

SERMAYENİN TÜRKİYE TARIMINA NÜFUZU VE GETİRDİĞİ MÜPHEMLİKLER

THE PENETRATION OF CAPITAL INTO TURKEY'S
AGRICULTURE AND ITS AMBIVALENCES

Cihan CİNEMRE 

Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, Faculty of Science and Letters,
Department of Sociology, cihan.cinemre@msgsu.edu.tr

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Öz

Bu çalışma sermayenin özellikle 2000'li yıllardan sonraki dönemde Türkiye tarımına nüfuz etmesiyle ilgilidir. Araştırma konusu, toprak mülkiyetinde ortaya çıkan eşitsizlik, tohumun metalaşması, tarımsal ürünün dolaşımı üzerinde perakende tekellerinin hâkimiyetinin pekişmesi ve tarımsal üretimdeki uluslararası işbölümü doğrultusunda yetiştiricilik örüntüsündeki değişim bakımından ele alınmıştır. Sermayenin hareket kanunlarıyla devlet zorunun birliğinin bu dönüşümü harekete geçirdiği ileri sürülmüştür. Çalışmada, sermayenin tarıma yönelik girişimlerdeki belirleyici bir uğrağın, onun doğrudan tarımsal üretime yatırılmasında yaşanan tereddüt olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Sermayenin bu tutumu onun tarımla ilişkisine içerilmiş müphemliğin temel nedenlerinden biri olarak koyulanmıştır.

Abstract

This work deals with the capital's penetration into Turkey's agriculture particularly in the era following the 2000s. The subject matter is examined in terms of the emergence of inequality in the ownership of the land, the commodification of seed, the consolidation of the rule of retail monopolies over the circulation of agricultural products, and the change in the pattern of cultivation reflecting the international division of labour in agriculture. It is asserted that the unity of the laws of motion of capital with the state coercion impelled these changes. It is emphasised in the study that a crucial moment of capital's mode of engagement with agriculture is its shunning from investing in direct agricultural production, which in turn is postulated as one of the fundamental causes of ambivalence internal to their relationship.

1. Introduction

Throughout the work it is intended to constitute a dialectical understanding of agriculture in Turkey; agriculture is hypothesised as becoming. Through the penetration of capital into the rural, the annihilation of the peasantry occurs in unity with the existence of a new peasantry. The new peasantry that has come to exist is internally differentiated and its relationships within the rural are diversified. Now, peasantry's existence indicates an ontology emerging through its motion within an expanded whole, growing beyond the presupposed locality of the rural.

The specific purpose of this work is to elucidate, despite the persistence of the small peasantry, the emergence of new social relations of production and the commodification of the activities related to agriculture in Turkey in their entirety. The motion constituting that entirety specifically is substantiated in the unity of the opposites – of coercion and the market, the negation and affirmation of the small peasantry, the amassment of wealth and the growing misery, and of proletarianization and capital accumulation with the existence of small peasantry resulting in the latter's subjection to the blind forces of the market. The constitution of these specific unities in Turkey is in effect primarily due to the counter-offensive of the capital, – collaborating with the international organisations of imperialism – which was substantiated in the military coup of September 12, 1980, and further advanced since the beginning of the 2000s. The counter-offensive streamlined the field that the laws of motion of the capital were to be actualised. Thus, the constitution of a new peasantry and a new logic of agricultural production have come to pass. The disruption of the property layout in agriculture ensued, capitalist relations of production flourished throughout the rural, and peasantry was dissolved because of the dominance of the corporations producing agricultural inputs and those that put the agricultural products into circulation. These are supported by the coercive apparatus of the state.

The notion of ambivalence is emphasised in this study because it refers to unpredictability and reciprocity in the workings of the market. Ambivalence indicates that because of the imperatives concerning agricultural production, despite the immense force capital and the state combined might exert, these forces must devise elaborate approaches while dealing with agriculture. Class relations are fundamentally more compelling in the rural than in towns and become ever perplexing due to the diffusion of capital resulting in ambivalences and complexities that challenge the theoretical efforts to understand the rural. Ambivalence is closely related to the notion of uneven development. Today, this notion is actualised through the unequal relationships between the towns and the rural, core and periphery, capital and farmers and between distinct sections of the rural. These relationships are actualised through the global value

chains. With the expansion of commodity circulation to the rural comes along the competition between producers, territories, and the predominance of corporations over them. This means that the distribution of the riches among spaces, peoples, and individual subjects, which always involves some sort of coercion, is invariably variegated. The outcomes of incorporation into commodity circulation are unforeseeable, inconsistent, and contradictory, thus ambivalent.

This work comprises two sections each consisting of two sub-sections to constitute a dialectical understanding of capital's penetration to agriculture in Turkey and the ambivalences it engenders. The first section is primarily theoretically inclined, and it intends to understand the agricultural problem in terms of Marxism's approach to the organisation of agriculture under the sway of capital. The first sub-section deals with capital's methods of engaging in agriculture. Here, capital refraining from getting involved in immediate agricultural production but, nonetheless, seeking to appropriate surplus value through its control over agriculture is posed as a fundamental question. In the second sub-section the pertinacity of the small peasant production partly owing to this demeanour of capital is examined. The persistence of small peasantry is particularly significant to understanding the agriculture of a country like Turkey where unchecked commodification of agriculture takes place throughout a rural property layout in which small commodity production still occupies a considerable place. In the second sub-section, today's primary form of the subjection of the peasantry to the market imperative and the reign of capital, the Global Value Chains (GVCs) are examined as well.

While dealing with the emergence of capitalist farming and with the internal differentiation of the peasantry as its correlate, the emergence of inequality in landed property should be a fundamental topic. Therefore, in the third sub-section, this subject matter is dealt with through the relevant empirical data. The last subsection deals with the commodification of the seed, fundamental input for cultivation, and the agricultural product. Here, the change in the pattern of cultivation is also examined in conjunction with an emphasis on the exertions of the international organisations of imperialism, since they fundamentally are the arbiters of the international division of labour in agriculture.

2 Capital's methods of engaging in agriculture

2.1 On capital's abstaining from the agricultural production as such

Karl Marx concisely brings up the content of capital's penetration into agriculture. The concentration of the means of production and their conversion into capital take place, and simultaneously the immediate producer turns into a waged labour. The new mode of production in its embryonic form is differentiated from peasant farming by the amount of land cultivated on account of a

single capitalist farmer and by the extensive employment of capital in a larger area (Marx, 1991, pp. 814-815). Then, there is the tendency inherent to the capitalist mode of production to reduce the size of the rural population relative to the non-agricultural population, since in the industry (in the narrow sense) the growth of the constant capital in its relationship with the variable capital is related to an absolute growth in the variable capital – even though there is a relative decline in its relationship to the constant (Marx, 1991, p. 775).

