



SYRAIN REFUGEES MIGRATION AND THEIR IMPACT ON TURKEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PEACBUILDING OPPORTUNITIES, 2022¹

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ABSTRACT

This study After eleven years for the ongoing Syrian civil war that occurred in 2011 as a part of the Arab Spring protests. Syrian refugees seek a better life in exile, sometimes by going from one nation to another, and other times by making the need for asylum in Turkey voluntary. to the Istanbul case where its inhabitants of host nations regarding refugees for threat and what are the ways to peacebuilding with Syrian refugees despite the difficulties. The study's major findings are that Turkish citizens see Syrian refugees as threat and an opportunity.

Keywords: Impact, Presence, Syrian refugees, Peacebuilding, Turkey.

SURİYELİ MÜLTECİ GÖÇLERİ VE 21. YÜZYILDA TÜRKİYE'YE ETKİSİ: BARIŞ İNŞASI FIRSATLARI, 2022

ÖZET

Bu çalışma, 2011 yılında Arap Baharı protestolarının bir parçası olarak meydana gelen ve on bir yıl sonrasında da devam eden Suriye iç savaşını ele almaktadır. Suriyeli mülteciler, bazen bir millettten diğerine giderek, bazen de Türkiye'deki sığınma ihtiyacını gönüllü hale getirerek sürgünde daha iyi bir yaşam aramaktadırlar. Ev sahibi ülkelerin sakinlerinin mültecileri hem bir tehdit olarak görebileceği hem de zorluklara rağmen Suriyeli mültecilerle barışı sağlamanın yollarının neler olabileceğine dair İstanbul örneği incelenmiştir. Çalışmanın ana bulguları, Türk vatandaşlarının Suriyeli mültecileri hem tehdit hem de fırsat olarak görmeleridir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Etki, Varlık, Suriyeli Mülteciler, Barışın İnşası, Türkiye

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1 INTRODUCTION

Not only has the Syrian civil war led to the destruction of a nation, but it has also resulted in the biggest massive immigration that Europe has seen since World War Two. In truth, the magnitude of this inflow, which appears to be menacing Europe, pales in contrast to Turkey's refugee issue. The continuance of the continuing battles in Syria, as well as the absence of answers, present Turkey with a variety of issues.

To begin with, it is becoming increasingly clear that, even though the war ends, returning refugees to their home places would be difficult in the foreseeable future, and those were already adapted. This situation has compelled the Turkish government to prioritize several extremely difficult, sensitive, and complex issues, such as providing opportunities for refugees to relieve their stay in Turkey but rather adjust to life in Turkish society, along with meeting refugees' urgent needs for education, health, housing, employment, public services, and other relevant needs. Since ninety percent of refugees living just outside of the refugee camps and are still in near contact with the local community in different cities such as Istanbul, Hatay, Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Adana, Mersin, they are already connected with each other also the cohesion and integration in this community have become the priority issues.

Moreover, the continuation of the conflict, as well as the improbability of refugees ever returning to their home countries, necessitates the establishment of a permanent and societal power cohesiveness. To sustain social cohesiveness, the motivations that shape the local community's attitude toward immigrants should be thoroughly explored from both a local and a national perspective. Firsthand, Turkey can no longer base its Syrian policy only on "temporariness" or "temporary protection." Any detail that is postponed, deferred, or ignored for the sake of "temporariness" may cause huge issues in the future. As a result, while doing what needs to be done in terms of domestic and foreign policies regarding Syrians coming back to their country, it is also vital to recognize the reality that a significant portion of them would prefer to stay permanently in Turkey, necessitating the development of several living-together strategies (HUGO 2014, p.8). Social cohesiveness is dependent on the host country people's perceptions of refugee groups, as well as attitudes created because of locals' preconceptions and immigrant groups' views. Social cohesiveness is defined as the degree of closeness and cooperation between sections of the community (Berkman, Kawachi 2000, p. 175). Therefore, this specifies the development and management of good attitudes towards this crisis.

The Syrian refugee crisis highlights the inadequacies of today's international asylum and protection system, while also providing a chance for the international community to put the notion of "burden-sharing" into action. States, international institutions, and non-governmental associations (NGOs) should work together on a global scale to address the social, cultural, economic, political, and geopolitical technological aspects of the Syrian refugee crisis. While Turkey's reaction has been exceptionally generous thus far, its capacity to accommodate and assist more refugee flows is limited. As the situation worsens, a real useful and forward-thinking reaction will necessitate greater international cooperation and assistance.

