Towards a Sociology of Classical Greek Music
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Abstract
In this article I briefly survey, from a synchronic perspective, the various occasions on which music of one kind or another was played in archaic and classical Greece (ca. 750-320 BCE), and discuss the different social functions served by these performances and the various effects that they made (or were supposed to make) on their audiences. A sociology of ancient Greek music should look somewhat different from a history of that music, and different too from a purely philosophical/aesthetic or technical appreciation of that musical culture; and I attempt to include both etic and emic accounts of what music amounted to, what it did for people, who (i.e. members of which social groups and classes) performed the various different kinds of music, and who listened and/or responded in one way or another to these different kinds, while trying to assess what ordinary Greek people, as well as theorists and philosophers, thought about the role of music and musicians within their larger social and existential world. This article attempts to take due account of the “liveness” and corporeality of all Greek musical performance, and of its strong, but not uniform, affective impact. In particular, I focus on differences of gender, status, and ethnicity, and on the social functionalities of different musical idioms and instruments (strings, pipes, and percussion) that we can identify from our various sources, both literary and visual. Overall, I find Aristotle (especially in the Politics) to be the most helpful and reliable guide.

Keywords
Ancient Greek Musical Culture • Aristotelian Views on Music • Music and Social Differences • Music and Gender • Music and Identities • Corporeality in Musical Performance • Music and Emotion

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In this article I will briefly survey the different occasions on which music of various kinds was played in archaic and classical Greece (ca. 700-320 BCE), and will discuss the different social functions served by these performances and the various effects that they were supposed to make on their audiences, as well as the different attitudes and values exhibited within Greek culture regarding their extensive and multifaceted “music scene” overall. It has often been said that ancient Greek society was exceptionally musical, and certainly the plethora of descriptions of musical activity and of theoretical discussions of music stands out in contrast e.g. to ancient Roman or pre-Modern English culture in general. It is also the case that Greece’s position as (part-real, and part-imagined) “origin” and ancestor of the whole Western cultural tradition, together with the adoption specifically by the Christian Church and other medieval and Renaissance intellectual authorities of many aspects of (neo-) Platonic and neo-Pythagorean musical theory, has meant that an inordinate amount of attention – much of it only loosely based on any actual Greek musical practice, and focusing instead on elaborate notions of numerology and/or the ethical attributes of particular tunings and scales –has been paid over the centuries to a particular set of elite Greek ideas about the nature and purpose of music in human society that can be shown to be in many respects unrepresentative of mainstream Greek attitudes, and that are somewhat misleading as an account of Greek musical culture in general.

A sociology of ancient Greek music should doubtless look somewhat different from a history of that music, and different too from a purely philosophical/aesthetic or technical appreciation of that musical culture. Just as in the modern era a sociological account (post-Bourdieu) of Western musical tastes and practices has different goals and will tend to focus on different issues from a philosopher’s (aesthetician’s) or traditional musicologist’s account of the nature, structures, and effects of music, and each will bring to bear a different degree of interest in the respective roles of “composer”, “performer”, and (various strata of) “audience” within a particular society or musical tradition, so too in investigating ancient Greek music we need to design our own most appropriate tools of analysis, rather than simply following the ancient sources that happen to be most plentiful, influential and oft-cited concerning the nature, or the moral and educational value, of music. A proper sociological investigation should thus involve considering both etic and emic accounts of what music amounted to, what it did for people, who (i.e. members of which social groups and classes) performed the various different kinds of music, and who listened and/or responded in one way or another to these different kinds, and trying to assess what ordinary Greek people, as well as theorists and philosophers, thought about the role of music and musicians within their larger social and existential world.

Most modern accounts and appreciations of Classical Greek music accept, more or less explicitly, the cultural assumptions of the main ancient (elite) literary sources, while also interpreting these sources within a (modern) cultural framework and set of assumptions that reflects traditional Western European notions of what constitutes high “musical culture” and even what counts as “music” at all. Thus the views of Plato, Aristoxenus, Aristides Quintilianus, [Plutarch] On Music, and others from the ancient philosophical-educational tradition have continued to loom large, even while it is obvious that these authors – each with his own individual opinions and differences of emphasis, to be sure – was nonetheless writing from a similar perspective and within a shared – but relatively narrow – cultural/critical tradition, one that promoted a particular social agenda that was in many respects unrepresentative of the prevalent social practices of their times. Thus their intense focus, for example, on the moral and educational value of music, and their detailed descriptions and debates about the various tunings and scales available to composers and performers at different stages in Greek musical “history”, probably tell us relatively little about the actual musical practices of their society at large – just as reading books, articles, and reviews written in the mid- or even late-20th century about (Western) art music would give future historians of culture little clue as to the existence and impact of the multiple new music forms that were burgeoning and proliferating during this same period in the Anglophone world (jazz, blues, rock ‘n roll, soul, gospel, blue grass, country, reggae, Cajun, funk, etc.) – forms that were reaching far larger audiences among many different constituencies than the elite-favored “Classical music” that was, relatively speaking, dying on its feet.

In recent decades, scholars (Barker, 1984, 1989, 2005; Bundrick, 2005; Comotti, 1989; Franklin, 2002; Gentili & Pretagostini, 1988; Mathiesen, 1999; Power, 2010; West, 1992; et al.) have greatly facilitated non-specialists’ access to the ancient Greek sources and have opened up the field for others to explore. But for the most part these studies have continued to reproduce much the same balance of evidence and opinions, and hence many of the same prejudices, as the elite sources that have survived in the largest quantity. Only by reading between the lines and against the grain of some of these texts, and by collecting evidence from other sources such as vase-paintings, festival inscriptions, and song-lyrics (as well as Aristotle, to be sure), can we hope to

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3 Literacy was far from universal in ancient Greece, and literary authors almost invariably came from the intelligentsia. Whatever their own individual social/ethnic origin may have been, authors almost always wrote for, and in relation to, members of the wealthy and socially dominant class(es), i.e. “elites” – except of course for those poets and dramatists who did not write in their own voice and were composing (to some degree at least) for a mass audience. Since music-making did not always involve expert usage of “standard language”, it is likely (as we shall see) that musicians came from a wider range of social and ethnic backgrounds than literary authors.

4 This observation was made already by the anonymous author (5th-4th century BCE) whose opinions are partly in the Hibebe musical papyrus (Pap. Hibeh 1:13); see Barker 1984: 183-85.

5 Academic scholarship and university positions devoted to the history, analysis, and sociology of non-“Classical” (Western) music were almost non-existent until the 1970s. Even non-Western “classical” musics tended to be covered in college curricula by only a tiny fraction of the faculty. It took until the 1990s before a significant broadening of the curriculum and of scholarly outlets for musicological publication occurred within the academy in Britain and the USA, along with a concomitant acknowledgment of the value of “ethnomusicology” in its various forms. See further Merriam 1964, Keil & Feld 1994, Nettl 2005.
penetrate a little further into the thicker texture of the ancient performance scene in all its dimensions and dynamics.

In this article I will attempt to sketch the main features of Classical Greek music from a sociological perspective, touching on such issues as: the status of instrumental and solo vocal performers in relation to their audiences and/or to citizen groups of dancer/singers; elite attitudes to music-making vs music-listening and appreciation; distinctions of gender, ethnicity, regionalism, and status/class (including “amateur” vs “professional”) within the overall music-making scene of Greece as a whole. Each of these topics deserves a much more detailed discussion than I can provide here. But I hope this sketch can provide a useful overview and starting-point for further investigation.

As far as we can tell, the Classical Greek music systems (tunings, melodic structures, instruments, etc.) were not very different from those of e.g. the Hittites, Assyrians, Phrygians, Lydians, and other Anatolian musics that had preceded them, all in turn deriving largely from the widespread Babylonian systems of the 2nd millennium BCE. But the “sociology” of who played (or was supposed to play) what kinds of music, what social status was associated with which instruments and which kinds of musicians, and what particular instrumental, vocal, choreographic, and stylistic distinctions were (or were supposed to be) observed by the various different performers and listeners within Greek culture, seems to have evolved in quite interesting and distinctive ways during the period ca. 700 and 320 BCE – i.e. the period that we broadly label “Classical”.

Two large methodological issues need to be addressed, however, from the outset: (i) what do/should we count as “music”? and (ii) to what extent should a sociology of Classical Greek music attempt to take account of diachronic changes within the extended culture of the mainland, the islands, Anatolia, Sicily and S. Italy, and regions to the north (Black Sea, Thrace, etc.), during the period 750-320 BCE?

(i) What counts as “music”? In what follows, I will be inclusive rather than restrictive in my definition (as surely befits an anthropological or sociological analysis). So I will regard “Greek music” as including not only all kinds of artful/intentional human vocalizing and instrumental/percussive effects, but also the corporeal movements that

7 See Merriam (1964), Walker (1990), and Nettl (2005) on the recommended parameters of ethnomusicology.
8 A case could certainly be made for including non-human and/or non-intentional sound-production as also counting as “music” in particular, bird-songs, water and wind, and other elements of the natural geophysical soundscape were often described as being musical or quasi-musical by Greek writers, and modern ethologists, evolutionary biologists, and anthropologists – as well as musicologists – are increasingly inclined to expand the realm(s) of “music” so as to include more than just human tone-production (e.g., fonosfera/phonosphere: Bettini, 2008; cf. Schafer, [1977] 1994, Krause, [2002] 2016; also Feld, 1982/1990). Likewise, within human societies it is often hard to determine whether e.g. wails of lamentation or involuntary cries of excitement, bodily movements, and clapping of hands should count as being “musical”. In the case of birds and other animals such as hylolobate gibbons or vervet monkeys, a distinction is usually drawn between “cries” (conveying information, e.g. distress or warning) and “songs” (expressing ? emotion, desire, affection?): see articles in Wallin et al. (2000), Kroodsma (2005), and Marler andSlabbekoorn (2004).
often accompanied such sound-production, whether in the form of organized dance, or as hand/arm-gestures, foot-stomping, and more or less random trance states. In the Classical world, dance was rarely separated out, in practice or in theory, from other aspects of music-making (singing, instrument-playing, ritual incantation, etc.), and as in most cultures of the world, listeners were usually expected to respond to the aural stimuli of music with their own physical movements, which often constituted a kind of participation in the music-making. Thus a musical performance might involve several different components of sound-producers and audience responses, as well as reciprocal visual stimulation and display. Music was rarely just a matter of a “musician” playing a “piece of music” to which others (merely) listened. (I will return to this important topic in more detail below.) Overall, keeping this broad definition of music in mind should enable us to avoid the misleading tendency of much Western European and North American music criticism of the last 200 years (at least up until recently), to concentrate almost exclusively on the “high” art music of the period and its (implicitly silent and motionless) listeners, and on the critical debates that surrounded such music among literary and philosophical elite listeners. (ii) Our other methodological problem is less easy to solve. From the outset, when we undertake a/the sociology of the music of this culturally rich period, we confront the fact that Greek society was undergoing many changes, sometimes of quite radical kinds, and the roles played by music and various kinds of musicians within society were changing too. This was not a static social system, but an evolving one, and the music scene seems often to have been one of the most distinctive and exciting arenas of innovation and modification. So some kind of diachronic “history” of that music scene needs to accompany any synchronic analysis, and we need to be aware of the tensions/differences between older (Archaic) and newer (late-Classical and Hellenistic) musical practices and attitudes, especially when we consider the writings of our two most important philosophical/cultural analysts from that period, Plato and Aristotle (and also Aristotle’s star musicologist-student Aristoxenus). In their writings we can observe a distinctive set of attitudes that both is and is not typical of their time, and their prescriptive remarks about music performance and listening need to be interpreted with that tension in mind.

In diachronic terms, then, we can state – broadly, and at the risk of over-simplification – that the degree to which prominent public performances of music involved elite men (aristocrats, the wealthy, political leaders, even middling citizens) as music-makers, rather than simply as listeners, seems to have declined significantly between the 7th and the 4th centuries BCE. This decline can be most obviously observed in the area of choral performance (choreia), although our sources are of course skimpy and not always transparent. Thus it looks as if, on the one hand, during the 7th and 6th centuries choral groups made up of citizen boys or girls (paides), young men (neoi), unmarried women (parthenoi), or adult men (andres), were widespread and highly esteemed throughout

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9 D’Angour (2011) and Gurd (2016).
the Greek world. These choruses usually comprised between a dozen and fifteen, but sometimes as many as fifty singer-dancers, accompanied by kithara (concert lyre) or auloi (double reed-pipes), or occasionally by both together. At festivals both local and regional (and even Panhellenic, such as the Pythian Games at Delphi) these choral groups – largely amateur, but often highly trained and skilled – were regarded as representing their particular communities (city or town) and as embodying the style, taste, and communal character (the collective *habitus*, we might say) of that whole community.¹⁰ In these contexts, it is not clear what social status (what degree of prestige) was occupied by the instrumentalists who usually accompanied the choruses; but in some cases –especially among the *kitharists* (string-players)- the instrumentalist might also be the composer and/or lead-vocalist of the song (just as Apollo is imagined as being the “leader of the Muses” [*Mousagetês* in divine musical performances]),¹¹ and some *kitharodes* (solo kithara-singers) might travel widely to give solo recitals and/or accompany choruses:¹² we know of several historical or semi-mythical figures such as Archilochus (from the island of Paros), Terpander (beginning in Lesbos and later influential at Sparta), Arion (Lesbos, Corinth, Sicily), Thaletas (Crete and Sparta), and Alcman (Sparta, though perhaps originally from Lydian Sardis), all of whom achieved cosmopolitan fame and distinction in such contexts, as poets, musical innovators, and cultural leaders. Some of these itinerant/migrant virtuoso performers were even credited with having helped to establish a new “constitution” and musical regime for a city: such stories were given added resonance by the coincidence that the standard Greek word for “law”, *nomos*, was also a standard term for “melody, musical scale”, and thus *eunomia* (“good government”) might often carry associations of “harmonious music”, and vice versa.¹³

The prevalence and social prominence of these choruses seems to have shrunk somewhat as the Classical period proceeded, even while opportunities for solo virtuoso instrumental and vocal performance persisted. Thus for example instead of regarding choral participation by children and adolescents as a key component of their overall “education” and enculturation – an education conducted primarily, it seems, in the places where they would learn traditional poetry and rituals in the form of songs, and where dancing would overlap with gymnastic and athletic endeavors as their physical training – “school-rooms” instead became the more or less official locations of education and enculturation, and the skills of reading, writing, and public-speaking began to occupy a more prominent place than music on the cultural scale, especially for men. At these schools, basic competence in tuning and playing the lyre and *auloi*, and in singing, were still included; but in some communities at least, it

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¹¹ See below, on the Homeric Hymn to Apollo.

¹² For extensive discussion of *kitharodes*, see, Power (2010).

¹³ See e.g. the entries for Terpander, Thaletas, and Alcman in Campbell (1988).
looks as if choral performance may have receded in importance. By the 4th century BCE, Plato (with his nostalgic fetishizing of choreia in the Laws) and Aristotle (with his fetishizing of leisureed adult critique/diagōgē in the Politics) are both found to downplay the value of citizens actually learning to play an instrument with particular skill, and they both also express some anxiety about various kinds of popular dance and theater music. I will return to this issue later in this chapter.

With these methodological issues in mind, let us turn now to the project before us, i.e. a social analysis of the Classical Greek music scene.