The motion that Marx spoke of goes on today; however, today, this is much more extensive. The recently extended breadth of capital's penetration into agriculture happens through a specific form of organisation: the agro-food industrial complex. What this notion indicates is the capital's effort to intervene in every moment of agricultural production, from the production of the agricultural input to the consumption of the agricultural product; and as distinct from the industry, the agricultural production as such is not the primary activity that the capital gravitates towards. Presuming this tendency of capital is crucial today to examine the dominance of capital over agriculture and the workings of the latter. Richard Lewontin implies the validity of this assumption, while considering the capitalist transformation of agriculture, emphasising the necessity to distinguish between farming and the agro-food system. The latter, of course, does not merely correspond to farming as such; it includes the activity of cultivation, but it is more of a matter concerning the production, transportation and marketing of the inputs of the farmer and the transportation, processing and marketing of its final products (Lewontin, 2000, p. 95). This distinction is made by Henry Bernstein through counterposing the notion of agriculture and the agricultural sector (Bernstein, 2010, pp. 64-65). The great transformation that took place in the rural caused by the penetration of capital into agriculture turned farming as the peasant's primary activity and the peasantry in general into aspects of an expanded sphere and conditioned them by the relations of exchange and domination within that sphere.

Capital has an inherent tendency to avoid being invested in direct agricultural production, and one of the fundamental reasons behind this tendency is the separation of land ownership from the farmer in the capitalist mode of production. Marx calls the fixed capital investment made to soil *la terre capital*. These investments turn the soil into capital from being a mere raw material. Landowners take measures against these investments through tenancy contracts. With the expiration of the contract, the improvements made to the soil are to be the property of the landowner. This is one of the reasons for the landowner's effort to keep the duration of the lease as short as possible as the capitalist mode of production develops. In this way, what is sold is not going to be merely the land, but improved land; the capital incorporated into the earth – for which the landowner has

paid nothing – will be joining the property of the landowner (Marx, 1991, pp. 756-757).

Alexander Chayanov's exposition provides further clarity to understand that the capital's mode of penetration into agriculture is contingent on specific constraints that it has to deal with within this branch of production. Large-scale forms of economic organisation are not as beneficial in agriculture as they are in industry. In agriculture, spatial concentration is not possible. Therefore, in the capitalist mode of production, it is not possible to organise farming in line with the principles of horizontal concentration and invariably other ways to control the anarchy in agriculture and to arrange it in accordance with the capitalist principles are sought (Chayanov, 1991, pp. 3-6). According to Lewontin, the failure of capital's classical concentration in farming is due to both the financial and physical features of agricultural production. Since the depreciation of the cultivable land is not possible and the liquidity of the investment made in agricultural plots is very low, the real estate market for the farms is very weak, and the ownership of the cultivable land is not attractive for the capital. There is also the capital's problem of shortening its reproduction time since this is connected to the annual cycle of any plant's growth and a fixed cycle of the maturation of the livestock (Lewontin, 2000, p. 95).

Then, capital does not gravitate towards direct agricultural production but is equally inclined to become involved in agrarian activities. In this case, what must capital do, specifically regarding agriculture? Chayanov mentions that agriculture goes through the stages of industrial capitalism, abandoning the semi-natural forms of existence and becoming subject to commercial capital. Commercial enterprises bring numerous peasant households into their sphere of influence. Commercial capitalism gains control over these small commodity producers and their links to the market, it advances a credit system with equivalent conditions to slavery and transforms the organisation of agricultural production into a particular type of exploitative distribution system based on the deprivation of the worker. Chayanov (1991, pp. 6-7) expands on this mode of organisation through the Muscovite cotton firm Knopa's exploitative relationship with the cotton cultivators. Kautsky (1988, p. 283) evaluates the same relations of production through the organisation of the Swiss factory of the Nestlé Company; the factory processes 10,000 litres of milk daily. The milk is the product of 12,000 cows from 180 villages that are subjected totally to the House of Nestlé. V. I. Lenin (1977, pp. 268-269) speaks of the materialisation of an organisation similar to Nestlé's in Russia with the amalgamation of the production of milk, cheese, and butter. Through the organisation of combined dairy farms, capital subjects the small farmers. Lenin says that, in this case, the role of the combined dairies is like grain elevators classifying grain in commercial grain production in the sense of procuring a

merchandise supply of a specific quality. Through grading, it ceases to be an individual product and becomes a generic (*res fungibilis*) product. The commodification of classified grain causes it to become the subject of speculation, and Cronon (1991, pp. 97-148) in his renowned work expands on the subject matter. To this end, the technologies of transportation, the stockpiling, and the administration of products in immense quantities without spoiling them are required.

In unity with the capital's aversion to engaging in direct agricultural production is its insistence on penetrating into agriculture, nevertheless. This finds its clear expression today in the dominance of huge agro-business monopolies backed by new biogenetics and retail technologies. The agricultural input companies and agri-food corporations are intertwined; the former reigns over the farmers' access to their conditions of production, the latter puts farmers' products into circulation and the reciprocal relationships of these are the primary causes of the *predicament of the peasantries of the periphery*. Friedmann mentions that a combined agri-food sector revealed itself for the first time between 1947 and 1973 – the US-centred food regime era. Since then, agro-food capitalists, prompting global enclosures, have become the most dynamic sector of the global economy. Biology and genetics have replaced chemistry and physics to become the capital's most dynamic technological frontiers. The scale of agro-food capital has grown immensely due to the mergers and their conglomeration with the chemicals industry (Friedmann, 2006, p. 463).

The monopolistic power of corporations and the methods that they have recourse to achieve that power are built on corporate research on biogenetics, the reproduction of intellectual property, and mergers and takeovers. Biogenetics advances on *an act of enclosure* that appropriates the life material produced by nature itself and by humanity in interaction with it over thousands of years. The appropriation takes place to ensure the social dominance of the capitalist class over the others for their profit motives and the realisation of surplus value, which is the source of the latter. Several works approach the subject matter from the vantage of these hypotheses (Lewontin, 2000; Moore, 2015, pp. 263-275; Lewontin and Levins, 2009, pp. 163-267; Middendorf et al., 2000, pp. 107-125). Through mergers and takeovers, the centralisation of capital is intertwined with the monopolistic nature of biogenetics corporations' activities (Hauter, 2012; Howard, 2021, pp. 107-127; Kalaitzandonakes and Bjornson, 1997; Boyd, 2003; Kloppenburg Jr., 2004; Juma, 1989).

