



Atıf Bilgisi/Citation

Palancı, Müge. “The Impact of the September 9/11 Terrorist Attacks on the Arms Trade and Defense Expenditures of States”. *Diplomasi ve Strateji Dergisi*, s.11 (2025): 1-25.
<https://doi.org/10.58685/dsd.1580461>

Makale Bilgisi/Article Information

Araştırma Makalesi/Research Article

Etik Beyan/Ethical Statement

Bu çalışmanın hazırlanma sürecinde etik ilkelere uyulmuştur/This study was conducted in accordance with ethical research principles

Hakem Sayısı/Reviewers

İki Dış Hakem/Two External

Değerlendirme/Reviewers

Çift Taraflı Kör Hakemlik/Double-blind

Benzerlik Taraması/Plagiarism Checks

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Çıkar Çatışması/Conflicts of Interest

Çıkar çatışması beyan edilmemiştir/The Author(s) declare(s) that there is no conflict of interest

Finansman/Grant Support

Herhangi bir fon, hibe veya başka bir destek alınmamıştır/No funds, grants, or other support was received

Etik Bildirim/Complaints

editor@dsjournal.org

Sürdürülebilir Kalkınma Amaçları/Sustainable Development Goals

Bulunmamaktadır/No particular objectives have been defined

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THE IMPACT OF THE SEPTEMBER 9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE ARMS TRADE AND DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OF STATES

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Abstract

Defense expenditures are important for the protection of states from internal and external threats and for ensuring security. In this context, the securitization of defense expenditures after the September 11 terrorist attacks increased the defense spending of countries and brought about the globalization of terrorism together with the changing agenda of security. The September 11 terrorist attacks caused an increase in the defense expenditures of states. With the increase in asymmetric threats and the deepening and expanding security discussions, states started to take joint action against the risk of global terrorism after September 11. In this case, the uncertainty experienced in the nature of the threat after the Cold War had a significant impact. This uncertainty experienced in the nature of the threat caused states to seek security, especially with the September 11 terrorist attacks, as the reference object of security to be protected as the referent object of protection. This search for security led to an increase in defense expenditures. In this sense, the aim of the article is to analyze the change in the defense expenditures of states after the September 11 attacks through the Copenhagen School securitization and desecuritization approaches, which are critical security approaches.

Keywords: *Terrorism, September 11, Copenhagen School, Securitization, Security Sectors.*

11 EYLÜL TERÖR SALDIRILARININ DEVLETLERİN SİLAH TİCARETİ VE SAVUNMA HARCAMALARI ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ

Öz

Savunma harcamaları devletlerin iç ve dış tehdit risklerden korunması ve güvenliğin sağlanması adına önem taşımaktadır. Bu bağlamda 11 Eylül terör saldırıları sonrası savunma harcamalarının güvenleştirilmesi ülkelerin savunma harcamalarını arttırmış, güvenliğin değişen gündemiyle birlikte terörizmin küreselleşmesini de beraberinde getirmiştir. 11 Eylül terör saldırıları devletlerin savunma harcamalarının artmasına neden olmuştur. Asimetrik tehditlerin artışı, derinleşen ve genişleyen güvenlik tartışmalarıyla, 11 Eylül sonrası devletler küresel terörizm riskine karşı ortak hareket etmeye başlamıştır. Bu durumda Soğuk Savaş sonrası tehdidin doğasında yaşanan belirsizliğin etkisi olmaktadır. Tehdidin doğasında yaşanan bu belirsizlik, Soğuk Savaş sonrası devletlerin referans nesnesi olduğu güvenliği korunacak “şey” olarak, özellikle 11 Eylül terör saldırıları ile birlikte güvenlik arayışı içerisine girmelerine neden olmuştur. Bu güvenlik arayışı savunma harcamalarının artmasına sebebiyet vermiştir. Bu anlamda makalenin amacı 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrası devletlerin savunma harcamalarındaki değişimin eleştirel güvenlik yaklaşımlarından olan Kopenhag Okulu güvenleştirme ve güvenlik-dışlaştırma yaklaşımı yoluyla analizini yapmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Terörizm, 11 Eylül, Kopenhag Okulu, Güvenleştirme, Güvenlik Sektörleri.*

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War and the change in the traditional understanding of security, it is possible to show ethnic conflicts, regional and national criminal organizations, terrorism, human trafficking, hazardous material and arms smuggling, excessive population growth and environmental destruction as examples of the main problems threatening the security of countries in this period (Fatić 2002). This shift in the security paradigm also influenced national defense budgets. Also, the emergence of asymmetric threats further reinforced this trend. The globalization of the threat of terrorism after the September 11 attacks and the subsequent American intervention in Iraq and

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Afghanistan directly affected states' defense expenditures. This situation is closely related to the fact that the concept of security in international relations has been subject to discussions of expansion and deepening since the end of the 1980s. In this context, the Copenhagen School has made a comprehensive and counterintuitive analysis of security. While the Copenhagen School criticizes Realism, it does not consider security only in military or political terms. In their joint study dated 1991, Buzan and Waever defined security in two categories: (i) national security, which is centered on sovereignty, and (ii) societal security, which is centered on identity and the continuity of society (Özerim 2014).

