

## SAUDI INTERVENTION AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS PROCESS IN YEMEN AND SAUDI-IRAN TENSION

*Mehmet CANDAN\**

### Abstract

Yemen was one of the few countries that needed to reach a positive conclusion during the 2011 Arab Uprisings. However, due to the air operation launched by Saudi Arabia in March 2015, the process was interrupted and the country fell into a deeper crisis. In some interpretations of the crisis that Yemen has fallen into, the dominant view is that Saudi Arabia has instrumentalized the developments in Yemen for its own domestic policy in line with the regional goals of America and Israel. However, after the uprisings, the developments in Yemen were presented to the public as the Houthis, one of the parties to the internal conflict in Yemen, trying to take over Yemen as 'Iran's proxy' and that Saudi Arabia was fighting against Iran's sectarian expansion in Yemen. This article aims to explain the role of Saudi Arabia in the political crisis that Yemen, which was expected to achieve success as a result of the 2011 Arab Uprisings, has fallen into, by using the historical sociology method. This article will argue that Saudi Arabia, which deepened the crisis in Yemen with its airstrikes in 2015, triggered this crisis because it wanted to prevent possible throne fights in the near future and to secure the future kingdom of Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), and that it even used the sectarian and geopolitical conflict it had with Iran as a tool for this effort. Therefore, this article aims to explain how the Saudi Kingdom instrumentalizes Yemeni politics for the design of its own domestic politics in line with the Middle East politics of the US and Israel.

**Key Words:** Yemen, Houthis, Saudi Arabia, US, Iran.

## SUUDİ ARABİSTAN'IN ARAP AYAKLANMALARINDAN SONRAKİ SÜREÇTE YEMEN'E MÜDAHALESİ VE SUUDİ-İRAN GERİLİMİ

### Özet

Yemen, 2011 Arap Ayaklanmaları sürecinde olumlu sonuca ulaşması gereken birkaç ülkeden biriydi. Ancak, Suudi Arabistan'ın Mart 2015'te Yemen'e başlattığı hava operasyonu nedeniyle süreç kesintiye uğradı ve ülke daha derin bir krize girdi. Yemen'in içine düştüğü krize ilişkin yapılan kimi yorumlarda, Suudi Arabistan'ın Yemen'deki gelişmeleri Amerika ve İsrail'in bölgesel hedefleri doğrultusunda kendi iç politikası için araçsallaştırmış olduğu görüşü hâkimdir. Ancak ayaklanmalardan sonra Yemen'deki gelişmeler kamuoyuna Yemen'deki iç çatışmanın taraflarından Husilerin 'İran'ın vekili' olarak Yemen'i ele geçirmeye çalıştığı ve Suudi Arabistan'ın İran'ın Yemen'deki mezhepçi genişlemesine karşı mücadele etmekte olduğu şeklinde sunulmuştur. Bu makalede 2011 Arap Ayaklanmaları sonucunda başarıya ulaşması beklenen Yemen'in, tam aksine, içine düştüğü siyasal buhranda Suudi Arabistan'ın rolünün tarihsel sosyoloji yöntemi kullanılarak izah edilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Yine bu makalede, Yemen'e 2015'te düzenlediği hava saldırıları ile ülkedeki krizi daha da derinleştiren Suudi Arabistan'ın, bu krizi tetiklemesindeki asıl nedenin, ülkesinde yakın

\* Phd Candidate, Ankara Sosyal Bilimler University, Institute of Social Sciences, Middle East Studies, e-mail:

[mehmet.candan@student.asbu.edu.tr](mailto:mehmet.candan@student.asbu.edu.tr)

ORCID:0009-0002-3058-8565

Başvuru/Submitted: 18.09.2024

Kabul/Accepted: 30.11.2024

gelecekte yaşanması muhtemel taht kavgalarını engellemek ve veliaht prens Muhammed Bin Selman'ın (MBS) müstakbel krallığını güvence altına almak olduğu, İran'la yaşadığı mezhepsel ve jeopolitik çekişmeyi bile bu çabasına alet ettiği ileri sürülecektir. Dolayısıyla bu makalede, Suud Hanedanlığının Yemen siyasetini ABD ve İsrail'in Ortadoğu siyaseti doğrultusunda kendi iç siyasetinin dizaynı için nasıl araçsallaştırdığının izah edilmesi amaçlanmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Yemen, Husiler, Suudi Arabistan, ABD, İran.

## 1. Introduction

The demands of the Yemenis on the streets during the Arab Uprisings that began in Tunisia in 2010 and quickly spread to Yemen and Egypt in 2011 were not very different from the demands of the Tunisian and Egyptian protesters: To reckon with the dictatorial regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had led the country into poverty despite ruling for 33 years and whose name was associated by corruption constantly. Yemenis, who were already fed up with poverty and whose average national income per capita was around \$2,000, began to organize street protests from all segments of society to change the regime. Saudi Arabia and the US intervened in the transition process, Saleh was removed from office and Mansour Hadi was appointed as interim president for two years. During this process, the country still had a chance to achieve stability thanks to the "National Peace and Participation Agreement" and "Power Sharing Agreement" signed with the opposition in 2013 and 2014. However, the process was interrupted due to the air operation launched by coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen on March 25, 2015, and the country was dragged into a deeper crisis.

Saudi Arabia's political and military intervention in Yemen after the Arab Uprisings is generally evaluated from two different perspectives. The first one is that Saudi Arabia has instrumentalized the developments in Yemen for its own domestic policy in line with the regional goals of America and Israel. According to this perspective, King Salman bin Abdulaziz took over the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia together with Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the grandson of Abdulaziz bin Saud and one of the third-generation princes. This situation increased the efforts of those who want to hold on to power to instrumentalize foreign policy to secure the thrones, due to possible throne struggles in the Saudi Kingdom in the near future.<sup>78</sup> In this process, Saudi Arabia was already coordinating the transition process with the US after the civil unrest in Yemen. MBS then sent troops to the Yemen. He also further increased sectarian tension in the region by executing Saudi Shiite cleric Ayatollah Nemr.