Sanctioning of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) simultaneously with the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) marks a crucial moment in the reign of monopolies. Pagano (2014, p. 1418) asserts that this moment corresponds to a break in the world economy facilitating the emergence of the institutions of intellectual monopoly

capitalism. This new organization of big business not only corresponds to the concentration of knowledge into a few hands but is based on the move from a world of open science and open market into a world of closed science and closed market (Pagano, 2014, p. 1410). The correlative of the stricter intellectual property rights following the 1990s is the expansion of GVC trade and the tendency towards the redistribution of rents in favour of lead firms (Durand and Milberg, 2020, p. 410). The theory of capital and agriculture's peculiar relationship with its inherent inequality must be premised on the co-existence of monopolies, capitalist farmers, and small peasantry. Reckoning with this premise enables a true understanding of the rural relations of production and the relationship between capital and cultivators, which are constitutive of the agricultural setup.

2.2 The simultaneity of distinct modes of production

One of the fundamental aspects of the subject matter dealt with in this work is the staunch determination of small agricultural producers to survive. The survival of the small agricultural producers corresponds to one of the ambivalences stemming from capital's engagement in agriculture and its dialectical understanding is essential to grasp the *sui generis* complexity of the relationship between rural space and capital. The dialectics internal to this mode of ambivalence consist in the particular challenges that capital must encounter in its endeavour to govern agriculture. The penetration of capital into agriculture is necessarily incomplete owing to the nature of agricultural production and land. Despite its evident force, capital in its relationship with agriculture must contrive relationships that are intricate distinct from its relationships with the industry.

Ambivalence refers to the dissipation of abstract theories, ideals, and intentions in the face of the concreteness of an unpredictable space constituted in/through reciprocity. As Marx says, 'Men make their own history, but not just as they please' (1943, p. 23). Ambivalence is the circumscription of the subjectivity and intentions by the pasts of the spaces and the peoples that are constitutive of the real. Thomas J. Puleo and Henry Sivak in their works on catastrophe contrast ambivalence with simplicity, certainty, clarity, and predictability (Puleo and Sivak, 2013, p. 458). Veronica Gago's notion of neoliberalism from below is relevant to understanding the workings of ambivalence in the rural. The concept refers both to the dynamic of resisting exploitation and dispossession and to the foundation for an intensification of that exploitation and dispossession. Gago, while expanding on this dialectic relationship quotes Marx, emphasising his understanding of the real as multiply determined: 'The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse' (Gago, 2017, p. 11).

Space corresponds to concreteness with its complexity and unpredictability, and with respect to rural space, these characteristics become ever compelling compared to towns because of the heterogeneity of the social classes in the rural, since the latter evades universality in various ways. Besides, the complexity of the rural is more advanced at the periphery compared to the core because of the peasantry's imperative to diversify its activities to compensate for the risks stemming from market fluctuations (Wilson and Riggs, 2003, pp. 695-696).

A mediation significant to expand on ambivalence in terms of dialectics – negation of the negation – is resilience, signifying that the exercise of force is never mechanical, and its outcomes are unequivocally variegated. Crowley and Elliott speak of the resilience of peoples against hazards. Resilience is the complex web of social interactions, characteristics, and capacities that enables a community to live with the hazards they face (Crowley and Elliott, 2012, p. 209). This may be transcribed to space's resilience in the face of the interferences made by the state and capital. Capital negates the pre-capitalist relations of production and the layout of land ownership; however, peasants' urge to resist proletarianization and dispossession and rural being scattered over the space negate the negation. The peasantry is effaced to bring forth a new peasantry.

Places are complex, making them both fragile and resistant to rapid changes (Puleo and Sivak, 2013, p. 461). Even though capital throws rural into disarray, this does not correspond to its irreversible annihilation and while the layout of land ownership is being transformed in favour of the capitalist farmer, smallholders and various aspects of pre-capitalist relations of production persist. Murray and Overton speak of various local systems at the periphery that do not entirely dismiss capitalism but are built on a strong foundation of communal self-reliance and reciprocity, enabling them to preserve social forms. They are efforts to disengage from some of the perceived harmful aspects of capitalism. In this way, local economies gain resilience against the creative destruction the market brings (Murray and Overton, 2016, p. 429). Then, we come up with the unity of necessity and freedom, the subjectivity of capital receives its modality through its encounter with agricultural production, and as Benjamin Selwyn indicates, production processes are not a-historical, de-political, and a-social (Selwyn, 2016). For instance, in colonial Nigeria, the struggle over the relations of production and corresponding property relations regarding the production of palm oil signifies that within the organisation of production, which is almost completely integrated into the international circulation of a commodity the small peasantry may still be the dominant element (Buell, 1928, pp. 766-781).

Today, the dialectics of fragility and resistance, inclusion and exclusion manifest themselves primarily through the organisation of Global Value Chains – the primary mode

of incorporating small producers into international commodity circulation. YARA, the Norwegian fertiliser corporation's workings exemplify the actualisation of those dialectical relationships within a GVC and their intrinsic inequality. YARA's investments in intangible assets facilitate the governing of the value chain integration of smallholding Tanzanian farmers while coercing other actors in the chain into a narrow range of tangible production tasks, thus preventing them from developing their own intangible capacities (Tups and Dannenberg, 2023). This mode of inequality along the value chain manifests itself in the distinct compositions of production processes of the subjects operating within the value chain as well. The processing of black tea which involves five distinct phases is a capital-intensive process contrary to tea harvest which is labour-intensive. This divergence matters to understand the unequal relationships between the subjects situated in the earlier and the later stages of the commodity chain of tea (Değirmenci and Karaçimen, 2019, p.142). In Turkey, along the value chain of peanut, the most disadvantaged are the small producers compared to the larger producers in terms of lower gross and net profits (Özalp and Ören, 2023, p. 20). The neoliberal policy and the relations of exchange, exploitation, domination, and dependency along the value chain have increased the production costs at a higher rate than incomes (Özalp and Ören, 2023, p. 5).

The workings of any lead firm in a GVC vindicate Werner and Bair's contention that global value chains are both effects and drivers of uneven development (Werner and Bair, 2019, p. 183). Werner speaks of the enduring and emerging forms of territorial and social unevenness throughout the global economy. Uneven development is implicated in the formation and restructuring of the production networks (Werner, 2016, p. 461). While agriculture ceases to be a mere local matter through the incorporation of small peasantry into international commodity circuits through the GVCs, the uneven development the latter involves manifests itself as the co-existence of distinct but reciprocally related – market imperative mediated – sub-sectors.