According to Buzan and Waever, all states around the world are interdependent in terms of security. In this context, the security of a state cannot be considered separately from the security of another state. In the post-September 11 period, it has been seen that states are under a global risk against the risk of global terrorism. In this context, by establishing a relationship between military security and national security, there has been an increase in defense spending and arms trade as a result of the securitization of terrorism by states. The securitization of the terrorist threat after September 11 has seriously reshaped the dynamics of states' defense expenditures and arms trade, and distinct stages of the securitization and desecuritization processes have been clearly observed.

States can take joint action on the objects they have securitized or in situations where they perceive security threats. On September 11, the threat turned into a real attack, and this attack came not from the Soviet Union, but from an enemy as concrete as terrorism, which is very difficult to identify and respond to. The distinction between friend and foe in international relations was becoming blurred when it came to terrorism. This new struggle was dubbed the "gray war" by David Von Drehle in his article published on September 12, 2001, in *The Washington Post* (Drehle 2001).

In our study, the terrorism risk to the arms trade and defense expenditures of states in the post-September 11 period was evaluated within the framework of the "securitization" and "regional security complex" approaches of the Copenhagen School. Within the scope of my research, data sources SIPRI (International Peace Research Institute), WMEAT (World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers) and MIPT (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) were used. While conducting this evaluation, an attempt was made to find answers to the following research questions:

- What is the impact of terrorism on state security expenditures after the Cold War?
- Do state defense expenditures develop in parallel with the security environment?
- What is the impact of securitization on state defense expenditures? (Global Level of Securitization-Referent Objects: States, Region vs.)

Hypotheses:

1. Successful securitization of terrorism increases defense spending.
2. Increased defense spending creates a security dilemma.
3. De-securitization reduces defense spending.

1. Conceptual Analysis

According to Wolfers (1952), security consists of the objective absence of threats to valued assets and the subjective absence of fear that these values will be attacked. Baldwin expands this definition and defines security as “the situation in which harm to the values held is minimal” (1997). The increase in threats and risks with uncertain boundaries in the security environment of the international system after the Cold War has led to radical changes in the perspective on security in the field of international relations. In this context, while the classical definition of security has changed, it has begun to expand by including different reference objects and actors. The replacement of the threat from the Soviet Union by the threat of international terrorism and nuclear arms proliferation has led to the necessity of rethinking security. There are three fundamental threats to the state: threats to the idea of the state, that is, to the ideological existence of the nation-state; threats to the physical existence of the state, that is, to its citizens and basic resources; and threats to the institutional identity and structure of the state, that is, to its political system (Buzan 2008, 65). In addition, the relationship between the economy, civil rights and freedoms, domestic policy shaped within the framework of democratic political processes, and national security attracts attention (Baldwin 1995). Moreover, security actors have expanded beyond the state to include individuals, societies, international organizations, civil society, and various interest groups as non-state referent objects (Krause and Williams 1996). The increase in security objects enables securitization to become a useful discourse strategy by governments as a policy. Securitization theory, which has a constructivist basis, sees security as a speech act (Çona 2023). The main purpose of problematizing a phenomenon as a security issue is to ensure a certain mobilization that will appeal to people’s emotions by making the problem as ‘existential’ as possible (Huysmans 2006, 82). When an issue is presented to society as a security problem, it is stated that various reference objects are under threat, and this is one of the most important pillars of securitization. According to Balzacq (2005, 171-201), securitization has three components: political elites, target audience, and the referent object whose security is claimed to be under threat. The reference object is the object that is declared to be the target of the security threat (Baysal and Lüleci 2015, 77). Securitizing actors are those who have influence over the masses and the capacity to securitize an issue (Rumelili and Karadağ 2017, 74). In the securitization approach, the stronger the network intended to be built between the reference object and the securitizing actor, the more directly the problem can be conveyed to the audience. The

securitizing discourses of the Bush government against the Saddam regime in Iraq in 2003 are an example of the successful relationship established between the referent object and the securitized actor.

2. Securitization

The Copenhagen School, a branch of critical security studies, and the concepts of "Securitization" and "Regional Security Complex" developed by it are gaining importance in understanding the changing face of security. Securitization is the political decision to prevent a potential threat to a valued referent object (Buzan 1997). Discourse is used as the most important tool in constructing the threat as a security problem. Any issue can become a security problem through the speech-act alone, irrespective of whether the issue creates an existential threat in material terms (Emmers 2016, 64).