UNHCR has made important contributions to Turkey's Protective environment for Syrian refugees, notably by concentrating on the legal and institutional framework required for Syrians to register and receive social services. As the Syrian population continued to increase and spread across the nation, UNHCR was extremely slow to change away from the case management and camp model, but began to adapt in 2014 and 2015, first by creating community centers, and then by scaling up Community based protection based on Urban Strategy. (UNHCR 2016, p.16)

Furthermore, Turkey's status as an emerging player may be attributed to the country's continuous political and monetary advancement in the early long periods of the twenty-first hundred years as well as the disintegration of the Western rule-based request efficient generosity, this has given provincial entertainers amazing chances to expect relative financial strength and security certain capacities that have generally been



appointed to the extraordinary powers during the virus war. Turkey also has some similarities with several other developing powers and the relative experience of the fast economic expansion stability, as well as a continuous political transition reform. As the globe becomes increasingly multipolar, throughout this decade, Turkey has used its religious, ethnic, and linguistic systems, as well as cultural links, to build its soft power, both regionally and nationally.

2 METHODOLOGY

This study adopts qualitative and quantitative research methods in form of study area that draws on secondary and primary source data. Because of this dependency, the researcher employs data from peer-reviewed scholarly publications published in high impact journals, as well as books and articles. Because the study focuses on a current problem, the researcher focuses on current data. Despite the fact that the internet is a great source of information, the study relies on data from credible organizations such as the United Nations, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the United Nations Development Programmed. European Union, World Bank, Turkish International Cooperation Developing Agency, and Turkish Government.

2.1 Inclusion criteria

- Date of publication from 2011
- Articles opened by access
- Articles about Syrian refugees' migration just in Turkey

2.2 Exclusion criteria

- Date of publication before 2011
- Not free opened articles
- Studies on Syrian refugees in other countries

3 LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 General Overview of Refugees Migration

Syrians were allowed to enter Turkey when they started showing up at the Turkish-Syrian line in the spring of 2011. Those with travel papers were permitted to enter turkey not surprisingly, while those without were owned up to brief displaced person camps. As the number of refugees or visitors as they were known in expanding forma, the public authority raised an extending number of camps along the line to protect them. The public authority of Turkey gave brief security to Syrian exiles on October 11(Okyay 2017, p.829-846) making it the principal country nearby to do as such. This mirrored Turkey's entryway strategy, non-refoulment strategy, and obligation to give fundamental philanthropic help to outcasts. In any case, as the number of exiles kept on ascending throughout the late spring of 2012, strikingly in view of the heightening battling in Aleppo and its environs, the limit of the public authority run camps started to diminish. Constantly 50% of 2012, the Turkish government has started to confine access, bringing about the foundation of in excess of 20 brief camps along the Syrian side of the line for people anticipating induction to Turkey.

In the interim, a rising number of Syrians escaping the contention in the northern Syria started to enter turkey through supposed informal intersection focuses, joining the positions of Turkey's developing non-



camp outcast populace. IDPs have as of late gone to bootleggers as Turkey closes both informal and official intersection locales inferable from the weakening security circumstance on the Syrian side of the boundary, it is basically useless that the line among Syria and Turkey has been very permeable all of the time. While enamines were covered along region of the boundary during the Virus War time of the 1950s, they didn't seem to forestall crossline developments of people and items. Crossline sneaking was successive even before the Syrian outcast emergencies started, however it has escalated as the level of Syrians holding back to cross has expanded. Rates have been recorded around then going from 15 to 30 Turkish Liras which implies around then 8 to 15 Dollars pass from Syrian Country entering Turkey country also approximately was 30 to 100 Turkish Lira which means 15 to 50 Dollars at that time to cross a contrary path. In the in the interim, Turkey needs to permit Syrians with authentic international IDs to enter the nation openly and get residency cards. The intersections are supposed to be used by transients leaving Syria, yet additionally by military aggressors going between displaced person camps and Syria. As indicated by continuous reporting, contenders travel towards facilities including visits home, leisure, and recreation amusement, there were claims of within one time period warriors conveying them as moving by one spot for another within Istanbul (Utami 2015) but developing worries about security and grievances from the nearby populace prompted a clampdown, and such contenders are not generally allowed to carry weapons in Turkey.

At last, the truth of the matter is that Syrians crossing the Turkish line needing earnest clinical consideration affects Turkey's local wellbeing frameworks. A significant piece of Turkey's transitory security strategy, as will be investigated further beneath, has been the arrangement of medical services for Syrian displaced people. This is seen on the boundary with the vehicle of harmed and very sick regular people, as well as warriors, to Turkish medical clinics. Whenever troops regular folks are harmed fighting inside Syria, they are conveyed to the boundary, where Turkish ambulances transport them to medical clinics. They are hence shipped off to care homes for harmed troops, which are purportedly paid for by outside nations.