According to another assessment on the Yemen crisis; that the Houthis (also known as Ansarullah), one of the parties to the internal conflict, tried to take over Yemen as an 'Iranian proxy'; and the view that Saudi Arabia was also fighting against Iran's sectarian expansion in Yemen predominates. Saudis feared that the Houthis would become something like Hezbollah in the Arabian Peninsula, equipped with Iranian-provided missiles and armed with political status.<sup>79</sup> According to this view, the Yemen problem is actually the geopolitical and ideological struggle between Iran and Saudis. However, only from this perspective, the local dynamics in Yemen are not taken into account. In addition, due to the air campaign launched by the Saudi-led coalition on March 25, 2015, the real reasons leading to the crisis seem to be forgotten. Indeed, it is important to discuss the reasons why the Saudis intervened in Yemen. In this study, it is argued that ignoring the main goals of the Saudis intervention in Yemen, the debate over the Saudi Arabia-Iran conflict further deepens the Yemen crisis. Therefore, this study discusses the causes and consequences of Saudis intervention in Yemen, together with the reasons for the failure of the transition period of the Yemen crisis after the Arab Uprisings using the method of historical sociological approach.

---

<sup>78</sup> Ataman, Muhittin, "Suudi Arabistan'da Yaşanan Değişim: Krallığın Yeniden Yapılanması" [Change in Saudi Arabia: Restructuring of the Kingdom]. (2018).

<sup>79</sup> ISS, Muhammad bin Salman and the new Saudi Arabia, 24. (2018)/a, <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/muhammad-bin-salman-and-the-new-saudi-arabia> (data access: 30.12.2019).

## 2. Arab uprisings, transition process and international dimension of Yemen crisis

Yemen was a poor country due to challenging geography, lack of functioning government and bureaucracy and lack of national identity. So, with the addition of corruption in the Saleh administration, the contraction in power negotiation, the decrease in oil revenues, scarcity and poverty, the riots that began in Tunisia in 2010 reached easily to Yemen in 2011. The demands of the protesters in Yemen were essentially the same as those in Egypt and Tunisia: the separation of the head of government and a technocratic coalition for democratic elections and a legitimate government that could demand popular sovereignty.

The resignation of Egyptian President Mubarak on February 2011 changed the mood of the riots that began in Yemen. That night, thousands of students, youth activists and others gathered outside the University of Sana'a. Like their counterpart in Cairo, they marched to the main square of the city, called Tahrir Square, which demanded Saleh's immediate resignation. After a short demonstration, the security forces dispersed them and took control of the square. The protesters returned to the university and camped outside the square. This new square remained the epicenter of the rebellion in Sana'a. As in the case of Egypt, the world focused its attention on the capital Sana'a. However, as in the case of Egypt, the capital was not only a city the protests erupted. For example, in Taiz, south of Sana'a, university students and staff began their protests on February 11, and within a few days the number of people in the capital exceeded the number of people marching. In Aden, protesters advocating the restoration of independence in southern Yemen called for the immediate step down of Saleh. As in the case of Egypt, the level of violence outside the capital at least initially exceeded the level of violence within it. In the first week of the protests in Taiz, security forces shot and killed eleven people in Aden.<sup>80</sup>

The situation changed dramatically on March 18, when government forces shot and killed more than fifty demonstrators and injured dozens. This sparked a wave of rebellion, exacerbating important parts of the popular view of Saleh. Within a few days, dozens of lawmakers, diplomats, tribal leaders and military officials announced that they had withdrawn their support for the president. The most important of these groups are the anti-Saleh stance of Chief of Staff Ali Mohsen, the Joint Meeting Party (JMP) leadership and members of the al-Ahmar family. However, unlike street protesters who openly called for Saleh's departure, Islah Party and the JMP proposed a negotiated transition.<sup>81</sup>

Starting in April 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), led by Saudi Arabia and backed by the US and the EU, tried to put forward an agreement that weakened Saleh and proposed a framework for transition in Yemen. The deal was negotiated between Saleh, Ali Mohsen, al-Ahmar brothers and traditional power brokers in the JMP, and only the organized opposition ruled out the Ansarullah, the Southern Yemen HIRAK Movement and street protesters, confirming their long-standing distrust. Saleh agreed first and then broke the deal three times during the year. He finally signed a withdrawal agreement in Riyadh in November. The agreement envisaged the gradual withdrawal of Saleh from formal power in exchange for immunity for him and his main allies. Saleh was allowed to continue his role as president of the GPC. Power was transferred to Mansur Hadi, the long-serving vice president. Hadi's choice was perceived as an acceptable compromise for every fraction that did not have its own power base at that time. According to "National Peace and Accession Agreement", the elections were held in February 2012, only Hadi was voted. A national unity government formed in which GPC and JMP shared the Cabinet seats equally. The agreement also provided a framework for national dialogue, constitutional revisions, reforms in military and security apparatus and presidential elections in 2014.<sup>82</sup>

---

<sup>80</sup> Perkins, Brian, Yemen: Between Revolution and Regression. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 40(4), (2017). <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1205368> (data access: 05.03.2024).

<sup>81</sup> Kamrava, Mehran, *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2014), p. 382.

<sup>82</sup> Popp, Roland, War in Yemen: Revolution and Saudi Intervention, *CCS Analyses in Security Policy*, No:175 Zurich, (2015). <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse175-EN.pdf> (data access: 02.01.2020).

But before the uprising, actors who were not part of the system were mostly left out. In particular, Ansarullah and Hirak rejected the GCC agreement and boycotted the February 2012 elections. Ansarullah opposed the transitional agreement and refused to call for his arms to be released, but in addition to the national dialogue launched in March 2013, they became active participants with the moderate southern leaders. Between Hadi's coming to power in 2012 and 2014, Houthis increased the pressure on the central government. This effort resulted in September 2014, with forces loyal to Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthi movement in Sana'a, forcing Hadi to accept a "Power-Sharing Arrangement" in the form of a unity government.<sup>83</sup>

US-based think tanks commented this process that the power imbalance caused by Houthis's victory and the collapse of the National Dialogue has diminished their desire to share power. Accordingly, they rejected the unity government; they imposed on Hadi, bombed the presidential palace, put Hadi under house arrest and finally forced the government's resignation in January 2015. The Houthis turned a coup into a 'glorious revolution': they dissolved the parliament, set up a revolutionary regime, and appointed Abdulmalik's cousin Muhammad al-Houthi as temporary president. Hadi fled Aden, where he established his own exiled government, but Houthis was probably He continued to push south towards the scene to drive it away. The GCC once again tried to make a diplomatic decision to save Hadi's position and lay the groundwork for the restoration of the status quo, but Houthis sniffed the victory and refused to participate. While fleeing to Saudi Arabia, the US was forced to suspend anti-terrorism operations and withdraw its personnel. The ground was prepared for the escalation of the civil war.<sup>84</sup>

