

Azerbaycan-Türkiye Relations in the Context of Security Community: One Nation, Two States

Güvenlik Toplumu Bağlamında Azerbaycan-Türkiye İlişkileri: Bir Millet İki Devlet

Zehra KARAYEL*

Abstract

The cooperative relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan have benefitted them in recent years individually and collectively; they have developed and pursued collective interests. This study aims to discover the nature of the relationship between Türkiye and Azerbaijan in the context of the security community. With the expanding brotherly relations among the people, the two countries created a common entity similar to what Karl Deutsch called a "security community". Constructivist scholars Adler and Barnett brought some path-dependent variables and classifications to the concept of the security community, making research on this subject easier to conduct. This paper will evaluate the recent developments between the two countries using the case analysis method in light of the criteria these security community theorists developed and determine its place in security community classification. It will argue that the relationship qualifies a mature security community as cooperation created common goals and interests that bound them together and developed mutual trust and identity. The paper will contribute to the literature on the security community and the countries' foreign policy.

Keywords: Security Community, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, TANAP, Karabakh, Turkic Council

Öz

Türkiye ile Azerbaycan arasındaki iş birliği, son yıllarda söz konusu her iki ülkenin de çıkarına hizmet ettiği gibi, kolektif çıkarlar ortaya koyup ve bunları kollamalarını sağlamıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı Türkiye ile Azerbaycan arasındaki ilişkinin doğasını güvenlik toplumu bağlamında ele almaktır. İki toplum arasında güçlenen kardeşlik ilişkileriyle birlikte ülkeler, Karl Deutsch'un "güvenlik toplumu" olarak adlandırdığı yapıya benzer bir ortak varlık ortaya koymuştur. İnşacı akademisyenler Adler ve Barnett de güvenlik toplumu kavramsallaştırmasına dahil ettikleri izlek bağımlı değişkenler ve sınıflandırmalarla konuyu araştırma yapmaya daha uygun hale getirmiştir. Makale, güvenlik toplumu kuramcılarının ortaya koyduğu kriterler ışığında vaka analizi yöntemiyle iki ülke ilişkilerindeki gelişmeleri değerlendirerek güvenlik toplumu sınıflandırmasındaki yerini belirleyecektir. İş birliğinin, iki ülkeyi birbirine bağlayan, karşılıklı güven ve ortak kimliği teşvik eden ortak hedefler ve çıkarlar meydana getirdiğinden bahisle ilişkilerin olgun bir güvenlik toplumuna tekabül ettiğini tartışacaktır. Çalışmanın hem güvenlik toplumu hem de ülkelerin dış politika literatürüne katkı sunması beklenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlik Toplumu, Türkiye, Azerbaycan, TANAP, Karabağ, Türk Konseyi

* Research Assistant., Hitit University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Political Science and Public Administration, Çorum, Türkiye. e-mail: zehrakarayel35@hotmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0001-8744-3215

Geliş Tarihi / Submitted:
11.10.2024

Kabul Tarihi / Accepted:
16.12.2024

Introduction

Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project, Azerbaijan's Karabakh Victory, and the recently rising Turkic Council are developments that draw the attention of the international public to Türkiye-Azerbaijan cooperation. Bilateral relations and increasing interaction between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, which have steadily strengthened over the years, are not only cooperation at the state level but also solidarity in the social domain. The state of social unity and partnership that Heydar Aliyev expressed as "one nation, two states" during his visit to Türkiye in 1994 is reminiscent of the concept of the "security community" that was put forward by Deutsch in the 1950s. It is thought that the two countries, which have significant cultural, linguistic, and historical commonalities, gradually formed a security community after the independence of Azerbaijan.

Although the cooperation between the two countries draws attention to the recent achievements, they have developed institutionalized cooperation and coordination in a wide range of fields since the 1990s. They have been operating on many common international platforms and support each other in many global issues. In this direction, the two countries established a Strategic Partnership in 2010 and a Strategic Alliance in 2020. The development of the Turkic Council, which has become a shining star in recent times, is the product of the joint efforts made since the 1990s. The giant TANAP project is a continuation of the energy transportation projects that started in the 1990s. The victory achieved in Karabakh in 2020 was the result of military training and technical and equipment cooperation that began in the early 1990s.

Coordination and cooperation between two states, whose diversity and intensity have increased over the years, is a process that shapes identities and interests. Beyond being a military/political alliance, the two countries form a social entity. From song contests to solidarity in instances of war and disasters, there is a profound mutual sympathy and sense of unity between the two peoples. Adding developing technology and transportation opportunities to the convenience of a common language and culture, the interaction between the two peoples has created similar preferences and modes of living.

The relationship was studied from economic, energy, and diplomatic dimensions from a realist perspective and with a focus on economy, energy, and diplomacy.¹ However, recently, the social dimensions of the relationship have also been studied by Şahin and Selvi²

1 Reha Yılmaz, "Türkiye-Azerbaycan İlişkilerinde Son Dönem", *Bilge Strateji*, 2:2, 2010; Mehmet Dikkaya and Deniz Özyakışır "Developing Regional Cooperation Among Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan: Importance of Regional Projects", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 13:1, 2008; Çağla Gül Yesevi and Burcu Y. Tiftikçigil, "Turkey-Azerbaijan Energy Relations: A Political and Economic Analysis", *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, 5:1, 2015, pp. 27-44; Şaban Kardaş and Fatih Macit, "Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations: The Economic Dimension", *Journal Of Caspian Affairs*, 1:1, 2015, pp. 23-46; Nuray Erdoğan, "Tanap Projesinin Türkiye ve Azerbaycan Enerji Politikalarındaki Yeri ve Önemi", *Ömer Halisdemir Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 10:3, 2017, pp. 10-26; Elchin Suleymanov, Cihan, Bulut and Farhad Rahmanov, "Economic And Political Analysis of Azerbaijan-Turkey Energy Relation", Ssrn Scholarly Paper 3060066, *Social Science Research Network*, 2017, <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3060066>; Aynur Baba-Zada, "Türkiye – Azerbaycan Diplomatik İlişkiler: 1918-2014", Master Thesis, İnönü University, Sakarya, 2016; Araz Aslanlı, "Türkiye-Azerbaycan Ekonomik İlişkileri", *Yönetim ve Ekonomi Dergisi*, 25:1, 2018; Erjada Progonati, "Türkiye ile Azerbaycan Arasındaki İlişkilerinin Enerji Jeopolitiği", *Journal of Current Researches on Business And Economics*, 11, 2021, pp. 73-92; Elvin Jabrayilzade, "Azerbaycan ve Türkiye Arasındaki Siyasi, Ekonomik ve Ticari İlişkilerin Değerlendirilmesi", Master Thesis, İstanbul Sabahattin Zaim Üniversitesi, İstanbul, 2021; Nigar Huseynli, "Effect of Renewable Energy and Traditional Energy Production on Economic Growth: The Case of Turkey and Azerbaijan", *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, 12:3, 2022.

2 Çiğdem Şahin and Yunus Emre Selvi, "Türkiye'nin Azerbaycan'a Yönelik Kamu Diplomasisi ve Etkileri", *Avrasya Etüdları*, 61, 2022, pp. 245-280.

and Derman³ published their papers on public diplomacy. Ghanbarlou⁴ and Ibrahimova⁵ made their contributions about the effects of television series and social media on bilateral relations, respectively, yet without holding onto a concrete theory.