In the rural two sub-sectors become distinguishable through their modes of relationships with the market. Akram-Lodhi, Kay, and Borras Jr apprehend the transformation of agriculture following the 1970s through the decisiveness of the activities correlated to the export-oriented agriculture subsector and the relationships that it accordingly brings about. In their work, the authors draw attention to the existence of a bifurcated agricultural layout, in which two subsectors exist side by side. What is essential to the reconfiguration of this structure are the 'processes facilitating the expanded commodification of products, labour, nature, and space, which affect the relationship between the export and peasant production subsectors.' The key to understanding these processes is the reconfigurations

between the production for the market, the stubborn persistence of the peasant production for use, and the deepening of semi-proletarianization. The binding of the market imperative is intertwined with the processes of semi-proletarianization (Akram-Lodhi, Kay, and Borrás Jr, 2009, pp. 215-216). Semi-proletarians attempt to drift apart from the market imperative regarding food production since they cannot compete with the imported food and local capitalist farmers, but the market imperative imposes itself – to survive, they must sell their increasingly commodified labour power (Akram-Lodhi, Kay, and Borrás Jr, 2009, p. 229). Drifting apart corresponds to what Werner puts forward with the notion of constitutive exclusion, which is the frequent exclusion of livelihoods and regions from global production networks being part and parcel of accumulation through these arrangements and the remaking of uneven development they entail (Werner, 2016, p. 458).

When commodification in agriculture and the internal differentiation of peasantry it brings about are in question, semi-proletarianization must be a decisive notion to reflect on. It indicates the survival of the small peasantry, not a complete proletarianization, and it does not merely consist in the peasant's necessity to become waged labour. Then, the peasant's predicament consists of her existence as a subject who lost her autonomy, desperation in the face of price fluctuations, isolation and constant indebtedness. Chayanov's notion of self-exploitation further renders the understanding of the pertinacity of the small peasantry. Bernstein expounds on this notion. The peasant families – despite their low productivity – are inclined to more intensive farming compared to capitalist farmers and must sell crops at lower prices and rent or buy land at higher prices compared to capitalist farmers. The capital tolerates and even encourages peasant or family farming as long as they produce cheap food, reducing the labour cost of the capitalists or produce labour power (Chayanov, 2010, p. 94). Capitalism has to reproduce its outside constantly thriving on the peculiar combination of exploitation and expropriation that the ambivalent articulation of capitalist and non-capitalist practices enables (Berndt, 2018, p. 11). In an economy articulated to the world capitalist system, peasant households depend on the capitalist class for their reproduction. These relationships between small producers and capital explain both the former's persistence and the acute poverty they must endure (Harriss and Harriss, 1979). The lack of most public works accompanies market dependency and self-exploitation; thus, rural resilience is founded on the consent to impoverishment. Kautsky mentions the degradation of the reproduction of peasantry: as taxation, indebtedness, and the exhaustion of the soil become more cumbersome for agriculture, the peasantry gets involved in competition through overwork and the refusal of any civilised needs; it descends into the depths of barbarism with its own free will (1988, p. 220). Mamdani (1987, p. 213) asserts that even for a casual observer, the social

conditions of the lower-middle and poor peasantry are no less than a shocking desolation. Today, the peasantry's desolation is the outcome of various activities of corporations and their domination, conceptualised by Tiago Teixeira (2024, p. 5) as the dark side of GVCs leading to social downgrading, the reproduction of informal and precarious working and living conditions, and the formation of an exploitable working class and dispossession.

Here, through the reality of self-exploitation and uneven development, we get to the consolidation of the existence of the small peasantry mediated by a concrete dialectical reversal. The small peasant's vulnerability compelling him to mobilise all members of the household in the poorest conditions and through over-work in the most adverse conditions, and his capacity to seriously depress the household's level of reproduction cause peasant family's cost of living and production to be lower than that of the capitalist farmer. Then, the capitalist farmer and lead firms as external forces turn towards the persistence of the small farmer to acquire foodstuff and labour power at lower prices. In sum, there are both impulsive, internal motives for the resilience of the small peasant family and the external ones; the market imperative turns towards this impulse externally and the existence of the small peasantry is this *dialectical relationship*.

Ambivalence mediated by dialectics is evident in various relationships pertaining to this sphere. However, since it is determinative of the fortunes of all subjects partake, the ambivalence of primary importance is the anarchic workings of the market. Peasant's dependency on the market which as Kautsky says 'proved to be even more moody and unpredictable than the weather' (1988, p. 16) to procure her inputs and to dispose of her products leads to her insecurity. Any peasant in Turkey in her isolation at a time when there is no state protection over agriculture, in her subjection to the blind forces of the market, is unsure whether she would get a price for her products or get the price to suffice to cover her production costs. Thus, any peasant's life as such becomes ambivalence itself.

The ambivalence that the market mediated relationships brought about in the rural is expressed in the outlook of the peasantry on the rural life as well. When the village-based labourers are asked about their preference between waged labour work and peasant work, virtually all of them opt for the former on the ground of counteracting the economic risks. The regular waged labour work, in the outlook of the peasantry used to correspond to the reliance on another, to the probability of immediate dismissal without compensation, a drama abound with homesickness and being abroad. The reasoning setting forth that peasantry is more perilous than waged labour signifies the tremendous rupture in the values such as self-sufficiency and freedom affirming peasantry (Özğurlu, 2011, pp. 96-97).

3 On the concrete effects of capital's engagement with Turkey's agriculture

3.1 The change in the layout of land ownership and the emergence of the capitalist farmer

With the state's withdrawal from agriculture following the military coup of September 12, 1980, and leaving the rural's fate to the blind forces of the market, a thorough depeasantation – simultaneous with the internal differentiation of the peasantry – occurred in rural Turkey. It is possible to discern the dissolution that took place in recent years within a motion in which the size of specific holdings expanded, and the formation of the capitalist farmer has accelerated; however, it is not possible to assert the small peasantry's absolute dissolution. What is taking place is essentially the internal differentiation of the peasantry, which Lenin referred to as one of the defining moments of capital's penetration into agriculture in Russia throughout the post-reform era. The beginning of the entire process is the appearance of the inequality in landed property. The former peasantry is completely dissolved and excluded by totally new rural inhabitants who are the basis of a new society in which the commodity economy and capitalist production are dominant. The groups at the two extremes, new types of rural inhabitants are being developed at the expense of the middle peasantry. The common feature of both types is their economy's commodity, money quality. Among the wealthy, a capitalist class of farmers leasing land comes into being. In most cases, plot size requires a labour force larger than the family can provide. The constitution of a rural proletariat is the necessary condition for the existence of the wealthy peasant. An insignificant farming on a patch of land, with the farm in a state of utter ruin, the inability to exist without the sale of labour power (the industry of the destitute peasant), and an extremely low standard of living distinguish the rural proletariat (1977, pp. 176-177).

