CIVILIZATIONS REFRAMED
TOWARDS A THEORETICAL UPGRADE FOR A STALLED PARADIGM

Henry E. Hale*
(The author is grateful to Farzin Farzad for research assistance.)

Abstract

Relative to their perceived importance in international and domestic politics, civilizations are radically understudied by social scientists. One possible cause is that existing research on civilizations is too often based on outmoded primordialist assumptions about the nature of identity that at least partly trace back to Huntington's "clash of civilizations" paradigm. A new theoretical framework is proposed for understanding civilizations based on important post-primordialist research, including in human psychology. This approach not only helps us understand the appeal and spread of Huntingtonian ideas, but generates fresh predictions that can be tested and developed as part of a new research program.

Civilizations are widely portrayed as the grandest of all world actors, the largest human groupings short of humanity itself and the source of people's most fundamental identities and behaviors. World leaders and terrorists alike describe them as the prime movers in global politics, and media often resort to them when interpreting everything from the September 11 attacks to China's economic ascendance to popular prejudices against migrants. Yet despite its prominence in public discourse, the study of "civilizations" has remained largely peripheral to social science. The debate on Samuel Huntington's seminal "clash of civilizations" thesis is an exception that proves the rule. Sparking a firestorm of public discussion across the globe, this argument was pilloried by many of the world's leading scholars, for whom the whole concept of civilization became tainted with all the problems they found in Huntington's work. Some initially sought to test his thesis, but the most prominent systematic attempts came up negative and such efforts have since petered out.[1] One can still find it in some leading journals as a spicy "straw man" argument that is debunked to the benefit of the preferred argument,[2] and in a few countries that Huntington characterized as "torn" between two civilizations the notion has framed much scholarship on their own identities and foreign policy orientations.[3] But for the most part, the notion of civilizations remains prominent mainly in politics and mass media rather than scholarship.

This article suggests that this relative stagnation of the civilizations paradigm may result from the fact that it is widely interpreted as a last bastion of primordialism. Tests have focused primarily on the primordialist parts of Huntington's theory, and debates on civilizations' role in world politics have been divorced from remarkable advances in research on identity over the last two decades. Negative findings from such research have tended to lead scholars to ignore the paradigm rather than attempt to rethink it. And those who continue to embrace it--typically politicians and policy analysts rather than scholars--are also those to whom primordialism tends to appeal, so they also see no need to reconsider it. Accordingly, little

* Associate Professor, George Washington University. Dept. of Politica; Sience and International Affairs

[1] This will be discussed more below.

[2] Yashar 2007, 160-81.

[3] For example, Russia and Turkey. Since much of this literature is published in local languages rather than English, it does not get much attention beyond theses countries. An English-language example is Pantin, 2010, 4-20.

effort has been applied to considering whether post-primordialist understandings of identity might lead not to the outright rejection of the concept but instead to revision and new insights.[4]

This article argues that post-primordialist findings about the nature of identity would lead us to rethink the notion of civilizations and that we should go ahead and update it in order to frame a research agenda for gaining a better understanding of the role of civilizational identity in domestic and international politics. The concept is surely worthy of such an effort. For one thing, in order to produce a holistic understanding of human identity, it would seem self-evident that we must study the most macro-level identifications as well as local and meso-level ones. Even beyond this, civilizational identity is very widely believed to be important, including by world leaders who actually make policy and practice international relations and domestic politics.[5] Moreover, media in different countries often frame major events in civilizational terms, with the most prominent recent example perhaps being American media coverage of the September 11 attacks.[6] Indeed, given how significant civilizations are in international political discourse and understandings, the concept would seem radically understudied by social scientists. The following pages thus examine the development of civilizations theory, focusing in particular on the Huntingtonian work that has come to shape current debates, and then show how up-to-date post-primordialist research on identity politics recasts the notion of civilization, lending it new scholarly and practical capacities for understanding domestic and international politics.

The Civilizations Paradigm

Civilizations have long been the subject of study, especially among relatively small groups historians, macrosociologists, geographers, and others interested in large-scale developments in human society such as the rise of the Western world or the disappearance of ancient civilizations.[7] Huntington's work catapulted the concept into broader public and scholarly discourse, starting with a paper in 1990 that then developed into his well known "The Clash of Civilizations?" article, published in 1993 in the policy analysis journal Foreign Affairs.[8] This article, largely a response to the Western triumphalism evident in Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" thesis,[9] rejected the claim that democracy and liberal markets would spread to the rest of the world now that the Soviet bloc had collapsed. Instead, he posited, large civilizational blocs defined by culture (first and foremost religion) would increasingly define the main lines of global conflict, and that "Western civilization" was most likely to clash with "Islamic civilization" and "Confucian civilization," which primarily had China in mind. The ensuing controversy prompted Huntington to elaborate in a book, which appeared in 1996 and further spurred the debate.

This produced a dramatic growth in civilization studies, but the development started to trail off after a few years. Figure 1 reports year-to-year trends in the number of books and articles

---

[4] Treating Huntington as a primordialist, one of the few efforts to retool the theory is: Katzenstein, 2010, with a chapter by Patrick Jackson reframing civilization as a discursive practice* *. Jonathan Benthall suggests the promise of retooling the concept, but leaves it at a suggestion after citing the overwhelming discrediting of the concept due to its association with Huntington, in Benthall 2002, 1-2. An attempt to refine the concept but without deep engagement with new findings from identity research is Cox 2000, 217-34.

[5] Eriksson and Norman, 2011, 417-36; Tsygankov, 2003, 53-76. And see this article by a high-ranking Singaporean official: Mahbubani 1993, 10-14.

[6] Abrahamian 2003, 529-44.

[7] Some of the most cited according to Google Scholar are Braudel 1995; Flannery1972, 399-426; Wallerstein, 1984. Many others are cited by Huntington 1996.

[8] Huntington 1990; Huntington 1993, 22-49.