According to another comment, in September 2014, with the support of Saleh supporters, the Houthis took advantage of the power gap and captured important points of the capital city Sanaa and forced Mansur Hadi to resign. Later, the Houthis, who declared that they had dissolved the parliament, formed a "Presidential Council" under their control. After taking over the capital Sanaa, the Husei-Saleh alliance continued its progress in Yemen, eliminating its rivals and besieging the city of Aden, the southernmost of Yemen, in March 2015.<sup>85</sup>

According to Another Egypt centered think tank magazine, political moment during the transition process may be described in four directions. The first sees it as a revenge moment, the second sees it for the fall of the republic, and the third sees it as the moment of finishing off what is left of the Republic and the fourth sees it as revolutionary. The Houthi movement restricted the central authority of the movement in exercising its natural functions without overthrowing it, but rather kept it within a formal framework.<sup>86</sup>

According to Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the leader of Houthis, government and President Mansur Hadi suddenly resigned unnecessarily. This resignation was a political maneuver and a non-serious step. The goal was to impose unjust legitimate demands on the people. But to him, harmful work will be yielded beneficial results. They took this step in bad faith; but he hopefully it would bring good for this country. They want from all political groups to act responsibly in this sensitive period of the country. This is an extremely sensitive stage; but it also offers great opportunities. This revolutionary popular movement is on the right track. They feel responsible and that no group or segment is excluded; on the contrary, it wants the process to work in line with the National Peace and Accession agreement. They constantly emphasize participation. They want a reasonable and reasonable relationship with the outside. They have no hostility towards any Arab or Islamic country. They do not want conflicts and problems with the international community, the UN and the Security Council.<sup>87</sup>

---

<sup>83</sup> Kamrava, Mehran, *ibid*, p.385

<sup>84</sup> IISS, Muhammad bin Salman and the new Saudi Arabia, 24. (2018)/a), <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/muhammad-bin-salman-and-the-new-saudi-arabia> (data access: 30.12.2019).

<sup>85</sup> Salisbury, Peter, Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State. Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, (2016), <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-05-25-yemen-stemming-rise-of-chaos-state-salisbury.pdf> (data access: 05.03.2024).

<sup>86</sup> Arab center for Research and Studies, Collapse State: Yemen منصر اعدالولة القبيلة البصر اعدالولة المليشيا اليمن. انهيار الدولة: اليمن. From the tribal state conflict to the militia state conflict, 2015, <http://www.acrseg.org/36587> (data access: 30.12.2019).

<sup>87</sup> Yakın Doğu Haber, (2015), Abdulmelik Husei'den Yemen Değerlendirmesi, [Abdul- Malik al-Houthi Reviews Yemen], [http://www.ydh.com.tr/HD13600\\_abdulmelik-husiden-yemen-degerlendirmesi.html](http://www.ydh.com.tr/HD13600_abdulmelik-husiden-yemen-degerlendirmesi.html) (data access: 31.12.2019).

### **3. Why Yemen crisis is discussed over Saudi-Iran conflict rather than internal problems**

Four years after Arab Uprisings, the idea of reckoning with the corrupt governments of the Yemenis came to a dead end. By targeting Iran, Saudi Arabia led the incident to an international dimension and then to military intervention. For this, real problems of Yemenis overshadowed by the geopolitical and ideological struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In addition, due to the air campaign launched by the Saudi-led coalition on March 25, 2015 the crisis in Yemen more deepened. Therefore, the relations of these two countries, both with each other and with Yemen, need to be examined briefly and more closely.

#### ***3.1. Saudi-Iranian historical and geopolitical rivalry***

The roots of the Saudi-Iran tension date back to the Arab conquest of Iran during the reign of Hz. Omar after Islam and the end of the Sassanid Empire, which was established in the territory of today's Iran. Some Iranian intellectuals see the Arabs as the main culprits of Iran's backwardness and consider the Arab attack on Iran and the collapse of the Sassanids as the beginning of backwardness and decadence. This group, who disregards the richness that Islam has added to Iranian culture, claims that the ancient Iranian tradition has become barbaric due to the Arab invasion. In addition, Iran is among the countries that led the Shuubiya movement, which was developed in response to the mawali policy implemented by the Umayyads against non-Arabs.<sup>88</sup> From that time to the present, Arabs and Iranians have maintained distant relations over Arab-Persian debates.

Due to the Islamic nature of Iran's 1979 revolution, although such approaches were partially in the background after the revolution, this time the sectarian tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran had to come to the fore. Because the Saudi Kingdom, founded in 1926, adopted the Salafi Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. This interpretation distances itself from Shiism, the official sect of Iran, by claiming that it is polytheism for any Muslim to show excessive love and closeness to anyone other than Allah and the Prophet. According to the Salafi-Wahhabi interpretation, the Islamic knowledge that a Muslim needs is commanded in the Quran. The Prophet Muhammad and his companions also applied the Quran in their lives and lived in accordance with this knowledge. In order to understand Islam and apply it in daily life, there is no need for any other interpretation, person or intermediary other than these two basic sources. Contrary to this interpretation, the dominant view in Shiism is that the Islamic Ummah should not be left without administrative control after the death of the last Prophet Muhammad, and that Muslims should be subject to and obey Allah's saintly servants or chosen Imams through the belief in 'velayat'.

The geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran can be traced back to the desire of both states to become more powerful in the region. For this reason, it is possible to talk about a constant state of tension in Saudi-Iranian relations that began between the Pahlavi Dynasty and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and has continued to this day. During the Shah's period, there were times when Saudi Arabia and Iran sometimes cooperated to limit the regional influence of Soviet Russia under the guise of the threat of communism and the increasing influence of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. However, for example, after the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, when Saudi King Faisal cut off oil supplies to Western countries in order to ensure that Western countries would support Israel in order to stop its attacks, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, did not comply with this decision and responded by mobilizing all his means to increase oil supplies.<sup>89</sup>

---

<sup>88</sup> Ahmedi, Hamid, Religion and nationality in Iranian identity, *Policy Journal of Faculty of Law and Political Sciences*, Number: 67. Start page: 27 | End page: 36 (2009) <https://www.sid.ir/paper/110034/fa> (data access: 31.12.2020)

<sup>89</sup> Omar, M. Adil, Suudi Arabistan-İran İlişkileri Bağlamında Ortadoğu'nun Güncel Sorunları, [Current Problems of the Middle East in the Context of Saudi Arabia-Iran Relations], *Bölgesel Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 2 (1), (2018). 203-243.

