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Establishment of Condominium under Anglo-Egyptian Administration and the Crisis of 1924 in Sudan

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Abstract

The zones of influence granted to Britain and Egypt by the Condominium Agreement signed by the parties in 1899 upon the end of Mahdia Period in Sudan played crucial role in shaping Sudan's modern history. The joint regimen performed in Sudan presents a quintessential specimen to the present studies on various domains in terms of exemplifying not only the administration of a land by two different forces with distinctive political experiences, but also the sovereignty struggle over the land. In Sudan during Wingate Period (1899-1916), the policies British authorities followed in economic and social realms gave

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way to a rapid growth with respect to administration and infrastructure. Beyond doubt, this state augmented the influence Britain posed on the territory. This article focuses on the period during which Britain was more influential in Sudan involving the Condominium Agreement of 1899 and the period of the Crisis of 1924, which helped crack the door open for the independence of Sudan, as shed light by the official documents regarding the period.

Keywords: Sudan, Egypt, Condominium, Colonization, Nationalism, R. Wingate.

Sudan'da İngiltere-Mısır İdaresi Altında Kondominyum'un Tesisi ve 1924 Krizi

Öz

Sudan'da Mehdiye Döneminin sona ermesiyle İngiltere ve Mısır arasında yapılan 1899 Condominium Antlaşması'nın taraflara verdiği nüfuz alanları Sudan'ın yakın dönem tarihinin şekillenmesinde oldukça önemli olmuştur. Sudan'da görülen ortak idare biçimi, sadece bir kara parçasını, farklı politik deneyimlere sahip olmalarına rağmen, iki farklı güç tarafından idare edilme tarzını değil aynı zamanda bir bölge üzerindeki egemenlik mücadelesini de göstermesi bakımından günümüzde farklı alanlardaki çalışmalara eşsiz bir örnek teşkil etmektedir. Wingate Dönemi Sudan'ında (1899-1916) İngiliz otoritelerinin ekonomik ve sosyal alanlarda izlediği politikalar, idari ve altyapısal alanlarda hızlı bir gelişmenin görülmesini mümkün kılmıştır. Şüphesiz, bu durum İngiltere'nin bölge üzerindeki nüfuzunu daha da arttırmıştır. Bu makale, döneme ilişkin resmi kayıtların ışığında 1899 Condominium antlaşması da dâhil İngiltere'nin Sudan'da daha etkin olduğu döneme ve sonraki yıllarda Sudan'ın bağımsızlığına kapı aralayan 1924 Krizine odaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sudan, Mısır Kondominyum, Kolonizasyon, Milliyetçilik, R. Wingate.

Introduction

After The Ottoman Empire conquered Sudan being led by Mehmed Ali Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, in 1821, it was administered

under Egyptian influence until it was invaded by the British Empire. Sudan, under the control of the Khedivate of Egypt, was ruled not only by Egyptian-Turkish administrators but also by Western statesmen. Thus, at some points of time, in some regions of Sudan, Western statesmen like Samuel Baker Pasha, Charles Gordon Pasha, Rudolf Slatin Pasha and Gessi Pasha were appointed as well to work for the Egyptian government by the Egyptian Khedive¹. The most well-known of these is Gordon Pasha, who was sent to Sudan as the governor-general in 1884² to embark on a challenge against Mohammad Ahmad. The 'Mahdism' discourse used by Mohammad Ahmad brought Sudan to the public agenda in 1881 more than ever before. The failures of Hicks Pasha and Gordon Pasha regarding Sudanese operations were several of the exceptional occurrences that shadowed the power of Britain at the time³. Hence, the impact of the Mahdist movement in Sudan played the most significant role in bringing about the circumstances that led to the Condominium Period.

The actors responsible for the condominium operation in Sudan were the British statesmen who were engaged in a struggle against Mohammad Ahmad and his successor, Khalifa Abdallah. Among them, Lord Kitchener, the sirdar of the Sudan operation (1896-1898), and Wingate, the director of intelligence, became the most eminent figures in terms of defining the future of Sudan after the Condominium Agreement in 1899. Meanwhile, the views of Lord Cromer, the British Consul-General, concerning Egypt and Sudan could be marked as definitive factors during the Mahdist Movement relating to the determination of British politics.

Although the joint Anglo-Egyptian administration in Sudan, Condominium, began with the Agreement of 1899, it was not genuinely

¹ P. M. Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1961, p. 36, 37; P.M Holt-M.W Daly, *A History of The Sudan*, Longman, London, 1988, p. 48; Harold Macmichael, *The Anglo-Egyptain Sudan*, Faber and Faber Limited, Lodon, 1934, p. 37-44; See also, Abdullah Özdağ, *Nil'de Ayaklanma ve Savaş Sudan'da İngiliz Politikası*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 2022, p. 6, 7.

² The National Archive (TNA) Foreign Office (FO), 881/3185, General Gordon to C. Vivian, 16 February 1877, Cairo, Tel. 4.

³ TNA. WO, 147/37, *The Insurrection of the False Prophet II*, 27 February 1884, No: 8; E. Baring (Cromer), *Modern Egypt*, Macmillan and Co., London, 1908, p. 369.

able to be established until Khalifa Abdallah and those close to him had been killed, and moreover, until the Mahdist movements in some centers of Sudan had been suppressed. As a matter of fact, the term of office of Lord Kitchener, the first governor-general of Sudan, lasted too short; towards the end of 1899, he was replaced by Wingate. It is evident that his extensive experience in the region coupling with his proficiency in Arabic and other skills contributed to his suitability for the role. The British sovereignty in Sudan was truly achieved in the period of Wingate. The correspondences among British statesmen occupy an important place in the realm of Sudan studies. Given the Condominium period with respect to Sudan-related studies, the correspondences among Lord Kitchener (1899), Wingate (1899-1916) and Lord Cromer (1899-1907) are of exceptional cruciality. The intelligence reports regarding Sudan also contribute to the region being well-understood. In addition, the annual general reports prepared on Egypt and Sudan are among the most precious sources of data. Nowadays, the significance of these regularly prepared reports in terms of their contribution to the Sudan studies carried out during the following periods is much better comprehended.

This research focuses on understanding and analyzing the initial periods of the condominium, the unique polity of Sudan, via official documents. Most of the research done in this realm concerns the functioning of the Anglo-Egyptian management during the condominium period. Was there a genuinely joint administration? What kinds of effects did this polity cast on the political developments in Sudan? The research aims to find the answers to the just-mentioned questions. There are outstanding academic studies with respect to this period of Sudan, for sure. Nevertheless, at the present time, when new documents and information have been coming into view, identifying and elaborating them through an unprecedented perspective may give way to new approaches to historical events.

Reginald Wingate Period in the Anglo-Egyptian Administration (1899-1916)

After the long years of war that started with Mohammad Ahmad's claim to be the Mahdi and continued with Britain's invasion of Sudan, the British and Egyptian shared administration was established in Sudan

thanks to the agreement made in Sudan in 1899. What does this shared polity, namely condominium, that sometimes yielded to crisis between the sides mean? And what rights did its contents grant to the parties? Firstly, condominium means the retaining of a land by two or more forces in a joint manner. However, putting this into practice was not possible. In line with the nature of the international relations, the sovereign power was to have a say for all the parties. This was the exact situation in Sudan at the beginning of the twentieth century. Although an agreement in Sudan in 1899 marked the beginning of a joint administration, the governance of Sudan was actually to be controlled by Britain⁴. On the other hand, Despite Egypt's legal status as a province of the Ottoman Empire, the Egyptian and British administrations effectively disregarded this designation⁵.