[9] Fukuyama 1989, 3-18.

that include the word "civilizations" as recorded by the interdisciplinary scholarly database JSTOR. As expected, we see a significant increase following Huntington's major 1993 and 1996 publications and then a slight drop by the start of the 2000s. Research on civilizations perked up again after the September 11 events, with pundits and scholars wondering whether or not this tragedy and the "war on terror" that followed represented the onset of the kind of civilizational clash that Huntington had predicted. Figure 1 indicates that this activity plateaued, however, by around the mid-2000s. Of course, these figures include any use of the term "civilizations" at all, so many of the counted books and articles may not correspond with the usage we are interested in. Figure 2 thus reports the results of a narrower search for articles that mention both "civilizations" and "Samuel Huntington." The broad trends are generally the same, though with much smaller numbers. As Peter Katzenstein has noted, civilization studies has had a particularly difficult time gaining traction in political science.[10]

An overall conclusion one might draw is that civilizations research has not been a robustly growing paradigm since the mid-2000s, and in fact it is now in some danger of remaining marginal or fading in international scholarship unless it is to receive a new injection of life. It is a hypothesis of this article that the civilizations paradigm has stagnated in part due to "fixable" confusion regarding the concept of civilization itself, with this confusion leading scholarly and public debates in non-progressive directions that have prompted many to avoid or abandon this line of research. We can trace much of the confusion back to Huntington, in particular his shifting conceptual framework and the frequently provocative language he used.

On one hand, Huntington is widely branded a primordialist, treating civilizations as essentially immutable and naturally prone to conflict with each other, and there is much in his two seminal publications on civilizations that would seem to support this view.[11] For one thing, civilizations are quite tangible in his account: one can identify them with concrete names that resonate widely, and even count the major ones at seven (or eight): Western, Islamic, Confucian/Sinic, Hindu, Latin American, Orthodox, and Japanese (and perhaps African). Civilizations are also almost by definition age-old, "the most enduring of human associations," typically existing for many centuries if not millennia.[12] And at the individual level, he often stresses the impermeability of civilizational boundaries: Azerbaijanis cannot become Armenians, he avers.[13] What holds civilizations together are the strongest of human bonds. Citing hardly any evidence from the field of psychology, or even other works that themselves cite such research, Huntington claims that people have a "need" for "identity," and that when people lack a sense of it they search for it and in this search "what counts" are "blood and belief."[14] Religions, he asserts, "give people identity."[15] And identity comes from distinguishing oneself from an Other, making identity by its nature a source of divisiveness and conflict.[16] Indeed, he explains the importance of religion for identity thus: "Religions give people identity by positing a basic distinction between

[10] Katzenstein 2010, p.3. He also notes that sociology has engaged it more than political science, particularly in considering the meaning of intercivilizational contacts (p.4). Some of this literature simply ignores Huntington altogether, essentially returning to earlier conceptions of civilizations; see Eisenstadt 2007, 113-26.

[11] E.g., Katzenstein 2010.

[12] Huntington 1996, p.43.

[13] Huntington 1993, p.27.

[14] Huntington 1996, pp.77, 126, 262.

[15] Huntington 1996, p.97.

[16] Here he does cite one social psychological theory, "distinctiveness theory," in one 1988 article in the journal Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Huntington 1996, p.67, footnote 24 in Chapter 3).

believers and nonbelievers, between a superior in-group and a different and inferior out-group."[17] One cannot, he avers, be "half Catholic, half Muslim."[18] By these lights, hostility between different groups is natural, and he frequently uses language like "the fires of communal identity."[19] In one of his most provocative lines, he declares that "it is human to hate," and that "for self-definition and motivation people need enemies."[20] Certainly in keeping with primordialist tenets, he predicts that relations between different civilizations will generally be "cool," often "hostile."[21] And again, even in his book length treatment, there is virtually no citation of any major work on human psychology to back this up. Inflammatory language called even greater attention to these primordialist aspects of his theory, for example his line that "Islam's borders are bloody, and so are its innards."[22]

It is these claims that most of his fiercest opponents have seized upon to attack his theory, often invoking the same sorts of critiques that constructivist theorists of nationalism used in years past to undermine primordialist theories of nationalism and ethnicity.[23] It essentialized civilizations, ignored massive differences among the groups within them, unnecessarily assumed hostility between them, misunderstood Islam, and incorrectly posited that identity was primarily about an opposition between Self and Other.[24] Some even called the ideas dangerous.[25] At the same time, many for whom primordialist notions have appeal--including politicians who benefit from primordialist understandings--have embraced the primordialist claims. For example, Huntington's theory posits Russia as a civilizational leader with a legitimate right to a privileged role in other former Soviet countries, giving it appeal there for politicians and other thinkers.[26]

What is often overlooked, however, is that Huntington in fact recognized and addressed many of the critiques coming from a constructivist perspective on identity that would seem to contradict some of his other assertions. He must have been aware of constructivist thinking: During and before his influential pieces on civilizations were published, he advised a Harvard PhD dissertation that became one of the most important works of constructivist theory on identity politics, that of Daniel Posner.[27] And indeed one can find significant nods to constructivism in Huntington's writings on civilizations. Perhaps most importantly, the theory is based on the idea that identity has multiple levels, with civilization being merely the highest level, the largest category of humans below that which distinguishes them from other species.[28] People have "multiple identities," he argues, and civilizational consciousness thus is not incompatible with national or ethnic consciousness, though certain situations can lead one to dominate the others.[29] Different identifications become more or less salient depending on the situation.

---

[17] Huntington 1996, p.97.
[18] Huntington 1993, p.27.
[19] Huntington 1996, p.253.
[20]   Huntington 1996, p.130.
[21] Huntington 1996, p.207.
[22] Huntington 1996, p.258.
[23] For a good summary of the constructivist critique of primordialism, see Chandra 2001, 7-11; Chandra 2012.
[24] E.g., Ajami 1993; Bilgrami, 2003, 88-93; O'Hagan, 1995, 19-38; Russett et al. 2000; Said, 2001.
[25] Smith, 1997, 163-4; Tipson, 1997, 166-9; Walt, 1997, pp.176-89.
[26] For example, the international "Dialog of Civilizations" initiative organized by Vladimir Yakunin, regarded by many insiders in the 2000s as a possible presidential successor to Putin.
[27] Posner 2005.
[28]   Huntington 1993, p.24.
[29] Huntington 1996, p.267.