After the revolution, the same tension arose due to reasons such as the risk of Shiite Arabs living in Saudi Arabia being affected by the Revolution and concerns that the Iranian Revolution would spread to Saudi Arabia in line with Iran's desire to export the revolution. In addition, the increasing Iranian hegemony in countries such as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon caused the Saudis to be extremely worried and this situation led the Saudis to cooperate more with the US in terms of politics. In the Iran-Iraq war that started immediately after the Iranian Revolution, the Saudis supported Iraq without hesitation and the Saudi Kingdom aimed to benefit from the fact that this war was wearing down both countries. This time, the revolutionary character of the Arab uprisings that started in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 and spread to Yemen led the Saudis to take even harsher measures in Yemeni internal affairs in cooperation with the US, assuming that their Kingdom was at risk of being surrounded from the south as well as the north of the country.

### **3.2. Saudi Arabia's Yemen Problem**

Especially since the second half of the 20th century, there has been a complex network of relations between the Saudi Kingdom and Yemen. In modern history, it can be summarized that the Saudi Arabia's relationship with Yemen that supporting the dismissed Imams against leftist movements, establishing close ties with the tribes, defending the status quo against Yemen rebellions and Arab Uprisings, instrumentalizing foreign policy by using Yemen's uprisings in the struggle for domestic kingdoms, to continue the geopolitical war with Iran and to prevent the Bab-el Mandeb Strait from falling into the hands of the Houthis in Yemen.

After the end of the Imam period in Yemen after 1962, Saudi Arabia supported the dismissed Imams against Egypt. There is also a very effective network of relations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen's tribal leaders as an extension of the dominant tribal culture in the region. Since the 1970s, Yemen has sent nearly one million workers to Saudi Arabia. Since the 1980s, Yemen tribes have been able to withdraw money from Saudi Arabia to prevent socialist 'irreligious' movements in Yemen, and the Saudis have been buying weapons from the United States to provide this support. Even at that time, in the arms trade between the Saudis and the US, agreements were concluded with the US was profitable.<sup>90</sup> As the Iraqi attack on Kuwait in 1991, the Saudis withdrew their support from Yemen because of the abstention of the Yemenis and sent 800 thousand Yemen workers back.<sup>91</sup> However, the relationship between the Saudis and the important tribal leaders has continued and has been in constant contact with the Saudi Arabian tribal leaders in shaping Yemen's domestic policy.

On the other hand, the Saudis have played no other role than supporting President Saleh in the Houthi-Saleh civil wars in order to prevent the Houthis from becoming active in the politics of Yemen. However, the overthrow of Saleh as a result of the 2011 Arab Uprisings forced Saudi Arabia to actively design Yemen's domestic politics together with the United States. With the transfer of the Saudi Kingdom to King Salman in the beginning of 2015, Saudi Arabia opened its denomination card and saw the Houthi Movement in Yemen as an extension and threat of Iran's Shiite expansionism. Thus, in the 1980s, the Communist threat from Yemen to Saudi Arabia was transformed into a Shiite threat by 2010's, and with this threat perceptions, the country spent a significant amount of sources to buy weapons from the United States.

The Yemen war has been a major struggle for MBS since the beginning of Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen. As soon as MBS took over as defense minister, his first act was to organize the GCC and launch an air strike codenamed "Operation Decisive Storm" on March 26, 2015. In the proactive foreign policy pursuit of the MBS, it may be interpreted as taking positions for future throne fights awaiting the Kingdom of Saud following the death of his father. King Salman bin Abdulaziz, who helped his son Prince MBS, began to make unprecedented changes in a row before less than four months after throning. The King removed his half-brother Prince Muqrin and raised his third nephew, Prince Muhammad bin Nayef (MBN), to second place. He made his own son, MBS, number three in the line of succession. These changes were combined with Salman's pursuit of the most ambitious

---

<sup>90</sup> Dresch, Paul, *Tribes, Government and History in Yemen*, Oxford: Clerandon Press, (1989). p. 240-262.

<sup>91</sup> Cleveland, William, *A History of Modern Middle East*, Pheledelphia: West view Press, (2009), p.543.

foreign policy in Saudi history. Also, behind these changes, Saudi Foreign policy was instrumental in domestic policy because of possible fights for the throne. The effects of global and regional actors were observed in domestic policy developments during the period of King Salman. MBS's cooperation with these actors could be considered as an effort to increased effectiveness in domestic politics and eliminate rivals.<sup>92</sup>

One of the first actions of King Salman was to execute Ayatollah Nemr, the Arab Shiite cleric, along with 47 religion activists at the beginning of 2016. Nemr was a cleric who opposed the Kingdom's armed actions and conflicts, demanded reform and freedom of expression, called for the elimination of corruption and discrimination, and criticized Iran's policy in Syria. It is also known that Ayatollah Nemr criticized Saudi Arabia's intervention in Bahrain and Yemen. Representatives of the UN, the US and the EU interpreted this execution as a very dangerous development that could have serious consequences in the region and pointed out that it would escalate sectarian tension. The Saudi consulate in Mashhad and the Saudi embassy in Tehran were set on fire by protesters. For Houthis this event was Saudi's execution of a public warrior and a great clergyman in a false trial by violating human rights.<sup>93</sup> Thus, sectarian tension and the Saudi-Yemen war in the region became more intense.

MBS was not a well-known person inside or outside the country until his father Salman became king. MBS received all his education in his home country, but after his father became king, he worked in government jobs for a very short time. Those who follow Saudi Arabian politics realized that this change was actually a transitional step, because it was the first step in paving the way for his son MBS. As many expected, King Salman appointed MBS as MBN's successor in June 2017. On May 20, 2017, US President Trump and Saudi Arabia's King Salman signed a series of letters of intent for a total of \$350 billion in arms purchases from the United States, \$110 billion immediately and the rest over 10 years. The planned arms purchases included tanks, warships, missile defense systems and cybersecurity technology. There had to be a 'reasonable' justification for the billions of dollars spent on arms purchases from the US: Geopolitical conflicts with Iran based on sectarian tensions, the ongoing hot war with Iran's allies in Yemen.