3.2 Response to the Influx of Syrian Refugees in Turkey

The overarching goal of this evaluation is to analyses UNHCR reaction to the flow of Syrian refugees into Turkey from 1 January 2014 to 30 June 2015. Protection has always been UNHCR's main concern in Turkey. By the middle of 2015, 1.8 million Syrian refugees were registered at a basic level at a part that this would be achievable or affordable using UNHCR's traditional and more through methods, by providing them with degree in security with provision of public services seldom seen among first-time refugees migration to country and to a large measure, this was made possible by the patient, low-key, and adaptable support of UNHCR protection workers, particularly a very unusual policy and advising team of country officers. The purpose is to raise funds for UNHCR in a more efficient manner existing of outreach

Moreover, the responsibility here for UNHCR is to track, monitor, and mitigate the danger of social tensions and potential conflict between refugees and their host communities. During the assessment, the evaluation team consulted with UNHCR and its partners, government, universities, and non-governmental organizations regarding social cohesiveness, and what steps UNHCR has done to mitigate the danger of social conflict. This section of the UNHCR study provides numerous relevant elements of this subject, such as controlling public opinions of Syrian refugees, interaction with local officials, refugee representation, and assistance to host communities, the function of community centers as bridge builders, cultural appropriateness, and lastly promotion of long-term livelihoods for refugees. UNHCR recommends that UNHCR Turkey should collaborate with its partners to create a Strategic communications Action plan to support the protection and solutions started, as they recommend elsewhere, with a focus on social cohesion and a secondary focus on fundraising.

3.3 Civil Society and Syrian Refugees

This research has tended to focus regarding the way that Syrians survive inside Turkey, also the way that



the Turkish government treats them, and Turkish citizens' impressions of Syrians. There have been few studies on how Turkish civil society adapts or changes because of Syrian settlement here, as well as the medium and lasting effect that these developments in democratic governance may have on both cultures. Syria's continued existence in Turkey, as well as in surrounding host countries Lebanon and Jordan, and how these nations are currently coping, raises the essential concerns regarding nature of assisting the refugees.

Political and monetary advancement in the early long periods of the twenty-first hundred years as well as the disintegration of the Western rule-based request efficient generosity, has given provincial entertainers amazing chances to expect relative financial strength and security certain capacities that have generally been appointed to the extraordinary powers during the virus war.

Additionally, answering the presence of Syrians happens with regards to an undeniably intricate world of politics, both at home and abroad. At worldwide level, the EU and Turkey Joint Activity Program, concurred 2015 also authoritatively carried out on 20 Walk 2016, specified that for each Syrian transient got backward in Turkey, currently Syrians in Turkey cannot endeavor in entering the EU wrongfully will be relocated to the Union, subsequently transforming refugees as peace and strategic actors. The subject of the drawn out stay of Syrians is likewise especially questionable, with a discussion on the prudence of holding back nothing, a few entertainers see adversely as absorption, or harmonization, which is the favored recipe of the DGMM.

The influx of Syrians into the country has increasingly drawn the attention of a diverse array of actors, who may be loosely called civil society, but who's grouping only underscores the folly of such a phrase. The civil society response to the entry of Syrian migrants into Turkey could be seen as a period of self-reflection for Turkish civil society actors. Turkey has reached a point where the integration of Syrians must be openly discussed and planned.

3.4 Turkey's Syrian Refugees Resilience

Facilitating Syrians' access to self-reliance while maintaining social cohesion with host communities in a difficult economic situation will be a major challenge for the Turkish government and its allies in the foreseeable future. The expression of strong political will, supported by major donors and translated into action through public policies such as the harmonization plan and the ESSN exit strategy, are essential preconditions to sustain the economic participation of refugees. While livelihood partners have built substantial programs in recent years, this is far from the case due to travel, out of the essential scale for refugees to be employed by large Turkish companies. Many of the most qualified Syrian citizens have fled to Europe. Second,

Investing in manufacturing in areas where refugees are present when labor is available and host communities are less willing to work could result in a win-win situation. Several authorities contacted for this research underlined the importance of this local in Gaziantep, the emphasis had already been highlighted in a significant way. Third, although the presence of refugees can be seen as an advantage in stimulating local development, host communities must also be equitably supported. The general unease of a large part of the Turkish population at the potential long-term presence of refugees,

Because fostering cross-community trust is a new responsibility for Turkish institutions and the private sector, any accessible evidence on social cohesion and employment programs that the foreign community can provide would be an important asset to this endeavor. Fourth, the current emphasis on formalization is essential to ensure both good working conditions for refugees, access to sufficient income and fair competition among job seekers. Given the magnitude of the challenge, even minor contributions should be mobilized to further unlock the resilience and potential displayed by Syrian refugees and their host



communities. These two ideas are particularly suited to the problems of the Turkish scenario,

3.5 Public Perception of Syrian Refugees in Turkey

Just 21.70 percent of individuals said they would be fine with a Syrian family moving into their area. Additionally, the people who say they would invite a Syrian exile as a neighbor or companion represent just 26.06 percent and 25.48 percent of the example, individually. The HDP allies are the most responsive to associating with Syrian exiles, while the CHP and İYİ Parti individuals are the most un-open. Just 35.49 percent concur that Ankara went with the right choice by laying out the entryway strategy for refugees during the early long stretches of the Syrian nationwide conflict.