Some studies are suspicious of the sustainability of good relations between the two countries, claiming that divergence of interests, cultural differences, and the “hegemonic” nature of the relationship⁶ would surpass the “pragmatic” cooperation and “superficial” brotherly discourse and commonalities,⁷ primarily based on the governmental change in Türkiye and the Armenian rapprochement of Ankara.⁸ However, the common feature of these studies is that they all presume the realist perspective’s superiority over other theories. Aliyev,⁹ for instance, supports their claim explicitly based on this realistic superiority.

In short, most studies investigated the relationship between the two countries from a realist perspective, ignoring societal domain, identities, and the change in process that proved an essential part of the bilateral relations. A couple of studies focused on social dimensions exclusively, not in an integrated fashion with the material factors that affected the relationship. However, the developing relationship and increasing cooperation areas between Türkiye and Azerbaijan were not only institutionalized in the policy-making domain but also added up within societal relations and established profound ties that bound the people together and became a drive/force for cooperative relations to consider in policy-making. That necessitates a constructivist analysis of the relations that would integrate the material factors with the social aspects and include path-dependent variables, change, and add up in the process, such as institutionalization identity formation.

This article will examine the nature of the relationship by the criteria put forward by the security community theorists using the case analysis method and theorize the nature of the relationship. It will begin by introducing the original concept of the security community, which Deutsch put forward in the 1950s. Then, the constructivist elaboration of the theory by Adler and Barnett, such as the development process (tiers), the factors affecting the process, and security community types will be presented. The article will then summarize the bilateral relations from many aspects, including societal dimensions since Azerbaijani independence, and identify the factors given by the two theorists in the relationship. Finally, the article will argue that the relations qualify as a loosely coupled mature security community.

3 Giray Saynur Derman, “Türkiye-Azerbaycan İlişkilerinin Siyasal ve Ekonomik Boyutları ve Kamu Diplomasisi”, *TÜRKAV Kamu Yönetimi Enstitüsü Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 2:2, 2022.

4 Raheb Mohammedi Ghanbarlou & Aykut Sığın, “Türk Televizyon Dizilerinin Azerbaycan Toplumunu Üzerindeki Sosyo-Kültürel Etkilerini Anlamaya Yönelik Bir Değerlendirme”, *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 15:1, 2020, pp. 583-592.

5 Pervane İbrahimova, “The Role of Social Media in the Process of Development of the Socio-Political Structure of Turkish Society and Azerbaijani-Turkish Relations”, *Uluslararası Yönetim Akademisi Dergisi*, 6:1, 2023, pp. 58-69.

6 Elbay Aliyev, Azerbaijan - Turkish Relations (1992-2012): A Foreign Policy Account, *Master Thesis*, Middle East Technical University, Ankara 2012; Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, Hülya Demirdirek, Orhan Gafarlı, Yana Zabanova, & Andrea Weiss, “Turkish Societal Actors in the Caucasus”, *Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD)*, 86, 2016.

7 Elif Kanca, “The “Single Nation, Two States” Idea: Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations in the Post-Soviet Period”, *Уроки Истории XX Века: “Мы” и “Наши Соседи”(Турция и Южный Кавказ)*, 161, 2012; Lilit Mayilyan, “Understanding the Underlying Dynamics of Turkish-Azerbaijani Relations: “One Nation, Two States?””, *Eurasia Contemporary IX*, 9:1, 2023, pp. 39-67.

8 Fariz İsmailzade, “Turkey-Azerbaijan: The Honeymoon is Over”, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 4:4 2005, pp. 1-11; Rovshan İbrahimov, “Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Armenia in 2008-2009: Impact on Azerbaijani-Turkish Relations”, *Bilge Strateji*; 12, 2015; Mehmet Dikkaya and Jason Strakes, “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish-Azerbaijani Relations? Result For Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Process Between 2008 And 2010”, *Review of Socio-Economic Perspectives*, 2:1, 2017, pp. 84-102.

9 Elbay Aliyev, Azerbaijan - Turkish Relations (1992-2012): A Foreign Policy Account, *Master Thesis*, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2012, p. 68.

1. Theoretical Framework

Security community, a concept put forward by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s, is “a community integrated to the extent that its members feel assured of resolving their disputes with others without escalating into physical conflict”.¹⁰ The only way to resolve the differences between the members of a security community is peaceful change, which occurs when there are enough widespread institutions and habits in a region to create a “sense of community” and a long-term expectation of “peaceful change” within the community. For the emergence of security communities, the harmony of essential values and mutual responsiveness are necessary.¹¹ These two elements ensure mutual trust and that behaviors are mutually predictable. Deutsch also draws attention to the importance of the expected gains from the integration.

Deutsch believes four interconnected criteria must exist to explain how security communities arise. First, a security community can only be developed between governments with complementary trade or transportation policies. Second, the states must communicate with one another. Third, these governments must feel that the cooperation they develop will provide them various advantages. Finally, one party must be aware of the other’s identity to foster loyalty. In addition to these fundamental requirements, Deutsch provides twelve other social and economic conditions for constructing a unified security community, such as establishing common institutions, political allegiance, and shared interests.

Instead of focusing on security communities in their terminal conditions, as Deutsch did, Adler and Barnett¹² center the process leading to the security community with a social constructionist method, thus helping us understand the stages of building a security community. Adler and Barnett describe the security community as “supranational regions composed of sovereign states whose citizens share common expectations for peaceful transformation”.¹³ Adler and Barnett’s security community refers to a shared security mechanism incorporating some type of regional central power comprised of sovereign states. Pluralistic security communities can be categorized based on various factors, including the extent of institutionalization and members’ trust in one another. In this paradigm, the duo created an ideal classification known as the loosely and tightly coupled pluralistic security community. There are few definitions for making sense of shared identity and belonging in the loosely pluralistic security community. Nevertheless, members of the community have a basic understanding that they pose no threat to one another.

Adler and Barnett based their assessments on a three-layered theoretical framework in which they attempted to identify the conditions that will lead to the formation of security communities. The first layer contains material and non-material trigger factors, such as technological developments, external threats, or the impact of the new definitions of social realities. The second layer includes the changes and transformations by members’ interactions. The duo distinguishes between structural factors, like power and ideas, and process factors, like social learning. The dynamic process finally leads to the third layer, where trust is formed and a common identity is built.

Examining the evolution of these communities with a pathway-dependent approach, the duo reveals the nascent, ascendant, and mature stages. In the nascent stage, the relevant

10 Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney. A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Lee Maurice, Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, Richard W. Van Wagenen. *Political Community and The North Atlantic Area*. Princeton U.P., 1957.

11 Ibid.

12 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.

13 Ibid, p. 30.

actors may not be conscious of creating a political structure envisaging regional integration. However, they tend to interact. Actors coordinate relationships, tending to increase mutual security, reduce the cost of interaction, and encourage more interaction. At this stage, the aim may not be to establish a security community but to trigger mechanisms (common threat perception, the expectation of commercial interest, mutual identity, or organizational belonging) to bring states closer. Actors can increase cooperation, deepen the interaction, and get other members to comply with agreements through international organizations. While actors in the nascent stage are generally utility-driven and require organizational coordination, states in the ascendant and mature stages act focused on building a common identity.