After his appointment, MBS took some important steps to arbitrate his own power. In this context, in the second half of 2017, the royal family weakened potential power centers in the country in order to prevent opposition from business and religious circles. Approximately four hundred people who were influential in the country's political, religious and economic life were detained and executed 47 of them. MBS, trying to be effective in American politics, also thought that it would institutionalize US-Saudi Arabia political relations with a PR campaign through expensive lobbying efforts and anti-Iranian relations in the region.<sup>94</sup>

However, one of the main drivers of Saudi intervention of Yemen is also have a geopolitical dimension. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have launched a proxy war with Iran, since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Their leaders tried to destroy and overthrow Bashar al-Assad to prevent Iran from Syria. The Saudis and Emirates believed that the Shiite militias took over the capital of Yemen, Sana'a. After Houthis seized the capital, Saudi Arabia's crown prince of MBS and UAE's crown prince Zayed alarmed. They feared that the Houthis would become something like Hezbollah in the Arabian Peninsula, equipped with Iranian-provided missiles and armed with political and legal status. At the same time, it would turn out that the conditions gave Saudi Arabia and the UAE the opportunity to strategically realize what they had failed in Syria.<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>92</sup> Öztop, Mustafa, Suudi Arabistan Dış Politikasında Muhammed Bin Selman'ın "Bumerang" Etkisi, [The "Boomerang" Effect of Mohammed Bin Salman on Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy], *Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi*, 6(1), 203-230. (2019). <https://doi.org/10.26513/tocd.468840> (data access: 10.09.2024)

<sup>93</sup> Al-JazeeraTurk. (2016), Şiilerden idama sert tepki, [Harsh reaction from the Shiites for the execution], <https://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/siilerden-idama-sert-tepki>, (data access: 08.01.2020).

<sup>94</sup> IISS, Strategic rivalries around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, 24(16), (2018/b), <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/bab-elmandeb-strait> (data access: 30.10.2019).

<sup>95</sup> IISS, Muhammad bin Salman and the new Saudi Arabia, 24. (2018/a), <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/muhammad-bin-salman-and-the-new-saudi-arabia> (data access: 30.12.2019).

### 3.3. *Iran and the Houthis: The proxy war issue and the axis of resistance*

Iran's relationship with the Houthis in Yemen has been a hot topic since the Houthis took power in 2015, following the Arab Uprisings. The first reason for this is that the Houthis have little to do with Iran historically and sociologically. Although the Houthis are widely portrayed as Shia in terms of faith, they are known to be Zaydis referred to as the Fivers. The Zaydis are considered part of Shia Islam, but they differ significantly from the mainstream of Imamiye in Iran, which is referred to as the Twelvers. Furthermore, among the various Shia schools, the Zaydis are considered the closest to Sunni Islam, as they reject concealing religious belief (*taqiyya*) and distance themselves from criminalizing the first three Islamic caliphs for not recognizing Imam Ali's legitimate right to rule. For this reason, the Houthis and Iran can be described as distant relatives in terms of sectarian relations.<sup>96</sup> However, due to the Houthis' uprising-like objections to the Saleh Administration in line with the discursive influences of the Iranian revolution, the principle of the revolutionary approach of the Twelver Shiites and the Fiver Shiites to political readings was revived.<sup>97</sup>

The Shabab al-Mou'mineen (Believing Youth Movement), founded in the 1990s under the leadership of Hussein al-Houthi, initially aimed to challenge economic deprivation in Yemen, achieve religious autonomy and freedom, and protect the Zaydi community. The movement has increasingly politicized its demands for the recognition of the Zaydi faith as an official religion, freedom for Zaydi political activities, the removal of government oppression of Zaydi regions, the economic development of the Saada region, and the end of Western cultural and political influence in the country. Hussein al-Houthi, raised the slogan "God is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse on the Jews, victory to Islam" and further radicalized the movement at 2002. Thus, earlier steps were taken towards rapprochement between the Islamic Republic regime and the Houthi movement. Despite the apparent growing ideological closeness between the Houthis and the Islamic Republic, Iranian officials have denied any connection to the Yemenis. They say that Iran's support for the Houthis is primarily moral. They claim that Iran is a model for preserving the Zaydi identity and combating the political, social and economic discrimination that the Zaydis face.<sup>98</sup>

Before the 2011 Arab Uprisings, Iran had little to no contact with Yemen. Developments in Yemen were not a priority in Iranian foreign policy. There were no flights between Tehran and Sanaa during this period. Due to the geographical distance and lack of strong ties, Yemen did not occupy a significant place on the agenda of Iranian foreign policy.<sup>99</sup> Iran's relationship with Yemen was limited to the Houthi leadership being influenced by the political rhetoric of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. However, it is known that before the Arab Spring, Houthi leader Hussein al-Houthi traveled to Iran and held contacts there.<sup>100</sup> For this reason, the civil war in Yemen that began with the 2011 Arab Spring was primarily driven by local and political factors and was neither an international proxy war nor a purely sectarian conflict.

However, by the end of 2010, American officials began to allege that Iran was responsible for transferring small amounts of arms to the Houthis. Similarly, the UN Security Council's Iran Sanctions Committee reported that Iran likely began providing small amounts of arms to the Houthis in 2009.<sup>101</sup> Yemen's accusations that Iran was providing arms and training to the Houthi arms continued throughout the transition period that began with Saleh's removal from power in November 2011 and continued until the Houthis seized power in January 2015. The interception of the Jihan 1, an

<sup>96</sup> Almahfali Mohammed, Root James, How Iran's Islamic Revolution does, and does not, influence houthi rule in Northern Yemen. Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies. (2020) <https://portal.research.lu.se/en/publications/how-irans-islamic-revolution-does-and-does-not-influence-houthi-r> (data access:01.09.2024)

<sup>97</sup> Garib Rıza, Hamid Rıza, Hüseyin Bedreddin El-Husi ve Yemen Direnişi, [Hussain Badr ed-Din al-Houthi and Yemen Resistance], İstanbul: Feta Yayınları. (2020). p: 4-83.

<sup>98</sup> Talashan, Hassan, Iran's Islamic Revolution and its impact on Shiite geopolitical developments in Yemen. *ایران اسلامی انقلاب* و تأثیر آن بر تحولات ژئوپلیتیک شیعه در یمن. *Faslname-i Sheeshinasi*, (2012), [https://www.shiitestudies.com/article\\_242530.html?lang=en](https://www.shiitestudies.com/article_242530.html?lang=en)

<sup>99</sup> Sinkaya, Bayram, Houthi – Iran Relations: Distant Relatives Turns Brothers in Arms, *Türkiye İran Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 1(2), 76-93. (2022). <https://tiaddergi.com/manuscript/uzak-akrabaliktan-silah-kardesligine-husi-iran-iliskileri-11> (data access: 01.09.2024).

<sup>100</sup> Garib, Rıza & Hamid, Rıza, *ibid*.

<sup>101</sup> Juneau, Tomas (2021), How war in Yemen transformed the Iran-Houthi partnership. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, p-3.