Social Realities and Imaginary Representations: Greek Musical Performances, 750-320 BCE

Our evidence about the Archaic-Classical music scene comes, broadly speaking, in four main forms: contemporary poetic texts in which “singers” (aoidoi) and other musicians are described; contemporary vase-paintings of musical performances; narratives and descriptions from later centuries, many of them coming from anecdotal or faux-systematic music “historians” such as Athenaeus and pseudo-Plutarch, whose accounts fluctuate wildly in their reliability; and contemporary or near-contemporary discussions, whether descriptive or prescriptive, by philosophers and cultural historians (above all, Plato and Aristotle) who are interested in the effects of music and the proper and best ways for music to be performed within a particular community. From the Hellenistic period on, we also have quite extensive inscriptive records from major festival sites, listing the events, institutional arrangements (including hiring of musicians and composers), awards of prizes, and (in some cases) names of instrumental and vocal prize-winners. The special case of Athenian drama (tragedy, comedy, and satyr-play) will be considered separately below: this was a major musical venue, involving large numbers of performers, thousands of spectators, and relatively huge sums of money spent on each production; but many of the aesthetic and social elements involved require special analysis.

Of these sources, even while Plato presents the most vivid (often facetious) and influential accounts of Greek musical performance culture in his Ion, Republic, and Laws, and even while Aristoxenus (substantial fragments of whose work survive) was clearly the most thorough-going and systematic of all the Classical-period musicologists, the

14 Marr (1956), Griffith (2001); but see e.g. Wilson (2000) for a reminder of the continuing prevalence of choral performances throughout Greece; also Kowalzig (2007), Kowalzig and Wilson (2013); and cf. Stefanis (1988), Caso and Slater (1995), LeGuen (2001), Anezi (2003), Manieri (2009) etc. on musical competitions in general, and especially on the associations of performers (“Artists of Dionysus”) who were organized all over the Greek world to participate in them.

15 In some cases these late authors were able to draw on the studies of serious 4th century BCE scholars such as Aristoxenus, Dicaearchus, and Heracleides of Pontus (all of them students of Aristotle), whose knowledge of earlier musical practices and personalities was quite extensive, but far from comprehensive. See further Barker (1984, pp. 205-304, esp. 301-304).

16 Most readily accessible in Barker (1989). Many other late sources, such as Aristides Quintilianus, are recognized as containing—along with large doses of Plato—a great deal of Aristoxenian material as well, usually at second- or third-hand: see Barker (1989, pp. 392-535).
most useful and informative surviving source of information and ideas for our current sociological purposes, all things considered, is Aristotle. So I shall be deploying Aristotle’s De Anima, Politics, and Poetics quite extensively in what follows, even while attempting to take proper account of all the other kinds of relevant evidence as well.

Hierarchies of Musical Taste & Performance Restrictions

Strings vs pipes… and percussion – differences of gender & ethnicity. Most ancient and modern accounts of the Classical Greek music scene agree in presenting a fairly consistent and straightforward hierarchy of instruments, genres, and performance contexts. The lyre-type stringed instruments (lyra, kithara) and their associated song-types (often directed to Apollo and/or Artemis, or celebrating various up-beat divine and human activities at festivals or in the symposium) rank highest, in terms of prestige, prize-money for performers, and expressions of approval from elite arbiters of taste among our literary sources. Lower on the prestige-scale, but probably more widely played and more universally enjoyed at the broadest range of social occasions, were the double reed-pipes (auloi, of various types). Multi-stringed instruments (harpis, zithers, sometimes referred to as pēktides = “finger-plucked instruments”), various kinds of percussion and idiophones/membranophones (castanets [krotala, krembalas], cymbals [kymbala], tambourines and frame-drums [tympana], gongs, rattle/shakers [seistra], and bull-roarers [rhomboi], were all employed quite extensively as well in many musical contexts, especially those (many!) for Dionysus and Cybele (the Great Mother) –many of which involved primarily female dancers and singers— and also those that were associated with other northern and eastern divinities (Sabazius, the Korybantes, the Kabeiroi, the Daktyloi, Adonis, Isis, etc.). In the countryside, other kinds of pipes than the auloi were also widely used (collectively referred to as syrinx).

17 Aristotle’s terminology, as well as his gender- and class-inflected analytic approach, has much in common with Bourdieu’s (with Cicero an important Classical intermediary: thus lexis, habitus, and various dynamics of social-power relations, “correctness”, “taste”, etc.). I will be making extensive use of this commonality in what follows.

18 Barker (1984), West (1992) etc. Barker’s article “Music” in the various editions of the Oxford Classical Dictionary (most recently, the 4th edition, eds. S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth, E. Eidinow [Oxford 2012] is a masterful synthesis and analysis of modern scholarly understanding of Greek and Roman music, and I recommend this highly as a general overview. I have learned much from Barker, West (along with many others too), and I greatly admire their scholarship. If at times in the present article I may appear to be dissatisfied with Barker’s and West’s accounts of the ancient Greek music scene, this is largely a reflection of my own more ethnomusicological-sociological orientation to the material, in contrast to their more positivistic, technical, literary, and aesthetic approach.

19 For descriptions of the various materials, tunings, uses, and characteristics of the different types of auloi, see esp. West (1992, pp. 81-107), Mathiesen (1999), Hagel (2010), Barker (2012), also Hagel (n.d.).

20 Instruments of this type (i.e. “harp”) had been widely used in many Near Eastern contexts (Assyrian, Hittite/Phrygian, Cypriot, etc.); see e.g. Franklin (2002), Schuel (2004), with illustrations. It is hard to determine how widespread their use was in Classical Greece: see Barker (1984), Maas and Snyder (1989), West (1992, pp. 70-79). Puzzlingly absent from the record of Greek instruments of the Classical period are lutes, i.e. long-necked stringed instruments, with or without frets, such as frequently are represented on Bronze Age Egyptian and Hittite monuments (see e.g. Schuel, 2004): such an instrument (pandoura seems to have been its Greek name) is first attested on Greek monuments only from the mid-4th century onwards (Mathiesen, 1999, pp. 283-285; Winnington-Ingram & Higgins, 1965), and no such instrument is ever mentioned in literary texts of the pre-Hellenistic period.

21 On the Korybantes, Kabeiroi, Kouretes, and other similar types of music-making daimones, see Poerner (1913), Jeanmaire (1939; 1949), Linforth (1946), Hemberg (1950), Ustinova (1992-1996), Bremmer (2014), Griffith (forthcoming in 2018). See also Hardie (2004). Musical performances of this kind will be discussed further below (pp. 244-247).
Because (at least, according to our mainly Atheno-centric fifth- and fourth-century sources) male citizens were largely restricted in their instrumental music-making to lyre and *kithara*, while women and non-citizen males (including resident aliens and slaves, as well as itinerant professionals from various regions and of various ethnicities) experienced no such restrictions, it is likely that (a) more music, whether domestic or public, was actually performed by women than by men\(^2\) and (b) a significant proportion of the most skilled and affective music-making was not only non-Athenian in origin and character but also, to a significant degree, performed by non-Greeks; furthermore (c) it seems clear as well that the range of musical sounds (instruments, timbres, genres, vocalizing styles) that might be heard from these non-citizen (often female) musical performers was generally much wider and often more expressive than the (necessarily more restrained and narrowly calibrated) sounds made by Athenian citizen males.\(^3\) Thus Athenians of all social statuses were accustomed to the idea that much of the most exciting and affective music that they heard was produced by performers whose own social position was lower than their own and who might not, for example, even be fluent speakers of Attic Greek. The resultant social dynamics will have been consequently somewhat complex: the essential/imagined gendering and ethnicity of “Greek music” may not have squared at all exactly with the dominant military-civic norms of the Athenian democracy or of polis-culture in general (a point to which I will return).

At the same time, the basic social hierarchy and civic prestige-scale of strings vs pipes (and percussion) persisted, unchallenged, with male string performances by Greek *kitharodes* and *kitharists* consistently operating at the top of both the financial and the aesthetic/social spectrum —in as much as the prizes awarded in festival competitions to victorious *kitharodes* and *kitharists* were regularly larger than the prizes for pipe-players (*aulêtaï*),\(^4\) and our most prominent surviving literary and philosophical/musical-theoretical authors (Plato, Aristotle; and later e.g. Athenaeus, ps.Plutarch, Aristides Quintilianus, etc.) all assign the leading roles in Greek musical innovation and distinction to male *kithara* players (Terpander, Alcman, Arion, Lasus, Timotheus; or in the mythological realm, to Orpheus and Thamyris—and in the divine realm, to Apollo).\(^5\)

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\(^2\) One significant piece of evidence in support of this assertion is the official Athenian ordinance ([Aristotle] *Constitution of the Athenians* 50.2) that the ten *astronomoi* (“city-managers”) responsible for maintaining order, cleanliness, etc. in the city-center, were required to monitor the fees paid to musicians who were hired on a daily basis (presumably for symposia, small-scale religious festivals, etc.), limiting them to 2 drachmas per musician: the three types of musicians mentioned in the ordinance are all female (pipe-players, harpsists, and lyre/kithara-players). Some modern scholars have interpreted this ordinance, along with other references in literature to *aulêtrides* (female “pipe-players”, often mistranslated as “flute-girls”) as really meaning prostitutes, with their musical skills being only secondary. But for convincing refutation of this view see Goldman 2015.

\(^3\) Obviously the terms “ethnicity” and “non-Greek” or “non-Athenian” involve complicated issues of cultural analysis, which I cannot pursue here. See esp. McCoskey 2012; and for the cultural-regional “mix” and differences within ancient Greek music overall, see e.g. Panegyres (2017), Griffith (in progress).


\(^5\) By contrast, the founding-fathers/genii of Greek *aulos*-playing were traditionally said to be the Phrygians: Marsyas (often imagined as not fully human, but a satyr) and his student/boyfriend Olympus—a telling index of the strong tendency within mainstream Greek
Performers vs listeners. Quite apart from the persistent and consistent musical hierarchy of instruments and gendered performativities that we have outlined, another important fault-line can be discerned, that between performers and audiences, and between different kinds of audiences. Several of our elite sources draw attention to this question: does the “highest” and best musical activity consist of playing, or of listening? And what is the best way to listen to and appreciate music of this or that kind? As I noted above, a diachronic shift can be observed here, as our earlier sources are generally readier to present music-making as a noble and entirely respectable activity than our later ones, which tend increasingly to assign the most expert musicians to a professional class of performers whose status is markedly lower than that of the ruling or citizen elites who listen to them (and in many cases, pay them). Or perhaps, rather than a simple chronological shift, we should recognize instead an ongoing tension between two competing ideals of music-making, one of which honored the skill and beauty of the musician’s voice and artistry, and regarded these both as markers of divine inspiration and value, and also as providers of supreme psycho-social and ethical benefit to their audiences, while the other valued more highly the mental discrimination involved in appreciating the finer points of a high-level musical performance, while manifesting some ambivalence (distrust or even contempt) about the professional level of skill required of the actual performers. A number of elite sources, for example, insist that the ability to produce oneself exquisite and ravishing musical sounds is less valuable to a community than the “lawgiver’s” or gentleman’s talent for selecting and enjoying the “right” music for the particular occasion.26

This on-going tension, or ambivalence, was significantly stronger in the case of music than it was for e.g. the visual arts (painting, sculpture, architecture) or even for literature (poetry, historiography, philosophy), both because the effects of music on listeners were (and are) so pervasive and strongly emotional and affective, and because, unlike the case of those other fine arts, the musical performer is present him/herself in person while the emotional effect is taking place among his/her audience—they are being “moved” by his/her performance much more immediately and personally that in the case of someone looking at a painting or reading a poem (or even hearing poetry originally composed by e.g. Homer and now being narrated

26 Plato Laws 2. 669a-671a, 4.719a, 7.798d-802a, 809a-811c; cf. Aristotle Politics 8. 5.1339a26-39b10, 8.6.1340b20-41b18, where gentlemanly appreciation and critique of expert musicianship is explicitly preferred as a social practice to the actual expertise of the most skilled performers themselves, who are referred to as “professionals” (technikoi) and as being typically “vulgar-craftsmen-types, mechanics (banausoi)”. On the notion and dynamics of “professionalism” in general among Greek poets in the archaic-classical periods, see now Stewart 2016, with further references, but his article does not discuss musicians per se.
by a rhapsode). I will return to this point below (with particular focus on Aristotle’s analyses of sound and musical affect).

This shifting focus and uncertainty of cultural emphasis regarding the respective roles/value of the performer and the listener, can be nicely observed in a comparison between three of the best-known and most influential of all ancient Greek accounts of singing and music-making that survive to us from the earliest period of Greek literature (ca. 750-600 BCE): Homer’s *Odyssey*, Hesiod’s *Theogony*, and the (so-called) “*Homeric Hymn*” to Apollo. All three of these are lengthy poems composed in dactylic hexameter verse that was not actually sung, but rather recited, but they all describe at length the aesthetic and social impact/effects of high-level, expert—whether professional or amateur—musical… performance.

In Homer’s *Odyssey*, the professional singer-kitharists Phemius and Demodocus are both of relatively low social class; they perform at the behest of the aristocratic families that control social operations among the Ithacans and Phaeacians respectively; they are treated as being especially valuable for the beauty and originality of their aesthetic product (and in the case of Demodocus, for the accuracy of his verbal narrative); and it is clear that they enjoy some degree of divine blessing from Apollo and the Muses, even while they hold no political power and seem relatively lacking in personal wealth as well. (In the *Iliad*, it is true that the high-born warrior-prince Achilles does sing to himself and Patroclus, accompanying himself on a fancy *kithara* that he had captured during this campaign (*Iliad* 9. 186-91), as a way of consoling himself for his present predicament; but the implication of this passage appears to be that only when *not* being active as a warrior and political agent would a prince thus actually perform music, and it is notable that his audience consists only of his one intimate friend—he is not performing to a group, let alone “in public”.

In Hesiod’s account of the Muses and his own calling to be a poet, by contrast (*Theogony* 1-115), we are given an extended account of the extraordinary beauty, elegance, and vocal and choreographic skill of Zeus’ musical daughters, and their pervasive ability to affect the moods and behaviors of humans and gods alike throughout the world. The poet

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27 Plato’s *Ion* explores the dynamics of a virtuoso Homeric rhapsodic performance, in ways that somewhat recall a musical performance. But on the whole, the difference in the *Odyssey* between e.g. Odysseus’ spoken narratives and the “songs” of Phemius and Demodocus is clear enough, and that difference continues to grow greater once “rhapsodic” narrative and “choral/monodic lyric” song-making go their separate performative ways, after the 7th century BCE; see e.g. Burkert (1985), and Nagy, (1990). Plato’s solution (in the *Ion*, and elsewhere) to the “problem” that Muse-inspired musical-poetic performers (coming from various regions and backgrounds—largely non-philosophical) have such remarkable impact on audiences of all kinds, is to insist that they do not actually know or control what they are doing as performers, but are either more-or-less passive conduits of divinely-originated beauty (as in *Ion*), or are actually out-of-their-minds (possessed by some kind of “madness” *mania*, as in *Phaedrus*). Plato’s vivid language and imagery have been influential over the centuries, but generally less than helpful, to those seriously interested in explaining (in other than metaphorical terms) musical and poetic affect.

28 For discussion of the possibilities that/how Homeric verse may originally have been sung, see West 1981, and Hagel n.d. But it seems certain that by the 7th century BCE (the likely date of the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*) Homeric and Hesiodic verses were recited with fairly minimal vocal modulation and without instrumental accompaniment.

