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### BEYOND PEACEKEEPING: THE EVOLUTION OF LIBERAL INTERVENTIONISM AFTER THE COLD WAR

### BARIŞI KORUMANIN ÖTESİNDE: SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI LİBERAL MÜDAHALECİLİĞİN EVRİMİ

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#### ABSTRACT

This article examines the evolution of liberal interventionism in the post-Cold War era, delineating its historical trajectory and its implications for contemporary international relations theory. During this period, interventionism manifested distinctive traits within the context of the bipolar international system. However, the advent of the unipolar system gave rise to a transformation in these characteristics, resulting in a distinct shift in their manifestation. This shift coincided with the ascendance of liberal democracy, which introduced several novel characteristics that have manifested in numerous global occurrences. As a consequence of a reduction in interstate conflicts and an increase in those occurring within states, frequently instigated by ethnic or religious strife, the United Nations has witnessed a substantial expansion in peace operations. Moreover, this article examines how peacekeeping operations and state-building processes have developed over time, offering insights into the ways in which these concepts have transformed. This analysis addresses the evolution from the traditional peacekeeping paradigm to a more comprehensive and multifaceted approach, namely multidimensional peace operations. Such multidimensional peacekeeping operations encompass a broader range of activities extending beyond the mere monitoring of ceasefires. These may include, for instance, the provision of humanitarian assistance, the supervision of elections, and the advancement of state-building efforts, among other possible actions. This article provides a detailed examination of the fundamental transformations and their implications for the future of liberal interventionism, particularly in light of the evolving landscape of global conflict and instability.

**Keywords:** *Liberal Interventionism, State-building, Peacekeeping, International Security.*

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## ÖZ

Bu makale Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde liberal müdahaleciliğin evrimini incelemektedir. İki kutuplu uluslararası sistem sırasında müdahalecilik belirgin özellikler göstermiştir. Ancak tek kutuplu sistemin oluşmasıyla birlikte bu özellikler daha farklılaşmaya başlamışlardır. Bu değişim, liberal demokrasinin yükselişiyle aynı döneme denk gelmiş ve beraberinde birçok uluslararası olayda kendini gösteren bir dizi yeni özellik getirmiştir. Devletlerarası çatışmaların azalması ve sıklıkla etnik veya dini çekişmeler tarafından kışkırtılan devlet içi çatışmaların paralel olarak artması sonucunda, Birleşmiş Milletler barış operasyonlarında önemli bir genişleme gözlemlenmiştir. Ayrıca bu makale, barışı koruma operasyonlarının ve devlet inşası süreçlerinin evrimini, bu kavramların özelliklerinin nasıl değiştiğine dair bir açıklama getirmek amacıyla incelemektedir. Mevcut analiz, geleneksel barışı koruma paradigmasından daha kapsamlı ve çok yönlü bir yaklaşıma, yani çok boyutlu barış operasyonlarına doğru evrimi ele almaktadır. Bu çok boyutlu barışı koruma operasyonları, diğer olasılıkların yanı sıra, örneğin insani yardım sağlanması, seçimlerin denetlenmesi ve devlet inşası çabalarının ilerletilmesini de kapsayan, yalnızca ateşkeslerin izlenmesinin ötesine geçen daha geniş bir dizi faaliyetin gerçekleştirilmesini gerektirmektedir. Bu makale, özellikle küresel çatışmalar ve istikrarsızlığın değişen bağlamı ışığında, liberal müdahaleciliğin geleceği için temel dönüşümleri ve bunların sonuçlarını detaylı bir şekilde incelemektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Liberal Müdahalecilik, Devlet İnşası, Barışı Koruma, Uluslararası Güvenlik.*

## Introduction

The dissolution of the Soviet Union precipitated a profound transformation in the global landscape, giving rise to novel approaches to international intervention. The new international system may not have been characterized by the same degree of tension as the previous order, but it did give rise to a number of complex and multifaceted conflicts. During this period of unipolarity, liberal states and international organizations, led by the United States, demonstrated a greater willingness to engage in international interventions. As a consequence of these interventions, the concepts of peace and state-building, collectively known as liberal interventionism, underwent a transformation that differed from that observed in previous decades.