On 19 January 1899, upon the signing of the Condominium Agreement by British Consul-General of Egypt, Lord Cromer, and Egypt's minister of foreign affairs, Boutros Pasha Ghali, an agreement was reached regarding the basic principles with respect to the future of Sudan⁶. Following the agreement, as a result of the meetings that continued between the two parties, the constitutional law of Sudan was declared in 1899. The 1899 agreement did not dictate any right to be sovereign in different regions of Sudan for either party. Respecting the territorial integrity of Sudan, the parties were to share the administration of Sudan on a governmental basis only. For this reason, the territorial land covered by Sudan constituted the first article of the agreement consisting of 12 articles. To this, the first article of the

⁴ SAD, 586/2/1-99, H.A. Macmichael Catalogue.

⁵ M.W. Daly, *Empire on The Nile The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1898-1934*, Cambridge University Press, London 1986, p. 14, 15.

⁶ SAD, 700/10/1-13, G.W. Bell Catalogue, 1899 The Original text of the Condominium Agreement; see also for all articles of the agreement, Harold Macmichael, *The Sudan*, Ernest Benn Limited, London 1954, p. 70-72; Mekki Shibeika, *British Policy in The Sudan 1882-1902*, Oxford University Press, London, 1952, p. 412-418; M.W. Daly, "The Development of the Governor-Generalship of the Sudan 1899-1934", *The Journal of African History*, Cambridge University Press, London 1983, No.1, p. 77-96; For Turkish literature on the treaty articles, see. Abdullah özdağ, "Sudan'da İngiliz Kolonyalizmine Geçiş: Condominium Antlaşması (1899)", *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, XVIII/72: 853-861.

agreement referred to “Sudan” as the whole territorial land in the south of the parallel of latitude 22⁷.

As a result of the 1899 Agreement, Sudan began to be jointly governed by Egypt and Britain. Britain’s politics related with Sudan had paved the way for Egypt, which had been historically putting in claims on this land. In 1898, the Fashoda crisis that increased the tension between Britain and France, and then the intentions of Italy and Belgium relating to Sudan⁸ forced the British authorities to make an agreement with Egypt. To Lord Cromer, the cause of the Mahdi uprising in Sudan was the misconduct of Egypt in Sudan. Had the British administration not managed the financial and military resources of Egypt wisely, the Sudan operation would not have been a success. In this sense, Lord Cromer stated that, without Britain, Egypt would not have had enough power to carry out the Sudan operation on its own regarding their military and financial capacity. Still, Lord Cromer stated in his report that the financial contribution of Egypt to this operation was more than that of Britain, and that Egypt supported the operation at a considerable extent with its military force⁹. Therefore, for the administration of Cairo, who paid a high price, it became possible to have a say in the future of Sudan.

In advance of the Condominium Agreement of 1899, there had been no total consensus between the ambassador, Lord Cromer and London regarding the financial structure of Sudan. Lord Cromer suggested that Britain not be involved in any civilian and military expenditures in the region except for a small British battalion in Khartoum¹⁰. He was aware of the fact that the income from Sudan overweighed the expenditures, and that the budget would not be balanced in the absence of Egypt. So, complying with Lord Cromer, the British commission of treasury stated that they would admit no extra liability, and that military expenditures had to be compensated by the state treasury of Egypt¹¹. Lord Cromer

⁷ Macmichael, *The Anglo-Egyptain Sudan*, p. 65; Also see, Daly, *Empire on The Nile*, p. 18.

⁸ Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, p. 109.

⁹ SAD 403/7/1-66, H.A. Macmichael Catalogue.

¹⁰ TNA. FO, 407/147, Foreign Office to Treasury, 9 December 1898, London, Tel. 392.

¹¹ TNA. FO, 407/147, Salisbury to Cromer, 21 December 1898, London, Tel. 420.

stated that there might be some misunderstandings regarding the financial structure of Sudan, and requested that this topic be left off discussion. Moreover, he proposed that not a single article related to this issue be included in the letter of agreement. This article involved the guarantee of the British Treasury in case of any request for military and civilian expenditures¹². As a result of the meetings between the British authorities and the administration of Egypt, the financial relations of Sudan to Egypt were defined with the title of "Regulations for the Financial Administration of the Soudan", which was added to the Condominium Agreement upon the decree of the council of ministers of Egypt. Even though the Agreement of 1899 had been signed between Britain and Egypt, financial regulations were left to the initiative of the council of ministers of Egypt. Like Lord Cromer stated, Britain was not inclined to undertake any financial responsibilities for Sudan. In 1901, some new financial regulations were made by Egypt's Ministry of Finance, among the consultants of which there were Wingate and Gorst¹³. The fact that Sudan was financially supported by Egypt contributed substantially to the newly constructed system in its first steps. By this means, with new investments in the following years, the income of Sudan was to increase substantially.

Lord Kitchener, the implementor of the Sudan operation, was appointed as the governor-general of Sudan during the first months of 1899. Having been the first governor-general of the Condominium, once he started his duty, he sent some vital instructions to governors and officials¹⁴. His ideas regarding Sudan were¹⁵: "We must look for the improvement and the good government of this country. The task before us all is to acquire the confidence of the people, to develop their resources, and to raise them to a higher level..." Lord Kitchener, having served in Sudan for a long period of time, transferred his duty to Sir Reginald Wingate due to the South Africa War without making his ideas related with Sudan come true. On 22 December 1899, Wingate received

¹² TNA. FO, 407/147, Cromer to Salisbury, 22 December 1898, Cairo, Tel. 422.

¹³ Gabriel Warburg, "The Sudan, Egypt and Britain, 1899-1916", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1970, No.2, p. 163, 164.

¹⁴ For instructions Lord Kitchener to governors, see Duncan, *The Sudan*, William Blackwood and Sons Ltd, London, p. 85-87.

¹⁵ K.D.D. Henderson, *Sudan Republic*, Ernest Benn Limited, London, 1964, p. 49.

the titles of the Sirdar of the Egyptian army and the Governor-General of Sudan¹⁶.

Once he became the governor-general of Sudan, he appointed Slatin Pasha, who was his assistant previously and contributed to him substantially as the Sudan Inspector General under the approval of the British Government¹⁷. Wingate, the Governor-General, strove against Khalifa Abdallah and his followers during his first years. Although the State of Mahdi received a definitive defeat in the Kerrari War and lost its authority in Sudan, Khalifa Abdallah continued his activities in Kurdufan with the help of his son being in the first place and the people close to him in command of a considerable military force. In the combat that took place in Umm Diwaykarat, which was not too far from the Aba Island, the last standing organized military force of Khalifa Abdallah was defeated. In the combat, Khalifa Abdallah, Ali Mohammad Hilu and Ahmad Fadil were killed. Osman Digna, a prominent figure and significant warrior, managed to escape¹⁸. Despite the demolition of the Mahdi State and the killings of the authoritative leaders of the movement, rebellions against the Britain-Egypt joint administration continued. After the followers retaining their commitment to the Khalifa had seized the goods of the people in the eastern and southern parts of Sudan, the tribes decided to merge¹⁹. In the meantime, Rudolph V. Slatin, who was the director of intelligence during the Sudan Expedition, and Mr. Broun had meetings with the tribes in Bahr-el Gazel to stand with the newly-established government and to re-facilitate the flow of trade²⁰.