Indeed, even in the most quarrelsome matter, these discoveries show an intense issue of a solid xenophobic current notwithstanding the city's standing, repeating portrayal as a «world», «City» or «Cultural Capital». Just 35.49 percent of individuals accept think Ankara went with the right choice by setting up an open in the US, there is an entryway strategy for displaced people. Just 27.69 percent concur with the assertion «Syrians ought to be permitted to work. » Also, simply 25.96 percent support «granting citizenship to Syrians with no crook record and the capacities to seek after callings popular in Turkey. » When we split down degrees of help by party inclination, we observe that MHP and İYİ Parti allies are the most ridiculously passionately gone against this proposition, which we call restrictive citizenship. There is no measurably critical relationship between respondents' perspectives in regard to exiles and their age, orientation, training level, or month-to-month family pay. This proportion drops to 18.28 percent for people with a month-to-month family pay of under TRY2,500.

Whenever asked the amount they concurred or emphatically concurred with the assertion «Arabs have consistently manipulated us over our time, » 66.47 percent of our respondents concurred or firmly concurred. Just 13.20 percent of those surveyed concurred or unequivocally concurred. Restrictive citizenship was upheld by 21.02 percent of the principal bunch and 42.39 percent of the second. Moderate social groupings will more often than not be less adversarial toward Syrian exiles overall.

Attitudes toward Syrian refugees are influenced by factors other than identity and culture. As fears about the country's economic future grow, opinions against Syrian refugees become increasingly hostile. Fluency in Turkish is another criterion that plays a beneficial, albeit limited, role in the appraisal of refugees. The likelihood of granting a residency permit to a refugee who speaks little Turkish is 17.66 percent among MHP voters and 13.89 percent among İYİ Parti voters.

These measurements are 25.18 percent and 18.11 percent, separately, for outcasts who communicate in Turkish easily. This mission ought to include valuable encounters with outcasts of different ages, orientations, instruction, and expert classifications to challenge the pattern of depicting Syrians as a solid gathering and to give a more exact depiction of them. This unique gap between low-wage individuals against destitute displaced people sabotages social attachment.

3.6 Approaches to Peacebuilding

Diplomats in Turkey insist on believing that the economy is preferable to aid. « Turkey's Official Development Assistance, with 3.307 billion USD in 2013, was among the biggest among the rising countries. Considering Turkey's involvement in various international efforts, the ODA fund provided bilateral assistance of US\$3.156 billion. While Turkey assists non-Muslim countries such as Ukraine, Macedonia, and Kenya, most of the State's actions focus on Muslim-majority countries, many of which are classified as least developed or vulnerable.

Instances of Turkey's primary and social peacebuilding procedures should be visible in Afghanistan,



Somalia, and Balkan nations like Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Specialized limited software engineers, foundation projects, and the arrangement of fundamental administrations make up most of Turkey's primary peacebuilding drives. Framework tasks, for example, redesign of government structures, and development of schools and streets are normal in all nations including Turkey. » At last, Turkey's endeavors to lay out friendly harmony stand apart with its emphasis on intercession and strictly touchy drives.

Turkey's way to deal with peacebuilding has advanced over the course of the last ten years essentially that Turkey focused stability intercession 1990s, the more extensive worldview of incorporates combining government construction and community cohesion. This has been upgraded by new international strategy drives that accentuate both intercession and fortified monetary relations as suitable peacebuilding measures that benefit both Turkey and the beneficiary nations. Regardless of Turkey's earnest aims to advance harmony and security in its area and all over the planet, Ankara's ability to understand this vision has genuine blemishes. An expected 2.7 million Syrian outcasts, resurgence of the conflict with the PKK, profound infiltration of IS into the country's metropolitan communities, proceeded with political unpredictability following the November races.

In addition, Turkey's ambitious foreign policy goals and ambition to project soft power have alienated many allies in recent years. Relying on Africa's support for the second term at the United Nations Security Council in 2016, Turkey received the votes of only 60 out of 193 countries. In light of Turkey's inaccurate estimates of the Assad regime's survival in Syria, Ankara realized the gravity of the crisis. Its impact on stakeholders across nations, as well as the problems it seeks to solve around the world, seems to be eroding. There is a mismatch between the prestige and rhetoric surrounding Turkey's participation and the actual effectiveness of the operations being conducted.

The recent resignation of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who has formulated many of Turkey's new foreign policy concepts, raises uncertainty about the viability and durability of the country's peace-building techniques. As of the end of 2016, there are 26 camps in Turkey where approximately 250,000 refugees are sheltered in the creation of a disaster and emergency management strategy. This decision marked a turning point in the government's handling of the refugee crisis, as migrants began pouring into towns across Turkey, especially Istanbul.