29 Later authors, however, credited Achilles with extensive musical skills taught him by the centaur Chiron (e.g., Statius *Achilleid* 1.185ff).
praises their beautiful voices, their elegant and desirable appearance, and their exquisite skill as dancers, even while Hesiod himself, in the end, avails himself of only a small fraction of these powers—he is given by them a “staff” (skēptron) of laurel instead of the more traditional Muse-gift of a lyre, and his activity as a “singer” (aoidos) turns out to be monotonously vocal and verbal: his poetry is accompanied by no instrument, he does not dance, and he relies instead entirely on the words of his “songs” (i.e. narrative and didactic poems) to affect his audience. So we can see that both “Homer” and Hesiod are slanting their accounts of high-level musical performance in such a way as to align their own audiences with a logo-centric notion of what “song”-culture is and what its priorities should be: according to these (amusical) hexameter poets, the most precious cultural asset is a verbal expert who “knows” important truths and events and names,\(^\text{30}\) while the aural and visual charms of an actual singer, instrumentalist, or dancer are to be ranked slightly lower on the scale of value. At the same time we may detect a paradoxical confirmation even within these same texts that the joy and excitement generated in an audience by more “musical” performances, with the resultant enhancements provided by melody, varied rhythms, differing vocal and instrumental textures, and visual spectacle (costumes, dance-movements, physical attractiveness of the performers, etc.) are likely to be greater and more impactful in any given community, including that of the gods themselves, than any merely verbal narrative—for the Muses themselves, according to Hesiod, delight their father Zeus and the other Olympian gods with the full auditory and visual range of their musicality. (We will return below to the fact that the Muses are also female—a recurrent tendency in Greek imaginings of ideal and/or original musical performance.)

This impression that Homer and Hesiod are (purposely, but surreptitiously) downplaying the “musical” elements of Greek song-culture, in favor of words and narrative, is confirmed by the vivid description of divine music-making that we find in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo. Apollo himself is Zeus’ eldest and most prestige-laden son; and among his key attributes is skill at playing the lyre and kithara.\(^\text{31}\) In this—paradigmatic and idealized—multi-dimensional model of ancient Greek musical performance, as conducted among an elite family and their larger community (i.e., the children of Olympian Zeus together with their extended family), we find acoustic and visual elements completely intertwined with one another, and multiple bodies engaged in movement (not just Apollo’s hand applying the plectrum to his kithara), while it is also clearly indicated that the internal “audience’s” responses (as well as those of the performers themselves) are simultaneously cerebral and corporeal:

\(^{30}\) Chadwick (1952), and Detienne (1996).

\(^{31}\) The tortoise-shell lyre (chelys), according to Greek mythology, was actually invented, constructed, and first played by Apollo’s younger brother, Hermes—a master-technician and communicator, but also a somewhat lower-class divinity in several respects (Brown, 1947; cf. Clay, 2006). It is Apollo who is almost invariably presented as the ace performer on both kithara and lyre, and his musicality is almost exclusively limited to those lyre-type stringed instruments (chelys-lyre, phorminx, kithara—i.e not the harp or zither, nor pipes or percussion), and of course his voice as well. Visual images of Greek (human) kitharodes and of Apollo playing his kithara (esp. on Athenian vase paintings) tend to look almost identical in their general posture and youthful glamor; see Power (2010).
And playing his scooped-out lyre (*phorminx*), glorious Leto’s son
goes also to rocky Pytho,
his divine garments scented, while his lyre (*phorminx*)
under the golden plectrum makes a delightful clangor.

From there *he goes up* from earth to Olympus swift as thought,
to the house of Zeus, *to join the congregation of the other gods;*
*and at once the immortals devote themselves to lyre music (*kitharis*) and song.*

_The Muses, responding all together with lovely voice,_
sing of the gods’ divine gifts and of human
sufferings – all that they have from the immortal gods
and yet live witless and helpless, unable
to find a remedy for death or a defence against old age.

_The lovely-haired Graces and the cheerful Horai,_
_and Harmonia, Hebe, and Zeus’ daughter Aphrodite,_
dance (*orcheuntai*), holding each other’s wrists;
_and among them also performs, singing (*metamelpetai*), one neither plain
nor short of stature, but tall and fair to behold,_
_Artemis profuse of arrows, fellow nursling of Apollo._

_Among them also Ares and the keen-sighted Argus-slayer [= Hermes]_*
sport/flirt/play (*paizonta*); while he, Phoibos Apollo, plays his lyre (*enkitharizei*)
in the middle, stepping fine and high, and splendor shines about him,
and the flashing of his feet and his tunic of quality thread.

Leto of the golden locks and resourceful Zeus
are delighted in their great hearts as *they watch*_
their dear son sporting/playing (*paizonta*) among the immortal gods.

_(Homeric Hymn to Apollo 179-206, tr. M. L. West, adapted)_

Apollo here is leading a chorus of singers and dancers. He himself is the chief
focus, as he is singled out for the most extended description at the beginning and
end of the passage: he struts among them (202), playing the concert-lyre (201
enkitharizei),^32_ wearing immortal, perfumed clothing (184, 203), wielding a golden
plectrum that produces a “desirable clang/resonance” (185 *kanachēn ... himeroessan*),
“while splendor shines all around him, with the sparklings/flashings of his feet and
of his fine-woven tunic” (202-3). Like many of the *kitharodes* illustrated on Athenian
vases, he is the epitome of youthful beauty and style, and the combination of visual,
olfactory, and acoustic splendor that he emits is captivating and infectious. He leads
and directs a chorus of Muses “responding all together with lovely voice” (189 *hama
pasai ameibomenai opi kalēi*, i.e. a unified voice, all sounding as one); and then the

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^32_ His instrument is described both as a *phorminx* and as a *kithara/kitharis*: such verbal imprecision is not uncommon in archaic Greek poetry: Barker (1984), Maas and Snyder (1989), West (1992).
description broadens out to highlight the hair and bodies of the divine dancers who link up, hands on wrists, and join in—an ensemble of the most beautiful and desirable young goddesses: Charites, Horai, Harmonie, Hebe, Aphrodite. One goddess stands out among the others, almost a co-leader of the group, it appears: Artemis (Apollo’s divine sister), “tall, impressive of form”, 197-198), and she specifically “joins in the singing” (197 metamelpetai), clearly taking second place only to Apollo himself.

Whether or not Apollo actually sings as well as playing his kithara we are not told. The Muses and Artemis apparently are the main singers (189-93, 197), and we might expect some of them also to be playing hand-percussion (krotala), and possibly other instruments as well (as a female chorus is described doing elsewhere in this Hymn, and in many scenes on vase-paintings). The other young goddesses form a circle-dance, linked hands on wrists (194-96; again, vase-paintings confirm this as a common configuration for female choruses), and their contribution to the ensemble seems largely to be visual, as they interpret and enhance with their bodies the music that Apollo is directing. Then, in addition to the female singers and elegantly ordered dancers, there are two male participants, or interlopers, Ares and Hermes. These two youngsters (half-brothers to Apollo, sons of Zeus by different mothers) are said here to “play/sport among those” dancers and singers (200-1 en tēsi ... paizousi). What is entailed by this “playing”? In a context such as this, we should probably understand a combination of informal dancing, showing-off, and flirting, since paizō often carries erotic implications, especially in contexts of young women dancing and having fun together—a typical scenario, as we shall see, for romantic encounters and seduction, even occasionally rape.

At a little bit of a distance from the musicians and dancers, two seated listeners admire the performance (204-6): Leto and Zeus, Apollo’s mother and father, mature, parental, a little more detached parents, “take pleasure in watching their son ‘playing’ with the <rest of the> gods”. Zeus himself hardly ever plays or sings in Greek literature or art. Here Zeus’ and Leto’s pleasure is not, it seems, primarily acoustic, but visual and social: they appreciate that their son is having such a great time, looking so splendid, and winning the approval and collaboration of all his siblings and hangers-on. This wouldn’t be able to happen without the musical component, which is both an occasion (for getting together, showing-off, touching, flirting) and an auditory, psychological stimulus to goodwill and synchronized movement among the group, each in his or her particular way.

33 Her conspicuous height and beauty, marking her out among the other goddesses, may remind us of the figures of Hagesichora, Agido, and Astumelousa in Alcman’s Maiden Songs (f1r 1-3); see Campbell (1988), Calame (1997).
34 See Pepion (2009), with illustrations and further references.
35 For the connotations of “play” (paizō and sumpaizō) in connection with young women or goddesses in Greek literature, see Rosenmeyer (2004), Bathrelou (2012), and further below pp. 226-228. Aristotle (Politics 8. 3.1337b23-38a12, 8. 5.1339a11-30) discusses paidhā (“fun, play”) as the commonest response/function for music in general; see further pp. 239-243 below.
36 Aristotle Politics 8. 5.1339a41-39b9.
The music thus has different significance and impact for the various members of this “congregation” (187 homêgurin); each individual adds, and finds, something different in it.37 And the whole scene is observed (imagined) and narrated by a human poet (“Homer”) in tuneless hexameters, with no chorus or dance, as he recites to a listening or reading public who are brought through his words alone to imagine the performance-scene and to conjure up similar moments from their own experience to enhance and enliven it.

We may note that it is taken for granted here that almost all the young Olympian gods and goddesses enjoy participating in the combination of acoustic and visual performance (song and dance) that is on offer, while the older generation sits and watches.38 It is a multidimensional musical assemblage, imagined as a perfect aesthetic and social event that involves several different kinds and degrees of participation –assembling, kithara-playing, vocalizing, moving in co-ordinated or improvised ways, touching, listening, sitting and watching. At the opening of this Hymn (lines 1-13), the occupants of Olympus are described as being anxious about Apollo’s impetuous and potentially violent presence (2-3 “the gods tremble when he comes into the house of Zeus, and they all jump up from their seats as he approaches…”). But now the description of his music-making dissolves all such anxiety and brings a mood of inclusion, relaxation, and mutual approval –even while distinctions of gender and hierarchies of status are reinforced. The scene is presented as a model of the ways in which music is supposed to work;39 moving bodies, beautiful voices, physical interactions between participants, often an erotic/romantic aura… and relatively small attention being paid (at least in this particular celebration among the gods) to the actual words of the song. (But most modern Classical scholars, coming as they do from the ranks of language- and literature-specialists, have preferred to focus almost exclusively on the verbal content of archaic-Classical Greek “song culture.”)

**Liveness: The dynamics of live, synaesthetic performance; aspects of sound-production and -reception; musicians and “audiences”**. Ancient Greek music was indeed almost always a social activity, and was conducted “live” and in real time. It was also usually an interactive, and often synaesthetic, experience for all the participants. As among most societies during the history of the world before the invention of recording technologies and mass production of records/tapes/

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37 In other contexts, the specific, charming and exciting effects on individuals of playing and/or listening to music are more minutely observed and described: e.g., the Muses at Hesiod *Theogony* 1-115; Hermes playing and singing at Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*, after he has built the first lyre; or Agathon’s seductively beautiful song at Aristophanes *Theaetemphoriazuae* 39-172. See esp. Peponi (2012, pp. 98-104).

38 On the face of it, the participation of such a wide variety of divinities seems to provide an *a priori* proof that for most Greeks it was not generally believed that music affected character-formation (*ethos*) in any significant way, since presumably the gods do not need their characters to be shaped and modified any more than they already have been. Certainly, the character of e.g. Aphrodite is not similar to that of Artemis, or Ares, or Zeus –yet they all apparently respond with joy and appreciation to the same music. This shared enjoyment crosses gender lines: male and female gods play and sing together, to the same music.

39 See Lonsdale (1993) on “dance as an ordering force.”
CDs/MP3s, etc. (a process that began roughly in the early 20th century), listening to music involved also watching one or more music-makers as they performed, as well as being aware of other audience members at the same time that the musical sounds were entering one’s ears. Reactions and responses to musical performances were thus usually more collective than individual (or, we might say, simultaneously individual and collective). Music was seldom performed and listened to by solitary individuals.\(^{40}\) The contrast in this respect with the modern hi-tech West is enormous.

Furthermore, whether music was sung or played on instruments or (as often) both at once, it usually entailed elements of bodily movement beyond the basic activation of a singer’s lungs, larynx, and tongue, or an instrumentalist’s fingers, and some form of visual display as well –costumes, gestures, formations, often including dance. Thus the activity of performing and listening/ responding to “music”, for most Greeks, as for many/most other societies, was not simply acoustic, but also visual and even haptic, i.e. synaesthetic.\(^{42}\)

These processes of sound-production and listening are not always unidirectional –not simply and always from musician(s) to audience/spectators. Nor is the “music” always produced (entirely) by human agents who are intentionally planning and projecting the particular (combination of) sounds that the audience(s) end up hearing. Musicians are affected by their audience(s); and the sounds and sights of a musical event often also include many features that are not produced by, and are out of the control of, the central/featured musical performer(s).\(^ {43}\)

Many ancient Greek critics and observers of musical performance describe quite vividly the process of musical affect, using terms not only of “pleasure, delight” (hēdonē, terpsis, chara, ktl.) but also of “mind-bending” (psychagōgia) or “movement” (kinēsis) of the soul, “rapture” (ekplēxis), “possession/ecstasy” (enthousiasmos), and “desire, yearning” (erōs, himeros), terms that emphasize the capacity of melody, rhythm, and vocal/instrumental timbre to overwhelm and alter people’s moods, and to

\(^{40}\) E. M. Forster’s description in ch. 5 of Howards End (1910) of different individuals listening to a concert performance of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is often cited in this regard; see e.g. Kivy (1990).

\(^{41}\) We can acknowledge the relatively few occasions in Greek literature on which ordinary individuals sing or hum or whistle to themselves, perhaps remembering and re-performing (however inaccurately) a tune they have previously heard, or when instrumentalists practice their skills or rehearse a piece with a view to a later more public performance, without having to abandon our claim about “social” performance. Achilles singing to himself and to Patroclus (Homeric Iliad Book 9) seems thus to be distinctly peculiar (see above p. 221). For Hermes’ lyre-playing (to himself and his mother) in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, immediately after his invention of the instrument, see above (nn. 31 and 37). When a shepherd plays a pipe (syrinx) in the countryside, s/he is of course accompanied by flocks of animals and/or other wild creatures, whose responses are often described as being quite sensitive and sympathetic.

\(^{42}\) Butler and Purves (2013), including esp. Porter’s chapter (pp. 9-26) on the nine Muses. For the visual dimensions of choral performance (choreia), see esp. Pepone (2012) and e.g. Calame (1997), Naerobout (1997), Kowalzig (2007), Kowalzig and Wilson (2013). Smell might often be part of the sensory experience as well, with perfumes, oils, smoke, wine, and other substances contributing to the overall festive or sympotic effect: cf. Xenophanes fr. B1 West = fr. 1 Gerber ( Athenaeus 11, 462c). On the corporeal and haptic qualities of ancient music-reception (vibrations, beats, etc.), see further below, pp. 234-239.