Wingate, the Governor-General, pursued peaceful policies in order for the administration he established to be supported by the tribes. Notwithstanding that, he did not refrain from taking harsh measures against the tribes rebelling against new Mahdist claims and the government. In line with this, a person called Mohammad Al-Amin, who

¹⁶ Daly, *The Sirdar*, American Philosophical Society Independence Square, Philadelphia, 1997, p. 131.

¹⁷ Richard Hill, *Slatin Pasha*, Oxford University Press, London, 1965, p. 69.

¹⁸ Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, p. 112, 113.

¹⁹ TNA. FO, 403/579, Cromer to Lansdowne, 21 February 1902, Cairo.

²⁰ TNA. FO, 403/579, Wingate to Cromer, 27 February 1902, Khartoum.

declared himself Mahdi in the region of Kordofan, was captured and executed in Obeid. Upon the incident, the Governor-General, Wingate, issued a circular in Sudan announcing that whoever rebelled against the governments of Egypt and Britain would be sentenced to life imprisonment²¹. Upon the claim of Al-Amin to be the Mahdi, Mohammad Wad Adam (1904) was killed in Singa, Abd El Gadir Mohammed Wad Habuba (1908) was killed in Island during the fight against those claiming to be the Mahdi²².

According to the Condominium Agreement of 1899, the new order established in Sudan created a negotiation space for Sudanese and Egyptian administrators despite a few inevitable disagreements. In fact, even though the agreement protected Sudan against serious liabilities, it prevented an independent administrative organization from being constituted. However, it must be noted that there was no educated social class in Sudan who could deal with bureaucratic missions. The country consisted of people mostly organized in tribes living in rural areas. The analyses carried out by British bureaucrats, with Lord Cromer and Wingate in the first place, relating to the future of Sudan pointed to this reality as well. In this context, Lord Cromer stated “under such circumstances, we are experiencing genuine difficulties regarding how to control the officials and what to do to in order to prevent them from turning into despot characters.” Lord Cromer expressed that they did not wish to establish a military state in Sudan, adding that the administration of Sudan was being contemplated to be a civilian one. So, Lord Cromer and Wingate, who shared the same idea, adopted a decentralized form of administration and implemented it. To Lord Cromer, the exertion to managing Sudan from Cairo would present the same condition as would the exertion to managing Egypt from London, which would end up in an utter catastrophe. During this period, not only did the decentralized way of administration pose certain troubles, but

²¹ TNA. FO, 881/8235, Cromer to Lansdowne, 17 October 1903, Cairo.

²² See for detailed information on Wad Habuba, Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, “Mahdist Risings against the Condominium Government in the Sudan, 1900-1927”, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 12/3, 1979, p. 44-48; Macmichael, *The Anglo-Egyptain Sudan*, p. 98, 99.

it also accelerated the way the local government system operated²³. The administrative and military authority in South Sudan constituted a more peculiar situation compared to that in the South. The centralized government in Khartoum had severe problems administering the public due to their more primitive way of life and the violent acts committed by the tribes. In fact, most of the major investments were made into North Sudan. Between 1899 and 1919, there emerged a substantial economic and sociological gap between North and South Sudan. While peace and progress were observed in North Sudan, there was a state of chaos in South Sudan by reason of bloody armed conflicts. The unwillingness of the Khartoum administration to allocate more resources and invest them into South Sudan conducted to gaps between the regions hard to be caught up with²⁴.

As soon as Wingate, the Governor-General of Sudan took up his position, he started working to solve the boundary issues. The negotiations to define the Sudanese borders came to conclusion in 1902. The most significant of them were those that were carried out between Ethiopia and Eritrea. So, the border-related issues Sudan had with these countries were resolved. Military units were dispatched to Kordofan, Darfur and Bahr-el Gazel, which were in the south and west parts of Sudan to facilitate full sovereignty. So as to alleviate the security problems the tribes were causing in Kordofan region, Captain Mahon was sent to the territory²⁵. Then, R. Slatin Pasha, who had served in the region before, came to Darfur and Bah-el Gazel to organize negotiations with local administrations and tribes. Being the former Governor of Darfur, R. Slatin Pasha mediated the attachment of the tribes and other actors to the centralized government via his good level of Arabic. According to Lord Cromer, Slatin Pasha not only made regulations with respect to the border issues, but he also came to terms with Ali Dinar pertaining to certain issues²⁶. Undoubtedly, Stalin Pasha was the most

²³ TNA. FO, 881/8675, Cromer to Lansdowne, 15 March 1905, Cairo, Cromer's report on Sudan in 1904.

²⁴ G.N. Sanderson, "Nagative Legacies of the Condominium to the Independent Sudan, Sudan: Environmet and People", *Second International Sudan Studies*, University of Khartum, 8-11 April 1991, p. 46, 47.

²⁵ TNA. FO, 881/8235, Wingate's Sudan Report, 18 January 1903, Bor (White Nile).

²⁶ TNA. FO, 881/8385, Cromer to Lansdowne, 26 February 1904, Cairo.

effectual person in Sudan after Cromer and Wingate between 1900 and 1914, when he was deposed²⁷.

The Sudan-Ethiopia border was managed to be fully drawn in 1904 despite the issues during previous periods²⁸. The borders with the Congo Free State were accepted in 1906²⁹. The enclave of Lado was included in the Mongolla State of Sudan upon the death of King Leopard II in 1910. As a result, Sudan happened to have a land reclamation of 27.000 square kilometers³⁰.

During the following periods of Wingate as the Government-General, Mahdism was not eradicated. The memorandum published by Wingate in 1908 revealed this reality. Wingate mentioned that the divine mission of Mohammed Ahmad carried on among the tribes in Sudan, and there still were thousands of people that would follow his path³¹. Therefore, Wingate, the Governor-General, put forward that the Sudanese land was too vast, and that they did not have enough numbers of troops to sustain security in the area. To Wingate, making Sudan a more secure and liveable place depended on two measures to be taken immediately. The first one was to increase the military force in Sudan, and the second one was to alleviate the intracommunication and transportation facilities of the country, and to aid the mobilization of the troops. It was too formidable to put Wingate's former point into practice. As he accepted as well, Egyptian soldiers would not desire to work in the southern and eastern parts of Sudan in unhealthy conditions. Besides, it was not an easy task to persuade the Egyptian Government either. However, Wingate insisted on his second wish to be realized immediately. He believed in the emergency of building a railway that would reach the southern and eastern centers of Sudan³².

Governor-General Wingate's proposal to increase the number of the troops, which he emphasized in the first article of his proposal, was

²⁷ Daly, *Empire on The Nile*, p. 62.

²⁸ TNA. FO, 881/8675, Cromer to Lansdowne, 15 March 1905, Cairo, Cromer's 1904 report on Sudan.

²⁹ Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, p. 112, 113.

³⁰ TNA. FO, 881/9986, E. Gorst to Edward Grey, 25 March 1911, Cairo.

³¹ TNA. FO, 881/9298, Wingate's Sudan Memorandum, 9 August 1908, Dunbar.

³² TNA. FO, 881/9298, Wingate's Sudan Memorandum, 9 August 1908, Dunbar.

declined by the ambassador in Cairo, Eldon Gorst, on the grounds that the Sudanese treasure could not afford it, and the Egyptian administration could contribute only to a limited extent. On the other hand, the ambassador in Cairo did not hesitate to support the second alternative. The railways constructed in various centers of Sudan were to bring forth continuous development, and to emit the opportunities for Sudan to be administered under better conditions in the future. In order to implement this, substantial funds were required to be pooled³³.