Securitizing actors (states, policy-makers, governments, bureaucracies, lobbyists, political leaders and pressure groups) gain legitimacy to resolve the issue by using extraordinary means or taking measures (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998, 21). Actors securitize what they see as a threat by imposing it on society as a security issue. The reference object that actors present to society is the most important thing that needs to be secured. As the meaning of security has developed, there has been an increase in the referent objects; states are no longer the sole referent objects of security. The audience is the community that the securitizing actor tries to make accept the threat. The actor reaches the target audience through the speech act, and for successful securitization, the target audience must accept the threat. Therefore, a securitisation process would see an actor describe to an audience some danger which poses a threat to the object of security. The audience can then either accept or reject the move. If the audience accepts the securitising move, the issue at hand is successfully securitised and extraordinary measures may be taken against it.

In this context, the Copenhagen School is important because it carries out its securitization approach through security sectors. These sectors are military security, economic security, political security, societal security and environmental security. The sector that we will address in the context of securitization approach for our study is military security. The military sector is the one in which the process of securitization is most likely to be highly institutionalized (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde 1998, 49). Military security concerns states' perceptions of each other's intentions through their armed offensive and defensive power. States increase their security expenditures by securitizing terrorism and terrorist groups. In this context, military security is used as a securitization tool to protect national security. In this context, although the state is not the only important reference object, it is still the most important actor in security.

Ole Waever presents desecuritization as an option and argues that the securitization step may lead to over-securitization and therefore create “societies of fear.” (Waever 1993, 64). Those in power can always try to gain control over an issue by using the tool of securitization (Waever 1993). In this context, it can be stated that securitization is created jointly with its opposite, desecuritization (Hansen 2011, 530). In desecuritization, the issue is less politicized and attempted to be resolved outside the security area. According to Ole Waever, what needs to happen is to bring the issue back into the realm of normal politics, that is, to “desecuritize” it (Waever 2012, 24). In this context, while the boundaries of the relationship between securitization and desecuritization become unclear, where the process begins and ends is still a subject of security debates. On the other hand, excessive securitization may lead states to engage in military interventions. An example of this is how, after the September 11 attacks, US President George W. Bush declared these attacks as an “act of war” and used terrorism as a tool for securitization in the context of a “threat”. The US, which first embodied President Bush’s determined struggle with the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, made the second move with the intervention in Iraq in 2003 (Hook and Spanier 2018, 276-302). In fact, the Copenhagen School questions whether it is a good idea to address as many issues as possible within the framework of security (Waever 1995, 64). Instead of an excessive and irrational expansion of the scope of security, the Copenhagen School advocates desecuritization of issues, that is, returning securitized issues to the realm of normal politics (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 208). Approaching an issue with an excessively security-focused focus will necessitate taking urgent measures regarding that issue, thus desecuritizing the policies to be implemented and removing them from the scope of existential threats. The decline in defense spending by states is closely related to the extent to which the reference objects they present to society as threats in the field of security are securitized. During the G.W. Bush era, the “terror” threat discourse led to various military operations in the Middle East, and terror was, in a sense, securitized. Thus, “the use of force was legitimized through the threatening discourses constructed by the American administrations” (Buzan 1997, 13). The increasing securitization trend in US politics after the September 11 terrorist attacks (Buzan 2008, 119) is reflected in the influence of government leaders’ persuasive rhetoric. In a sense, the US created its own definition of terrorism during this period and securitized the concept. According to Noam Chomsky, “Underlying conventional discussion of terrorism and aggression is the consistent rejection of one of the most elementary of moral principles: that we apply to ourselves the same standards we do to others, if not more stringent ones. Acceptable definitions of the terms do, therefore, become a difficult matter” (Chomsky 2007, 44-45). This situation causes the state, as a securitizing actor, to use terrorism in its security policies by instrumentalizing it over national security. This situation allows the state, which monopolizes violence, to increase military expenditures. An example is the view of the Middle East as a macro-securitization region under US monopoly after the September 11 attacks. The statements

of US Presidents Bush and Obama, as securitizing actors, that refer to national security through their National Security Strategies (NSS) and their speeches to the public are noteworthy. President Bush's statement titled "The allies of terror are the enemies of civilization" during this period is a statement that should be examined in this context and is the most interesting statement during this period (G. W. Bush 2006, 406). While President Bush referred to terrorists as enemies of civilization, he also emphasized that the war on terror is not a war between civilizations, but rather a war within civilizations (NSS, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, 31). In addition, the phrase "America at War" (UGS 2006), in the national security strategy published in 2006 is important in terms of creating an atmosphere of fear among the American people. With these statements, the steps taken by the United States are legitimized. This situation is seen in the US invasion of Iraq. It was also emphasized that if the US stopped attacking Iraq, the enemy could continue its weapons of mass destruction production programs and torture chambers, and even launch another attack against humanity (G. W. Bush 2004, 202).

It can be said that the concept of terrorism, which was securitized after the September 11 attacks, was desecuritized with the 2008 global crisis until 2015. The decrease in defense expenditures of states can be explained by the fact that the economic crisis has taken the first place on the state's agenda. The declines in state defense expenditures during these periods confirm this. In this context, desecuritization can reduce defense spending. However, according to Ole Waever and Barry Buzan, securitization is needed for de-securitization the process to start again, and in this context, after the de-securitization between 2010 and 2015, the securitization process started again in 2015.