Prior to the 1992 conceptualization of liberal interventionism by United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding policy was constrained to warring states and narrowly defined as the act of consolidating peace and preventing the recurrence of conflict (Balthasar, 2017). Prior to the Cold War, liberal interventionism frequently took the form of colonial initiatives, which were supported on the premise that the "civilization" of other nations was a necessity. Often driven by economic and imperialist motives, these interventions proved ineffective in advancing the self-determination or well-being of the affected populations. In the latter period of the Cold War, there was a notable shift towards the containment of communism. This was

accompanied by a perception that interventions aligned with authoritarian regimes were vital for the prevention of the spread of communism. In the 1990s, there was a notable shift in the conceptualization of peacebuilding, accompanied by an increased emphasis on liberal ideals such as human security, good governance, and accountability in public administration. This new approach underscored the significance of preventive conflict measures and the establishment of institutional structures to maintain peace at all stages of conflict (Balthasar, 2017).

As a result of this shifting phenomenon of international interventionism, concepts and characteristics such as liberal values, the establishment of liberal institutions, and democracy have become pivotal elements within the framework of liberal interventionism. In the context of countries experiencing conflict, civil war, or "failed states" that have supported terrorism or failed to prevent its emergence, the establishment of liberal values and institutions has been identified as a key strategy for building peace. However, as these interventions have not been successful in practice, the definition and characteristics of liberal interventionism have had to adapt. This article provides an analysis of the evolution of liberal interventionism, exploring the reasons for this change and the ways in which it has become more comprehensive than traditional approaches.

This article is divided into three sections. The initial section will examine the ways in which shifts in the international system have contributed to the evolution of a more encompassing conceptualization of intervention. The subsequent section will delve into the transformations that have occurred in peacekeeping operations. The third section will examine the advancements in peacebuilding approaches, categorizing them into two distinct subtitles: democratic peacebuilding and state-building.

### **The End of Bipolarity: A New Landscape for Intervention**

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has undertaken a significant expansion of its activities pertaining to peace operations, driven by a multitude of factors. As outlined in the Agenda for Peace of 1995, there are four key reasons for this surge in peace operations. Firstly, the nature of war has undergone a significant transformation. The prevalence of inter-state wars has declined, giving way to a rise in intra-state conflicts. This shift can be attributed to the dissolution of the constraints that previously hindered conflict in the former Soviet Union and other regions, including Africa. Consequently, internal religious or ethnic strife within these states has increased, while inter-state wars have remained relatively infrequent (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). In the period between 1988 and 1995, only eight of the 21 UN peace operations were inter-state, while 13 were intra-state (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). In these conflicts, there was no presence of regular armies, militias, or armed civilians on either side, and there were no discernible front lines, which resulted in increased suffering for civilians (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). Furthermore, in these types of conflicts, state institutions such as the police and the judiciary impede the governance of these states, resulting in chaos. Consequently, UN

operations have expanded their scope to include the re-establishment of government institutions (Boutros-Ghali, 1995).

A second rationale for the expansion of UN operations is the deployment of UN forces to safeguard the activities of humanitarian agencies seeking to assist civilians in conflict zones, which often operate in challenging and unpredictable environments (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). Thirdly, UN operations became multifunctional in the late 1980s. While the initial role of operations was to facilitate negotiations for a settlement, the scope expanded to encompass assistance in implementing comprehensive settlements (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). In this novel role, the operations are no longer solely led by military arrangements; they are also led by civilian arrangements. This new approach entails a plethora of novel functions, including the supervision of cease-fires, the return of refugees and displaced persons, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, and constitutional reforms (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). Fourthly, these multifunctional peacekeeping operations demonstrated that the UN is capable of assuming a role subsequent to the negotiation process, namely the establishment of national institutions, the formation of civilian police forces, and the advancement of human rights, with a view to achieving a sustainable peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1995).