\(^{43}\) In such collaborative or accidental group contexts, the different, and somewhat unpredictable, degrees of agency and intention involved in the total production and reception of sounds, depending on each individual’s or entity’s or group’s position within the whole musical event, might be designated a “swarm” or “rhizomatic” effect, in the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari (1987, pp. 7-9); (cf. Porter & Holmes, 2017).
bring about enhanced states of excitement, a sense of escape from reality and of vivid recollections or serene forgetfulness.\textsuperscript{44} In some cases, such descriptions are focused primarily on the verbal content, on the “story” that is being narrated and the referential meaning and vividness of that narrative (as when Odysseus weeps and buries his head in his cloak while listening to Demodocus’ song about the Trojan War among the Phaeacians (\textit{Od. 8}); and likewise, Hesiod’s Muse-inspired singer is supposed to bring about “forgetfulness of evils” as he narrates theogonies and heroic narratives, \textit{Theog. 93-103}). These are the texts that modern Classicists and historians of literary criticism and aesthetics tend to focus on, as evidence for the affective power (the “Varieties of Enchantment”, as George Walsh \cite{Walsh1984} termed them) of ancient Greek poetry.

In many musical settings, the audience’s responses—and often the dancers’ movements as well—might constitute essential elements of the whole performance (as in the scene from the \textit{Homer} \textit{Hymn to Apollo} discussed above); indeed, it would not sound, or look, or \textit{be} the same performance without those responses. And, as we noted above, the live, real-time connection and interaction between musical performer(s) and listener(s) (i.e., between the producer of the sounds and the people affected by those sounds) was physical, even corporeal, in a way that other forms of art-making and receiving/enjoying its products (e.g. painting, sculpture, literature) were not.

All of this means that a “piece” of music in antiquity did not really exist apart from the particular musician(s) who were performing it in the moment—though audiences’ memories of that moment, or writers’ descriptions of such a moment, might have their own special valence as well. Certainly tunes attributed to famous performer-composers, mythical or historical, were well-known (e.g., the \textit{aulos}-melodies of Olympus or Marsyas; or the \textit{kitharodic nomes} of Terpander; or the songs from tragedies by Phrynichus, Euripides, and others); but these were likely to be re-performed by later generations in significantly different manner from their original versions.\textsuperscript{45} Annotated musical texts did exist from ca. the late 5\textsuperscript{th} century BCE; but hardly anyone except professional musicians/singers seems to have consulted them.\textsuperscript{46} There was no fixed “String Quartet no. x, op. y”, perennially available in identical form for any ensemble to re-perform. Instrumentalists and singers mostly learned (by ear) from other musicians and singers, and their own subsequent versions of what they had learned were bound always to sound slightly, and distinctively, different.

In this live, real-time musical environment, then, performers were personally producing sounds that directly (and almost instantly) stimulated the ears, brains,


\textsuperscript{45} See e.g. Plato \textit{Symposium} 215a-e and Aristotle \textit{Politics} 8. 5.1339b42-40a10 on Olympus/Marsyas; Plutarch \textit{Life of Nicias} ch. 29 on Athenian captives at Syracuse singing Euripides’ songs; Aristophanes \textit{Wasps} 219-20, 269-70, 1474ff and \textit{Frogs} 910, 1299-1300 for Phrynichus’ songs.

and nervous systems (“souls”) of others, i.e. their listeners or audience. Whether the melody and rhythms of the “piece of music” were of the musician’s own invention, or were his or her version of a traditional tune or of someone else’s original composition (e.g., Olympus, Pindar, Euripides, Timotheus...), the singer and/or instrumentalist was personally present and could usually observe, and to some degree control, the listeners’ reactions. In some cases, a chorus might be simultaneously responding to and co-performing that music in dance and/or song (as in the scene from the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, discussed above). The audience’s responses too constituted an integral element in the whole performance.47 Music thus could never be disembodied, nor disembedded from its cultural context of participatory performance, except in the abstract discussions of the musicologists, mathematicians, and philosophers (whose texts, unlike the melodies and dances, in some cases actually survive for us to read).

These kinds of performance contexts have of course been the norm in most human societies over the centuries, with the real-time connections and interactions between performer(s) and listener(s)/spectator(s) being integral to the whole musical event.48 In general, music is a “social practice,” a group activity. Not only is the musician (singer, instrumentalist) thus making an impact and affecting the listeners directly, but s/he is also personally controlling the pace and dynamics of the interaction between them. And of course many Greek theorists, including Aristotle (as we shall see below), believed that music, highly expressive as it is, somehow contains and conveys ethos (“character”) to the listener’s soul—or at least “something similar to” (homoiooma) or a “representation, expression” (mimēsis) of ethos—, which would seem to mean that the musician, in altering the affective state of that listener, is somehow imparting something of his/her own character or mental-spiritual state to that other person, if only briefly and temporarily,49 and is doing so at his/her own pace and level of intensity. Whereas a reader of a text or viewer of a painting or sculpture can choose how fast to move his/her eyes over the surface, and even perhaps in which order to process the different elements and what to concentrate on, or go back and revisit, out of the mass of visual information that is contained therein, the listener has much less choice about the musical sounds that are being conveyed in a live performance. The tones are arranged in sequence, and it is the performer who decides exactly how fast to deliver them, when to speed up or slow down, when to make them louder or softer or modify the timbre, and when

47 Even in the modern era, a “live” performance by a group/band (unless this musical aggregation happens to be e.g. a symphony orchestra, string quartet, etc., playing a fully written-out museum piece by e.g. Beethoven or Mahler in a silent concert hall) is usually very different, even in “purely musical” terms, from a recording of that same aggregation made and edited in a studio.

48 Recitation of e.g. epic or iambic poetry (which usually was not accompanied by music) likewise was “live”—as Plato’s Ion vividly depicts— but usually involved delivering words composed by someone other than the reciter (Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, etc.), and these texts came subsequently to be incorporated into the school curriculum as “literature”. Drama is an important special case that deserves fuller discussion than I can provide here.

49 This issue of course raises the notorious question, whether the “emotion, affect” contained in a piece of music consists solely of formal properties (pitches, rhythms, timbres, formal arrangement of tones) or is somehow “expressive” or “imitative” of actual human feelings and moods. In Greek terms: can a cowardly musician perform a brave and warlike song convincingly? Can a man compose “female-sounding” music (as Agathon claims to do in Aristophanes’ Thesmophoriazusae); see e.g. Halliwell (2002, pp. 234-249).
to draw the performance to a close. The musician is in control, and the listener depends on
the musician to bring the listening experience to a satisfying conclusion at his/her own pace.
Certainly there will be musical occasions on which the listeners’ responses significantly
affect the pace and dynamics of the musician’s performance, and, as we have seen, collective
music-making by a group is quite common (in a way that collective writing or painting or
sculpting is not); but still the degree of live interaction and of the listener’s dependency on
the performer’s choices and taste is much greater than in other art forms. Thus, generally
speaking, the musician exercises a significant degree of power over his/her listeners, and
in contexts in which the social status of the performer is lower than that of the listener, or
the gender is different—and such contexts were very common in the Greek world—this
psychagogic dynamic is potentially quite awkward and filled with social tension.50 For an
author (political theorist) like Aristotle, who regards technically expert musicians and other
skilled craftsmen as “low-class, vulgar” (banausos, Politics 8. 2. 1337b8-10, 6. 1340b40-
41b18; etc.), to allow one’s ears and soul to be stimulated so affectively by well-played
music (especially aulos-music employing non-Dorian modes), in the theater and elsewhere,
would seem to be jeopardizing the autonomy and self-mastery essential to proper adult
citizen mentality and behavior—and Aristotle acknowledges that in many cities of his day
this is just what is happening.51

This awkwardness, in terms of the relative social (and perhaps educational)
disparity between performer and listener(s) helps to explain why both Plato and
Aristotle are so concerned to disassociate musical performers of the more virtuosic
type from the rest of the citizen population, and to recommend that these full-time,
professional musicians be supervised and regulated by law-givers or other aesthetically
enlightened citizens.52 These critics are aware that the musicians themselves might
actually be masters of all kinds of exciting melodies and rhythms that nobody else is
able to play53—and they worry that these musicians cannot, or should not, be trusted
to select the most appropriate tunes for every occasion: someone else (a philosopher-
judge, or festival-organizer) has to be given that responsibility. Any such suggestion
for regulating an activity such as mathematics, or philosophy, or even painting,
would of course seem absurd (would Plato want mathematically-inexpert citizens
to tell his philosophers what kind of geometry to pursue, and when...?); but music

50 Similar observations/complaints are made about the “charming” effects of a skilled orator in manipulating, dominating, and
even bewitching his audience = psychagogía (Plato Gorgias, Phaedrus; ps. Longinus On the Sublime; etc.; cf. De Romilly,
1975; Halliwell, 2011), Porter (2016), and below pp. 244-247.

51 Plato at times adopts the ingenious, if unconvincing, solution to this problem, of suggesting that the musician (or rhapsode, 
or song-writer) is not really the source of the bewitching and affective sounds and language that the audience hears—these
come ultimately/originally from the gods/Muses (e.g., via the “chain” of magnetic rings of which the actual performer is only
the last and the least responsible: Ion 533d-536d; cf. Phaedrus 244a-245c). By contrast, Aristotle’s notion of enthousiasmos
(“inspiration, possession, excitement”, discussed below, pp. 244-247), even if it might suggest some degree of “divine”
origin for the music-induced arousal experienced by listeners, does not seem to be employed in such a way as to deny to the
performer full control over his/her musical creativity and output; cf. Halliwell (2012, pp. 236-249).

52 So e.g. Plato Laws, Aristotle Politics 8.

53 Except the Muses themselves, of course—so suggests Plato’s Athenian in the Laws (2. 669a-c, and passim), an interesting and
revealing angle on the imagined gender of Greek music (p. 244-247).
was felt by utopian social engineers to be too affective and ethically impactful to be left unsupervised. The discussions in both the Laws and Aristotle’s Politics are thus revealing for the degree of anxiety that they reveal about the performer’s supposed power to affect his\textsuperscript{54} audience; and for moralists like Plato (in the Republic) and— to a lesser degree— Aristotle (in both the Poetics and the Politics), the Theater of Dionysus was an especially anxiety-provoking venue, given that several thousand impressionable audience members might be exposed there to the superior musical talents of star actor-singers and pipe-players.\textsuperscript{55}

When—as often in the ancient Greek context, as in many other parts of the world today— music is \textit{accompanied by dance}, then the audience’s/spectators’ responses are additionally complicated—enhanced, we might say—by those extra visual and corporeal dimensions, though the main dynamic remains largely the same. The chief difference is that the corporeal and visual elements of the whole performance are more elaborately arranged and may comprise proportionately a larger component of the overall impact than in the case of solo and/or stationary music-making. Ancient Greek dance—both its social role and the aesthetics of spectator response—has been the focus of numerous studies in recent years, and our understanding of choral performance (\textit{choreia}) as an institution, with its elements of religious ritual, group self-presentation, and adolescent training constituting a distinctive and ideologically charged “ordering force” within a community, has been greatly enhanced.\textsuperscript{56} But the role of the “actual music” in these performances has not always received much attention.\textsuperscript{57}

19\textsuperscript{th} century European discussions of the “fine arts” emphasized those aspects of art (music, painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry) that were divorced from the body and from practical functionality, and this was the period during which Eduard Hanslick’s notions of “pure music”, “music for itself”, came into prominence. Similar currents of formalist opinion can be found here and there in ancient Greek aesthetic writings;\textsuperscript{58} but for the most part it seems to have been taken for granted that music performed useful social and psychological functions, and that it helped to get things done in daily life. Thus for most Greek music-lovers of the Classical period there

\textsuperscript{54} Csapo and Slater (1995), Csapo (2004). Both Plato and Aristotle use masculine nouns— and Plato in this passage even terms them \textit{poëtai} “poets” rather than musicians!

\textsuperscript{55} Wilson (2000), Csapo (2002), Hall (2002), Roselli (2012). We may note that in actual practice no festival organizers, whether in Athens or elsewhere, is ever recorded as having made any attempt to instruct dithyrambists or kitharodars in advance what kinds of music to play. The anecdotes that we find of musicians being punished for playing unsuitable, new-fangled tunes at this or that festival (esp. in Sparta) are few and mostly of very dubious authenticity: see e.g. the testimonia regarding Timotheus’ performances at Sparta (Barker, 1984, pp. 95-97; Campbell, 1988; LeVen, 2014); also the musical/religious career of Orpheus in Aeschylus’ \textit{Lycurgia} (\textit{Edonians & Bassarids}).

\textsuperscript{56} Calame (1997), Stehle (1997), Lonsdale (1993), Naerebout (1997), Wilson (2000), Kowalzig (2007), Peponi (2009), Budelmann and Power (2015), and Olsen (2017). Outside the field of Classics, dance studies have grown to cover a wide range of sub-disciplines, some with an anthropological focus, others with more of an aesthetic and theoretical orientation: see esp. Foster (1986) and Olsen (2017), with further references.

\textsuperscript{57} See Mullen (1983), Kowalzig (2007), and Peponi (2012; 2013), however, for valuable exceptions.

\textsuperscript{58} Porter (2010; 2016), Halliwell (2002; 2012), and below p. 243.
was no clear distinction between music as a “fine” art and as a “performing” art or practical craft.⁵⁹

Elite ambivalence, or even downright hostility, towards virtuoso instrumental and vocal performance appears to have grown stronger during the course of the 5th century, especially in relation to “theater music” (which included tragedy, satyr-play, comedy, and dithyramb, all of them performed in honor of Dionysus and all employing expert pipe-players as well as choruses). With the addition of extra strings to the *kithara* and movable sleeves and keys for the *auloi*, together with the institution of prizes for actors in dramatic competitions,⁶⁰ it became possible for composers and performers to present modulating melodies and vocal or instrumental timbres of greater complexity, volume, and expressive capacity than ever before—capacities that were only attainable by means of extended and intensive practice and specialization.⁶¹ Star musicians and actors were thus more sharply marked-off than before from ordinary, amateur performers. Increasingly, elite men found themselves concentrating on purely verbal skills, rather than musical, and on developing a range of vocal expression that was confined to the exacting, but limited, performance spaces of the schools, law-courts, council-chamber, and assembly. “Attic Oratory” and “Rhetorics—and also historiography—thus became the names of the game, in terms of expressive and competitive male self-presentation—and within that oratorical arena, intense but tightly constricted debates could be conducted around the proper degree of voice-modulation, histrionic gesturing, and verbal selection (which in due course evolved into Ciceronian discussions of Asianism vs Atticism, etc.).⁶² Some elites even eschewed the arts of public verbal performance (rhetoric) in the name of “philosophy” and written argumentation. Within Athens itself, acting and music-making seem increasingly to have been assigned to non-Athenians; and at the same time prejudices arose against (especially) those musical arts that were practiced at a high level by other communities, most conspicuously, Thebes/Boeotia and the Anatolian sea-board, even while the star musicians from those regions continued to enjoy considerable popular success in the Theater of Dionysus at Athens and at other regional and national competitions.

The most conspicuous case of such regional prejudice that can be traced from the existing sources is that of the Athenians’ cultural bias against the music of Thebes and of Boeotia as a whole. This bias meshed conveniently with the growing elite disparagement during the later 5th century BCE of the pipes (*auloi*) in favor of the strings (lyre and *kithara*), which we have already noted. Thebes, rivalled only by the island of

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⁵⁹ But see pp. 242-244 below, for Aristotle’s attempt to draw such distinctions and discuss their implications.

⁶⁰ On the growing vocal skills (especially highlighted in solo arias composed for tragedies) and popular appeal of professional actors during the 5th-4th centuries BCE, see Hall (1999; 2002), and further Easterling and Hall (2002), Csapo (2004).