The railroad project to connect the cities of Sawakin and Atbarah, both of which have coasts on the Red Sea, was completed in 1906. In 1909, the construction of a harbour at which modern ships could land began³⁴. New trade routes were specified to facilitate the flow of goods from Port Sudan, which would replace Sawakin. This way, the trading activities could be executed independently from Egypt³⁵. The ambassador Gorst had mentioned that via the establishment of the connection between port Sudan and Khartoum, the opportunities for transportation increased; so, these investments played a crucial role in considering the recovery of Sudan³⁶. In spite of the exertions of Governor-General Wingate and Ambassador Gorst, the construction of railways in the south was not a possibility owing to the geographical features of the land. However, to improve the telecommunication and transportation opportunities, the construction of roads began in the years to follow³⁷.

The fundamental problem of the Condominium Period regarded how to manage the financial system. Financial regulations relating to Sudan were made upon the confirmation of the Egypt Council of ministers in January 1901 by Lord Cromer, Lord Kitchener and Mr. Gorst. At the center of these regulations was the support provided to Sudan by Egypt. On the other hand, the basic taxing system, where herds of

³³ TNA. FO, 881/9298, Memorandum regarding Sudan, Eldon Gorst, 18 August 1908, London.

³⁴ Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 53.

³⁵ Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan, p. 121.

³⁶ TNA. FO, 881/9986, Gorst to E. Edward Grey, 25 March 1911, Cairo.

³⁷ Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan, p. 121.

animals, land and date palms were non-exempt, was decided to be retained. Undoubtedly, the financial system was redesigned on bureaucratic foundations from top to bottom³⁸. In 1901, with the joint decision taken by Governor-General Wingate, British Financial Consultant and Egyptian Government, new financial regulations were made without altering the fundamental principles³⁹. During the Condominium Period, the alterations concerning the financial system facilitated the establishment of a peaceful and safe environment around important centers, and the flow of new investments led to an increase in the revenues and expenses of Sudan. The annual budget of Sudan was balanced thanks to the remittances made by Egypt until 1913. Besides, the investments made into Sudan were financially compensated by Egypt⁴⁰.

Ambassador Gorst stated that Britain would not stray from expenditures by mentioning that the British Government was responsible for the sustenance of the administration in Sudan. If the Government of Britain were not to make the required investments, they could face even more costs⁴¹. The facts that Gorst was assigned to Cairo as the Ambassador succeeding Lord Cromer and that he had good relations with the Khedive of Egypt allowed him to enhance his efficiency. While the revenues of Sudan totaled only 126.569 Sterlings in 1899, the revenues rose up to 979.343 Sterlings in 1908, and up to 3.766.133 Sterlings in 1923. On the other hand, the expenditures of Sudan ascended swiftly as well. Their expenditures came to 230.238 Sterlings in 1899 while they elevated to 1.163.659 Sterlings in 1908, and later up to 3.392.470 Sterlings. During the Condominium Period, the expenditures of Sudan were often more than its revenues⁴².

Upon the invasion of Sudan, a feeling of discomfort respecting Egyptian and Sudanese young officers surfaced. More as an outcome of administrative and financial implementations, several rebellions that

³⁸ Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, p. 118.

³⁹ Macmichael, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, p. 112.

⁴⁰ Warburg, "The Sudan, Egypt and Britain 1899-1916", p. 164, 165.

⁴¹ TNA. FO, 881/9298, Gorst's Sudan Memorandum, Eldon Gorst, 18 August 1908, London.

⁴² For annual profit and loss account statement of Sudan between 1899 and 1923, SAD 403/7/1-66, H.A. Macmichael Catalogue.

broke out were able to be quelled⁴³. Thereupon, Wingate chose to sort out the Egyptian commissioned officers in Sudanese military units who were to serve in the other parts of the country. These steps highly disturbed the Egyptian commissioned officers all around Sudan. Meanwhile, the Egyptian commissioned officers were objecting to the lack of personnel in Egyptian and Sudanese armies. By 1902, the seventeenth and the eighteenth Egyptian battalions and the fourteenth Sudanese battalion had been disbanded⁴⁴. In the southern parts of Sudan, new military barracks were built. The Southern Sudanese, having been enrolled in the armed services, were used for quelling the rebellions. However, Wingate took advantage of the Muslim Egyptian and Sudanese armies to suppress the rebellions in the north, as he believed in the sensitivity of religious feelings.

At the end of 1916, Wingate, the Governor-General of Sudan, was summoned to Cairo by the British Government and assigned as Egypt High Commissioner after Henry McMahon. The reason behind this determination following the death of Lord Kitchener in 1916 was the fact that Wingate was the most experienced statesman⁴⁵.

Nationalistic Movements in Sudan and Egyptian Administration's Loss of its Efficacy

When World War I broke out, a constitutional menace regarding the Turkish sovereignty in Egypt emerged; because legally, the Turkish sovereignty in Egypt was still continuing, and Abbas Hilmi, the Khedive of Egypt, was on good terms with the Ottoman sultan. This inextricable knot concerning the dependency of Egypt was unentangled with Britain announcing its protectionist role over Egypt on 18 December 1914. No longer was there a discussion regarding the Turkish sovereignty over Egypt. The protectionist role of Britain over Egypt also applied to Sudan. After all, no trouble regarding the obedience of Sudan to the authorities of Britain came in sight during the Great War⁴⁶.

⁴³ Daly, *Empire on The Nile*, p. 34-38.

⁴⁴ SAD, 987/10/1-87, Unpublished/Draft Work, M.W. Daly Catalogue.

⁴⁵ Henderson, *Sudan Republic*, p. 61.

⁴⁶ Macmichael, *The Anglo-Egyptain Sudan*, p. 117.

With the nationalistic movements gaining power and with some groups declamatorily laying claim on Sudan, political conflicts in Egypt and Sudan began to emerge for Britain; thereby, Sudan arrived on the scene of international politics. Despite the fact that several administrative and financial amendments had been made, new urban generation began to appear with unusual demands over Sudan⁴⁷. From then on, modern Sudanese nationalism and political organizations were to begin to be witnessed. This shift in Sudan was definitely dependent upon the political changes in Egypt. The activities of the press, under the wings of sects to a great extent, had especially the chattering classes in their spell⁴⁸. Meanwhile, nationalistic movements had sprung in the territories of Mesopotamia and Hijaz as well, as the educated groups longed for playing more eminent roles in the administration of their own country⁴⁹. The circumstances were not anyhow different in Egypt and Sudan. Furthermore, World War I induced radical changes in the political arena of Sudan. The call for Jihad by the Ottoman Sultan drew British authorities closer to Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the leader of mahdists. Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi always utilised this opportunity to be in good terms with British authorities. Hence, thanks to his moderate policies contrary to those of Mohammed Ahmad, who was his father, Abd al-Rahman got a significant foothold in the internal political life of Sudan in the terms to follow⁵⁰.

The nationalistic groups in Egypt began to pose a serious threat to foreigners, and especially to British authorities and the Egyptians who worked with them. The most basic rationale behind the anti-Britain movement was to gain independence. In the spring of 1919, the inner restlessness naturally began a movement against the central authority in Sudan, which had a restrictive effect on the central administration⁵¹,

⁴⁷ SAD 403/7/1-66, Khartoum, 10 September 1932, H.A. Macmichael Catalogue, Sudan Memorandum.

⁴⁸ Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, "Arabism, Africanism, and Self-Identification in the Sudan", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1970, 8/2, p. 241.