He thus recognizes that the causal arrow does not lead simply from identity to conflict, but that conflict can cause shifts in identity; in his view, certain conflicts will cause civilizations to become more salient than other levels of identity.[30] In multiple places, Huntington recognizes also that civilizations and the cultures they embody can change, such as with a dramatic event.[31] "People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change," he declares. He adds that "civilizations can obviously blend and overlap" as well as "divide and merge."[32]

The main problem here is that Huntington's most boldly stated hypotheses drew heavily from the primordialist aspects of this theory without a rigorous attempt to reconcile them with the constructivist elements. Thus subsequent researchers can be forgiven for focusing on the former, primarily testing whether civilizational differences explain patterns of conflict and conflictual attitudes. And since primordialist theory has been generally discredited,[33] it is not surprising that virtually all efforts to systematically test Huntington's thesis have come up negative.[34] What many scholars have found support for is an important role for religion and faith in conflict and other aspects of politics.[35] But while Huntington linked the notions of civilization and religion, even he recognized that these are different concepts, and scholars who have distinguished between them in their tests have tended to find that if anything, religion itself is more important than the notion of civilizations.[36] With the concept of civilizations tainted by primordialism and not found not to be a significant predictor of conflict, scholars have generally neither followed up on the constructivist elements of Huntington's theory nor attempted to redevelop the notion of civilizations according to current understandings of identity. This rest of this article attempts to put "civilizations" onto more solid conceptual footing, paving the way for a more promising (if more modest) research agenda.

Reclaiming Civilizations

Identity, at its most fundamental, comes down not to some urge to generate conflict but instead to the need for human beings to understand the social world in order to successfully navigate it. People define their identities not "in opposition" to "others," but in relationship to a whole array of personal points of reference. Identity, then, is more like "social radar," a social navigation device, than a dividing line between an "us" and a "them."[37] The challenge humans face is that the brain is too limited to perfectly understand the enormously complex social world, and much of the social world is in fact unknowable at any given point in time. This forces human beings to develop rules of thumb for navigating it, and identity categories are one way people can generate "good guesses" as to how they relate to the social world and how it relates to them when they cannot be certain.[38] Identity, then, is primarily about uncertainty-reduction, which social psychological research indicates is a fundamental human

---

[30] *Huntington 1996, p.267.*

[31] *Huntington 1996, p.226.*

[32] *Huntington 1993, 24.*

[33] *Chandra 2012.*

[34] *E.g., Breznau, Kelley, Lykes and Evans, 2011,671–91; Fox, 2002, pp.415–34; Fox, 2001, 459–72; Henderson and Tucker, 2001, 317–38; Neumayer and Plumper, 2009, 711–34; RussettOneal, and Cox, 2000, pp.583–608. Not all findings have been completely negative, though they are far from robustly supportive and focus on smaller implications of the theory; see Robert Johns Davies, 2012, 1038–52 (though even this result is primarily about religion, not civilizations per se).*

[35] *Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008, 171–9; Johns and Davies 2012.*

[36] *Fox, 2007, 361–82; Grim 2007, 633–58.*

[37] *Hale 2004, 463.*

[38] *Brown 2000, 265.*

need.[39] There is also evidence that cognitive mechanisms for categorical thinking are an evolved capacity of the brain.[40] Rogers Brubaker has thus famously warned against the tendency of "groupism," of treating people who happen to fall into a cognitively useful identity category as a "group" that is capable of action and understandable primarily as a larger entity.[41] One element of our revised understanding about civilizations, then, is the following: We should not think of "civilizations" as essentialized "actors" on the world (or any other) stage, but instead treat them primarily as reality-simplifying categories that reflect one way actual, concrete people make sense of the world in order to act, pursuing their interests as they see them.

Denying cognitive categories (points of personal reference) the status of "group" does not strip them of meaning or power. Importantly, categories can be "thick" with meaning, holding a great deal of "navigational" value even to the point of prescribing particular scripts for action with respect to certain categories of people.[42] But they can also be very "thin," connoting very little meaning other than the fact of the category itself (for example, the category of people who prefer blue shirts to green shirts). But while categories connoting hostility and even aggression are possible, there is nothing inherently conflictual in the nature of identity differences--they are first and foremost about understanding, not competition or conflict.[43] Civilization is one such identity category. We thus reach another proposition for a revamped theory of civilizations: *We should not expect civilizational dividing lines to be fraught with the potential for conflict in and of themselves, and an important area of study should be the conditions under which they become associated with conflictual meaning.*

This does not necessarily mean that civilizational divides will not be associated with conflict at all. Another important proposition emerging from psychological research and scholarship on identity is that when collective action problems already exist for other reasons, such as conflicts of interest and the absence of institutions that credibly enforce cooperation, thick identity divides that overlap with the parties involved can exacerbate the collective action problems. This is because an identity provide, while not providing a motive for conflict, can foster a sense of separation from control on the part of any category of people who stand to lose from what representatives of another category of people do if an attempt to cooperate goes wrong. And because people tend to overestimate the dangers from situations they do not control, the sides can become less willing to trust each other, leading to breakdowns in collective action, potentially sparking conflict.[44] We thus reach another proposition: *Civilizational divides are unlikely to be the primary cause conflict, but they may well exacerbate conflicts that can arise from collective action problems based on differences of material or other human interests.*

Civilization, of course, is only one of many identity categories available to individuals in any

---

[39] *Hogg and Mullin 1999, 249-79 and 253-5; Brown1988, 227; Gaertner, Sedikides, Jack L. Vevea, and Iuzzini, 2002, 586.*

[40] *Tooby and Cosmides 1992, 19-136.*

[41] *In particular, see Brubaker 2004; and Brubaker 1996.*

[42] *Geertz 1973; Hogg and Mullin 1999; Knight, Bernal, Garza, and Cota 1993, 213– 34.*

[43] *Huntington 1996, .68, footnote 25 does cite Donald Horowitz, whose own prominent work (especially Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) itself cites a psychological theory that does posit an inherent hostility between human groupings. But later research in psychology has revised the interpretation of the findings on which this theory is based. A summary of this theory and the newer findings calling key tenets into question can be found in Hale, 2008, chapter 2. See also Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov, 2004, 31-64; Russet et al. 2000, 585.*