Then with the end of the Cold War, the scope of UN operations expanded significantly, evolving from a relatively limited set of activities to a multifaceted and diverse array of endeavours. Nevertheless, it can be argued that this transformation did not alter the fundamental nature of peacekeeping operations during the 1990s. As Richmond (2004, p. 87) notes, the discourse surrounding Cold War peacekeeping operations remained largely unchanged in the 1990s. Instead of peacekeeping operations, there was a greater emphasis on the ways of building peace. Additionally, during this period, the UN was required to obtain the consent of the parties involved in peace-making, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding operations (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). This was due to the continued prevalence of the Westphalian sovereignty perception, which ultimately led to the failure of UN interventions in Rwanda and Bosnia, where instances of genocide and massacres were observed.

Consequently, throughout the 1990s, a transformation in the scope of UN operations was observed, with a shift toward a more multifunctional approach. A larger number of actors became involved in these operations. Despite this shift in approach and the involvement of a greater number of actors, the fundamental character of the UN's interventions remained consistent with those conducted prior to the Cold War.

### **From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Expanding the Scope of Intervention**

The 1990s saw numerous successful peacekeeping operations. However, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the genocide in Bosnia between 1992-1995 demonstrated that the UN peacekeeping operations were not without flaws. As outlined in the Brahimi Report, the successful execution of complex operations, such as those witnessed in

Bosnia, hinges on three key factors: political support, the rapid deployment of UN forces, and the implementation of a robust peacebuilding strategy (Brahimi, 2000). The rapid deployment of forces represents one of the fundamental tenets of peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi Report posits that the deployment of forces, whether by consent of the parties or by coercion, is a crucial aspect of this process. As the report indicates, the consent of the parties can be influenced by their own interests, particularly in the context of intrastate conflicts. For example, one party may utilize the presence of the UN to gain time, and when it is no longer advantageous, it can withdraw its consent (Brahimi, 2000).

Furthermore, the report elucidates that the UN forces should utilize force not only in response to attacks on their own personnel, but also in instances where civilians are targeted. In certain scenarios, local parties may lack the moral authority to act, underscoring the necessity for the UN to safeguard civilians and prioritize its impartiality based on moral considerations (Brahimi, 2000). Peou (2002, pp. 57-58) posits that the principles of consent and impartiality are not synonymous, as morality delineates a distinction between aggressor and victim, and the UN bears a moral obligation. Consequently, it can be argued that collective security is justified on moral grounds, thereby supporting the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.

As Chandler (2004, pp. 60-61) notes, in 2000, independent ad hoc International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established with the aim of legitimizing humanitarian intervention. In order to inform its deliberations, the Commission engaged in consultations with a range of stakeholders, including governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academics, and policy think tanks. In accordance with the Commission's findings, the moral obligation of states to protect their citizens' human rights is of paramount importance. In the event that one state fails to fulfil this responsibility, other states are duty-bound to intervene without reservation or limitation with regard to the use of force, as postulated by the liberal peace theory (Chandler, 2004, p. 63).

However, the violation of sovereignty represents one of the most significant challenges associated with the use of force in the absence of consent in such operations. To address this issue, the concept of state sovereignty had to be revised. According to the revised definition, a state cannot be considered sovereign if it fails to protect its citizens' human rights. In essence, human rights are incorporated into the three traditional characteristics of a state: territory, authority, and people (Chandler, 2004, p. 65; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 7). Consequently, the traditional delineation between the consent of the state and intervention became blurred, and peacekeeping and peace enforcement were merged into a concept known as "robust peacekeeping" (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 7).

The other notable shift is the issue of collective security, which has led states to be hesitant to make compromises when their interests are not directly involved in the

