranged rules for the questions arising out of society, which may be than formed with the help of the quality criteria of logic and law (Habermas, 1996: 59-60). Under certain conditions, such as publicity, equality, informality and truthfulness, the norms obtained in the discourses and the rules developed from them can fulfil not only the everyday requirements of society but also its technical and technological requirements. Based on those rules and legitimised norms, a stable, peaceful society can be established: Self-determination, popular sovereignty as a component of democracy is stabilised in this approach by the normativity of human rights as a set of rules of the legal system with the corresponding legal enforcement. In that understanding, democracy is not possible without a regulation in its legal form. In law, all expectations are brought down to a common ground and stabilised as a set of rules for political authority. At the same time, these expectations are generated through the parliamentary mechanisms, i.e. in democracy, as a legitimate mechanism of right (Habermas, 1998: 155, 179). Habermas converges democracy as the medium of political power and law as the medium of normativity according to a two-stage model. “The first stage is characterised by the position of a royal judge who monopolises the functions of dispute resolution, the second stage by the legal institutionalisation of a ruling body that enables collective decision-making in the organised form of political rule.” (Habermas, 1998: 176-177)

### (Civic) Education

With these explanations and to define the term more precisely, it can be stated that civic education consists of theory (like rights out of which the law is driven) and practice (of democracy). Theory means a form of knowledge with unconditional values, norms and moral concepts, such as human rights and

participation. Practice, on the other hand means organising everyday life with the help of a theory. To this end, rules must be derived from theory and then followed in practice (Kant, 1977a: 612-630). From a binary logic, theory can be categorised into *knowledge* and *norms* like justice and solidarity, and practice into *skills* in the sense of ability and *resources* to act upon. Resources are symbolic media such as money, education, rights, power, fame, etc. that serve something else (Habermas, 1981: 270). For example, money is used to buy a house, good health, recreation, education, etc. Power is used to make decisions, even against the will of opponents as M. Weber would put it. There is a transitive relationship between these media, they mutually support each other: the more resources, the more ability. In a democratically constitute community, the relationship also applies in the opposite case, i.e. the more ability the more resources. Resources and solidarity in the sense of value-based action have the common feature that they are both means for something else. Solidarity, for example serves (as a resource) to strengthen national, religious, gender, etc. identities (Habermas, 1991: 49-77; Habermas, 1996: 128-192).

There is also an instructive relationship between knowledge and norms. Acquiring knowledge requires principles, which in turn relativise the already acquired knowledge. Principle-based action assimilates knowledge into skills and abilities, which not only transform knowledge into techniques and technologies but also relativise the original knowledge and in many cases falsify it in the sense of Karl Popper. Knowledge (insight and cognition) proves itself according to the principle of falsification and the scholar and educated with the knowledge and skills acts according to the principle of fallibility. The criteria of social research, such as accuracy, objectivity, reliability and validity, are thus a subgroup of the principles of falsification and fallibility. If what has already been written is put into a tabular relationship, the following elements can be obtained.

**Table 4.** Theory and Practice

<b>Practice</b>	<b>Theory</b>	<b>Knowledge (insight and cognition)</b>	<b>Abstract values as good for all of us</b>
<b>Skills/abilities</b>		educational policies based on lifeworld insights, expectations and scientific cognition, technologies	participation as a form of action based on common and just principle
<b>Resources as means for something else</b>		money (income) power (political influence) rights (human rights and civil rights)	solidarity (representation and deliberation as a forms of its implementation)

A distinction has already been implicitly made between values and norms (cf. eligible and worth of recognition), and thus between solidarity and justice (Habermas, 1991: 49-77). Accordingly, values are the principles of action within a community based on mutual solidarity, and hand down insights. They answer the question *what is good for me* at the individual level and *what is good for us* at the group level. In contrast, moral norms based on cognition answer the questions *what is good in and for itself* and *what is good for all those who may be affected*. Instead of the logic of solidarity among like-minded people, in the case of norms the logic of justice is used as valid system in general. As a system of knowledge creation, these principles can ensure that the attempt of legitimising norms and the appropriate conclusions out of those norms are derived logically from the cognition and that the corresponding rules of social reality are factually prescribe to those acting in accordance with insights.