4 Syrian Refugees in Turkey

4.1 Governmental Policies Toward Syrian Refugees

The concepts and legal foundation of the policy: As of the finish of 2016, Turkey had 26 camps for around 250,000 outcasts. The choice is a defining moment in the public authority's treatment of the outcast emergency, as travelers run to towns around Turkey, especially Istanbul. These enhancements prompted a huge expansion in the number of Syrian evacuees in Turkey, a country with an enormous number of Syrian outcasts. Because of the European movement emergency, in 2015 and 2016, right around 1,000,000 Syrians and different displaced people entered the EU through Turkey, as well as different courses.

The outcome was the «EU-Turkey Declaration» given in Walk 2016, which brought about the EU giving a monetary guide to Turkey, at last adding up to 6 billion euros to finance programs. for Syrian exiles in return for Turkey finding a way those ways to forestall one more mass migration into Europe. The EU additionally consented to move one Syrian evacuee for every Turkish unlawful outsider back to the EU, extend visa opportunities for Turkish residents, and start the postponed EU promotion process. for Turkey. It likewise prompted the foundation of the Outcast Office in Turkey, supporting exercises going from building new schools to reinforcing the guard limit of different partners in Turkey, as well as projects significant money help projects, for example, the Crisis Social Wellbeing Net and Training Contingent Settlement.



Essentially, the public authority took on the «Escape Procedure from ESSN» in 2018, recognizing that Syrians with Transitory Safeguarded Status are steadier in Turkey and calling for changes to permit evacuees casualties to decrease their investment in friendly help «by helping them to adjust to working. market » in Turkey. Albeit a few 3.7 million Syrians are as of now getting transitory security in Turkey, just 63,789 Syrians have been allowed work licenses starting around 2019.

Table 1: Total Work Permit Issued to Syrian Arab Republic Citizens between 2016 – 2019 in Turkey.

Year	2016	2017	2018	2019
Number Of Work Permits	13.290	20.966	34.573	63.789

Source: Ministry of labor and social security in Turkey, (2020)

EU Deal with Turkey: As is notable, the European «crisis» of Syrian transients started distinctly in 2014, when the outcasts showed up in Europe. Following 2015, the EU's endeavors were focused on stopping the outcast flood and laying out critical and broad participation plans. Thus, they intended to arrive at an understanding in view of monetary help with the countries in the Mediterranean bowl facilitating refugees, basically Turkey. The «Turkey-EU Arrangement, » struck by Turkey and the EU on Walk 18, 2016, was the main move in the EU's «externalism» plan beginning around 2016.

The «1 to 1 rule» was completed for Syrians, under which Syrians who went to the EU through Turkey would be returned to Turkey. Regardless, for each Syrian returned to Turkey, one Syrian from Turkey who meets the UN Delicacy Models would be resettled in the EU, with a cap of 70,000 resettled pariahs every year. In any case, this procedure failed inferable from contrasts over overall guideline consistence, amount issues among EU part states, and execution challenges. Accordingly, all additional asylum searchers observed venturing out to the Greek islands from Turkey will be audited, as Turkey is seen as the safeguarded third country under the readmission understanding.

As different objectives of the understanding, for example, visa advancement and the re-foundation of Turkey-EU relations, slipped bogged down, the title was changed to. The underlying tranche included 1 billion EUR from the EU financial plan and 2 billion EUR from the Part States. The subsequent tranche included 2 billion EUR from the EU spending plan and 1 billion EUR from the Part States. The understanding among Turkey and the EU seems to have stopped the movement of exiles into Europe.

Because of the moving international climate, Turkey, ISIS, and Kurdish groups have hindered the progression of new displaced people. The greater part of the Syrians in Turkey who were intending to venture out to Europe had proactively done as such. After 2017, the Syrian populace in Turkey developed almost completely considering births. In the interim, the obstructing of the Balkan course, which can be portrayed as a post-current resistance practice more tough Mediterranean assurance, and the critical circumstances wherein the people who came to the Greek islands yet couldn't travel to Europe decreased the interest in change to Europe.

Nonetheless, it ought not be disregarded that the displaced person game plan has brought about various negative political occasions in Turkey, as well as elevated «Anti-European» and «Anti-Western» tendencies among the Turkish public. For this situation, a fascinating dynamic has emerged among Turkey and the EU, albeit the EU has remotely forced the present circumstance, Turkey has medium to communicate it in its inward and worldwide approaches. For certain, the EU or its part states assume a huge part to the EU's advantage by giving monetary guide to Turkey to haven searchers. Be that as it may,



it is likewise significant for Turkey.

The continuation of this monetary guide, which represents the vast majority of the monetary weight associated with bearing the cost of safe haven to shelter searchers. Training, wellbeing, lodging, security, limit improvement, and different administrations are pivotal in Turkey for both Turkey and the exiles. Accordingly, it is important that these assets, which were planned for a considerable length of time as 3 in addition to 3 billion be kept up with. In the interim, certain EU Individuals, most prominently Germany, are expected with the monetary help program.