operation. Peou (2002, p. 61) identifies four categories of UN member states based on their level of willingness to contribute resources. The first category comprises developing countries that lack the financial capacity to provide support, yet they account for 77% of the troops deployed in UN operations. The second type comprises developed and wealthy states that provide economic support for these operations but do not contribute troops to the most challenging ones (Peou, 2002, p. 61). The third type is that of powerful states that are less willing to deploy troops to peace operations. Permanent members of the Security Council often fail to agree on peacekeeping requirements, and they have contributed very few troops. For example, the Council failed in Rwanda because it could not act quickly, despite having reliable information about the situation on the ground. In fact, the size of the troops was reduced by the Council (Peou, 2002, p. 62). The fourth type is liberal democracies that are also unreliable in contributing troops because they must first secure the approval of their citizens to support a UN operation, which can significantly delay the commencement of action. Furthermore, they refrain from military involvement in these operations when their national interests are not directly implicated (Peou, 2002, p. 62). Badescu (2010, pp. 95-96) asserts that the burden falls on developing countries, which creates two problems. First, developed states that champion R2P operations are not involved in the operational process, and second, the effectiveness of these operations is contingent upon preparation, mandates, and rule of engagement, which developing countries are less adept at achieving than developed states. It can thus be argued that the UN required a more rapid response to prevent human rights violations. However, given the aforementioned reasons, this remains an ongoing challenge for the UN.

Furthermore, the case for the development of responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention should be made more forcefully, given that it is a point of contention among many academics. One of the arguments posits that these operations are, in fact, manifestations of imperialistic aspirations of the North over the South. Some realists posit that these post-Cold War operations represent moral crusades driven by ideologically motivated imperialistic hegemonies (Moses, 2013, p. 130). The other argument is that these operations are inconsistent and selective. For example, while there was an intervention by NATO in Kosovo in 1999, there was not in Congo during Civil War. This selectivity issue can affect people to think that these operations have lost their legitimacy and credibility (Pattison, 2010, pp. 169–170). An additional argument posits that humanitarian interventions are predicated on the interests of the interveners, rather than on humanitarian considerations. Consequently, these operations are deemed illegitimate (Pattison, 2010, p. 171). For example, if a state intervenes in a country to protect access to its natural resources, but refrains from intervening in another similar crisis due to a lack of strategic rationale, the moral legitimacy of such action is called into question. Those who advocate for intervention may contend that the ultimate goal—saving lives—justifies the use of any means necessary. However, this inconsistency may be criticized as undermining the universality of humanitarian principles. Fundamentally, if interventions



are framed as morally imperative, their implementation must transcend national interests and adhere to a consistent ethical standard.

Consequently, there has been a notable shift in peacekeeping operations, particularly during the late 1990s. These operations have become increasingly intricate, with a heightened emphasis on humanitarian considerations and a proliferation of discourse surrounding the nuances of sovereignty and the criteria for intervention. The evolving conceptualization of sovereignty has paved the way for a greater scope of operations that do not necessitate the consent of the involved parties.

### **Towards Sustainable Peace: Integrating State-Building and Democratic Peacebuilding**

This section will present an analysis of the evolution of peacebuilding strategies, with a focus on two key areas: democratic peacebuilding and state-building.

#### **Democratic Peacebuilding**

The conclusion of the Cold War and the triumph of liberal democracy marked a significant shift towards greater democratic governance on a global scale. In the period between 1990 and 1996, more than thirty countries adopted liberal democratic constitutions for the first time and by the mid-1990s, 61 percent of the nation-states were conducting competitive, multiparty elections for major public office, representing a significant increase from the 41 percent that held such elections a decade earlier (Paris, 2004, p. 20). This favourable context for democracy influenced the conceptualization of peace operations. As Heathershaw (2008, p. 600) asserts, this was a consequence of the "burgeoning optimism" that emerged during the post-Cold War era.

The concept of post-conflict peacebuilding was first articulated in the 1992 Agenda for Peace. Its definition was subsequently expanded in the 1995 Agenda for Peace and the Brahimi Report. As Heathershaw (2008, p. 601) notes, the aforementioned reports are explicit in their assertion that the ethical and institutional features of liberal democracy are integral to peacebuilding operations. In the Agenda for Peace, the roles of peacebuilding operations are delineated as follows: "monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Paris (2004, p. 19) asserts that throughout the 1990s, all peacebuilding operations pursued a uniform set of strategies for achieving lasting peace, namely democratization and marketization. The primary objectives of multilateral peacebuilding operations led by the UN and other international agencies, including NATO, OSCE, EU, IMF, World Bank, and NGOs, are the promotion of civil and political rights, such as freedom of speech and a free press, the preparation and administration of democratic elections, the training of police and justice officials, the encouragement of free-market economies, and the reduction of the state's role in the economy and the stimulation of the private sector