One conclusion from that discussion about solidarity and justice for civic education can be driven from Habermas' thesis according to which democracy and the rule of law are of equal origin. This would mean that forms of deliberation must be created, and they must be created for solidarity from bottom up. The action towards that goal can in turn be differentiated into deliberation (through education) and participation (in political power). Participation is a political act but one that is derived from law, civil and human rights as well as from abstract principle like justice. Participation can be seen as a value (of justice) as well as a mean for solidarity expressed in sympathy. That's why republican prioritise the solidarity for as self-government to the rule of law as a universally binding principle of action. In line

with that idea and just as Aristotle saw justice as a principle of interaction between people of similar character and belonging to the same community of free and equal people, one can interpret with Oakeshott that political education is an act within a community of people who sympathise with each other. “Consequently, relevant political reasoning will be the convincing exposure of a sympathy.” (Oakeshott, 1962: 125) However, there is a close connection on the one hand between the learning of and for the articulation of certain ideas, and on the other hand between interests and the understanding of political education as action consisting of knowledge and skills. From both point of view, the contributions of schools and youth work to civic education can be summarised as follows.

**Table 5.** Contributions of Schools and Youth Work to Civic Education

<b>Practice</b>	<b>Theory</b>	<b>Insights based on common values, practice and aspirations</b>	<b>Norms based on cognition that are good in and of themselves</b>
<b>Skills and abilities (of the personality)</b>		<i>for acquisition of knowledge and ensuring its base</i> -free access to media (publications, newspapers, internet, libraries) -free access to educational institutions from kindergarten to universities	<i>for securing membership and legitimizing institutions through participation</i>  identity formation through the appropriation of cultural assets, solidarity and individuation on their basis
<b>Resources (means for something else like society, politics)</b>		<i>development and renewal of techniques and technologies through empowerment</i>  room for experimentation, especially for people with negative communication about systemic media such as money, power, law	<i>continuity and renewal of society (of the political) through deliberation</i>  deliberation in the process of will-formation and decision-making in petitions, demonstrations, elections and votes as well as participation on political offices

Having reached this point, the social work perspective allows us to formulate the following criticism of the demands made by normative concepts such as *bildsamkeit*. Without an updated view of facts, these concepts can only lead to the immunisation of a world view, at the expense of the profession and discipline of social work. A good example of this can be found already in the study in Marienthal. It is neither the upbringing of parents, nor education in organised institutions, nor the individual ability of children to be educated, but the community or society in general that determines the performance of children. The economically determined life of parents in society is more or less regulative when it comes to the children’s ability to be educated; regardless of the strength of the children’s will, regardless of the strength of the childrens receptivity to education, and regardless of the parents’ values, the parents’ unemployment alone results in poorer health (35, 82), a threefold reduction in gift wishes (58), fundamentally different perceptions of the future with corresponding verbalisation of expectations (60, 104), a fundamentally different way of dealing with clothes and shoes of the children (Jahoda, et..al 1971: 86-87). The result is that „the working class man never fully developed an effective scope and could therefore be kept in an inferior position.“(Jahoda, et..al 1971: xiv) Although the notion of educational maturity (*bildsamkeit*) is an attempt by pedagogy to integrate *also* socially disadvantaged children into societal educational organisations, a notion of *bildsamkeit* beyond the economic resources of parents not only extends the socio-economic exclusion of these socially disadvantaged children with an authority of science but also creates moral expectations on these children and their parents that also prevent their deliberation in education and participation in society. In this case, lifelong work on one’s own image does not lead to immaturity but to the fateful subjugation of the personality to society.

Before driving some rules of out of that discussion, one last point has to be made: Social work is placed in a certain society and expectations (Soydan, 2012). There are not only differences across diverse societies and norms but also differences between youth work and school social work. The crucial difference to other forms of social-educational offerings can be seen in the principle of informality. Only selected children and teenagers are admitted to social-educational care centre, even against their will. Staying at care centres itself is associated with increased restrictions on autonomy, with heteronomy.

The children's initial lack of emotional ties to the staff rationalizes that very heteronomy. On the other hand, school attendance is compulsory for all children and teenagers. There is hardly any European country in which upbringing and education are left to the arbitrariness of the parents alone (Oevermann, 1997: 162-171). That compulsion is counteracted binding legal norms like *Convention on the Rights of the Child* and with the establishing of institutions such as youth clubs and school social work pursuing autonomy despite factual heteronomy. On the other hand, in the youth centre the young people are neither legally obliged to go there, nor are they exposed to permanent physical presence of social workers - the visit and departure of a young person to and from a youth centre is left to the young people themselves. The youth workers could and may motivate the young people to visit the youth centre or to have a conversation there. But without intrinsic motivation, staying in the youth centre is not worth for any party. Finally, all young people may go to a youth centre. In contrast, only children from school X who are required to attend school can take advantage of school social work. The presence or absence of compulsion means that the pupils at school X can have a decisive influence on the school social work services, whereas a young person A born in Afghanistan, for example, has no idea about the youth centre in Hamburg, even though in principle A may also use its services. There is no citizenships requirement for taking part on services in youth centres (Bollweg et al., 2020).