Therefore, the first step in the study of the penetration of capital into agriculture in Turkey and the multifaceted commodification taking place in it since the beginning of the 2000s should be the differentiation in the size of arable land that separate enterprises own and it is in this sense possible to speak of two opposing tendencies that are in unity. On the one hand, there is further fragmentation of the small and medium-sized plots. This tendency can be distinguished by comparing the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) data of 2001 with the General Census of Agricultural Enterprises and the Agricultural Holding Structure Survey of 2016. For instance, while in 2001 the agricultural enterprises with a land size of less than 20 decares corresponded to 34% of all enterprises, this percentage was almost 38.5% in 2016. Another indicator of the fragmentation of the plots is that while this group of enterprises owned 5.3% of the entire arable land, this percentage fell to 4.5% in 2016. Meanwhile, the largest agricultural enterprises, those

with more than 1000 decares corresponded to 0.15% of the total in 2001, their share has risen almost to 1% in 2016. But more significant is the increase in the share of the land that this group owns, from 5.3% to 15.5% in the same period. At whose expense has this change taken place? The data indicates that while a part of the middle-scale enterprises are fragmented, some of them have been merged or taken over by other enterprises. For instance, while the agricultural enterprises of 20-100 decares had comprised 50% of the total in 2001, they comprised 42% in 2016. Moreover, this group's share of total arable land dropped from 36% to 24.5% in the same period. The share of agricultural enterprises with a plot size of 100-500 decares in the total was 16% and the area they held was 47% of the total in 2001. This group's share in the total number of enterprises has risen to 17%, while their share in total arable land has decreased to 43.5%; therefore, also within this group the fragmentation and the loss of arable land manifest themselves in their unity. On the other hand, a group of agricultural enterprises increasing in numbers are those with plots of 200 to 1000 decares. These comprised 5.5% of all agricultural enterprises in 2001, rising to 8% in 2016. The area that this group owns has increased from 29% to 36.5% in the same period (TURKSTAT 2007; TURKSTAT 2018).

The state acted to establish the preservation of large land ownership firmly. To this end in 1984 the Law of Agricultural Reform on the Land Regulation of the Irrigation (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, n. d.) was enacted, authorising the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to consolidate land in specific areas. Law Amending the Law on Soil Preservation and Land Utilisation (Official Journal, n. d.) was enacted in 2014. With this law, the ministry was authorised to determine the size of the parcel of arable land with an adequate size that is not to be further shrunk. The arable land of specified minimum was endowed with the quality of indivisible possession. The law pleads that the arable land of indivisible size if subject to inheritance or joint ownership cannot be parcelled out, its shares cannot be sold, transferred or pledged to the third parties.

Another indicator of the emergence of capitalist farming is the drop in the share of the farms solely cultivating the plots they own and the corresponding rise in the share of the farmers cultivating both the plots they own and the plots owned by others. In 2006, the share of agricultural enterprises solely cultivating their own land was 85.1%; this group's share among the total was dropped to 79.5% in 2016. More compelling is the change in the expanse of the land that these two distinct groups cultivate. The share of the area cultivated by the farms cultivating both the land they own and the land owned by the others has risen from 26.4% to 36.4% in the same period. The fall in the share of farmers cultivating only their own land increases with the size of the farm. In this period, among the plots with a size of five to nine decares, the share of the farmers cultivating solely the land they own has fallen

by 4.17% and the plot size that this group cultivates has fallen by 4.6%. However, among the group with a plot size of 500 to 999 decares, the drop in the share of farmers cultivating the land they own is 12.5% and the drop in the share of the land they cultivate is 11.5% (TURKSTAT 2008; TURKSTAT 2018). Therefore, one may conclude that, as capitalist farming develops, marginal farmers who are unable to sustain a livelihood with farming and economically utilise their land lease out their plots and are directed towards other employments. On the one hand, the smaller farms are being fragmented, and on the other hand, larger farms are being established, indicating the *emergence of the capitalist farmer the correlative of which is the expansion of the class of agricultural waged labourers*. Although there is no data on the producers cultivating both the farms they own and work on the farms of the others as waged labour, it is still possible to discern the proletarianization of the rural labour. In 1999, 4% of those employed in agriculture were waged or casual labourers. Their share has risen to 5% in 2004, 7.4% in 2013, and 13% in 2022 (TURKSTAT 2012; TURKSTAT 2014; TURKSTAT 2023a).

What distinguishes the rural dwelling waged labourer from those dwelling towns is the former's ownership of landed property. The predicament of the land-owning waged labourer consists essentially in his inability to secure a subsistence relying merely on cultivation necessitating waged labour work. Metin Özügürü's (2011) notion of the village-based proletariat encompasses this mode of existence triggered by the new international division of labour and predominant throughout the underdeveloped social formations. This class corresponds to the peasantry working as waged labour off the household or employed in non-agricultural production.

The impossibility of the small peasantry to secure a subsistence relying on the natural economy and its renouncing of cultivation are manifested in the relations of landed property in Gaziantep's Sakçagözü village. In this village %39 of those selling their labour power also hire sharecroppers and lease out their lands which means that those who forsaken the agricultural production are fundamentally small agricultural producers. In the mentioned village %51 of those leasing out their land are the peasants owning a land mass of 50 decares or less. Only %25 of the peasantry who own 50 decares or less lease land. Among those who sell their land %82 are peasants owning 50 decares and less and they fall under this category due to their land sale. This signifies the tendency of the middle peasantry's passage to the rank of the small ones (Taşdoğan and Ağdemir, 2019, pp. 305-306).

On the day of May 13, 2014, the most dreadful labour massacre in the history of Turkey took place resulting in the killing of 301 miners in Manisa's Soma district, a basin providing the most blatant instance of depeasantation and its staggering impacts on rural life.

Coşku Çelik speaks of the people of the Soma basin being coerced into selling their labour power due to the commodification of the means of production and reproduction. Two concurrent acts of privatisation were determinative to bring about this outcome. One is agriculture's, first and foremost tobacco cultivators' falling under the sway of big corporations which rendered it impossible for the small peasantry to sustain its sustenance through cultivation. The second is the handing of the coal production over to the corporations resulting in increased investments throughout the basin. The number of miners has increased fourfold between 2000 and 2013 owing to a great extent the expropriated and impoverished peasantry of the basin formerly maintained their livelihood through tobacco cultivation (Çelik, 2017).

Çelik's account of the Soma basin matters to grasp the nature of the rural waged labour and how it is differentiated from the labour force residing in towns. The peasant families of the basin, albeit continuing agricultural production, are compelled to other sources of income. Former tobacco producers have turned into coal miners; however, they and their families are not separated from the land altogether. These families, through the utilisation of the household's labour in various ways maintain agricultural production. The continuation of agricultural production consists of going to the lowlands for daily work or the unpaid labour of women and children within the household. Indigenous peasant families' continuing involvement with cultivation is what distinguishes them from the migrant coal miners in terms of labour process and class relations. Indigenous miner families carry on their relationship with soil to meet the family's needs at least (Çelik, 2017, p. 801). An analogous pattern is observable elsewhere. In Gaziantep's mountain village Aceroba, although all of the peasants are landed, almost all of them work as waged labourers nevertheless. Of the lowlands village Sakçagözü's population %30 gains income through waged labour and along with agriculture they are engaged in portage, driving, grocery, waitressing and nonskilled factory work (Taşdoğan, Ağdemir, 2019, p. 307).