Accordingly, in the second stage, the ascendant stage, various institutions and organizations begin to develop over time due to an increasing number of interactions. In this process, it is seen that the mutual trust between the parties gradually increases, the parties harmonize their identities with each other, and a conceptual sense of partnership is formed. In the ascendant stage, there is closer cooperation in the military field. Security concern (perceived by each other) is significantly reduced while mutual trust deepens. At this stage, the process in which actors mutually shape each other and construct a reliable expectation of peaceful change begins with the joint construction of a common identity. In the maturity stage, a common identity has now been formed, and the parties continue their mutual interactions within the framework of solid common institutional structures and rules. Reaching this stage means that the stage where war or violence will no longer be possible.¹⁴ In this stage, there is institutionalization, supranationalism, and a high degree of mutual trust, and thus, the possibility of military conflict is nonexistent or close to nonexistent. Community may be tightly or loosely coupled at this stage depending on the degree of cooperation and institutionalization. In tightly coupled communities, there is a joint response to common threats and a system of rules applying them all, such as a federation, etc.

According to Adler and Barnett, who divide the factors that encourage the security community into stages, precipitating factors play a role in the first stage.¹⁵ Precipitating factors increase interstate interaction and dialogue and encourage the establishment of social ties. For example, the spread of notions, such as democratization, globalization, cooperative security, and technological developments, may encourage states to align themselves and coordinate their policies mutually. Besides, the expectation of commercial gain, cultural, political, and social homogeneity, and sudden changes in the distribution of military power can also be triggers.

In the second stage, structural and process factors play a role in building mutual trust and identity. Constructivist theorists considered material factors (knowledge and power) as “structural factors” and mutual interaction, international organizations, and social learning as “process factors”. Instead of explaining warlessness only with the balance of power, the security community engages in social processes such as social interaction, norm/habit formation, and identity construction. According to constructivism, the relations between states give meaning to the material conditions.

According to Adler and Barnett, there is a social construction process of community and identity in the security community, which is not only determined by material conditions (e.g., geopolitical concerns).¹⁶ States may unite against a common threat, in line with a shared

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 49-55.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 37.

¹⁶ Ibid.

interest, or due to identity and social values. However, members of the community must share values and meanings to a certain extent.¹⁷ There should be face-to-face and direct relationships among members in various areas. There should be continuity of interaction so that members can sometimes see it as a responsibility to make short-term concessions for their long-term interests.¹⁸ Thus, actors interact in a way that reflects long-term common interests and spreads reciprocity and trust to overcome fear.

As a structural factor of power (military/economic), security plays a crucial role in building communities. The emergence of communities generally occurred with the initiative of stronger/developed countries in size, power, economy, politics, administration, and education and being the center of attraction. Power continues to be important in the sustainability of the emerging community. Knowledge, another essential structural factor, shapes cognitive structures, shared understandings, and meanings. Cognitive structures critical in defining mutual identity and what is legitimate are determined more by center states.

Process factors are interactions, organizations, and social learning. Mutual interaction can occur in economic, material, political, and technological fields. The quantity, velocity, and diversity of transactions are measured by “dynamic density”.¹⁹ International institutions and organizations contribute to constructing the security community directly (by creating behavioral norms simply by existing) and indirectly (by encouraging mutual trust and a frame of interaction through control and sanction mechanisms). By using these organizations as a platform, states convey their perspectives to each other, re-evaluate their preferences, and rediscover who they are.²⁰

The last of the process factors is social learning, the redefinition or interpretation of reality. Social learning refers to the motivation and capacity of actors to manage or even change their identities and beliefs about the material and social world. Thus, a norm, identity, or cultural practice passes from individual to individual and even from society to society. Therefore, ethnic/linguistic similarity is a facilitator here. Administrative units’ political and organizational capacities are crucial in harmonizing identity and values and ensuring mutual interaction and trust. Thus, in building a community, some states should not weaken compared to others; on the contrary, they should increase their effectual communication capacities.

Individuals generally “internalize” these changes, while governments “instrumentalize” them. In harmonizing core values, manipulations by decision-making elites may occur.²¹ Some sectarian or political values may be emphasized, and some cultural values may be pushed back. The point that should not be disregarded is that mutual trust, interaction, and communication are not only between officials but also between societies and individuals because the security community is not an intrastate pact but a social integration. Therefore, inter-communal interaction and public diplomacy are essential tools. Social learning, which enables the development of a security community, generally occurs through the initiatives of policy-makers and elites.

At the third analytical level, the two essential factors that create serious prospects for peaceful change are mutual trust and common identity.²² These two are mutually supporting factors, yet trust is the premise, and thus, some trust is required to construct a common

17 Ibid, p. 31.

18 Ibid, p. 3.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid, p. 43.

21 Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and The North Atlantic Area*.

22 Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*.

identity. This limited trust initially involves some risk; it needs to be supported and deepened by a common identity. Trust is a social phenomenon that emerges after the assessment that the other party will behave according to expectations. In many cases, trust is established through the involvement of a third party (government/organization). Afterward, knowledge and belief about the other party become the source of trust or distrust about that party. In other words, as progress is made in the process leading to a security community, it is expected that members will increasingly rely on their knowledge, beliefs, and personal experiences in trusting each other, and therefore, organizations established to build trust will gradually lose their importance.

Another factor that creates serious expectations for peaceful change is identity.²³ Identity is a social concept that explains one's position relative to others. Neither identity nor interest are fixed; they are shaped by interactions in the process. The emergence of a common identity reshapes interests and thus eliminates the security dilemma. In this respect, national and state identities are shaped in relation to those outside that community. The factors that shape new identities are not only commonalities and shared destiny but also differences with those outside the group. Therefore, it is expected that the actors that make up the security community will be distinguished from the outside actors in terms of identity.²⁴

Lastly, a mature community might be tightly or loosely coupled. In a loosely coupled community, identity is built on a positive feature that distinguishes the community from others but unites it within itself. On the other hand, in tightly coupled communities, the collective cognitive distance between members is small, and the community has an identity similar to the corporate identity. While a common identity encourages the state and individuals to act together in line with that identity in loosely coupled communities, individuals' identities exist independently of the international environment and national state identities in tightly coupled communities. The interests of states and the identity of individuals have become the same as those of the community.

2. The Case

With the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, Azerbaijan gained independence in the South Caucasus. Türkiye was the first state to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. In the first years of independence, Baku had a hard time due to economic problems and the lack of a regular army to resist the Armenian attacks in Karabakh. Western allies' expectation from Ankara in this period is that Türkiye will constitute an alternative, Western, and democratic model to Russia and Iran. Despite its financial and institutional capacity shortcomings, Ankara assumed the "big brother" role to the Turkic Republics and initiated regular meetings. Ankara's South Caucasus policy at the time was to balance Russia and Iran and to support Azerbaijan. During this time, Baku reinforced its independence and recovered its economy while aiming to save Karabakh.