As of April 2022, there are approximately 3,761,267 Syrians seeking «temporary protection» in Turkey. Furthermore, since 2011, Turkey has suffered from a large number of defectors from neighboring countries, especially Afghanistan and Iraq. This means that the number of internationally protected persons in Turkey has increased from 58,018 in 2011 to now when only those legally registered are counted. Despite the fact, Turkey halted the "open door policy" in 2016 and since then erected a wall more than 900 km long along the border of Syria, Iraq and Iran to fight terrorism and reduce the situation illegal migration, immigration operations across the Turkish border continue.




Figure 1. T.R. Service of Inside Directorate General of Movement The executives.

Source: T.R. Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, (2022)
<https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>

Temporary protection is offered to the majority of Syrian refugees in Turkey, as Turkey's geographical reserve under the Geneva Convention restricts granting refugee status to non-European asylum seekers. Although they are often referred to as refugees or asylum seekers, Syrians in Turkey can be divided into three types.



The ensuing characterization involves 99,643 people who came to Turkey before 2011 and stayed with a «residence permit». The second-rate class contains around 50,000 Syrians who made an appearance in Turkey before 2011 anyway have not yet been joined up.

4.2 Refugees Presence Impact on Turkish Sectors

4.2.1 Refugees Impact on Social Stability

As of August 1, the number of undocumented Syrian immigrants using the sea route was 47 in 2011, 347 in 2012, 3,101 in 2013, 8,418 in 2014, 68,711 in 2015, 22,988 in 2016 and 6,399 in 2017. At the same time, the crisis took the smuggling industry to dangerous heights. As a result, attempts to combat smuggling have increased, and 646 migrant smugglers were apprehended by Turkish security authorities between 2011 and August 1, 2017, according to data from the Coast Guard Command. Deaths rose as immigrants desperately wanted to reach Europe. and those coordinating smuggling began to take more dangerous routes.

Another important problem that comes to mind when refugees and security are mentioned in the many "security" threats that asylum seekers will create in the society they will take refuge. As it is known, one of the most important fears voiced around the world is that the massive influx of refugees will cause local people to lose their jobs due to the cheap labor represented by the refugees and the security problems arising from the refugee communities. Concerns here focus not only on immigrants but also on the possibility of the emergence of a disorderly atmosphere that creates favorable conditions for terrorist groups and organized crime networks.



Figure 2. Picture for a Syrian Family crossing to Europe illegally through Turkey.

Source: Beaulieu, T., Sarker, S., & Sarker, S. (2015). A conceptual framework for understanding crowdfunding.

Communications of the Association for Information Systems.

Just 15% of the populace in Istanbul When inquired as to whether they think the presence of foreigners in their city is seen emphatically, after six years, the quantity of individuals who accept this is an increment. Most Turkish occupants feel that the deluge of Syrians has had adverse consequences. As per a review led



in October 2017, 78% of inhabitants said Syrians have made their country less protected. One more public review, distributed in December 2017, uncovered that 75% of Turkish residents don't feel they can live calmly with Syrians.

A December 2016 investigation of Turkish residents in Istanbul found that 72% were awkward despite Syrians and 76% communicated little compassion toward the travelers. Nonetheless, both the inward resistance and Syrians looking for citizenship contend that the naturalization system is indistinct. The issue could erupt again before the 2019 decisions as the resistance has frequently cautioned that the specialists could resettle Syrians to weaken the resistance vote in unambiguous regions. Politically burdened bunches feel the public authority is utilizing Syrians to satisfy political plans both at home and abroad.

Minorities, for example, the Alevis, strange Shiites who make up around 15-20% of Turkish society, accept that Syrians are blessed with honors that other strict or ethnic gatherings don't have. "We Alevis actually don't have equivalent citizenship," said a representative for the social community. "Now and again, Syrians are given freedoms that Turkish residents don't have.". The decision party campaigned for the Turkish nation to "help our Muslim family in trouble". This idea of religious fortitude is fundamental to the association's endeavors to restrict and battle negative mentalities toward evacuees.

"We don't see a great deal of viciousness on account of religion," guaranteed an overseer from an Islamic foundation in Istanbul. Turkish people in strict areas affirm this view, however, they likewise concur that genuine snags eventually offset religious solidarity. A neighborhood muhtar in Istanbul's Sultangazi locale has grumbled that the focal government has utilized "strict exchange", encouraging penance and resilience, to keep individuals from fighting the requirement for schools and privileges of laborers. The decision party's account of Sunni Muslim solidarity has powered hatred against both the public authority and Syrian outcasts in left-wing or common regions.

As said before, Alevis is particularly sensitive. A spokesman for the Istanbul-based community stated, "We feel a deliberate campaign to divide society on the basis of religion, using sectarianism." These groups may be attracted to an allegation that focuses on popular rights, even if they believe that the government does not have the authority to make such claims. Alevis in the vicinity of Gazi, where about 50% are Alevi, feared that the Syrians would settle and reduce the Alevis to a minority. Throughout the month, anti-government media websites claimed that migrants were "invading" Turkish beaches, leaving mountains of trash and assaulting women.