Iranian ship carrying forty tons of weapons off the coast of Yemen in January 2013, provided the clearest evidence of Iranian support for the Houthis.<sup>102</sup> A year later, several hundred IRGC-Quds Force personnel sent to Yemen reportedly began training Houthi fighters. Iran's military activities in Yemen were reportedly overseen by Abdolreza Shahlai, a deputy commander of the Quds Force. However, both the Iranian government and the Houthis denied these claims.<sup>103</sup> According to Prof. Thomas Juneau from the University of Ottawa, the majority of the Houthis' arsenal comes from Yemeni army stocks, the black market and local production. The Houthis also take risks and shape their own foreign policy, not following the chain of command with Iran.<sup>104</sup>

After 2014, Iranian leaders presented the Houthis' progress as if Iran were the success of the revolution and declared it as part of the axis of resistance. The highest-level statement to illustrate the relationship between Iran and the Houthis is made from Ali Akbar Velayati, former Foreign Minister and presently Ayatollah Khamenei's international relations consultant. In his meeting with a group of clergymen from Yemen on October 18, 2014, Velayati expressed his satisfaction with the leadership of Houthi-Ansarullah's leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi in the Yemen revolution and hope that the role of Hezbollah in Lebanon was to take Ansarullah in Yemen. He stated that Islamic Republic supports Ansarullah since they see them as part of the Islamic awakening movement<sup>105</sup>. Although there are various levels of ties between the Houthis and Iran, this does not mean that they are the direct proxies of Iran in the region. Maybe this relation can be named allies. Support statements from Iran can be seen as an attempt to control and direct the movement. But, the transformation of the developments in Yemen into the Shiite-Sunni struggle and the isolation of the Sunni world brought Ansarullah closer to Iran.<sup>106</sup>

Iranian media, security elites and religious leaders close to Ayatollah Khamenei hailed the Houthi victory and condemned Saudi 'aggression'. Hossein Amir Abdullahian, a former deputy foreign minister for relations with the Arab world and later foreign minister as an advisor to the speaker of the Iranian parliament, said that Iran has spiritual and emotional ties to the Houthi Ansarullah movement and supports them politically to help Yemen secure its sovereignty. In addition to their 'spiritual' ties to Iranian leaders, the Houthis, who are politically inexperienced and diplomatically isolated, have become more open to Iranian guidance and support. Moreover, the Houthis, who are careful to distance themselves from Tehran, have begun to move their movement towards the 'axis of resistance', a bloc of regional states and non-state actors led by Iran and openly resisting American and Zionist hegemony in the Middle East. Thus, distant relatives between Houthis and Iran turns brothers in arms.<sup>107</sup>

Saudi Arabia considered the Houthis to be an Iran's proxy, interpreted the Houthis' advances as part of Iranian expansionism, and presented its airstrikes on Yemen in 2015 to the public as a proxy war. The Houthis' membership in the Zaydi branch of Shiism and the Iranian government's efforts to use Shiite geopolitics as an effective tool in foreign policy were the basis for these claims. However, connecting Ansarullah's ascension to Iran and associating it with the Shiite ascension leads to neglect of the influence of internal dynamics in Yemen and to the reductionist conclusions.<sup>108</sup> Indeed, the local and social dynamics of Yemen are not in fact neither what Saudi Arabia envisions nor Iran wants to construct. The Houthis actually reflect an organized-militant projection of the Zaydis' drive to protect their identity. The fact that the Zaydis were left, culturally and economically by the central

---

<sup>102</sup> Reuters. (2014, December 15). Iranian support seen crucial for Yemen's Houthis. <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/iranian-support-seen-crucial-for-yemens-houthis-idUSKBN0JT17A/> (data access: 01.09.2024)

<sup>103</sup> Sinkaya, Bayram, "İran Yemen İlişkileri ve Ensarullah Hareketi", [Iran Yemen Relations and Ansarullah Movement], ORSAM Uluslararası Siyaset Dergisi, (2016). <https://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/iran-yemen-iliskileri-ve-ensarullah-hareketi/> (data access: 05.03.2024).

<sup>104</sup> Juneau, Thomas, (2021), How Iran Helped Houthis Expand Their Reach, War on the Rocks National Security, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/how-iran-helped-houthis-expand-their-reach/> (data access: 10.04.2024).

<sup>105</sup> Isna, انصار اللهيمن بايد همانند حزب اللهدر لبنان تار و ريسمبارز هکنند [Walayati: Ansarullah in Yemen should fight terrorism like Hezbollah in Lebanon], (2014), <https://www.isna.ir/news/93072614511> (data access: 30.12.2019).

<sup>106</sup> Sinkaya, Bayram, (2016), *ibid*.

<sup>107</sup> Sinkaya, Bayram, (2022), *ibid*.

<sup>108</sup> Sinkaya, Bayram, (2016), *ibid*.

government of Yemen for decades, on the other hand, the marginalization of Saudi Arabia through sectarian policies constitutes the origin of the Houthi problem. Seeking an answer to the Zaydi question, the Houthis turned into a radical-militant organization with both the influence of Iran's ideological power<sup>109</sup> and the harsh treatment of the Yemen administration.<sup>110</sup>

#### 4. Conclusion

Yemen the poorest country on the Arabian Peninsula under Saleh, whose name had been associated by corruption constantly. 10 million of the population of 24 million living in 10 million Yemenis 'one step away from famine' especially for the last several decades. For this, the Arab Uprisings that started in Tunisia in 2010 spread to Yemen in a short time. Just as in Tunisia and Egypt, the opposition in Yemen also protested the authoritarian rule of Saleh. The masses from all walks of life participated in these uprisings and the Houthi-Ansarullah Movement, which was constantly excluded from the administration, was spearheaded. In the same process, Saudi Arabia, which is actively involved in various countries at every stage of the Arab Uprisings, intervened in Yemen along with the US during the transition process, and the removal of Saleh from the administration and the replacement of Mansur Hadi in 2011. Signing of the National Peace and Participation Agreement with opponents in 2013 and Power-Sharing Agreement in 2014 was also under the supervision of Saudis. However, in February 2015, President Hadi, who was in charge of enforcing these agreements and taking the country to an election with a constitutional amendment, fled to Aden. First, he announced his resignation then withdrew his resignation and called on the GCC to conduct military action against the Houthis.