In Azerbaijan, following a Russian-led foreign policy in the first years of its independence, Pan-Turkist Elchibey assumed power in 1993, which caused a breakthrough. In addition to the troubles with Armenia, a significant decline occurred in relations with Moscow and Tehran. In particular, the "United Azerbaijan" discourse caused concern about territorial integrity in Iran, and thus, Tehran moved closer to Armenia on the Karabakh issue. Attaching importance to relations with the West and Türkiye, Elchibey expected military

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and The North Atlantic Area*.

support from Türkiye against the Armenian attacks in Karabakh.²⁵ However, since the conditions of the period did not allow for a unilateral intervention by Türkiye, Ankara made diplomatic efforts for a multilateral intervention. Meanwhile, Elchibey was overthrown in a Moscow-backed military coup in 1993.²⁶

Heydar Aliyev, who came to power in Azerbaijan in June 1993, pursued moderate policies toward Russia to break international isolation and normalize relations with Iran. However, Aliyev did not receive the support he expected from Russia in the Karabakh issue and adopted a balanced policy as of 1994. He took the ceasefire of 1994 in Karabakh as an opportunity to balance Armenia by consolidating his power and gathering his economic and military power. With the “Deal of the Century” signed with Western companies in 1994, Baku strengthened its position economically and increased its strategic importance for the West.²⁷ The United States of America (USA) became a co-chairman of the Minsk group created for the Karabakh issue.

Aliyev visited Ankara in February 1994 to renew trust in the bilateral relations. Leaders of Türkiye and Azerbaijan signed 17 separate agreements in the frame of “Development of Friendship and Multilateral Cooperation”, one of which was about oil transportation. Aliyev articulated the famous phrase “two states, one nation” in the Turkish parliament during this visit. Two governments signed the Oil Production and Sharing Agreement in September 1994.²⁸ Then, a coup attempt to remove Aliyev from power was prevented via Süleyman Demirel’s warning in March 1995.²⁹ Therefore, the friendship between Demirel and Aliyev was significant for bilateral relations. Military cooperation, which started with the training given by Türkiye to Azerbaijani officers in the early 1990s, was advanced and expanded to include technical equipment with the new agreements.³⁰ Azerbaijan, which has developed relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the 1990s, has received significant support from Türkiye in its army-building process, got its military units by NATO standards, and gained operational experience.

The regional balance of power pushes Türkiye and Azerbaijan closer. There is a rivalry between the two power centers in the region: one is created by the cooperation between Russia, Iran, and Armenia, while the cooperation between Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Georgia creates the other. Tripartite projects, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Pipeline of 1999 and the Baku-Erzurum (BTE) Natural Gas Line of 2001, which transport the Caspian reserves to Europe and bypass Russia and Iran, were supported politically and financially by the West. These strategic projects also helped isolate Armenia, with which Ankara and Baku have problems. Iran and Russia remain close to Yerevan regarding the Karabakh issue, while Türkiye closed its border with Armenia in 1994 and promised Azerbaijan in 1999 that it would remain closed until the Karabakh issue was resolved. Moreover, due to regional dominance issues, Iran and Russia have been skeptical towards Türkiye and its Turkic ties.

Bilateral commercial relations were encouraged during the Aliyev Era, protocols were implemented to prevent double taxation in 1994, and countries designated each other as the

25 Seçil Öraz Beşikçi, “Bağımsızlık Sonrası Dönemde Azerbaycan Dış Politikasındaki Stratejik Değişimler ve Yönelimler”, *Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi*, 16:2 Kış, 2016, p. 242.

26 İrfan Sancak, “Azerbaijan in Independence Process and Effects of the June Coup on Foreign Policy”, *Balkan Journal of Social Sciences/Balkan Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 7:13, 2018.

27 Beşikçi, “Bağımsızlık Sonrası Dönemde Azerbaycan”.

28 Sancak, “Azerbaijan in Independence Process”.

29 Baskın Oran, “*Türk Dış Politikası*” Cilt II: 1980-2001, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002.

30 Tayfun Atmaca, “*Yirminci Yüzyılın Sonunda Azerbaycan ve Türkiye Münasebetleri (1993-1999)*”, Şafak Matbaası, İstanbul, 1999, p. 221; Sancak, “Azerbaijan in Independence Process”.

most mutually favored countries in taxes and duties. An agreement was signed to encourage investments in 1995, and the sectors encouraged have diversified over the years. Cooperation has occurred in joint investments across various sectors, including industry, construction, transportation, and telecommunications. Türkiye was Azerbaijan's largest import partner in the mid-1990s. Although Türkiye fell to second place with the ruble depreciation after the crisis in Russia in 1998, bilateral trade volume generally followed an increasing trend.³¹

Azerbaijan, particularly in the second half of the 1990s, viewed Türkiye as its main ally and role model. Believing that Türkiye had embraced a form of apolitical Islam despite sectarian differences, Azerbaijan permitted Türkiye to operate in the country's religious services sector, which had stagnated during the Soviet period.³² In addition, Heydar Aliyev's arrival in Türkiye for treatment when he was experiencing health problems showed his trust in Türkiye. However, in the early 2000s, there was a change of power in both Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The rise of an Islamist party into power in Türkiye initially worried Azerbaijan about deviations from traditional foreign policy. Nevertheless, the ever-more improved relations proved to be beyond governmental preferences and outlived changing governments.

Bilateral relations, which developed based on heads of state and cultural partnerships in the 1990s, became more institutional and strategic in the 2000s. The BTC oil pipeline started operating in 2005, while the BTE natural gas pipeline began in 2007. Also, in 2007, a deal was signed for another tripartite project, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project. Although tripartite cooperation significantly impacts the regional balance, the relations between Baku and Ankara differ from their connection with Tbilisi in both intensity and scope. Therefore, the relations between Baku and Ankara have more than commercial or geopolitical benefits.

In 2008, a situation occurred that tested the Ankara-Baku relations. The new government in Ankara, trying to solve its problems with its neighbors, took a step towards normalization with Yerevan. Taking advantage of being in the same football league for an international tournament, Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited Yerevan, assessing that it would make progress both in the Karabakh issue and in ending genocide propaganda. This attempt faced Baku's reaction over the symbolic "flag crisis" in the match. This lack of policy coordination was likely related to the loss of influence of the old elites who carried out Turkish foreign policy for many years. Baku sent a message to Ankara regarding energy prices and the flag arrangement in the Turkish cemetery in Baku. Eventually, the new government in Ankara ended the Yerevan initiative by evaluating that normalization with Armenia (before the Karabakh issue was solved) would damage its relations with Azerbaijan.³³

NATO's expansion policy and the rapprochement of Baku and Tbilisi with the European Union (EU) and NATO eventually pushed Moscow to take an aggressive stance in the South Caucasus. In 2008, Azerbaijan accelerated its relations with NATO, which enabled the USA to lift the arms embargo and provide military aid of 4.3 million dollars. Besides, Azerbaijan is included in the EU Near Neighborhood Policy, the list of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries receiving technical support within the EU, and the Europe-Asia Transport Corridor. Then, intending to reassert its dominance in the region, the

31 Araz Aslanlı, "Türkiye-Azerbaycan Ekonomik İlişkileri", *Yönetim ve Ekonomi Dergisi*, 25:1, 2018, p. 24.

32 Sofie Bedford, "Turkey and Azerbaijan: One religion—two States?", in *Turkish-Azerbaijani Relations*, Routledge, 2016.

33 Kaan Gaytancıoğlu, "Son Dönem Türkiye-Azerbaycan İlişkileri Çerçevesinde Yaşanan Bayrak Krizi'nin Değerlendirilmesi" *Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi*, 2:1, 2010, pp. 43-50; Çağla Gül Yesevi and Burcu Y. Tiftikçigil, "Turkey-Azerbaijan Energy Relations: A Political and Economic Analysis", *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, 5:1, 2015, pp. 27-44.