[44] *Hale 2008; Slovic 1987, 280– 5.*

given situation, including the kind of collective action problems over material and other interests discussed above. So what does psychological theory have to say about when it will be widely invoked? While multiple categories might be activated by the brain in any given situation, research has tended to find that categories become salient to an individual depending on how well they help make sense of an important situation (a quality psychologists often call fit) and on the accessibility of the categories.[45] That is, categories become important in part because they fit a situation and help make sense of it, but also in part because they are simply there to be used, either chronically accessible in the individual's brain (for example, due to socialization or a traumatic experience) or simply available in the situation at hand (as when someone tells the individual to use the category). Importantly, since categories used as rules of thumb are by definition simplifications, they do not need to perfectly fit a situation to be used. But the worse the fit, the less likely is the category to be invoked, especially when an alternative category is available that fits better.[46] This leads to an additional proposition, ceteris paribus: The tendency for individuals to interpret events in terms of civilizations and to act based on meaning they attach to civilizational categories is likely to grow to the extent that civilizational categories actually do come to provide better explanatory fit for processes impacting individuals' life chances and/or to the extent that the notion of civilization itself becomes more accessible to them, for example, becoming more widely presented by media as a viable frame. In addition, because every individual is different and has a different relationship to the social world, we would expect civilizational identification not to be evenly distributed across all members of a civilization, but instead to exist in distributions across a population. That is, some individuals in a civilization will identify more strongly with it than will others, and this variation is likely to depend on individual-level fit and accessibility of the civilizational categories.

Another cardinal insight from research into identity is the notion of that identity is inherently situational.[47] That is, identities are not important to the same degree in all situations. Instead, salience varies according to the situation.[48] Moreover, within certain limitations that are still debated by scholars, individuals can even strategically accentuate different aspects of their identity in order to get the best outcome for themselves.[49] One of the implications of this research is that if the stakes involved in fitting with a certain identity category become more important for individuals (for example, if their life or material welfare comes increasingly to depend on their association with this category), we would expect this identity dimension to become more salient and to become thicker with meaning for them. Thus even if the fit and accessibility of civilizational categories remains constant relative to the situations people face, we arrive at another proposition, ceteris paribus: If the kinds of situations for which civilization is a good explanatory fit grow in importance to individuals, these individuals are more likely to act on the basis of civilizational identity and civilizational identity is likely to become more prominent generally. This is also likely to vary across individuals as well as groups of individuals.

Because civilizations are not "groups" based on an us-them opposition, but are instead better understood as meaningful categories that individuals use for uncertainty-reduction in the service of interest-oriented action, research on identity suggests we must take very seriously the possibility of the overlap of civilizations, which Huntington acknowledged could exist but

---

[45] Oakes, Haslam, and Reynolds, 1999, 59.

[46] Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides, 2001, 15387–92.

[47] One of the best treatments remains Royce1982.

[48] This is one of the many constructivist insights Huntington recognizes, citing Horowitz (Huntington 1996, p.68).

[49] Chandra 2012; Posner 2005.

generally downplayed.[50] Putting this another way, it would seem quite possible for people to identify with multiple civilizations at the same time so long as one does not rule this out by definition. Research by Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, and Yogendra Yadav, for example, has shown how significant pluralities have long identified strongly as both "Spanish" and "Catalan," feeling pride in being part of each category, even though primordialist theories of ethnicity and secessionism would seem to rule out this possibility.[51] A third-generation Muslim raised in the United States, for example, might be proud to be part of both Islamic and Western civilizations, and if this is possible for individuals, there is no reason it could not be possible for majority populations in a given country. While in some places Huntington says this is impossible, in other places what he writes indicates that the previous sentence is correct, as with his noting that before the 1990s, Bosnian Muslims primarily "viewed themselves as Europeans."[52] This also raises the intriguing possibility that civilizational identities could in principle become cross-cutting in some countries. This leads us to the proposition that: People can belong to multiple civilizations at the same time, thus countries Huntington calls "torn," those where people widely disagree on which civilization they belong to, might in many cases be better conceived of as "dual countries," members of two civilizations--or at least, this should be considered an important possibility to be explored. Huntington disparaged the notion that torn countries could "bridge" civilizations, but the analysis here suggests this is quite possible.

We now encounter the thorny issue of the role of religion and values in civilizational identity. Indeed, it is here where Huntington makes the superficially strongest case that civilizational belonging inherently divides: You cannot be "half Catholic, half Muslim."[53] Of course, this statement hinges on a proposition that might not be true, that being "Catholic" or "Muslim" is exclusively about a specific code of religious beliefs that deny each other. Yet Huntington himself admits that in many societies, large shares of people do not actually adhere to the strict official tenets of organized religion that make these faiths incompatible and put them into conflict. This does not lead him to conclude that such people are outside the realm of civilizations, so even by his own evidence we must conclude that civilization does not equate to unbending and intolerant religious belief (not to mention the fact that some civilizations in his account, like the Sinic, are not defined primarily by an actual religious doctrine). And to the extent that civilizational identity is not only about religion in the sense of orthodox (small "o") codes of beliefs, the proposition that civilizations are inherently at odds and that individuals cannot be members of more than one becomes harder to sustain. Moreover, for many people, categories like "Muslim" or "Catholic" (not to mention "Japanese" or "Western") are at least as much ascriptive categories, defined by to some degree by birth, as they are about one's actual beliefs at any given time. It may indeed, then, be possible to be, in at least some sense, half Catholic, half Muslim--it all depends on how one defines the halves, and this can be contested and can change. Another proposition is thus: Association with religious traditions does not necessarily make civilizations incompatible or put them in conflict. This discussion brings us to the pioneering work of Fredrik Barth, whose research has important implications for how we should understand the relationship between civilizations and such factors as religion and values. He showed how ethnic groups can endure over time at the same time that the cultural "markers" distinguishing groups from each other can change.[54]

---

[50] *Huntington 1993, 24.*
[51] *Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav, 2011, Chapter 1.*
[52] *Huntington 1996, 268.*
[53] *Huntington 1993, 27.*
[54] *Barth 1969, 9-39.*

One of the implications is that it is misguided for Huntington and others to treat what are in fact the boundary markers of civilizations (including any specific religious tradition or sets of values) as the essence of civilizations. Specific values and religious tradition can be crucial markers dividing civilizations at any given point in time, but we must also be aware of how these can completely change--even to the point of being entirely replaced by another marker--and not threaten the existence of the civilization itself. The Irish, indeed, did not stop being or identifying with the category "Irish" after almost entirely losing their language and shifting to English, a process that is only now being reversed.