⁶¹ Csapo (2004).

⁶² Such debates are nicely represented in e.g. Cicero’s *Brutus* and Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ *Preface* to his treatises on *The Ancient Orators*. One branch of that male arena of competition actually eschewed altogether public performance: thus Isocrates, Plato, and (as a “historian”) Thucydides preferred the written word to the spoken, each in his different mode. In all three cases, they presented influential programmatic statements about their disavowal of “agonistic,” public, and acoustic performance.
Lesbos, could boast the most distinguished track record of musical achievement, both within the Greek mythological tradition and in historical fact — whereas Athens’ own claims to indigenous musical distinction were very modest (almost non-existent). Boeotia as a whole (of which Thebes was the largest and most powerful polis) was famed for being the source (Lake Copais) of most of the reeds manufactured and used in Greek pipes (auloi), and the various festivals in musical at the Valley of the Muses and elsewhere (including nearby Delphi) stood in marked contrast to Athens’ largely imported and more recently developed musical culture (most notably the Panathenaic festival, and the cult of Dionysus Eleuthereus, both introduced, it appears, during the 6th century by the Peisistratid family). The popular stories of Athena’s rejection of the reed-pipes and of Apollo’s musical victory over the satyr Marsyas (i.e., a victory of strings (kithara) over pipes (auloi) as well as of Greek over Asian) and his savage mutilation of Marsyas afterwards, seem to have come into existence only in the mid-5th century and to have been especially popular in Athens. Doubtless plenty of other regional and ethnic prejudices existed within Greek musical culture overall; but rarely are they as fully documented as this case, which is of course the result of Athens’ preeminence as a source of literary and visual (ceramic) evidence for this period.

It is within this context of a more highly developed professionalism and new levels of virtuosity among singers and instrumentalists from the 5th century onwards, and a consequent intensity of elite ambivalence concerning direct participation of citizens (especially adult men) in public music-making (and especially an ethnically-tinged disapproval of the auloi), that we need to consider and evaluate Plato’s and Aristotle’s respective discussions of the role(s) of music within society. The value that we attach to each of these revered theorists is likely to shape our interpretation of the whole Greek music “scene” and of Greek notions of music in general. The numerous comments, descriptions, and recommendations that we find scattered throughout Plato’s dialogues have of course exerted enormous influence on subsequent generations of music historians, musicologists, and aestheticians – but they probably exercised far less influence on Plato’s own contemporaries and immediate successors. It is perhaps surprising to see how often modern scholars quote the views of Plato’s Socrates (as expressed especially in Book 3 of the Republic) or of the Athenian Visitor (in the Laws) as if these represented typical and widely-held Greek attitudes.

63 Athens seems to have had no home-grown individual musical performers to set beside such distinguished Thebans and Boeotians as Amphion, Harmonia, Dionysus, Linus, Hesiod and the Muses at Mt Helicon (Theespiae); Pindar (renowned as a pipe-player and -teacher as well as a poet); Pronomos, Potamon; etc. (see above, p. 219). The island of Lesbos likewise was much more distinguished than Athens for its musical heritage; and other cities such as Sparta, Sicyon, and Milletus also had distinctive claims to musical fame.


65 For regional and ethnic distinctions within the ancient Greek music scene at large, see now Panegyres 2017. The significance of the regional/dialectal labels assigned to the different musical modes (Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, Ionian, Aeolian, etc.) is a complicated matter, and by no means fully understood. (This issue is not really addressed by Panegyres 2017.) I will not attempt to sort it out here, beyond stating that whatever regional connections these terms may once have had in relation to musical modes, these were no longer operative during the Classical period.
It is more prudent, from a sociological perspective, to be skeptical about accepting anything that is presented as a point of view or opinion in Plato, unless we first apply several grains of salt; and certainly a high proportion of the chief recommendations that we find expressed in Plato’s dialogues (e.g., about morality, epistemology, or psychology) deviate fairly widely from normal Greek notions and practices.

Thus the recommendations made by Socrates in the Republic in favor of strings and the Dorian mode, rejecting pipes and other modes such as Lydian, Ionian, etc., seem to be, as we have noted already, typical of a particular 5th-4th century strand of elite Athenian theorizing about music, rather than reflecting mainstream social attitudes or the most prevalent musical practices and tastes. Likewise, almost all Platonic and Neo-Platonic/Pythagorean theorizing about numbers and ratios as being the key to musical betterment and understanding (including the theory of the “Harmony of the Spheres”) is easily recognized as a minority obsession—one that certainly became mainstream during later antiquity and the Middle Ages, but in the Classical period was soundly debunked already by many and disregarded by almost everyone. Similarly too, the extensive discussion of choral performances in Plato’s Laws, with their meticulous stipulations about the particular modes and styles appropriate to the different genders and age-groups of this or that chorus, are being presented at a period in the mid-4th century BCE when chorality (as we noted) was already in decline as an institution. As for Aristotle: we will return to his (generally more mainstream and reliable) commentaries and recommendations, later in this article.

Overall, however, we may say that the elite tradition of musicological interpretation in general (i.e., not only Plato) assigned the highest degree of prestige and aesthetic distinction to three kinds of musical “activity”: (i) listening to music played in public on stringed instruments by experts (i.e. kitharists and kitharōdes), usually with a vocal component as well, and sometimes accompanied also by a group of dancers; (ii) singing and dancing oneself publicly in a chorus, usually in one’s adolescence or youth (usually with a professional instrumentalist contributing significantly to the overall performance); (iii) singing solo with one’s own accompaniment on the lyre at a private symposium for peers (male or female, i.e. men usually playing for men, women playing for women, as seems to have been the case e.g. for Sappho and her companions, and for many female groups depicted on 5th century Athenian Red-Figure vase paintings). All three of those activities were universally regarded as being appropriate for free-born citizens of all statuses, even while the custom of

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66 All available evidence confirms that aulos-playing and the use of Phrygian, Lydian, Ionian etc. melodic patterns persisted for many generations after Plato (e.g. in the Theater of Dionysus), to widespread popular acclaim and elite appreciation (including that of Aristotle, as we shall see). The “New” musical forms mocked by Aristophanes in the Frogs were clearly very popular with mass audiences: see Barker (1984, pp. 93-98), Casp (2004), and LeVen (2014). (As for the question, why Plato’s Socrates in the Republic accepts Phrygian melodies into Kallipolis [whereas Aristotle bans them from his educational program for the young, while still encouraging their use in various public venues, including the Theater], this need not be addressed directly here: see Gostoli (1995), Pelosi (2010), Barker (2005; 2012).

67 For example Aristotle De Caelo 2.9.290b-91a.
participating actively as a chorus-member seems gradually to have declined from the 6th into the 4th century BCE (as we have noted). The same may also be true of symphonic music-making: for, whereas lyric poetry-texts and also vase-paintings of the 6th-5th century regularly represent individual elites singing and playing the chelys-lyre or the barbitos, or in some cases singing to the accompaniment of someone else’s (slave, or other professional) pipe-playing, by the 4th century such active music-making seems to become less common among elites, and instead the activity of listening and discriminating critique of music played by others has become the ideal. And we may perhaps add a fourth source of musical prestige –perhaps the highest-ranked of all– the act of presiding over a musical event, i.e. performing the role of “producer” or sponsor or “impresario”. The chorēgos (lit. “chorus-master”, i.e. producer) who funds and organizes a victorious choral group for a dithyramb or tragedy competition at the Great Dionysia in Athens receives high honors indeed, including the right to lead a procession dressed in a scarlet robe and wearing a gold crown, and then to erect a large, inscribed public monument (a tripod on a marble pedestal) that would stand for decades or even centuries to come, in his own honor. Likewise numerous honorific inscriptions in various regions of Greece celebrate the generosity of the ἀγονοθεταί (“festival organizers”) who preside over the various musical contests, at which musicians and actors (usually members of the guild of Artists of Dionysus (Dionysou Technitai) would sign contracts for stipulated fees, and would then compete for cash prizes among themselves. Here the discrepancy between the actual performing “artists” and the higher-status “producers” is perhaps at its most explicit –less mystified than the scene in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo discussed above, in which both Apollo as lead-performer and Zeus as presiding authority receive full honor.

**Sound Effects, Affect, and Psychology: Aristotle On Perception, Hearing, and Voice (Phōnē)**

Of all the ancient writers who discuss the nature, value, and social functions of music, by far the most wide-ranging and insightful is Aristotle (along with his disciples and successors), and his descriptions and analyses will be central to much of what follows in this article. Aside from his direct consideration of the effects and uses of music in its various aspects, Aristotle has interesting and pertinent observations to offer about the basic physical and psychological processes of hearing. In Book 2 of his brief, densely-packed treatise On Psychology (usually referred to by the Latin form of its title, De Anima), Aristotle enters into a systematic discussion of perception

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68 For Plato’s nostalgic program in the Laws, see Bobonich, and the papers in Pepone (2013), passim; also Prauscello (2014).
69 For illustrations on Athenian vases of music-making, see Bundrick (2005). On the growing tendency for elites to prefer listening and critiquing to actually playing music, see Aristotle Politics Book 8 (discussed below) and Ford 2003 (though the focus there is more on literature than on music).
70 Wilson 2000; further examples (mainly of the Hellenistic and Roman periods) from all over the Greek world are discussed in Csapo and Slater (1995), LeGuen (2001), Manieri (2009).
(aisthèsis), in which he devotes a couple of pages (chapter 8) to sound and hearing (419b3 peri psophou kai akoēs). He does not discuss music specifically in this work (we have to go to the Politics and the Poetics for that); but his account in De Anima 2.8 of sound-production and hearing is consistent with what he says about music and its effects on the human “soul” in other works, and illuminates nicely the “liveness” of musical events in the Greek world and in ancient societies in general. Aristotle’s account of perception steers a careful course between the wholesale materialist theories of Presocratic predecessors such as Empedocles and Democritus, on the one hand, and the mind-body dualism of his teacher, Plato, on the other, as he explores the physical and physiological processes of seeing, touching, smelling, tasting and hearing, and considers too the faculties of memory and imagination (phantasia) that enable people (and some animals) to recall sounds and sights that are no longer directly present.

For Aristotle, hearing is a particularly physical and corporeal process. All sounds that are heard (psophoi) involve a series of physical impacts. A sound is generated in the first place by an impact, a “striking” (plēgē, plēttein 419b10-13, 435b11; 419b21-22; ruptein 419b12, 420a20; krouein, krouma 420a23, 424a32), and this impact moves the air continuously in a certain pattern until –almost but not quite instantaneously– it causes the (previously motionless) air inside a listener’s ear to be moved in response.

Sound (psophos) that occurs in actuality is always the sound of something, against something, and in something; for what makes it is an impact (plēgē). ...A thing [or individual] is productive of sound, then, if it can move air ... continuously as far as the [organ of] hearing. Air is intrinsic by nature to hearing: because it [the organ of hearing] is in air, when the air outside is moved, that inside is moved too. (De Anima 2.8. 419b 9-11; 420a3-6)

In terms of a musical performance, this means that the air that is set in motion by a singer or by the reed of an aulos or string of a lyre stirs the air inside a listener’s ear

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71 The title of this work in Greek is Peri Psychēs. For the most part I follow the Oxford Classical Text of David Ross (1956), and I have consulted esp. the translations and commentaries of Ross (1961), Hicks (1907) and Polansky (2007).

72 We possess discussions of human music and of sound and voice of a rather piecemeal kind in additional works of the Aristotelian corpus that were presumably composed by his students or successors, notably the Problemata (ch. 19. 917b-923a Peri Harmonian); cf. Barker 1984: 190-204, and the short pamphlet On Things Heard (Peri Akoustōn = De Audibilibus). Two of Aristotle’s most distinguished students, Theophrastus and (esp.) Aristoxenus went on to write full-scale studies of music and music theory. Aristotle himself also discusses aisthèsis (“perception”, including hearing) and phantasia (“imagination”) in relation to non-human animals in his monumental Investigation into Animals (= Historia Animalium).

73 Plato and his followers were committed to the notion of an immaterial, immortal soul, residing (somehow, mysteriously) in a defective, corruptible, and undependable material body whose physical sensations, perceptions, appetites, reactions, and impressions are never to be trusted, in contrast to the reasoning powers and potential for true knowledge possessed by the soul and its nous (intellect). For Aristotle, by contrast, the psychē is not an immaterial thing; but it is also not an actual physical entity and cannot exist by itself: it is a dynamic faculty, or combination of faculties, that enables a living organism to feel, move, grow, reproduce, etc. –rather like the combination of electrical current plus software that makes a digital machine function. Despite these radical differences, Plato’s brief account of hearing at Timaeus 67a-c is remarkably similar in several respects to Aristotle’s in De Anima 2.8 (see next n.), though Plato’s other remarks about sound and music at Timaeus 46c-e seem to be on quite a different wavelength.
and makes the ear-drum respond more or less exactly to—even to replicate—that initial movement. So far, this material, corporeal sequence of impacts and reactions is easy to understand, and seems uncontroversial. But it is less easy to grasp precisely what kind of “movement” Aristotle thinks is taking place in the listener’s psyche itself, in response to the movement of the ear-drum. 74 The activities of the “soul”, in Aristotle’s system, cover roughly what we think of as the operations of the brain and nervous system, though Aristotle did not in fact recognize the important role played by the brain in human sensation, cognition, and emotion and tended instead to locate such operations in the areas around the heart and other internal organs. The nerves and nervous system had not yet been discovered in Aristotle’s era either. 75 So how did Aristotle think that the soul was “moved” by external stimuli, and what did this “movement” consist of?

Even without an understanding of the nervous system (let alone of electric currents, cells, synapses, hormones, etc.), Aristotle did recognize that sensory stimuli could be received all over the body and yet could almost immediately be apprehended by the central faculties of perception, feeling, and thought (the psyche), whether these faculties be located in the heart and internal organs or in the brain (ancient opinions differed on this). His way of describing what the soul actually was and how it could receive, assimilate and interpret such physical signals from the sense organs was generally framed in terms of the psyche’s being the (immaterial) “form” <as it were, the operating system> of the living (material) body, or of its being the faculties of the living body in action, with the psyche receiving the “form” (eidos) or “pattern” (logos) of any material/external stimulus without any of the matter itself. Thus the soul does indeed undergo a kind of “movement” (kinēsis) and a “change, alteration”, even while this change or movement is not actually (any longer) corporeal (see esp. De Anima 2.12. 424a17-34). 76

If we may extrapolate further from Aristotle’s discussion of seeing and sight, where he goes into more detail about what it is that the soul acquires when it receives a stimulus from a sense-organ, we can tentatively conclude that in the case of hearing he thinks that this is the logos or eidos (the “pattern”, or “form”) of the original source-sound. Thus, though the actual vibrating air is not incorporated into the psyche (which would be impossible—unimaginable—since the psyche is not a material object) when actual hearing and actual sound come together (hama gignetai), the psyche does undergo a movement/change/adjustment/alteration/affection 77 in its arrangement, i.e. in terms of its functioning

74 Exactly what Aristotle thinks the psyche is and how it works, in material terms, is a large and complicated question that we need not attempt to resolve completely here: see previous note, and what follows in the text; also, Hicks (1907), Halliwell (2002), Caston (2005), Polansky (2007), and Shields (2016), with further references.