⁴⁹ SAD, 987/10/1-87, Unpublished/Draft Work, M.W. Daly Catalogue.

⁵⁰ Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, "The Role of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi in the Sudanese National Movement 1908- 1956", *Northeast African Studies*, 3/1, 1996, p. 8.

⁵¹ TNA. FO, 407/323, Special committee consisted by J. M. Ewart to the Private Secretary, 21 April 1925, Khartoum.

which Britain had sustained really well up to that time. From the early 1919 on, political murders started to be in sight. The political movements of Zaghoul Pasha were mobilizing Egyptians against the British administration⁵². When the nationalistic movements had grown stronger, Allenby, one of the most eminent statesmen of the period, who was influential in Palestine regarding the Ottomans, was appointed to Egypt as High Commissioner. Upon several unsuccessful meetings with some nationalistic leaders, the British Government was to assign Allenby to declare the independence of Egypt⁵³.

The British Government were well-aware regarding how vital an area Egypt was for themselves; hence, London sent "Milner Mission" to the area in order to detect the uneasiness occurring in Egypt and to determine what sort of precautions needed taking. The members of the commission led by Lord Miller involved Sir Renneld Rodd, Sir John Maxwell, Sir Owen Thomas, Sir Cecil Hurst and Mr. J.A. Spender. Of these members, Sir John Maxwell and Sir Owen Thomas prepared reports regarding Sudan by staying in the area for a few weeks⁵⁴:

The report of the Milner Commission clearly stated that administratively, the area was under the sovereignty of the British, and that the administrative system was run by the British authorities. Even though Milner Commission regarded the way the administrative system worked in Sudan to be excellent, they did not have the same viewpoint with respect to the administrative system in Egypt. The report mentioned that unless the governmental system of Egypt was altered, a well-operating administration would not be able to be constituted, which would conduce to complications⁵⁵. In any case, the source of complication was the fact that the administrative system in Egypt was affecting Sudan directly; in other words, the problem stemmed from the desire of the Egypt's civil and military administrators to pursue more effective politics in Sudan. To them, Sudan was an inseparable part of

⁵² SAD 403/7/1-66, Sudan Memorandum, 10 September 1932, Khartoum, H.A. Macmichael Catalogue.

⁵³ Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, 125.

⁵⁴ SAD 403/7/1-66, Milner Mission Report, 1920, H.A. Macmichael Catalogue; Besides, for "Milner Commission" see. Harold Macmichael, *The Anglo-Egyptain Sudan*, p. 138-142.

⁵⁵ TNA. FO, 141/446, Curzon to Ramsay, 13 August 1920, London.

Egypt⁵⁶. Nevertheless, Milner Mission did not suggest any proposals regarding South Sudan. Yet, administratively, Sudan evolved to bear a decentralized policy, and Southern provinces began to take resolutions more independently⁵⁷. Actually, this circumstance indicated Britain had resolved to disconnect the two constituents of the Nile River Valley, having been regarded as a whole unity up until that period⁵⁸.

The first sign of political uneasiness in Sudan was the demonstration on 30 May 1919 attended by some Egyptian army members having been discharged from their posts against the British authorities in Khartoum⁵⁹. In 1919, when anti-British politics began to stiffen in Sudan, the central administration in Khartoum shared their increasing concerns with respected people, nomad tribes and many other people from various fractions. All parties were declared that Egypt would not be allowed to interfere with Sudan. If the British government decided to withdraw, they were to share it with the Sudanese so that the Sudanese would get ready to protect their interests⁶⁰. Later, the British authorities noticed that the Egyptians incentivised the people in civilian and military areas in Sudan to rebel. So, it was determined to evacuate the Egyptian military and administrative executives from Sudan⁶¹.

The British authorities had been aiming to break the Egyptian influence on Sudan on a gradual basis. To achieve this goal, Allenby imposed restrictions on the authority of Egypt over Sudan via Egypt's declaration of independence, which he published on 28 February 1922. The "Condominium" in Sudan literally represented British authority. There were almost no high-ranking Egyptians stationed in Sudan. As well as Education, many domains were actually working through the

⁵⁶ Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, "Britain, The 1924 Sudanese Uprising, and the Impact of Egypt on the Sudan", *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1986, 19/2, p. 237.

⁵⁷ M. Abdel Rahim, "The Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan 1899-1947", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 2/3, 1966, p. 230, 231.

⁵⁸ Bushra Hamad, "Sudan Notes and Records and Sudanese Nationalism 1918-1956", *History in Africa*, Vol. 22, 1995, p. 248.

⁵⁹ Duncan, *The Sudan*, p. 137.

⁶⁰ TNA. FO, 407/323, Special committee consisted by J. M. Ewart to the Private Secretary, 21 April 1925, Khartoum.

⁶¹ SAD, 987/10/1-87, Unpublished/Draft Work, M.W. Daly Catalogue.

British system. Since 1913, Sudan had been financially independent; therefore, it had a different political status from the political status of Egypt, regarding which the administration of Egypt was most feared. Egypt had turned into an independent force, and Egyptian nationalists were putting on a determined stance regarding Sudan. The Condominium entitled Sudan political privileges; thus, the conflict between the two states over Sudan was inevitable⁶².

Britain, in order both to keep the administrative system in Sudan off Egypt's influence and to diminish the pressure Sudanese nationalism had been inflicting on the British authorities, began reformations concerning administrative domains in 1920. The first phase of this binary policy was to throw the administrative domains on local Sudanese people. The second phase of this policy was to establish legal regulations via which the tribes would be able to manage themselves. Beginning in 1920, the young people chosen from among the local people of Sudan began to receive courses. Upon the success they had achieved, they were assigned in various places around Sudan⁶³. During the years to follow, hundreds of people were to replace the Egyptian and British administrators. The utter motivation behind this policy on administrative domain was to throw the administration of Sudan on the Sudanese as early as it could be. Just as it was in some parts of Darfur, there were several centers where the Ottoman-Egyptian joint administration still applied. Just like the Mongolla province in South Sudan, this system still ran in the centers. Owing to the fact that the same person was in charge of both justice and administration, there were problems regarding the collection of taxes. Thus, the dependence of these centers on the government was achieved via the alterations realized on these administrative departments⁶⁴.

On the other hand, the centralized administration was encouraging Sudanese tribes to take more active part in terms of administration. Nevertheless, it was not possible to implement the same administrative

⁶² Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, p. 125, 126.

⁶³ TNA. FO, 407/417, H.W. Jackson to Allenby, Report on the Soudan for 1921, 1 June 1922, Khartoum.

⁶⁴ TNA. FO, 407/417, Lee Stack to Allenby, Report on the Soudan for 1922, 6 May 1923, Erkovit.

system in every region of Sudan due to its vast land and the huge differences in its social construction. The fact that the tribes living in North Sudan were Muslim and that they were stationary made the problems conveniently solvable. However, the same circumstances hardly applied to South Sudan. In South Sudan, the vast majority of the people were pagan, and they had adopted a primitive tribal way of life. Consequently, they were strictly committed to their customs. According to the Governor-General of Sudan, Lee Stack, who was assigned to this post succeeding Wingate, it would be impossible to implement a more extensive and more liberal system due to the social structure⁶⁵.