The general need to analytically distinguish groups from their boundary markers is also quite obvious if one reflects on the values and faiths associated with civilizations. Huntington and many others portray Western civilization as being defined by core values like democracy, liberalism, Christianity, individualism, human rights, and the rule of law (among other things) and portray these values as a key source of conflict with other civilizations, which it is said do not and cannot share these values.[55] But if Western civilization dates to at least the year 1500, as Huntington writes, then even the most basic knowledge of history makes clear that none of them can be essential to the West's existence--indeed, some of the world's most monstrous regimes arose from Western culture that denied virtually all of these things with great popular support.[56] The only possible candidate from among this set of values for being a defining feature of the West through this period could be Christianity, but the West has never been coterminous with it and never homogeneously Christian. Moreover, Huntington himself writes that the West has actually never been the source of a great religion, instead being a producer of ideologies, which have also changed greatly over the years.[57] If other civilizations are in fact defined exclusively by religion, then we should not call them civilizations but just religious groups. But if there is something more to the notion of civilization, then we must conclude that no particular religion is in fact essential to any civilization. And in any case, religions themselves can change quite dramatically over years and especially centuries, and indeed all major religions at almost all times face disputes over exactly what the religion entails as well as varying levels of commitment among the flocks. Moreover, because different sets of people can benefit politically and materially from different content and locations of boundary markers, we should not expect the boundary-making process to be free of politics.[58]

We thus reach set of new implications: Differences in values (or any other things) that exist between civilizations today will not necessarily be significant tomorrow; there is likely to be a great deal of contestation within civilizations over what values do and should constitute their boundaries; and much of the conflict around civilizational boundary markers like specific values is likely in fact to reflect the material or political interests of powerful sets of individuals who seek to establish boundaries in ways that benefit them politically or economically. Essentially, these are struggles about how categories should be defined and the meaning we should attach to categories. We should expect who wins these struggles to depend in part on fit and accessibility, with the latter being particularly susceptible to manipulation by individuals in power through state institutions or mass media.

What does research into the nature of identity have to tell us about what are likely to be

---

55 *This is throughout Huntington 1993, 1996.*

56 *Huntington 1996, 50.*

57 *Huntington 1996, 3-4.*

58 *Wimmer 2013.*

the major markers of civilizational identity, the lines along with civilizational boundaries are likely to be sustained? Civilizations, we recall, are defined as the highest-level identity divisions the world has to offer, the largest human identity categories short of "human being." Since civilizations do not reduce immutably to any one marker, then the options for civilizational boundary making are limited to the set of markers that divide the world in ways that cannot be aggregated below the level of "human." Since categories are likeliest to become salient if they plausibly fit important situations and are accessible either chronically or in the situation at hand, then we can narrow down the list of likely boundary candidates a bit further.

In particular, civilizational categories are likely to be defined by markers that are: perceptible, resistant to change, correlated at least roughly with other divisions in the social world that people believe to be important, and already associated with at least some sense of common fate.[59] While this should be the subject of further research, several candidates come immediately to mind. Religious traditions remain a major contender, as do broad patterns in physical traits (especially race), language families, and geographic macro regions. Since nation-building frequently followed the rise of the state,[60] so might we also expect the emergence of any macro-level international institutions to have at least some potential to become civilizational markers. True, many of these things in fact roughly overlap, and all but the latter have been associated (if not conflated or confused) with the notion of civilization in the literature. But each can define civilizations in different ways, and different combinations and variations on the various markers can lead to different or even rival civilizational projects competing for the adherence of the same people.

 We thus reach one more implication to highlight: *We should not take for granted that the seven (or eight) major civilizations that Huntington named (building on the work of others) in fact constitute "the set" of civilizations as if they were fixed entities to be dissected and studied.* Instead, we should treat the existence of any civilization (as well as any boundary markers that might define it) as an empirical question for research. Since individuals in a society can have varying degrees of identification with a given civilization, and since some civilizations can be more robustly defined by multiple strong, overlapping boundary markers than others, scholarship should also investigate whether they might vary in civilization-ness.

How Might Civilizations Then Matter?

This article is meant to help frame a research agenda, meaning that each of the claims voiced above should be the subject of research and that the conclusions developed above should be extended or revised where necessary as a result of this research. Nevertheless, the theory does generate some testable implications as to what role we should expect civilizations to be playing in domestic and international politics. To the extent that such tests are borne out, we gain confidence that the proposed reframing of civilizational theory as a whole is valid.

1. We would expect civilizational identity to become more salient in domestic and international politics should at least one of the following three things happen: (a) civilizational identity becomes more accessible to people as an interpretive frame for problems in which their life chances are significantly at stake; (b) civilizational identity increasingly fits as a means of

---

[59] *Chandra, 2006 377-424; Fearon 1999; Hale 2004.*
[60] *E.g., 1991; Brubaker 1996.*

understanding these problems; and (c) the situations for which civilizational identity is a good fit become more important to people.

Huntington's own ideas provide an excellent opportunity to test (a). Indeed, one might well argue that Huntington himself has already accomplished (a) to an extraordinary degree, and scholars (however much they may disagree with him) must now consider his ideas to be an important part of the empirical reality that they study. Huntington's theory is not just a potentially self-fulfilling prophesy; it is very arguably a real one that has already take place to a significant degree for reasons our revised understanding of civilizational identity explains.[61] If the civilizations reframed theory is correct, with the spread of Huntingtonian ideas, we would expect to find an increase in policymakers and masses identifying with civilizations, interpreting the world in terms of them, and (especially for policymakers) acting based on such notions.

Our reframed theory of civilizations does agree with Huntington when it comes to (b): the fit of civilizational identity with significant situations is likely to grow as globalization proceeds. Particularly important are processes that bring peoples from across the globe into more direct contact with each other in ways that significantly impact life chances, such as migration flows across perceived civilizational divides and enhanced communications. To the extent that these divides also continue to overlap with global economic divides, the more civilizational markers are likely to be invoked cognitively as shorthands for inferring individuals' status, power, and potential. This should be evident in survey results over time, which should be conducted with proper controls rather than looking only at simple trends over time.