Considering the historical process of Yemen for the last seventy years, it is possible to observe the influence of the Saudi Arabia in these decisions of Mansur Hadi. For this purpose, MBS, appointed as Defense Minister, first announced army operation codenamed "Decisive Storm" on March 26, 2015 against Yemen, then escalated the sectarian tension in the region by executing the Saudi Shiite cleric Ayatollah Nemr, further increasing the tension by describing the Houthis belonging to the Zaydi sect as Shia and proxy force of Iran. He signed various agreements with US consisted of arms purchase. By the way he instrumentalized the foreign policy in line with own future policy. It is impossible to ignore the historical and geopolitical conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran, both in the internal conflicts in Yemen and the Saudi air strikes after the Arab Uprisings. However, at the beginning of the Arab uprising, the Houthis did not act in line with Shiite expansionist principles and did not emerge as a proxy force of Iran. Indeed, Yemen was one of the few countries that should have reached a positive result in the 2011 Arab Uprisings process. But the real problems of the people remain unsolved in the shadow of international conflicts.

#### REFERENCES

Ahmedi, Hamid, "Religion and nationality in Iranian identity", دین و ملیت در هویت ایرانی حمید احمدی, Policy Journal of Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Number: 67. Start page: 27 | End page: 36 (2009) <https://www.sid.ir/paper/110034/fa> (data access: 31.12.2020)

Almahfali Mohammed, "Root James, How Iran's Islamic Revolution does, and does not, influence houthi rule in Northern Yemen." Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies. (2020) <https://portal.research.lu.se/en/publications/how-irans-islamic-revolution-does-and-does-not-influence-houthi-r> (data access:01.09.2024)

<sup>109</sup> Mayli, Mohammad Reza, and Mutii Maryam, "قدرت نرم در سیاست خارجی جمهوری اسلامی ایران", [Soft power in Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran]. Article 6. 9(35), (2016). <https://www.sid.ir/paper/247613/fa> (data access: 05.03.2024).

<sup>110</sup> Cingöz, Murat, Yemen Krizinin Kökeni, [The Origin of the Yemen Crisis], 22.04.2019, ORSAM Raporu, Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi, 231. (2019), / <https://orsam.org.tr/yemen-krizinin-kokeni/> (data access: 17.11.2019).

CANDAN, M, (2024), "Saudi Intervention After The Arab Uprisings Process in Yemen and Saudi-Iran Tension", *AUSBD*, 7(14): 105-118

Al-JazeeraTurk, (2016), "Şiilerden idama sert tepki" [Harsh reaction from the Shiites for the execution], <https://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/siilerden-idama-sert-tepki> ,(data access: 08.01.2020).

Ataman, Muhittin, "Vekalet Savaşının İki Aktörü: Suudi Arabistan ve İran," [Two Actors of the Proxy War: Saudi Arabia and Iran] *Kriter Dergi*, 3(31) (2019) .<https://kriterdergi.com/dosya-iki-kusatma-arasinda-yemen/vekalet-savasinin-iki-aktoru-suudi-arabistan-ve-iran> (data access: 31.12.2019).

Ataman, Muhittin, "Suudi Arabistan'da Yaşanan Değişim: Krallığın Yeniden Yapılanması" [Change in Saudi Arabia: Restructuring of the Kingdom]. (2018),.<https://www.dunyabulteni.net/ortadogu/suudi-arabistanda-yasanan-degisim-kralligin-yeniden-yapilanmasi-h427360.html> (data access: 05.08.2020).

Byman, Daniel, "Yemen's Disastrous War," Brookings Institute, (2018), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2018.1518376?journalCode=tsur20> (data access: 30.12.2019).

BBC Arabic, (2015), "Yemen Crisis: Why the Gulf States waged a war against the Houthis." [https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2015/05/150503\\_yemen\\_war\\_crisis](https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2015/05/150503_yemen_war_crisis). (data access: 16.11.2019).

Ben-Yishai, Ron, (2015) "The US dropped the ball on Yemen," *Ynetnews.com*, Israel <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4641278,00.html> (data access : 11.11.2019).

Büyükkara, Mehmet Ali, "Sosyal, Siyasi ve Dini Yönleriyle Yemen Husi Hareketi", [Yemen Houthi Movement in Its Social, Political and Religious Aspects], *Divan Disiplinler arası Çalışmalar Dergisi*, 16(30). (2011). <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/divan/issue/25959/273501> (data access: 05.03.2024).

Chatham House (2019), "Operation Decisive Storm: Analyzing Four Years of Conflict in Yemen." <https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/operation-decisive-storm-analysing-four-years-conflict-yemen> (accessed: 30.12.2019).

Cingöz, Murat, "Yemen Krizinin Kökeni," [The Origin of the Yemen Crisis], 22.04.2019, ORSAM Raporu, Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi, 231. (2019), / <https://orsam.org.tr/tr/yemen-krizinin-kokeni/> (data access: 17.11.2019).

Cleveland, William, *A History of Modern Middle East*, Philadelphia: West view Press, (2009), p. 497-545

"Collapse State: Yemen" انهيار الدولة: اليمن. منصور اعدولة القبيلة بالصراع اعدولة المليشيا From the tribal state conflict to the militia state conflict. Arab center for Research and Studies.28. Jan. 2015 <http://www.acrseg.org/36587> (data access: 30.12.2019).

Crooke, Alastair, "America Immobilized as Iran-Saudi Arabia Proxy War Turns Bloody", *Huffpost*, (2015). [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/america-iran-saudiwar\\_b\\_7001776.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/america-iran-saudiwar_b_7001776.html), (data access: 17.11.2019).

Dresch, Paul, *Tribes, Government and History in Yemen*, Oxford: Clerandon Press, (1989). p. 240-282

Garib, Rıza & Hamid, Rıza, Hüseyin Bedreddin El-Husi ve Yemen Direnişi., [Hussain Badr ed-Din al-Houthi and Yemen Resistance], İstanbul: Feta Yayınları. (2020). p-5-149

Gelvin L, James, *Modern Ortadoğu Tarihi*, [History of Modern Middle East] 1453-1915 İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları.

Gelvin L, J. (2012), *The Arab Uprisings –What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Horton, Michael, "Anti-Government Protests in Yemen: An Opportunity for Unity or a Catalyst for Further Unrest?" *The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor*, (2011).

CANDAN, M. (2024), "Saudi Intervention After The Arab Uprisings Process in Yemen and Saudi-Iran Tension", *AUSBD*, 7(14): 105-118

<https://jamestown.org/program/anti-government-protests-in-yemen-an-opportunity-for-unity-or-a-catalyst-for-further-unrest/> (data access: 30.12.2019).

IISS, "Muhammad bin Salman and the new Saudi Arabia", 24. (2018/a), <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/muhammad-bin-salman-and-the-new-saudi-arabia> (data access: 30.12.2019).

IISS, "Strategic rivalries around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait", 24(16), (2018/b), <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/bab-elmandeb-strait> (data access: 30.10.2019).