Despite Lee Stack having been appointed to this office, the nationalistic struggle kindled against the British authorities induced steps to be taken against the foreign intervention. The first step against the British authority became the notice "The Claim of the Sudanese Nation" published by Ali Abd al-Latif, the Dinka-based first lieutenant of the 9th Sudan battalion⁶⁶. The reason why Ali Abd al-Latif began this movement and got supported was the effects of the economical crisis caused by the mismanaged investments like Sennar dam. This crisis environment vested Ali Abd al-Latif with new opportunities to expand his movement⁶⁷. Yet, no prospects stand to propose this movement to have sprung all of a sudden as it was known that numerous leagues had been overtly and covertly carrying out activities against the British administration priorly. Thusly, the hypothesis that Abd al-Rahim Qulaylat, a former railway worker, conducting the newspaper "Ra'id al-Sudan", which was later closed down, was exiled to Egypt due to his anti-British activities paved the way for the groups in favour of him and Wahba, who later became a newspaper editor, to lead to the emergence of Ali Abd al-Latif is so robust⁶⁸. Ali Abd al-Latif was involved in quarrels with British authorities, which marked the beginning of the first political organization. He founded Sudanese United Tribes Society in 1922. Ali Abd al-Latif took the Egyptian revolution of 1919, which was

⁶⁵ TNA. FO, 407/417, Lee Stack to Allenby, Report on the Soudan for 1923, 19 June 1924, Ramleh.

⁶⁶ TNA. FO, 407/323, Special committee consisted by J. M. Ewart to the Private Secretary, 21 April 1925, Khartoum.

⁶⁷ Sanderson, "Nagative Legacies of the Condominium...", p. 47, 48.

⁶⁸ Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, "Britain, The 1924 Sudanese Uprising...", p. 239-242.

able to receive compromises from Britain, as an example. He was later arrested and imprisoned. Actually, the turning point of the Anti-Britain movement in Sudan was the Khartoum visit of Hafiz Bey Ramazan, the leader of Vatan Party in Egypt in December 1923. During this period, the speeches of Hafiz Bey Ramazan in favour of Egypt and several of his meetings triggered the anti-Britain group in Sudan again. Hafiz Bey Ramazan had extravagated to such an extent that he had founded "Party for the Liberation of Egypt and the Sudan" in Egypt. This state was an invaluable political capital for Hafiz Bey Ramazan to consolidate his followers in Egypt. Yet, his political stance could not help him as he was overwhelmingly defeated in the elections of January 1924⁶⁹.

Ali Abd al-Latif rebegan his political campaigns in 1924; he had changed his mind and was ready to cooperate with Egyptians to take down the British administration. He had an organization called White Flag League, not aiming at a Sudan independent from Egypt⁷⁰. However, it is a still-debated issue whether the call to unite with Egypt was a matter of faith or a discourse produced tactically to get Egypt's support. The organization established by Abd al-Latif prevailed more among military school students. In January, 1924, there probably were only around 150 people in the league⁷¹. So, Sudan nationalism diverged into two branches, the former being the Nile Valley Union, and the latter being independent nation-state. The vital political activities in Sudan occurred within the framework of the White Flag League. While such activities were observable in the north, South Sudan was in too isolated a state for such political movements to take place in⁷².

In January 1924, the political conjuncture in Egypt changed. Saad Zaghloul Pasha won the elections by landslide and he declared that he aimed at total independence for Egypt and Sudan⁷³. Fuad, the king of Egypt, during his speech at the second annual celebration of

⁶⁹ TNA. FO, 407/323, Special committee consisted by J. M. Ewart to the Private Secretary, 21 April 1925, Khartoum.

⁷⁰ Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan, p. 128.

⁷¹ Daly, Empire on The Nile, p. 293.

⁷² SAD 403/7/1-66, Sudan Memorandum, 10 September 1932, Khartoum, H.A. Macmichael Catalogue.

⁷³ TNA. FO, 407/382, Sudan Intelligence Report (From here on abbreviated as SIR), No: 354, January 1924.

independence day, stated that Sudan and Egypt were the sister countries never to fall apart from each other, which worried British authorities. Meanwhile, upon the demolition of the caliphate which continued during the Ottoman Dynasty by the government Ankara in Turkey, Hussein bin, the Sharif and Emir of Mecca, declared himself to be the Caliphate of all Muslim people. Nevertheless, this step taken by Sharif Hussein was disregarded by the religious ulemas in Cairo. The fact that Sharif Hussein took special interest in Sudan, him being the Caliphate could be a source of perturbation for Britain. Yet, the British also knew that his influential power was limited indeed, and he actually would not have a chance to provoke the Muslim people in Sudan. The prospects that the Sudanese could rely on King Fuad were better compared to Sharif Hussein⁷⁴. Given the position of Sudan, the British authorities expressed that the Sudanese did not trust the politicians, and they would not act upon this motivation. Moreover, not even the words of Seyyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the son of the leader of Mahdi Movement, and the words of the king of Egypt could activate large groups of people⁷⁵.

Through the end of May, “the League of the White Flag” restarted their activities under the leadership of Ali Abd al-Latif. Having got loose from prison, he was treated like a hero, and associated with the future of Sudan. Ali Abd al-Latif totally kept hold of the organization. Ali Abd al-Latif had a temperate, intelligent personality; yet, he was known to be in touch with some nationalistic groups in Egypt⁷⁶. Despite all the struggle, Sudanese nationalist groups could not generate a sufficiently effective enough discourse to build a nation as they could not associate Sudanese nationalism with a common language, culture and religion⁷⁷. The reason why Ali Abd al-Latif depended on Egypt during this period may be attributed to the weakness of the ideological bases of the strife he had embarked on. As a matter of fact, this nationalism was to

⁷⁴ TNA. FO, 407/382, SIR, March 1924, No: 356.

⁷⁵ SAD, 586/2/1-99, H.A. Macmichael Catalogue.

⁷⁶ TNA. FO, 407/382, SIR, May 1924, No: 358.

⁷⁷ Elena Vezzadini, “Nationalism by Telegrams: Political Writings and Anti-Colonial Resistance in Sudan 1920–1924”, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 2013, Vol. 46, No. 1, p. 48.

gradually grow out of collective struggle against colonialism in the years to follow.

The administration of Egypt were holding the British authorities responsible for the foregrounding of the Sudanese identity in Sudan. The news published in the Egyptian press expressed that the British authorities were effective in each decision taken by the central government in Sudan and that this did not reflect the truth⁷⁸. However, the situation was not as easy as the Cairo administration claimed it was. The foundations of the Sudanese nationalism stretched out to the period during which the Mahdi of Sudan started a war against the administration of Egypt in 1881. The fact that Abd al-Rahman supported centralized government upon negotiating with British authorities during the incidents of 1924 had him step forward against his rivals⁷⁹. During Abd al-Rahman negotiating with with the tribes with respect to the problems in Sudan on 10 June 1924, his statements regarding the requirement to act independently from Egypt caused him to make enemies from several fractions. Later, the speeches given by Lord Parmor on 25 June and by MacDonald on 30 June at the Sudanese parliament regarding the necessity that Sudan had to be governed by Britain became pretty effective⁸⁰.

The League of the White Flag who had a positive attitude towards the Egypt administration as anti-Egypt groups were becoming more effective in Sudan organising demonstrations in cities like Khartoum, Port Sudan, Atbarah, Wadi Halfa, Shendi and el-Obeid. Moreover, several of the demonstrations had to be interfered with. It was understood that Ali Abd al-Latif wanted to achieve success by reaching out to larger masses of people. Nevertheless, his demonstrations in the center of Khartoum were too weak. Notwithstanding this, Sudanese authorities apprehended the eminent people close to Ali Abd al-Latif by raiding their houses. Due to the demonstrations that took place during July, Ali Abd al-Latif was sentenced to 3 years in prison. This situation was tried to be reflected onto world public opinion as if the British had

⁷⁸ TNA. FO, 407/382, SIR, June 1924, No: 359.