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(Paris, 2004, p. 19). In summary, liberalization has been recognized as a potential solution for civil conflicts, given that liberal democracy is widely accepted as the prevailing model of government globally, with the exception of a few states such as China, Iran, and Cuba (Paris, 2004, pp. 20-21). The rationale behind this is the concept of the liberal peace theory, which posits that democracies are inherently peaceful and inclined towards peaceful coexistence due to their shared norms (Doyle, 2005, p. 463). This was reaffirmed in the 1980s and had a significant impact on social scientific research as well as peacebuilding operations in the 1990s (Paris, 2004, p. 37).

Furthermore, Doyle (2005, pp. 464-465) posits that there are three fundamental tenets of a liberal peace: the first is democratic representation of the people, which underscores the significance of fair elections; the second is liberal individual rights, such as free speech and free consent, which foster respect and justice at both the domestic and international levels; and the third is an open market economy, as opposed to economies that are isolated from global trade. It is posited that the absence of these characteristics will result in interstate conflict. In light of the fact that liberal peace theory was the dominant theory throughout the 1990s and after the Brahimi Report, it seems reasonable to conclude that "peacebuilding in UN peace operations now appears to lie in something akin to the democratic peace argument". This implies that democratic governance should be constructed at the local level in conflict zones. As a result, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor have witnessed this democratization and neoliberal development process (Richmond, 2004, p. 89).

Nevertheless, the concept of democratic peacebuilding demonstrated that its theoretical foundations are insufficient for the creation of a stable and enduring peace. Paris (1997, p. 56; 2010, p. 341) asserts that liberal interventions in conflicts during the 1990s resulted in the exacerbation of existing problems. The primary issue is the hasty promotion of liberal values, such as democratization and marketization, which can potentially lead to instability, impede the consolidation of peace, and, in some instances, reignite conflicts (Paris, 1997, p. 56). For example, in Angola, post-war elections in 1992 prompted one of the parties in the conflict to resume fighting due to the absence of institutions to resolve disputes over the electoral process. In Nicaragua, economic liberalization resulted in disparities in the distribution of socio-economic resources, despite the success of political liberalization (Paris, 2010, p. 341). Similarly, in Bosnia, the consequences were analogous. The early elections that followed the Dayton Agreement resulted in the victory of nationalist parties that had been involved in the war. This outcome complicated the subsequent peacebuilding processes (Belloni, 2007, pp. 73-74). Furthermore, the liberal economy in Bosnia had adverse consequences. Belloni (2007, pp. 96-97) asserts that the market economy was perceived as a means of resolving inter-ethnic tensions. However, market reforms served to exacerbate existing divisions, contributing to a process of ethnicization in both the economy and society at large. In this regard, they provided a further opportunity for ethnic elites to amass significant wealth.



It can thus be argued that the establishment of democratic systems and the promotion of liberal economic structures are insufficient conditions for the creation of peace between opposing parties. As Heathershaw (2008, p. 608) notes, the concept of democratic peacebuilding has been criticized as a failure. In the wake of this criticism, a shift in thinking emerged in the mid-1990s, prompting a re-evaluation of alternative approaches. He asserts that one such approach is civil society-based peacebuilding, which employs a bottom-up, non-state-centric strategy and involves other actors such as NGOs and academics. This approach posits that individuals are both victims and perpetrators of conflict and that their involvement in the peace process is crucial, as civilian action can be a significant factor in peacebuilding efforts (Gawerc, 2006, p. 441). In order for a peace process to succeed, it is essential that the communities involved demonstrate mutual acceptance, engage in cooperative interaction, feel secure, have a sense of human dignity, establish a mechanism for problem-solving, and ultimately, engage in broad reconciliation (Gawerc, 2006, p. 442).