3. Regional Security Complex Theory

With the end of the Cold War and the change in the structure of security after the September 11 terrorist attacks, regional dynamics have come to the fore in the international system. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, influenced by Realism, Constructivism and the English School, developed the regional security complex approach, which has made a major contribution to security studies. The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes (Buzan and Waever 2003, 4).

Barry Buzan and Ole Waever have analyzed security by dividing the world into different regional security complexes and isolators (Regions or states). The following definitional criteria for a three-tiered scheme: superpowers and great powers at the system level, and regional powers at the regional level (Buzan and Waever 2003, 34). According to the Copenhagen School, some regions can be defined as "super complexes" when two or more regional security complexes are intertwined. This situation shows that different security complexes can form. This situation is related to the security

dependency between states. In this context, regional security dependency has emerged as a concept shaped within the framework of power balances, security dilemmas and security structures in terms of international relations (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde 1998, 11). For a region to become a regional security complex, it must fulfill certain conditions.

1. A specific geographical boundary that distinguishes the regional security complex from other regions,
2. The presence of two or more autonomous structures/units (usually states) within the regional security complex, i.e. an anarchic structure,
3. Having poles to distribute power between structures/units,
4. The existence of social structures that enable the building of relationships of enmity and friendship (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde 1998, 18).

In this context, the concept of friendship and enmity is of great importance in the formation of the security complex. These relations are reflected in the decisions taken by states in shaping their national security policies. In this context, the impact of relations with regional security complexes (RSCs) on national security perception gains importance. In this context, national security (states), considered as subsystems after 9/11, fills the gap between national security and international security by creating a diverse regional security complex. In this context, threat is more related to proximity. The September 11 attacks have changed the dynamics of cooperation among regional states to conflict and terrorism. This has led to regionalization in security. Military conflicts are no longer multilateral but rather regional.

The fact that the September 11 terrorist attacks were dealt with under the title of “Global War on Terror” (President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror, 2006). in the international system is in a sense proof that no state is safe. Additionally, different regional security complexes emerged after September 11 and were classified by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. According to the classification made; including the Horn of Africa and West-Africa proto-complexes; North America, South America, Europe, Post-Soviet, Middle East, Southern Africa, Central Africa, South Asia and East Asia and 11 in total were identified (Buzan and Wæver 2009, 447).

The emergence of non-state actors in the international system after the September 11 attacks in 2001 drew attention to the importance of military securitization by the nation state, along with the interaction between global and regional security, and this led to an increase in military expenditures. Military security describes force-based pressure relations (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde 1998, 7). Military threats can affect all components of the state. It can put into question the very basic duty of a state to be able to protect its citizens as well as have an adverse effect on the “layers of social and individual interest” (Buzan 1991, 119).

4. Macro-Securitization: 9/11

The Copenhagen School analyzes the securitization approach at the level of the nation state. However, the September 11 terrorist attacks have shown that securitization can also occur at the international level. Terrorism poses a major security threat to the international system. According to Buzan and Wæver the most powerful macro-securitizations “will impose a hierarchy on the lower level ones incorporated within them, but it is also possible for a macro-securitization to bundle other securitizations together” (Buzan and Wæver 2009). Most importantly, the war against terrorism is not only about protecting state territory but also about its ideological basis. The ideological sources that feed terrorist groups are:

- Oppression and national revenge,
- Reactionary currents of anti-Western political Islam,
- Anti-Globalization.

In this context, it can be seen that national and international security are intertwined with the ideological basis of terrorist attacks. The securitisation occurred with many attempts to discard the idea that all terrorists were Islamic extremists (Wæver 2008). Also, the global and political discourse on security changed. Through discourse, within the United States and around the world, the macrosecuritisation of terrorism shaped the international political-military and agenda for years to come. The importance of international terrorism in the international arena is particularly related to the values it threatens. These threats were against of democracy, human rights, and market capitalism.

In macro securitization, there is also an actor a reference object, and a receiving audience. In macro securitization, the referent objects are larger in scale. They can ‘structure’ international security (Buzan, 2006).The declaration of global war on terrorism has particularly caused macro securitization to affect the international system. According to Buzan (2006)

The explicit ‘long war’ framing of the GWoT [Global War on Terror] is a securitizing move of potentially great significance. If it succeeds as a widely accepted, world-organizing macro-securitization it could structure global security for some decades, in the process helping to legitimize US primacy.

It is seen that under the title of war on terrorism, national states are increasing their defense expenditures and presenting it to the public as an issue requiring urgent action. For example, with the macro securitization discourse adopted by the Bush administration, US interests were presented as if they were universal values (Buzan 2008, 119). On the other hand, it is noteworthy that states, which are the most important actors in international relations, have experienced changes in their strategic behavior due to the threat of terrorism. This situation has created the need to “feel safe” by increasing arms trade and defense expenditures. When terrorism is perceived as a threat, states allocate more economic resources to

security. In this context, countries have moved from the “threat-based planning” of the Cold War to the “capability-based planning” after September 11, and it is seen that this decision was taken in response to the threat of terrorism, which required urgent military and national security.