⁷⁹ Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, "The Role of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi in the Sudanese National Movement 1908- 1956", p. 10.

⁸⁰ TNA. FO, 407/382, SIR, June 1924, No: 359.

been following a cruel policy in the area⁸¹. As a consequence, the demonstrations had grown so large that they started covering the civilian and military groups in August⁸².

The most outstanding of these events taking place in various parts of Sudan was the demonstration held by the students of Khartoum Military School on 9 August⁸³. These demonstrations went on in Shendi, El Obeid, Blue Nile Province, Dongalla and Malakal during August, September and October; however, they were dispersed before turning into bigger rebellions because of not being supported by the public in Khartoum and the other regions. It was seen that there were a great number of Sudanese soldiers and commissioned officers influenced by the Egyptian commissioned officers who were in Sudanese military units. Because of this, the evacuation of some politicized Egyptian commissioned officers to Cairo began. From then on, the Egyptian commissioned officers in the Sudanese army were to be gradually eliminated⁸⁴. The negotiations regarding the evacuation of the Egyptian army from Sudan had already begun. In May 1924, Lee Stack, the Governor-General, suggested transition of Egyptian army from Sudan back home within four years commencing in 1924⁸⁵.

In 1924, while the correspondences among nationalist groups were accusing the British of injustice and despotism, they were issuing a call for more help from Egypt. The correspondences exchanged later involved harsher expressions related with Britain⁸⁶, which obligated British officials to conduct negotiations with Egypt. As a matter of fact, while demonstrations in favour of Egypt were ongoing in Sudan, several negotiations between the British government and the Egyptian

⁸¹ TNA. FO, 407/382, SIR, July 1924, No: 360; See for the statements of the Sudanese regarding Ali Abd al-Latif upon the punishment he had received. Elena Vezzadini, "Nationalism by Telegrams: Political Writings and Anti-Colonial Resistance in Sudan 1920–1924", p. 51, 52.

⁸² SAD, 987/10/1-87, Unpublished/Draft Work, M.W. Daly Catalogue.

⁸³ SAD, 987/10/1-87, Unpublished/Draft Work, M.W. Daly Catalogue.

⁸⁴ TNA. FO, 407/382, SIR, August 1924, No: 361, PRO; FO, 407/382, SIR, September 1924, No: 362.

⁸⁵ SAD, 987/10/1-87, Unpublished/Draft Work, M.W. Daly Catalogue.

⁸⁶ Elena Vezzadini, "Nationalism by Telegrams: Political Writings and Anti-Colonial Resistance in Sudan 1920–1924", p. 49, 50.

administration regarding the status of Sudan were being proceeded. In Cairo, high commissioner Allenby had brought to attention that there were several troubles regarding his negotiations with Zaghoul Pasha. The first one of these problems was that Egyptian Government had been posing influence on the legislative power of Sudan. To Allenby, the problem was actually based upon the fourth article of the original text of the 1899 Agreement. According to the article, all announcements and deeds of the Governor-General of Sudan were to be brought out under the recommendation of the council of ministers by acquiring permission from the Khedive of Egypt, the Government of Britain and the British Consul-General.

On 14 January 1899, Lord Cromer had strongly recommended that the authority in Cairo not be capacitated; nevertheless, the agreement was still signed. In line with the right given by the fourth article of the agreement, the influence of Egypt administration had lifted its effectiveness over Sudan gradually. Consequently, Allenby demanded that the British Government reject any demands by Zaghoul Pasha no matter what they were, claiming that the recognition of the rights of Egypt over the legislation of the government of Sudan would make things difficult for the administrations of Britain and Sudan. The control of Egypt over Sudan was based on the Agreement of 1899, and this agreement legalized this control. This was a case accepted by British authorities; yet, with Egypt becoming independent in 1922, their policies over the countries in the area exceedingly disturbed Britain. Thus, this circumstance caused an uncertain and controversial state between the two countries over Sudan. To Allenby, the augmentation of Egypt's policies over Sudan was definitely to afflict the British authority over the territory⁸⁷.

Zaghoul Pasha stated during the negotiations with British representatives in 1924 that the government of Egypt had the right to directly communicate with the Government-General of Sudan on the basis of the fourth article of the Agreement of 1899 as Lord Allanby had mentioned based on the actuality that the Governor-General was appointed by the Khedive of Egypt. Zaghoul Pasha also presented some documents to prove righteous. Upon this, the correspondences

⁸⁷ TNA. FO, 141/446, Allanby to MacDonald, 26 July 1924, Ramleh.

regarding 1899 were obtained from the archives by the assistant of the colonel, A. K. Clark Kerr and presented to Zaghoul Pasha. Clark Kerr stated that there was no written document obtained as to the direct communication of neither himself nor even the senior bureaucrats in Cairo⁸⁸.

Regardless of the claims of Zaghoul Pasha over Sudan, the administration of Sudan in Khartoum was requested not to respond to British authorities. In this case, Kerr, the assistant High Commissioner, was to remark that they were following a policy in favour of retaining of the status quo⁸⁹. As the negotiations between the British authorities and Zaghoul Pasha were proceeding, a memorandum was published on 19 August. In this memorandum, "Sudan Defense Force" constituted of the Sudanese was recommended in place of Egyptian army. The Sudanese Government declared that Egyptian troops had to be evacuated from Sudan; and in case of refusal, all required precautions were to be taken by the British. Moreover, they demanded that 48 hours be allotted for the disarmament of the Egyptian troops. The overt support of the Sudanese Government to the British policy was to result in Egypt's alteration of their policies over Sudan⁹⁰.

After the 1920's, as a result of the gradually ascending tension in Britain-Egypt relations, the fact that Lee Stack, the Governor-General carrying on negotiations with the Government of Egypt regarding the reformations in Egypt, was assaulted by young Egyptian nationalists with guns on 19 November 1924 brought about a breaking point in the realm of politics in Sudan⁹¹. This event gained momentum to the evacuation of the Egyptian troops out of Sudan. The attempts to carry through this evacuation had begun two years ago. This assassination ended up with Lord Allenby, who had demanded that the Egyptian army in Sudan be evacuated, sending Egypt Government an ultimatum accordingly on 22 November⁹². The course of events was so rapid that

⁸⁸ TNA, FO, 141/446, Kerr to MacDonald, 25 August 1924, Ramleh.

⁸⁹ TNA, FO, 141/446, Kerr's report, 8 September 1924, Ramleh.

⁹⁰ SAD, 987/10/1-87, Unpublished/Draft Work, M.W. Daly Catalogue.

⁹¹ Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, p. 125, 126.

⁹² Regarding the contents of the ultimatum, Lord Allenby to Zaghoul Pasha, see Macmichael, *The Anglo-Egyptain Sudan*, p. 155.

prior to any instruction from the Government of Britain reaching to Lord Allenby, he had sent the ultimatum to the Egyptian authorities. The Government of Zaghoul resigned upon this ultimatum, and the new government was assembled under Ziur Pasha. Despite the rejection of his ultimatum by the new Egyptian Government, the forced evacuation began on 24 November⁹³. The determination to evacuate the Egyptian troops in Sudan having been taken, a resistance against the evacuation was commenced by Egyptian commissioned officers and soldiers. But on 1 December 1924, the resistance in Sudan was completely broken. All Egyptian soldiers were instructed to obey the orders and evacuate Sudan⁹⁴.