According to one local, since the Syrians don't speak Turkish, they couldn't hear the warning, and "a small incident can quickly turn a snowball into an entrenchment". Top government leaders have reacted angrily to such claims. Strange social media accounts are summoning people to the streets. After the coup plot, about 25,000 police officers were fired for alleged links to an acronym for the government-created Fethullahist terrorist organization.

Altinok 2017, Networks reproachful of the public authority, particularly those on the left, are worried that the public authority is utilizing youngsters to become fanatics to fill openings in the radical police force. Doubt of the security administrations is imbued among allies of the Kurdish development, who infrequently suddenly erupt at Syrian travelers. Disagree communicated via web-based entertainment prompted the capture. All of this is heightening discontent, conceivably focused on Syrians, a considerable lot of whom consider Erdogan to be their rescuer.

Sadly, the repressed disappointment in our childhood shows itself in the Syrians, keeping Syrians from entering specific roads. Syrians are additionally careful about Turkish police. As of October 2017, the Inside Service utilized 386 gatekeepers in Istanbul and is assessing demands for another 2,000 positions. They dread that these safeguards could manhandle their power or be utilized to smother genuine resistance.



Heads of outcast camps ought to be approved to select Syrian associates to assist them with settling questions and recognize possibly hazardous circumstances. Syrian people group pioneers can likewise assist with districting lead representatives and city chairmen managing outcast issues all the more real.

4.2.2 Refugees Impact on health care

The increasing migration of vulnerable populations leaving the warzone brought several problems to Turkey's healthcare system and socioeconomic determinants of health. In Turkey, the increasing prevalence of infectious diseases and other public health-related consequences of war (Hargreaves, 2016; Doganay & Demiraslan, 2016; Eskiocak, 2013), an insufficient number of healthcare professionals, and overcrowding of hospitals and emergency services (zdoan, 2014, Savas et al., 2016; Tekeli Yesil & Altner, 2017; Gulacti et al., 2017). zdemir et al. (2017), for example, advocate the significance of integrating Syrian physicians and nurses into the health system based on a model that is being followed in Turkey. Making health facilities incapable of providing service by attack, falling in service capacity. Decrease in food production, cost of food, decrease in storage and processing capacity, emergence, and prevalence of nutrition problems.

Demolition in infrastructure:

- Decreased water supply capacity, insufficient access to safe water.
- Reduction in waste disposal capacity, poor sanitation conditions, environmental pollution from combat vehicles.
- Reduction in communication capacity.

Housing problem:

- Demolition of houses, unsafe housing conditions.
- Health and security created by displacement for internal or external migration problems.
- Health problems (acute respiratory tract infections, diarrhea, measles, parasitic diseases, malnutrition, nutritional deficiencies, increase in sickness and death) caused by temporary settlement in camp areas.
- Stopping of production, inadequacy, depletion of stocks.
- Reduction in income Decreased purchasing power, Black market.

Here the impact is on the public and private Turkish hospitals, and if we look closely at the absorptions in Turkish hospitals of medicines and medical supplies and even places and rooms, we find that most of these refugees have replaced many, and because of their serious conditions in which they were entering Turkey and then entering emergency to hospitals led to the depletion of many supplies and even draining the energies of nurses and doctors. On the other hand, when we see that most Turks do not speak Arabic, they have faced big problems with Syrian refugees despite the presence of many different international and regional bodies specialized in this issue, and if we look at the period of Covid-19, the medical situation has become tense in the whole world and not only in Turkey, but here Syrian refugees also had a great impact on the capabilities and responses in Turkish hospitals.

4.2.3 Refugees Impact on Economy



4.2.3.1 Employment

Even when the economy is performing relatively well, the labour market of Turkey reveals significant structural difficulties that impede formal employment creation:

- Even though Syrians are excluded from the information, the work force is rising at a relatively quick rate.
- Casual work is well known.
- The lowest pay permitted by law is about equivalent to the middle pay.
- Firms gripe that laborer miss the mark on vital abilities, and diminished specialists work extended periods of time, restricting their possibilities for expertise advancement.
- Regional disparities in unemployment rates continue.

Immediate benefits of formal occupations include the ability to earn minimum wage and work fewer hours. The expected percentage of workers earning the minimum wage is 18.3 percent, or 3.3 million. Contrasted with the normal or middle compensation in Turkey, the lowest pay permitted by law is a lot higher. The middle wage rate of the minimum wage in 2019 was 86 percent.

This implies that 41% of the specialists in Turkey, or 7.4 million individuals, procure beneath the lowest pay permitted by law. A new report on the impacts of raising the lowest pay permitted by law on the Turkish work market shows that business shifts from formal to casual positions when the lowest pay permitted by law rises. Likewise, when the lowest pay permitted by law rises, more modest, lower-efficiency organizations are bound to leave the market. This information shows that casualness is broad, which is incompletely credited to the low-efficiency levels of this work.