As for (c), the use of civilizational markers as rules of thumb (that is, the thickening of civilizational categories to have implications for a wider range of situations) is likely to grow in moments of economic crisis, when people begin to feel they have more at stake in the collective action problems involved in issues like migration for which civilizational divides are plausible frames. They are also likely to become more salient if major conflicts that threaten people's life chances happen to occur for which civilization is a plausibly fitting interpretation--even if civilizational divides are not the cause of that conflict. Indeed, conflict breeds identification far more than identification breeds conflict.[62]

Overall, because Huntington has already written his works, because globalization is proceeding, and because economic crises sometime in the future are likely, then, our revised theory would in fact predict that we should see the growing salience of civilizational identity in domestic and international politics. Very importantly, "salience" does not reduce to conflicts, but refers to the cognitive use by both masses and political leaders of civilizational frames for interpreting the world and guiding action of all kinds (violent or peaceful) within it.

2. The reframed theory also predicts that we are likely to see conflicts between members of different civilizations (intercivilizational conflicts). But here we diverge strongly with Huntington: Such conflict is likely not to be driven primarily by differences in values or religions, and certainly not from any innate human urge to hate other groups. Instead, such conflicts are likely to result from problems of collective action that have their primary roots in much more "ordinary"

---

[61] E.g., Walt 1997, 189. For a fuller statement of this thesis, see Henry E. Hale, "Conjuring the Clash," paper in preparation.
[62] Thus in some sense we might talk about the "civilizationizing of clashes."

drivers of human behavior, in particular material and political interests. That is, when simple collective action problems (not to mention direct conflicts of material or political interest) happen to overlap with civilizational divides, then we would expect such conflicts to be more intense and harder to resolve (due to lower propensities to trust the other side) than if the conflict did not break down at all along identity lines.[63] This can and should be tested.[64]

3. This leads us to another prediction that is virtually the opposite of Huntington's. He recommends organizing international relations along civilizational lines as a way to contain civilizational conflict by facilitating intercivilizational negotiations, including restructuring the United Nations Security Council. But our revised understanding would predict this would actually increase civilizational conflict. This is because organizing the institutions of international relations along civilizational lines starts to bring the collective action problems inherent in international relations into overlap with civilizational divides. This increases both the fit and accessibility of civilization as a way of interpreting behavior in these collective action problems, and thereby is likely to exacerbate the collective action problems and raise the chances of intercivilizational conflict. While this claim could only be tested if something like his recommended reforms are actually implemented, what can be tested is the following: where institutions plausibly overlap with civilizational divides, civilizational identity is more likely to be invoked to interpret and guide action with respect to these institutions.

4. Values and religion are likely to play important roles in intercivilizational conflicts and tensions. But to the extent that they do, this is likely to be at least as much a reflection of interest-based struggles within civilizations themselves as the product of the differences in values and religion themselves. For one thing, leaders who expect to benefit politically or materially from a conflict that comes at the expense of other members of their own societies can find in the politicization of morality a way to reduce local dissent. Similarly, powerful individuals with investments in the status quo, unwilling to share power or wealth with others in their own society, can find it convenient to justify this in terms of civilizational values that can (inaccurately) be presented as primordial, necessary to defend against outside forces. This is harder to test, since we cannot read the minds of individual leaders. But careful critical analysis of the civilizational value and religious claims of political leaders should be able to identify the important political and economic considerations involved (or their absence) and determine whether a political interpretation of is more or less credible that an interpretation that the conflict actually has its roots in heartfelt expressions of civilizational values. The reframed civilizations theory would be falsified to the extent that evidence is overwhelming that leaders voice values and religious considerations that in fact do not also happen to reinforce their own personal material and political interests.

5. Reframed civilizational theory also leads us to the following counterintuitive hypothesis: The greater the salience of civilizational identity, conflicts within civilizations should also become more likely, ceteris paribus. This is because if civilizations become more important, the stakes become higher for the exact placement and content of their boundaries. Actors within civilizations are thus more likely to struggle more intensely over supremacy in the civilization and over civilizational boundaries in order to gain the content and location that benefits themselves,

---

[63] *This is consistent with widespread findings that overlaps between cultural and economic or political disparities can be particularly prone to conflict: Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 87-119; Hechter 1975; Sen 2008, 5-15; Brian Shoup 2007.*
[64] *This testable proposition should not be confused with any argument that civilizational conflict will be more intense or frequent than ethnic conflict, a possibility that will be discussed below.*

and to avoid content and placements that put them at a disadvantage. Indeed, because civilizations can be defined in myriad different ways and because there are no obvious or natural borders between them, a corollary might be: The more salient civilizations become, the more contested we should expect their boundaries to be. While the existence of a single state corresponding to the civilization can structure and potentially manage such intracivilizational struggles, they are likely to occur nevertheless even in one-state civilizations, with oppositions and factions within even authoritarian countries voicing their own new versions of their civilization's identity and struggling for control over the state. Importantly, these intracivilizational conflicts do not have to take place between states but can also take place within them or along lines that cross-cut state borders, as with "clashes" between conservatives and liberals over migration in most countries of the West. And even more importantly, these conflicts need not be violent ones, such as wars, but can also take the form of polarization, rivalries, and tensions within or even the breakdown of institutions of cooperation within the civilization.

6. Can we expect conflict between "reframed" civilizations to be (or become) any more intense or frequent than ethnic or national conflict? The short answer, if the theory is correct, is no. For one thing, as was just explained, a rise in the salience of civilizational identity is likely to lead to greater intracivilizational conflict over the boundaries of civilizations, and ethnic divisions are likely to be highly accessible and good fits as frames for these kinds of struggles. Moreover, purely civilizational identity is likely to be a less good fit than ethnic identity to the kinds of situations that have the most important implications for people's life chances. In particular, states are and are likely to remain (as even Huntington recognized)[65] the institutions most powerfully impacting any given individual's well-being, and ethnic categories are likely to remain much more plausibly relevant for interpreting and informing action with respect to the kind of distributional issues that states raise. Indeed, civilizations are much more abstract in their implications for people's everyday lives, and the range of issues to which they are directly and obviously relevant for individuals' well-being is therefore much narrower. Of course, many of the most salient potential boundary markers of civilizations (especially language, race, and to at least some extent religion) are themselves ethnic in nature.[66] In such cases, ethnicity and civilization are working together when they overlap with interest-based collective action problems, and it may be that a civilizational divide adds an "extra" level of thickness that can complicate trust in such a situation more than a "regular" ethnic divide would. But ethnic categories by themselves have proven capable of taking on all kinds of additional meaning as rules of thumb for navigating and acting in social situations, and there is no reason to expect that civilizational dimensions of identity would be any more capable of this. Indeed, it is hard to get more intense than the Rwandan genocide, which needed no civilizational dimension for a collective action problem rooted in political and economic interest largely created by colonial rule to become one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century.