From these considerations, three rules can now be derived in the sense of Kant's theory-practice mediation for professionals in youth and school social work (Kant, 1977a: 612-630). The first rule for the professionals is: make sure that the children and adolescents themselves determine their own lives starting in kindergarten. Make sure that Socratic Oath is in tune with the time (Hentig, 1983: 246). The second rule is: initiate discourses in which relevant questions can be asked, answered, justified and put in practice. To ensure, that this takes place under conditions of freedom, equality and justice, build a wall compliance with these very conditions (Arendt, 1992: 187) The third rule is: accept that the children and young people affected may decide against your will. This can take place by the professionals rejecting the decision of the young people affected by first putting the decision up for discussion from the perspective of the young people themselves. Of course, this implies the ability of the professionals to justify the respective decision from the perspective of the children and young people themselves. In this respect, the rule is: show that you have understood them and can act accordingly. The practical sign of this is their full approval.

## Conclusion

Civic education takes place inside a political culture in communication with personality system and society. Therefore, political education can be approached from different perspectives. Participation, representation and deliberation were the centre of that contribution. From a communicative action perspective, politics can be defined as the process of generating collectively binding decisions to create a moment of shared and potentially universally valid norms and shared goals despite factual divergence, dissent and a tendency towards conflict. It is undisputed that democracy is one of the binding norms in civic education. Historically, democracy was first practised in the ancient city states. This was a relatively manageable area with less functional differentiation. Democracy meant in that time the direct *participation* of citizens as equals and free for the common good, which, under the guidance of the logos, reflects the ethos and pathos of the people. But citizens meant only wealthy and mainly old man born into well established families. J.J. Rousseau, too, could imagine a democracy only in a small area with no glaring social differences. But the rise of democracy in the USA added a new experience to its: *representation*. The founder of representative democracy set and wanted, in the words of Tocqueville, the culture of action revitalising general equality of social conditions. For Tocqueville, democracy as the medium of equalisation of social conditions is in line with zeitgeist. It cannot be stopped even by arm force. Rather, this spirit lies everywhere, in the individual, culture, science, knowledge, religion, politics and moral.

With the new experiences in the USA comes a new problem: the danger of the tyranny of the majority. In small-scale direct democracy like in ancient Greek Athen, the problem did exist but dealt within a closely interwoven community of shared values. In monarchies and aristocracies, these dangers are solved by limiting the right to vote; only members of the upper class with a high level of education, income and property are allowed to participate. On the other hand, democracies legitimise themselves with the participation of all those potentially affected. In a democracy everyone should be guaranteed the right to political participation regardless of their ascribed qualities, like nation, religion and gender. In view of this principle, the solution of monarchies and aristocracies becomes no longer legitimate. That's why the question of the conditions of participation in representative democracies becomes more urgent; how are the legitimate ideas and interests of the majority of citizens to be reflected in the concrete decisions of the minority leading the state? Mill would suggest not only reforms in political system but also education and participation of the people, especially granting women political rights can bring a proper solution. By granting women political rights, they will acquire the necessary skills to exercise them. Women would learn to develop a sense of personal responsibility for the common good and an opinion on political issues, and then act in accordance with their own interests. From the point of view of Mill, education can be understood as the process of acquiring formal-logical operations and upbringing as the process of socialising through social values and norms enabling the people to act according the general principle of a just society.