Kremlin intervened militarily in Georgia in 2008. The fact that Western states did not follow a deterrent policy against Russia regarding the invasion of Georgia forced Azerbaijan to be on good terms with Russia.³⁴ Baku, whose expectations from the West decreased significantly in the Karabakh issue, felt the need to pay more attention to regional balances. In the face of Russian aggression, the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform was established among the countries in the region in 2008.

Baku and Ankara signed a High-Level Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance Agreement in 2010 to increase cooperation in military, political, commercial, infrastructure, technology, and sociocultural fields. Thereafter, joint ministerial meetings have been held between the two countries. Joint commissions have been established for cross-border interaction in various fields, such as the judiciary, military, diplomatic representation, natural disaster management, international transportation, labor and social security, media, and employment, and the systems have been integrated. Under this agreement, if one party is under an armed attack, the other party can mobilize all its resources, including military means, to assist the party under attack.

New tripartite projects (the TANAP and the Baku-Tbilis-Kars Railway), were added to the two countries' energy and transportation cooperation list. By connecting the Caspian natural gas to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) with the TANAP pipeline built up to Edirne, the expectation of economic growth and shared profit has brought the two countries closer together. The TANAP project, implemented entirely with Turkish and Azerbaijani financing and technology, did not offer third countries any rights on the line and reserve. Azerbaijan provided gas flow to Türkiye in 2018 and to TAP at the end of 2020. The railway line was opened in 2017, and cargo transportation between Türkiye and Azerbaijan started in 2019. Türkiye, dependent on foreign sources for energy, has not only increased its energy security through this cooperation but also started to earn income from energy management and transportation as an energy corridor. Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) has a 19 percent share in the Shah Deniz Field, a 19 percent share in the BTE, and Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Company (BOTAS) has a 30 percent share in TANAP.³⁵

A second war for Karabakh broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020, and Azerbaijan regained control of Karabakh after many years. While Türkiye delivered significant support for this victory, Russia probably provided tacit approval for this outcome. In addition to military technological support, Ankara stood by Azerbaijan through diplomacy and information efforts and became a party to the war. Türkiye's support of Azerbaijan shows the depth of bilateral relations. With the Shusha Declaration of June 2021, Türkiye and Azerbaijan elevated bilateral relations to the level of High-Level Strategic Partnership and Alliance, increased the depth and scope of cooperation, and included collaboration in the defense industry and establishment of joint law enforcement forces in the scope of interaction.

Ankara's initiatives towards a broader Central Asia since the 1990s, based on historical ties and cultural partnerships, also bore fruit in recent years. Cooperation and dialogue between the Turkic Republics developed through the formation of the regional Turkic Council. In the process leading to the Turkic Council, the most significant support for Ankara's efforts came from Baku, and Azerbaijan served as a bridge. The potential of the route created by the member countries as a trade route has increased significantly

34 Nona Mikhelidze, "The Azerbaijan-Russia-Turkey Energy Triangle and its Impact on the Future of Nagorno-Karabakh", *Documenti Istituto Affari Internazionali*, 1018, 2010, pp. 1-8.

35 Yesevi and Tiftikçigil, "Turkey-Azerbaijan Energy Relations".

with the cooperation. This potential, which is attractive for infrastructure investments, will increase the countries' commercial capacity and create a synergy for higher political synergy. Türkiye's political, military, and technological support in Azerbaijan's victory in the Second Karabakh War must also motivate the Organization of Turkic States toward integrating into the Turkic Council in November 2021, right after the Karabakh Victory. The potential of the belt called the Turan Corridor has increased even further with the Karabakh victory in 2020 and the commitment to open the Zenzegur Corridor.

3. Discussion

3.1 Tier One

After the end of the Cold War, ideological differences and the barriers to interaction between the countries diminished, and the cultural similarity (common culture and language) found some space to flourish. Turkish thought was the element that facilitated the interaction. Prevailing democratization, economic liberalization, and integration with the West were the precipitating factors for a security community. Besides, the common threats and interests, especially the energy projects, have encouraged this cooperation. For Azerbaijan, lacking direct access to the open sea, energy export is a matter related not only to its economy but also to its sovereignty and independence. Türkiye is a strategic neighbor for Azerbaijan to open up to Europe and the world. In the 2000s, technological development played a crucial role in creating a unique lifestyle for these two communities.

Geopolitical concerns and the problems these two countries experience with regional actors are similar. Deutsch,³⁶ and Adler and Barnett³⁷ state that common threat perception is one of the factors that can bring two actors closer. Concerns about Russia and Iran in a broader geopolitical arena bring Azerbaijan and Türkiye closer together. Russia causes concerns in Azerbaijan mainly about its independence and sovereignty. Iran mistrusts Azerbaijan regarding its territorial integrity, the Azerbaijani minority within its borders, and the sharing of Caspian Sea reserves. Türkiye's power projection over Central Asia worries Iran and Russia because they compete for regional dominance. Iran is the obstacle to establishing land connections between Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Russia and Iran are generally uncomfortable with Azerbaijan and Türkiye's alliance with the West. However, since both Ankara and Baku experienced some disappointment in their relations with the West in the 2000s, they began diversifying their collaborations and attaching more importance to regional relations. Notably, the cooperation between Türkiye and Azerbaijan allowed them to punch above their weight.

3.2. Tier Two

Power and knowledge are two material factors affecting relationships. Türkiye is superior in population, economy, and military, and the fact that it has more experience in statecraft is the center of attraction. Furthermore, since the Aliyev period, Azerbaijan has become a stronger country in the region with its economic development and balanced policies, making it a valuable ally and commercial partner for Türkiye. Türkiye, as the stronger ally, provided Azerbaijan with military training and equipment and shared its experience in state-building, military, and diplomacy. Having more soft power, Türkiye might have a greater role in determining the norms and the elements of mutual identity. Yet, both countries developed more robust political and administrative units for continuous and effective communication channels.

36 Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and The North Atlantic Area*.

37 Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*.

Process factors in the second stage are interactions, organizations, and social learning. “Dynamic density” has increased steadily in social, military, economic, and technological fields. Thanks to bilateral and multilateral cooperation, Türkiye and Azerbaijan have taken more initiative in protecting their geopolitical interests. By crowning the existing sympathy and similarities with mutual interaction in various fields, these two countries have developed a relationship based on mutual trust, and the sense of “we” has been encouraged among the people. The social dimension of their relations is one of the most important dimensions that distinguishes Azerbaijan-Türkiye relations from a mere military alliance relationship.

The intensity and diversity of the governmental exchanges between the two countries have also increased. There are common platforms, such as the Turkish Speaking Countries Summit, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization Summit, and the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, which have helped to increase multilateral interactions since the 2000s. Bilateral meetings have occurred between governments in many areas, including military, security, intelligence, energy, and investment. Türkiye and Azerbaijan introduced a joint economic cooperation program and took steps to increase the number of their projects in the field of energy. Furthermore, these two states also advanced coordination in foreign policy during this period. Azerbaijan launched flights to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 2005 to support Ankara on the Cyprus issue. Türkiye passed a decision at the Council of Europe in the same year that Armenia was an occupier in Karabakh. As of 2008, the state leaders of Türkiye and Azerbaijan began to make their first post-election overseas visits to each other, which has now become a tradition.