75 This discovery occurred about a century later, and its implications were explored above all in antiquity by Galen.

76 For this stage of the process (from movement of air in the ear to “movement” of the soul/mind) we need to go both to De Anima 2.12. 424a12ff, and to Book 8 of the Politics, where we find Aristotle employing terms such as pathos (“reaction, affect”), alloiosis (“alteration”), metabolē (“change”) as well as kinēsis tis (“a kind of movement”) See below, pp. 246-247 (on responses to enthusiastic music in Aristotle’s Politics).

77 This “movement/change/alteration/state of feeling” is variously described by Aristotle as kinēsis, metabolē, alloiosis, pathos.
and affective state.\textsuperscript{78} And this alteration (though Aristotle does not spell this out) apparently must bring the listener’s soul into a closer alignment, temporarily, with that of the sound-maker. So in the case of a musical performance, each listener is necessarily being affected by the musician’s own personal mood or character – or at least, by the mood (\textit{pathos}) and musical “character” (\textit{ēthos}) that the musician’s performance has created, whether through his/her own nature or through skill/art (\textit{technē}), in a process that both Aristotle himself and, in a previous century Aristophanes’ Agathon, had termed \textit{mimēsis}.\textsuperscript{79}

In the \textit{Politics} (8. 1340a18-41) Aristotle comments that, whereas most types of sensation are devoid of moral or ethical content (completely so in the case of touch, smell, and taste, while visual stimuli convey such content “only slightly” through colors and shapes), music can convey strong “likenesses” (\textit{homoioëmatata}) or “representations, expressions” (\textit{mimēseis}) of particular moral qualities, emotional moods, or aspects of character (\textit{ēthos}): “In melodies and rhythms... there are likenesses that are especially close/analogous to real human nature” (\textit{malista para tas alēthinas phuseis}) – likenesses of anger and gentleness, of courage and of moderation... And we change <in> our soul as we listen to such <melodies and rhythms> (\textit{metaballomen tēn psuchēn akroōmenoi toiotūtōn})”. As Stephen Halliwell comments, “The qualities of music... are taken by Aristotle to have a direct communicative effect on the mind and emotions of the (appropriately receptive) hearer, who ... seems to experience the appropriate feelings as a necessary part of listening to the music: the listener’s mind is “changed” in the very act of listening.”\textsuperscript{80} And we may add, that “change” is brought about by musicians who are present in person and are intentionally “moving, changing” us.

However we decide to interpret Aristotle’s account of the \textit{psychē}’s movement in response to sensory stimuli such as sounds,\textsuperscript{81} the live and almost instantaneous connectivity between sound-producer and listener is unmistakably acknowledged by this account, while the stimulating function of air-vibration provides a vibrantly haptic dimension to voice-production and -reception that we need to keep in mind when we consider how music works on listeners, a dimension that is not always acknowledged in ancient or modern discussions.

\textsuperscript{78} The “movements, changes” that occur in the eye when it sees something are less palpable and less easy to observe and describe than the movements of air within the inner ear when it hears something. See further Caston (2005) with full discussion of Aristotle’s views.

\textsuperscript{79} For Agathon, see Aristophanes \textit{Thesmophoriazuae} 35-265, discussed briefly above (nn. 37 and 49). For \textit{mimēsis} in ancient Greek aesthetic discourse overall, esp. in Aristotle, see Halliwell (2002).

\textsuperscript{80} Halliwell 2002: 243 (and cf. his further discussion at 2011: 238-44, where he focuses primarily on \textit{katharsis}). Halliwell’s detailed analyses of Aristotle’s views in the \textit{Poetics} and \textit{Politics} (particularly in Halliwell, 2002, 2011) explore carefully the various ways in which music (according to Aristotle) is able to “express” (or “represent”, \textit{mimēsēhai}), but also “affect” and “move” (\textit{kineisthai}) \textit{ēthos} in the soul of a listener – however those complex terms are to be understood; I find his account mainly very helpful and convincing. Helpful too is Sifakis 2001, who does not agree with Halliwell on all points. But this is not the place for me to attempt to explore all the (large and important) questions of “character” and music’s moral/ethical component, as theorized by Aristotle and other ancient authors.

\textsuperscript{81} Plato’s account at \textit{Timaeus} 67a-c is similarly coy as to how the movements of air received through the ears are conveyed to an area “near the heart” so that the soul (\textit{psychē}) can apprehend and interpret them.
In purely material terms, then, the “movement” of air that a musician produces makes a direct impact and temporarily “moves, affects, changes” the sense organs and psychological apparatus (psychē) of the listener, in a process that is to a considerable degree controlled by the musician through the chosen sequence of tones, patterns of rhythm, tempo, and timbre of voice or instrument. Obviously most Greeks of the Archaic and Classical periods did not hold fully worked-out theories about perception in general (aisthēsis), about the process of hearing (akoē), or about the definition and nature of psychē (“soul”), as Aristotle did – but I think we can take Aristotle’s views as being in most respects common-sensical and consistent with the widely observed facts of everyday experience available to the Greeks in general, insofar as anybody can see that a lyre-string vibrates when it is struck, and anybody can feel his or her throat and tongue vibrating when s/he speaks or sings, and likewise can feel the impact of loud sounds on/inside the ear.

Thus, whether or not we (or Aristotle’s contemporaries) may choose to buy completely into the details of his analysis of sound-perception, Aristotle is articulating a direct and easily observed connectivity between sound-source and listener. 82 In his other works, esp. the Politics and Poetics, Aristotle discusses in more general terms the “reactions, affect” (pathos) and “movements” (kinesis) and “changes” (alloiōsis) that the psychē undergoes when it is excited and affected by music, and the natural pleasure that all human beings derive in general from rhythmos and harmonia (i.e., rhythms, and tones and different melodic patterns). 83 All in all, then, the “movements” and changing “pattern, arrangement” that a listener experiences in his/her psyche while hearing music played is somehow both a mechanical, material reaction generated by a series of impacts and the resultant disturbances of air, and also a pattern of feelings (moods, emotions, character traits) that the musician has personally produced and that s/he is continuously manipulating/modulating as s/he plays or sings.

Modern neuroscience has advanced considerably beyond Aristotle, to be sure, in its ability to track and even explain (or at least “account for”, according to various criteria) some of the emotional and psychological effects that are triggered in the brain by listening to (certain kinds of) music – whether these brains be of birds or of humans. 84 But most modern experiments on humans are conducted with recorded music; so the issue of the visual elements of performance and of the personal interaction between performer and listener characteristic of live music-making are generally absent.

82 He also adds (De Anima 2.8.420b5–421a6) a fascinating discussion of “voice” (phōne) that personalizes this connection still further. According to Aristotle, only air-breathing creatures with souls and the capacity for “imagination” (phantasia) have a real “voice”, and the function of that voice is to “make sounds that communicate” (420b32 sēmantikos... tis psophos estin kē phōne) – and ultimately, to help them “live well” (420b19 heneka tou eu).

83 Aristotle Politics 8.5.1340b17-18 (and cf. 1340a4-6); Poetics 4. 1448b20-21; also cf. Plato Laws 2.653d-654a. See further below, pp. 240-247.

84 See e.g. Small (1998), Wallin et al. (2000), Levitin (2005), Patel (2008), Bicknell (2009), Salimpoor et al. (2011); also (from an earlier era) Meyer (1956).
Aristotle’s Sociology of Musical Types and Effects

For a more systematic discussion of music’s effects and of the different social functions that music is assigned in human societies, we turn to Aristotle’s Politics. Unlike so many of the Pythagoreans and Platonists (and later neo-Platonists), whose belief in the ethical value and effect of music (along with related ideas about numbers and ratios) dominated their whole outlook, –with results that often look very quaint to modern readers– Aristotle, who never set out to be an actual musicologist (he left that to his distinguished pupil Aristoxenus), strikes most modern readers as being remarkably sane and normal in his assessment of music’s psychological impact and social value. His is by far the most useful and balanced ethnomusicological and functionalist account of music that we possess from antiquity. In his Politics (Book 8, passim), Aristotle assigns a remarkably prominent position to music: his whole treatise in fact concludes (whether or not he intended this to be anything close to its “conclusion”) with a discussion of just what the point, or value, of music is in society, and how music of different kinds is or should be played and listened to. Aristotle has no doubt that music is immensely and universally enjoyable; that it is mostly good for people; and that it belongs in the youthful education and adult leisure pursuits of the citizens of his ideal polis-community. But he is also scratching his head a bit (1337b27 “one might be puzzled...”, diaporēseien an tis) as to what exactly it is that music does for people –all kinds of people, children and adults, the best and the wisest as well as the more impressionable and vulgar– that is so worthwhile and beneficial.

Aristotle turns out to be a uniquely helpful source of information and ideas about the social aspects of ancient Greek musical performance, and the different kinds of effects, impacts, affects, and altered states that it can produce. Unlike Plato, whose dialogues present playful, often facetious discussions that recognize no obligation to be self-consistent or believable, and that often go out of their way to ridicule or parody widely-held views of the time, Aristotle can generally be trusted to report fairly straightforwardly what he takes to be the “commonly held opinions” of his contemporaries (endoxa) and to take these seriously as deserving discussion. His own tastes and opinions also seem to be in many respects fairly normal and typically Greek (in contrast, again, to Plato’s): sexist, racist, elitist though Aristotle may be, he nonetheless belongs among the mainstream in most of his basic assumptions about the nature and purpose of human existence. In particular, he recognizes the positive value of pleasure, bodily as well as spiritual/mental, and of material goods as well as intellectual ones, and he is especially interested in the pleasures provided by music.

Aristotle emphasizes the importance and pervasiveness of music in human communities, and devotes considerable attention to the question of how it ought to be
deployed in his model polis: indeed the *Politics* ends with his discussion of music.\textsuperscript{85} He recognizes that music in general both is enjoyable (for everyone, of all ages and character-types: 1340a1-5) in acoustic/sensory terms (i.e., the sounds of music are pleasant to our ears –and Aristotle, unlike Plato, does not insist that sung words are important for an essentially musical response) and he makes it clear throughout his discussion that music contributes significantly to the well-being of the various (disparate) members of any given society— even while he also argues, like Plato, that certain kinds of music, listened to in the correct manner, may provide a superior benefit for those who are discriminating enough to appreciate them. In his (rather rambling, and in places disjointed) analysis,\textsuperscript{86} Aristotle ends up laying out a basic framework in which musics of different kinds, performed implicitly by different practitioners and explicitly for different audiences, are to be classified in five basic categories, each of which serves a somewhat different social function— though it seems that in some cases the same musical performance might fall into more than one category, depending on its audience.\textsuperscript{87}

Aristotle’s categories of musical types, or functions, are not as neatly and tidily laid out for us as we might wish. In fact, he deploys two different systems for categorizing music: one in terms of types of melodies (according to the way that “some philosophers distinguish/define things” (1341b32-34 ὧσ διαίρουσι τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίαι), and the other in terms of his own observation of music’s psycho-social effects. According to the first system (that of “some philosophers”), there are three basic types of melody: “ethical”, “practical”, and “enthusiastic.”\textsuperscript{88} According to the second system, which forms the organizing principle for most of Aristotle’s discussion in Book 8, there are five main functions for music in society: (i) relaxation, release of stress, fun (anapausis, anesis, paidiâ); (ii) ethical improvement, especially for the young; (iii) leisured/aesthetic critique and appreciation (diagôgê); (iv) practical

\textsuperscript{85} This discussion occurs in the course of Aristotle’s larger discussion of education, which has led some commentators to try to limit Aristotle’s comments to their potential educational implications. But it should be obvious to even a casual reader of the *Politics* that Aristotle’s interest in music here, and the range of his discussion, has expanded to include a much wider consideration of the function(s) of music within any community, and of the different ways in which different kinds of people (not all of them potential citizens of his ideal polis) enjoy and are affected by music.

\textsuperscript{86} Scholars agree that Aristotle did not publish the *Politics* and did not in fact “complete” the work, whether or not he composed it all more or less at the same time and with a consistent program in mind (about which scholars disagree: see e.g. Lord [1982], Kraut [1997], Halliwell [2002], Sifakis [2001]; also Kidd [2016]).

\textsuperscript{87} This whole lengthy passage presents several minor detours and also a number of textual difficulties and uncertainties, even while the main threads of Aristotle’s argument remain fairly clear and self-consistent. Scholars disagree as to how relevant Aristotle’s remarks in the *Poetics* about rhythms and harmonia, and about melos and hêdasmenos logos, or his discussions of the effects of sound on the body and soul in any of the more technical works of the Aristotelian corpus (De Anima, De Audibilibus, Problemata) are for the interpretation of the *Politics*. In particular, debates about his references to katharsis in both *Poetics* and *Politics* have caused endless disagreement. In what follows I will not be going into much detail about any of this; but my own opinion is that there is no good reason not to read these works and these passages in light of one another. In general, for commentary and interpretation of the musical content of *Politics* 8, see the references in the previous n.

\textsuperscript{88} Of these three categories, “ethical” and “enthusiastic” are discussed in detail by Aristotle, but “practical” (praktikos), as a term applied to harmonia, is never explained by him and only crops up twice or three times altogether in the *Politics*. See next n. and below, pp. 242-247.
activity, i.e. getting things done in daily life,\textsuperscript{89} and (v) arousal of strong emotion and affective states \textit{(enthusiasmos)}. In what follows I will consider all five categories as being included in Aristotle’s overall scheme of musical things.

But before we examine in more detail these five categories, we need to pause to clarify an important question concerning the short-term vs long-term “ethical” impact of music on the soul, according to Aristotle. As he launches himself into his discussion of the role of music in the education of young future citizens, he characteristically pauses to raise some fundamental questions:

It isn’t easy to define what power/effect/value \textit{(dunamis)} music has, nor why \textit{(tinos... kharin)} we should engage with it, whether (i) for the sake of fun \textit{(paidiā)} and relaxation \textit{(anapausis)}... or rather (ii) whether one must suppose that music contributes to virtue \textit{(aretē)}, inasmuch as it is able ... to form/affect people’s character \textit{(to ēthos poion ti poiein}, lit. “to render <someone’s> character of such-and-such a kind”) by accustoming them \textit{(ethizousan) to be able to enjoy <things> correctly \textit{(chairein orthōs)... or whether (iii) it contributes to leisure activity \textit{(diagōgē)} and to intelligent thought \textit{(phronēsis)}.\textsuperscript{90} (Ar. Pol. 8.5.1339a14-26)

A little later \textit{(1340a14-27)} Aristotle observes as a basic fact that “music is something enjoyable” \textit{(tōn hēdein}, lit. “<one> of the pleasant <things>”), while also suggesting that acoustic/musical stimuli make an unusually strong affective impact on the soul,\textsuperscript{91} and he goes on to claim (following the critical currents of his day stemming from Damon of Oea and Plato) that the moods or emotions present in and conveyed by music are “similar” to actual moods and emotions that are produced by events in the real world.\textsuperscript{92} Then he adds: “For we change <in> our soul when we listen to such <affective rhythms and melodies>\textit{”} \textit{(metaballomen gar tēn psuchēn akroōmenoi toioutōn). This sentence is crucially important for understanding Aristotle’s ideas about the impact and value of music; but it is not as clear-cut in its meaning and implications as one would wish. Does Aristotle think that every moment spent listening to an affecting, emotionally arousing piece of music (or watching an affecting tragedy, for that matter), produces a lasting effect on the “character”

\textsuperscript{89} In two (or possibly three) places, Aristotle uses this term “practical” \textit{(praktikos)} as a category (1341b34, 42a4, 42a15? but without any explanation: see n. 88 above, and also p. 245 and n. 105 below on the disputed reading at 1342a15 (praktika or kathartika).