The tendency towards the inequality in land ownership and the simultaneous proletarianization becomes self-evident in the statement of an agricultural engineer working in İzmir's district of Dikili: 'Small enterprises deteriorate day by day. In 2000 in the farmer registry system, there were 2000 farmers in Dikili... In 10 years 150, all of which are big farmers, will remain. I tell the local peasants; that these are but good days. It's going to be worse ahead. Farming will make money, not the farmer. For instance, all their children work in Dikili for a salary. I say that they rehearse the future... They will be farmhands (Eren, 2017, pp. 813-814). All these indicate at the success of the class struggle carried out by the state and the firms against peasants and workers,

which Selwyn (2016, p. 1771) indicates as constitutive of the formation of an employable/exploitable workforce.

Depeasantation in Turkey is mutually related to the ageing of the rural, this is essentially due to the impossibility of founding a household in any village. Zeynep Ceren Eren maintains that contrary to the previous generations, marriage, rather than settling down in the village, corresponds to departing from it and the possibility of breaking with rural life and the farm and orchard work identified with it. Due to women's desire to leave the village, younger men migrate to nearby towns and cities. A village chief from Bergama district states: 'In the village, the youth could not meet with girls to get married. Everyone thought of wedding their daughters with state officials or tradesmen, this is how the immigration began, in the village no girls remained. Before that the youth could found a household, now they cannot. This is why there are no children left in the village, there is no youth' (Eren, 2017, p. 825). The families who encourage their children to forsake the village life contend their disposition by assigning negative values to village work. They speak of the village work as if it were a filthy job or a disease. This outlook of the peasantry is construed by the author through the notion of 'loss of dignity' pertaining to village life and work (Eren, 2017).

The ageing of the peasantry and the gradual vanishing of marriages from the village life as its correlative becomes evident in the remark made by Carol Delaney regarding the change she came across in her 1997 revisit to the central Anatolian village where she carried out anthropological research between 1980 and 1982: 'The village has shrunk by half and the houses were abandoned despite the signs of modernity. Secondary school was closed down due to lack of students. However, there was also a brand new, impressive building rigged with solar panels for heating and energy. I did not understand why a new public building this big was needed since the village was in decline. One of the villagers with an eerie sense of humour said, "We use the building for funerals", "We need a place to accommodate the visitors attending funerals" ... Nowadays, funerals replaced weddings, once the most important event in the village. The village has become a graveyard... a place to die and for the dead. The village will die with the death of those still living there' (Delaney, 2014, p.11).

3.2 The commodification of seed and agricultural product in Turkey

The thorough commodification that Turkey's agriculture has gone through since the military coup has been put into place through the collaboration of the Turkish state with *international organisations of imperialism*. These are called organisations of imperialism, because as Utsa Patnaik and Prabhat Patnaik (2017, pp. 85-86) correctly indicate, capitalism is a system established in the midst of pre-capitalist small production, interacts with it and

must obtain goods it requires from it; in growing quantities and at non-increasing prices as capital accumulates. To this end, capitalism must exercise coercion on its exterior and this is called imperialism.

The most revealing index concerning the outcomes with respect to agriculture caused by the decisions of January 24, 1980, aiming privatisation and commodification and their enforcement to society through the wave of violence initiated by the military coup should be the terms of trade. Korkut Boratav (2009, pp. 116-117) examines the subject matter with reference to Agriculture's Internal Terms of Trade (AITT) relative to the industrial sector. This measure signifies the ratio between the prices that the farmer gets and the movement of prices she pays for with reference to a base year. Throughout the decade of the September 12 regime and Turgut Özal, AITT depreciated annually on an average of %3.7 and %46.6 in total which corresponds to a slump in agricultural prices unprecedented since the Great Depression.

Following the coup, the number of crops subject to support purchase has been reduced, the input subsidies have been interrupted, and the liberalisation of the import of agricultural products caused terms of trade to move at the expense of agriculture. For instance, in 1980 to purchase 100 kilograms of fertiliser diammonium phosphate the amount of grain that had to be sold was 10.5 kilograms, the latter rose to 107.5 kilograms in 1988. To acquire 800 grams of pesticide Dithane M 45 the quantity of grain to be sold was 13.8 kilograms in 1980, this quantity rose to 60 kilograms in 1988 (Petrol-İs, 1988, p. 114).

Turkey's capitalism went through major crises in 1994, 1999, and 2000-2001 and with each crisis, further penetration of capital into agriculture ensued under the supervision of international organisations. Erdoğan's rule began following this crises-ridden era, and the coercive practices concerning the capital's penetration of agriculture are further advanced.

The epitome of the advance of coercive practices through the collaboration of the state with international organisations is December 1999's letter of intent given to the IMF, which is also a document articulating the interests of the agro-food businesses of the core. In this letter, it is mentioned that the subsidised price for cereals will be determined such that the spread between the subsidised price and the projected world market price will not exceed 35% and the spread will further be narrowed down in the coming years. Undoubtedly, this clause is in line with the rulings of the Uruguay Round to enable grain dumping by the US and EU. In the letter, the shift to direct income support is also emphasised. Supposedly the agricultural support policies then were not cost-effective; they distorted market price signals and, thus, the resource allocation. In the letter, it was proposed that the government would gradually phase out the credit subsidies to farmers and that various public sector

enterprises engaged in agriculture would be privatised (IMF, n.d.).

The letter's content is a manifestation of Araghi's notion of the enclosure food regime, (2009, p. 134) which distinctly indicates the configuration of agriculture in the periphery in accordance with the requirements of the core's agri-food industry regarding the disposal of the surplus product. A crucial component of this regime, as Kevin Watkins (1991, pp. 39-40) indicates, is the pressure exercised by corporate grain export interests – first and foremost of Cargill's – and the 1960s structural overproduction in the US causing a shift to aggressive export subsidisation from the control of supply; for the core, the significance of the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) included in the Uruguay Round stems from this pressure. The agreement asserts contracting parties' reduction of internal and export subsidies to ensure the unfettered sale of EU and US grain in the international market. Following the 10 years since the foundation of the WTO, the agricultural dumping made by the agrobusiness corporations originating in the US and EU wreaked havoc on global markets. All farmers in the world, including those in the US, went bankrupt. On the other hand, global food corporations have greatly benefited from the lower prices of raw materials for their products, owing to the high levels of agricultural dumping (Murphy et al., 2005). AOA is the expression of the subjective, concrete, and coercive power of the US and EU, rather than being an expression of the market's objective, anonymous, and abstract dominance.