The two countries’ energy, trade, and investment cooperation has improved spectacularly. Energy is one of the critical topics in this regard. The Türkiye-Azerbaijan cooperation on energy, which started with triple projects, was crowned with TANAP. These long-term giant investments show that these two countries have stable and reliable relations built over time, creating a unity of interest between the two countries. The trade volumes of the two countries with each other are disproportionate to their GNP.³⁸ Türkiye has been the second-largest exporter to Azerbaijan since 2016, and the two countries signed a Preferential Trade Agreement in 2020. The foreign trade volume between the two countries was 5.02 billion dollars in 2021: 2.34 billion dollars in Turkish and 2.68 billion dollars in Azerbaijani exports. Strategic items exported from Türkiye to Azerbaijan include aircraft, helicopters, UAVs (unmanned air vehicles), and UCAVs (unmanned combat air vehicles).

Türkiye’s total investment in Azerbaijan between 2002 and 2020 has reached 12 billion dollars, while Azerbaijan’s investment in Türkiye during the same years has reached 19.5 billion dollars.³⁹ Azerbaijan consortium State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and Turkish Petrochemical Company (Petkim) set up Star Refinery in İzmir, which produces processed petroleum products (such as jet fuel.) and currently meets 25 percent of the internal needs. Starting its operations in 2018, Star Refinery is the highest investment (6.3 billion dollars) made by the private sector in a single location in Türkiye. The total investment made by SOCAR in Türkiye in the last 15 years has reached 18 billion

38 Elyar Türker, “*Azerbaijan-Turkey Political Relations, Social Capital and Gravity Theory*”, 2022, p. 32-40.

39 Azerbaijan (AZE) and Türkiye (TUR) Trade | OEC, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/economic-relations-between-turkey-and-azerbaijan.en.mfa>, accessed 16.09.2023; Economic Relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan / Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/economic-relations-between-turkey-and-azerbaijan.en.mfa>, accessed 16.09.2023.

dollars.⁴⁰ Moreover, Türkiye is the largest investor in Azerbaijan's non-hydrocarbon sectors through its 12 billion dollars in investment.⁴¹

Social learning as a process factor is redefining or reinterpreting the reality at social and governmental levels. The capacity of administrative units and ethnic/linguistic similarity are crucial in harmonizing values, interests, and identity. The main reason for straining relations over the flag crisis in 2008 was the lack of policy coordination due to the interruption of regular communication links. Thus, the institutionalization of coordination for the regular convey of mutual expectations is critical. After finding an Azerbaijani flag at the body search at the entrance of the Armenia and Türkiye football match in 2023, Turkish police kissing and respectfully receiving it presents an example of social learning. Besides, there should be continuity of interaction so that the parties see it as their responsibility to make short-term concessions for their long-term interests. Baku's launching flights to TRNC in 2005 at the request of Ankara and at the expense of drawing the EU's reaction and potentially contradicting its claims in Karabakh is an example of this trade-off.

Besides the communication channels and commissions, face-to-face and direct relationships among members in various areas should increase for social learning to occur among people. The decisions the administrators took and the agreements they made, combined with the developing technologies and transportation opportunities in the 2000s, helped the interaction between Turkish and Azerbaijani people increase. The Eurovision Contest is just one example of how people's favor towards each other has been visible for many years. Social media platforms helped to increase the interaction between two people with high intelligibility in Turkish and Azerbaijani languages.⁴²

In recent years, citizens of both countries have preferred to study, work, and live in each other's countries more comfortably. The visa-free travel period between the two countries has started in 2021. Currently, most interactions occur in the field of education and trade. Of the 27,943 students who went abroad to study from Azerbaijan between 2000 and 2021, 10,645 chose Türkiye. Of the 60,905 international students studying at Azerbaijani (state and foundation) universities between 2000 and 2020, 33,955 were students from Türkiye.⁴³ With the trade initiative between these two countries, Azerbaijani people increasingly preferred Turkish e-commerce sites. The governments' mutual good treatment of each other's citizens plays a crucial role in the countries hosting each other's nationals in large numbers.

Leaders use public diplomacy to appeal to each other's public opinion because civil society is crucial in increasing mutual understanding and dialogue.⁴⁴ One remarkable use of public diplomacy is that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan read the poems of Azerbaijani national poets Ahmed Javad and Bakhtiyar Vahapzade after the Karabakh Victory in 2020. Today, public diplomacy towards Azerbaijan is carried out by Turkish governmental units responsible for education and religious services, such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and Yunus Emre Institute. Non-governmental organizations connecting these two countries increased in number in the 1990s and boomed in the 2000s,

40 Star Refinery Reached 113 Percent Capacity Utilization Rate in 2022, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/star-rafineri-2022de-yuzde-113luk-kapasite-kullanim-oranina-ulasti/2881606>, accessed 16.09.2023.

41 Aslanlı, "Türkiye-Azerbaycan Ekonomik İlişkileri", s. 22; Jabrayilzade, "Azerbaycan Ve Türkiye Arasındaki Siyasi, Ekonomik ve Ticari İlişkilerin Değerlendirilmesi", pp. 58-59.

42 İbrahimova, "The Role of Social Media in the Process of Development of the Socio-Political Structure".

43 Şahin and Selvi, "Türkiye'nin Azerbaycan'a Yönelik Kamu Diplomasisi ve Etkileri".

44 Ibid.

most of which carried out joint work in difficult times such as disasters, terrorist attacks, and war.⁴⁵

The Azerbaijani government has adopted a religious services policy to put sectarian elements in the background and emphasize cultural elements instead.⁴⁶ This change is an example of elite manipulation to harmonize core values. In 2009, TRT Avaz started its operations in different dialects, including Azerbaijani Turkish. Azerbaijani state consortium SOCAR acquired the Star Media Group in Türkiye in 2013. A study shows that Turkish series and television programs are in great demand in Azerbaijan because the Azerbaijanis find many cultural commonalities.⁴⁷

3.3 Tier Three

The two countries have developed an entity that differentiates them from other regional actors where there is mutual trust, a sense of community, and thus dependable expectation for peaceful change. According to the results of the KONDA research report, 66% of the Turkish public chose Azerbaijan as the most reliable country for supplying energy.⁴⁸ A research conducted in Azerbaijan in November 2020 asked, “Which state flag, other than the Azerbaijani state flag, do you sympathize with?” and 95.1% of the participants answered, “The Turkish flag”. Another remarkable result from the research is the answer given to the question, “Do you believe that the Turkish army will support Azerbaijan if the war starts in Karabakh?”. The answer to this question is “yes” with 94.9%.⁴⁹

The solidarity between the Turkish and Azerbaijani peoples was apparent during the war in 2020. Brotherly relations with Azerbaijan are one of the rare issues on which there is consensus in Turkish public opinion and domestic politics. Thus, the main opposition parties of the period, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), opposed the government’s steps to normalize relations with Armenia between 2008 and 2009 due to its possible effects on relations with Azerbaijan.⁵⁰ Shortly after the war broke out in Karabakh in 2020, the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) unanimously accepted a bill to send soldiers to Azerbaijan, and all parties except the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) published a statement supporting Azerbaijan. This political support given in the parliament was a reflection of public opinion. The Turkish people followed the Karabakh War widely and uninterruptedly, and Turkish broadcasting organizations significantly contributed to conveying Azerbaijani theses to the world. The message delivered in the military ceremonies held after the Karabakh Victory was that victory belonged to the two countries.