\textsuperscript{90} It is noticeable that here Aristotle omits “enthusiastic” music from his list, and proposes only three functions, one of several indications that his discussion in Book 8 of the \textit{Politics} exists in a somewhat preliminary, unrevised, and even muddled state. But as will emerge in the rest of this article, not only does he credit “the philosophers” with including enthusiastic music as one of the three basic types (above, p. 240) but he also himself devotes considerable attention to this in later sections of Book 8 (see below, pp. 244-247).

\textsuperscript{91} See above pp. 234-239 on Aristotle’s account of hearing in \textit{De Anima}. His account of music in the \textit{Politics} makes clear that he thinks that music makes a greater affective impact on the soul than the other sensory stimuli such as taste and touch, even than vision.

\textsuperscript{92} He suggests that when music is/sounds “angry” or “mild”, “courageous” or “restrained,” these affective qualities in the music constitute “ likenesses of the actual natures” of those states in the real world \textit{(homoiomata malistata para tas alethinas physeis)}; see Halliwell (2002, pp. 239-249) for good discussion. This question, how and in what sense music can be or can sound (i.e. seem to be) emotional, and how music is able to trigger the strong affective states in listeners that it demonstrably does, continues to be hotly debated. See e.g. Meyer (1956), Kivy (1988; 1990), Patel (2008), Juslin and Sloboda (2001) (e.g. Bunt and Pavlicevic, 2001), Bicknell (2011); also Halliwell (2002) ad loc, with further references.
of a person’s soul? (This appears to be e.g. Plato’s view, and is one of Socrates’ chief reasons for banning most tragic performances from Kallipolis.) Or does Aristotle make a distinction between habitual listening to certain types of character-building music (especially for the young), on the one hand, and occasional listening to all kinds of more or less affective music (or watching pity- and fear-inducing tragedies in the theater) by adults, on the other? I believe that the latter is Aristotle’s position (though he may indeed vacillate a bit, during the course of his discussion in Politics 8). 93 While fairly long chunks of his discussion of “ethical music” for the education of young people might seem to imply the contrary, it seems to me (as I shall argue below) that in the end he makes it clear that listening to emotionally arousing music of a “non-ethical” kind (including esp. “enthusiastic” music) can be both enjoyable and worthwhile for all kinds of people, and that this is because the affective state that is produced by such music is short-term and transitory. 94 In any case, Aristotle certainly recognizes that one major type of musical performance (which he labels “enthusiastic” or “passionate” music – a category which must necessarily include songs as well as purely instrumental performances – is designed and experienced primarily for its affective (pathogenic) qualities, rather than for its verbal content or ethical impact. We shall return to discuss “enthusiastic” music in detail later in this article. But first we need to survey Aristotle’s account of the other four basic functions for music in society.

The first and most obvious function of music that he outlines is also the most pervasive: (i) relaxation, release of stress, fun (anapausis, anesis, paidiá). Music is greatly enjoyed by everyone (1339b20), young or old, male or female, gentleman, laborer, or slave, and its ability to provide harmless pleasure (like, e.g., sleep, or drinking, or dancing, as Aristotle suggests at 1339a17-21) is recognized as a benefit by all, especially by those whose lives are full of stress and hard work (1341b41 pros anesin te kai pros tôn tês suntonias anapausin). Thus music in general is in these terms recreational, relaxing and enjoyable, and without harmful side-effects – definitely a social good. Aristotle does not go into detail in the Politics about the physiological and psychological mechanisms through which this “relaxation” is provided by music, nor why playing and/or listening to music is such “fun” (paidiá) for humans. But he appears to relate these effects to the natural human delight in rhythm, harmony, and mimēsis (as in Poetics ch. 4), while recognizing (as in De Anima 2.8) that sounds of all kinds cause “movement” (kinēsis) and “change” within the human ear and hence in the soul (psychē), a process of stimulation that can be inherently – and harmlessly – pleasurable, just like other sensory experiences (taste, smell, touch, and sight). 95 (ii) Like Plato’s Socrates and many other ancient philosophers and educational theorists, Aristotle also is committed to the notion that certain kinds of music can provide ethical improvement and character formation, especially for the young (Pol. 8.5.1339a14ff). Specifically, he recommends that musical pieces composed in the Dorian

94 The same is true for the enjoyment of tragedy, we might observe, as described by Aristotle in the Poetics.
95 See further pp. 234-235 above, and Sifakis (2001), Griffith (forthcoming).
mode and performed on stringed instruments (cf. Plato Rep. 3, discussed above) should be taught in school as a component of the shaping of the characters of the future citizens of his ideal polis.\textsuperscript{96} Accordingly, he disapproves of aulos-music within an educational program (1341a17-22) because “the aulos is not an ‘ethical’ instrument but rather, an ‘orgiastic’ one”, i.e. it is not good for building a virtuous character but rather for arousing emotional responses. So, he goes on (1341b22-24) “the proper occasions (kairous) for using the aulos are those in which the performance-event (theòria) is designed to produce emotional stimulation-and-release (katharsis) rather than instruction (mathèsis).”\textsuperscript{97} (iii) Rather nebulous –but important for Aristotle’s elitist aesthetics– is music’s function as an object of \textit{leisured, aesthetic critique and appreciation}, conducive to “intelligent thinking” (phronēsis, 1339a26). Some music, according to Aristotle, should be designed in a refined style so as to be appreciated and critiqued (though not actually performed) by highly discriminating, leisured listeners, for its own sake. Music of this kind will be performed, as we noted above, by professional musicians who themselves presumably lack the aesthetic and ethical discrimination of their elite audience, yet can perform the appropriate pieces with the requisite skill. Aristotle’s rather evasive label for this psycho-social function, or activity, is diagōgè (lit. “pastime”), and this kind of “appreciation” and critique (krisis) of music, Aristotle insists, should be quite distinct from –and is superior to– the cruder “relaxation, fun (anesis, paidiā)” that the lower and less refined social classes find in their music-listening. It is questionable whether or not Aristotle succeeds in drawing a clear and valid distinction between these categories (i) and (iii). In the end, the distinction may be thought to amount to nothing more than a class-based mystification of certain kinds/modes of “relaxation” and “fun, i.e., a familiar kind of upper-class fetishizing of <high> “art” vs <low, vulgar, cheap> “entertainment.\textsuperscript{98} These first three categories all seem fairly straightforward and easy to grasp, at least in Aristotle’s terms.

Likewise, the fourth category, though Aristotle himself barely pauses to define or discuss it at all: (iv) \textit{Practical music/music of action –music for getting things done}. Music was widely employed by the Greeks, as by many other civilizations, to accompany all kinds of practical activity, i.e. as an aid to coordination and repetitive movements, or an energizer, or a pleasant distraction and mood-enhancer during boring or unpleasant tasks. Such functions for music were presumably what Aristotle (and “some philosophers”) meant by \textit{praktika}. Such music was ubiquitous, and multifarious; and overall it must have involved a high proportion of the population of all ages –a much wider “audience” and larger body of musical practitioners than was reached by the high-end kitharodes and auletes who competed in festivals and commanded most of the ancient musicologists’ attention. There is no need here to go into detail about all

\textsuperscript{96} Belief in the ethical effects of music was widespread in antiquity, but by no means universal, especially in its more pedantic and technical versions (as we have seen); see Anderson (1966), Barker (1984) s.vv. “character”, “ethos”, Halliwell (2002; 2011); \textit{contra}, Philodemus \textit{De Musica} Book 4 (passim), with Wilkinson 1938.

\textsuperscript{97} We shall return below (p. 245) to this important sentence and to the term \textit{katharsis}.

\textsuperscript{98} See e.g. Bourdieu (1987), also Ford (2003).
the different occupations and activities for which music was employed. In addition to all kinds of sacral and sacrificial procedures, music often accompanied and facilitated manual labor of all kinds, sailing and rowing, warfare, athletic training, child-care, many kinds of games, and medical and psychiatric treatments (by means of incantation [epôidai], especially). For several of these activities, visual illustrations survive showing singing and/or instrumental accompaniment –most of them involving the aulos; for others we rely on literary testimony. (v) “Enthusiastic” music: Aristotle’s fifth category –to which he devotes considerable attention, though in rather a scattered and piecemeal manner– is music’s capacity to be especially affective and emotionally arousing. He frequently employs for this the vivid Greek term enthousiasmos (lit. “the state of being entheos = “having god inside one”) along with the adjective enthousiastikos, though, like many Greek authors, he leaves open the question whether the term is to be understood literally or figuratively. Other –less colorful– terms that he uses in the Politics, apparently interchangeably with enthousiastikos, to refer to highly exciting music are: orgiastikos (lit. “belonging to sacred/special ritual”), hieros (lit. “sacred”), bakkhikos (lit. “Dionysian”), and pathêtikos (lit. “pathos-inducing”, i.e. affective, emotional). He repeatedly makes clear that this/these kind(s) of music is/are played (mostly, or always) by the pipes (auloi) and in the Phrygian mode (phrugisti). It becomes clear as Aristotle’s discussion proceeds that he thinks virtually all listeners find music of this kind to be exciting, affective, and mood-altering, even while he notes that certain especially impressionable or unstable people may be stimulated to an exceptional degree and may experience an extreme state of emotional “release” as a result (katharsis):

It is clear, therefore, that all the musical modes (harmoniais) should be employed [see in an ideal city], but not all in the same way. In education (paideian) the modes most expressive of character (tais ëthikòtatais) are to be preferred, but in listening to the performances of others we may admit the ‘practical’ modes (praktikais) and the ‘affective’ modes (enthousiastikais) also. For any affect/emotional state (pathos) that exists very strongly (ischurôs) in some people’s souls (peri enias sumbainei ... psuchas), exists <also> to some degree in all <souls> (touto en pasais huparchei), differing only

99 See e.g. Comotti (1989), West (1992); also e.g. Lonsdale (1993), Kolotourou (2011).
100 See Pfister (1924), Furley (1993), with further references; and cf. Yinger (2017) for some modern forms of music therapy.
101 See p. 228 and n. 49, 92 above, for discussion of the terms “emotion”, “affective”, and “arousal” in relation to human responses to musicmaking.
102 Similar ambiguity between literal and figurative reference surrounds other such affective/psychological terms, e.g. monia, ekstasis, eklêptêas esp. in contexts of artistic creativity and religious fervor: see further Rouet (1985), Hailwell (2011), Porter (2016).
103 Modern Anglophone scholars have employed various translations for the kind of altered mental state that is entailed in Aristotle’s enthousiasmos, from “inspiration, excitement” to “possession, ecstasy,” to outright “frenzy”.
104 See esp. 8.7.1342b1-5 “Among the modes (harmoniôn) the Phrygian has the same impact/effect/status (dunamin) as the aulos does among the instruments (organôn): for both of them are ‘orgiastic’ and ‘pathetic’. All Bacchic performance and all kinds of ‘movement/affect’ of this type (pasa hé toiautê kinêsis) belong to the aulos especially among the instruments, and to the Phrygian melodies among the modes...”. Thereupon Aristotle proceeds to discuss the innovative dithyrambic performances of the composer Philoxenus and others (1342b6ff).
in degree (*tōi hētton... kai tōi mallon*): for example, pity, fear, and also *enthusiasmos*. Some people become possessed (*katokōchimoi*) by this movement (*kinēseōs*, sc. of the soul by musical stimuli), and from sacred melodies (*ek tōn hierōn melōn*) we see them restored (*kathistamenous*) when they employ the melodies that especially arouse the soul (*tois exorgiazousi tēn psuchēn melesi*), as if (*hōsper*) they have undergone a healing process (*iatreias*) and a ‘release’ (*katharseōs*). Those who are prone to feelings of pity and fear and those who are in general very emotional (*tous holōs pathētikous*) must necessarily undergo exactly this same experience (*to auto dē touto ... paschein*), and everyone else too according to the degree to which each one possesses such <tendencies>; and to all of them a kind/degree of ‘stimulation-and-release’ (*katharsis*) occurs (*pasi gignesthai tina katharsin*) and they experience delight and a feeling of lightness (*kouphizesthai meth’ hēdonēs*).\(^\text{105}\) (Aristotle *Politics* 8.7.1342a1-14)

Aristotle clearly has in mind here a spectrum of “enthusiastic/orgiastic” musical performances and experiences, ranging from all-out healing rituals in which people are “possessed... and restored...”, as if undergoing a healing” (i.e. full-scale rites of the more specifically Korybantic kind, referred to often by Plato, Aristophanes, and others).\(^\text{106}\) to somewhat milder and more restrained enjoyment of e.g. “high art” auletic recitals or the songs of tragedy and dithyramb; and somewhere between these two extremes we might expect to situate a wide variety of other “Bacchic, sacred” musical events such as are referred to in our literary sources and depicted on numerous vase paintings. Aristotle appears to consider it normal and natural that one and the same musical performance might elicit differing degrees of arousal within a group of listeners, depending on their individual personalities and dispositions; and even the more restrained listeners might still enjoy some degree of pleasurable “release of emotion” (*katharsin tina*) and “lightening” of their mood (*kouphizesthai*). As he continues (1342b16-28), Aristotle explains that musicians competing in the theater and at festivals should be allowed to use the more affective modes and melodies, particularly for the “relaxing entertainment” (*anapausin*) of the lower-class elements in the audience (“craftsmen, laborers, and such like”); yet he acknowledges that there is also a more “educated and free” contingent within those audiences (*eleutheros kai pepaideumenos*), even while he implies that these discriminating listeners will be less affected than the vulgar lower classes by the “extremely strained and colorful” melodies (*suntona kai parakekhrōmena*). He sums up: “What belongs naturally to each <class of people> provides pleasure to them” (*poiei de tēn hēdonēn hekastois to*).

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\(^\text{105}\) The next sentence presents a problem of reading and interpretation. In the MSS, we have “Similarly, ‘kathartic’ melodies (*ta melē ta kathartika*) provide harmless pleasure to people.” The force of “similarly” (*homoōtis*) is then hard to grasp, since it seems that Aristotle is already discussing “kathartic” melodies in the preceding sentence. So several editors and translators (including Ross in his OCT) follow Sauppe in reading *praktika* for *kathartika* (picking up on 1342a4, just above). The main thrust of Aristotle’s argument is not affected by our choice of reading.

kata phusin oikeion). Thus overall, even while Aristotle’s snobbish outlook leads him to insist that the more emotionally affective types of music appeal more to the lower classes, it is quite clear that (unlike Plato) he does not consider the more extreme forms of emotional arousal and relief to be appropriate only for defective human beings. One does not have to be a baby, or demented and pathologically fearful, to enjoy—and benefit from—listening to (and perhaps even participating in?) these exciting, “enthusiastic” music-forms and songs, even though they surely would not be so suitable for the leisurely discussion-sessions and critical appreciation (diagōgē) of Aristotle’s citizens, nor obviously for the teaching of children in school.\textsuperscript{107} And from the Poetics we learn that Aristotle thinks that attending the theater to watch and listen to tragedies being performed can be both highly pleasurable and quite “philosophical,” even while he is fully aware that all the music played there is accompanied by the auloi and most of it is in Phrygian harmonia.