The enclosure regime works toward a specific international division of labour, in which a specific pattern of cultivation agriculture is imposed on the periphery. Rosa Luxemburg (2003) in her well-known *Accumulation of Capital* expounds on the rule of Mehmet Ali Pasha over Egypt, who imposed the production of industrial crops – first and foremost of sugar cane and cotton – on the *fellaheen*. Amiya Kumar Bagchi speaks of the distortion in the design of cultivation in Indonesia under Dutch rule through very similar coercion. Intensification of labour by way of the regime of exploitation organised by the Dutchmen induced an increase in yields in a number of crops – first and foremost sugar (2009, p. 100). This mode of specialisation is fundamental to Patnaik's theory of imperialism. The tropic landmass, instead of being cultivated to meet the needs of the indigenous people, is utilised for individual or productive consumption in the core (2017). NAFTA is an instance of enforcing free trade, culminating in the constitution of an international agrarian division of labour in accordance with the needs of the core. Following the agreement, although Mexican farmers increased their fruit and vegetable exports to the US and Canada, they must now live with corn imported from the US (Berndt, 2018, p. 7).

The change in the cultivation pattern towards nontraditional crops indicates the incorporation of a peripheral country's agriculture into GVCs. Robinson mentions that nontraditional agricultural export production takes place more fully under capitalist relations and entails much deeper market integration (2008, p. 60). Selwyn investigates the steering of cultivation towards export and industrial crops through the case of grape production in Northeast Brazil. Agriculture's upward integration into new circuits of globalised capital has been one of the most salient transformations in agricultural production, distribution and consumption since the 1970s (2016, p. 1776). Undoubtedly, in Turkey, today's popular export products were being produced before the liberalisation of foreign trade of agricultural products. However, as Robinson (2008, p. 59) suggests, nontraditional exports may specify the production previously directed at domestic consumption to turn into production for exports.

Cultivation to meet the needs of GVCs is a decisive step in the commodification of agricultural products. To this end, the device that Alford and Phillips designate as facilitative governance and the policies and strategies relevant to promoting the formation and operation of GVCs and GPNs are put to work (2018, p. 102). Therefore, the steering of cultivation towards the market rather than the peasant's subsistence does not take place haphazardly; the farmer is coerced into it. In Turkey, through the premeditated activities of various coercion apparatuses, the specialisation in agricultural production of industrial and export crops has become apparent since the beginning of the 2000s. The production of industrial crops – safflower, rapeseed, corn, and sunflower – has risen significantly between 2003 and 2022, while the wheat cultivated area has shrunk from 91 million hectares to 66.3 million hectares. (TURKSTAT 2023d; TURKSTAT 2023e). The specialisation of Turkey's agriculture in the division of international labour as the producer of fresh vegetables and fruits was consolidated as well (TURKSTAT 2023f; TURKSTAT 2023g). There has been an increase in the number of fruit trees, first and foremost apples, peaches, and apricots. Apple production has risen more than twofold, and the production of peaches has increased almost threefold. The number of nuts trees has also risen. One of the most important agricultural items of export of Turkey is citrus and the number of all citrus trees has risen significantly from 2004 to 2022 (TURKSTAT 2023h; TURKSTAT 2023i; TURKSTAT 2023j).

Zülküf Aydın's study illustrates the conjunction of the change in the cultivation pattern with the emergence of new relations of production in the countryside. In the Kumluca district of Antalya following the landowners' transition to hothouse production of fresh fruits and vegetables the necessary labour force was secured through the exploitation of the displaced sharecropping Kurdish labour force. They produce for big retailers such

as Metro and Tesco-Kipa by engaging in contract production mediated through the agency of local brokers provided that they meet the EuroCap, HACCP, and ISO standards. The standard abiding requires the usage of specific seeds and chemicals which in turn reinforces the dependency of the producers on international monopolies like Monsanto and Dupont operating in the region (Aydın, 2016, pp. 55-57). For instance, due to seed variety selection along the groundnut value chain, the farmer's dependency on the output market is established. Retailers and wholesalers standardise the groundnut as such (Özalp and Ören, p. 5, 2023).

In the Erdemli district of Mersin, the state of affairs is analogous to Kumluca. The change in cultivation took place through the utilisation of hothouses. The change was concurrent with the shrinking of the cultivated land and the peasantry's imperative to work in non-agricultural jobs as waged labour to sustain their livelihood. What maintains the agricultural nature of Erdemli authors say is its urbanisation (Bayraktar et al., 2015). This state of affairs signifies a dialectical reversal in which the peasantry's alienation from the rural is in unity with the reproduction of rural life.

The corporate control of cultivation may be tracked in the villages of Gaziantep as well. Gaziantep's Sakçagözü is a lowlands village, a part of the commoners cultivates potatoes for Pepsi Lay through a contract relationship. The corporation controls the cultivation process as far as the harvest time and provides the inputs. The corporation stipulates cultivators to purchase inputs such as seed, pesticide and fertilizer from itself or the designated brands. In the final stage, the corporation determines the size standards of the potatoes it procures. An analogous relationship of domination takes place between the local maize cultivators of the village and Pioneer which is owned by Du Pont. Those peasants engaged in animal husbandry sell their goat milk to the ice cream company MADO (Taşdoğan and Ağdemir, pp. 303-304, 2019). The cultivation pattern has changed in the Bakırçay basin as well. In the lowlands, the most fundamental change is the substitution of cotton and tobacco with tomato, maize and sunflower (Eren, 2017, p. 818).

The commodification of seed, since it embodies life itself, should be regarded as crucial for the dominance of capital over agriculture, particularly in peripheral countries such as Turkey. One of the fields subjected to the most rapid privatisation and import liberalisation following the military coup has been seed breeding. Following the coup, seed imports rapidly advanced in Turkey; there were less than 5 private seed companies in 1982, and their number rose above 80 in the early 1990s (Gisselquist, Nash, and Pray, 2002, p. 247). From the standpoint of privatisation and transformation of the local seed companies, Turkey's seed market may be regarded as a laboratory (Açıköz, Abay, and Açıköz, 2010, p. 155). Miran (2005, pp. 32-34) examines the post-1980 policy's relation to the increase in the number of seed-producing companies, the

excessive price fluctuations that the cultivators face while buying seeds, and the diversification of the private and public companies in their patterns of supplying seeds. Specifically, this diversification is about, as Pingali and Traxler (2002) indicate, the self-pollinating crops being incompatible with acquiring profits through the investment in research and corporations' preference to work on the development of biological systems to control seed germination and gene expression. These technologies preclude farmers from reserving and replanting seeds. Therefore, in the world seed market, only a number of crops – maize, soybean, cotton, and vegetables – are prevalent. Özkaya expands on the subject matter by examining the increasing power of the transnational seed companies and the efforts of the states and the international organisations – first and foremost, the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) – to actualise that power. The effects of this actualisation are the annihilation of biological diversity, the loss in the nutrient content of fruits and vegetables, and the tendency of seed prices to rise (2007). In sum, in Turkey, corporations' predominance is intensified through the notion of intellectual property, and farmers are subjected to an act of enclosure and are now in the face of greater uncertainty. State coercion – first and foremost through the Seed Law of 2006 (Seed Law of the Republic of Turkey, Main Law No: 5553) – contributed to this course. With this law, severe restrictions have been imposed on the production and circulation of seeds outside the capital's control, and whoever is to acquire seeds for cultivation for the market is almost obliged to obtain them from private companies.