5. Arms Race and Defense Expenditures of Countries in the Context of the Changing Security Paradigm After September 9/11

Another external factor that determines a country’s many defence needs and the resources it allocates to defense is the defense expenditures of neighboring countries. This is because when a country allocates more resources to its defense to ensure national security, it may indirectly endanger the security of its neighboring countries. Even if there is no hostility between neighboring countries, this perceived insecurity problem causes countries to increase their defense spending. With the end of the Cold War, the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world saw a decrease in defense spending in places such as South Asia, North Africa and the Middle East from the 1980s to the 2000s, while in later years, political changes in the Middle East and East Asian countries, as well as global terrorist incidents and the US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, led to an increase in defense spending. One of the key reasons for the increase is the shift in U.S. security policy under the new Bush Doctrine. India and Japan have raised their military spending in line with their GDP growth, apart from the two years 2001 and 2002. The same is true for China and in France and the UK, the military burden declined slightly in recent years, but in France, it began to rise in 2003 (SIPRI Yearbook 2004).

In order to understand the impact of the securitization approach on countries’ defense expenditures, dividing the processes into certain periods will contribute to the assessment of the level to which this impact is realized. In this context, the following periods, in which important breaking points occurred, were taken into consideration for my study.

5.1. 2001-2003: Immediate Aftermath of 9/11 Attacks, Spike in Global Defense Spending and Examples of Discursive Securitization

Defense and military spending started to fall in Western Europe and NATO after the Cold War ended. A new era in security was ushered in with the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center in New York, which stunned the whole globe. During this period, “the use of force was legitimized thanks to the threatening discourses constructed by the American administrations” (Buzan 1997, 13); every issue was easily taken out of normal politics and put into the politics of panic. While the whole world was divided into two poles, those who supported the United States and those who did not, those who did not side with Washington in this othering were accepted as being on the same side as the terrorists (Bowden 2002, 30). A prime example of securitization is the technique used to win over the public on a global scale to the invasion of Afghanistan following the attacks. The statement made by Bush to the

Guardian is an example of the construction of securitization through discourse. The Afghan administration has clearly targeted and used the following statements (The Guardian 2001):

It threatens people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering terrorists... But the only way to defeat terrorism, which is a threat to our way of life, is to stop it, to eliminate it, and to destroy it where it thrives [in Afghanistan]The civilized world is rallying behind America. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens, could be the next target.

These statements by the Bush administration created the public perception of a situation requiring urgent action, and the Afghanistan intervention was legitimized. The shift to “emergency” measures is consistent with the discovery of new goals and methods as well as new approaches to managing international relations (Mabee 2007, 9). Bush explained why urgent action must be taken, stating that there is a “global” threat: “Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning” (Bush, State of the Union 2002).

Bush’s definition of global terrorism and her references to it as a threat to sovereignty in her statements affected military expenditures in the world, especially after 2001. The table below shows the increase in military expenditures worldwide between 2001-2003. Securitizing actors (e.g., the Bush administration) have defined terrorism as an existential threat and encouraged a significant increase in defense spending. Thus, the securitization of terrorism has directly resulted in increased defense budgets.

Table 1: Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GDP, CGE, Population, and Their Ratios, By Group and Country, 1995-2005

	Military Expenditures (ME) Billions dollars		Armed Forces (AF)	Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Billions dollars		Centrsal Govt Expend's (CGE) Billions dollars	People	ME/AF	ME/GDP	ME/CGE	ME Per Capita	Armed Forces Per 1000 People	GDP Per Capita
	Current	Constant 2005	Thousands	Current	Constant 2005	Constant 2005			%	%	Constant 2005 dollars	Soldiers	Constant 2005 dollars
WORD													
2001	864	953	20.500	35.900	39.700	10.100	6.150	46.400	2,4	9,4	155	3,3	6.450
2002	931	1.010	20.200	37.300	40.500	10.500	6.230	50.000	2,5	9,6	162	3,2	6.500
2003	1.020	1.080	19.300	39.100	41.600	11.000	6.300	55.900	2,6	9,8	171	3,1	6.600

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 2005.

5.2. 2003-2007: Iraq Intervention, Proliferation of Global Terrorism Discourse, and Continued High Defense Spending and Dissemination of Discourse

Iraq was considered the central country in the so-called Axis of Evil by the United States. Apart from Iraq itself, most other “future Iraqs” also seemed to be located in the Middle East: Iran, Syria, Libya,

and Algeria (Miller 2010, 55). While declaring war on global terrorism, the US claimed that the government of Saddam Hussein, which was not overthrown in the Gulf War, threatened its national security. Bush wanted to establish the right to attack countries the US deemed threats, and Iraq, being both weak and easily demonized, was an exemplary case to establish the precedent (Hinnebusch 2007, 222).