IISS. (2018/c), "Yemen's debilitating war," 24. <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/yemens-debilitating-war> (data access: 30.12.2019).

IISS, Research Dossier, "Iran's Networks of Influence in the Middle East", (2019), [https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier/iran-19-07-ch-5-yemen/?\\_id=72EA0D2C12554943BF6058585C69DF6E&z=z](https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier/iran-19-07-ch-5-yemen/?_id=72EA0D2C12554943BF6058585C69DF6E&z=z) (data access: 02.01.2020).

Isna, انصار اللهيمنبايدهمانندحزباللهدرلبنانباتروريسمبارز هکنند [Walayati: Ansarullah in Yemen should fight terrorism like Hezbollah in Lebanon], (2014), <https://www.isna.ir/news/93072614511> (data access: 30.12.2019).

Jeremy, M.Sharp, "Yemen: Background and US. Relations, Congressional Research Service", (2015), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf> (data access: 25.03.2015).

Juneau, Thomas (2016), "Iran's Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a Limited Return on a Modest Investment", *International Affairs*. 92(3). <https://academic.oup.com/ia/articleabstract/92/3/647/2326947?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false> (data access: 05.03.2024).

Juneau, Tomas (2021), "How war in Yemen transformed the Iran-Houthi partnership", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 1-23.

Juneau, Thomas, (2021), "How Iran Helped Houthis Expand Their Reach, War on the Rocks National Security", <https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/how-iran-helped-houthis-expand-their-reach/> (data access: 10.04.2024).

Kamrava, Mehran, *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2014), p. 373-397.

Mayli, Mohammad Reza, and Mutii Maryam, [Soft power in Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran] ايران "قدرت نرم در سياست خارجى جمهورى اسلامى ايران", Article 6. 9(35), (2016). <https://www.sid.ir/paper/247613/fa> (data access: 05.03.2024).

Nagi, Al-Assam, "Preparing for a Failed War", Carnegie ME Center, (2019). <https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/80282> (data access: 30.12.2019).

Omar, M. Adil, "Suudi Arabistan-İran İlişkileri Bağlamında Ortadoğu'nun Güncel Sorunları", [Current Problems of the Middle East in the Context of Saudi Arabia-Iran Relations], *Bölgesel Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 2(1), (2018). 203-243.

Öztop, Mustafa, "Suudi Arabistan Dış Politikasında Muhammed Bin Selman'ın "Bumerang" Etkisi", [The "Boomerang" Effect of Mohammed Bin Salman on Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy] *Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi*, 6(1), 203-230. (2019). <https://doi.org/10.26513/tocd.468840> (data access: 10.09.2024)

Perkins, Brian, *Yemen: Between Revolution and Regression*. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 40(4), (2017). <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1205368> (data access: 05.03.2024).

Popp, Roland, *War in Yemen: Revolution and Saudi Intervention*, CCS Analyses in Security Policy, No:175 Zurich, (2015). <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse175-EN.pdf> (data access: 02.01.2020).

CANDAN, M, (2024), "Saudi Intervention After The Arab Uprisings Process in Yemen and Saudi-Iran Tension", *AUSBD*, 7(14): 105-118

Ra'y El-Yavm, "Who will rule Yemen after the capture of the presidential palace, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, or President Mansour Hadi and what is the future role of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh after his revenge against all his opponents?". /من يحكم اليمن بعد الاستيلاء على القصر-. (2015). [www.raialyavm.com](http://www.raialyavm.com) (data access: 30.12.2019).

Rıza, Garip & Rıza, Hamid, Hüseyin Bedreddin El Husi ve Yemen Direnişi. [Hussein Badreddin Al Houthi and the Yemen Resistance], İstanbul: Feta Yayıncılık, (2020), p: 4-152

Rostami, Ferzad, Kamran, Lutfi, Pirmuhammedi, Said, "The War of Powers in Yemen and the Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran" "جنگ قدرت ها در یمن و امنیت جمهوری اسلامی ایران فصلنامه ی مطالعات بین الملل Studies of IR Journal. Iran: Islamic Azad University, 12. (2019), <https://www.sid.ir/paper/247574/fa> (data access: 05.03.2024).

Salisbury, Peter, "Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State", Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, (2016), <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-05-25-yemen-stemming-rise-of-chaos-state-salisbury.pdf> (data access: 05.03.2024).

Sinkaya, Bayram, "İran Yemen İlişkileri ve Ensarullah Hareketi", [Iran Yemen Relations and Ansarullah Movement], ORSAM Uluslararası Siyaset Dergisi, (2016). <https://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/iran-yemen-iliskileri-ve-ensarullah-hareketi/> (data access: 05.03.2024).

Sinkaya, Bayram, "Houthi – Iran Relations: Distant Relatives Turns Brothers in Arms", Türkiye İran Araştırmaları Dergisi, 1(2), 76-93. (2022). <https://tiaddergi.com/manuscript/uzak-akrabaliktan-silah-kardesligine-husi-iran-iliskileri-11> (data access: 01.09.2024).

Sırma, İhsan Sürayya, Osmanlı Devletinin Yıkılışında Yemen İsyanları, [Yemen Rebellions in the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire] İstanbul: (2008), Beyan Yayınları.

Talashan, Hassan, "Iran's Islamic Revolution and its impact on Shiite geopolitical developments in Yemen", "بحران یمن: بررسی زمینه ها و اهداف مداخلات خارجی عربستان و امریک", Faselname-i Sheeshinasi, (2012), [https://www.shiitestudies.com/article\\_242530.html?lang=en](https://www.shiitestudies.com/article_242530.html?lang=en)

"The Yemen Crisis: An Overview of the Areas and Purposes of Saudi-American", (2018), Foreign Int. Policy. "پژوهش های راهبرد", "بحران یمن: بررسی زمینه ها و اهداف مداخلات خارجی عربستان و امریک", Iran: Allameh Tabataba'i University Press, Strategic Research of Politics. [https://qpss.atu.ac.ir/article\\_6802.html](https://qpss.atu.ac.ir/article_6802.html) (data access: 05.03.2024).

UN Human Development Program Human Development Reports. <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center> (data access: 30.12.2019).

Yakın Doğu Haber, (2015), "Abdumelik Husi'den Yemen Değerlendirmesi" [Abdul- Malik al-Houthi Reviews Yemen], [http://www.ydh.com.tr/HD13600\\_abdumelik-husiden-yemen-degerlendirmesi.html](http://www.ydh.com.tr/HD13600_abdumelik-husiden-yemen-degerlendirmesi.html) (data access: 31.12.2019).