This state of affairs caused the rapid commodification of seeds in Turkey; the amount of seeds sold in Turkey rose from 150,374 tonnes in 2002 to 1,297,360 tonnes in 2022 (TİGEM, 2023, p. 14). There has also been a significant increase in the sales of chemical fertilisers, of which Turkey is heavily dependent on foreign markets to acquire its raw materials – more than %90 (TAGEM, 2018). According to FAOSTAT (n.d.), between 2003 and 2021 there has also been a significant increase in the use of pesticides, insecticides, and fungicides which Turkey's agriculture depends on foreign corporations for their supply.

Farmers in the Global South are squeezed by lead firms from both the buying and supplying ends of GVCs (Tups and Dannenberg, 2023). The buying end of the chain is primarily the retail monopolies. What constitutes monopolistic power is first and foremost the retailer's power of monopsony. Several studies have examined the workings of retail monopolies and their mode of organisation (Coe and Hess, 2005; Reardon and Berdegue, 2002; Biles et al., 2007). Rita Schwentenius and Manuel Ángel Gómez (2002, pp. 494-496) speak of the challenges that in particular the small producers face while selling directly to supermarkets because of the latter's demands from suppliers. The imposition of ever

stringent private standards governing fruit quality and safety prompts supermarket-led firms to attain market dominance and they demand a constant supply of low-cost produce (Alford and Phillips, 2018, p. 103). Those who can meet these demands are large farmers or the small ones organised in cooperatives. All these ultimately come to retailers' grabbing a greater portion of the value produced in agriculture (Barrientos and Visser, 2012; Magdoff et al., 2010; Ponte, 2002; Alford, 2020; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005).

In Turkey, the consolidation of retail monopolies is a matter pertaining to the era following the 1990s. Özcan (2008) examines the case through the predominance of Migros Türk over the circulation of agricultural products. However, the company's dominance is a thing of the past; now the discount markets reign over retailing – a dominance that became discernible beginning with the mid-2000s. According to the Turkish Competition Authority's Final Report on the Evaluation of Fast-Moving Consumption Goods Retailing Sector, the revenue of the organised channel (supermarkets, hypermarkets, and discount markets) increased by 81% from 2019 to 2021, while the revenue of the traditional retailing was increased by 35%. In the same period, while the number of retail stores fell from 192452 to 188915, the number of organised retail stores rose from 32,907 to 39,147.

In this period – probably because the purchasing power of the working class has deteriorated significantly – the revenue of discount markets has significantly risen. While the nominal rise in the revenue of whole retailing has been 57% from 2019 to 2021, the revenue of the discount markets, A101, BİM, and Şok increased by 109%. In the report, the rise in the number of discount stores is also emphasised. It is also mentioned that because there has not been an extensive entry to retailing recently, the growth in the sector primarily taking place through acquisitions and the introduction of new stores by the retail chains – first and foremost by discount markets – is one of the reasons for the high levels of barriers to entry into the market. In recent years, there has been a considerable exit of retailers from the market without any new entries to compensate, which is one of the reasons for the high rates of concentration in the market. In the report, it is mentioned that the monopsony power of the retailers may result in advantages such as direct financial support as direct additional service charges, exclusive supply of products, and the most favoured customer support. These retailers incur costs on the suppliers by reducing shelf and listing prices. In the case of suppliers' refusal of lower prices, their products probably won't show up on the retailers' shelves. Retailers also externalise unforeseeable and extra costs to suppliers (Kazak et al., 2022). Therefore, today, retailers in Turkey have achieved an immense monopolistic power. Here, what Marsden and Wrigley (1995, p. 1908) mention as the deregulating nation-state delivering cheap pools of

unskilled and semi-skilled labour for retailers is a deciding factor.

4. Conclusion

Capital's engagement in agriculture is riddled with various ambivalences; first and foremost, the ambivalence internal to the workings of the market – the objective negation of all subjectivity. Then, it grows out in the peripheral rural the ambivalence, exhibiting itself as the objective and subjective resistance to commodification and the unpredictability of the market. Objective resistance corresponds to the complexity of the rural relations of production and the capital's relationship with the latter the understanding of which through dialectics is necessary. Peasantry's insistence on holding on to its holding, regardless of its economic relevance, poses the rural's subjective resistance to dispossession and proletarianization. In Turkey, despite the intensive interference of capital with agriculture and the state once extensively subsidising it now renouncing its protection leading to tendencies towards dispossession, agriculture indicates a space where small and middle agricultural production still hold a significant place. Then comes about the multiple intricate and vigorous methods that capital makes use of to overcome the rural's capacity to resist incorporation into commodity circulation. Thus, Turkey's rural is constituted by the dialectics of depeasantation and resilience. For sure, the rural is fragile in the face of the capitalist state's onslaught since it is disorganised and scattered over the space but for the same reasons, it is somehow resistant to the penetration of capital. Then, the dialectical principles – negation of the negation, unity of opposites, peoples and space somehow being unreceptive to external effects – are required to comprehend that ambivalence.

The subject matter is important because inasmuch as it concerns the transformation of agriculture, the dissolution and the internal differentiation of the peasantry in Turkey, it is also related to the extremely high levels of food inflation and the accompanying predicament of the working classes in the cities. The high level of food inflation is closely connected to Turkey's farmers dependency on transnational corporations to acquire their inputs and retail monopolies for the sale of their products; throughout this work, it is reflected on this relationship of dependency disrupting both rural life and the livelihood of the urban population.

Peasants' dependency on corporations results in the predicament of both the immediate producers of the rural and cities. Their predicament does not merely consist in the laws of the motion of capital, but rather of its unity with the state's coercion, exacerbated throughout the now almost 23 years of Erdoğan's rule. The methods of coercion are extensive, from the privatisation of public companies to the state's disengagement from intervening in the market, the liberalisation of the international trade

of agricultural products on the one hand to privatisation of water, the utilisation of the fertile soil for the generation of rent, the ruining of the soil with the construction of quarries and mines, and the proletarianization of the direct producers on the other; they are to be regarded in their unity.

The numerous counter-movements that have taken place in rural Turkey in recent years are in dialectical opposition to this onslaught alluding to the incursion of capital backed by the state's coercive power. Any political subject, in order to intervene in the state of affairs in today's Turkey, cannot neglect these counter-movements originating in the rural. Any political subject has to do away with the fracture between the rural and the urban caused by the development of the capitalist mode of production. In this way, the way will be paved for the planned and rational agricultural production that will sublimate the market imperative and corporations' profit motives rule over agriculture and the cities' access to food.

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