Using its rhetoric, the US sought allies in Europe and received support from the United Kingdom. In particular, the US claimed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, portraying it as a threat to international security. Despite this, there were also countries within the European Union that did not view the US intervention in Iraq positively. At this point, the member states of the European Union, who find a “preventive strike” acceptable in the presence of real and acceptable reasons, emphasize that the “preventive war” approach, which they think forms the basis of the Bush doctrine, has no place in international law (Ortega 2003). Despite this, the Iraq intervention, which had a high economic cost, was carried out with public support. The US has already borrowed some \$2 trillion to finance the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars and the associated defense build-up – a major component of the \$9 trillion US debt accrued since 2001 (Bilmes 2013, 19). The \$100–200 billion estimate put up by Lawrence Lindsey, the chief economic adviser to President George W. Bush, in 2003 was the first widely reported estimate of the cost of a war in Iraq (Wallsten 2006). Citing threats from Iran, Syria, and various terrorist groups, the Bush administration is offering more than \$60 billion in new weapons and military assistance to Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other U.S. allies in the Middle East (Arms Control Association 2007). With the claim that terrorism poses a threat to international security, the need for states to protect their national security has increased, and securitizing steps are important in this regard. In 2006, Washington concluded the largest number of new arms deals (\$16.9 billion worth in 2006, 41.9 percent of the global total) and made the most actual arms deliveries (\$14 billion, nearly 52 percent of global arms deliveries) (Arms Control Association 2007). The securitization element used by the US both in society and globally was about the presence of biological weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and stopping human rights violations in the country. These securitizing discourses formed the legitimate basis for defense spending. A successful securitization process is possible when the speech act is accepted by the target audience. For example, the US administration’s terror discourse has been accepted by the target audience and was successfully securitized, which subsequently led to increased defense spending, as the hypothesis suggests.

5.3. 2008-2014: Decline in Defense Budgets Following Economic Crisis, Examples of Desecuritization

The impacts of the long-brewing global financial crisis were more apparent in the middle of 2007 and early 2008 years and large financial organizations either failed or were acquired, stock markets have

plummeted globally, and governments in even the wealthiest countries have had to devise rescue plans to save their financial systems (Global Issues 2013). This situation has led to an increase in the political fragility of states. While there has been a decrease in the share of defense expenditures from GDP between 2010 and 2019, with the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic seen all over the world, a 4.4% contraction in GDP occurred and a 2.6% increase in the ratio of defense expenditures to GDP was observed (SIPRI 2022).


According to the data published by the European Defense Agency, 16 of the 26 EDA participating Member States have decreased their investment expenses (more exactly, equipment procurement and R&D), with an overall decrease from 42 billion EUR in 2008 to 41 billion EUR in 2009 (European Defense Agency 2010). In this context, as can be seen in the graph below, for example, the European Union experienced an increase in defense expenditures between 2000 and 2009 (There was a significant increase of 49% in defense expenditures between 2000 and 2009) The distribution among regions is shown in the table below, and then entered a downward trend until 2016 after the 2008 economic crisis, as can be seen in the table.

Table 2: Defense Expenditures Between 2000-2009

REGIONS	BILLION DOLLARS	2000-2009 INCREASE%
AFRICA	274	62
US	738	72
ASIA AND OCEANIA	276	67
EUROPE	386	16
MIDDLE EAST	103	40
TOTAL	1.531	49

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2010.

Table 3: EU Defense Expenditures (US Dollars)



Source: World Bank Group, 2022.

Lower defense budgets compel military decision-makers to make tough choices about how to distribute limited resources. The spending reduction effect at the national level pertains to national defense capacities. How these capacities will be used is closely related to the relationship between the decline in defense spending, the changing understanding of security, and the uncertainty of threats. The existence of risks and threats may force states to change their defense policies; times of economic crisis are an example of this. With the reduction of defense expenditures, the urgent agenda issue is seen as the welfare of the people. Because military power is difficult to sustain if it is not at the same level as economic power (Krtalic and Major 2010, 142). In this period, there is no dominant terrorism discourse accepted at the national level, and the issue of terrorism remains outside of security.

As can be seen in the table above, the United States spent the most, but the largest increase in spending was observed in Asia. In Europe, the defense spending rate is low. In the Middle East, defense spending increased by 40%. Regional defense spending during this period was made by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain and Kuwait. The 15 countries with the highest military expenditures in 2009 are shown in the table below.