7. Huntington implies that when people in the same society disagree on what civilization they belong to, this is a negative phenomenon, creating a "torn" society that therefore experiences unnecessary additional conflict. But civilizations theory reframed leads to a different set of expectations. For one thing, post-primordialist research on identity has found that identity divides are not necessarily a negative phenomenon for states. Johanna Birnir has found, in fact, that once one strips identity of the primordialist assumption of being inherently conflict-prone, the presence of multiple ethnic

---

[65] Huntington 1993, 22.

[66] *The primary exception would be if civilizations become defined primarily by geography, though even here, there is a strong correlation at the global level between geography and ethnic population distribution.*

categories can provide a basis for more stable party systems in emerging democracies. Similarly, Kanchan Chandra has shown how the presence of cross-cutting identity cleavages can undercut the efforts by radicals to polarize society along any one ethnic dimension.[67] But even more importantly, our theory has led us to the important testable expectation that people can identify simultaneously with multiple civilizations, and that a country therefore really can be part of more than one civilization at the same time in a meaningful sense, that they really are better seen as "bridge" countries than torn countries. Turkey, for example, really is both part of the West and part of the Islamic world. Russia really is part of the West and part of the Orthodox world. Second-generation Mexican immigrants to the United States really are both part of the West and part of Latin American culture. The same might be said for many other countries and individuals. This suggests that so-called "torn" societies in fact need not worry about having to choose, and that they can be at peace finding their own blend and internal distributions of civilizational identifications. Of course, other members of these civilizations may not always recognize the "bridge" states as full-fledged co-civilizationists, but post-primordialist theory makes clear that this cannot be regarded as a permanent state of affairs and that this likely has as much to do with struggles of economic or political interest as it does with the content of the markers that happen to define civilizations at any given moment. Civilization-switching, then, is not only possible, but to be expected as civilizational boundary politics and other changes over time create shifts.

Conclusion

Upgrading civilizations theory to bring it into line with post-primordial research on identity helps us move beyond Huntington, whose work paradoxically led to a dramatic increase in the real-world importance of civilizational identity while leading scholarship on it into a dead-end. The reframed theory explains this phenomenon. Identity categories like civilizations are sets of personal points of reference that the human brain uses to navigate an impossibly complex social world, and such categories get invoked for action depending on their fit with important situations and their accessibility. Huntington's theory significantly increased the accessibility of civilization as a frame for interpreting international politics, in part because its simplicity appealed to mass media (especially after September 11, 2001) and in part because it meshed well with the material and political interests of powerful actors who could use the paradigm to justify or promote their own policies.

But the rise in prominence of civilizational rhetoric in practice must be understood correctly. Civilizations are not unitary actors, but categories for understanding the world. Civilizational divides involve no inherently conflictual impulses, nor are they necessarily mutually exclusive, and nor are they permanently defined by any given values, including religious values. Civilizational divides can facilitate conflict, but primarily by overlapping with and thereby exacerbating interest-based collective action problems that are created by other factors. Civilizational boundaries and content are the subject of political competition, and this competition means that the rise of civilizational salience is as likely to increase conflict as much within civilizations as between civilizations, and that civilizations are likely to change and evolve greatly over time. We thus should not expect civilizational conflict to eclipse ethnic conflict, which is likely to remain a key axis of intracivilizational conflict. All of these propositions should be tested and developed through further research. There is certainly much to be done in the field of civilization studies now that we can put Huntington's seminal but ultimately distracting work behind us.

---

[67] *Birnir 2007; Chandra 2005, 235-52.*

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abrahamian, Ervand. 2003. "The US Media, Huntington and September 11," Third World Quarterly, v.24, no.3, pp.529-44.

Ajami, Fuad. 1993. "The Summoning," Foreign Affairs, v.72, no.4, September/October.

Analysis of Huntington's Thesis," British Journal of Political Science, v.32, no.3, July, pp.415-34.

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities, revised edition, NY: Verso.

Anya Peterson Royce. 1982. Ethnic Identity: Strategies of Diversity, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Barth, Fredrik. 1969. "Introduction," in Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, pp.9-39.

Baumgartner, Jody C., Francia, Peter L. and Jonathan S. Morris.2008. "A Clash of Civilizations? The Influence of Religion on Public Opinion of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East," Political Research Quarterly, v.61, no.2, June, pp.171-9.

Benthall, Jonathan. 2002. "Imagined Civilizations?" Anthropology Today, v.18, no.6, December, pp.1-2.

Bilgrami, Akeel.2003. "The Clash within Civilizations," Daedalus, v.132, no.3, Summer 2003, pp.88-93.

Braudel, Fernand.1995. A History of Civilizations (English translation by Richard Mayne published by New York: Penguin.

Breznau, Kelley; Nate, A. Lykes; Jonathan Valerie and Evans. 2011. M. D. R. "A Clash of Civilizations? Preferences for Religious Political Leaders in 86 Nations," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, v.50, no.4, December, pp.671-91.

Brown, Rupert. 1988. Group Processes, 1st edition, Oxford: Blackwell.

Brown, Rupert. 2000. Group Processes, 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell.

Brubaker, Rogers Nationalism Reframed, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. Ethnicity Without Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Brubaker, Rogers; Loveman, Mara and Stamatov, Peter. 2004. "Ethnicity as Cognition," Theory and Society, v.33, no.1, pp.31-64.

Cederman, Lars-Erik; Wimmer, Andreas and Min, Brian. 2010. "What Makes Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and New Analysis," World Politics, v.62, no.1, pp.87-119.

Chandra, Kanchan. "Introduction: Constructivist Findings and Their Non-Incorporation," APSA-CP (Newsletter in the Organized Section in Comparative Politics in the American Political Science Association), Winter 2001, pp.7-11.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2005. "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability," Perspectives on Politics, v.3, no.2, June, pp.235-52.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. "What is Ethnicity and Does It Matter?" Annual Review of Political Science, v.9,pp.377-424

Chandra, Kanchan. 2012. Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics New York: Oxford University Press. Cox, Robert W. 2000. "Thinking about Civilizations," Review of International Studies, v.26, December, pp.217-34.