It is remarkable—but should not be surprising to us—that Aristotle is so comfortable in acknowledging that enthusiastic/orgastic/sacred/Bacchic/pathos-inducing music is going to be widely available and highly valued in his (and any) polis. He seems to take this for granted as a normal social fact. This does not mean that he thinks most of his population will need or will want to engage in full-scale Korybantic-type therapy. Rather, he stipulates that, even while most people won’t actually fall into ecstatic trance states in listening to Phrygian music played on the auloi (i.e. full-blown trances are just for actual “patients” seeking a katharsis-type cure), most people nonetheless do get affected by such music to some (more limited) degree, and they derive harmless pleasure from listening to it. As Aristotle phrases it (1340a8-14), music of the affective genre, such as Olympus’ aulos-melodies, “by common agreement makes <people’s> souls ‘enthusiastic’, and enthousiasmos is an affective reaction of the ἐθος of/involving the soul” (ho d’ enthousiasmos tou peri tēn psuchēn ἐθous pathos estin) – a curious phrase that appears to mean by pathos a temporary stimulation and alteration of physiological and mental state, along the lines described by Rouget and other anthropologists and ethnomusicologists.\textsuperscript{108} Such “arousal/alteration” occurs for a relatively short period of time, and the whole process of arousal and subsequent calm does not bring about

\textsuperscript{107}At 1342a3-4 Aristotle stipulates that in the context of education, students should only be exposed to “ethical” harmoniai, but that adults should be allowed to listen to all kinds. (He has also previously proposed that boys should only learn to play instruments well enough to be able as adults to appreciate and critique music played by others.) So the actual performing of e.g. Phrygian tunes on the auloi should be left to others (heterón cheirourgoutōn). In the passage immediately following his discussion of enthusiastic music and katharsis, Aristotle notes (1342a14-18) that the theater is a context in which especially exciting music (auloi, Phrygian harmonia kil.) can be performed only by professionals for the pleasure of others (= adults of all kinds). He doesn’t say much in the Politics directly about the relative merits of listening/watching vs performing, for those who seek only “relaxation, fun”—but his remark about the relaxing effects of dance (1339a17-21) includes the comment “some people think...”, as if he himself is dubious. Aristotle never engages in direct discussion of the social value of dance and choral performance within a community, as Plato does (see esp. Peponi, 2013).

\textsuperscript{108}Aulos-music at gentlemen’s symposia was of course absolutely normal, almost mandatory. Most often it was performed by paid auletrides (free or slave female pipe-players), though men sometimes played as well. The question, how often the symposiasts themselves might play the auloi for one another seems impossible to answer. It may well have varied from one social group to another.

permanent change in the character, disposition (ēthos) of the listener; hence such music does not fall into the “ethical”, i.e. character-building, category.110 The auditory stimulation of “enthusiastic” music provides for almost everyone harmless excitement and pleasure – in Aristotle’s terms, “fun” (paidiā) and “release, relaxation” (anesis). In the field of musical performance, then, we can say that, for Aristotle, “enthusiastic” music comprises a distinct and major genre of its own and serves a specific social “function”, or range of functions; We may observe too that Aristotle seems to recognize that this large and capacious genre of “enthusiastic” music overlaps to some degree with the genre of competitive “theater music” and thus also with the (quasi-“literary”) genres of dithyramb, tragedy, and comedy, i.e. genres which include high-art, virtuoso specimens of enthusiastic, aulos-accompanied song-types.

**Religion and Musical Gods**

Finally, no account of any society’s musical life would be complete without attention being paid to the role of religion in music–making and listening (however we may define “religion”). In my account, I have brought into the discussion a number of descriptions that involve what we might call “religious” occasions (e.g., at one end of the spectrum, Hesiod’s Muses and the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, and at the other, Aristotle’s account of “enthusiastic/orgiastic” musical experiences); but I have not directly addressed the extent to which the Greeks of the Classical period thought of their gods as being musical and as enjoying human music. There is no space to go into detail here; but it should be immediately clear to anyone who engages with Greek literature and art that music-playing, singing and dancing for the gods, and even depictions of the gods themselves participating in music-making, are ubiquitous.

Greek divinities with musical aptitude/authority include Apollo vs Hermes as lyre-players; Hermes also as a syrinx-player –Pan too; Dionysus as a patron of all kinds of pipe- and percussion-accompanied music, both human and daimonic (Nymphs, Satyrs, et al.); Cybele (the Great Mother), Sabazius, likewise; as well as numerous Muses, Sirens, Korybants, Kabeiroi, etc. As we saw in the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo*, almost all the young female goddesses like to dance and sing (maybe not Athena – but she is not entirely female). The ancient Greek polytheistic world-view was designed to accommodate mixed and shifting dynamics concerning the sources of artistic production in general, and especially concerning the mysterious power of music to

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110 Aristotle seems to hold the same opinion about going to the theater: watching (and listening to) a good tragedy arouses quite strong emotions (pathē) – especially pity and fear – in the audience members; but the resultant “katharsis of such emotions” (*Poetics* ch. 6) does not alter their character permanently in the way that Plato’s Socrates asserts in the *Republic*. For further discussion of this (controversial) issue, see esp. Halliwell (1998), Seferis (2001); also Bernays (1857/2015), whose analysis has often been consulted by subsequent scholars only in abbreviated form, and consequently misrepresented and misinterpreted (cf. Porter, 2015). Bernays argues convincingly that the *katharsis* provided by music or drama according to Aristotle entails a process of stimulus-and-release/relief of emotions/affect that is relatively brief, short-term, and self-contained (rather like the processes outlined e.g. by Meyer, 1956; Levitin, 2004); the process is in itself exciting, pleasurable, experience-enhancing, and repeatable. But for the purposes of this article, the precise meaning of Aristotle’s *katharsis* is not in fact crucial.
“move” listeners both mentally/spiritually and physically, and to change people’s attitudes and moods, enhancing almost every activity within the practical worlds of labor, leisure, and entertainment, as well as more specifically religious celebrations. The Greek gods and goddesses collectively love music, without reservation. Thus, unlike the peoples of the Book, whose God—or even whose greatest Prophet—may frequently speak aloud in human language but who never Himself sings, dances, or plays any musical instruments, nor even shows much sign of enthusiasm when music is being played in His presence, the Greek pantheon—itself a kind of extended family or mini-polis-community of supernatural beings, imaginatively projected out from standard Greek fantasies of more mundane human experience—was full of musical personalities, several of them very distinctive in their “sound” and style of performance, others more versatile and catholic. The divine level mirrored in most respects the human (and even animal)[111] levels of music-makers… Music was (good) for all.

Klasik Yunan Müzik Sosyolojisine Doğru

Mark Griffith

Öz
Bu makalede Arkaik ve Klasik Yunan tarihinde (MÖ yak. 750-320) çeşitli türden müziklerin icra edildiği farklı durumları eşsüremli bir bakış açısıyla kısaça gözden geçirerek, bu icraların farklı toplumsal işlevlerini ve dinleyicileri üzerinde bıraktığı (ya da bırakması beklenen) çeşitli etkilerini ve ayrıca Yunan kültürünün, bunyesindeki geniş ve çok yönlü müzikal faaliyetlerle ilgili farklı tavr ve değerlerini tartış.parseColor Bu yüzden, gerçek anlamda sosyoloji bir incelemeye müzikin neye tekbül ettiği ve insanların ne işine yaradığı, çeşitli türlerinin kimler tarafından icra edildiği, bu farklı türleri kimlerin dinlediği ve/veya hangi tepkisi verdiği, kuramlar ve filozoflar kadar, sırasında Yunan halkın da daha geniş sosyal ve kozmolojik dünyaları bağlamında müzik hakkında ne düşündüğü, kültürün hem içinde hem dışından bakılarak araştırılmalıdır. Bu makale Yunan müzik performanslarının ”anında icra” ve bedensellik yönünün yanı sıra biçim açısından çeşitli ama her durumda güçlü ruhsal etkisine de eglerek, incelenmekte geç kalınmış bir konuyu ele almaktadır. Bilhassa toplumsal cinsiyet, statü ve etnisite farklılıklar, çeşitli müzik dillerinin ve çağıların toplumsal işlevsellikleriyle ilgili muhtelif yazılı ve görsel kaynaklar bulunmakla birlikte, Aristoteles’in (özellikle de Politika eserinin) bu konularda en yararlı ve güvenilir kilavuz olduğu kimsidirız.

Anahtar Kelimeler
Eski Yunan Müzik Kültürü • Aristoteles’in Müzik Üzerine Düşünceleri • Müzik ve Toplumsal Farklılıklar • Müzik ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet • Müzik ve Toplumsal Kimlikler • Müzikal Performanstaki Bedensellik • Müzik ve Duygu

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Bu makalede Arkaik ve Klasik Yunan tarihinde (MÖ yak. 750-320) çeşitli türden müziklerin icra edildiği farklı durumları eşsizleri bir bakış açısıyla kısaca gözden geçirerek, bu icraların farklı toplumsal işlevlerini ve dinleyicileri üzerinde bıraktığı (ya da bırakması beklenen) çeşitli etkilerini ve ayrıca Yunan kültürünün, bünyesindeki geniş ve çok yönlü müzikal faaliyetlerle ilgili farklı tavr ve değerlerini tartışacağım. Yunan toplumunun olağanüstü müzikal bir toplum olduğu birçok kez dile getirilmiştir. Bu tespit doğru da olabilir yanlış da; nitekim böyle bir şey nicel olarak ölçülemez. (Yunan akort sistemleri, ezgileri ve çalgılarının büyük bölümü, diğer komşu toplumlarındaki, özellikle de Anadolu’da kilerle aynı Mezopotamya geleneğinden doğmuştur ve Erken Yunan müzik kültürünün Phrygia ve Lydia gibi kültürlerle ortak ve farklı yönleri hakkında bir yargıda bulunmamız olanaksızdır.) Diğer yandan şu bir gerçeklik ki, Yunanistan’ın (yari gerçek,e, yarı hayale dayalı olarak) bütün Batı kültür geleneğinin kaynağı ve öncüllü sayılması durumuna bir de özellikle Hristiyan kilisesinin ve söz sahibi Rönesans entelektüellerinin (yeni-)Platoncu ve yeni-Pythagoraşı müziğ kuramını büyük ölçüde benimsemesinin eklennesi, müzikin insan topluluklarındaki doğası ve işlevselliği ilgili, Yunan eliti ait belirli bir dizi düşünceye yüzey boynuna aşırlı ilgi gösterilmesi sonucunu getirmiştir. Bu ilgi çoğu durumda gerçek Yunan müziği uygulamalaryla ancak uzaktan iliklili biri ve daha çok nümerolari ve(ya) belirli akort çeşitlerinin ve dizilerin varsalıahlaki etkileri gibi karmışik olgulara yönelmiştir. Ayrıca bu düşüncelerin birçok açıdan ana akım Yunan yakaşımını temsil etmediği ve Yunan müzik kültürünün genelli hakkında yanlış bir tablo ortaya koyduğu savunulabilir.

nefeslilerin (özellikle auloı), kullanımını en yaygın çalgı grubu olduğu ve auloı çalgısının uyarıldığı duyularla ilgili eleştiri (en açık örneğini Platon ve Aristoteles te görüriz) getirenlerin genellikle eğitim ve ahlak konusuna eğilen küçük bir azınlıka sınırlı olduğu anlaşılmaktadır (bu kişilerin çoğu Atina’da yani auloı ile ilgili yaklaşımların Thebai gibi rakip kentlerden oldukça farklı olduğu bir yerde yaşamıştır). Müzik eğiliminde ve müziğin kolaylaştırdığı etkisiyle gerçekleştilmiş sayışı sosyal etkinlik vardır. Bunlar kutsal nitelikli törenlerden (hayvan kurban etme, düğünler, zafer kutlamaları, cenazeler gibi) şolenlere, çeşitli türden fiziksel işlerden (kürek çekme, ip eğirme ve dokuma, savaş yürüyüşü, sürüler gibi, ekme yapma gibi) çocukların ninni söylemeye, bedeni veya ruhu iyileştirmek için büyük formülleri okumaya ve kısmen ya da bütünüyle planlanmış estetik etmeleri gibi estetik açıdan çok daha seçkin etkinliklere kadar uzanır. Bu etkinliklerin çoğunun “müzik” unsuru genellikle şarık söylemeyi (ya da en azından bazı gelişkin vokal unsurlarını) ve nefesli çalgı olarak, ayrıca, gerçek anlamlı “dansa” tekabül etse de etmese de bazı ritim beden hareketlerini de içermekteydi. Telli çalgı (lyra ya da kithara) icrasının olması ya da olmaması şartırlar daha çok iliskiliyor, özellikle de açıktı hava etkinliklerinde. Nitekim nefeslilerin tasması daha kolay, güvendi daha fazlaydı; daha kullanılan ve farklı ruh hallerini temsil etmeye daha uygun olduklarını herkesçe kabul görmüştü.

Çinsiyet Ayırımı

Farklı Müzik Türleri
Telli çalgıların baskın olduğu, görece kısıtlı, ağır ve tekduze eğzi ve danslara ödedeşlenen Apolloncu müzikle, genellikle nefeslilerin ve bazen çokça vurulmuş çalgıların kullanımını Bacchosçu (Dionysosçu) müzik arasındaki bilindik ayrım mutlak bir karşılıklık
ve farklılık olmamakla birlikte, oldukça çeşitli müzik türlerine gelişme olanağı vermiş ve toplumun hemen her kesiminden gerek içerci gerek dinleyici olarak katılımını oldukça geniş bir dinsel ve sanatsal etkinlikler bütününe oluşmasını sağlamıştır. Atina’daki tiyatro gelenekleri, (*dithyrambos* koroları, tragedyalar, *satyros* oyunları ve komedyalar) başka müzikal yeniliklerin yanı sıra müzik türlerinde ilgi çekici etkileşimlere de neden olmuştu. Nitekim bu oyunlarda tüm oyuncular erkek ve çoğunlukla Atina yurttaşları idiysel de dramatik karakterler ve koro dünyasını dört yanından erkek, kadın, ilah, hatta hayvan olmak üzere çeşitli hayalleri figürlerin şarkı ve danslarını sahneye taşırtdı. Muhtemelen diğer kentlerin koro müziği temsillerinde erkek müzisyenler bu denli baskın değildi.

**Anında İhra**

Eski Yunan’da tüm müziklerin anında icra edilmiştir, dolayısıyla içerci(ler) ile dinleyiciler arasında performances boyunca doğrudan iktisit ve görsel temas kurulmuş olmasının önemli bu makalede söz konusu kültür ile ilgili vurgulanın bir başka temel özelliktir. İçerci(ler) ile dinleyiciler arasındaki ilişki bir şair, ressam ya da heykeltürəshan, eserine ilgi gösterenlerle ilişkisinden daha dolaysız ve yakındı; nitekim bu durumlarda genellikle sanatçı, ilgi ve beğenme sürecini gözlemlemek ve yönlendirmek üzere hazırlık bulunmamıştır. Eşlik etmeke olan çağ çözümlü bedensel hareketleriley bizzat karşısında ve bu şekilde halkın dinleme ve izleme tepkilerini daha da çok etkileyen dansçı-sarkıcıların durumunda sinestezik dinamikleri karmaşık ve çok katmanlı olabilir, tipki tanırların, *Apollo* için *Homeros Tarzi İlahı*de betimlenen müzik yapıtlarında ve dinleyişlerinde olduğu gibi.


**References/Kaynakça**