45 Araz Aslanlı and Vefa Kurban, “Azerbaycan-Türkiye İlişkileri ve Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları”, *Marmara Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 3:1, 2016, p. 31-43.

46 Sofie Bedford, Ceyhun Mahmudlu, & Shamkhal Abiov, “Protecting Nation, State and Government: ‘Traditional Islam’” in Azerbaijan. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 73:4, 2021, p. 691-712.

47 İbrahimova, “The Role of Social Media in the Process of Development of the Socio-Political Structure”.

48 KONDA. (2022). *Enerji Tüketimi ve Ekonomi Araştırması* [Survey]. <https://konda.com.tr/uploads/turkiyede-enerji-tuketimi-ve-ekonomi-arastirmasi-5ac4d11d627af5ed19c7a2150a8590abf3bbab1b91ac08adf9cc559790bcd66.pdf>, accessed 07.01.2024

49 Şahin and Selvi, “Türkiye’nin Azerbaycan’a Yönelik Kamu Diplomasisi ve Etkileri”.

50 Bülent and Akpınar, “The relations between Turkey and the Caucasus”.

Conclusion

Drawing lines between the stages of the relationship moving towards a security community is a challenging task. According to Deutsch,⁵¹ the process leading to a security community is not black and white. It is possible that the parties do not define mutual relationships in the same way, and the perceptions of people and that of rulers may not be the same in any given time. Türkiye's embrace of Azerbaijanis escaping from Karabakh due to Armenian occupation in the early 1990s shows that there was a spirit of solidarity and brotherhood between peoples at that time. This feeling of brotherhood and solidarity goes back even further. Although the interaction between Türkiye and Azerbaijan halted during the USSR period, familiarity was never forgotten, and interaction visibly revived after the 1990s. However, the close coordination between governments and the communities' sense of unity has recently become stable.

During the 1990s and 2000s, the relations seemed to be in a nascent stage. There were common threat perceptions and expectations of commercial interest; thus, the interactions were more transactional and interest-driven. Organizational frameworks, such as the relations with the EU and NATO, mattered more in the bilateral relationship in this period than today. Baku's demand for military support during Armenian aggression in Karabakh was not met by Ankara then, partly due to a shortage in capacity and partly due to the lack of a sense of community. Today, it is hard to imagine such a response (or a lack of response, to be precise) from Türkiye if Azerbaijan is under a military attack.

Although there has yet to be a clear indication of the start of the ascendant stage, it is believed to have started around 2010. However, the flag crisis in 2008 indicates that the institutionalization of coordination was delayed due to the change of governments. Besides, Türkiye and Azerbaijan signed a strategic partnership agreement in 2010, and the coordination in various areas became intense. With this 2010 agreement, states announced their military partnership to the world. In the 2010s, the increased mutual trust and coordination between the two countries enabled the execution of large projects without third-party involvement, and the governments rediscovered their (mutual) interests.

When investing in other countries and trading strategic raw materials and energy, states consider not only material factors, such as prices and exchange rates, but also factors, such as intergovernmental political relations, history, culture, and linguistic partnerships. The existence of mutual trust, communication, social organizations, technology transfer, reduced trade costs, and reduced risk of commercial disputes make bilateral trade more predictable and convenient. The acceleration of trade due to partnerships between the countries and political, social, and cultural interaction is called the "law of attraction".⁵²

Some mutual norms and habits were formed in this period around the 2010s. Strengthening cooperation has brought about new common gains/interests and mutual achievements, such as TANAP, the rise of the Turkic Council, and the Karabakh Victory. Azerbaijan became the first (and the only for the time being) former Soviet republic to bypass Russia in its energy export. The BTC pipeline carried approximately 80 percent of Azerbaijan's oil after Azerbaijani independence.⁵³ With the TANAP project, which has become more important for European energy security since the start of the Russia-Ukraine

51 Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and The North Atlantic Area*.

52 Türker, "Azerbaijan-Turkey Political Relations, Social Capital and Gravity Theory".

53 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, n.d.

War, Baku reduced its dependence on Russia in gas exports and got to sell more gas. Besides economic interests, energy projects have served Azerbaijan in isolating Armenia.

The Turkic Council, which draws attention to its recent rise, consists of Turkish-speaking countries and, therefore, is based on mutual ethnic and cultural characteristics. However, since the Council member countries sit on the Middle Belt/Corridor, one of the most important global trade and energy routes, the coordination and cooperation they develop have geopolitical importance. Türkiye-Azerbaijan collaboration has a critical role in bringing the Turkic Council to its current state. In parallel with the development of the trade infrastructure for energy and goods between Türkiye and Azerbaijan (BTK Railway, which started operating in 2017, and the Zangezur Corridor, soon to be opened), the Trans-Caspian trade route has become more strategic. These developments may also be helpful for the revival of the Turan Corridor.

Since the Karabakh War in 2020, Türkiye and Azerbaijan have seemed to be in the mature stage of the security community. The Turkish military's technological support was critical to operational success. Bayraktar TB2 and Turkish TRG-300 rockets sent by Türkiye disabled Armenian artillery units and tanks and had a crucial impact on the course of the war. In the post-war agreement, the Zangezur Corridor was opened, which provided a land connection between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, and these two countries called each other strategic allies.

Considering the factors mentioned above, it can be evaluated that the political and social interactions between the two countries have promoted a mutually non-threatening relationship and, thus, formed a security community, as Deutsch calls it. The structure is characterized by a collective "we" awareness that emerges through social communication and interaction among its members. Having no mutual supranational/legal structure, Türkiye and Azerbaijan are assessed to form a loosely coupled security community. This dynamic has facilitated the establishment of a lasting and stable peace between the two countries.

Conflict of Interest Statement:

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

REFERENCES

Published Works

- ADLER Emanuel and BARNETT Michael (1998). *Security Communities*, Cambridge University Press.
- ALIYEV Elbay (2012). *Azerbaijan - Turkish Relations (1992-2012): A foreign Policy Account*, Master Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara.
- ASLANLI Araz (2018). "Türkiye-Azerbaycan Ekonomik İlişkileri", *Yönetim ve Ekonomi Dergisi*, 25:1, 15-27.
- ASLANLI Araz and KURBAN Vefa (2016). Azerbaycan-Türkiye İlişkileri ve Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları, *Marmara Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 3:1, 31-43.
- ATMACA, Tayfun (1999). *Yirminci Yüzyılın Sonunda Azerbaycan ve Türkiye Münasebetleri (1993-1999)*, Şafak Matbaası, İstanbul.
- BABA-ZADA, Aynur (2016). Türkiye – Azerbaycan Diplomatik İlişkiler: 1918-2014, *Master Thesis*, İnönü University, Sakarya.