Table 4: The 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2009

Rank	Country	Spending (s.b.)	Change 2000-2009(%)	Spending per capita (\$)	Share of GDP 2008(%)	World share (%)
1	USA	661	75.8	2 100	4.3	43
2	China	[100]	217	[74.6]	[2.0]	[6.6]
3	France	63.9	7.4	1 026	2.3	4.2
4	UK	58.3	28.1	946	2.5	3.8
5	Russia	[53.3]	105	[378]	[3.5]	[3.5]
Sub-total top 5		937				61
6	Japan	51.0	-1.3	401	0.9	3.3
7	Germany	45.6	-6.7	555	1.3	3.0
8	Saudi Arabia ^b	41.3	66.9	1 603	8.2	2.7
9	India	36.3	67.3	30.4	2.6	2.4
10	Italy	35.8	-13.3	598	1.7	2.3
Sub-total top 10		1 147				75
11	Brazil	26.1	38.7	135	1.5	1.7
12	South Korea	24.1	48.2	499	2.8	1.6
13	Canada	19.2	48.8	568	1.3	1.3
14	Australia	19.0	50.2	892	1.8	1.2
15	Spain	18.3	34.4	408	1.2	1.2
Sub-total top 15		1 254				82
World		1 531	49.2	224	2.7	100

[] = estimated figure; GDP = gross domestic product.

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Yearbook 2010.

China would remain very clearly the top 2, the ratio between US and Chinese military spending would decrease from 6.6 :1 to 3.2 :1. The next three biggest spenders would be India, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Turkey and Colombia would enter the top 15, replacing Australia and Canada (SIPRI Yearbook 2010). The largest increase was made by China (\$100 billion), which increased its defense spending by 15% in 2009. With the 2008 global crisis, there was a general decrease in defense spending in the world until 2015.

Table 5: Regional distribution of defense expenditures between 2010-2015

Region	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
World	1774	1779	1774	1746	1746	1760
Africa	31,3	34,7	35,6	39,0	39,1	37,0
North Africa	11,4	14,2	15,2	16,7	18,0	18,4
Sub-Saharan Africa	20,0	20,6	20,4	22,3	23,3	20,7
America	847	838	800	747	706	689

Central America and the Caribbean	7,8	8,1	8,9	9,4	10,2	10,6
North America	777	769	725	668	628	613
South America	62,0	60,8	66,1	69,6	68,1	65,4
Oceania	27,7	27,2	26,3	26,1	28,2	30,4
East Asia	235	247	262	275	293	310
Europe						
Central Europe	22,0	21,5	21,1	20,9	22,3	25,2
Eastern Europe	67,4	72,8	84	88	94,1	101
Western Europe	307	296	289	278	274	271
Middle East	142	145	158	169	181	...

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2022.

As can be seen from the table above, the highest spending is in America, but military spending in the Asian region has increased over the years. In Europe, defense expenditures appear to have shown a decreasing trend until 2015. Apart from defense expenditures, arms exports and imports are also under the management of certain countries. Countries that sell arms are generally based in the US and Western Europe. Some of these companies are; US-based Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics and British BAE Systems. The largest importers are Saudi Arabia, China, and the United Arab Emirates. On the other hand, Russia is also one of the countries that make significant arms sales in the market and has made high arms sales especially between 2011-2015. After the 2008 global crisis, an increase in arms industry trade was observed. A country's military spending for its national security causes other countries to spend in this area. This creates a security dilemma. Especially after September 11, uncertainty about the source of the threat has pushed states to increase their defense spending.

5.4. After 2014: The Rise of DAESH, the Resurgence of Securitization with Russia's Annexation of Crimea

The increase in defense spending after 2015 was influenced by Russia's occupation of Crimea and the fight against DAESH. In particular, Russia's occupation of Crimea has reminded states of the

existence of geopolitical risks. In February, “Munich Security Conference Report of 2015” declared that: “War has returned to Europe, proving that even the region with the most tightly knit web of common rules, institutions, and interdependence is at risk (Bambals 2015, 15). The occupation of Crimea has once again demonstrated the importance of regional cooperation. On the other hand, the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and Copenhagen in 2016 were one of the main factors that caused states to increase their security expenditures again. This can be attributed to the change in tactics of Al-Qaeda, which called on Muslims in Western countries to carry out lone actor attacks in the countries they live in after the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011. The call made by DAESH in early 2015 also reiterated the same demand (European Parliament 2017).

One of the most important reasons for the increase in defense expenditures of states is the existence of threats. The concept of security is used to take precautions and perceive defense against a threat, and when considered from the perspective of states, it is an effort to ensure the sovereignty and integrity of states (Dedeoğlu 2008, 24). In this context, the attitudes of states towards the changing agenda of security and related threats after the Cold War have begun to differ. The primary duty of the state should be to eliminate the restrictions in the social, physical, economic and political fields that impede the freedom of the individual (Baylis 2008, 80-81). At this point, unlike the realist theorists in the Copenhagen school, there is no such thing as only ensuring the security of states, but it is also stated that in the context of military security, insecure situations against the state may come from different threats. It draws attention to the permeability between the security of the state and the security of society, due to the uncertainties of threats after September 11 and the impact of the relationship between security sectors. In this context, Securitization makes an important contribution to terrorism studies in terms of examining how an issue, individuals, identities and religion are socially marginalized (Çona 2023, 131). One of the most important outcomes of the securitization of the terrorist threat after September 11 is the increase in defense spending in this context.