It recommended keeping the lowest real wage allowed by law below-average productivity gains in order to reduce employment costs, especially for low-skilled and/or young workers. It is called “formal employment” and thus broadens the tax base.

4.2.3.2 Effects on the Economy

Entrepreneurs are disappointed with the developing number of unregistered Syrian organizations, which incorporate road merchants and shops selling contraptions or embellishments, supermarkets, eateries, beauty parlors, and bread kitchens. Syrian organizations, in contrast to Turkish organizations, can't acquire advances from the Little and Medium Undertakings Improvement Association or the Service of Economy. Syrians additionally experience issues acquiring bank advances, completing exchanges abroad, or just opening a record. Financial backers, scared by administrative boundaries and questioning advancement possibilities, loan little microfinance to Syrian organizations.

Notwithstanding, Syrian organizations can have a huge impact. As indicated by a June 2017 report by Building Markets, a US-based non-administrative association, Syrians in Turkey have contributed more than \$330 million and made a larger number than 6,000 lawful organizations beginning around 2011. As indicated by a similar review, these organizations utilize a normal of 9.4 individuals. Syrians, by far most of whom recently worked in the casual area. At long last, the chance of getting assets and specialized help can urge Syrian business visionaries to enroll in their business and give formal work valuable open doors to different Syrians.

Another alternative is to support joint Turkish-Syrian societies, which has the added benefit of encouraging



more engagement between Syrian and Turkish residents.

5 CONCLUSION

Finally, understanding whether Turkey (both governmental and nongovernmental proposals) is replying to Syrians at concentrated stages, throughout terms of that they are focusing attention on their existences locationally, financially, and sociologically, would then define to a certain extent the living area wherein Syrian-led efforts are permitted to function, as well as the extent to that they are engrained inside of legislation and culture. Then it will make a huge effect on Syrians' lasting cohabitation in Turkey, the direction of Syrian society as well as internal and beyond Syria, and Turkey's response towards foreigners. The strategies Syrians organize or do not organize, beyond the shelters influence how they comprehend the character that really takes to become a refugee and what it means to be in a steward society relationship evolves in the future, just as they look for a new order for managing also developing modern lifestyles, temporary either lasting, the value about the study is based on how it affects Turkish society, especially marginalized individuals within the existing steward society. and then how Turkey would comprehend not just the issues of refugee requirements but also the demands of the newfangled society produced by the influx of Syrian people elsewhere. These might be direct effects of commingling and interchange, or, extra frequently, indirect effects since these exchanges appear to be limited. the impact of refugees not only on Turkey but also on other countries around the world, wars should stop, and peace should prevail in the whole world because not only refugees are affected because their origin country has been destroyed but also all the neighborhoods' countries are facing problems from this issue.

Four main areas for understanding the main issues that Syrian communities deal with in Turkey can be identified: the degree of understanding between both Syrians and Turkish citizens; Syrian community proposals and channels; the degree of bridge between Syrians and Turkish citizens to resolve peace; and fears for the future. These four worlds are tightly intertwined, and further study is needed to fully appreciate the complexities. However, it must be viewed from a peaceful perspective, which is divided along religious, governmental, social, and economic lines. Residents of rural areas of Syria have difficulty adjusting to urban life, especially in some parts of the city for economic reasons. Moreover, the chance of this group staying permanently in Turkey increases by the day, and with the length of their stay with us already in Turkey increases, they feel obligated to build a new lifestyle for themselves.

1. Language is the key for the overcoming problems, also it is an important component for schooling and employment.
2. It is also important role for the quality of education in the upcoming future since Syrian students are enrolled in public schools her it is necessary to provide the number of physical facilities and teacher capacities as well as those teachers should be specially trained for Syrian's children culture and the effects of the war on them.
3. To avoid negative reactions Turkish Parents and Children should create awareness for helping Syrian children know more about their culture and try to help them in returning to their origin country in the future.
4. To avoid Syrian children's, go to streets and work inappropriate works, financial assistance should be provided to them and help those children's to enter schools, then they are able to learn and think about their culture, thus able to help his family in the future.
5. About the economic: To ensure effective and suitable sectoral and geographical investments, it is important to expand investment opportunities for Syrians, enhance consultation and incentive systems, and build specialized consultation centers in municipalities and industry-trade rooms for this purpose. Because the nature of economic activity necessitates it, it would be beneficial to enact laws that allows businesspeople with temporary protected status to roam freely. Furthermore, increased local concern about Syrians receiving preferential treatment in regulatory obligations to start businesses may be a cause of contention for local business owners functioning in the same location, ending in unfair competition. For



the reasons outlined above, it is critical to take this topic seriously in order to avoid anti-Syrian outbursts and maintain a quiet work atmosphere.

6. In this context, adequate safeguards should be created to prevent Syrians from operating as an irregular and cheap working population, as well as building and distributing the awareness that Syrians may live good lives in commerce and leads to economic integration.

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