- BEDFORD Sofie (2016). "Turkey and Azerbaijan: One Religion–two States?", Murad Ismayilov & Norman A. Graham (eds.), *Turkish-Azerbaijani Relations*, Routledge, London.
- BEDFORD Sofie, MAHMUDLU Ceyhan and ABILOV Shamkhal (2021). "Protecting Nation, State and Government: 'Traditional Islam' in Azerbaijan", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 73:4, 691-712.
- BÜLENT Aras and AKPINAR Pınar (2011). "The Relations between Turkey and the Caucasus", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 16:3, 53-68.
- DERMAN Giray Saynur (2022). "Türkiye-Azerbaycan İlişkilerinin Siyasi ve Ekonomik Boyutları Ve Kamu Diplomasisi", *TÜRKAV Kamu Yönetimi Enstitüsü Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 2:2,123-156.
- DEUTSCH, Karl W., BURRELL, Sidney. A., KANN, Robert A., MAURICE Lee, LICHTERMAN Martin, RAYMOND E. Lindgren, FRANCIS L. Loewenheim, RICHARD W. Van Wagenen (1957). *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton U.P.
- DİKKAYA Mehmet and ÖZYAKIŞIR Deniz (2008). "Developing Regional Cooperation Among Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan: Importance of Regional Projects", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 13:1, 93-118.
- DİKKAYA Mehmet and STRAKES Jason (2017). "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish-Azerbaijani Relations? Result for Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Process Between 2008 And 2010", *Review of Socio-Economic Perspectives*, 2:1, 84-102.
- ERDOĞAN Nuray (2017). TANAP Projesinin Türkiye ve Azerbaycan Enerji Politikalarındaki Yeri ve Önemi", *Ömer Halisdemir Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 10:3, 10-26.
- GAYTANCIOĞLU Kaan (2010). "Son Dönem Türkiye-Azerbaycan İlişkileri Çerçevesinde Yaşanan Bayrak Krizi'nin Değerlendirilmesi", *Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi*, 2:1, 43-50.
- GHANBARLOU Raheb Mohammedi and SİĞİN Aykut (2020). "Türk Televizyon Dizilerinin Azerbaycan Toplumuna Üzerindeki Sosyo-Kültürel Etkilerini Anlamaya Yönelik Bir Değerlendirme", *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 15:1, 583-592.
- HUSEYNLI Nigar (2022). "Effect of Renewable Energy and Traditional Energy Production on Economic Growth: The Case of Turkey and Azerbaijan", *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, 12:3, 257-261.
- İBRAHİMOV Rovshan (2015). "Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Armenia in 2008-2009: Impact on Azerbaijani-Turkish Relations", *Bilge Strateji*, 7:12, 47-59.
- İBRAHİMOVA Pervane (2023). "The Role of Social Media in the Process of Development of the Socio-Political Structure of Turkish Society and Azerbaijani-Turkish Relations", *Uluslararası Yönetim Akademisi Dergisi*, 6:1, 58-69.
- İSMALZADE Fariz (2005). "Turkey-Azerbaijan: The honeymoon is Over", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 4:4, 1-11.
- JABRAYILZADE Elvin (2021). Azerbaycan ve Türkiye Arasındaki Siyasi, Ekonomik ve Ticari İlişkilerin Değerlendirilmesi, *Master Thesis*, İstanbul Sabahattin Zaim Üniversitesi, İstanbul.
- KANCA Elif (2012). The "Single Nation, Two States" Idea: Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations in the Post-Soviet Period. *Уроки Истории XX Века: «Мы» и «Наши Соседи» (Турция и Южный Кавказ)*, 161.
- KARDAŞ Şaban and MACİT Fatih (2015). "Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations: The Economic Dimension", *Journal of Caspian Affairs*, 1:1, 23-46.
- MAYILYAN Lilit (2023). "Understanding The Underlying Dynamics of Turkish-Azerbaijani Relations: "One Nation, Two States?"", *Eurasia Contemporary IX*, 9:1, 39-67.
- MIKHELIDZE Nona (2010). "The Azerbaijan-Russia-Turkey Energy Triangle and its Impact on the Future of Nagorno-Karabakh", *Documenti Istituto Affari Internazionali*, 1018, 1-8.
- ORAN Baskın (2012). *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt II: 1980-2001*. İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.
- ÖRAZ BEŞİKÇİ Seçil (2016). Bağımsızlık Sonrası Dönemde Azerbaycan Dış Politikasındaki Stratejik Değişimler ve Yönelimler, *Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi*, 16/2 Kış.
- PROGONATI Erjada (2021). "Türkiye ile Azerbaycan Arasındaki İlişkilerinin Enerji Jeopolitiği", *Journal of Current Researches on Business and Economics*, 11, 73-92.
- ŞAHİN Çiğdem and SELVİ Yunus Emre (2022). "Türkiye'nin Azerbaycan'a Yönelik Kamu Diplomasisi ve Etkileri", *Avrasya Etüdleri*, 61, 245-280.
- SANCAK İrfan (2018). "Azerbaijan in Independence Process and Effects of the June Coup on Foreign Policy", *Balkan Journal of Social Sciences/Balkan Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 7:13, 57-71.
- SULEYMANOV, Elchin, BULUT, Cihan, & RAHMANOV, Farhad (2017). *Economic and Political Analysis of Azerbaijan-Turkey Energy Relations* (SSRN Scholarly Paper 3060066). Social Science Research Network. <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3060066>

- TER-MATEVOSYAN Vahram DEMIRDIREK Hülya GAFARLI Orhan ZABANOVA Yana and WEISS Andrea (2016). "Turkish Societal Actors in the Caucasus", *Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD)*, 86, 3-5.
- TÜRKER, Elyar (2022). Azerbaijan-Turley Political Relations, Social Capital and Gravity Theory, 6th *International Congress of Eurasian Social Sciences*, Bodrum, Türkiye, 32-40.
- YESEVİ Çağla Gül and TİFTİKÇİGİL Burcu Y. (2015). "Turkey-Azerbaijan Energy Relations: A Political and Economic Analysis", *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, 5:1, 27-44.
- YILMAZ Reha (2010). "Türkiye-Azerbaycan İlişkilerinde Son Dönem", *Bilge Strateji*, 2:2, 23-42.

Internet Sources

- AC DİDK T. R. (2023). *Türkiyə Respublikası Diaspor təşkilatları* [Formal]. Azərbaycan Respublikasının Diasporla İş Üzrə Dövlət Komitəsi. <http://diasporamap.com/az/country/235>, accessed 16.07.2023.
- Azerbaijan(AZE)andTürkiye(TUR)Trade|OEC.* (n.d.). OEC-The Observatory of Economic Complexity. <https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/aze/partner/tur?measureBilateralTradeSelector=vizValueOption2>, accessed 16.07.2023.
- Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline.* (n.d.). <https://www.socar.az/en/page/baku-tbilisi-ceyhan-pipeline>, accessed 16.07.2023.
- Economic Relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan / Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs.* (n.d.). <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/economic-relations-between-turkey-and-azerbaijan.en.mfa>, accessed 16.07.2023.
- KONDA. (2022). *Enerji Tüketimi ve Ekonomi Araştırması* [Survey]. <https://konda.com.tr/uploads/turkiyede-enerji-tuketimi-ve-ekonomi-arastirmasi-5ac4d11d627af5ed19c7a2150a8590abf3bbab1b91ac08adf9cc559790bcdd66.pdf>, accessed 01.07.2024.
- STAR Rafineri, 2022'de yüzde 113'lük kapasite kullanım oranına ulaştı.* (n.d.), <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/star-rafineri-2022de-yuzde-113luk-kapasite-kullanim-oranina-ulasti/2881606>, accessed 16.07.2023.