In this context, the table below shows regional military expenditures for 2021:

Table 6: 2021 Regional Military Expenditures and Shares (USD, %)

Region	2021 (Billion \$)	Share (%)
World	2.113	100,00
Africa	40	1,88
North Africa	20	0,93

Sub-Saharan Africa	20	0,95
America	883	41,80
Central America and the Caribbean	11	0,52
North America	827	39,14
South America	45	2,14
Asia and Oceania	586	27,73
Oceania	35	1,67
South Asia	95	4,50
East Asia	411	19,44
Southeast Asia	43	2,04
Central Asia	2	0,09
Europe	418	19,77
Central Europe	37	1,73
Eastern Europe	76	3,61
Western Europe	305	14,43
Middle East	186	8,82

Source: SIPRI, 2022.

In 2021, military expenditures worldwide amounted to 2 trillion 113 billion at current prices in US dollars. Regionally, the highest spending rate was the Americas Region with 41.80% (\$883 billion). According to the table, the second highest spending region was Asia and Oceania with 27.73% (586 billion dollars). China, which is in the East Asia subgroup and is the world's second largest economic power, is the second-highest defense spender, which brings the Asia and Oceania country group to the top again. The Middle East region reached a share of 8.82% with an expenditure of 186 billion dollars. The region with the least spending was Africa with a share of 1.88% in total

expenditure (40 billion dollars). Military expenditures of European Union countries increased from 2014 to 2021, reaching 257 billion 96 million dollars. The table below shows military expenditure information for some European Union member countries.

**Table 7: Military Expenditures of European Union Countries Between 2007-2021
(Million Dollars)**

	2007	2014	2021
Germany	40.111	44.663	56.017
France	50.684	53.135	56.647
Italy	31.982	27.701	32.006

Source: SIPRI, 2022.

Security concerns of states are an important factor in military expenditures; however, this situation has increased especially in the period after 2015 due to the impact of both terrorist attacks and Russia’s expansionist policy. Especially with the Russia-Ukraine war starting in 2022, the statements that European states will increase their defense expenditures are drawing attention. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s statement that Germany will increase its defense spending to 100 billion dollars also shows that this increase will continue (Reuters 2022).

On the other hand, defense expenditures in the Asian continent are increasing significantly. In particular, China’s military spending has the highest share after the United States. Its defense spending of \$252 billion in 2020 represents a 1.9% increase compared to 2019 and a 76% increase compared to 2011-20 (SIPRI 2022).

Although regional cooperation between states is important in reducing security concerns, the securitization policies of states cause an increase in military expenditures. Military and threat-focused expenditures cause a focus on defense expenditures in the security equation at national and international levels.

Conclusion

This study examines the relationship between global defense spending and the securitization of terrorism after September 11, using the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School. By analyzing the transformation of state responses to asymmetric threats, it demonstrates how terrorism evolved from a traditional security issue to a dominant legitimization tool on the international security agenda. Empirical data confirm that the securitization of terrorism, especially during the Bush

administration, has been effective in determining defense spending priorities for the United States and its allies. When the important points that constitute the main lines of the study are framed, the key findings outlined in the table below are emphasized come to the fore;

Research Question/Hypothesis	Theoretical Concepts	Examples
How has the securitization of terrorism affected defense spending?	Speech act, Securitizing actor, Target audience.	Bush’s “war on terror” rhetoric.
Successful securitization increases defense spending.	Target audience, Speech act.	Increase in defense budgets of the US and allies.
De-securitization reduces defense spending.	De-Securitization.	Spending declines after the 2008 economic crisis.

The findings support the first hypothesis. The successful securitization of terrorism has led to a significant increase in defense spending. Emotionally charged speech acts such as the “Axis of Evil” framed terrorism as an existential threat, and this perception of threat has legitimized the implementation of extraordinary measures and the allocation of resources. The intervention in Afghanistan exemplifies how securitization discourse generated public and political support for military action. Consistent with the second hypothesis, the increase in defense spending has led regional actors to reorganize their military capacities, which has led to an arms race, particularly in regions such as the Middle East, triggering a security dilemma.

In contrast, the third hypothesis, that “deseuritization will reduce defense spending,” was only partially supported. While the 2008 global financial crisis led to a relative downgrading of security rhetoric in public discourse, defense budgets, especially in the United States, have remained largely stable. This suggests that once an issue is securitized, it is difficult to desecuritize it completely due to institutional inertia and geopolitical unpredictability. Furthermore, regional conflicts such as the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and the Syrian civil war have led to the emergence of localized securitization patterns, seriously affecting the arms trade and military spending

These findings highlight the importance of understanding securitization not only as a discursive process but also as a strategic policy tool by states to reorganize institutional structures and shape public opinion.

As a result, it is possible to say that the securitization of terrorism has had a profound and lasting impact on the global security architecture and defense economies. While the shock experienced after 9/11 led to a clear change in spending priorities and the legitimization of the “Global War on Terror” narrative, the long-term result has been the normalization of high military budgets and the institutionalization of security as one of the fundamental axes of state policy.

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