Eisenstadt, S.N. 2007. "The Reconstitution of Collective Identities and Inter-Civilizational Relations in the Age of Globalization," Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie, v.32, no.1, pp.113-26.

Eriksson, Johan and Norman, Ludvig. 2011. "Political Utilisation of Scholarly Ideas: The 'Clash of Civilisations' vs. 'Soft Power' in US Foreign Policy," Review of International Studies, v.37, no.1, January, pp.417-36.

Fearon, James D. 1999. "Why Ethnic Politics and "Pork" Tend To Go Together," mimeo, May, 21-23.

Flannery, Kent V. 1972. "The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations," Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, v.3, pp.399-426.

Fox, Jonathan. 2001. "Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West," Journal of Peace Research, v.38, no.4, pp.459-72.

Fox, Jonathan. 2002. "Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative

Fox, Jonathan. 2007. "The Rise of Religion and the Fall of the Civilization Paradigm as Explanations for State Conflict," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, v.20, no.3, pp.361-82

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History and the Last Man," The National Interest, Summer, pp.3-18.

Gaertner, Lowell; Sedikides, Constantine; Vevea, Jack L. and Iuzzini, Jonathan. 2002. "The 'I,' the 'We,' and the 'When,'" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, v.83, no.3, pp.574–91, 586.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Culture, New York: Basic Books.

Grim, Brian J. 2007. "Religious Persecution in Cross-National Context: Clashing Civilizations or Regulated Religious Economies?" American Sociological Review, v.72, no.4, August, pp.633-58.

Hale, Henry E. 2004. "Explaining Ethnicity," Comparative Political Studies, v.37, no.4, May, pp.458-85, p.463.

Hale, Henry E. 2008. The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World NY: Cambridge University Press.

Hechter, Michael. Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

Henderson, Errol A. and Tucker, Richard. 2001. "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict," International Studies Quarterly, v.45, no.2, June, pp.317-38.

Hogg Michael A. and Mullin, Barbara-A. 1999. "Joining Groups to Reduce Uncertainty: Subjective Uncertainty Reduction and Group Identification," in Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, eds., Social Identity and Social Cognition, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, v.72, no.3, Summer, pp.22-49. Huntington, Samuel.1990. "Collision of Civilizations" (translation by Nahum Ben David), Jerusalem: Shalem Publication.

Introduction: Constructivist Findings and Their Non-Incorporation," APSA-CP (Newsletter in the Organized Section in Comparative Politics in the American Political Science Association), Winter 2001, pp.7-11.

Johns, Robert and Davies, Graeme A.M. 2012."Democratic Peace or Clash of Civilizations? Target States and Support for War in Britain and the United States," Journal of Politics, v.74, no.4, October, pp.1038-52.

Katzenstein, Peter J. 2010. Civilizations in World Politics: Pluralist and Pluralist Perspectives, New York: Routledge,

Knight, George P.; Bernal, Martha E.; Garza, Camille A. and Cota, Marya K. 1993. "A Social Cognitive Model of the Development of Ethnic Identity and Ethnically Based Behaviors," in Bernal and Knight, eds., Ethnic Identity: Formation and Transmission Among Hispanics and Other Minorities, New York: SUNY Press.

Kristin Birnir, Johanna. 2007. Ethnicity and Electoral Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press. Kurzban, Robert; Tooby, John, and Cosmides, Leda. 2001. "Can Race Be Erased? Coalitional Computation and Social Categorization," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA (PNAS), v.98, no.26, December 18, pp.15387-92.

Mahbubani, Kishore. 1993. "The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West," Foreign Affairs, v.72, no.4, September-October, pp.10-14.

Neumayer, Eric and Plumper, Thomas. 2009. "International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations,"

British Journal of Political Science, v.39. no.4, October, pp.711-34.

O'Hagan, Jacinta. 1995 "Civilisational Conflict? Looking for Cultural Enemies," Third World Quarterly, v.16, no.1, pp.19-38

Oakes, Penelope J. S.; Haslam, Alexander and Reynolds, Katherine J. 1999. "Social Categorization and Social Context: Is Stereotype Change a Matter of Information or of Meaning?" in Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, eds., Social Identity and Social Cognition Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999 pp.55-79.

Pantin, V.I. 2010. "The Political and Civilizational Self-Identity of Contemporary Russian Society in a Global Context," Russian Social Science Review, v.51, no.1, January-February, pp.4-20.

Russett, Bruce M., R. Oneal, John and Cox, Michaelene. 2000. "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence," Journal of Peace Research, v.37, no.5, September, pp.583-608.

Said, Edward W. 2001. "The Clash of Ignorance," The Nation, October 22.

Sen, Amartya. 2008. "Violence, Identity, and Poverty," Journal of Peace Research, v.45, no.1, January, pp.5-15

Shoup Brian. 2007. Conflict and Cooperation in Multi-Ethnic States, Oxford: Routledge.

Smith, Tony. 1997. "Dangerous Conjecture," Foreign Affairs, v.76, no.2, March-April, pp.163-4.

Stepan, Alfred; Linz, Juan J. and Yadav,. Yogendra 2011. Crafting State-Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Tipson, Frederick S. 1997. "Culture Clash-ification: A Verse to Huntington's Curse," Foreign Affairs, v.76, no.2, March-April, pp.166-9.

Tooby, John and Cosmides, Leda. 1992. "The Psychological Foundations of Culture," in Jerome H. Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, eds., The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, New York: Oxford University Press.

Tsygankov, Andrei P. 2003. "The Irony of Western Ideas in a Multicultural World: Russians' Intellectual Engagement with the 'End of History' and 'Clash of Civilizations," International Studies Review, v.5, no.1, pp.53-76.

Wallerstein, Immanuel.1984. The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations New York: Cambridge University Press.

Walt, Stephen M. 1997. "Building up New Bogeymen," Foreign Policy, no.106, Spring, pp.176-89.

Wimmer, Andreas. 2013. Ethnic Boundary Making (New York: Oxford University Press.

Yashar, Deborah J. 2007. "Resistance and Identity Politics in an Age of Globalization," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, v.610, March, pp.160-81.

Figure 1. Number of articles and books recorded (but not necessarily included) in the JSTOR database each year that contain the term "civilizations" in any language 1988-2012.


Figure 2. Number of articles and books recorded (but not necessarily included) in the JSTOR database each year that contain the terms "civilizations" and "Samuel Huntington" in any language 1988-2012