Moreover, Belloni (2001, p. 163) puts forth that civil society plays a constructive role in sustainable long-term peace processes in countries experiencing significant societal divisions. Additionally, he asserts that economic incentives alone are inadequate for fostering reconciliation. Additionally, he asserts that economic incentives alone are inadequate for achieving reconciliation. He identifies two essential characteristics of civil society: firstly, it occupies a position between individuals and the state, enabling individuals to express themselves by constraining state excess, and it is targeted by NGOs to represent vertical relations of dependency and authority. Secondly, it is associated with moderation and tolerance, representing horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation through participation in society (Belloni, 2001, p. 168). In their research, Paffenholz and Spurk (2006, p. 13) identify seven functions of civil society. 1. civil society serves to safeguard civilians against the despotism of the state or other authorities. 2. it monitors the actions of central authority, such as public spending or corruption, and holds them to account for their actions. 3. it creates channels for communication and increases public awareness. 4. it has a socialization effect, which leads to the development of tolerance, mutual trust, and compromise. 5. it strengthens the bonds between individuals via engagement and participation, and builds a bridge between societal cleavages. 6. it has an intermediation and facilitation role between interest groups and independent institutions. 7. it provides services such as shelter, food, or education, especially when the state is unable to do so. However, shortcomings exist in the formulation of civil society strategies. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are the primary actors in these strategies, and they may have adverse effects on the peacebuilding process. For example, McMahan (2004, p. 581) asserts that there are discrepancies between the priorities of civil society organizations that are supported by the international community and those that are supported by Bosnian citizens in Bosnia. Furthermore, McMahan (2004, p. 582) asserts that NGOs impede the growth of state institutions by providing services that the state is better equipped to offer, thereby undermining the capacity of the Bosnian state to govern

effectively. Consequently, it is possible to argue that civil society strategies alone are inadequate for establishing sustainable peace, and that peacebuilding strategies require further development.

In consequence of this realisation, it was acknowledged in the late 1990s that the imposition of liberal values alone is an inadequate means of establishing a sustainable peace. The cases of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Angola demonstrated that rapid democratization and economic liberalization were ineffective in resolving the issues inherent to deeply divided countries. At this point, civil society strategies began to gain recognition among academics as a component of the peacebuilding process, as well as a means of fostering democratic peace. However, some scholars have posited that the conceptualization of peacebuilding strategies requires further development, as the civil society approach may, in certain instances, give rise to unintended consequences.

### **State-building Approach**

The other significant development in peacebuilding strategies is the state-building approach, which was first theorized in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This approach posits that there is a need to prioritize the strengthening of state institutions to consolidate political and economic reforms (Paris, 2010, p. 342). The fundamental premise of this approach is the transformation of non-Western states into modern entities in accordance with liberal values (de Guevara, 2010: 114). While the civil society approach is a bottom-up strategy, it can be argued that state-building is a top-down strategy. As Paris and Sisk (2009, pp. 1-2) observe, there was previously a focus on rapid democratization and economic privatization, which preceded the establishment of institutions. This approach, they argue, gave rise to the challenges identified above. However, they contend that the implementation of liberal values is contingent upon the creation of mechanisms such as power-sharing agreements and the establishment of institutions.

It is posited that the process of state-building will facilitate the formation of states, which in turn will contribute to the establishment of good governance. Furthermore, it is proposed that this will act as a conduit between individuals and the international community, enabling the adaptation of international norms and control mechanisms into those states (de Guevara, 2010, p. 114).

Moreover, other scholars have made significant contributions to the evolution of the state-building approach. Fukuyama identifies the issue of weak governance as a key challenge, criticizing the efficacy of previous peacebuilding operations for failing to establish self-sustaining states. He proposes that the development of a state capable of providing effective public administration should be a core component of peacebuilding strategies (Paris and Sisk, 2009, p. 8). Fearon and Laitin also posit that states with weak governmental institutions are not merely prone to civil conflicts, but may also give rise to international threats. Previous peacebuilding operations have been characterized as unsustainable, disorganized, and poorly resourced, with insufficient attention paid to