From this perspective, the challenge in upbringing, education and training lies in the provision of norms that favour being autonomous in concrete society. Kant's question of how autonomy is possible under heteronomy can thus be translated into question of how the distortion of being an autonomous person, how blind followership can be counteracted despite a factually achieved but not legitimate order. How can *never again* be upheld even under unfavourable conditions? No single person can answer this question authoritatively for all people and societies. Instead of a recipe, Habermas would suggest public discourses where the participant can deliberate about what is best for a given situation. This is the idea of *deliberation*. Firstly, *deliberation* is reminiscent of the conviction that there is a logical structural relationship between negotiations, traditional ethical self-understanding and discourses based on principle in line with justice. Accordingly, in the respective discourses of traditional communities and in the subsystems of society (such as law, economy, democracy and education), the respective forms of action, rules of coexistence and forms of argumentation condense, which owe the presumption to the rationality, not the content, but the structure of a verbalised and communication-oriented action itself. Secondly, the deliberative approach sees a universalistic resource not only in the money of the market and the power of bureaucracy but also in the solidarity of the community. Solidarity as a resource and goal of deliberation links politics, law and education to the living world, from which essential impulses for the vitalisation of political culture emerge. Without a democratic political culture supported by the values inside the lifeworld and curious individuals with a instinct propensity to public engagement, political education remains vulnerable to ideologies representing particular interest. From that point of view, gentlemen, scholar and educated shouldn't to be regarded as absolute answers worthy of recognition but as typified responses to the challenges in a community of a certain time and place. They were recognisable answers. Today, these responses must be conceptualised anew in the face of new conditions. Accordingly, individuation through socialisation can mean the creation of norms that can be accepted by all those potentially affected. These norms include democracy and the rule of law as well as a agile public.

Within a democratically organised society, upbringing and education enable the individual to participate in socially important resources such as wealth, education, power, rights etc. Civic education goes hand in hand with the notion that adolescents are expected to learn, grow and become who they like to be. In democratically organised communities this view is complemented by the promotion of a pluralistic culture in every phase of institutionalised process of opinion-forming and decision-making. Different conceptions of life, ideas and interests are seen as a basis for the search for cooperation, compromise and consensus in accordance with the fact and norm of pluralism. For their part, adolescents are expected to understand politics as a process of divergent opinions and different type of will formation. Adolescents are required to consider the structural tension of institutionalised settings as part

of the complexity of every politically important issue. Adolescents are called upon to recognise that not only consent and cooperation but also dissent in opinion-forming and conflict in the representation of interests are the different sides of this complexity. They are challenged to develop a strategy to remain capable of acting despite these tensions, complexities and ambiguities.

In child and youth welfare, civic education can be seen as a institution of reflection on one's own position in a given society. Professionals must consider the institutionalised differences (e.g. voluntariness, coercion, greater co-determination, etc.) when selecting methods for the deliberation with children and young people. A concept of civic education based solely on people's ability of reasoning without reference to experience harbours the danger of emulating a construct that proves to be not only highly rationalistic, but also just as spectacularly misguided. Civic education must take the everyday experience of adolescents as the basis for analysis and intervention. The idea of educability already standardised by Humboldt and Herbart presupposes the ability of people to stand up for their ideas and interests. In this respect, it is not about teaching the right way to act, but about developing techniques, abilities and skills, i.e. competences, to bring this ability of self-determination to fruition. Social work has the task of providing a space for the development of self-determination and independence. It is about a space in which adolescents can reflect on their own reasoning. In this respect, civic education is not the same as learning new terms, but rather a new language with corresponding grammar, syntax and semantics. At best, everything that social work does corresponds to the logic of this new language. Therefore, the motto is: be a role model.

Deliberation depends on the willingness and ability of the adolescents and on the offers, expectations, institutions and norms of the political community. In this understanding, civic education has a hinge function between the community, law, education and the adolescents. However, civic education does not only take place in socio-educational settings, but everywhere. Democratically constituted communities challenge and encourage their next generation in every sphere of life by enabling them to their rights, by letting them to participate. Rights on their part enable individuals to act in the politically constituted world. These political boundaries restrict the freedom of the individual. In schools, as part of this politically constituted world, laws are in force, which encourage to freedom and / or uniformity. Democracy takes up the demands for freedom and channels them into the legal and educational system. Youth centres are often the places from which impulses for democracy emerge. In a democratic constitutional state they can be the places of new ideas for a political culture orientated towards common good. Youth and school social work can take on the function of a wall that stops any tendencies towards hostility, discrimination and violence by promoting a culture of plurality, mutual respect and goodwill. In this way, a language of communicative action can be found by mediating the idea of the democratic rule of law, education and the awareness of the transience of achievements with the challenges, paradoxes and innovations of zeitgeist.

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**1. Declaration of the contribution of the researchers:** Single-author, 100%

**2. Conflict of interest:** There is no conflict of interest whatsoever.

**3. Ethics Report:** There is no requirement for ethics committee approval.

**4. Research Model:** This is an essay, a conversation based on hermeneutics.

**5. Disclosure:** On the one hand, it is about a discourse on the conditions for the participation of children and young people in democracy, prosperity, law and education in Germany and, on the other hand, about reflection on the contributions of child and youth services to political education.

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