While the withdrawal procedures of the Egyptian army from Sudan were bound to start, the Government of Britain commanded that the military units within Sudan be put under the order of Governor-General and that the commission appointed by him take over the authority. In addition, British Government revealed their opinion that an Egyptian expert witness should be appointed as the commander of the armies in Egypt. On 18 December 1924, the Government of Britain conveyed their determination to Lord Allenby, who was in Cairo, that, under the circumstances of the time, London was not either obliged or rightful to assign a British commander to command the Egyptian army. Consequently, the political and military situation in Egypt and Sudan had gradually begun to change⁹⁵.

As Sudan Defense Force was being constituted, upon the recommendation of the Governor-General of Sudan, a person ranking colonel (local brigadier) was to be appointed to the head of this unit that served in Khartoum. As a matter of fact, the total count of this force was not to surpass six thousand people⁹⁶. The British military units in Sudan included two infantry battalions, one artillery battalion and auxiliaries whereas Egyptian soldiers were constituted of two infantry battalions, three batteries and one company of artillery unit in various

⁹³ SAD, 987/10/1-87, Unpublished/Draft Work, M.W. Daly Catalogue.

⁹⁴ SAD, 987/10/1-87, Unpublished/Draft Work, M.W. Daly Catalogue.

⁹⁵ TNA, FO, 407/323, Foreign Office to War Office, 16 January 1925, London, Tel. 176.

⁹⁶ TNA, FO, 407/323, Foreign Office to War Office, 6 April 1925, London, Tel. 184.

parts of Sudan; one railway battalion in Atbarah and some auxiliaries, a total number of 1851 people⁹⁷.

The assembly of the Sudan Defense Force attached a new element in Anglo-Egypt relations. The 1899 Condominium Agreement had decorated the Governor-General, who was the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, with high echelons. However, the Governor-General of Sudan was outranked by the Secretary of War of Egypt. As a consequence of the constitution of Sudan Defense Force, the military garrisons in Sudan fell under the control of the Sudanese Government. The "Sirdar" title was eradicated, and military command was transferred to a high-ranking commander entitled as the Commander of Sudan Defense Force⁹⁸. As a result, Sudan became more independent from Egypt regarding political and military domains while the influence Britain had on the territory remained despite the emerging opposition.

Conclusion

Condominium, the joint administration form in Sudan beginning with the 1899 Agreement, caused Sudan to take on a new political character at the beginning of the 20th century in spite of the considerable number of problems it made way for because the form of administration that had run under the sovereignty of Egypt for long years evolved to a form of administration where Britain was influential. Commenting on this period, an elaborate comprehension of the 1899 Agreement is a prerequisite. All in all, this agreement designated the

⁹⁷ TNA. FO, 407/323, Allenby to Chamberlain, 18 April 1925, Cairo, Tel. 187.

⁹⁸ SAD, 987/10/1-87, Unpublished/Draft Work, M.W. Daly Catalogue.

political developments of Sudan during the years that followed it. Notwithstanding the fact that the arrangements for the 1899 Agreement began after British and Egypt forces conquered Khartoum in 1898, it is understood that it was not well-implemented. Actually, the underlying reasons for this may be regarded as the fact that Khalifa Abdallah was carrying on his activities; and that authority was not able to be established in some centers of Sudan. The cause of the unestablished authority must be the Mahdist fraternities that had to be fought at once; and it is this urgency that compelled Britain and Egypt to sign the agreement despite the complications not yet solved. A manifestation of this may be shown as the fact that Lord Cromer persuaded the British Government to take out some articles of the letter of agreement that might cause several complications between the parties and had them removed. Despite everything, the continual years of war in Sudan finally came to an end with the acceptance of the 1899 agreement.

In 1899, the administrative character of Britain was tried to be instituted in compliance with the social and economical structure in Sudan. During the first years of the Condominium, following the struggle against the proponents of Mahdism, peace and safety were established in Sudan to a large extent, and new administrative and financial regulations were made. R. Wingate fully instituted the sovereignty of Britain in Sudan. Consequently, it would be more righteous to address the period between the years of 1899 and 1916, when R. Wingate served in Sudan as the Governor-General, as Wingate period.

Wingate period may be considered as a successful time-span in terms of the implementation of British policies in Sudan with respect to many a sphere like administrative structuring, financial regulations, railways, harbours, educational institutions. Wingate always knew how to supervise the intertribal balance implementing British policies. It must also be noted that behind Wingate's success in Sudan, the impact posed by the socio-economic circumstances during the period play their parts as well. As a matter of fact, the period during which nationalism and independence discourses were raging was during World War I, overlapping the post-Wingate period.

The nationalistic discourses in Sudan triggered several anti-Britain activities during the 1920's. Considered from this point of view, the preliminary questions to be raised may be whether Egypt had a part in this; and if so, how big a part Egypt played in this. Varied as the answers to the previous questions can be, in the present study, it will be understood that there was an Egyptian interference with Sudan to no less a degree. Actually, this condition was a result of the habit of Egypt as they had administered Sudan for about a century. When the administration of Egypt could not manage to influence Sudan more than Britain did, at least when they could not reflect its administrative characteristics upon Sudan, they had a go at creating a public opinion against Britain in the area. Given the political developments after 1920, it is possible to state that Egypt was successful at this policy; yet, given the consequences of these developments, it is impossible to regard Egypt's policy as a success story.

Behind the nationalistic discourses underlie the groups that developed independently from Egypt as well. These groups having been educated in western ways did not mind the existence of British sovereignty in Sudan contrary to Ali Abd al-Latif's "White Flag League", which carried out activities in favour of Egypt. In Sudan, there also was another group that disregarded the former two and wanted independence, but they could not produce an effective policy. Besides, the fact that Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi followed a policy in favour of Britain and against Egypt explains that the religious side adopted a distinctive political view. Behind their attitude towards Britain might have been the policy of Britain to gradually turn over the full administration of Sudan to the Sudanese after 1920. This would mean an absolutely independent Sudan in the years ahead.

Along with the Egyptian interference with the internal affairs of Sudan, the nationalistic movements against the British that broke out in such centers as Shendi, Umm Durman and Khartoum led to a socially constructed defiance of the British administration. 1924, the year Britain-opposition turned into protests was a political breaking point in the history of Sudan. The demonstrations held in various parts of Sudan reached to their peak with the joining of military students and some Egyptian and Sudanese commissioned officers in Khartoum in August

1924. However, it must be mentioned that had the propagandas these groups carried out in favour of Egypt been supported by tribes, they could have caused the British, who did not have enough number of military personnel, to evacuate the territory. Nevertheless, a vast majority of public did not support the movements that broke out in centers like Khartoum, Atbarah, Umm Durman and Port Sudan. So, the demonstrations were managed to be suppressed before they grew. Meanwhile, the assassination of Lee Stack, Britain's Governor-General of Sudan, eradicated the tolerance the British bore pertaining to the policy of Egypt regarding Sudan. Consequently, all military and civilian positions in Sudan were transferred to the Sudanese once they had been reclaimed from the Egyptian commissioned officers and officers. Viewed from this aspect, the Sudan Crisis of 1924 offered every opportunity to the Sudanese to have more part in the future of their own country as the British authorities preferred cooperating with the local tribes and communities rather than the Egyptians.

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