strengthening state institutions (Fearon and Laitin, 2004). Moreover, Belloni (2007, p. 122) proposes that the most efficacious method of fostering civil society is to construct reliable state institutions. It can thus be postulated that state-building plays a supplementary role alongside democratic and civil society approaches.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the War on Terror fundamentally altered the parameters of military operations. It was demonstrated that the United States could be the target of an attack even by states with limited capabilities. This led to the conclusion that these states should be the primary focus of the United States and the international community (Cunliffe, 2007, p. 57). It is widely held that weak and failed states provide a breeding ground for terrorist groups that can pose a threat to any state in the world and to the citizens of those states (Hehir, 2007, p. 307). Consequently, a state-building approach has been employed with great efficacy in new interventions within the framework of the War on Terror, including in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Nevertheless, the state-building approach may also be subject to criticism. Firstly, some observers hypothesize that this approach represents a novel form of colonial control over war-torn states (Paris and Sisk, 2009, p. 11). Chandler (2006, p. 9) asserts that state-building represents a novel approach that has resulted in the emergence of "rogue states," defined as entities whose governing institutions may receive substantial external resources but lack genuine social or political legitimacy. Secondly, it is argued that state-building strategies may impede the development of self-sustaining state institutions due to the creation of dependency on the international community's extended and intrusive role (Paris and Sisk, 2009, p. 11). Furthermore, Belloni (2007, p. 122) asserts that in Bosnia, the international community forced privatization, which undermined the role of the state in controlling the economy, and that local nationalists have benefited as a result of the weakening of state institutions.

Thus, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, state-building emerged as a new theory to develop peacebuilding strategies. While it provides innovative strategies for establishing institutions before promoting democratic values, its implementation presents certain challenges. This has led to the suggestion that for a successful and sustainable peace, the government, civil society and grassroots level should all be involved in the process (Gawerc, 2006, p. 441). It can therefore be argued that a combination of all peacebuilding strategies, including democratic, civil society and state-building, is required.

## **Conclusion**

In recent times, it can be observed that liberal interventionism has witnessed a decline in popularity compared to its standing during the early years of the Cold War. In light of the interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, as well as the subsequent peacekeeping and state-building processes, it is evident that these interventions were not as successful as initially hoped. In particular, the developments in Iraq and the emergence of an organization like ISIS have rendered such interventions more controversial (Beauchamp,

2021). Furthermore, in consideration of the gradual dissolution of the unipolar international system, it can be posited that the US-led West will encounter greater challenges in undertaking such interventions as it has in the past. Additionally, given the evolving global political landscape and the criticism levelled against liberal institutionalism, even in its native countries of origin, it can be predicted that such demands will gradually diminish in societies across the globe.

However, following the conclusion of the Cold War, liberal interventionism was embraced as a strategy to maintain peace in war-torn countries, with the promise of liberalism serving as a key motivating factor. In the 1990s, there was a notable increase in the number of peace operations, which diverged from their predecessors. These operations addressed humanitarian concerns, and the UN assumed a multifaceted role. The UN was not the sole actor; other entities, including NGOs, regional organizations, and civil society, also participated. As a result, the nature of peacekeeping operations underwent a transformation, and its characteristics expanded. This shift led to the emergence of a new term, "peacebuilding." During this period, the unsuccessful operations in Rwanda and Bosnia also prompted discussions about the issue of sovereignty and introduced the concept of R2P.

Furthermore, peacebuilding operations underwent significant transformations in the 1990s and 2000s. Given its top-down approach and emphasis on state-centric outcomes, it has been critiqued for perpetuating a colonial mindset and fostering dependency on external actors. Consequently, countries undergoing state-building operations may face challenges in achieving self-sustainability, and their state institutions may become relatively weak. Whilst the future trajectory of liberal interventionism remains uncertain, contemporary global dynamics suggest that the concept may evolve into new forms rather than disappear altogether. The rise of a multipolar order, increasing geopolitical competition and divisions within the West may lead to a decline in direct military interventions. However, transboundary problems such as human rights violations, climate crisis and migration will continue to require the international community to intervene through different means. Consequently, liberal interventionism may be superseded by more indirect and adaptable strategies, such as coalition-based economic sanctions or technological interventions. While liberal interventionism may not be entirely eschewed, it is plausible that its form will evolve, maintaining its influence on the global order. This proposition offers a more nuanced analysis, acknowledging the transformation of liberal interventionism rather than assuming its complete dissolution.

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